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Uteris ac noue legi continentia.
 diligenti indagine etiam atq.
 etiam confidantibus: nobis: puta
 diuina innotuit. sacre pagine tita-
 tum. circare ut signa. peripue uersari.
 Ut enim egregi doctores autem in libro
 de doctrina christiana: omnis doctrina. t-
 raram est signorum. si res: etiam y signa dis-
 cuntur. Hec autem hic res appellantur: que
 si ad significandum aliquando adhibentur.
 Signa sunt: quos uis est in significando. *Aug.*
 non aliquid sunt: quos ois uisus est in signifi-
 cando. non in intellectu. qd non ui-
 mur. si aliquid significandi gra: ut aliq.
 sacramenta legalia. alia. que si solum
 significant. si conferunt. qd int adiuuat.
 sic congrete sacramenta. si qd aperit intelligit.
 que hic appellantur signa. res ille uidelicet.
 que ad significandum aliquando adhibentur.
 Omne g signum: etiam res aliq. est. Quod enim
 nulla res est: ut in eodem auo. atq. omo-
 nia est. si autem commisit omnis res. signu
 est: qd si adhibetur ad significandum ali-
 quid. Sicut innotuit theologus specy-
 latio. si uisus. atq. modesta: diuinam scy-
 pturam. secundum ptequam. in doctrina te-
 nent adiuuat. De his g nobis aduatum. ad re-
 diuinat aliquam in intelligendas: do du-
 ce apte uolentib: discendum est: et
 pnam. de rebus: postea de signis disere-
 mus. De rebus communiter agitur.
 No g in rebus confidendum est. ut in eo-
 dem auo. atq. qd res alie sunt: quib: fru-
 endum est. alie qd intendum est: alie. q.
 fruuntur et uiuunt. Ille qd fruendum est:
 nos beatos faciunt. Illi qd intendum est:
 tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuuant.

quasi adiuuantur: ut ad illas res. q. nos
 beatos faciunt. puenire. etq. inherere pos-
 simus. De rebus que fruuntur et uiuuntur.
 Res si que fruuntur et uiuuntur. nos sumus: qst
 int utiq. constituti: angeli sci. *Aug.*
 sic fruuntur. Fruuntur autem est: amore inhe-
 rere alicui rei. pte se ipsam. Vt si: id qd in
 usum uenit. refertur ad obtinendum
 illud. q. fruendum est. Alias: abusu est. non
 ui. Nam ut uisus: abusu. t. abusu. notari
 debet. De rebus quib: fruendum est. Res g
 qd fruendum est: si pte. et si: si si si. *Aug.*
 tam tunc. quedam summa res est: commu-
 nisq. oib: fruendis: est: cum res dici debet
 et si rerum oium causa: si tunc et causa. *Aug.*
 et si facit pmutari. notum. qd tunc excel-
 lentie conueniat: si qd melius dicitur tunc
 hec. ut dicitur. De rebus qd fruendum est. Res
 autem qd fruendum est. mundus: in eo
 creata. Unde. autem in eod. *Aug.*
 hoc mundo. si fruendū sit manifestum. *Aug.*
 p ea q. facta sunt. intellecta conspiciantur. ut
 de spiritualibus etiam capiunt. Item in eodem.
 In omnibus rebus. ut si in re. quib: fruendū
 est: que etiam incommutabiles sunt. *Aug.*
 autem intendum est: ut ad illas pstrutione
 pueniat. Vt autem. in re. de tunc. fruuntur *Aug.*
 cognati: in qd ipsi pte uoluntas delect-
 tata conquiescit. Vt si in re. qd aliud res
 sunt. quo fruendum est. Item qd in re
 int fruuntur. alie qm supra. *Aug.*
 si. qd idem autem. in re. de tunc. alie qm
 sup accipiunt ut si fruuntur: sic dicitur. Vt si casu
 mere aliqd. in facultatem uoluntatis fruuntur
 autem est: ut cu gaudio. si ad huc spei. si
 iam res. Ad hoc. ois q. fruuntur. ut si assumunt
 et si aliqd in facultatem uoluntatis cu fine



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PETER LOMBARD

BY

MARCIA L. COLISH

VOLUME ONE



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AUTHOR'S NOTE

I include this author's note in order to clarify some technical stylistic decisions made in this book which entail apparent inconsistencies, inconsistencies which medievalists have long since come to live with, if not to love, but which may trouble readers coming to this book from another part of the landscape.

First, there was no agreement on Latin spelling in the Middle Ages, a fact reflected in the policies of editors of medieval texts and the houses that publish them. Some editors and publishers systematically classicize the spelling of medieval Latin, however the language may be used in the manuscripts on which the texts depend. For example, they substitute "i" for "j" or "u" for "v" on this basis. On the other hand, some editors and publishers retain the spellings found in the manuscripts. I have followed the practice, when quoting from editions of medieval Latin texts, of preserving whichever decision regarding the spelling is followed by the edition in question.

Another discrepancy concerns the Anglicization, or not, of the Latin names of medieval personages, and the titles of well known works. There are names, such as John of Salisbury, Gilbert of Poitiers, and Peter Lombard, whose English form is in common use among Anglophone readers. It would be an affectation to refer to these people in Latin or in another language. On the other hand, there are figures, such as Ordericus Vitalis and Jacques de Vitry, for whom this is not the case. My practice has been to use whichever version of the name has the greatest immediate recognition value, regardless of the lack of symmetry that any result. Similarly, while the titles of works written in Latin will usually be cited in that language in the text, others, such as Abelard's *Ethics* and Augustine's *City of God* or *Eighty-Three Diverse Questions*, will be given in English as more familiar or as less cumbersome than their Latin originals.

I will have occasion to cite repeatedly in this book the works of scholastic theologians and canonists, not only by the page or column number in the texts in which their works are printed, but according to the more specific, and traditional, finding tools indicated by the subdivisions within their texts. This practice, too, is quite standard for medievalists, who will readily recognize abbreviations such as "d" for *distinctio*, "c" for *capitulum* or *causa*, "q" for

quaestio, and *dictum* for a canonist's summation of a point. This system of abbreviations should serve as a guide for any readers unfamiliar with this standard scheme of citation for medieval texts.

Let me note as well that no effort has been made here to regularize the spelling of "mediaeval" to "medieval" or vice versa. When these adjectives occur in titles or in the house style of publishers, the spelling given by the author or by the publisher is the spelling that will be followed.

I will have occasion to cite female scholars, both in the bibliography and in footnotes organized alphabetically, who began to publish under one surname but who have changed their surnames thanks to a change in their marital status. I will cite their works alphabetized according to the first surnames under which they began to publish, with their subsequent surnames indicated in square brackets following their original names. I trust that this practice will not be confusing to readers who may initially seek citations to the writings of these scholars in locations where they will not be found.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AHDLMA</i>	<i>Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge</i>
Beiträge	Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie [und Theologie] des Mittelalters
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum, continuatio medievalis
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum, series latina
<i>CIMAGEL</i>	<i>Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen âge grec et latin de l'Université de Copenhague</i>
CSEL	Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum
<i>DTC</i>	<i>Dictionnaire de théologie catholique</i>
<i>ETL</i>	<i>Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses</i>
<i>FS</i>	<i>Franciscan Studies</i>
Landgraf, <i>Dogmengeschichte</i>	Artur Michael Landgraf, <i>Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik</i> , 4 vols. (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1952–56)
MGH, Scriptores	Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores
<i>Misc. Lomb.</i>	<i>Miscellanea Lombardiana</i> (Novara: Istituto Geografico de Agostini, 1957)
<i>PL</i>	<i>Patrologia latina, cursus completus</i> , ed. J. P. Migne
<i>RHE</i>	<i>Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique</i>
Rolls Series	Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi, Scriptores
<i>RSPT</i>	<i>Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques</i>
<i>RSR</i>	<i>Revue des sciences religieuses</i>
<i>RTAM</i>	<i>Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale</i>
<i>ZkT</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie</i>

PREFACE

Like the account of creation in Genesis, this book came into being in two stages, in response to two successive inspirations, although in this case they were purely human. Shortly after he had completed a book on Adam Wodeham, the early fourteenth-century Oxford scholastic, William J. Courtenay happened to remark to me that, in Wodeham's day, university students engaged in getting over the academic hurdle of the commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard mandated by the theological faculties felt no obligation to gloss all sections of the work in equal detail. Instead, they gave very cursory attention to the parts they found uninteresting and concentrated on those they found stimulating or problematic. A few years later, John Van Dyk noted in print that, in the fifteenth century, scholastics had abandoned that practice and had returned to the systematic commentary on the entire text.¹ Combining these two observations and pushing the common question they raised backward in time, I was struck by the fact that medievalists would be able to survey and map the *terra incognita* that remains in our knowledge of much of the history of speculative thought from the middle of the twelfth century to the end of the period if the *Sentence* commentaries of all the scholastics known to have made them could be studied in chronological order and in a comparative way. Such a study, I ruminated, would enable us to track, and possibly to account for, the shifting interests in different generations, in different geographical centers, in different religious orders or pedagogical cadres—whatever categories such an investigation might reveal as significant.

Hard on the heels of that thought came a sobering reflection. Except for a handful of the best-researched of the scholastics, the *Sentence* commentaries of the high Middle Ages have not been edited and published. To be sure, thanks to the assiduous labors of Friedrich Stegmüller and his continuators, the authorship and present whereabouts of hundreds of manuscripts which preserve

¹ John Van Dyk, "The Sentence Commentary: A Vehicle in the Intellectual Transition of the Fifteenth Century," in *Fifteenth-Century Studies*, 8, ed. Guy P. Mermier and Edelgard E. DuBruck (Detroit: Fifteenth-Century Symposium, 1983), pp. 227–38.

these commentaries are now known.² At the same time, the very extensiveness of this body of material makes the task of editing, or even sampling, all these manuscripts too daunting to be undertaken by a single scholar, in a single lifetime. Having been pulled back to earth by this thought, I was bouyed up again by another observation. Even if the editing and publishing of all known *Sentence* commentaries could be done, ideally by a large international équipe of medievalists with unlimited funding, it would not be possible to interpret fully what the commentators had said unless we had, as a base line, a clear idea of what the Lombard himself had said in the *Sentences*. Do we really know, I asked myself, what the Lombard's theology actually had been? Preliminary research into that question revealed an astonishing fact. Peter Lombard makes an appearance in all manuals and textbook surveys, because all medievalists acknowledge the formative role that his *Sentences* played in the education of university theologians and philosophers in the high Middle Ages. Also, no less than three successive critical editions of the *Sentences* have been produced within the past century.³ Yet, there exists no good modern book-length treatment

² Friedrich Stegmüller, *Reportorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, 2 vols. (Würzburg: F. Schöningh, 1947). This ground-breaking survey has been supplemented by Victorinus Doucet, *Commentaires sur les Sentences: Supplément au Répertoire de M. F. Stegmüller* (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1954); J. B. Korolec and R. Palacz, "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 11 (1963): 140–45; J. B. Korolec, A. Półtawski, and Z. Włodek, "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller," *ibid.* 1 (1958): 28–30; Zdzisław Kuksewicz, "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller," *ibid.* 5 (1960): 45–49; Jerzy Rebeta, "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller," *ibid.* 12 (1967): 135–37; Josef Trřška, "Sententiarum Pragensis," *ibid.* 13 (1968): 100–10; Zofia Włodek, "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller d'après les MSS. de la Bibliothèque du Grand Séminaire de Pelplin," *ibid.* 8 (1961): 33–38; "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller," *ibid.* 5 (1963): 144–46; "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller d'après les MSS. de la Bibliothèque de Wrocław," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 6 (1964): 100–04; "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller d'après les MSS. des bibliothèques de Prague," *ibid.* 7 (1965): 91–95; Kazimierz Wójciki, "Commentaires sur les *Sentences*: Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller," *Mediaevalia Philosophorum Polonorum* 13 (1968): 111–14; John Van Dyk, "Thirty Years since Stegmüller: A Bibliographical Guide to the Study of Medieval Sentence Commentaries," *FS* 39 (1979): 255–315; William J. Courtenay, "Newly Identified 'Sentences' Commentaries in the Stuttgart Landesbibliothek," *Scriptorium* 41 (1987): 113–15. I am indebted to Professor Courtenay for this last reference.

³ On the editorial history of the *Sentences* in modern times, see Ignatius C. Brady, "The Three Editions of the 'Liber Sententiarum' of Master Peter Lombard (1882–1977)," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 70 (1977): 400–11.

of Peter Lombard's thought. The only general monographs on this subject were published at the turn of the twentieth century or earlier; and they are all seriously out of date.⁴ The only relatively modern introductions to Lombardian theology are found in brief encyclopedia articles.⁵ Once I had made that surprising discovery, the idea of writing the present book came into focus with startling clarity. A full-dress study of the Lombard's theology would be well worth doing in its own right, I concluded, in order to fill this gap in our knowledge of the twelfth century's most renowned and influential theologian, independent of its potential utility for scholars who might want to study successive *Sentence* commentaries as a barometer of later medieval speculative thought.

Confident that I had hit upon the useful project of understanding a thinker who has the distinction of being, at the same time, famous and poorly known, I next sought to assuage my curiosity as to how such a paradoxical situation could have arisen in the first place. This led to the second genesis of the book, whose inspiration was an extremely illuminating historiographical essay on Peter Lombard by Ermenegildo Bertola.⁶ Bertola's paper helps to show how and why Peter Lombard has fallen through the cracks, in modern historiography of medieval thought. At the same time, it shows how the disesteem for the Lombard has functioned as an index of the ways in which the received tradition has conceptualized the history of medieval speculative thought, ever since this subject started to be revalued in the nineteenth century. What is involved here is not a series of periodic inflations and deflations of the Lombard's reputation, but rather a succession of unsympathetic appraisals of it. The consistency of this dismissive view is striking, even though it has been informed by a variety of inter-confessional, intra-confessional, philosophical, and other interpretive agendas. What-

⁴ Otto Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus: Ihre Quellen und ihre dogmengeschichtliche Bedeutung* (Leipzig: Dieter'sche Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1902); Joh. Nep. Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus und ihre Stellung im zwölften Jahrhundert*, Beiträge, 3:5 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1901); Julius Kögel, *Petrus Lombardus in seiner Stellung zur Philosophie des Mittelalter* (Greifswald: Julius Abel, 1897); F. Protois, *Pierre Lombard, évêque de Paris dit le maître des Sentences: Son époque, sa vie, ses écrits, son influence* (Paris: Société Générale de Librairie Catholique, 1887).

⁵ Joseph de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," in *DTC* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1935), 12 part 2: 1941–2019; now superseded by Martin Anton Schmidt, "Das Sentenzenwerk des Petrus Lombardus und sein Aufstieg zum Muster- und Textbuch der theologischen Ausbildung," in *Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 1: 587–615. I would like to thank Dr. Max Haas for the latter reference.

⁶ Ermenegildo Bertola, "Pietro Lombardo nella storiografica filosofica medioevale," *Pier Lombardo* 4 (1960): 95–113.

ever the reasons, commentators have succeeded in marginalizing the most central theologian of his time, and have created a modern Peter Lombard who is a caricature of his medieval reality, making it all but impossible to appreciate what his contemporaries found worthwhile in him. The line of inquiry opened up by Bertola, therefore, pointed to two other considerations which went into the shaping of this book. First, it suggested that, in rescuing a major figure from undeserved neglect, I might also be able to contribute to a rethinking of the larger issue of how we conceptualize the twelfth century and its place in the history of medieval thought. Second, it suggested the *modus operandi* which I have followed in my attack on this assignment, the reading of Peter Lombard not from an anachronistic or tendentious perspective, but in relation to the schools and masters of theology in the first half of the twelfth century. For, it is only by positioning him in the context of contemporary debates that we will be able to see what the agenda of scholastic theology was at that time, and why the Lombard was held to have succeeded better than his coevals in addressing its needs and concerns.

Given the extensive attention lavished on the thought of the twelfth century in the decades since its status as an age of renaissance was established, the claim that its contours need to be redrawn may require a defense. That claim can be validated, I will argue, if we juxtapose the older assessments of Peter Lombard side by side with the interpretive problems which they fail to solve. Here, we can take Bertola as our starting point, and supplement what he has brought to light.⁷ As he has shown, scholars have agreed in finding Peter wanting, for one reason or another, since the sixteenth century. Reformation Protestants objected to him as the progenitor of scholasticism, a movement which, for them, stood for false doctrine, a tortuous and hair-splitting mode of reasoning, and the incorporation of philosophy into theology that had forged the leaden bonds which their own polemic sought to shatter. For them, Peter's problem was that he was too scholastic. At the same time, Counter-Reformation Catholics, especially those supporting the revival of Thomism in their day, rejected him, substituting the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas for his *Sentences* as their school text, because they did not find him scholastic enough. The early modern rationalists, who distanced themselves from these controversies, dismissed him for being too theological and not suf-

⁷ Ibid. Unless otherwise noted, the material in the next three paragraphs depends on Bertola.

ficiently philosophical. Like their Protestant predecessors, Enlightenment thinkers equated the Middle Ages with scholasticism, understood pejoratively. They criticized the Lombard for seeking to unite Aristotle with the Augustinian tradition, viewing this union as a *mésalliance* from the other direction, although in the eyes of some philosophes, Anselm of Canterbury had to share the blame with Peter for this misstep.

In the historiography of the nineteenth century, scholars turned from a Peter Lombard held up as an example of whatever was deemed worthy of attack to a Peter Lombard seen as irrelevant. However they may have diverged in their versions of the story line of medieval intellectual history, they agreed in treating him as all but invisible, a character with no real part to play, virtually writing him out of the script. The German school, starting with Heinrich Ritter and continuing with Bernhard Geyer, Clemens Bauemker, and Martin Grabmann, saw the high Middle Ages as a period of philosophical revival. Important as they held the reception of Aristotle to have been, they regarded the influence of Platonism as equally critical. They tended to subdivide twelfth-century thinkers into two groups, depending on which of these schools of ancient philosophy they were deemed to have espoused. For them, Adelard of Bath, Anselm of Canterbury, and the Chartrains formed the honor guard of Platonism, with Peter Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers, and Honorius Augustodunensis in the vanguard of Aristotelianism. Since they saw in Peter Lombard a man without commanding allegiances to either of these traditions, the German school concluded that he was simply not in tune with contemporary intellectual trends. This view is repeated by J. N. Espenberger in one of the earliest full-length studies of Peter's thought.⁸

The French school, launched by Victor Cousin and followed by Barthélemy Hauréau, Maurice DeWulf, and Émile Bréhier, also accented philosophical renewal in the twelfth century, but took a somewhat different tack from the Germans. Strong proponents of rationalism, and anxious to defend the view that the Christianity of medieval thinkers had not prevented them from being real philosophers, they placed particular emphasis on the revival of metaphysics, the reopening of the debate over universals, and the effort to correlate reason and revelation, concerns destined to receive more attention in the thirteenth century. Judged according to this proleptic and increasingly neo-Thomist standard, the relevant

⁸ Espenberger, *Die Philosophie*, passim and esp. pp. 8–15.

groupings among the twelfth-century thinkers were not the Platonists and Aristotelians. Rather, the century took shape, for the French school, as a conflict between the conservatives, such as Anselm of Laon, William of Champeaux, Bernard of Clairvaux, and the Victorines, on the one side, and such harbingers of the future as Anselm of Canterbury and, above all, the Abelardians and Porretans, on the other. Now, Peter Lombard borrowed from both of these groups but was not a card-carrying member of either. So, once again, he was relegated to the sidelines and seen as having avoided the great issues of the day. He was held to have lacked an interest in metaphysics and was described as an enemy of logic even though he was sometimes constrained to use it, with no position on universals to defend and with nothing to contribute to the synthesis of reason and revelation.

In short, for the French as well as the German school, Peter was regarded as being of no philosophical interest at all, and, therefore, as being of no interest at all, globally. He simply watched the great parade go by, and did not march in it himself. So great was Peter's perceived refusal that F. Protois could devote an entire monograph to condemning a figure whose attitude toward philosophy he presents as one of avoidance, abstention, indifference, and disdain.⁹ And, as late as 1969, an echo of this position could be found in David Luscombe. Of Peter, he says, "he expected nothing from philosophers and he excluded them in favor of an exclusive cultivation of the theological tradition."¹⁰ A much more influential extension of the French school into the historiography of the twentieth century was the work of Étienne Gilson. It is instructive to note that he does not even include Peter Lombard in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, except when he refers to the commentaries on Peter's work made by scholastics who can be pressed more easily into the Procrustean bed of the realism-versus-nominalism or reason-versus-revelation debates.

In the first wave of the revolt of the medievalists, theology took a decidedly back seat to philosophy as an index of why the twelfth century should be seen as a period of revival. Such did not invariably remain the case in the historiographical sequel, in which theology now came to be included in the plot, and in which it could

⁹ Protois, *Pierre Lombard*, passim and esp. pp. 40–41. This same line is taken by Kögel, *Petrus Lombardus*.

¹⁰ David E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 279.

be conceded that it was not sufficient to read medieval theologians across their theology for the sake of the philosophy that might thereby be extracted. Welcome as this shift in perspective has been in many quarters, it has not necessarily led to a more generous or less tendentious appraisal of the Lombard. At issue here is not just confessional or philosophical polemics but also hermeneutics. Whether or not they share the views of the neo-Thomists, many of the scholars in this group have basic difficulty reading a sentence collection and understanding how ideas are being put forth in this genre of theological literature, of which Peter's *Sentences* is the salient example. They tend to measure this genre against the norm of a late thirteenth-century *summa*, which it does not resemble formally. By that standard, they find it wanting. At first glance—and, typically, a first glance is all that Peter's *Sentences* receive from them—it looks like a compilation of the opinions of past authorities, pure and simple, rather than as the vehicle for the theologian's own positions. This is the way in which the *Sentences* have been described, all too often.

Otto Baltzer framed the terms of this assessment almost a century ago. He observes that Peter states, in the prologue of the *Sentences*, that his aim is to bring together the views of the church fathers. Baltzer reads this statement literally, as exhausting the Lombard's objectives, and uses it to define the parameters of his own study. He confines his efforts to cataloguing Peter's sources and subjecting them to statistical analysis, in order to see which authorities he relies on the most.¹¹ It never occurs to Baltzer that Peter's prologue needs to be read as a *captatio benevolentiae*, an expression of the "modest author" topos. Nor does it occur to him to go beyond the noting of Peter's citations to a consideration of the uses to which Peter puts them. This understanding of Peter's relationship to his authorities has remained remarkably durable. In 1960, Enrico Nobile could call the *Sentences* a *cento* lacking in any discernible principle of organization.¹² A year later, Philippe Delhaye could describe it as the mere echo of a tradition.¹³ The same view informs Jaroslav Pelikan's recent assessment of the *Sentences* as an exercise in running in place, "the reaffirmation of Augustine,"

¹¹ Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen*, passim and esp. pp. 1–14.

¹² Enrico Nobile, "Appunti sulla teologia dei *Quattro libri delle Sentenze* di Pier Lombardo," *Pier Lombardo* 4 (1960): 49–59.

¹³ Philippe Delhaye, *Pierre Lombard, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa morale* (Montreal: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1961), p. 27.

and as nothing much else.¹⁴ And it can be found as well in Gillian Evans's still more recent estimate of the *Sentences* as essentially a reference book in which Peter's main project is to promote certitude and orthodoxy by anxiously placing a cordon sanitaire around the theological boundaries fixed by the church fathers.¹⁵

Although they come to Peter from the history of theology rather than from the history of philosophy, these interpreters still produce the same cumulative effect. They tell the reader that modern scholarship is justified in not taking Peter Lombard seriously. They report the fact of the scholarly neglect of him with complacency and satisfaction, not with regret or self-doubt. On the first page of the book he writes to document the correctness of this state of affairs, Protois announces, "Pierre Lombard est aujourd'hui plus cité que lu et plus célèbre que connu."¹⁶ Luscombe agrees, calling the *Sentences* "one of the least read of the world's great books," a circumstance commensurate with his view that its author was "a cautious, sober, and apparently dull expositor."¹⁷

This alleged dullness has been traced to Peter's lack of a sufficiently speculative mind as a theologian by Antonio Brancaforte. Brancaforte sees the Lombard as a religious thinker, seeking to find a middle ground between mysticism and rationalism, of the sort he thinks Thomas Aquinas later achieved. Unfortunately, because of his intellectual shortcomings, Peter's reach exceeded his grasp.¹⁸ Still more dismissive than this criticism of Peter as a failed Thomist avant la lettre has been the criticism of him as a twelfth-century humanist manqué. While he acknowledges that Peter could and did use grammar as a tool of theological analysis, Marie-Dominique Chenu mentions him only occasionally, and disparagingly, as having failed to promote the speculative grammar that flowed into the *logica modernorum* and as having contributed nothing to the discovery of the world and man concurrently taking place in the school of Chartres, which Chenu sees as the main achievements of twelfth-century thought.¹⁹ And, Jean Leclercq rejects the Lom-

¹⁴ Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 3: 270.

¹⁵ Gillian R. Evans, *The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Road to Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 102–04.

¹⁶ Protois, *Pierre Lombard*, p. 1.

¹⁷ Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, p. 263.

¹⁸ Antonio Brancaforte, "Contributo di Pietro Lombardo all'unità del pensiero medioevale," *Teoresi* 8 (1953): 230–45.

¹⁹ Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 93, 96, 99, 116.

bard, that prototypical sentence collector, as a tiresome florilegist, in his repeated efforts to argue that it was not the scholastics but the monastic theologians who were the true Christian humanists and the true authors of theological renewal in the twelfth century.²⁰

To be sure, Leclercq speaks for the monks, especially those in the reformed orders such as the Cistercians, in the effort to win them a hearing, along with the scholastics who have tended to dominate the histories of medieval theology. There are some historians of scholasticism who, while not ceding an inch of their turf, have yet manifested some disquiet over the traditional image of the Lombard as an also-ran or as the negative mirror image of the really important developments in twelfth-century thought. Also, as historians they feel the prick of their professional conscience and an obligation to account for the status Peter attained in the medieval chapter of the story. Some commentators have therefore made an earnest effort to find some merit in Peter's work and to grasp why it caught on. But, the best they have been able to come up with is a mixed review. In the judgment of Artur Michael Landgraf, the scheme of organization of the *Sentences* is a coherent one; it became canonical with good reason. On the other hand, its contents are both impersonal and unoriginal.²¹ For Joseph de Ghellinck, the *Sentences* definitely enjoyed more posthumous glory than they deserved. He sees this work as a cold and lifeless résumé lacking in boldness or creativity. At the same time, he concedes that Peter did do his research thoroughly, assembling an impressive dossier of patristic citations but without manifesting any indiscreet curiosity.

²⁰ Jean Leclercq, "The Renewal of Theology," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 68–87, reprising his more extended argument for the same position in *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture*, 2nd ed. rev., trans. Catherine Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1974), passim and esp. pp. 1–7. Leclercq is followed by Stephen C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics, 1100–1215* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), ch. 3. Recently, Brian P. Gaybba, *Aspects of the Mediaeval History of Theology: 12th to 14th Century* (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1988), pp. 7–65, has noted some of the inconsistencies of Leclercq's view and has suggested that the distinction between monastic and scholastic theology which he draws be replaced by a distinction between "experiential" and "notional" theology; but he does not place Peter Lombard in this scheme.

²¹ Artur Michael Landgraf, *Introduction à l'histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante*, ed. Albert-M. Landry, trans. Louis-B. Geiger (Montreal: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1973), pp. 53, 132. This view is shared by Henry Cloes, "La systématisation théologique pendant la première moitié du XII^e siècle," *ETL* 34 (1958): 329, although he paradoxically sees this alleged unoriginality as a virtue.

His organization is cogent and his coverage is well balanced. But these traits are not sufficient to overturn Ghellinck's basic conclusion.²² Ludwig Ott is rather more generous. Not only does he accept the idea that Peter's sweep of the fathers is wider than that of his contemporaries, but also that he is more accurate than they are in the way he presents them, often correcting thinkers with whom he disagreed by showing that they had misused their sources. Ott has also noticed that Peter uses logic constructively in a number of ways, to order his material lucidly, to harmonize discrepancies among his authorities, and to introduce distinctions that clarify theological topics. Still, on balance, like Landgraf and Ghellinck, he finds Peter impersonal, unoriginal, and uncreative.²³ Jacques Le Goff finds "force, clarity, and a synthetic spirit" in Peter's work but concurs in the view that he made no significant or original contribution.²⁴ While acknowledging that Peter recognized the initiatives made by other twelfth-century thinkers and incorporated them into the *Sentences*, while noting that he did not shrink from controversy, and while admitting that he did advance the debates at times, Luscombe's final verdict is the harsh one cited above.²⁵ One of the single most influential historians of scholasticism in modern times, Martin Grabmann, has signaled another positive feature of the *Sentences*. Both the clarity and cogency of its plan and its method for weighing and analyzing authorities, he observes, lent the book a high degree of pedagogical utility. Yet, in the last analysis, it is not the intrinsic merit of the Lombard's work that sealed its fate, he thinks, but the lucky timing of its appearance and the influence of Peter of Poitiers, the disciple of the Lombard who promoted it.²⁶

Even with these hesitant steps toward the recognition of Peter Lombard as more than just a nay-sayer to the major intellectual movements of his day and more than a mere compiler, a good, gray florilegist, the historiography to date still fails to explain how he

²² Joseph de Ghellinck, *L'Essor de la littérature latine au XII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, 1946), 1: 70–73; *Le Mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle*, 2nd ed. (Bruges: De Tempel, 1948), pp. 202–49.

²³ Ludwig Ott, "Petrus Lombardus: Persönlichkeit und Werk," *Münchener theologische Zeitschrift* 5 (1954): 105–13; reprised in "Pietro Lombardo: Personalità e opera," *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 15–21.

²⁴ Jacques Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 148.

²⁵ Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, pp. 262–79.

²⁶ Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2 vols. (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1957 [repr. of Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911 ed.]), 2: 404–07.

succeeded in seizing the theological initiative and in capturing the imagination of his contemporaries. It also fails to explain why it was he, and not one of his allegedly more exciting compeers, who became the enduring classic, the standard introduction to systematic theology in the medieval university curriculum, starting with Paris in 1215. The book which follows will be an effort to rediscover the medieval scenario in which Peter plays the role of the hero, the scenario obscured by the modern versions of the twelfth century in which he is relegated to the role of a bit player or a chorus character, at least when his lines are not consigned to the cutting room floor altogether. In our view, the best way to place Peter Lombard in his own time is to read him, always, in conjunction with the theologians in the first half of the twelfth century. This is the context within which he worked and the audience to which he spoke.

The body of this book will be divided into two parts, of unequal length. In the first section, after a chapter presenting what is known about Peter's life, works, and medieval reputation, I will offer three chapters which may be regarded, collectively, as an extended essay on method. They will treat, respectively, the emergence in the twelfth century of systematic theology as a sustained pedagogical enterprise, in chapter 2; the problem of theological language in early and mid-century theology, in chapter 3; and biblical exegesis among the scholastics, in chapter 4. In each case my goal will be to target the methodological problems and opportunities arising from these concerns and to explore why the Lombard's address to them was, and was perceived to be, an improvement over the other current options. The second part of the book will treat the substance of Lombardian theology. In four chapters, largely but not entirely taking the four books of Peter's *Sentences* as my organizational guide, I will present his teachings on the divine nature and the Trinity in chapter 5; the creation, man, and the fall in chapter 6; Christology and the redemptive work of Christ in chapter 7; and, in the lengthiest part of the book, ethics, sacraments, and Last Things in chapter 8. In each area I will seek to position Peter's opinions in relation to the debates of his own time. The book will end with a conclusion summing up the findings of this investigation and offering my assessment of Peter's contribution to the development of Christian thought in the twelfth century.

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CHAPTER ONE

PETER LOMBARD'S LIFE AND WORKS

For a man of his acknowledged importance, Peter Lombard left behind him a remarkably scanty biographical record. Although he attained swift and enduring fame as an exegete and theologian, as well as high ecclesiastical office in a land far from his own, no contemporary biographer thought of commemorating his life. Nor did Peter himself leave any letters or personal documents that would help us to reconstruct and date his activities and relationships. Large gaps remain in the evidence that we do have concerning his life and works. Legends started to grow up about him as early as the thirteenth century; some of them still remain in circulation. The best of the modern scholars who has labored to establish what can be known for certain about Peter's life and works, who has sifted uncritical hypothesis from likely conjecture, is undoubtedly Ignatius C. Brady.¹ His studies lay the foundation for the material in this chapter, along with such amplifications and corrections as it has been possible to make.

BIOGRAPHY

Peter was born in the region of Novara, in Lombardy, probably between 1095 and 1100. Some scholars continue to give his birthplace as the small town of Lumellogno, although this is a fancy going back to the Renaissance historian Paolo Giovio, who derived

¹ The most reliable introductions to this subject, and our chief guides to it in this chapter, are the prolegomena to the two volumes of Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 3rd ed. rev., ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81), 1: 8*-129*, 2: 7*-52*, which supersede Brady's own earlier studies of Peter's life and works, "Peter Lombard: Canon of Notre Dame," *RTAM* 32 (1965): 277-95 and "Peter Lombard," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), 11: 221-22, studies which, in turn, offer correctives to the earlier investigations of Ludwig Ott, "Petrus Lombardus: Persönlichkeit und Werk," *Münchener theologische Zeitschrift* 5 (1954): 99-105; reprised as "Pietro Lombardo: Personalità e opera," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 11-15; and Damien Van den Eynde, "Précisions chronologiques sur quelques ouvrages théologiques du XII^e siècle," *Antonianum* 26 (1951): 223-33; "Nouvelles précisions sur quelques ouvrages théologiques du XII^e siècle," *FS* 13 (1953): 110-18; "Essai chronologique sur l'oeuvre littéraire de Pierre Lombard," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 45-63.

it from a play on the words *lumen omnium* in reference to Peter.² Nothing is known for certain about his origins, his social background, or his early education. Indeed, the first thirty-some years of Peter's life remain a complete blank. In the early fourteenth century the chronicler Ricobaldo of Ferrara invented the charming legend that he was the son of an impoverished widow who earned a meager living as a laundress. When news of Peter's election as bishop of Paris reached Novara, the city fathers decided to equip her in splendid style, at public expense, and to send her to Paris to visit her son with an escort of local notables. As the story goes, when the Novarese delegation arrived and made their courtesy call, Peter failed to recognize his mother in this richly attired lady. It was not until she returned, clad in her ordinary humble clothing, and chastised him, that he acknowledged her, embraced her, and did her honor.³ This legend remained so enduring that it could be invoked in the nineteenth century by the Novarese poet and politician Giuseppe Regaldi. As a defender of the working class, he sought to harness the aura of Novara's most famous citizen, the "son of a laundress," to his own cause.⁴ Another now-exploded legend is the "myth of the three brothers," which also derives from a chronicler of the high Middle Ages, Godfrey of Viterbo, and which is grounded on the geographically and chronologically impossible claim that Peter Lombard, his disciple Peter Comestor, and Gratian of Bologna were all siblings.⁵

Our first documented reference to Peter Lombard is found in a letter written by Bernard of Clairvaux to Gilduin, prior of St. Victor in Paris, between 1134 and 1136.⁶ Noting that this promis-

² Antonio Massara, "La leggenda di Pier Lombardo," in *Miscellanea storica Novarese a Raffaele Tarella* (Novara: G. Parzini, 1906), pp. 118–20. His source is Ricobaldo of Ferrara, *Historia imperatorum Romano-Germanicorum a Carolo M. usque ad an. 1298*, ed. L. A. Muratori, *Rerum Italicorum Scriptores* (Milan, 1726), 9: 124. This legend has died hard; it is retained in the most recent treatments of Peter's biography, Ludwig Hödl, "Petrus Lombardus," in *Gestalten der Kirchengeschichte*, ed. Martin Greschat (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983), 3 part 1: 205 and Mark A. Zier, "Peter Lombard," in *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph R. Strayer (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987), 9: 516.

³ Massara, "La leggenda," pp. 121–36.

⁴ Mario Nogari, "Giuseppe Regaldi e Pier Lombardo," *Bollettino storico per la provincia di Novara* 68 (1977): 78–94.

⁵ Massara, "La leggenda," pp. 122–36. The "three brothers" legend was first rejected by Antoninus of Florence. See *Gallia Christiana, in provincias ecclesiasticas distributa* (Paris: H. Welter, 1899 [repr. of Paris: Ex Typographia Regia, 1744 ed.]), 7: 70; Joseph de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle*, 2nd ed. (Bruges: De Tempel, 1948), p. 285.

⁶ Bernard of Clairvaux, *Epistola* 410, in *Opera*, ed. J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–77), 8: 391.

ing individual had been brought to his attention by Humbert, bishop of Lucca, and that he himself had borne the expenses connected with his education at Rheims for a time, Bernard recommends Peter to Gilduin. He clearly thinks that Paris is where Peter should go to enhance his theological education. Bernard urges Gilduin to support Peter for what he evidently envisions will be a fairly brief period of study.

The cathedral school of Rheims had initially suggested itself as a likely place for Peter to go because of the current presence there of masters who were continuing the tradition of Anselm of Laon, the best known theologian in France in the early years of the twelfth century.⁷ The most renowned of these, famous—or notorious—for his opposition to Peter Abelard, was Alberic. Also present was Lotulph of Novara. He had engaged in a public debate on Christology with Gerhoch of Reichersberg in Rome in 1126. His repute in Italy may have been an added draw in the eyes of his fellow-citizen. At Rheims as well Peter could study with Walter of Mortagne, who had also taught at Laon and whose correspondence shows him to have maintained connections with a number of masters at other centers. The pedagogy of these masters, like that of Anselm of Laon, was strong on traditional exegesis and relatively unresponsive to the philosophical concerns animating a number of theologians in this period. This fact, along with Alberic's departure from Rheims to accept the bishopric of Bourges in 1136, may account for the timing of Peter's decision to leave that school. And, the fact that it was Hugh of St. Victor to whom Walter had turned for clarification on the doctrine of the Trinity may have suggested the profitability of studying with Hugh, whose masterpiece, the *De sacramentis*, was now nearing completion.⁸

Peter arrived in Paris in 1136. Nothing can be proved about his exact whereabouts in that city until he emerged in ca. 1142 as an acknowledged writer and teacher. Whether or not he was already teaching at Notre Dame at that point, he most certainly lent luster to that school from at least 1145, when he became a canon of Notre Dame. Peter's means of support before he was able to earn a living as a teacher and before he derived income from his canon's prebend

⁷ John R. Williams, "The Cathedral School of Reims in the Time of Master Alberic, 1118–1136," *Traditio* 20 (1964): 93–114. See also Carlo Ramponi, "Leutaldo: Scuola teologica di Reims," *Pier Lombardo* 1 (1953): 14–15.

⁸ Damien Van den Eynde, *Essai sur la succession et la date des écrits de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1960), pp. 39–110, gives a thorough analysis of the date of the *De sacramentis* in relation to Hugh's other works and concludes, p. 110, that it was most likely completed in 1137.

remains a mystery. Did Gilduin respond favorably to Bernard's appeal, offering Peter hospitality at St. Victor and tuition with Hugh? This question has attracted debate. It is true that Peter's work reflects a thorough familiarity with Hugh's *De sacramentis* and with its largely Victorine sequel, the anonymous *Summa sententiarum*. He is deeply influenced by these sources. At the same time, one of the marks of Peter's theology is his grasp of the works of many other contemporary masters. He is thoroughly conversant, for example, with the writings of Peter Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers and his earliest disciples, Robert Pullen, and Gratian. It was certainly possible in this period to acquaint oneself with the teachings of thinkers with whom one was not bound in a formal master-disciple relationship. An objection has also been raised to the idea that Peter actually studied with Hugh on the antiquated, and sketchy, grounds that the school of St. Victor was already closed to externs by Hugh's day.⁹ Thus, William J. Courtenay maintains that the most Gilduin could have offered Peter was "meals and possibly accommodations . . . for at least a few months;" and he adds that "there is no evidence that he received formal instruction there, although he may have profited from personal contacts and possible access to the library."¹⁰ In response to this statement, it is important to distinguish the issue of subvention, on which there is, indeed, no documentation whatever, from the question of whether, as an extern, Peter could have had access to the formal pedagogy of Hugh of St. Victor. For, on the latter point, we have solid evidence that two other contemporary externs did study with Hugh, suggesting that Courtenay's conclusion may be too hasty.

⁹ Stephen C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics, 1100-1215* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), pp. 27-29; William J. Courtenay, "Schools and Schools of Thought in the Twelfth Century," unpublished. I am indebted to Professor Courtenay for allowing me to use this paper in typescript. On the other hand, it has been pointed out by Philippe Delhay, "L'organisation scolaire au XII^e siècle," *Traditio* 5 (1947): 245-50 [repr. in *Enseignement et morale au XII^e siècle* (Fribourg, Suisse: Éditions Universitaires, 1988, pp. 36-40]; Luc Jocqué, "Les structures de la population claustrale dans l'ordre de Saint-Victor au XII^e siècle et au début du XIII^e siècle," in *L'Abbaye parisienne de Saint-Victor au moyen âge*, ed. Jean Longère (Paris: Brepols, 1991), pp. 71-72, 72 n. 50, 91; and Jean Longère, "La fonction pastorale de Saint-Victor à la fin du XII^e siècle et au début du XIII^e siècle," in *ibid.*, p. 291 that, unlike monastic houses, St. Victor did not close its doors to externs in this period. Both Jocqué and Longère think that the Lombard did receive hospitality and instruction there, as does Patrice Sicard, intro. to his ed. of *Hugues de Saint-Victor et son école* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), p. 17. Hödl, "Petrus Lombardus," p. 206, also thinks that Peter was an extern student at St. Victor.

¹⁰ Courtenay, "Schools," n. 32.

One of these figures is Clarenbald of Arras. In 1142 or after, he wrote a commentary on the *De hebdomadibus* of Boethius, in the preface to which he reflects on his student days at St. Victor. This preface, in the form of a dedicatory epistle, was discovered by Nikolaus M. Häring in a previously unknown St. Omer manuscript and later incorporated by him into his critical edition of Clarenbald's text.¹¹ Clarenbald offers a justification for the composition of yet another commentary on the *De hebdomadibus*, given the fact that this work had been glossed repeatedly in the first half of the twelfth century. Two of his own masters, he observes, had done so, Thierry of Chartres and Hugh of St. Victor. Now, among twelfth-century authors, Hugh was exceptionally fortunate in the care lavished on his works by his successors. His oeuvre had already been catalogued by the Victorines as early as 1155. But, neither in the first nor in any subsequent inventory of his writings do we find a written commentary on the *De hebdomadibus*.¹² This means, unless there was a written gloss that did not survive, that the only way for Clarenbald to have known about Hugh's interpretation of that work was through his oral teaching. And, indeed, the term Clarenbald uses, *lectiones*, reports that this was the case.

Another contemporary witness to the fact that Hugh provided formal instruction to externs is Lawrence of Westminster. This Englishman began his monastic career at St. Albans and had already risen to the abbacy of Westminster when he decided to interrupt his duties in order to go to France to study with Hugh in the 1130s. After Hugh's death in 1141, he returned to England and moved to the abbey of Durham in 1143. It was here that he met Maurice, a monk of Durham. Maurice left Durham for Rievaulx, whose abbot he became in 1145. It was after that transfer that Lawrence dedicated to Maurice his *Sententiae de divinitate*,¹³ whose relationship to the Hugonian canon has received much discussion. The text of the dedicatory epistle was first discovered and printed

¹¹ Nikolaus M. Häring, "A Hitherto Unknown Commentary on Boethius' *de Hebdomadibus* Written by Clarenbaldus of Arras," *MS 15* (1953): 214–15; Häring, ed., *Life and Works of Clarenbald of Arras, A Twelfth-Century Master of the School of Chartres* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1965), pp. 19–20, 23. The locus in Clarenbald's text is the dedicatory *Epistola ad Odonem* 3, p. 64.

¹² Rudolf Goy, *Die Überlieferung des Werke Hugos von St. Viktor* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1976).

¹³ F. E. Croydon, "Abbot Laurence of Westminster and Hugh of St. Victor," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 2 (1950): 169–71; Delhay, "L'organisation scolaire," pp. 245–50 [repr. in *Enseignement et morale*, pp. 36–40]; Sicard, intro. to his ed. of *Hugues de Saint-Victor*, pp. 17, 23–24.

by Bernhard Bischoff,¹⁴ and, more recently, it has been incorporated into his edition of the entire work by Ambrogio Piazzoni.¹⁵ In it, Lawrence presents the *Sententiae* as a *reportatio* of Hugh's oral teaching, which Hugh looked over and corrected while Lawrence was still at St. Victor. The debate over this text has focused on the question of whether it actually is a *reportatio*, as Lawrence says it is, and if so, whether the teaching it reports reflects Hugh's opinions before or after the completion of his *De sacramentis*, or whether, on the other hand, the *Sententiae* is a work of Lawrence's own authorship, albeit closely dependent on Hugh. These debates, chronicled fully by Piazzoni,¹⁶ do not concern us here. What does concern us is the fact that Lawrence, as an extern, enjoyed the personal instruction of Hugh. The fact that master-disciple relations between Hugh and extern students such as Clarenbald and Lawrence took place in this period suggests that we should not rule out the lively possibility that such a relationship may have taken place as well between Hugh and Peter Lombard, between 1136 and the beginning of Peter's own teaching career, whatever his means of support may have been during those years.

The Lombard's teaching won rapid recognition; and it is likely that this is what inspired the canons of Notre Dame to invite him to join their ranks. Already in 1144, the author of the *Metamorphosis Goliae* could confidently add Peter's name as a "celebrated theologian" to the list of prominent Parisian masters whose "mouths breathe nard and balsam."¹⁷ Such praise recommended Peter to the canons, whose school had not boasted a theologian of distinction for some time, inspiring them to overcome their ingrained disinclination to recruit outsiders. The demography of the canons of Notre Dame in the twelfth century has received detailed and careful study.¹⁸ They were a highly pre-selected group, tightly knit

¹⁴ Bernhard Bischoff, "Aus der Schule Hugos von St. Viktor," in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet*, ed. Albert Lang, Joseph Lechner, and Michael Schmaus, Beiträge, Supplementband 3:1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935), 1: 346–50.

¹⁵ Ambrogio M. Piazzoni, "Ugo di San Vittore 'auctor' delle 'Sententiae de divinitate'," *Studi medievali* 23:2 (1982): 912.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 861–911.

¹⁷ R. B. C. Huygens, ed., "Metamorphosis Goliae," *Studi medievali* 3:2 (1962): 771: "Celebrum theologum vidimus Lombardum,/ cum Yvone Helyam Petrum et Bernardum,/ quorum opobalsamum spiratos et nardum."

¹⁸ Marcel Pacaut, *Louis VII et les élections épiscopales dans le royaume de France* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 106–46; *Louis VII et son royaume* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1964), pp. 109–17. See also Robert-Henri Bautier, "Paris en temps d'Abélard," in *Abélard en son temps*, ed. Jean Jolivet (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981), pp. 53–77; Jacques

in their social status and relationships. To a man—and this can be said, in essence, of the bishops of regalian France as well—they were members of the Capetian house, relatives of families closely linked to the Capetians by blood or marriage, scions of the Ile-de-France or eastern Loire valley nobility, or relatives of royal officials. This situation was especially pronounced at Notre Dame, where the fortunes of the canons and those of their secular relatives in the royal service went hand in hand. Networking, nepotism, and favoritism were the standard means of ecclesiastical advancement, promoted not only by the families of such men in order to enhance the power and influence of their lineages, but also as a calculated strategy of the monarch, in the effort to bind the prominent noble families in the royal domain to the royal cause, to reward their loyalty with promotion, and to block the advancement of those who were out of favor. For his part, Peter Lombard had no relatives, no ecclesiastical connections, and no political patrons or associates in France. He thus appears to have been recruited and welcomed by the canons of Notre Dame on the basis of scholarly merit alone. He was the one, and the only, member of that body who lacked its typical social profile. Also, unlike some prominent canons of Notre Dame—Robert of Garland leaps to mind—he was no pluralist. He cannot be identified with the Peter named as a canon of St. Mary's, Chartres, who in any case is described as a physician to King Louis VII, a profession he never practiced. Nor is he the master Peter whom Pope Eugenius III recommends in a letter to Henry, bishop of Beauvais, in 1151, asking him to provide that individual with a prebend. Peter Lombard was a beneficed cleric of Notre Dame of Paris only.¹⁹

Once a member of the chapter, Peter continued to advance. It is not known at what point he was ordained to the priesthood. He became a subdeacon in 1147. He participated as a theological expert at the council of Rheims, presided over by Eugenius III in 1148, and possibly at the consistory of Paris that prepared the way for it in the preceding year.²⁰ At some time after 1150 he became a

Boussard, *Nouvelle histoire de Paris: De la fin du siècle de 885-886 à la mort de Philippe Auguste* (Paris: Hachette, 1976), pp. 197-225; Elizabeth M. Hallam, *Capetian France, 987-1328* (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 193-95.

¹⁹ Brady, *Prolegomenon to Sent.* 1: 18*-19*.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 27*-30*. Brady notes that not all the contemporary sources mention Peter's attendance at this consistory and council. For the most recent analysis of the pertinent sources, see Laura Cioni, "Il concilio di Reims nelle fonti contemporanee," *Aevum* 53 (1979): 273-300. For additional bibliography, see Marcia L. Colish, "Gilbert, the Early Porretans, and Peter Lombard: Semantics

deacon, and an archdeacon by 1156, if not as early as 1152. Between the middle of July, 1153 and the beginning of December, 1154, his bishop, Theobald, was in Rome on ecclesiastical business. It is extremely likely that Peter was in his suite. He was certainly of appropriate rank to accompany his bishop; and, of course, he was the only member of the chapter who spoke Italian. It is generally agreed that it was Peter's presence in Rome at this time that afforded him the opportunity to discover the *De fide orthodoxa* of the eighth-century Byzantine theologian, John Damascene. Translation of John's work into Latin had just been completed by Burgundio of Pisa as a papal commission. Peter was the first Latin theologian to make use of John's work, and he did so to crucial effect in his own theology from 1155 onward.

Most striking of all as an index of how this outsider became an insider is Peter's election as bishop of Paris, a post to which he was consecrated on about the feast of SS. Peter and Paul, July 28, 1159. Describing him as "a man of great learning and admirable above all the other Parisian doctors,"²¹ the chronicler who reports this event leaves no doubt that it was scholarly attainment that won Peter this honor. The outcome is the more extraordinary given the fact that learning scarcely ranked high on the list of qualifications for high ecclesiastical office in the France of Louis VII. Indeed, of the some 300 men Louis raised to the rank of bishop within the royal domain, or in sees outside of it where he held regalian rights, one can number on the fingers of one hand those who were authors or notable masters. Besides Peter, the only one who was a foreigner was John of Salisbury. John's elevation to the bishopric of Chartres later in the century inspired astonishment in the eyes of many French clerics, notwithstanding his wide-ranging political connections, both in England and on the continent. Unlike Peter and John, the other exceptions to Louis' episcopal policy had long-standing ecclesiastical or social ties in the dioceses to which they were appointed.²² Moreover, the first name reputed to have been put forth in the Parisian election of 1159 was not Peter's, but that of Philip, also an archdeacon of Paris, but, unlike Peter, the king's younger brother. Philip looked to be the obvious choice. But, when

and Theology," in *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la logica modernorum*, ed. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), p. 229 n. 1.

²¹ *Continuatio Beccensis*, ed. Richard Howlett, Rolls Series (London: H. M. Stationer's Office, 1889), 81 part 4: 323: "Magister Petrus Longobardus, vir magnae scientie et super Parisiensium doctores admirabilis."

²² Pacaut, *Louis VII et les élections*, pp. 106–09; Hallam, *Capetian France*, p. 195.

Peter's name was placed in nomination, Philip stepped down, in deference to the man who had been his teacher. Louis may have been surprised initially when the canons presented Peter as their candidate; but he ratified the election without demur or delay.²³ Peter's reign as bishop was as brief as his attainment of the office was remarkable. He died on either July 21 or 22, 1160. His surviving episcopal *acta* are too few and unsubstantial to enable us to infer anything about his administrative style or priorities. His epitaph, which, like his tomb, lay in the church of St. Marcellus in Paris prior to its destruction during the French Revolution, speaks rather to his fame as the author of the *Four Books of Sentences*, and his glosses on the Psalms and the Pauline epistles.²⁴

WORKS

These are the works of Peter's that have come down to us, although the assiduous investigation of modern scholarship has shown that they were not his only writings. The commentary on the Psalms is Peter's earliest known work. It was completed before 1138. An English pupil of the Lombard's, Herbert of Bosham, states that it was composed for his own edification and reflection, and not as a text for classroom instruction.²⁵ There is no evidence that he taught Psalms exegesis formally until 1158–59, although Brady's careful labors as the editor of the *Sentences* reveal the fact that he made significant use of the material in the Psalms gloss in his teaching as a systematic theologian. The next surviving work is his commentary on the Pauline epistles, entitled the *Collectanea*. This work underwent two redactions, the first composed between 1139 and 1141,²⁶ and the second, which revised some but not all parts of the

²³ Robert of Torigni, *Chronica*, ed. Richard Howlett, Rolls Series (London: H. M. Stationer's Office, 1889), 82 part 4: 204 even describes Peter's election as having been promoted "connivente Philippo." See also *Gallia Christiana*, 7: 68. The story of Philip's withdrawal is doubted by Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 1: 33*–34*. But it is accepted by Pacaut, *Louis VII et les élections*, pp. 119, 139, whose analysis Brady does not consider.

²⁴ *Gallia Christiana*, 7: 69.

²⁵ The text is printed by Joseph de Ghellinck, "La carrière de Pierre Lombard: Nouvelle précision chronologique," *RHE* 30 (1934): 98. Peter's glosses on the Psalms are printed in *PL* 191. Herbert's work on these glosses is discussed by H. H. Glunz, *History of the Vulgate in England from Alcuin to Roger Bacon: Being an Inquiry into the Text of Some English Manuscripts of the Vulgate Gospels* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), pp. 219–24.

²⁶ Recently, Zier, "Peter Lombard," p. 517, has followed Brady in arguing for a date of ca. 1147–48 for the first recension because of Peter's familiarity with the ideas of Gilbert of Poitiers, which gained wide publicity at that time. But he

work, between 1155 and 1158. Finishing touches on both glosses were added by Herbert, our first external witness to the double redaction of the *Collectanea*.²⁷ Internal evidence supporting the double redaction has also been found in the material from the *Sentences* which Peter incorporates into the second version, reflecting the development of his thought particularly in cases where he uses John Damascene.²⁸ Herbert does not indicate whether Peter's Pauline exegesis was initially intended for classroom instruction.²⁹ That this was the case is highly likely on both substantive and methodological grounds. There are clear, and reciprocal, borrowings of subject matter between the *Collectanea* and the *Sentences*. Just as he imported material he was developing for the final edition of the *Sentences* into the second redaction of the *Collectanea*, so he assigned large chunks of the *Collectanea* to their appropriate subject matter categories within the *Sentences*. Here, Brady's careful annotations of Peter's exegetical sources in the *Sentences* document one side of the transaction, while his discovery and publication of several of Peter's interim revisions of the first redactions of his commentaries on Romans and 1 Corinthians, which do not yet reflect his most mature treatment of the topics involved, illuminate the process of exegetical revision.³⁰ This evidence aside, it is difficult to see why Peter would have gone to the trouble of updating the *Collectanea* unless he was planning to use it as a teaching text, side by side with the *Sentences*. According to Brady, he lectured on St. Paul from these revised glosses in his final year of teaching,³¹ an opinion that makes eminent sense. For, it was in his Pauline exegesis that Peter first worked out the method for handling conflicting authorities, both in

ignores the fact that Gilbert taught in Paris for several years prior to his elevation to the see of Poitiers in 1142, and the fact that Peter was informed on Porretan teachings well before the end of the decade. For the chronology of Gilbert's career as a teacher, see H. C. van Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1966), p. 25; Lauge Olaf Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta's Thinking and the Theological Exposition of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130-1180*, Acta theologica danica, 15 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), pp. 27-29. The text of the *Collectanea* is printed in *PL* 191-192.

²⁷ Ghellinck, "La carrière," pp. 95-100.

²⁸ Modern scholars who have tracked the internal evidence for the second redaction of the *Collectanea* include Jean Leclercq, "Les deux redactions du prologue de Pierre Lombard sur les Épîtres de S. Paul," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 109-12; Ermenegildo Bertola, "I commentari paolini di Pietro Lombardo e loro duplice redazione," *Pier Lombardo* 3: 2-3 (1959): 75-90. The text of the *Collectanea* printed in *PL* 191-192 is based on the second redaction.

²⁹ Ghellinck, "La carrière," pp. 95-100.

³⁰ Brady, Appendices 1-3, in *Prolegomenon to Sent.* 2: 53*-87*.

³¹ Brady, *Prolegomenon to Sent.* 2: 19*.

establishing the correct reading of Paul's text and in addressing the doctrinal questions that flow from it, a method visible in a more full-blown form in the *Sentences*. Methodologically too, then, the organic connections between his exegesis and his systematic theology suggest why he would have treated the *Collectanea* as a school text and as a natural pedagogical companion piece to the *Sentences*.

The *Sentences* constitute the Lombardian *summa* that emerged out of the course in systematic theology which Peter taught for well-nigh two decades. He is thought to have begun this approach to pedagogy soon after the completion of the first version of his glosses on Paul. He continued to revise his treatment of particular topics over the years, sometimes entertaining his students in class by citing, as a position to be refuted, one he had held himself only recently.³² The development of Peter's ideas in the *Sentences* benefited from his deep, independent, and discriminating research into the thought of earlier authorities and from his wide familiarity with the work of contemporary masters, which sometimes alerted him to the need to take a stand on issues that were otherwise of little interest to him and sometimes led him to abandon, or, alternatively, to emphasize more sharply, opinions he had stated in his own earlier writings. The major turning point in his theological development in the writing of the *Sentences*, which enables us to date its final edition to the years 1155–57, was his encounter with the works of John Damascene in 1154. This author gave Peter the tools with which to reformulate his position on Trinitarian theology and Christology and to develop new arguments against views he rejected. The revised edition of the *Sentences* was probably what he taught in the academic year 1157–58, since, at the instance of his pupils, the following year was given over to the teaching of exegesis. The final version of the *Sentences* went into circulation immediately. And, it was read in circles that went well beyond those of the scholastic classrooms of Paris and environs where one would expect to find it, as is witnessed by the fact that the provenance of the first extant manuscript of the *Sentences*, dated to 1158 in the hand of the same scribe who copied it, now Troyes Bibliothèque Municipal MS. 286, formerly 960, was the monastery of Clairvaux.³³

³² Ignatius C. Brady, "Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings of Peter Lombard," *Antonianum* 41 (1966): 454–90.

³³ This manuscript was first noted and described by Joseph de Ghellinck, "Le traité de Pierre Lombard sur les sept ordres ecclésiastiques: Ses sources, ses copistes," *RHE* 10 (1909): 17 n. 2; and Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1957 [repr. of Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911 ed.], 2: 362.

As a member of the cathedral chapter of Notre Dame, Peter Lombard served as a preacher as well as a teacher of theology at the school. Some thirty of his sermons have survived, twenty-six of which are printed among the sermons of Hildebert of Lavardin in Migne's *Patrologia latina*, while the other four, discovered recently, have been edited and published elsewhere.³⁴ The vast majority were composed for delivery in connection with specific liturgical feast days or seasons, particularly Advent, Lent, and Easter, and very occasionally for saints' days falling within these parts of the liturgical calendar. They adhere closely to the themes of the day, without digressing. Rather than making his point of departure the gospel or another biblical reading assigned to the mass of the day, Peter takes as his text some other biblical passage that relates to it or that sheds light on it. His objective is not to preach on a particular text, but on the significance of the event in the life of Christ commemorated in the liturgy. His goal is less an exegetical one than a dogmatic one, the illumination of doctrinal truths and ethical values, which he always seeks to place in a larger theological framework. He sometimes weaves additional biblical material into the fabric of the sermon to promote these ends.

In handling the Bible in his sermons, Peter displays a firm grasp of the principles of typological exegesis, using them cogently, and in moderation, to show the connection between the revelation of the Old Testament and that of the New. He is not interested in the multiplication of allegorical examples, or in repeating himself. Copiousness is not one of his stylistic ideals. His sermons are lean and have a clear beginning, middle, and end. He evidently expects his audience to be able to follow the structure of his sermons, without the need for him to highlight their organization or to summarize the points made at the end of each section. Peter shows himself to be in command of the standard rhetorical devices used in homiletic oratory. He uses parallel sentence structures, parallel rhythms, and pariform word endings to reinforce his points, as well as the frequent citation of examples in threes. But he is not an orator who speaks because he enjoys the sound of his own voice, in order to overwhelm his audience emotionally, or to impress them with a display of rhetorical pyrotechnics. Both his voice, and his presentation of doctrine, are straightforward. They appeal to the

³⁴ See the analysis in Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 2: 99*–112*. The sermons belonging to Peter in *PL* 171 are those numbered 4, 7–8, 12–13, 21, 23–25, 32, 35–36, 43, 45, 55, 67–68, 72, 78, 80, 99, 111–112, and 115. See also Damien Van den Eynde, ed., “Deux sermons inédits de Pierre Lombard,” in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 75–87.

intellect more than to the heart. He deals with essential truths of the faith, grounding them mainly on the birth, life, teaching career, miracles, passion, and resurrection of Christ. The doctrines aired are sometimes ones that were matters of great controversy in the period; but Peter presents them concisely and without polemics. Those sermons dealing with the Trinity and with the co-inherence of the divine and human natures in the incarnate Christ were clearly written in the 1140s or early 1150s, for they do not manifest the more pointed doctrine and the crisper theological vocabulary found in the final edition of the *Sentences* on those subjects. Likewise, the sermons in which Peter discusses the cardinal virtues do not yet reflect the mature doctrine of grace found in his later work. The few scholars who have commented on Peter Lombard's sermons have agreed in finding them clear, instructive, impersonal, grave, and cool in their tone of voice. They are not sermons designed to reveal anything about the inner life of the author. They were probably composed for delivery not to the wider urban congregation of the cathedral of Notre Dame but to the canons and the students at the school.³⁵ Peter was not a master of the spiritual life and does not seek to present himself as one in his sermons. Rather, he resembles a school chaplain, who wants his educated hearers to apply their intelligence to their experience of the liturgy and to the nodal mysteries of the Christian faith that it commemorates.

As late as 1971, when Brady published the first volume of his edition of the *Sentences*, most scholarly considerations of Peter's works, having disposed of the *dubia* and *spuria*,³⁶ were inclined to stop right here. More recently, however, and triggered by the pioneering work of Beryl Smalley and George Lacombe,³⁷ which he

³⁵ Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 2: 33* n. 2, 34*; Joseph de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," in *DTC* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1935), 12 part 2: 1960; Jean Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires des maîtres parisiens au XII^e siècle: Étude historique et doctrinale* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1975), 1: 87–88.

³⁶ On this, see Joseph de Ghellinck, "Les 'opera dubia vel spuria' attribués à Pierre Lombard," *RHE* 28 (1932), 829–45; Ludwig Ott, *Untersuchung zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Fröscholastik*, Beiträge, 34 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1937), pp. 80–82; Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 1: 113*–17*. These include three letters from an unidentified Peter of Paris, two of which are written to a non-existent Philip, archbishop of Rheims, an *apologia* defending Peter against the attack made on his Christology by John of Cornwall after his death, a *Practicae theologiae methodus*, an *In concordiam evangelicam*, and a *Glossa ordinaria*. Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 2: 112*, later judged that Sermons 31 and 32, printed in *PL* 171 among other of the Lombard's sermons, are dubious and spurious, respectively.

³⁷ Beryl Smalley and George Lacombe were the first to suggest an expansion of the Lombard's exegetical canon in their "The Lombard's Commentary on Isaiah and Other Fragments," *New Scholasticism* 5 (1931): 123–62; followed by Smalley, "Some Gospel Commentaries of the Early Twelfth Century," *RTAM* 45 (1978):

confirmed in his latest research into the Lombardian canon, Brady has pressed forward to the investigation of the other writings that can be attributed to Peter although they are no longer extant. These writings are all exegetical and suggest that the Lombard glossed not only the Psalms and St. Paul, but virtually the entire Bible. Since these works have not survived, it is impossible to date them and to discover why they failed to inspire the interest which the Psalms commentary and the *Collectanea* clearly attracted. And, by the same token, the evidence supporting the composition of these other glosses is, necessarily, indirect. Three main lines of inquiry have been pursued in establishing that they existed, and what they were. In the first place, and following Smalley's lead, Brady has found references to additional glosses of Peter's in the works of contemporaries who were his pupils, such as Peter Comestor, William of Tyre, and Peter the Chanter, and in other figures, such as Stephen Langton, whose exegesis is closely dependent on Peter's.³⁸ Another of Brady's tactics has been to detect the work of Peter the exegete in citations found in his other writings that cannot be traced to the glosses of the other exegetes on whom he drew.³⁹

A third approach of Brady's has been to appeal to external evidence, especially the cartulary of Notre Dame and related documents.⁴⁰ The cartulary records Peter's obituary, and with it the bequest he made to the chapter in his last will and testament. This will indicates that he owned a house, next to St. Christopher's church on the Ile-de-la-Cité. This he gave to the chapter along with an "entire chapel" containing a gold chalice, liturgical vestments, two silver basins, and two vessels used in the administration of the water and wine in the Eucharistic service, a breviary in two volumes, and a pallium or altar cloth. In addition, and carefully inventoried, he bequeathed his library. The titles include the entire New Testament, with glosses on all the books. The books of the Old Testament accompanied by glosses are the Psalms, the five books of Moses, the four major prophets, the twelve minor prophets, the Song of Songs, and the books of Job, Esther, Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, and Ecclesiastes. Also listed are Peter's own copy of his *Sentences* and the *Decretum* of Gratian.⁴¹ Since this is Peter's official

153–56, 175; "Peter Comestor on the Gospels and His Sources," *RTAM* 46 (1979): 113. This position receives the support of Hödl, "Petrus Lombardus," p. 208.

³⁸ Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 2: 19*, 23*–28*, 44*–52*.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29*–33*.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21*.

⁴¹ M. Guérard, ed., *Cartulaire de l'église Notre-Dame de Paris*, Collection des cartulaires de France, 4 (Paris: Crapelet, 1850), 1: 60.

and documented bequest, it deserves to be taken seriously. Brady also refers to a library catalogue of Notre Dame which, among other exegetical works, mentions glosses on the books of Esdra and Proverbs. He argues that these glosses, as well, are works of the Lombard's.⁴² This document, however, is far more problematic than Peter's last will and testament. The latter can be dated to the year of his death and it specifically refers to the glossed books of the Bible as his own. On the other hand, the library catalogue is not itself dated. It is located in the cartulary between two items that are dated, but their dates are from the late twelfth to early thirteenth century. Nothing is stated about the authorship of any of the exegetical works listed. Included in this catalogue are the *Quaestiones* of Peter of Poitiers, a disciple of the Lombard's whose writings date to the next generation.⁴³ It may well be, therefore, that Peter of Poitiers, Peter Comestor, or some other Notre Dame master of the second half of the twelfth century is the author of these glosses.

Finally, Brady has stated that none of the manuscripts ascribable to the Lombard in either of these documents were retained by the chapter of Notre Dame. He speculates that they were sold by his successor to the see of Paris, Maurice of Sully,⁴⁴ a known critic of some of Peter's teachings and, equally important, an avid fundraiser whose chief administrative objective was to finance the raising of the new, high Gothic cathedral of Notre Dame, whose construction he initiated. Such may have been the case. Brady mentions a copy of the *Sentences* listed in 1271 among the books possessed by Notre Dame for the use of poor scholars, described as *originale Lombardi*. He suggests that the term "original" here means "integral," and that this codex was not Peter's autograph copy.⁴⁵ This judgment is plausible, because the same language occurs in another document not noticed by Brady, which can scarcely refer to the selfsame manuscript. In 1296, Peter of St. Audemars, chancellor of Notre Dame, made a donation of his own, a collection of theology books to be kept in the charge of subsequent chancellors of Notre Dame, also for the use of poor scholars who could not afford their own copies. The inventory includes "the *Four Books of Sentences*. *Item*, the original of the *Sentences* of Master Peter Lombard," and goes on to describe the binding of the codex, its leather now somewhat the

⁴² Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 2: 21*-22*.

⁴³ *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame*, 1: 462, item 39.

⁴⁴ Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 2: 22*-23*.

⁴⁵ Brady, Prolegomenon to *Sent.* 1: 129*-30*.

worse for wear.⁴⁶ From the standpoint of the physical wanderings and vicissitudes of medieval codices, the ultimate fate of Peter's own personal copy of his masterpiece is unknown. But the academic survival of Peter's *Sentences* was never very much in doubt.

REPUTATION

How far do the biographical facts that can be gleaned, inferred, or plausibly conjectured about him go in putting a human face on Peter Lombard? While he remains tantalizingly elusive as a personality, some few glimpses of what he was like do emerge from the externals of his life. He was clearly a man who made a deep and lasting impression on his contemporaries, a man who inspired admiration and respect. As a foreigner without resources and connections, he succeeded in swimming against the current of French church history in his day, winning reception as a canon of Notre Dame, advancement in the chapter, and a stunning election to the bishopric of Paris. Strictly on the basis of talent, he rose to the top of the academic ladder and thereby captured for Notre Dame a commanding lead in the teaching of school theology, which was to flow directly into the theological faculty of the University of Paris in the immediate sequel. As a career intellectual, he managed to turn his outsider status in France into an asset. He was open to learning from a wide number of masters and found decided affinities with some of them; but he never sacrificed his independence on the altar of discipleship. In a period when personal animosities and professional jealousies often poisoned the exchanges between thinkers, embittering the lives of some masters and hindering their work, Peter appears to have made no enemies, but rather to have won the esteem of those who knew him, even though he did not shrink from espousing controversial opinions.

Peter's students quite naturally lauded him. As with William of Tyre, who was his pupil for six years, the Lombard's outstanding knowledge, the "sane doctrine commended by all," and the veneration his teaching inspired⁴⁷ could be invoked retrospectively as a

⁴⁶ *Excerpta ex Libro nigro*, 2, Appendix to *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame*, 3: 353: "Quattuor libri Sententiarum. Item, originale Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, in quodam libro coperto corio vitulino, jam quasi depilato, cum clavis rotundis cupro."

⁴⁷ This fragment from William of Tyre's *Historia* was discovered and first published by R. B. C. Huygens, ed., "Guillaume de Tyr étudiant: Un chapitre (XIX, 12) de son 'Histoire' retrouvé," *Latomus* 21 (1962): 823: "In theologia autem virum in ea scientia singularem, cuius opera que exstant prudentum chorus

measure of his own good fortune and of the solidity of his own academic training. The praises of the author of the *Metamorphosis Goliae* and of the continuator of Bec, cited earlier, came from men who had no such personal stake in his reputation. Even a critic, like Gerhoch of Reichersberg, could refer honestly and gracefully to Peter's distinguished research as the author of the *Sentences*, bringing together as it did "the opinions of many and diverse churchmen and scholastics both old and new,"⁴⁸ in the same work where he took exception to Peter's Christology, as he understood it.

Later in the twelfth and thirteenth century, chroniclers from various parts of Europe echo the impression of Peter's decisive seizure of the theological initiative which the inner history of scholasticism reveals. At the very least, with Jacques de Vitry, they hold his work to be useful.⁴⁹ More typically, as with Alberic of Trois Fontaines, they describe his *Sentences* as "a most excellent work" and his exegesis as now the acknowledged "greater gloss,"⁵⁰ while the Sanblasian continuator characterizes his teaching as brilliant and illustrious.⁵¹ A few thirteenth-century chroniclers repeat these views, sometimes almost verbatim; by then, they had acquired an air of complimentary boiler plate.⁵² But Vincent of Beauvais goes on to observe that Peter's works, "all of which are publicly taught

cum veneratione amplectitur et colit cum reverentia, virum sana doctrina per omnia commendabilem, magistrum videlicet Petrum Lombardum, qui postea fuit Parisiensis episcopus, annis sex continuis audivimus."

⁴⁸ Gerhoch of Reichersberg, *Liber de gloria et honore Filii hominis* 19, PL 194: 1143D.

⁴⁹ Jacques de Vitry, *Chronicon Legendae aurae inserto*, MGH, Scriptores (Hannover, 1879), 24: 171: "Floruit magister Petrus Lombardus episcopus Parisiensis, qui Librum Sententiarum, glosas Psalterii, et epistolarum Pauli utiliter compilavit."

⁵⁰ Alberic of Trois Fontaines, *Chronica*, MGH, Scriptores (Hannover, 1874), 23: 843: "Circa hoc tempus magister Petrus Lombardus fuit Parisiensibus episcopus . . . Qui tria fecit opuscula egregia, videlicet Librum Sententiarum, quod est opus excellentissimum, Glossaturam continuam super beati Pauli epistolas, et opus satis grande super Psalterium. Et hec est in scholis illa quae dicitur maior Glossatura."

⁵¹ *Continuatio Sanblasiana*, MGH, Scriptores (Hannover, 1868), 20: 308: "His diebus Petrus Lombardus et Petrus Manducator apud Parisiensium magistri insigni claruerunt . . . Preter hec in Apostolum nec non Psalterium continuas glosas luculenter admodum exposuit."

⁵² For instance, *Chronica Pontificum et Imperatorum Mantuana*, MGH, Scriptores (Hannover, 1879), 24: 218: "Eo etiam tempore floruit Petrus Lombardus, episcopus Parisiensis, qui Librum Sententiarum, glosas Psalterii et Epistolarum Pauli utiliter compilavit;" William Andrenus, *Chronica*, MGH, Scriptores (Hannover, 1879), 24: 725: "Et cum eisdem donariis Psalterium glossatum, epistolas Pauli glossatas, sententias magistri Petri."

in the schools," had attained the status of academic classics.⁵³ It is certainly true that, by the late thirteenth century, scholastics had concurred in dismissing some of Peter's opinions.⁵⁴ None the less, Dante Alighieri was on the mark in placing him in the Heaven of the Sun, the heaven of the theologians, along side of some of his most famous commentators.⁵⁵ These witnesses testify to the rapid acceptance which Peter's work received and to its continuing impact on both systematic theology and exegesis. But there is one of them, the same Ricobaldo of Ferrara responsible for launching some of the Lombardian apocrypha with which this chapter opened, who goes farther than anyone else in underscoring the particular qualities of mind and character that emerge from the nude facts of Peter's biography, the qualities that informed his writings and gave them their immediate excitement and durable appeal. Peter was recognized, Ricobaldo says, for the "shining intelligence" (*clarus ingenio*) irradiating his *Sentences*; he was "a learned and a humble man" (*vir peritus et humilis*).⁵⁶ In the chapters that follow, it will be our task to uncover the teachings that flowered from the stock of these inborn and acquired virtues.

⁵³ Vincent of Beauvais, *Memoriale omnium temporum*, MGH, Scriptores (Hannover, 1879), 24: 157–58: "Sub Ludovico Francorum rege, patre Philippi, magister Petrus Lombardus Parisiensis episcopus claruit, qui Libri Sententiarum et glosas psalteri et epistularum Pauli, que omnia nunc in scholis publice leguntur, ex multis catholicorum patrum dictis utiliter compilavit et ordinavit."

⁵⁴ Edward A. Synan, "Brother Thomas, the Master, and the Masters," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies*, 2 vols., ed. Armand A. Maurer et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 2: 227–42.

⁵⁵ Dante Alighieri, *Paradiso* 10.107–08: "quel Pietro fu che con la poverella/ offerse a Santa Chiesa suo tesoro." Massara, "La leggenda," pp. 135–36, thinks that the legend of Peter as the son of a poor laundress is the source for this image of the widow's mite. But, it derives from Peter's allusion to Mark 12:42–43 and to Luke 21:1–2 in his "modest author" description of his work in the *incipit* to *Sent.* 1 prologus 1, 1: 3.

⁵⁶ Ricobaldo, *Historia*, *Rerum Italicorum Scriptores*, 9: 124.

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE

The most central and enduring contribution to the history of Christian thought made in the time of Peter Lombard was a thoroughgoing reconsideration of the nature of the theological enterprise. As contributing members of the renaissance of learning that swept through the twelfth-century schools in all fields of learning, the theologians in his milieu were eager to amplify and to improve on the quality of instruction in their own subject. And, as with other contemporary masters, they were concerned with turning their subject into a professional discipline, one with a clear intellectual profile and a conscious sense of what pertained to it and where it stood in relation to other forms of intellectual endeavor. Theologians in the schools committed themselves, as never before, to the task of ensuring that their students possessed both the range and depth of knowledge and the technical skills required not only to solve practical problems within the church but also the skills required to train other professional theologians as masters in their own turn. As a consequence, a massive pedagogical assignment now confronted the school theologians. They were required to design a curriculum for the education of professional theologians. In constructing their syllabus, they had to decide what topics to include and the order in which to present them. They needed to supply, as well, a convincing rationale for their particular selection and ordering of the material. In addition, the theologians needed to devise pedagogical strategies for teaching their students how to think theologically. Students would have to learn how to appraise and to analyze the legacy of the Christian tradition and the positions of rival contemporary masters. They would need guidance in the fruitful application of ideas and principles drawn from sister disciplines. And, they would have to master the use of these tools and materials critically and constructively in addressing the theological problems of the day, both the hardy perennials and the questions being newly agitated.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

The response of the twelfth-century theologians to these perceived educational needs was to invent systematic theology¹ and the sentence collection as a means of doing it. It must be stressed here that both systematic theology and the sentence collection were inventions of the twelfth century. To be sure, a huge amount of theology had been written before this time. Latin theologians from the patristic period onward had produced a large number of genres of theological literature. They had written exegesis, polemics, hortatory, consolatory, and homiletic literature. They had reflected and debated on a host of individual themes and questions, whether dogmatic, sacramental, ethical, or publicistic. They had held up models of excellence in saints' lives and had catalogued heresies to be avoided. They had also, at times, collected debated issues and offered their solutions; they had commented on the creeds of the church; and they had drafted concise summaries of the main points of Christian doctrine for the instruction of neophytes. But, before the twelfth century, no Latin theologian had developed a full-scale theological system, with a place for everything and everything in its place, in a work that went well beyond the bare essentials, that treated theology as a wholesale and coherent intellectual activity, and that, at the same time, imparted the principles of theological reasoning and theological research to professionals in the making.² The genre of theological literature which proved to be the twelfth century's most innovative response to the pedagogical challenge presented by the teaching of systematic theology was the scholastic sentence collection. As we know, it was Peter Lombard's *Sentences*

¹ A useful introductory overview is provided by Henri Cloes, "La systématisation théologique pendant la première moitié du XII^e siècle," *ETL* 34 (1958): 277–329.

² For the contrast between the patristic and the twelfth-century handling of *quaestiones* and the relation of the latter to theological system-building, see Coloman Viola, "Manières personnelles et impersonnelles d'aborder un problème: Saint Augustin et le XII^e siècle. Contribution à l'histoire de la 'quaestio'," in *Les Genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales: Définition, critique et exploitation* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1982), pp. 25–30. Aloys Grillmeier, "Fulgentius von Ruspe, De fide ad Petrum und die Summa Sententiarum: Eine Studie zum Werden der fröhscholastischen Systematik," *Scholastik* 34 (1959): 526–65 seeks to show that patristic works such as Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum* and Gennadius, *Liber sive definitio ecclesiasticorum dogmatum* should be seen as schematic models for sentence collections such as the *Summa sententiarum*, and not merely as sources for individual opinions; but the effect of his analysis is to show the differences rather than the parallels between these kinds of works.

that was regarded by medieval scholastics as having met the educational objectives involved in this enterprise better than the sentence collections of his competitors. In order to see how and why this was the case, this chapter will consider the *Sentences* in comparison with the work of the actual or would-be systematic theologians of the first half of the twelfth century, not only among the scholastics who made use of the sentence collection as a medium but also among the non-scholastic theologians who wrote systematic theology, tackling parallel assignments but with quite different aims.

MONASTIC PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS

It is important to recognize that systematic theology was not a monopoly of the scholastics, and that not all scholastic theologians at the time were interested in writing it, or equally adequate to the task when they did essay it. There were a number of monastic authors who wrote systematic theology in the first half of the twelfth century. It is not their lack of an *esprit de système* that differentiates them from contemporary scholastics, but rather the educational agendas with which they associated it. At the same time, not all early twelfth-century scholastics were involved in system-building to the same degree. Some were, but went only part of the distance, while others did not set out on this itinerary at all. The activity was far from being monolithic; it does not always provide an automatic or infallible way of distinguishing one sub-set of theologians from another in this period. In order to illustrate that point, and to heighten our appreciation of what Peter aimed at and achieved, it will be helpful to approach him by way of the theologians of the generation before and during his own, with whom he may be usefully compared.

The earliest systematic theologians of the twelfth century were not scholastics at all but monks, German Benedictines deeply committed to the Gregorian reform movement in general and to monastic reform in particular. Some proponents of monastic reform at this time thought that the best way to achieve it was to found new monastic orders. But Rupert of Deutz and Honorius Augustodunensis, the figures who will serve as our cases in point here, sought to reinvigorate the Benedictine order from within. The energy which they applied to this task and the long term success of the systematic theologies which they wrote for that purpose do much to support John Van Engen's claim that the crisis deemed to have been afflicting Benedictine monasticism at this time has been

somewhat exaggerated.³ While Rupert and Honorius have much in common, a close look at their systematic theologies shows that they are as different from each other as each is from his scholastic counterparts.

Rupert's *On the Trinity and Its Works*, written between 1112 and 1116, is one of the first systematic theologies of the century.⁴ It displays many similarities with contemporary and later scholastic sentence collections. As with many current scholastics, Rupert is sensitive to the problem of theological language, particularly as it affects the treatment of Trinitarian theology and Christology. He has an up-to-date command of the terminology of Aristotle and Boethius, now receiving sustained attention in the schools. He is familiar and comfortable with the technical issues in logic and theology embedded in the contemporary debates over the teachings of Roscellinus of Compiègne. Rupert also reflects a preference for a literal account of creation, showing a responsiveness to the new interest in cosmology fashionable in some scholastic centers west of the Rhine. As well, in discussing marriage, he forecasts Hugh of St. Victor's critique of the anti-Pelagian Augustine on that subject, emphasizing the point that marriage is a sacrament instituted in Eden before the fall and that, in man's postlapsarian state, it is not merely a remedy for sin. Even more striking, the organization and coverage of *On the Trinity* has notable parallels with the works of the sentence collectors. Rupert deals with many of the same topics, and in much the same order, starting with God, then moving to creatures, and then treating the fall of man and its consequences, and God's reparation of the situation through Christ's redemption.

Yet, if we move beyond Rupert's vocabulary and schema to his actual handling of the topics he takes up, *On the Trinity* emerges as a *summa* decidedly monastic in character, both with respect to its appeal to the Christian tradition, its intended audience, and the mode of theological reflection it demands and promotes. As is typical with monastic theologians, Rupert is not so much interested

³ John Van Engen, "The 'Crisis of Cenobitism' Reconsidered: Benedictine Monasticism between the Years 1050–1150," *Speculum* 61 (1986): 269–304; *Rupert of Deutz* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 365–68. For another reappraisal of the openness of twelfth-century monasticism to currents of thought that some scholars would confine only to scholastic circles, see Marjorie Chibnall, *The World of Ordericus Vitalis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 58–85, 90, 99.

⁴ For a more extended discussion, see Marcia L. Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal in the Twelfth Century," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 18 (1988): 138–41. Rupert's *De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius* has been edited by Rabanus Haacke in CCCM 21–24 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1971–72). On Rupert, see Van Engen, *Rupert of Deutz*, esp. pp. 74–94 for this work.

in debating with authorities he disagrees with as with choosing the ones he finds illuminating, and weaving them seamlessly into his own discourse. He is not concerned with helping his readers reconstruct the history of doctrine on any of the points he discusses, but rather seeks to extract profit from his preferred sources and to direct the reader's attention to the intellectual sustenance he can gain from them. The model, and rationale, that Rupert adopts as his overall strategy is that of salvation history. As he sees it, in this life the triune God can best be known, short of mysticism, not primarily as the first cause though His effects in the natural world or through the analogies of the Trinity in the human soul, but through the work of divine creation, redemption, and renovation recounted in Holy Scripture. Rupert takes the standard relational terms used to describe the Trinitarian persons vis-à-vis each other—unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding—and applies them to the work of each Trinitarian person, manifested to man, as it is revealed in Scripture. This tactic is designed to support the idea that meditation on God, as He reveals himself in Scripture, will lead the mind to a knowledge of the eternal, unmanifested Trinity in itself. Thus, Rupert's whole enterprise yokes systematic theology to the kind of meditative, reflective *lectio divina* specific to the monastic calling, although with a stress on fundamental doctrine rather than on ethical edification.

Our second monastic systematic theologian, Honorius, provides an even more instructive comparison for our purposes. The particular aspect of the contemporary reform movement on which he took a stand was the debate over whether the Benedictines should continue to minister to lay congregations, as they had been doing for centuries. Contemporary critics opposed the idea, whether out of a desire to distinguish more clearly between the roles of the secular clergy and the monks in principle, or because they thought that the monks were inadequately trained for the ministry, or because they eyed greedily the tithes which the monks collected from their parishioners.⁵ Honorius was a vigorous defender of the rights of the Benedictines to serve lay congregations and, not incidentally, to receive their tithes. His response to the critics was forthright and practical. In the first year or two of the twelfth century, and most likely on his return to his native Germany from a

⁵ A good account of this debate is provided by M. Peuchmaurd, "Le prêtre ministre de la parole dans la théologie du XIIe siècle: Canonistes, moines, et chanoines," *RTAM* 29 (1962): 52–76.

course of study in England with Anselm and Eadmer of Canterbury,⁶ he wrote the *Elucidarium*, a work of systematic theology aimed at instructing his Benedictine confrères who served in the pastoral ministry, upgrading their theological knowledge, and equipping them to meet the perceived needs of their parishioners.⁷ While Honorius's immediate audience was thus a monastic one, his ultimate goal was to instruct the laity. He does not write to stimulate monastic meditation or to encourage theological speculation. He touches firmly, and lightly, on basic doctrines, emphasizing instead their practical consequences in ethics, the sacramental life, and the life to come. He presents a summary overview, sparked by vivid imagery, designed to hold an audience whose theological attention span was likely to be short and whose interest in the subject was anything but professional.

At the same time, the schema laid out in the *Elucidarium* is both inclusive, coherent, and sophisticated. Although some commentators have seen the work as lacking in logical consistency,⁸ it can hold its own in this respect, in comparison with the schemata of some of the scholastic systematizers later in the century. Honorius subdivides his work into three books. In the first, he takes up God, the creation of angels and their fall, the creation of man and his fall,

⁶ On Honorius's biography, his education, and the dating of this work, see Valerie I. J. Flint, ed. "Honorius Augustodunensis, *Imago mundi*," *AHDLMA* 49 (1982): 7–8; "The Career of Honorius Augustodunensis: Some Fresh Evidence," *R. bén.* 82 (1972): 63–86; "The Chronology of the Works of Honorius Augustodunensis" *R. bén.* 82 (1972): 215–42. See also Marie-Odile Garrigues, "Quelques recherches sur l'oeuvre d'Honorius Augustodunensis," *RHE* 70 (1975): 388–425; Eva Matthews Sanford, "Honorius *Presbyter* and *Scholasticus*," *Speculum* 23 (1948): 397–404. Flint's dating of the *Elucidarium* is supported by Robert D. Crouse, "Honorius Augustodunensis: Disciple of Anselm?" in *Analecta Anselmiana*, ed. Helmut Kohlenberger (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1975), 4 part 2: 131–39; Crouse challenges the view that Honorius studied with Anselm of Canterbury, although he admits that it is otherwise difficult to account for his familiarity with the *Cur deus homo*, which had just been completed when he wrote the *Elucidarium*. Janice L. Schultz, "Honorius Augustodunensis," in *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph R. Strayer (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), 6: 285–86, reports this difference of opinion without taking sides.

⁷ Honorius, *Elucidarium*, ed. Yves Lefèvre in *L'Elucidarium et les lucidaires: Contribution par l'histoire d'un texte à l'histoire des croyances religieuses en France au moyen âge* (Paris: É. de Boccard, 1954). On the context in which this work was written, see Valerie I. J. Flint, "The 'Elucidarius' of Honorius Augustodunensis and Reform in Late Eleventh-Century England," *R. bén.* 85 (1975): 179–89; "The Place and Purpose of the Works of Honorius Augustodunensis," *R. bén.* 87 (1977): 97–118. See also Josef A. Endres, *Honorius Augustodunensis: Beitrag zur Geschichte der geistigen Lebens im 12. Jahrhundert* (Kempten: Kösel'schen Buchhandlung, 1906), pp. 16–21.

⁸ Endres, *Honorius*, p. 197 n. 1; Joseph de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle*, 2nd ed. (Bruges: De Tempel, 1948), p. 119; Lefèvre, *L'Elucidarium*, pp. 201–05.

the need for redemption, the incarnation, and the earthly life of Christ. Under the latter heading, he considers not only Christ's nature as a God-man and its necessity or propriety as a means of man's redemption, but also offers a historical reprise of His life from the nativity to the ascension. Next, Honorius discusses the earthly survival and extension of Christ's saving work in the church, founded at Pentecost, and understood as Christ's mystical body. This body is manifested and made available most perfectly in the dispensation and ministry of the church by the Eucharist, which Honorius then takes up, adding, as a pendant to this topic, the problem of immoral priests and the efficacy of their Eucharistic ministry.

The ecclesiology developed near the end of Book 1 provides the conceptual foundation for the rest of the material Honorius treats in the next two books. Book 2 addresses, as its central concern, the ethical and sacramental life of the church in this world. Honorius leads off with a brief consideration of the nature of sin, which he sees as rooted in man's intentional use of his free will, and with a discussion of God's omnipotence, providence, and predestination as the basis for an understanding of the interaction of God's grace and man's freedom in the Christian life. Man's soul and the transmission and consequences of original sin are next considered, followed by baptism as the necessary corrective to the fall. After an abbreviated treatment of marriage, Honorius moves on to illustrate the various professions men exercise in Christian society. These are presented not so much as Christian callings but as conditions that bear with them specific moral responsibilities and temptations. Masculine activities alone are considered, from cleric to monk to ruler to soldier to merchant to jongleur to farmer. Honorius assesses the practitioner's chances of salvation in each case, with farmers leading the field and jongleurs all but condemned to perdition *ex officio*. While he ignores women, their social roles and their varying states of life, Honorius does take up the ethical problems and opportunities of different age groups. Refreshingly, he thinks young people are more likely to be saved than the old, since they are more flexible and open to change.⁹ Clearly, this presentation and analysis of ethical examples, drawn largely from lay professional life, is something Honorius finds more important than the psychogenesis of ethical acts and the intractable problem of free will and grace, to which he gives such perfunctory treatment. He rounds out Book 2 with the modes by which man has been ethically

⁹ Honorius, *Elucidarium* 2.52–66, pp. 427–31.

governed. Penance is the means available for moral correction and progress in the present dispensation, he notes; it was preceded in the Old Testament by the Mosaic law and the exhortation of the prophets. Throughout, guardian angels have been on hand to assist men against diabolical temptation. Honorius concludes this book with the sacrament of unction, which typically comes at the end of the earthly life of the individual Christian.

Fully one third of the *Elucidarium* is devoted to Last Things, a subject which Honorius takes up as a sequel and conclusion to the life of the church on earth, in the permanent assignments of its members in the life to come. Last Things is a topic which he embraces enthusiastically. All aspects of the eschatological scenario, from the condition of souls before the coming of Antichrist, the arrival and reign of Antichrist, the general resurrection, the second coming of Christ, the last judgment, Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven, are described in painstaking detail and in glorious technicolor. Honorius relies on such sources as the final chapters of Augustine's *City of God* and on the most imaginative passages of Julian of Toledo's *Prognosticon futuri saeculi*. He paints a synaesthetic and multi-media picture both of the torments of the damned¹⁰ and of the joys of the saved.¹¹

There are, to be sure, some problems in Honorius's coverage and organization. But it is also quite clear that his emphasis is dictated by his canny estimate of the intellectual needs, tolerances, and interests of his intended audience. Honorius's handling of the sacraments is intermingled with other subjects, whether dogmatic, as in the case of the Eucharist, or ethical, as in the case of the other sacraments. He omits confirmation and takes up holy orders only obliquely, in connection with the sacramental ministry of bad priests in Book 1 and the moral duties of clerics in Book 2. In his account of creation, he mentions angels, men, and animals, but not plants and other inanimate beings. His analysis, and his often harsh judgments, of the chances for salvation of various occupational groups on the basis of profession alone in Book 2 does not square entirely with his stress on intentionality in the moral life elsewhere in the same book. None the less, in comparison with many of the systematic theologians who wrote later in the century, Honorius is remarkably inclusive and his inconsistencies are relatively minor. Within the terms of his project, as he has envisioned

¹⁰ Ibid., 3.12–18, pp. 447–49.

¹¹ Ibid., 3.38–49, 3.79–120, pp. 454–57, 463–77.

it, his schema is cogent and easy to follow. It reflects his idea that the average Christian has both the need, and the capacity, to understand how individual doctrines hang together. And, the *Elucidarium* shows Honorius's willingness to give pride of place to the subjects his audience cares most about, the subjects on which their attention can be caught and directed to the theological reasons undergirding the norms ruling their daily lives and the faith that is the foundation of their hopes, fears, and expectations.

This elaborate and carefully orchestrated schema is combined with another feature of the *Elucidarium* which serves as an equally clear index of its intended function as a systematic theology for the common man, an utterly simplistic and catechetical presentation of the material it contains. In no sense does Honorius seek to alert his readers to the theological controversies of the day. Nor does he want to inform them of the fact that the authorities sometimes disagree and, if so, what to do about it. Honorius himself is prodigiously learned. The *Elucidarium* is based on thorough and up-to-date research. From his own rich command of the relevant theological literature, he makes his choices but without flaunting his knowledge. Since his aim is not to provoke inquiry but to lay questions to rest, what he does is simply to state clearly and firmly in his own words the best answers he can find to the questions he raises. He does not indicate by name or work the particular authorities he uses for this purpose and he does not explain why he prefers their conclusions. As Valerie Flint has aptly noted, in the *Elucidarium* the author's intention is "to reduce the most complex to the most simple, to substitute the answers for the learning process, and so supposedly to render that process unnecessary by the deft finding of answers."¹²

As the first systematic theologians of the twelfth century, Honorius and Rupert both bring a keen and judicious sense of audience to their tasks. Both hit the marks at which they aimed. Their works were immensely popular, as the numerous manuscripts preserving them over the next several hundred years attest.¹³ Together, they suggest how shortsighted it is to locate the revival of monastic theology in this period exclusively in those authors who took their cue from Bernard of Clairvaux. When *On the Holy Trinity* and the

¹² Valerie I. J. Flint, "Henricus of Augsburg and Honorius Augustodunensis: Are They the Same Person?" *R. bén.* 92 (1982): 150–51.

¹³ For Rupert, see Haacke's preface to the *De sancta Trinitate*, CCCM 22; for Honorius, see Lefèvre, *L'Elucidarium*, pp. 334–57; Flint, "Place and Purpose," pp. 119–27.

Elucidarium were written, they were quite original. Neither Rupert nor Honorius had either monastic or scholastic models to follow. Honorius's likely master, Anselm of Canterbury, the towering theological mind of the day, had moved theology a major step forward by his rigorous insistence on rational argument as a means of clarifying the faith. But his own oeuvre continued to reflect the earlier tendency of theologians to take on specific and limited problems in individual works rather than to provide a synthetic theological curriculum. And, the leading scholastics at the turn of the twelfth century, Anselm of Laon and his followers, while they made notable advances in one area of scholastic pedagogy, the analysis and criticism of authorities, did not see the construction of a systematic approach to theology as part of their project.

THE SCHOLASTIC SENTENCE COLLECTION AS A GENRE OF THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

This last statement may still require emphasis, given the fact that some of the most influential medievalists of our century have seen in Anselm of Laon and his disciples the inventors of the systematic sentence collection. This notion was popularized by Martin Grabmann, who saw their work as both dialectical and architectonic, and as heralding not only the elaborate sentence collections of the mid-century but also the *summae* of the thirteenth century to come.¹⁴ While he plays down their appeal to logic, Joseph de Ghellinck joins Grabmann in describing the works of the Laon masters as mini-*summae*, which present theological topics under a series of specific and highly coherent dogmatic headings.¹⁵ This view has been perpetuated by a number of other scholars.¹⁶ But its most enthusiastic supporter has been Franz Bliemetzrieder, one of the earliest editors of the Laon school manuscripts, who

¹⁴ Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2 vols. (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1957 [repr. of Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911 ed.]), 2: 157–68.

¹⁵ Joseph de Ghellinck, *L'Essor de la littérature latine au XII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, 1946), 1: 41–45; *Le Mouvement théologique*, pp. 138–48.

¹⁶ See, for example, Francesco Carpino, "Una difficoltà contro la confessione nella scolastica primitiva: Anselmo di Laon e la sua scuola," *Divus Thomas*, 3^a ser. 16 (1939): 39; Cloes, "La systématisation de théologie," pp. 277 ff.; Artur Michael Landgraf, "Zum Werden der Theologie des 12. Jarhhunderts," *ZkT* 79 (1957): 425, 428; Ludwig Ott, "Petrus Lombardus: Persönlichkeit und Werk," *Münchener theologische Zeitschrift* 5 (1954): 105; "Pietro Lombardo: Personalità e opera," in *Misc. Lomb.*, p. 15; René Silvain, "La tradition des Sentences d'Anselme de Laon," *AHDLM* 22–23 (1947–48): 1–52.

depicts Anselm of Laon as the century's most creative theologian in this respect and as the model for all subsequent systematic theologians up through Peter Lombard.¹⁷

The very wave of editorial activity unleashed by Bliemetzrieder has provided the corrective to this interpretation, by showing that the attribution of a systematic character to the writings of the Laon masters rests on a very shaky foundation, a far-too sketchy examination of the manuscripts in which they are preserved. More recent editors, in addition to bringing new texts to light, and proposing connections among them, have undermined the earlier view. Thus, Heinrich Weisweiler has proposed that Anselm set his face against the dialectical theologians of the age and that he did not create a new structure or model for theological education, preferring an approach embedded in biblical exegesis. As Weisweiler has observed, both Anselm's own works and those of his disciples only received schematic form later on, a form often imposed on the materials by the redactors who compiled their individual opinions.¹⁸ The most recent editor, Odon Lottin, agrees that both the literary form and the ordering of the doctrinal content found in the Laon school manuscripts is a function of *ex post facto* editorial arrangement and that they cannot be taken as an index of the school of Laon's own view of theological education. While there are identifiable family relations among the authors in this group, and while many of their individual opinions received respectful attention from other theologians during the first half of the century, he concludes, it cannot be shown that either Anselm or his followers created the systematic sentence collection, or that they organized their teaching along the lines of a later *summa*.¹⁹

¹⁷ Franz Bliemetzrieder, "Autour de l'oeuvre d'Anselme de Laon," *RTAM* 1 (1929): 436.

¹⁸ Heinrich Weisweiler, "L'École d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Champeaux: Nouveaux documents," *RTAM* 4 (1932): 237–69, 371–91; Weisweiler, ed., *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in deutschen Bibliotheken*, Beiträge, 33:1–2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), pp. 3–6, 27–257. For the most recent review of the literature dealing with the filiation of these texts, see Heinrich J. F. Reinhardt, "Literaturkritische und theologiegeschichtliche Studie zu den *Sententiae Magistri A.* und deren Prolog 'Ad iustitiam credens debemus'," *AHDLM* 36 (1969): 23–29.

¹⁹ Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, vols. 1–5 (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1948–59), 5: 7–10, 178–83, 229–30, 444–47; Lottin, ed., "Quatre sommes fragmentaires de l'école d'Anselme de Laon," in *Mélanges August Pelzer: Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale de la scolastique médiévale offerts à Monseigneur August Pelzer à l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire* (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1947), pp. 81–108. This judgment has been supported by

THE CRITICISM AND EVALUATION OF AUTHORITIES

While the Laon masters can no longer be viewed as the creators of the systematic sentence collection, their opinions do reflect another dimension of the approach to theological education taken up by later scholastics who did use that genre, and one which distinguishes their work sharply from that of the monastic systematizers just discussed. It also distinguishes the work of the scholastic theologians of this period from that of the canonists, even though the boundaries between these two disciplines in the early twelfth century were far less distinct and more permeable than they became later in the Middle Ages. Well before Peter Abelard had formulated his famous rules for the analysis and evaluation of authorities in his *Sic et non*,²⁰ the Laon masters indicate that they had already grasped and had learned how to apply the principles of authorial intention and historical criticism. The fact that this development was occurring, before Abelard's time, and that theologians such as the Laon masters as well as the canonists were contributing to it, has received a certain amount of scholarly appreciation.²¹ It has also been recognized that both canonists and

Ermenegildo Bertola, "Le critiche di Abelardo ad Anselmo di Laon ed a Guglielmo di Champeaux," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 52 (1960): 503-04; Bernard Merlette, "Écoles et bibliothèques à Laon, du déclin de l'antiquité au développement de l'Université," in *Enseignement et vie intellectuelle, IX^e-XVI^e siècle*, Actes du 95^e congrès national des sociétés savantes, Reims, 1970 (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1975), 1: 43. For more on this subject, see Marcia L. Colish, "Another Look at the School of Laon," *AHDLMA* 53 (1986): 7-11.

²⁰ Peter Abelard, *Sic et non* prologus, ed. Blanche B. Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 96. Good discussions of Abelard's essay on method here, which do not speculate on his sources for it, are Jean Jolivet, "Le traitement des autorités contraires selon le *Sic et non* d'Abélard," in *Aspects de la pensée médiévale: Abélard. Doctrines du langage* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1987), pp. 79-92; G. Paré, A. Brunet, and P. Tremblay, *La renaissance du XII^e siècle: Les écoles et l'enseignement* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933), pp. 290-91. Scholars who have recognized Abelard's methodological dependence on the school of Laon as well as on the canonists, at least in part, include Ermenegildo Bertola, "I precedenti storici del metodo del 'Sic et non' di Abelardo," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 53 (1961): 266-76 and Mary M. McLaughlin, "Abelard as Autobiographer: The Motives and Meaning of His 'Story of Calamities'," *Speculum* 42 (1967): 478.

²¹ Franz Bliemetzrieder, "Gratian und die Schule Anselms von Laon," *Archiv für katholische Kirchenrecht* 112 (1932): 37-63; Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Interaction between Canon Law and Sacramental Theology in the Twelfth Century," in *Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. Stephan G. Kuttner (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1976), pp. 483-93; "The Sententiae Magistri A. (Vat. Ms. lat. 4361) and the School of Laon," *MS* 17 (1955): 1-45; Stephan G. Kuttner, "Zur Frage der theologischen Vorlagen Gratians," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, kanonistische Abteilung* 23 (1934): 243-68. Still, the exclusion of the school of Laon from the group of

theologians freely invoked ancient authorities as a rationale for the departures from existing norms and practices that they might wish to advocate.²² Yet, typical of the theologians in this respect, the Laon masters reveal a bolder and more independent reading of authorities than what we find in contemporary canonists. While certainly defending their own positions, the canonists tried to find ways of adjusting the authorities who disagreed with their views with the authorities who supported them. In Stephan Kuttner's words, they strove to bring "harmony from dissonance." They felt a constitutional disinclination to abandon any of the authorities. Like thrifty housewives, they disliked waste. They wanted to save everything, and somehow find a place for it in the ragoût. On the other hand, the Laon masters are an early witness to the theologians' recognition of the fact that, in choosing some authorities as more cogent or relevant to contemporary needs and sensibilities, they might well have to exclude others. The theologians were able to accept the fact that the conflicts among authorities were sometimes real, and not merely apparent, and that when this was the case, they could be reconciled only at the price of being fudged. With their fellow theologians, the Laon masters felt free to make principled choices among the authorities. They did not feel as bound by precedent as the canonists and were perfectly willing to reject those authorities who failed to meet their critical standards.²³

theologians in this current dies hard, as is seen in the work of Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement*, pp. 164–66; Grabmann, *Die Geschichte*, 1: 236–46; Stephan G. Kuttner, *Harmony from Dissonance: An Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law* (Latrobe, PA: Archabbey Press, 1960), pp. 13, 25, 30; David E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 214–16, 218–22; George Makdisi, "The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into Its Origins in Law and Theology," *Speculum* 49 (1974): 640–61; Paré, Brunet, and Tremblay, *La renaissance du XII^e siècle*, pp. 284–92; J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 76–87, 239–47.

²² Karl F. Morrison, *Tradition and Authority in the Western Church, 300–1140* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 345. Morrison provides a good introduction to the previous scholarship on this subject, pp. vii–xi, 3–8, 15–33, 37–110.

²³ For this characterization of the canonical enterprise, see Kuttner, *Harmony from Dissonance*. The greater flexibility of the theologians in their approach to authorities and in their willingness to take an innovative line in using them has been noted by Paul Fournier and Gabriel Le Bras, *Historie des collections canoniques en occident depuis les fausses décrétales jusqu'au Décret de Gratien*, 2 vols. (Paris: Sirey, 1932), 2: 314–52; Häring, "The Interaction between Canon Law and Sacramental Theology," pp. 483–93. Cf. on the other hand Artur Michael Landgraf, "Diritto canonico e teologia nel secolo XII," *Studia Gratiana* 1 (1953): 371–413, who sees theologians as more conservative than canonists in this period, and Alfons M.

This tendency will be visible in a more wholesale fashion in the generation after 1130, by which point Anselm of Laon and his followers had either died or had passed from teaching to administrative positions in the church. But the method can be illustrated quite easily from the opinions of members of this school. Let us consider two examples, which are of interest because they both invoke the authority of Pope Leo I, in one case to approve it against the countervailing authority of Augustine and in the other case to reject it on the basis of historical criticism. As historical critics, these theologians handle the idea of the primitive church in a manner quite different from that of the canonists.²⁴ Rather than appealing to antiquity as a guarantee for a practice they want to retain, or reinstitute, or institute for the first time, these masters feel free to treat it as an index of obsolescence, invoking it in order to relativize and dismiss practices that may have made sense centuries ago but which fail to speak to present needs and conditions. This attitude is clearly visible in the Laon masters' consideration of the time of baptism. Leo had laid down the rule that persons to be baptized should be received by the church only on Easter or Pentecost Sunday, unless they were in danger of death. This ruling had established the canonical practice in the early church. The Laon masters reject this tradition on grounds of pastoral utility; for it does not regard the needs of the infants who now make up the vast majority of baptizands and who are incapable of articulating the fact if they are in danger of death. In addition to the welfare of these infants, the church must minister to the legitimate anxieties of their parents. The Laon masters anchor this pastoral agenda with a historical argument. In the time of the *ecclesia primitiva*, they observe, most new Christians were adults, who were capable of alerting their ministers if their health was at risk. Their collective reception in baptism on the great feasts of the resurrection liturgy served not only as an important form of public witness to the largely pagan society in which they lived, but also as a potent source of group reinforcement. But, none of these conditions now

Stickler, "Teologia e diritto canonico nella storia," *Salesianum* 47 (1985): 695, who sees the influences running as a one-way street from the canonists to the theologians.

²⁴ Glenn Olsen, "The Idea of the *Ecclesia Primitiva* in the Writings of the Twelfth-Century Canonists," *Traditio* 25 (1969): 61–86. For the theologians' countervailing use of this idea, see Colish, "Another Look at the School of Laon," pp. 12–14; "*Quae hodie locum non habent*: Scholastic Theologians Reflect on Their Authorities," *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, 15, ed. Phillip Pulsiano (Villanova: Augustinian Historical Institute, 1990), pp. 1–17.

obtain, the Laon masters conclude. Therefore, Leo's rule is no longer appropriate and may be disregarded.²⁵

In the case of our second example, taken from a Leonine ruling on marriage, historical relevance is not the issue, but rather the judgment that Leo offers better reasons for supporting his conclusions than Augustine does, on general principles. One of the standard questions raised in the twelfth century, under the heading of impediments to marriage, was whether a prior adulterous affair should be viewed as an impediment if the lovers later find themselves free to marry each other. The two authorities invariably cited by thinkers who take up this question, however they resolve it, are Leo, who maintains that the affair is an impediment, and Augustine, who holds that it is not. In explaining why they agree with Leo, the Laon masters argue that he has sounder reasons on his side. Leo had imposed the ban, they note, because he feared that the lovers, if permitted to marry, would be tempted to plot the murder of the obstructive spouse, an outcome they join him in wishing to discourage. Augustine's permission of the union of former adulterers, they continue, might give rise to scandal, making it seem as if the church were condoning their earlier misbehavior. On their own account, our authors add that the marriage of the former adulterers might also lead to the confusion of inheritance rights. For all these reasons, they find Leo's argument more compelling than Augustine's, and his conclusions more acceptable.²⁶

PETER ABELARD AND HIS FOLLOWERS

This kind of weighing of authorities, which was to become a central ingredient in the enterprise of systematic theology among the scholastic sentence collectors, was never credited to Anselm of Laon by his erstwhile pupil, Peter Abelard, who is frequently regarded as its inventor, rather than merely its codifier. In the event, and despite his innovative spirit in other respects, neither Abelard nor any of his own disciples emerges as the best example of this method in practice in the generation after Anselm. Nor do the Abelardians fare very well as exemplars of systematic curriculum

²⁵ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 371; *Sententiae Atrebatenses*, ed. Lottin in *Psych. et morale*, 5: 275–76, 431.

²⁶ Franz Bliemetzrieder, ed., *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, Beiträge, 18:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919), pp. 148–49; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon from the Liber Pancrisis*, no. 66–67; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 409, ed. Lottin, *Psych. et morale*, 5: 57–58, 288.

building, either. This judgment may be a startling one, given the fact that Abelard has been hailed as the father of scholasticism in innumerable textbooks. Yet, the legacy he left to systematic theology in the twelfth century is a rather scanty one. Abelard's basic weakness as a guide here is that he left no complete work of systematic theology of his own. He was one of those academics constitutionally incapable of finishing anything he started. Abelard essayed three general treatises, each entitled a *theologia* and each existing only in several fragmentary versions. His *Theologia "summi boni"*, *Theologia christiana*, and *Theologia "scholarium"* all announce the same agenda in their prologues, but none follows that agenda through to completion. Indeed, the sorting out and dating of these *disiecta membra* has become something of a growth industry in recent Abelard scholarship.²⁷ Taken together, the Abelardian fragments as collected by their modern editors state the author's intention to subdivide Christian theology into three parts—faith, charity, and sacraments. Under the heading of faith, Abelard limits himself to what he thinks readers need to know about the definition of faith as a cognitive state and the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology. Other things that Christians might need to know in order to be saved, and that professional theologians need to consider he either ignores or relegates to separate treatises composed late in his career, which he evidently sees as lying outside the project of systematic theology. Thus, his treatment of creation is found in his *Hexameron*,²⁸ while his handling of original sin and the redemption receives full attention only in his commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans.²⁹ The topic of Last Things does not appear in any of Abelard's theological treatises.

²⁷ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "summi boni"*, ed. Constant J. Mews, CCCM 13; *Theologia christiana*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 12; *Theologia "scholarium"*, ed. Constant J. Mews, CCCM 13 in Peter Abelard, *Opera theologica* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969–87). For the debates about the sequence and dating of the various fragmentary versions and redactions of these works, see Constant J. Mews, "On Dating the Writings of Peter Abelard," *AHDLMA* 52 (1985): 73–134; "Peter Abelard's (*Theologia christiana*) and (*Theologia 'scholarium'*) Re-examined," *RTAM* 52 (1985): 109–58; and his preface to Peter Abelard, *Opera theologica*, CCCM 13: 20–23.

²⁸ Mary Foster Romig, ed., "A Critical Edition of Peter Abelard's 'Expositio in Hexameron'," University of Southern California Ph.D. diss., 1981. The text is also found in *PL* 178. An edition incorporating Romig's work and including additional manuscripts is forthcoming from CCCM.

²⁹ Peter Abelard, *In Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 3:26, 5:19, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 11: 114–18, 164–66, 170–72; original sin is also taken up in Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, ed. and trans. David E. Luscombe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 20–22, 58–62.

The second part of Abelard's project addresses ethics. In practice, what he mainly has to say on that subject is that ethical acts can be reduced to ethical intentionalities. He reserves to his *Ethics* his fullest consideration of this claim, but he does not develop his analysis of the psychogenesis of ethical acts into a full-scale treatise on the Christian life.³⁰ Since sacraments constitute the last part of Abelard's table of contents and he rarely gets that far in his *theologiae*, his treatment of this topic is extremely sketchy, confined to the very small selection of sacraments that he was interested in, for personal reasons or because they could be used to illustrate some of his other concerns. Thus, he brings in baptism in the context of his objections to the traditional doctrine of the transmission of original sin and his handling of it reflects his fascination with circumcision as its Old Testament parallel.³¹ Penance is treated as a corollary of the idea that ethical intentionality is paramount in the ethical life.³² Marriage he gives extremely short shrift, taking it up primarily to dispraise it,³³ while the Eucharist interests him mainly because the doctrine of the real presence affords him the opportunity to explore the suitability of philosophical terminology to describe the change in the elements brought about by the consecration.³⁴

Abelard's handling of the sacraments and ethics also points to another deficiency of his work as a model for systematic theology, an occasional logical inconsistency that is startling in a thinker hailed as the paramount dialectician of his time. Abelard offers as his definition of sacrament in general the standard Augustinian statement that a sacrament is a visible sign of invisible grace.³⁵ He regards marriage as a sacrament. Yet, he finds nothing in the relations between spouses that signifies grace.³⁶ Equally problematic

³⁰ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 4–36, 53–56; also *In Ep. Pauli ad Romanos* 1:16–17, CCCM 11: 65.

³¹ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 20, 58–62; *In Ep. Pauli ad Romanos* 2:25, CCCM 11: 94; *Theologia christiana* 2.22, CCCM 12: 142.

³² Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 76–126. This point has been noted by Richard E. Weingart, "Peter Abailard's Contribution to Medieval Sacramentology," *RTAM* 34 (1967): 173–77.

³³ Peter Abelard, *In Hexaemeron*, ed. Romig, pp. 133–35; *PL* 178: 463C–464C; *In Ep. Pauli ad Romanos* 4:18–19, CCCM 11: 148; *Sermo* 3, *PL* 178: 407C. This point receives judicious treatment from Richard E. Weingart, *The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Abailard* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 195–96; "Peter Abailard's Contribution," pp. 172–73.

³⁴ Weingart, "Peter Abailard's Contribution," pp. 170–72.

³⁵ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "scholarium"* 16, CCCM 12: 406. This text, ed. by Eligius M. Buytaert, is the shorter version of the work; the version edited by Mews in CCCM 13 is the longer one that was used more widely in the twelfth century.

³⁶ See above, n. 33.

is Abelard's handling of penance. Consistent with his intentionalist ethics, it is not surprising that he comes down squarely on the side of contritionism, in the contemporary debate on whether the penitent's sins were remitted in the contrition or in the confession stage of the sacrament. The penitent's inner contrition gains him pardon for sin, Abelard holds, whether or not he goes on to confess his sin to a priest. None the less, and despite the difficulty of finding a priest who is upright and discreet, Abelard maintains that confession must not be omitted. His efforts to defend this notion find him getting more and more hopelessly entangled in the contradictions he spins.³⁷ The inconsistency between Abelard's ethical intentionalism and his actual advice can also be seen in his judgment as a moralist. In documenting his own basic principle that unknowing or accidental behavior is not morally culpable, he gives three cases in point. There are the people who put Christ to death, who, in their estimation, were not doing anything wrong but rather punishing a criminal and blasphemer. There is the man who sleeps with a woman not his wife under the misapprehension that she is his wife. These people, he argues, commit no sin. Then Abelard turns to his third example, a poor mother who lacks the wherewithal to provide bedding for her baby, who takes him into her own bed to keep him warm, and who accidentally smothers him while asleep. Notwithstanding the accidental character of the event and the woman's loving, maternal intention, he rules that she is deserving of punishment.³⁸

If logical consistency is sometimes a problem in Abelard's theology, despite his prominence in that field of endeavor, one can also find numerous soft spots in his handling of his authorities in practice, despite the excellent theoretical guidelines he provides in his *Sic et non*. Abelard does not hesitate to cite the anti-Pelagian Augustine, scarcely an apposite choice in this context, in support of his own effort to reduce original sin to actual sin.³⁹ His sense of the pertinence of a particular authority to the case he wants to build is equally if not more questionable in his handling of secular authorities. Abelard's quest for Trinitarian analogies in pagan literature

³⁷ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 76–126. The contradictions in this argument have been noted by Amédée de Zedelghem, "L'Attritionisme d'Abélard," *Estudis Franciscans* 35 (1925): 333–45; "Doctrine d'Abélard au sujet de la valeur morale de la crainte des peines," *ibid.* 36 (1926): 108–25.

³⁸ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 38–48.

³⁹ Peter Abelard, *In Ep. Pauli ad Romanos* 2:5–6, CCCM 11: 77–78. On this point, see Julius Gross, "Abälards Umdeutung des Erbsündendogmas," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 15 (1963): 14–33.

raised legitimate doubts in the minds of his contemporaries as to whether he grasped the difference between the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, with its coequal persons, and the subordinationism implicit in the Platonic doctrine of the World Soul, to which he compared the Holy Spirit.⁴⁰ Examples of passages where Abelard fails to take into account the theological or philosophical perspectives informing the views of the authorities he cites, or where he misapplies them, could easily be multiplied.

The followers of Abelard, like their master, drew heavily on philosophical as well as patristic evidence and they reveal a pronounced taste for logic, a dialectical handling of the topics they treat, and a sensitivity to the problem of theological language. They also take as their cue the master's tripartite subdivision of the subject matter. But, rather than trying to fill the gaps he left, thus developing his ideas into a full-blown *summa*, they see their primary task as the defense of the positions that had gotten Abelard into trouble, and even the repetition of some of his least lucid and most regrettable examples.⁴¹ They preserve his inapposite equation of the World Soul with the Holy Spirit, repeating his earlier and less nuanced position in the *Theologia "summi boni"* rather than the somewhat modified version of this idea which he provided in his later works.⁴² They also repeat his illogical treatment of marriage as a sacrament but which none the less neither signifies nor imparts any gift of grace.⁴³ In addition, the organizational skills of some of

⁴⁰ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "summi boni"* 1.5.36–38, 1.5.41–6.49, 3.4.94–99, CCCM 13: 95–99, 100–13, 198–200; he modifies his position slightly in *Theologia christiana* 1.71–78, 1.96, 1.123, CCCM 12: 101–04, 112, 124. On this point see, in particular, Tullio Gregory, "Abélard et Platon," in *Peter Abelard*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), pp. 42–46, 51; "L'anima mundi nella filosofia del XII secolo," *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 30 (1951): 494–508. See also Ludwig Ott, "Die platonische Weltseele in der Theologie der Frühscholastik," in *Parusia: Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger*, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1965), pp. 307–15; Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchieri [Fumagalli] and Massimo Parodi, *Storia della filosofia medievale da Boezio a Wyclif* (Bari: Laterza, 1989), pp. 214–15, 226.

⁴¹ These developments are recounted clearly by Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*.

⁴² Ott, "Die platonische Weltseele," pp. 315–18.

⁴³ This teaching is preserved most fully in Hermannus, *Sententie magistri Petri Abelardi* 28, 31, ed. Sandro Buzzetti, Pubblicazioni della facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell'Università di Milano, 101, sezione a cura di storia della filosofia, 31 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1983), pp. 120, 135. The status of this text, framed as a *reportatio* of Abelard's teaching, has been contested. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, pp. 158–64, makes what we find to be a convincing case for Hermannus as an Abelardian author in his own right, because of his response to criticisms of the master's doctrine of the Trinity, which Abelard himself did not take to heart in his

the Abelardians are questionable. The author of the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, for instance, starts with man, continues with Christology and the redemption, ethics and the sacraments, and places angels and God at the end.⁴⁴ His treatment of baptism reflects Abelard's interest in comparing this sacrament, and not others, with its Old Testament precursor. But the author is so taken with the utility of the circumcision-baptism comparison in aid of Jewish-Christian polemic that he blows it up all out of proportion in his sacramental theology as a whole.⁴⁵ All of the Abelardians, like their master, ignore Last Things. In addition, they all omit major topics that were heavily debated at the time, omissions that are sometimes stunning. Thus, the authors of the two *Sententiae Parisiensis* leave out penance, a sacrament which no other contemporary theologian ignores; and Hermannus omits, of all things, original sin. The apparent reason for these strategic omissions on the part of Abelard's disciples is their evident inability to find arguments against Abelard's critics on these points. As a technique of theological education, this tactic, like the truncated *theologiae* of Abelard himself, left, and was perceived to leave, a great deal to be desired, in twelfth-century scholastic circles.

GILBERT OF POITIERS AND HIS FOLLOWERS

Another master in this period who is given almost as much praise and attention as Abelard in the scholarly literature for his role as an intellectual innovator is Gilbert of Poitiers, whose trial at Rheims in 1148 as a philosophical and theological radical was the intellectual cause célèbre of the mid-century. Well before Gilbert's ideas had attained their fullest notoriety, he and his disciples had developed a general course in systematic theology, which can be found in two Porretan sentence collections dating to the early 1140s. The doc-

latest version of that doctrine, and in his more "Pelagian" handling of grace. Constant J. Mews, in the intro. to his ed. of *Theologia "scholarium"*, CCCM 13: 23–24 and in "The *Sententiae* of Peter Abelard," *RTAM* 53 (1986): 130–84, argues that this work is only a *reportatio* of Abelard's teaching and that its redaction by Hermannus, and not by some other student of Abelard's, is not certain. His main concern is to place this text in relation to other Abelardian works on the points which they have in common, without considering the areas in which the author departs from Abelard's position.

⁴⁴ *Ysagoge in theologiam*, ed. Artur Michael Landgraf in *Écrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934).

⁴⁵ *Ysagoge in theologiam* 2, pp. 181–89. This anti-Jewish agenda has been noted by Landgraf, intro. to his ed., pp. xlv–xlix; David E. Luscombe, "The Authorship of the *Ysagoge in theologiam*," *AHDLMA* 43 (1968): 7–16.

trine in these works summarizes Gilbert's teaching on the Mont Ste. Geneviève after his departure from Chartres in ca. 1137 and before his acceptance of the bishopric of Poitiers in 1142, with additions and corrections reflecting the opinions of these two pupils.⁴⁶ Together, they indicate how Gilbert and the early Porretans envisioned the theological enterprise. The authors divide their sentence collections into fourteen books. The first book is devoted to the problem of theological language, in general, with Books 2 and 3, on the Trinity and Christology, as specific applications of that problem. Given the amount of controversy that Gilbert had inflamed on precisely those questions, this represents a relatively modest allocation of space to the topic.

The vast bulk of the Porretan sentence collections, Books 4 through 11, is devoted to the sacraments, to which the authors now repair, before the universe has been created, and before man has fallen and found himself in need of them. In this period, the two most prevalent ways of organizing sacramental theology, on the part of authors offering a systematic account of that subject, were in the order of their institution or in the order of their reception. Another prominent scheme was to subdivide the sacraments into two groups, those received by all Christians and those, such as holy orders and marriage, received only by some Christians. Still another way of organizing this subject was to distinguish baptism and the Eucharist, or baptism alone, as necessary for salvation, from the rest of the sacraments, which might be omitted, in some circumstances, without jeopardizing one's salvation. The Porretans depart from all of these models and propose an original four-part model of their own, which they then, however, immediately abandon.⁴⁷ Sacraments, they state, can be divided into rites of initiation, rites of strengthening, rites of return, and rites of

⁴⁶ Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., "Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* I," *AHDLMA* 45 (1978): 83–180; "Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* II: Die Version der florentiner Handschrift," *AHDLMA* 46 (1979): 45–105. The dating of these texts derives from Häring's analysis of the paleographical evidence in the manuscripts on which his edition depends. For the dating of Gilbert's period of teaching in Paris, see H. C. van Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta: Se vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1966), pp. 25–32; Lauge Olaf Neilsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta's Thinking and the Theological Exposition of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180*, *Acta theologica danica*, 15 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), p. 29. John Marenbon, "A Note on the Porretani," in *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 353 n. 2 notes the existence of these works but does not discuss their contents.

⁴⁷ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.61, p. 144; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 4.61, p. 67.

perfection. This scheme suggests that the logical place to begin their exposition would be with baptism. But, they lead off with the Eucharist, even though they define it as a sacrament of perfection. Also, they omit holy orders, even though they repeatedly mention the clergy as administrators of the other sacraments. And, while they regard marriage as a sacrament, they cannot decide in which of their four categories it belongs. In Book 10, while discussing penance, they belatedly take up the question of original sin, vice, and virtue, thus presenting the fall of man well before his creation and well after the incarnation of Christ, ordained to remedy it. The creation itself is almost an afterthought for the Porretans. We find it, along with a brief reprise on original sin and an even briefer allusion to Last Things, in Book 13, sandwiched inexplicably in between two books devoted to the liturgy of Advent and Lent, respectively.

This last peculiarity, the inclusion of a lengthy analysis of the symbolic importance of the liturgy of these two seasons of the church year, is particularly striking, for it is a total anomaly as a topic in a scholastic sentence collection in this period. Its presence here calls attention to the other odd features of the Porretan scheme, with its heavy imbalance away from dogmatic theology, its lack of logical and chronological coherence, and its inconsistencies in the treatment of the sacraments which functions as the principal theme of these works. The inclusion of the liturgy also points up what the Porretans exclude. They have not the slightest interest in cosmology; their account of creation treats of angels and men only. Nor do they have any interest in discussing faith as a cognitive state, or, for that matter, as a virtue; ethics, as a topic, is omitted. Their most remarkable omission, however, is the atonement, a subject central to any Christian theology and one that was vigorously debated at the time. Yet, on the question of how Christ accomplishes His saving work the Porretans have nothing at all to say.

If this schema helps to explain why Porretan theology failed to capture the imagination of contemporaries as an approach to systematic theological education, much the same can be said for their handling of authorities. They do, to be sure, display occasional flashes of real insight, a thorough command of contemporary dialectic, and an acute sensitivity to source criticism. As with most theologians in this period, they object to Abelard's claim that God cannot do better or different than He does. In criticizing it, the Porretans astutely note that a basic flaw in Abelard's argument is his treatment of God's nature as if it could be compassed by a

logical analysis of possibility, necessity, and contingency, even though Abelard himself insists that, since logic is a formal art, it cannot take us beyond logic to ontology.⁴⁸ The Porretans' awareness of the technical features of Abelard's logic and the nature of its claims thus enable them to hoist Abelard on his own petard, and not merely to argue that his position is unacceptable because it is not congruent with God as He is believed to be. The most impressive example of the Porretan critique of patristic authority occurs in their argument against the practice of triple immersion in the administration of baptism. Going back to a point earlier than the fifth century, when Pope Leo I instituted that rule, they note that Cyprian ordained single immersion. In reporting Cyprian's rule, they note, Augustine garbled Cyprian's text and substituted triple immersion, which Leo then followed. Given the fact that the practice of the church since Leo's day has been based on a textual corruption, the Porretans argue that it can be safely dismissed.⁴⁹

These examples, while they certainly are impressive indices of the Porretans' ability to think in precise logical terms and to analyze their sources, are, however, exceptions that prove the rule. In the vast majority of cases, they simply state their own position without offering any particular rationale for it, even when the issue is a debated one. On the occasions when they feel a need to bolster their positions with authorities, whether biblical, patristic, or contemporary, their approach is simply to cite the authority by name, without quoting or paraphrasing his text or considering why he

⁴⁸ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 2.38–39, p. 119; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 2.38–42, p. 54. This is an understanding of Abelard's logic that is borne out in the studies of modern scholars. The best statements of this position are by Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchieri [Fumagalli], "La relation entre logique, physique et théologie chez Abélard," in *Peter Abelard*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), pp. 153–63; *The Logic of Abelard*, trans. Simon Pleasance (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), pp. 13–23, 28–36; Mario Dal Pra, intro. to his ed. of Peter Abelard, *Scritti di logica*, 2nd ed., Pubblicazioni della facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell'Università di Milano, 34, sezione a cura dell'Istituto di storia della filosofia, 3 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1964), pp. xxi–xxiii, xxvi–xxviii; Bernhard Geyer, in his ed. of Peter Abelard, *Philosophischen Schriften*, Beiträge, 20:1–4 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919–33), 4: 621–22, 624–33; Jean Jolivet, *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard*, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982), pp. 19–22, 117; Martin M. Tweedale, *Abailard on Universals* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 93–95, 130–32, 210. The chief dissenters are Lambert M. DeRijk, intro. to his ed. of Peter Abelard, *Dialectica*, 2nd ed. (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1970), pp. xxiii–xxviii, xl, lv–lix, xcv, xcvi, and Lucia Urbani Ulivi, *La psicologia di Abelardo e il "Tractatus de intellectibus"* (Rome: Storia e Letteratura, 1976), pp. 85–93, 95–100, not in the sense of Abelard's goals in this connection, but more in his actual achievement of them.

⁴⁹ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 7.13–14, p. 149.

takes the stand he takes, and without indicating very systematically the countervailing opinions and why they are objectionable. Despite the fact that they themselves clearly had mastered the necessary techniques, as pedagogues the Porretans are not very concerned with passing their methodology of theological reasoning on to their students.

The next mid-century systematic theologian of discernibly Porretan filiation, the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, is notably more eclectic than the earliest Porretans and much more erratic in his handling of authorities.⁵⁰ In one area, the creation, he offers a full catalogue of conflicting interpretations and adduces a particularly strong authority in support of each of them. After canvassing the disputes, and distinguishing carefully between those that can be settled with certainty and those on which our knowledge can only remain probable, he gives his own analysis and response at the end of each question. In other areas, however, he tends to ignore current debates. He does not consistently mention the names of authorities he calls on to anchor his own position. Nor does he refer very expressly or frequently to contemporary or recent masters. This unevenness in his treatment of authorities is coupled with an organizational framework that is equally problematic. His work is divided into six parts. He begins with the creation, set forth according to the hexaemeral account in Genesis, up to but not including man. Part 2 deals with man, free will and grace. In Part 3 the author treats original sin and its consequences. In Parts 4 and 5 he considers the incarnation and the sacraments, respectively, positioning the divine nature and the Trinity at the end of the sixth part. This placement of God at the end of the schema is unquestionably the most bizarre feature of the *Sententiae divinitatis*. It does not occur to the author that this topic is both logically, theologically, and chronologically prior to the other dogmatic issues he treats earlier in the work. Aside from this decided peculiarity, there are some notable omissions. The author departs from the early Porretan treatment of the sacraments, dividing them into those received by all Christians and those received only by some Christians. Having made this distinction, the only sacraments he actually discusses are those that fall into the first group, although it has to be said that, with respect to unction, he mentions it only and does not discuss it. Marriage and holy orders receive no attention. As with the early Porretans, he omits soteriology. But the gaps in this

⁵⁰ *Die Sententiae divinitatis: Ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertischen Schule*, ed. Bernhard Geyer, Beiträge, 7: 2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1909).

work are even more extensive, including angels, the devil, vice and virtue, the sacerdotal power of the keys in connection with penance, and Last Things.

HUGH OF ST. VICTOR AND THE *SUMMA SENTENTIARUM*

Far more influential than either the Porretans or the Abelardians was the systematic theology of Hugh of St. Victor, the *De sacramentis fidei christianae*, completed in 1137. In striking contrast to the sentence collections of both of these groups, Hugh produced a work that is both highly inclusive and that is informed by a clear rationale accounting for its organization and coverage, one which also places systematic theology as such along a trajectory of the modes of human knowledge.⁵¹ This rationale is located in Hugh's celebrated distinction between God's work of institution and His work of restitution. Hugh entitles the work *De sacramentis* because he views as sacramental all the modes by which God reveals Himself to man and all the modes by which He redeems man. In describing both of these processes, he follows a largely chronological, not logical, order, subordinating many topics to the larger question of how man comes to a knowledge of God, both as creator and as redeemer. Hugh takes pains to place the exercise of systematic theology very clearly in the context of this broader epistemological concern. It is, he states at the outset, a second-order mode of knowledge. In the first stage is a historical reading of Holy Scripture. Next comes an allegorical understanding of the historical sense. From that allegorical understanding he now proposes to compress the main points of doctrine, that must be known for man's salvation, and that need, therefore, to be included in a theological summary. It is also important, for Hugh, to distill from secular writers what can be known about God's work of institution in the natural world. This material supplements the information which Scripture supplies about creation. But the Scriptural matter, he notes, has a different slant. Its aim is less to tell man about nature as such than to explain how man arrived at his present dilemma and his need for salvation. Reprising a point he had discussed at length in his *Didascalicon*, Hugh completes these introductory remarks by commenting on the utility of the liberal arts for

⁵¹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis fidei christianae*, PL 176. Good general appreciations include Christian Schütz, *Deus absconditus, Deus manifestus: Die Lehre Hugos von St. Viktor über die Offenbarung Gottes* (Rome: Herder, 1967), pp. 22–89; Roger Baron, *Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Viktor* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1957), passim and esp. p. 139; Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, pp. 185–97.

the theologian, not only for the interpretation of the Bible but also for the light they shed on the work of institution. He also lists and describes briefly the books of the Bible, adding the church fathers as an appendix to the New Testament.⁵²

This elaborate essay on method in place, Hugh accordingly divides the *De sacramentis* into two books, devoted to God's work of institution and His work of restitution, respectively. The schema he proposes would, indeed, have provided a very cogent approach to systematic theology, at least if Hugh had adhered to the plan he sets forth and if he had defined his key terms more clearly than he does. One problem immediately apparent in the first book is that Hugh is not always sure of whether the best way to order the material is a chronological or a logical one, or according to the way in which man comes to a knowledge of the subject in question. Faced with having to make a decision on this question, he seeks to avoid the issue by trying to do all three things at once. At times, the results are rather confusing. Thus, at the beginning of Book 1, Hugh leads off with the creation, rather than with the creator. But, rather than starting with the work of the six days, he prefaces it with an account of form and matter and the question of whether primordial matter is preexistent. He then turns to the creation proper. But here, he displays a lack of certainty as to whether to present creatures in a hierarchical order, from primordial or exemplary causes, to invisible creatures, to visible creatures, or whether to follow the hexaemeral account in Genesis. His decision is to combine these two approaches, following neither consistently. Thus, having ushered man onto the stage as the last created being, Hugh backs up to discuss primordial causes and the question of why the world was created at all. Hugh also tries to come to grips with two other problems at this juncture. One is the question of whether, and how, the primordial causes can be differentiated from God. The other is the question of the sequence of creation followed in the Genesis account, which leaves unanswered how certain beings were capable of existing if they were created prior to the natural forces or resources needed for their survival. Augustine and Bede, Hugh's major sources on these issues, had come up with their own answers, of which Hugh does not make full use. He leaves the question of primordial causes dangling, although he accepts the view that God actually created the entire universe *simul*, at the same time, despite the six-day account related in Genesis. The

⁵² Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1, prologus 1.1.1, *PL* 176: 183A–187A.

question of why Genesis is written the way it is he answers by stating that this decision reflects the author's awareness of the way man comes to know the creation.⁵³

The subject of God, which Hugh takes up initially in the effort to explain how He differs from primordial causes, leads Hugh to develop a mini-treatise on the Trinity at that point, followed by three brief proofs of God's existence, after he has been discussing the Trinity for some time. But he does not continue with the Trinity or the divine attributes here because there is still some unfinished business remaining with respect to the creation, namely, angels. Angels represent an organizational problem for him since he has largely opted for a hexaemeral treatment of creation, and the creation of angels is not included in the work of the six days in Genesis. To be sure, Hugh could have inserted angels after his discussion of primordial causes. But he does not make that choice. He has, as noted, already opted for the creation *simul* theory. But he still tries to see how angels fit into the hexaemeron, with understandably inconclusive results. Abandoning this unresolved problem, Hugh returns to man, next considering man prior to the fall, the fall itself, and the consequences and transmission of original sin. He acknowledges the fact that what we can know about man in his prelapsarian state is largely conjectural. His tactic for addressing this subject is an interesting one. Rather than invoking a philosophical "state of nature" analysis, he works backward from the negative consequences of sin as described in the Bible to the positive conditions they replaced. In man's fallen state, he needs redemption, a thought that leads Hugh to remark briefly at this point on Hell, as the destination he faces without it, and on Purgatory and Heaven as the possibilities open to him with it. Still within Book 1, although, as he had indicated in his preface, it is the proper subject matter for Book 2, Hugh then introduces, hard on the heels of man's need for redemption, the incarnation of Christ. He regards Christ as the supreme sacrament. This idea leads him to offer a definition of sacrament itself, which he does, for the first time, in Book 1, chapter 9, almost at the end of the first book, although the idea of sacrament is the overall theme of the work, and despite the

⁵³ A good account of this problem, which accents the inconsistencies that result in Hugh's treatment of the creation, is Charlotte Gross, "Twelfth-Century Concepts of Time: Three Reinterpretations of Augustine's Doctrine of Creation *Simul*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 23 (1985): 325-34. See also A. Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique et Hugues de Saint-Victor*, 2 vols. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1895), 1: 321-28; Jakob Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor* (Würzburg: Andreas Göbel, 1897), pp. 37-57.

fact that he has been using the term, with a variety of denotations, in Book 1, as he plans to do as well in Book 2. For Hugh, sacraments, in any of the senses intended, bring salvation only when joined with faith and good works. And so, still in Book 1, he considers faith and the Ten Commandments.

Even thus far, it is clear that the first book of the *De sacramentis* is both redundant and disorganized. Its schematic problems stem both from delay and anticipation in his positioning of material, as well as from his trying to do too many things at once in his handling of creation. Book 2 has its own schematic difficulties. Hugh opens Book 2 with Christ's incarnation, which he had already introduced in Book 1. He then proceeds to restate his views on the Trinity. It is at this point that he first raises the vexed question of theological language, the meaning of terms such as person, nature, and substance with respect to the deity, although, it must be noted, he has already been using them, and without benefit of any lexical clarifications, in this same connection repeatedly, in both books. Hugh wrestles manfully with the contemporary debates on theological language, criticizing some of the more technically minded theologians of the day for being too abstruse or for turning the issue into a word game. He himself neither appreciates the technical problems involved nor the need for terminological precision in this context. He fails to come up with alternatives to the formulae to which he objects that are both clear and comprehensible and that convey with accuracy and specificity the doctrine he wants to support. Abandoning rather than resolving that subject, he moves on to the church and its sacramental rites, as an extension of the incarnation into the present age. It is possible that Hugh has picked up this idea from Honorius. In any event, he is the first scholastic theologian to include a discussion of ecclesiology in a systematic work.

Hugh's treatment of the sacraments, in the narrow sense of the specific rites of the church, is confined to sensible signs that signify, resemble, and contain grace. Unlike many of his predecessors, he presents a treatise on the sacraments in Book 2 that yokes them all to his general definition, that seeks a parallel treatment of all of them, and that does not weave them into or subordinate them to other topics. Hugh is a proponent of the septiform principle on the grounds he lays down in his definition of sacrament in general. He does not merely take up individual sacraments that interest him, ignoring those that he does not find truly sacramental. Instead, he explains why all seven are sacraments, in contrast with other rituals such as the sign of the cross, which are sacred signs but which lack the capacity to convey grace. If Hugh is clear on that

point, his treatment of sacraments shares with his treatment of creation in Book 1 a confusing tendency to approach his subject from several perspectives at once. He begins his account with holy orders because the priesthood is necessary for the administration of the other sacraments and because the different grades of holy orders reflect the ministry of Christ which the church now extends to the world. Marriage is taken up next because it was the first sacrament, instituted by God in Eden before the fall. Here we can see Hugh trying to combine a chronological model, based on the order in which the sacraments were instituted, with a logical model, based on the existence in place of the men needed to perform them. At the same time, Hugh presents baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, and unction in the order of reception. And, also at the same time, he distinguishes these sacraments, as received by all Christians, from the sacraments that some Christians receive, a thought that impels him to return to marriage, which he places after the Eucharist and reprises. In between the Eucharist and matrimony, and for reasons apparent to Hugh alone, he inserts a discussion of simony. One sometimes does find this topic included in a treatise on the sacraments within a larger systematic work. But when this is the case, it is typically presented after holy orders, as a perversion of that sacrament. Hugh offers no explanation for his inclusion of simony or for his location of it at the point where he places it. It is the only sin he treats in this particular context; for his more extended consideration of sin in general he introduces, more logically, as a preface to the sacrament of penance. Hugh concludes with a fairly detailed discussion of Last Things, expanding on what he had said about Heaven and Hell in Book 1 but not reiterating his earlier remarks on Purgatory.

While the sentence collections of contemporary and earlier scholastics often suffer from omissions, this is scarcely the problem with Hugh's *De sacramentis*. His difficulties lie more in the realm of redundancy and in his unwillingness to adhere to his announced schema, which would have yielded a more coherent organization than the one with which he actually emerges. Three other salient weaknesses are also visible in Hugh's attack on his assignment. One is the multiple points of view he brings to such subjects as the sacraments and the creation. Far from illuminating these topics by shedding light from different angles on them, this tactic leads to intellectual disjunction and confusion. A second difficulty lies in Hugh's vagueness about terms that he needs to define and to use clearly if he is going to succeed in refuting thinkers whom he opposes, or even if he is going to carry forward his own larger

project. Here, his inconclusive handling of theological language is an obstruction to his argument. Even more serious is his polyvalent use of the term "sacrament." Even after having produced a general definition that applies to the rites of the church which medieval Christians associated with that term, he continues to use it to refer to their Old Testament precursors, without qualifying the word in such a way as to clarify why God deemed it necessary to supplant these usages in the New Testament. Hugh even uses the phrase "sacraments of the devil."⁵⁴ From the context, it can be ascertained that what he means by this locution is probably the means by which the devil binds sinners to himself. None the less, it is an electrifying and anomalous formula in the light of Hugh's understandings of "sacrament" elsewhere in the work. Third, Hugh is not always alive to the resources made available by his sources. A good case in point, noted above, is the question of primordial causes. Although Hugh draws heavily here on Augustine's Genesis commentaries, he ignores the fact that Augustine had come to grips with the same problem and had resolved it in a manner that would have been perfectly sensible for Hugh to have adopted, given his doctrinal desiderata on that subject.

This last observation leads us to a consideration of Hugh as a guide to the handling of authorities more generally. Here, although he has a wide knowledge of patristic sources, and one that indicates a personal reading of them that goes beyond the materials available in *catenae* or anthologies, he is less a model for the critical evaluation of authorities than he is, at least potentially, as a guide to systematic theology.⁵⁵ In the first place, except in the contexts of Christology and Trinitarian theology, he does not give the names of the authorities to whom he refers. It was typical, in this period, for scholastic theologians to indicate the positions of contemporaries by the conventional use of *quidam* or *alii dicunt*, "as some say" or "as others say;" Hugh extends this usage to the fathers as well. Whether in the rare instances where he mentions them by name or in the more usual cases where he does not, he declines to indicate which of the author's specific works he is drawing upon. He does not quote from them, contenting himself with summarizing their conclusions. This practice does not make it easy for a reader to ascertain why Hugh prefers one position over another. While Hugh, as noted, presents the fathers as an appendix to Holy

⁵⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.8.11, *PL* 176: 312B.

⁵⁵ Ludwig Ott, "Hugo von St. Viktor und die Kirchenväter," *Divus Thomas*, 3rd ser. 27 (1949): 293–95.

Scripture, this does not mean, in practice, that he is unwilling to criticize or to reject patristic authority. When he does so, his tactic is to take his own line, based on the theological considerations he thinks are important at that juncture, but without systematically comparing or analyzing the authorities in question, sifting out their differences through the use of logic or preferring some to others on historical grounds. If he can find concord among the authorities he is pleased. But he is not interested in a sustained exercise in reconciling conflicts; and he does not multiply citations as an illustration of how to do so. He does treat, and take a stand on, some of the leading controversies of the day. But Hugh's disinclination to rationalize his own positions and to explain his reasons for preferring certain authorities to others and for his departures from tradition make him less helpful than he might be as a model for how to replicate the thought processes that have brought him to the conclusions he reaches.

It cannot be said that any of Hugh's immediate followers achieved dramatic rectifications of these Victorine deficiencies. The most important of these is undoubtedly the anonymous author of the *Summa sententiarum*, composed shortly after the completion of Hugh's *De sacramentis*. David Luscombe has aptly described the *Summa sententiarum* as "the Place de l'Étoile of early twelfth-century theological literature, the point of arrival and of departure and the center of circulation for many other writings and teachings."⁵⁶ This judgment is eminently sound when it comes to the way in which the author poses the questions he takes up and the positions he takes on them. He certainly tightens up the arguments against contemporary theologians whom Hugh had opposed, borrowing some of their ideas in the process, while avoiding some of Hugh's organizational problems. At the same time, he perpetuates some of the difficulties in Hugh's schema and omits some of the topics that Hugh had included. The *Summa sententiarum* is divided into seven parts. The author first takes up the theological virtues. Then he discusses the Trinity, the incarnation, angels, man, the fall, the nature and transmission of original sin, and the sacraments. For him, the sacraments include the precepts of the Old Law and six of the rites of the New, concluding with marriage.

⁵⁶ Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, p. 198. Luscombe gives a fine overall summary of the place of this work in contemporary theology and provides the most cogent analysis of its dating and its possible authorship, reviewing the previous literature, pp. 199–213. We concur with his view that the best date is ca. 1138–42 and that efforts to assign the work to any one author have been inconclusive. The text of the *Summa sententiarum* is printed in PL 176.

In comparing this author's schema with Hugh's, we note the omission of a hexaemeral account of creation. Only two creatures, angels and men, are considered. The rest of the cosmos, including the vexed question of primordial causes, goes by the board. Other salient omissions are holy orders, the church, and Last Things, as well as a number of issues hotly debated at this time, on which Hugh had not failed to state his opinions. Good examples can be found in the author's treatment of the sacraments. Under the heading of baptism, he does not take up the validity of baptism by desire or baptism by blood. With respect to penance, he states that contrition, confession, and satisfaction are all required, but indicates neither the fact that contemporaries were arguing about when, in that sequence of events, the penitent's sin is remitted, nor his own felt need to take a stand on this question. The author, like Hugh, offers a general definition of sacrament that is apposite to the rites of the church. But it does not apply, in his view, to the Old Testament practices which he none the less describes as sacraments. Undoubtedly, the most striking organizational peculiarity of the *Summa sententiarum* is the author's decision to discuss the incarnation before the creation and fall of man. This being the case, it is initially quite difficult for the reader to see why the incarnation occurred at all. It also points to another deficiency of this work, an extremely laconic and hasty treatment of soteriology.

The *Summa sententiarum* is much less redundant than Hugh's *De sacramentis*. But the author does repeat himself in the treatment of ethics. He defines sin in general in Book 3, the section of the work where he places the fall of man, introducing that definition, however, after he has already been discussing original sin and its difference from actual sin for some paragraphs. He then moves on to virtue, understood not in its own right but merely as the opposite of vice. Virtue also comes up in two other locations. Faith, hope, and charity form the author's subject in Book 1; and charity reappears as the fulfillment of the law following his consideration of the Ten Commandments in Book 4. In none of these places does he treat the psychogenesis of moral acts or the relation between grace and human effort in man's moral life.

As noted, the author does not address all the debated issues of the day. But he does seek to cover the major bases, whether controversial or not. Unless he is treating controversial questions, he is inclined simply to state his own opinions, without giving reasons for them. In handling some controversial points, he glosses over the fact that they are, indeed, controversial, and proceeds in the same manner. In cases where he does set forth a controversy as

controversial, he presents the conflicting views and the authorities on whom the contestants base them. He then tells the reader which position he supports, although he is not terribly skillful or forthcoming in explaining why. He sometimes contents himself with the nude citation of countervailing authorities, as if they were self-explanatory and intrinsically persuasive. While the author sometimes succeeds in selecting extremely pertinent advocates for the positions taken in these debates, his handling of his authorities does not help the reader to see what, in their reasoning or in the context of their arguments, makes them authoritative or not, in the author's eyes. In handling the Trinitarian and Christological debates of the day, the author is more inclined than Hugh to use the technical vocabulary imported into this area by the more avant-garde theologians, although he often uses these terms imprecisely, suggesting that he has not fully grasped the semantic construction which their coiners had placed upon them or the implications flowing from their use. These traits may help to suggest why the *Summa sententiarum* did not become a standard textbook in the teaching of systematic theology despite its strong substantive influence on contemporary scholasticism.

ROLAND OF BOLOGNA, ROBERT PULLEN, ROBERT OF MELUN

As we move deeper into the generation of the 1140s and 1150s, the tendency toward eclecticism, already visible to some degree in the *Summa sententiarum* and the *Sententiae divinitatis*, becomes more pronounced. This is certainly the case with Roland of Bologna, Robert Pullen, and Robert of Melun, Peter Lombard's chief competitors at that time. The first of these figures, Roland of Bologna, is an interesting witness to the fact that books travelled widely in this period, no less than pupils and masters, and that systematic theology was practiced beyond the Alps as well as across the Rhine, and among authors whose primary affiliation might be with a calling other than that of scholastic theology. For Roland was a master at Bologna not known ever to have left his native country, a master equally if not better known as a canonist and as one of the earliest commentators on Gratian's *Decretum*.⁵⁷ He produced a

⁵⁷ On this account, Roland in the past was sometimes confused with the Bolognese canonist Roland Bandinelli, who later became Pope Alexander III. This identification has been disproved by James A. Brundage, "Marriage and Sexuality in the Decretals of Pope Alexander III," in *Miscellanea Rolando Bandinelli, Papa Alessandro III*, ed. Filippo Liotta (Siena: Accademia senese degli Intronati,

summa of canon law, as well as a theological sentence collection written in ca. 1150.⁵⁸ Roland's theology bears the imprint of a canonical mentality at some points, no less than the marked influence of Abelard and, to a lesser extent, Hugh of St. Victor. Roland's organization shows the influence of both of these masters. His affinities with the Abelardians can be seen in his tripartite subdivision of his *Sentences* into faith, sacraments, and charity, although he reverses the order of the second and third subdivisions usual in that school. Also typical of the Abelardian approach is Roland's omission of Last Things and holy orders. The only feature of the priesthood on which he comments is the power of the keys. But, unlike the Abelardians, with their deep interest in the theme of free will, he does not discuss the angels' possession of that faculty or the psychogenesis of their fall. He gives un-Abelardian short shrift to these ethical questions in man's case as well.

After an Abelardian curtain-raiser on faith and its nature as a cognitive state, Roland offers a table of contents in his first book that can be seen as an improved version of Hugh's agenda in the *De sacramentis*. Although he does raise some cosmological questions only to leave them dangling, Roland has clearly solved some of the organizational problems that had plagued Hugh in that connection. Roland begins with the divine nature, treating God's attributes as such before moving to the Trinity. Next, he introduces the creation, and finds a far more cogent way of blending logic and chronology here than Hugh does. While he omits primordial causes, he begins with the creation of primordial matter, continuing with angels, the work of the six days, and man. This topic is followed by the fall and the transmission of original sin. Roland concludes Book 1 with a consideration of the Old Law, ordained to govern man. He goes into more detail on this subject than the Abelardians do but he keeps it more firmly under control as a superseded dispensation than Hugh does. Agreeing with Hugh that Christ is the supreme sacrament, Roland begins Book 2 with the incarnation, and treats the sacraments of the church in the order in

1986), pp. 59–83; *Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 257 n. 3; John T. Noonan, "Who Was Rolandus?" in *Law, Church, and Society: Essays in Honor of Stephan Kuttner*, ed. Kenneth Pennington and Robert Somerville (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), pp. 21–48. I would like to thank Professor Brundage for bringing this matter to my attention.

⁵⁸ Roland of Bologna, *Die Sentenzen Rolands*, ed. Ambrosius Gietl (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1969 [repr. of Freiburg in Breisgau: Herder, 1891 ed.]), pp. xvii–xviii for the dating; *Summa magistri Rolandi*, ed. Friedrich Thaner (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1962 [repr. of Innsbruck, 1874 ed.]), p. xli for the dating.

which they are received, as an extension of Christ's saving work in the world.

The weakest point in Roland's organizational scheme is his handling of ethics. Ostensibly, this subject belongs in book 3, under the heading of charity or the moral life of the Christian. He does talk about charity in that book, albeit in a cursory way. But his chief discussion of vice and virtue is placed in Book 2, as an addendum to the sacrament of penance. Another difficulty is Roland's placement of the topic of predestination. He locates it in Book 3 as a means of raising, under the heading of ethics, the question of the relation of free will to grace in the moral life. Both Hugh and Abelard had treated predestination under the heading of God's attributes and powers, perhaps a more logical setting for that topic. The chief debt that Roland the sentence collector owes to Roland the canonist lies in his treatment of the sacraments. As with other canonists, he tends to view the sacraments more from the standpoint of their administration than from the standpoint of their reception, and he assesses their validity largely in that light. In treating marriage, for instance, the aspect of the sacrament that brings a real sparkle to Roland's eyes is the impediments created by consanguinity and affinity, to which he devotes most of his attention and which he discusses with relish. He reflects none of the concern for the internalizing of the sacraments by the recipient and their role in his sanctification that are hallmarks of sacramental reflection on the part of contemporary theologians. Roland's canonical inclinations are also reflected in his tendency to handle legalistically the ethical questions debated the most ardently by current theologians, when he takes them up at all.

If Hugh shares the honors with Abelard in Roland's schema, Roland's methodology places him squarely in the camp of the Abelardians. Indeed, he is a better exponent of the approach Abelard advocated than the master himself in practice. Roland is extremely analytical and rigorous. He gives clear definitions of his terms and presents his material in a highly formal, question-oriented manner. In particular, he is interested in addressing issues that possess a philosophical content. He produces many authorities for and against each position he treats and explains clearly why he supports or rejects them. He seeks to reconcile them systematically when he can, typically citing the various opinions at the beginning of each question and then discussing their merits and demerits as he works toward his personal solution. Roland shows a keen awareness of the importance of historical criticism. A good example can be found in his treatment of confirmation. Roland notes that, in the

ecclesia primitiva, some authorities had agreed to waive the rule that a bishop is the only proper minister of confirmation, in cases where the Christian population was thin on the ground and a bishop might not be easily available. But, such a dispensation, he observes, is no longer needed in the present.⁵⁹ This kind of analysis is less typical of Roland's treatment of authorities than is his tendency to reformulate what they have to say in philosophical terms. In general, he is interested less in the context in which they had written than in the logical or metaphysical implications of their opinions. It is these implications that he is most eager to use, framing them, as well as the questions he addresses, in syllogistic form, whether inductive, deductive, or hypothetical. While Roland also adduces and applies the norm of theological appropriateness, his chief methodological trait is the systematic way in which he applies reason both to the questions he raises and to the authorities he cites.

The effort to refine Hugh of St. Victor's schema and to give more sustained attention to the weighing of authorities also characterize the sentence collections of Robert Pullen and Robert of Melun, both of whom were English theologians teaching in Paris during Peter Lombard's time. Since they lack the canonical outlook informing Roland's work, which is likely to have limited the latter's appeal among theologians, these two figures need to be considered carefully as real contemporary alternatives to Peter. Robert Pullen's efforts to improve on Hugh, on whom he is closely dependent, are more apparent than real. He produced the lengthiest sentence collection of the century, between 1142 and 1144,⁶⁰ before being called to Rome and made a cardinal. His *Sentences* occupy eight books. In the first, he begins with a brief proof of God's existence and then considers the divine attributes in general before proceeding to the Trinity. Book 2 covers the creation, angels, man, and the fall, and the nature and transmission of original sin. The theme of the third book is the redemption. Beginning with the Old Law in relation to the New, Robert continues with the incarnation and nature of Christ. Christ's human nature, and, in particular,

⁵⁹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 24. His methodological affinities to Abelard have been treated well by Gietl, intro. to his ed. of *Sentences*, pp. xxi–lxi; Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, pp. 244–53.

⁶⁰ Robert Pullen, *Sententiarum libri octo*, PL 186. For the dating of this work, see Franz Pelster, "Einige Angaben über Leben und Schriften des Robert Pullus, Kardinal und Kanzler der römischen Kirche (d. 1146)," *Scholastik* 12 (1937): 239–47; F. Courtney, *Cardinal Robert Pullen: An English Theologian of the Twelfth Century* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1954), p. 23.

Christ's human knowledge, receives more attention than any other dogmatic issue in Robert's *Sentences*. It occupies approximately half of Book 3 and the whole of Book 4. Book 5 continues with a historical account of the life of Christ, culminating with His sending of the Holy Spirit and His entrusting of His disciples with their evangelical mission at Pentecost.

In the remainder of this book and in the books that follow, Robert's concern is with how this evangelical mission is accomplished. He initiates that theme with a consideration of faith and justification, and then moves on to the ethical and sacramental lives of Christians. There is no distinct treatise either on ethics or on the sacraments in this work. Like Honorius, Robert tends to intermingle these subjects. Still in Book 5, and following justification, he takes up baptism and penance. He then backpedals to consider concupiscence as a consequence of original sin and the nature of sin in general, to which these two sacraments speak as a remedy. Sin in general is followed by the theological virtues, with another flashback, following that topic, to sins that are mortal. Ethics continues to concern Robert in Book 6, where he raises the question of the degree to which negligence, ignorance, and diabolical temptation affect man's culpability for sin. He then returns to the types of sin, distinguishing between original and post-baptismal sin. Having mentioned diabolical temptation earlier in Book 6, he picks up that thread again, now discussing the theme in connection with the assistance of the good angels in man's moral life. He ranks both the angels and the demons according to the Pseudo-Dionysian hierarchy. He then returns to penance, in connection with which he discusses the priestly power of the keys and excommunication.

Book 7 begins with another reprise on penance, focusing on the satisfaction stage of the sacrament. Next, Robert inserts a brief treatise on the church. As we can see, he does not position it, as Hugh and Honorius do, after his treatment of Christ's earthly life as the extension of His saving work in sacramental sanctification, even though he had alluded to the foundation of the church at Pentecost. Rather, Robert takes up the church under the heading of ethics. Making a brief pass at the two-swords theory, unusual among contemporary systematic theologians, who generally conceded this topic to the canonists and publicists in their division of labor, he moves to the various callings within the church. He discusses the grades of holy orders and then treats a series of lay professions, from ruler, to soldier, to civil servant; he then turns to virginity and marriage, and the active and contemplative lives. Returning to marriage, Robert now considers it not as a calling but

as a sacrament. In Book 8, Robert leads off with the Eucharist. But the bulk of this book is devoted to Last Things, which he covers in detail, drawing heavily on Augustine's *City of God*, as had Hugh. Antichrist and his reign, the second coming of Christ, the resurrection, the last judgment, and Heaven, Purgatory, and Hell are all described vividly and with much celestial fireworks, completing Robert's *summa*.

Even this bare report on his coverage and organization suggests the problems embedded in Robert Pullen's work as a systematic theologian. It is true that there are some omissions in his *Sentences*. Notably, he does not provide a general definition of sacrament, a discussion or a principled rejection of confirmation and unction as sacraments, or any notice of the confessionist-contritionist debate currently raging in his analysis of penance. Robert, like the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, confines his account of creation to angels and men alone. But it is less his omissions than his other difficulties that make Robert's work unwieldy and intellectually indigestible. There is a marked lack of logic in his handling of many topics. On one level, for example, his inclusion of holy orders and marriage under the heading of the church makes sense, but it does not enable him to distinguish these vocations from other Christian callings that he does not regard as sacraments. Given Robert's scheme for treating the sacraments, the Eucharist is presented almost as an afterthought. He frequently puts the cart before the horse. This tendency in turn results in his *Sentences*' most serious weakness from an organizational standpoint, acute redundancy. Stemming from Robert's inability to decide where to discuss a host of topics, this deficiency leads him to return to them over and over again. He takes up angels three times, once in the creation, next in man's moral life, and finally in the last judgment. Penance also receives three separate treatments, in association with baptism, in man's moral struggle as assisted by angels and as impeded by demons, and in connection with the authority of priests to impose satisfaction. The bits and pieces of what might have been a full-scale consideration of ethics are scattered among five different locations. "Haphazard" is the term used to describe Robert's schema by F. Courtney, and one can only agree.⁶¹

There are still other problems. A mid-twelfth-century reader picking up this work would gain no sense from it what was important and what was not from the amount of space Robert assigns to

⁶¹ Courtney, *Cardinal Robert Pullen*, p. 22.

particular subjects. Robert lacks a sense of proportion. He is also extremely longwinded. He also frequently digresses, including material from biblical history at some points that is not essential to the forwarding of his argument and which is quite irrelevant to the contexts in which it is placed. Not to put too fine a point on it, this tendency reflects Robert's marked propensity for padding. Digression is also one of his ways of beating a strategic retreat from problems he has trouble resolving. Another tactic he uses for the same purpose is the posing of substantive questions in the form of rhetorical questions, which, being unanswered, leave the reader up in the air. There are quite a few topics which he seeks to dispose of in one or another of these ways, the most glaring example being Christ's human knowledge.⁶² The reason why Robert leaves so many questions open is not because his sources, patristic and more recent, do not provide clear guidance on how definite conclusions might be drawn, but because he simply cannot make up his mind. He presents many controversial questions at otiose length, providing the alternative solutions, side by side, and then moving on without giving the reader any indication of what he personally finds useful or problematic in any of the opinions cited or what prevents him from choosing among them. As to what, in principle, would be needed in order to make a clear determination, he leaves the reader in the dark. Nor does he give the reader much help in deciding whether conflicting authorities are compatible or not. Often, as well, Robert repeats himself, multiplying long chains of authorities for each and every point, whether controversial or not, piling these citations on top of each other to no useful end, since they are basically saying the same thing, or are quoting each other, without adding any fresh perspective to the debate.

In citing authorities, outside of encumbering his text with superfluous references, Robert's technique is to give the authority's view, and then to offer a view drawn from reason, on the point under review. But he does not integrate reason with authority by investigating the authority's rationale for the position he takes. Robert does refer frequently, and positively, to philosophical sources. He is sensitive to the utility of grammar and logic as analytical tools. At the same time, he does not use logic as a structural principle in his schema, since he does not discriminate between topics that are controversial and need to be settled and topics that are not. Nor

⁶² A point noted despairingly by Horacio Santiago-Otero, *El conocimiento de Cristo en cuanto hombre en la teología de la primera mitad del siglo XII* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1970), p. 204.

does he always grasp the difference between assertion, citation of authority, explanation, and proof. Despite his appeal to the verbal disciplines, he does not develop and use a consistent theological vocabulary, or define key terms before he puts them to work. And, despite his exhaustive, and reduplicative, catalogue of patristic witnesses, he appeals to the Bible more than to any other authority. Altogether, it is perhaps not surprising that Robert Pullen did not succeed in attracting disciples and that his influence largely evaporated from the scholastic scene following his removal to Rome.

Working a decade later, Robert of Melun at first glance looks to be a self-conscious critic of many of the weaknesses in the *Sentences* of Robert Pullen. His own *Sentences* were composed from the mid-1150s through 1160, undergoing a double redaction.⁶³ Robert of Melun's stated goal was to attack Gilbert of Poitiers and to synthesize the theologies of Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor.⁶⁴ From Hugh he takes the conceptual model of God's institution and restitution as the basis of his schema, and the broadgauged language of "sacrament" as applied to both of these processes.⁶⁵ This appropriation entails, for Robert, as it does for Hugh, an interest in treating God as He manifests Himself to man, rather than God in and of Himself. In comparison with Hugh, Robert devotes more attention to topics such as predestination and original sin, which he feels the Victorines had given too abbreviated a treatment. From Abelard Robert derives his confidence in and command of logic as a tool in theological reasoning. While he does not always agree with Abelard's substantive conclusions, he often follows his lead in deciding what topics ought to be posed and what manner of address should be taken to them.⁶⁶ Another feature of the Abelardian legacy absorbed by Robert which sometimes goes by the board among the Abelardians themselves, and which is ignored by many other theologians at this time, is a concern with accuracy in

⁶³ For the dating of the work and the evidence of the two redactions, see Raymond-M. Martin, "L'Oeuvre théologique de Robert de Melun," *RHE* 15 (1914): 485; "Un texte intéressant de Robert de Melun," *RHE* 28 (1932): 313-15.

⁶⁴ Robert of Melun, *Sententie* prologus, ed. Raymond-M. Martin, 2 vols. in 3 (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1947-52), 3 part 1: 44-49. See, in general, Martin's discussion in his intro., pp. xi-xiv and his annotations to pp. 45-46; Ulrich Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre des Robert von Melun* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald Verlag, 1964), pp. 328-30.

⁶⁵ This side of Robert's work is well developed by Ulrich Horst, *Gesetz und Evangelium: Das Alte Testament in der Theologie des Robert von Melun* (Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1971), pp. 3-5.

⁶⁶ Ulrich Horst, "Beiträge zum Einfluss Abaelards auf Robert von Melun," *RTAM* 26 (1959): 214-26.

the citation of sources. All too often, Robert complains, writers give a mangled version of a text they are citing, or mis-attribute their sources, or misrepresent the views they are reporting, out of sloppiness or prejudice or ignorance. For this reason, he insists, it is important to give the author's name, the title of his work being cited, and a verbatim quotation rather than a paraphrase of his words.⁶⁷ He also criticizes people who are too wordy, who fling about Greek terms so as to flaunt their erudition and who get sidetracked into making inappropriate applications of the liberal arts to theology.⁶⁸

Another feature of Robert's *Sentences* which suggests that he is a serious pedagogue who means business is his careful subdivision of his text into titles, distinctions, and chapters, in order to highlight the intellectual itinerary through which he conducts the student and to facilitate reference. He outlines these subdivisions clearly and explains their purpose.⁶⁹ Robert is one of the earliest of twelfth-century scholastic theologians to do so, and his subdivisions are much more detailed than those found in any other such author in his time. Quite apart from the merits of his positions, the thoroughgoing professionalism which Robert's work projects in all these respects has inclined his editor, Raymond-M. Martin, to aver that he came closer than anyone else in the 1150s to giving Peter Lombard a run for his money. The reason why he did not, in Martin's opinion, is that Robert's *Sentences* remained incomplete.⁷⁰ In 1160, he was recalled to England to accept ecclesiastical preferment, ending his life as bishop of Hereford. His work as we have it omits the last three sections of the second part of his *Sentences*, which would have dealt with sacraments, ethics, and Last Things.

But is Martin's judgment accurate, or does it spring from misplaced editorial enthusiasm? A closer look at Robert's schema and his methodology in practice will help us to see whether he lives up to the project he announces in his no-nonsense prologue. As noted, Robert borrows from Hugh the notion of sacrament as his organizing principle. The two parts of his *Sentences*, accordingly, are entitled the sacraments of the Old Law and the sacraments of the New Law, respectively. Omitting the issue of what God reveals of Himself in nature, each section considers only what the Old and New Testaments reveal about Him. Accordingly, Robert prefaces his

⁶⁷ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* prologus, *Oeuvres*, 3 part I: 44–49.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–19, 25–44.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49–56, 59–156.

⁷⁰ Martin, "L'Oeuvre théologique," p. 489.

consideration of the divine nature, his first topic in part 1, with a discussion of the relationship of the Old Testament revelation itself to the revelation of the New Testament, as *figura* to *veritas*. He offers suggestions on the ways of reading the Bible, noting that theological language is sometimes used literally and sometimes figuratively in Holy Scripture. Here he recapitulates Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* by way of Hugh's *Didascalicon*. After commenting on the relationship of philosophy to revelation, which expands on the observations he makes on the utility of the *artes* in his prologue, he repeats Hugh's listing of the books of the Bible, adding to it a treatment of the ages of the world. To this he appends a consideration of the six days of creation. For Robert, creation includes unformed matter, formed matter, and man. He omits angels and other cosmological problems. At this point in part 1, having already ushered the world and man onto the stage, he returns to God, taking up the Trinity and how it may be known. This subject leads to another disquisition on theological language. Robert then moves to the divine attributes in general, which leads him to yet another consideration of theological language. Having ignored angels in the context of creation, Robert now introduces them. Judging from the point in his account at which he positions them, they would appear to have been created after the creation of man. Robert discusses their hierarchy, and their duties, including their role in the last judgment. He then returns to man and his composition and, in particular, his soul. After a digression on the so-called World Soul, he continues with the human soul and its similarities to and differences from the souls of animals and plants. A major faculty of the human soul is free will. This thought moves Robert to a comparison between charity and sin, to man's nature before the fall, to the fall itself, and to the character of original sin. The second part of Robert's *Sentences*, designed to cover the sacraments of the New Law, leads off with another reprise of the differences between the Old and New Testaments, this time by contrasting the Mosaic laws and rituals with the Christian sacraments. That task completed, the second section of part 2 treats the incarnation and nature of Christ, the redemption, Christ's conception, His condition in the tomb, and His harrowing of Hell. The text breaks off here, but, judging from the detailed table of contents Robert supplies, he planned to move directly from the harrowing of Hell to the sacraments, ethics, and Last Things in sections 3 through 5 of part 2.

A consideration of this schema reveals that Robert has not been entirely successful in eliminating the illogical order and redundancy that plague the *De sacramentis* and other works influenced by

it. In some respects he perpetuates the existing problems of the Victorine model and in other respects he substitutes his own version of repetition and inconsistency. Robert's decision to insert the creation in part 1 of his *Sentences* ahead of the creator reflects the Hugonian idea that man comes to a knowledge of God through His works. At the same time, Robert tries to structure the creation itself, or as much of it as he includes, in a more exclusively hexaemeral order than Hugh does, although without advancing the argument that the sequence of beings created according to the Genesis account is a reflection of the steps in human cognition. His placement of the topic of angels, detached from the creation account, is *sui generis* and has little to recommend it. Robert treats man both under the heading of creation and later on, after a consideration of the role of the angels in the last judgment that appears to jump the gun. The World Soul and the debates surrounding it would seem to belong more appropriately in the section of part 1 dealing with the creation. In part 2 of the *Sentences*, Robert brings up the conception of Christ by the Virgin Mary after His incarnation, nature, and redemption of man have already been discussed. This item is both logically, chronologically, and theologically out of place. We cannot know what Robert was planning to say in the ethical treatise that would have been the fourth section of part 2, and how much it would have reiterated or made use of his analysis of charity and sin in part 1. The most notable redundancy in Robert's *Sentences*, and it is one he is responsible for introducing into the Victorine tradition, lies in his handling of the topic of theological language. He sees, more clearly than Hugh, that this is an important subject, and he does make some notable steps toward attaining a clear and consistent vocabulary. But, the extensive, and repeated, attention paid by Robert to this issue is less an index of his success at resolving it than a reflection of his need to return to it, like a dog worrying a bone, in quest of a full resolution that remains elusive. In these respects, while Robert can be read as having purged his *Sentences* of some of the organizational problems of the *De sacramentis* and the *Summa sententiarum*, not to mention the *Sentences* of Robert Pullen, serious difficulties remain in his schema quite apart from its lack of completion.

On another level, Robert imports a fresh conceptual complication into his schema that is not found in previous works that stand under Hugh's shadow. He defines the material he treats in part 1 as the Old Testament *figurae*, which only shadow forth the New Testament *veritates*. In so doing, Robert compounds an unsolved dilemma concerning the status of the fundamental dogmas he

addresses in this part of the *Sentences*. He makes many points about basic and substantive metaphysical and anthropological realities in his treatment of divine and human nature. Thus, he is talking here about what truly is, not about partial and precursory events that merely adumbrate the fullness of revealed truth to come. Robert never comes to grips with the question of how, or whether, these dogmatic topics can truly be understood as typological foreshadowings of reality and not as essential truths of the Christian faith in their own right, truths that will never be superseded.

Turning to Robert's method of argument and his use of authorities, we can measure him here against his stated objectives and his criticisms of practices that he finds objectionable. He certainly does give careful and extended treatment to many of the issues that call for it the most urgently. Unlike the work of Robert Pullen, one can see at a glance in Robert of Melun's *Sentences* which topics are important, which topics are problematic, and which topics are not, in terms of the amount of attention he gives to them. Following Hugh, Robert tends to make little distinction between the Bible and the church fathers as authorities. He draws on a wide range of authorities, and they are authorities who are distinctly apposite to the points debated. He also calls on his own rational analysis. The method he employs reflects a technique which he had already developed as a master of logic, a field which, like Abelard, he had pursued before becoming a theologian. We have as a witness John of Salisbury, who studied with him at that time and who observes that Robert's teaching method typically juxtaposed pros and cons, in order to show that the same terms could bear different meanings and that there was more than one approach or answer. John adds that, although thorough in his exposition and analysis of the alternatives, Robert's own solutions were concise and to the point.⁷¹

While the first part of Robert's technique carried over into his work as a theologian, concision often goes by the board in his *Sentences*, and for two reasons. Like Robert Pullen, Robert of Melun can be extremely longwinded and repetitious at times. This is particularly the case when he has a weak argument, or no argument at all, and is using loquaciousness as a means of trying to obscure that fact. A second reason for this characteristic is Robert's very skill as a logician and his enjoyment of the use of this art, to a degree that sometimes oversteps the bounds of utility. Despite his own strictures on this very subject, and his praise of brevity, he sometimes ignores the good short answers that exist to the prob-

⁷¹ John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 2.10, trans. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), pp. 96–97.

lems he discusses at length in the very works of the authorities he cites on the point, suggesting either poor research, lack of imagination, or an enjoyment of debate for its own sake. This latter possibility is stressed by Luscombe in his appraisal of Robert's style of argument. He describes Robert as a "difficult author to read who often becomes weighted down with the effort of his own reasoning and with the fineness of his own distinctions."⁷² There is the undeniable air of a runaway logician in Robert of Melun. If he is analytical, he is primarily interested in analyzing concepts, not authorities, a trait he shares with Roland of Bologna. He does not, typically, concern himself with showing how the authorities have arrived at their conclusions; nor is he interested in contextualizing them. He is more likely to use an authority as the source of a substantive opinion, and then to supply his own logical reflections on that opinion. But he gives the reader little feel for the authority as a working theologian himself. While he demands accuracy in the citation of authorities, he sometimes garbles the authorities he cites, especially Augustine. This practice suggests that Robert was using his sources indirectly, and that he did not take the trouble to verify them. And, despite his objections to the use of Greek terms, he has recourse to them himself, for the simple reason that they are helpful in the clarification of certain doctrines.⁷³ Whether in his schema, or in his method, or in his doctrinal contributions more widely, it cannot truly be said that Robert of Melun advances the state of systematic theology as an intellectual enterprise very much. His failure to attract a following after his departure from the schools appears to have been a function not so much of the *lacunae* in his *Sentences* as of the fact that students of theology in the mid-twelfth-century came to much the same judgment on Robert's *Sentences* as have most modern scholars.⁷⁴

THE LOMBARD

Let us now, in an act of imagination, place ourselves in the position of a young scholar who arrives in Paris in the 1140s or 1150s, seeking the instruction that would enable him to become a

⁷² Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, p. 288.

⁷³ Milton V. Anastos, "Some Aspects of Byzantine Influence on Latin Thought," in *Twelfth-Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society*, ed. Marshall Claggett, Gaines Post, and Robert Reynolds (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 132-34.

⁷⁴ Anastos, "Some Aspects," pp. 132-34; Franz Bliemetzrieder, "Robert von Melun und die Schule Anselms von Laon," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 53 (1934): 17-70; Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre*, pp. 328-30.

master of theology in his own right. Let us assume that he is eager and committed, interested in obtaining the very best education he can find in exchange for the outlay of time, money, and effort which he is prepared to invest in schooling himself for a career as a professional theologian. Let us further suppose that he is also a careful and prudent person, willing to canvas the available options before choosing a master. He takes the trouble to hear Robert of Melun, and, if he arrives at Paris early enough, Robert Pullen, the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, and the Porretans and Abelardians as well. Hearing good reports about Peter Lombard, he attends his lectures too, and decides—as did so many auditors—that Peter is the master for him. In the light of the other alternatives, which we have now examined, and in comparison with them, what does he find in Peter's *Sentences* that sets the Lombard's teaching apart, in his eyes, as so clearly superior?

Having acquainted himself with Robert of Melun's teaching, our hypothetical student would have been pleased to note that Peter shares with Robert a concern for ready reference within his *Sentences* and that he likewise equips his work with the helpful numbering of chapters as a finding tool.⁷⁵ He would also have noticed that, like the Victorines, Peter offers a coherent overall rationale for his schema. Unlike the Victorine rationale, however, Peter's is not based on a biblical or historical plan. While he treats many topics in much the same order, and while he retains the Bible as a major theological source, he does not subordinate his material to the history of salvation. He offers, instead, a wider and more inclusive view of the theological enterprise, one that makes room for concerns that are also noetic, anthropological, moral, and metaphysical.⁷⁶ In outlining his own conceptual model at the outset of his *Sentences*, Peter calls on a familiar Augustinian principle, while assigning it a new role. The thematic orientation that Peter gives to his work is the distinction between signs and things, use and enjoyment, found in Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* and applied

⁷⁵ Ignatius C. Brady, "The Rubrics of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*," *Pier Lombardo* 6 (1962): 5–25. The distinctions which supplement this numbering of chapters were added in the early thirteenth century, probably by Alexander of Hales, and the original divisions were not always made in the same places as they were given by later thirteenth-century commentators on the *Sentences*. On this point, see Ignatius C. Brady, "The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of *Sentences* and Alexander of Hales," *FS* 25 (1965): 90–116.

⁷⁶ Cloes, "La systématisation," *ETL* 34 (1958): 327–29; Gillian R. Evans, *Old Arts and New Theology: The Beginnings of Theology as an Academic Discipline* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 42.

by that author to biblical hermeneutics. Peter takes these distinctions and applies them in turn to his own subject matter, using them to explain to the reader the relative value to be assigned to the topics covered in a work of systematic theology.⁷⁷ He agrees with Augustine that God Himself is the supreme *res*, the only being and the only object of knowledge and goodness Who warrants enjoyment in and of Himself. The created universe, the virtues, and the sacraments are *signa*, signs to be used in attaining the enjoyment of God. As for human beings, they are to be enjoyed as well as used. They deserve to be treated as moral ends; and, indeed, the created universe is ordered to their needs. At the same time, human beings ought to enjoy and serve each other with ultimate reference to God and their own salvation. Peter's reassignment of this Augustinian theme to its new task in the *Sentences* has the effect of reappropriating something known, but with a fresh eye and a fresh insight into the uses to which it may be put. This initial impression, gained from a reading of Peter's prologue, would have been reinforced for the student, as it can be reinforced for the modern reader, by a closer inspection of the Lombard's schematic curriculum and methodology.

One very striking feature of the disposition of material in the *Sentences* which sets it apart from its competitors is the fact that Peter combines a remarkably full coverage of the topics discussed by scholastics in this period with a highly personal allocation of space, one that gives the highest priority to the most speculative doctrines of the Christian faith. Fully one half of the four books of his *Sentences* is devoted to the divine nature and the nature of Christ. And, while Peter is concerned with how man comes to a knowledge of God and how God has manifested Himself to man, he also finds it important to consider God as the supreme reality in His own right. This emphasis can be seen immediately at the beginning of Book 1. After some brief remarks on the testimonies of the Trinity in the Old and New Testaments, Peter offers a series of more extended reflections on how God may be known through His similarities to other beings, and, equally, by His dissimilarities from them. An inspection of the universe will lead to the conclusion that the mutable world must have an immutable first cause. Metaphysical analysis will yield the conclusion that beings made up of parts and subject to modification by accidents must be grounded in

⁷⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 1. d. 1. c. 1-c. 3, 3rd ed. rev., ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81), 1: 55-61.

a simple essence that transcends them. Likewise, the triune nature of God can be appreciated by a comparison between it and created beings, to which the deity has both similarities and dissimilarities. Adverting here to Augustine's famous analogy of the Trinity in man's memory, intellect, and will, Peter finds this comparison helpful, and for two reasons. It points to the coinherence of the divine essence in three Trinitarian persons, while at the same time, the limits of this same analogy, which he is just as concerned with underlining, permit him to emphasize God's transcendence.⁷⁸

Having laid this foundation, Peter proceeds to a consideration of the Trinity first, next turning to the attributes which the Trinitarian persons equally share. His accent throughout this discussion remains squarely on God in and of Himself, as the supreme being, rather than on God as He has chosen to reveal Himself to man. In treating the attributes of the deity as a whole, in which all the Trinitarian persons are coequal, he continues to view the subject from the standpoint of God as a metaphysical reality. Peter is deeply interested in the terminology appropriate to the description of the attributes of the individual members of the unmanifested Trinity as well as in the terms apposite to the general divine attributes which They share. He is sensitive to the need for terminological distinctions in this connection, and is far more successful than his contemporaries and immediate predecessors in making the lexical specifications which he needs here and in applying his chosen vocabulary consistently. Other than that, another notable feature of his treatment of the deity in Book 1 is that Peter, without getting bogged down in the debates about the World Soul, devotes much more attention to the Holy Spirit and His mission than is typical of other scholastic theologians at this time.

Book 2 is devoted to the creation. Starting with the businesslike observation that God created the universe out of nothing, and that God was the only cause of the creation, Peter firmly shunts to the side the issue of exemplary causation. He next raises the question of why God created the universe at all. Reminding the reader of the principle that the universe exists for man's sake, which he had articulated in his prologue under the heading of use and enjoyment, he finds here a key to the organization of his material which had eluded compeers who had wrestled with the disjunctions in Hugh

⁷⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent* 1. d. 3, 1: 68–77. Giuseppi Lorenzi, "La filosofia di Pier Lombardo nei *Quattro libri delle Sentenze*," *Pier Lombardo* 4 (1960): 24–26, may be reading Peter somewhat proleptically in treating him as a defender of natural theology.

of St. Victor's account of creation. Beings, Peter notes, are both spiritual and material; and these two modes of being are combined in man. In each case, including man's own, the structure of being has been ordained by God for man's sake. With that principle in mind, he begins at the top of the created hierarchy of being with the angels, and then proceeds to the work of the six days. He feels no need to agonize over the cosmological problems embedded in the hexaemeral account in Genesis because they have nothing to do with the question of the final cause of creation, which is his major concern here. So, while he comments on all the creatures in the account, his treatment of creation is comparatively streamlined. Peter then arrives at the centerpiece of Book 2, the creation of man and his arrival at his present situation. Topics that interest him in this connection are how man was made, what he was like before the fall, and what would have been possible for him had the fall not occurred. Like Hugh of St. Victor, he is perfectly willing to speculate on what might be called the contrary-to-fact condition of man. In so doing, he opens up a wider horizon on the subject of man's natural attributes and aptitudes than Hugh does, before moving on to the exercise of free will that brought about the fall and its effects, particularly on man's capacity to exercise free will, in relation to grace, in his fallen state. The transmission of original sin, the difference between original and actual sin, and the psychogenesis of sin round out the topics covered in Book 2.

Peter then devotes Book 3 to Christology. Here, the theological terminology which he had developed in Book 1 in his analysis of the Trinity and the divine nature comes into play and is used to clear and cogent effect. Peter devotes most of this book to the nature of the incarnate Christ. He offers a full discussion of the debates current at this time concerning the ways in which the divine and human natures can be understood as coinhering in the incarnate Christ. He outlines the support the proponents of the three leading positions of the day could marshal from the Bible and the church fathers. He indicates the difficulties that he finds in all of them, proposing that, since they are all orthodox, yet all problematic, the matter should remain an open question. Peter shows a keen interest in Christ's human nature, and whether He was like us in all but sin. He also raises the question of whether the human Christ should receive worship, or only veneration. More important, however, is the nature of Christ's saving work, to which he devotes extended and finely nuanced attention. Concluding this section of Book 3 with the point that Christ's atonement motivates and empowers men to imitate Him, Peter next takes up the virtues, moving from

the theological to the cardinal virtues and then to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. While he initially presents these virtues and gifts as they function in the psychology of the human Christ, a person Who is unique, Peter's aim in this part of Book 3 is to explore the operation of virtue in the moral lives of ordinary human beings. He is content largely to state general principles and to analyze the overall character of ethical acts. While he does take up the Ten Commandments one by one, and gives a fair amount of attention to usury and lying as breaches of the rules against theft and the bearing of false witness, he is not interested in developing a taxonomy of moral conditions and activities as illustrated by particular professions or states of life.

At the beginning of Book 4, the Lombard introduces the sacraments, which, he reminds the reader, are signs intended to be used, rather than the things intended to be used as well as enjoyed, which he had been discussing in the two previous books. He also launches his treatment of the sacraments with a crisp definition of sacraments in general, and one which distinguishes them clearly from other devout practices or Christian callings which do not conform to his definition and which can thus be set to one side here. Peter also uses his analysis of what a sacrament is, why the sacraments were instituted, and what sacraments consist of as a means of discriminating sharply between the rites of the Old Law, and those of the New. This same analysis enables him to explain why he thinks that all seven of the Christian rites ventilated in this connection by some contemporaries are entitled to the name of sacrament. He then organizes his own consideration of the sacraments under the headings of the sacraments received by all Christians, in the order in which they are received, and those received only by some Christians, holy orders and marriage. In considering the grades of holy orders, he combines Hugh of St. Victor's reflections on how they illustrate different aspects of Christ's personal ministry with indications of how they are congruent with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Unlike either Hugh or Robert Pullen, however, he does not locate this topic, or the theme of sacraments more widely, within the context of an overt ecclesiology. His treatment of marriage and penance, in particular, reflects the benefit Peter derives from his familiarity with the work of Gratian. But he borrows what he wants from that master without departing from the strongly pastoral and moral interest in these subjects typical of the scholastics, concerned, as he is, with the way that these sacraments, and others, are internalized in the spiritual lives of the people who receive them.

Book 4 concludes with a discussion of Last Things. On this

subject, Peter is much fuller than the Porretans but much less detailed than the Victorines. What is most striking about Peter's handling of this subject is that he is far less interested in the manner in which the end of the world will come about, and where and when, than he is in the state of souls after the last judgment has taken place. The Lombard offers an extremely abbreviated treatment of Christ's second coming. Most notable of all, he omits the Antichrist altogether from his *Sentences*. This is not because he lacks a theology of the Antichrist. For, as we will see below in chapter 4, he developed a full-scale personal position on that subject in his exegesis of 1 and 2 Thessalonians. His goal, in the *Sentences*, appears to be to repress wild-eyed millenarian speculation, as inappropriate to the education of professional theologians. Likewise, while he draws on Julian of Toledo's *Prognosticon futuri saeculi*, Augustine's *City of God*, and Gregory the Great's *Moralia* for his treatment of Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven, as is typical in this period, he avoids the more flamboyant descriptive passages in which other theologians of the time revel. As authorities go, he prefers the more pared-down and sober account in Augustine's *Enchiridion*. Peter's aim in his treatise on Last Things is not to paint a vivid sensory image of the torments of the damned or the joys of the saints. Rather, it is to comment on these moral conditions as outcomes of the ethical and sacramental lives that Christians have led in this world, and as expressions of God's justice and mercy.

In looking at this schema as a whole, one is impressed immediately by two things. In the first place, Peter's *Sentences* make a clear, and personal, statement not only about the importance of the topics to which he gives extended consideration but also about the angle of vision that he thinks is appropriate or illuminating in connection with them. The agenda which he sets for himself in his prologue is carried through systematically in the body of the work. It informs his handling of both the most highly speculative doctrines of the faith and of the intellectual, moral, and spiritual means by which the Christian life may bring individuals to a grasp of the sublime realities which these dogmatic truths articulate. Second, Peter does a remarkable job of slicing through the redundancies, evasions, and confusions found in the other systematic theologians of his time. To be sure, there remain some areas of overlap in his work and his organization does reveal some imperfections. For example, since both angels and men possess free will, Peter offers a discussion of the relations between grace and free will in three different locations, under the heading of the attributes of angels and à propos of man, both before and after the fall. Also, he offers a

twofold consideration of Purgatory, once as a pendant to penance and again in his treatise on Last Things. The most serious organizational problem which Peter does not solve is what to do with ethics. He defines virtue, in relation to the ethical intentionality of the moral subject, in Book 1. Also in that book he considers whether virtue is to be used or enjoyed, and virtue as a natural good. Virtue surfaces again under the heading of Christ's human nature in Book 3, along with an analysis of its psychogenesis. But, Peter's analysis of sin, and his consideration of vice in general, is developed in connection with the fall of man and its consequences in Book 2. The positions Peter takes on these ethical questions are logically consistent with each other, wherever he locates the material. But, even though this is the case, ethics as a topic in its own right fails to receive a systematic treatise in Peter's *Sentences*. He tends to find this subject of interest primarily for the light it sheds on human nature and on the nature of the human Christ. Still, even acknowledging these flaws, Peter's *Sentences* goes a long way toward eliminating the deficiencies found in the schemata of his competitors. And, however much he may have learned from them about how to construct a curriculum for the teaching of systematic theology, the schema he produces is by far the most coherent of the day, and is one that bears the stamp of his own personal outlook.

Aside from the merits of his schema, our hypothetical student would readily have judged that Peter's instruction provided a better grounding in the techniques of theological reasoning required by the incipient professional than did the work of other masters of the time. The student would have been impressed both by Peter's sagacious and discriminating use of philosophy and the verbal *artes* and by his command of the Christian tradition. As some modern observers have not, he would have recognized Peter's prefatory criticism of philosophizing as a vain display of erudition and his assertion that reasoning should play a merely ancillary role in theology for what they really were, a *captatio benevolentiae* and not a description of the Lombard's actual practice.⁷⁹ Like other occupants of Peter's classroom he would have appreciated, in Peter's oral teaching, his use of syllogistic forms to structure arguments in a positive sense, as well as the appeal to logic to explode the tautologies in positions he sought to demolish. Whether or not the Lombard always imported these pedagogical tactics into the text of

⁷⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. prologus 3–4, 1: 3–4. See, on the other hand, Émile Lesne, *Histoire de la propriété ecclésiastique en France: Les écoles de la fin du VIII^e siècle à la*

the *Sentences*, he certainly drew on philosophy in the handling of substantive debates and in the clarification of terms and propositions.⁸⁰ As with the Porretans, Peter was able to meet a renowned logician, such as Abelard, on his own terrain, and to undercut him with his own weapons, as is visible in the two-part strategy which he develops to refute Abelard's claim that God cannot do better than He does. On the one hand, Peter shifts the debate from the category of the logic of necessity and possibility. He places it instead under the heading of another philosophical principle, the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power.⁸¹ And, on the other hand, he recasts it in the form of a grammatical argument, one based ultimately on the same Boethian and Aristotelian sources as Abelard had drawn on for his analysis of future contingents. This argument makes its point of departure the signification of a verb in a proposition. As Peter observes, there are two modes of signification in the verb. It denotes an action. And, it also denotes the time, whether past, present, or future, in which the action takes place. But, he continues, time is purely circumstantial with respect to the first mode of signification, the signification of an action. Time does not condition the reality of the action denoted by the verb. If, with respect to this action, the proposition is true at any time, it is true independent of a particular time. And, since God is eternal, the fact of His eternity is not altered even though the Bible may employ the grammatical convention of referring to some of His actions in the past tense of the verb. Thus, Peter concludes, we can rule out the idea of a future time in which God can improve on His creation, as Abelard claims.⁸² It is the same familiarity with Boethius, and the same sensitivity to the Aristotelian and Platonic roots of his polyvalent vocabulary, that enabled Peter to grasp what was problematic in the theological lexicons of some of his contemporaries and to discard definitions that were being used by them as inadequate to the

fin du XII^e siècle (Lille: Facultés Catholiques, 1940), 5: 656; Lorenzi, "La filosofia di Pier Lombardo," pp. 22–24.

⁸⁰ Ludwig Hödl, "Die dialektische Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts," in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge* (Montreal: Institut d'Études Médiévales/ Paris: J. Vrin, 1969), pp. 70–71; "Die theologische Auseinandersetzung zwischen Petrus Lombardus und Odo von Ourscamp nach dem Zeugnis der frühen Quästionen- und Glossenliteratur," *Scholastik* 33 (1958): 137–47.

⁸¹ Beonio-Brocchieri [Fumagalli] and Parodi, *Storia della filosofia medievale*, pp. 254–55.

⁸² Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 93, 96, 99.

theological assignments they were being called upon to shoulder.⁸³

It was not just philosophy and the *artes* that provided means for the clarification of ideas and terms and for the criticism of positions to which Peter took exception, as well as for the provision of alternative arguments, but also the church fathers and more recent Christian authorities. The Lombard's handling of his Christian sources reveals a deep and broad education, an acute and discriminating analysis of his authorities, both logically and contextually, in the light of the author's intentions, an appreciation of the importance of citing them accurately and using them appositely, and a willingness to criticize and reject authorities who, in his estimation, lacked cogency or who failed to support his own personal positions. Along with other scholastic theologians of the day, Peter sometimes made use of the *catenae* or chains of patristic citations assembled by earlier writers, such as the Augustinian *catena* put together by the Carolingian Florus of Lyon. In comparison with his contemporaries, however, his recourse to authorities relies less on indirect research of this sort and is based more thoroughly on his own independent reading of his sources, whom he cites more fully and accurately and whom he considers more thoroughly and analytically than anyone else. At times Peter imports into his discussion authors ignored by other contemporary scholastics, or not known to them. The most famous case in point is John Damascene, whose work Peter was the first Latin theologian to bring to bear on Trinitarian and Christological debate.⁸⁴ But there are other, less dramatic, examples. Peter has a more circumspect and thoroughgoing grasp of Augustine than his contemporaries. He draws on works, such as the *Eighty-Three Diverse Questions*, not cited by other theologians at the time. He is also fully aware of the fact that there is an anti-Manichean, an anti-Pelagian, and an anti-Donatist Augustine, and that this author's utility on certain topics varies with his particular polemical agenda.

Peter also displays a systematic interest in the reasoning that has led his authorities to the conclusions they reach. He makes it clear

⁸³ Angiolo Gambaro, "Il valore dell'opera di Pier Lombardo," in *Misc. Lomb.*, p. 5; Beonio-Brocchieri [Fumagalli] and Parodi, *Storia della filosofia medievale*, p. 255.

⁸⁴ Anastos, "Byzantine Influence," pp. 151–63; Ermenegildo Bertola, "Le 'Sententiae' e le 'Summae' tra il XII e il XIII secolo," *Pier Lombardo* 2 (1953): 25–41; Eligius M. Buytaert, "St. John Damascene, Peter Lombard, and Gerhoh of Reichersberg," *FS* 10 (1950): 323–43; Jacqueline Hamesse, "Le traitement automatique du Livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard," *Studies in Honour of Roberto Busa = Computazionale* 4–5 (1987): 74.

that this consideration is just as important as the author's substantive position in deciding whether to agree with him or not. To mention just one example, which also came up in our discussion of the school of Laon, Peter likewise contrasts the opinions of Leo I and Augustine on whether or not a prior adulterous affair is an impediment to marriage. Peter supports Augustine, because Augustine emphasizes the couple's desire to repent of their sin and to regularize their relationship when events make this possible. The accent on repentance and reparation, and the spiritual healing of the couple, is, in Peter's view, the correct one, and it is consistent with his wider view of the sacraments as having been instituted for the sanctification of Christians. And so, he prefers Augustine's view over Leo's more legalistic and punitive ruling.⁸⁵ At the same time, Peter disagrees sharply with Augustine on a host of other questions. In many of the locations where his Augustinian citations are the densest, Peter has brought Augustine forward in order to modify or to disagree with him. The accuracy of his Augustinian citations, whether he agrees with him or not, enabled later readers to use the *Sentences* to correct pseudo-Augustinian attributions or erroneous reports of his views.⁸⁶ In order to facilitate his analysis of the authorities, Peter, in agreement with Robert of Melun, insists on quoting them in full and on supplying the name of the author and the title of his work. He does this more consistently than Robert does, however, and the problem of mis-attributions or the corruption of the texts is sharply reduced, in the Lombard's work. As with Robert, Peter is not interested in supplying long chains of authorities to bolster each and every point. On topics that are not controversial, he is usually content to anchor his solution with a single pertinent authority. Where topics are in dispute, he does supply the foundations in authority for the various positions taken. Yet, while seeking to do justice to all sides, he does not multiply citations that merely repeat the same argument. Instead, he selects the strongest and most cogently put of the authorities without unnecessary reduplications. As with other theologians of the time, he typically refers

⁸⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 35. c. 4, 2: 471–72.

⁸⁶ Artur Michael Landgraf, "Der hl. Augustinus und der Bereich des Petrus Lombardus," *Scholastik* 29 (1954): 321–44; "Die Stellungnahme der Frühscholastik zur wissenschaftlichen Methode des Petrus Lombardus," *Collectanea Franciscana* 4 (1934): 513–21. This position should stand as a corrective to the views of J. Annat, "Pierre Lombard et ses sources patristiques," *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique*, ser. 3:8 (1906): 84–95; Ferdinand Cavallera, "Saint Augustin et le Livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard," in *Études sur Saint Augustin*, by Régis Jolivet et al. = *Archives de philosophie* 7:2 (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1930), pp. 186–99.

to contemporary masters as *quidam* or *alii*, recognizing the fact that the students and colleagues in his circle will know to whom he is referring. He even cites himself at times as *quidam*, both to refer to his own exegetical works, or even, in his oral teaching, to distance himself from a view that he had once espoused but that, as he and his students know, he no longer supports.⁸⁷

Equally noteworthy is the independent line that Peter often takes on the authorities he uses, even in cases where he draws on them indirectly. The major area in which he makes use of *catenae* and in which he does not quote his authorities or cite their works by title is in his discussion of creation in Book 2 of the *Sentences*. The ultimate source for most of his material is the series of commentaries on Genesis written by Augustine against the Manichees, made available through the agency of Florus of Lyon. As noted above, the cosmological concern with the discrepancies in the biblical account of creation, which bedevils masters such as Hugh of St. Victor and which can be traced to the attention given to the problem by Augustine himself, is suppressed by Peter, regardless of the fact that this is the way that the Augustinian heritage on this topic had been transmitted. Peter does so because he regards these concerns as not pertinent to the perspective on creation that he wants to take. Similarly, Peter feels free to use Julian of Toledo and Augustine's *City of God* very selectively in treating Last Things, in the service of the theological restraint which he thinks is needed in the field of eschatology.

Selectivity, and the freedom to offer his own way of framing the questions he takes up, are also visible in Peter's use of more recent sources. It has been argued that he draws heavily on the Abelardian dossier of authorities in the *Sic et non*, and in the same order, merely providing the solutions that Abelard omits.⁸⁸ But a closer study of his use of these materials has shown that Peter makes extensive use of the *Sic et non* only on some subjects, such as the divine attributes, the Trinity, and Christology, areas where he stood at odds with Abelard and areas in which he was able to draw on materials not available to Abelard, or available to him but ignored by him. Aside from a reference or two to the Eucharist and penance, Peter's appeal to the *Sic et non* in other respects is sketchy.⁸⁹ Similarly, it has been known for some time that Peter is

⁸⁷ Artur Michael Landgraf, "Schwankungen in der Lehre des Petrus Lombardus," *Scholastik* 31 (1956): 533–34.

⁸⁸ Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, pp. 94–95.

⁸⁹ Boyer and McKeon, comm. on their ed. of Peter Abelard, *Sic et non*, pp. 635–45.

heavily dependent on the *Summa sententiarum*, on a range of subjects from the doctrine of God, to the sacraments, to the definition of faith, to angelology, and to anthropology, a point which recent scholarship has expanded and consolidated.⁹⁰ Yet, while Peter certainly draws frequently from the *Summa sententiarum* both for the manner in which he poses questions and as a guide to the patristic authorities who may be pertinent to their solution, the positions with which he emerges and his rationale for supporting them often take an independent line. To cite one example, on a topic given yet another resolution by the Porretans, Peter, following the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, raises the question of whether baptism should be administered by means of single or triple immersion. With that master, he brings to bear on this question the authority of Gregory the Great, who had indicated that both modes of baptism are practiced in the church and that both convey an edifying liturgical symbolism. Gregory had concluded that the unity of faith would not be prejudiced by diversity of custom in this respect, and had left the matter open. While the author of the *Summa sententiarum* indicates a personal preference for triple immersion, he places as his highest priority the following of local custom. This solution is consistent with the position he takes on other sacraments, in cases where regional practices vary.⁹¹ While the Lombard takes account of the desirability of decorum, in advocating the support of local custom, he finds more compelling than his source the symbolic value of triple immersion, paralleling as it does the neophyte's death to sin and rebirth into new life with the three days Christ's body lay in the tomb between His own death and resurrection.⁹² Similarly, Peter goes a long way toward incorporating the work of Gratian into his sacramental theology. He draws heavily on the dossier of authorities assembled pro and con in the *Decretum*. But, Peter does not hesitate to edit Gratian's citations, to contextualize or to relativize them historically, or to subject them to theological criteria not advanced by Gratian himself, as a means of dismissing positions which Gratian cites, or supports, with which Peter disagrees. In the manner typical of his theological compeers, he has a pastoral and moral outlook on the sacraments, not a legalistic one, and he feels free to emphasize aspects of the sacraments not of interest to Gratian and to dismiss considerations high

⁹⁰ Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique*, 1: 180–93, although his analysis is flawed by his attribution of the *Summa sent.* to Hugh of St. Victor; the best guide to the current scholarship is found in Brady's annotations throughout the *Sentences* at the pertinent *loci*.

⁹¹ *Summa sent.* 5.4, PL 176: 130A–B.

⁹² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 3. c. 7, 2: 249–50.

on Gratian's agenda as unimportant. And, in areas where he takes a position diametrically opposed to Gratian's, Peter does not hesitate to stand him, and his catalogue of sources, on their heads when it suits his purpose. Further, since he does not rely exclusively on Gratian's research, he is able to correct some textual corruptions cited by Gratian as well as some apocryphal attributions which he makes.⁹³

In short, Peter's use of authorities reveals a well-informed, knowledgeable, and critical spirit, as well as great skill in the application of the materials he adduces to the solution of contemporary problems and to the articulation and defense of his own personal theology. The Lombard's handling of his authorities frequently involves unexpected juxtapositions which have the effect of posing issues in a new way.⁹⁴ He makes sustained and consistent use of the principles stated in theory but abandoned in practice by some of the more idiosyncratic theologians of the day, who often harnessed them to theological agendas that proved to be deeply flawed and not very serviceable.⁹⁵ In a wider sense, Peter's approach to his authorities suggests why it is a mistake to regard the sentence collection as a mere anthology, and the theologians who worked in this genre as mere compilers. Once one learns how to read it, the sentence collection can be appreciated as the main vehicle that advanced the teaching of systematic theology in the twelfth century, both with respect to the methodology it could convey and to the larger understanding of the theological enterprise it could envision. In both of these respects, Peter Lombard's *Sentences* were deemed to have provided the best response to the pedagogical demands made in the education of professional theologians in the mid-twelfth century because, quite simply, he produced the best version of this new genre of theological literature available at that time.

⁹³ Fournier and Le Bras, *Histoire des collections canoniques*, 2: 314–52; Häring, "The Interaction between Canon Law and Sacramental Theology," *Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, pp. 483–93; Landgraf, "Diritto canonico e teologia," *Studia Gratiana* 1 (1953): 371–413; Gabriel Le Bras, "Pierre Lombard, prince du droit canon," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 247–52.

⁹⁴ Bertola, "Le 'Sententiae' e le 'Summae'," pp. 25–41.

⁹⁵ Abelard is a good case in point. See Beryl Smalley, "*Prima clavis sapientiae*: Augustine and Abelard," in *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning from Abelard to Wyclif* (London: Hambledon Press, 1981), pp. 1–8.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PROBLEM OF THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

As the previous chapter has made clear, one of the important indices of the perceived capacity of a scholastic theologian to impart a serviceable methodology to his students in the first half of the twelfth century was his ability to develop and to use consistently a lucid theological vocabulary, one that could explain with precision what he meant and why the views of opposing masters were unacceptable to him. To be sure, the problem of theological language is endemic to this discipline. The general question of how human language, with its terms and analogies derived from created beings and experiences, can convey the divine reality had been, and would remain, a concern of theologians, preachers, and writers of religious literature across the centuries. But, more specifically, the professionalizing of theology in the first half of the twelfth century heightened the demand for terminological exactitude, especially in addressing the speculative doctrines of Christianity. A sensitivity to these needs can also be found in writers of monastic theology, as is the case with Rupert of Deutz. It is clearly visible in the works of Anselm of Canterbury.¹ But it was largely the scholastic theologians who made a systematic effort to address the need for terminological precision. Sometimes it was their familiarity with the verbal *artes* which sharpened their perception of this need. Sometimes the very originality of the response made by some scholastics to the problem brought new complications in its train and invited criticism, and the reformulation of the issue by their colleagues. The difficulties under which theologians labored in this period were made much more acute by the fact that, given the current state of philosophical knowledge, they lacked a lexicon that was both technical enough to shoulder the burdens it had to carry, and common to all the thinkers engaged in dogmatic speculation.² This lack of

¹ Marcia L. Colish, "St. Anselm's Philosophy of Language Reconsidered," in *Anselm Studies*, ed. Gillian R. Evans (London: Kraus International, 1983), 1: 113–23.

² Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 90–107; Gillian R. Evans, *Old Arts and New Theology: The Beginnings of Theology as an Academic Discipline* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 203; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 1 part 1: 20–21.

precision and univocity plagued all the theologians who recognized it as a problem. Over the course of two generations, there are some notable efforts to come to grips with it. Yet, here too, as with his schema for systematic theology and his technique of handling authorities, it is Peter Lombard who wins the palm. In tackling the recalcitrant problem of theological language, and in clarifying his terms and using them with rigor and consistency, he goes farther toward the development of a practicable vocabulary than was achieved by any European thinker prior to the reception of Aristotle, which was to alter fundamentally the terms of the debate in the sequel.

Outside of the general desire for clarity, there were three main difficulties specific to the intellectual history of the early twelfth century that triggered the debates over theological language in that period. Two of them stem from the fact that contemporary thinkers were heavily dependent on Boethius as their schoolmaster in the field of the Aristotelian *logica vetus* and as a philosophical theologian. Both his translations and commentaries on Aristotle's early logical works and his own theological *opuscula*, aimed at defending orthodox Christology and Trinitarian doctrine, received an attentive reading in the schools. These works were commented on repeatedly. Yet, the terminology of Boethius was a confusing guide to the theological language needed for the conduct of doctrinal debate in the very areas where he applied it, because he himself uses key terms essential to that debate, such as substance, essence, nature, and person, in diverse and incompatible ways. Four different definitions of nature are found in his writings³ and six different definitions of person.⁴ In the former case, he defines nature as that which can act and be acted upon; as the principle of motion *per se* and not accidentally; as the special property of a thing or the specific difference from other things that gives it form; and, more generally, as that which exists, in whatever mode, and, because it exists, is capable of being apprehended by the mind in one way or another. In the latter case, leaving aside *persona* as a theatrical mask or as a character in a work of drama or fiction, his definitions

³ Karl Bruder, *Die philosophische Elemente in dem Opuscula sacra des Boethius: Ein Beitrag zur Quellengeschichte der Philosophie der Scholastik* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1928), pp. 64–80; Claudio Micaelli, “‘Natura’ e ‘persona’ nel *contra Eutychen et Nestorium* di Boezio: Osservazioni su alcuni problemi filosofici e linguistici,” in *Atti del congresso internazionale di studi Boeziani*, ed. Luca Obertello (Rome: Herder, 1981), pp. 327–36.

⁴ Maurice Nédoncelle, “Les variations de Boèce sur la personne,” *RSR* 29 (1955): 201–38; Micaelli, “‘Natura’ e ‘persona’,” pp. 327–36.

include an accident or group of accidents in a man that make him different from other members of the human race; a determination of substance itself; a calling to the divine life through reason, love, and freedom; in the incarnate Christ, "the individual substance of a rational nature;" as applied to the Trinity, the eternal emanations of the divine supra-substance; and as a category of relation, according to the sense of the Aristotelian categories. This array of ambiguous definitions reflects the fact that Boethius sometimes uses his terms in a Platonic sense and sometimes places an Aristotelian construction on them. He does this partly because his argument, at any given point in his theological works, is polemical, and he tailors it to the *ad hoc* needs of the moment. He does so partly because of his conviction that these two schools of philosophy are ultimately compatible. The Boethian legacy leaves open two central questions, to which his works offer no clear solution: Given the fact that the creed uses the terms substance and person with reference to the deity, what do these terms mean in this connection, in comparison with what they may mean with respect to created beings? And, given the fact that the standard Trinitarian formula views the persons of the Trinity as joined together by the reciprocal relations of paternity, filiation, and procession, how apposite is the language of relation, or the language of any Aristotelian accident, to the deity?

The third problem relative to theological language confronted by early twelfth-century thinkers stems from the differences in approach taken by the Latin and Greek traditions to the theology of the Trinity, and a corresponding difference in the ways theologians in these churches had used the same terminology or the equivalent terms in each language.⁵ The Greeks emphasized the economic Trinity, that is, the persons of the Trinity as They manifest Themselves to man. The Greeks viewed the persons as three hypostases, accenting Their different functions. For them, the difficulty lay in showing how these hypostases possess a unity of nature. To the notion of divine hypostasis they attached the idea of a being possessing a nature, Who gives of that nature to another hypostasis. In each of the persons, nature is a content within a container. The

⁵ A good account of the contrast between Greeks and Latins and of the problems posed for medieval thinkers by Augustine and Boethius is found in M. Bergeron, "La structure du concept latin de personne: Comment, chez les Latins, 'persona' en est venu à signifier 'relatio'," in *Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIII^e siècle*, 2nd ser., Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales d'Ottawa, 2 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932), pp. 121-61, although he does not address the twelfth-century efforts to cope with the difficulties.

person's transference of that nature can be understood without the need to posit an underlying common nature as an intermediary in the process. Each of the persons is Himself the intermediary. Thus, the unity of nature in the three persons is seen as consecutive. On the other hand, the Latins, as illustrated most typically by Augustine, were concerned with how we can understand the relations of the Trinitarian persons among themselves, quite apart from anything They may choose to manifest of Themselves to man. The Latins based their position on the unity of the divine nature, seen as an ontological or logical substratum, with the Trinitarian persons seen as expressions of that nature, which coinheres in Them equally. With this principle in mind, it was necessary to distinguish between terms that refer properly to the divine nature which the persons equally share, on the one hand, and terms that signify the attributes that distinguish one Trinitarian person from the others, the terms that are specific and unique to each of the persons vis-à-vis the others. The Latins concluded that the best way to arrive at a valid conception of a person in this context was to understand the Trinitarian persons as relations. Unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding could thus serve as proper names of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, for they are terms referring to each of these persons alone. To this Augustine added his famous analogy of the Trinity in the human soul, whereby the persons are compared to the psychological functions of memory, intellect, and will. There is a division of labor here; but, Augustine emphasizes, it coincides with a functional interrelation among these faculties, each of which is an activity of the same subsistent soul.

But, given the Latin approach to the Trinity, how was it possible to maintain this position in the light of the Aristotelian understanding of relation, which, if applied to the definition of the Trinitarian persons, would treat Their personhood as accidental? The idea that the deity is a substance subject to modification by accidents made Latin theologians in our period acutely uncomfortable, and with good reason, for it suggested that the divine nature is subject to change and that, as accidents, the persons of the Trinity may inhere in that nature, or not, as the case may be. Further, did an acceptance of the Aristotelian understanding of relation as an accident extend to an Aristotelian understanding of substance as well? If so, the prime significance of substance would be its reference to created beings made up of matter and form. Such an idea would scarcely be apposite to the deity, whether to the divine nature in general or to any one of the Trinitarian persons in particular. And, if these Aristotelian understandings of relation and

substance were rejected, what comprehensible understandings could be found to replace them, and would they be adequate to bear the dogmatic weight which the theologians would have to place upon them?

Both the intractability of these questions and the theological centrality of the doctrines whose understanding they affected help to explain why Trinitarian theology and Christology were the controversies par excellence among early twelfth-century theologians. One could, to be sure, ignore that fact. This was the case with Anselm of Laon and his followers, who continued to use the language of the creeds and the fathers as if it were self-explanatory, self-consistent, and non-problematic. They simply repeat the traditional Latin terms, without defining them; one would never be aware of the fact that theological language was such a burning contemporary issue from reading their works.⁶ Another approach was to suggest an evasion of the problem by appealing to the *via negativa* in theological language, along the lines of the Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scottus Eriugena. Indeed, this tactic was advocated by thinkers connected with the school of Chartres, well known for its responsiveness to other aspects of the Neoplatonic heritage as well.⁷ According to this view, we cannot properly signify

⁶ See, for example, *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 236; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 282, 521, ed. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1959), 5: 190–94, 230, 333; Heinrich Weisweiler, ed. “Le recueil des sentences ‘Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur’ et son remaniement,” *RTAM* 5 (1933): 252–53; Friedrich Stegmüller, ed., “Sententiae Berolinensis: Eine neugefundene Sentenzensammlung aus der Schule des Anselms von Laon,” *RTAM* 11 (1939): 40; *Sententie divine pagine*, ed. Franz Bliemetzrieder in *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, Beiträge, 18:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919), pp. 5, 8–9.

⁷ Richard W. Southern, “Humanism and the School of Chartres,” in *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 61–85; *Platonism, Scholastic Method, and the School of Chartres* (Reading: University of Reading, 1979); and “The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres,” in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 113–37 has argued that this school, as such, never existed. Both on the basis of institutional associations among the thinkers in this group and their demonstrable family connections intellectually, this position has been refuted, effectively in our estimation, by Peter Dronke, “New Approaches to the School of Chartres,” *Anuario de estudios medievales* 6 (1969): 117–40; Nikolaus M. Häring, “Paris and Chartres Revisited,” in *Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis*, ed. Reginald O’Donnell (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 268–317, 329; Hans Liebeschütz, “Kosmologische Motive in der Bildungswelt des Frühcholastik,” *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, 1923–24, pp. 83–148; Olga Weijers, “The Chronology of John of Salisbury’s Studies in France (Metalogicon II. 10),” in *The World of John of Salisbury*, ed. Michael Wilks, Studies in Church History, Subsidia 3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 114–16.

the deity with theological language framed in positive statements. On the other hand, negative statements yield names of God which are more accurate, or at any rate, less inaccurate. God as He is remains basically inexpressible. Human language cannot compass Him. His nature is so transcendent that any attributes men may give Him, attributes drawn necessarily from their knowledge of created beings, must inevitably fall short of the divine reality, and so constitute an improper use of language. In one way or another, various members of this group of thinkers posit a sharp distinction between man's modes of speech (*forma loquendi*) and God's mode of being (*forma essendi*), and urge that positive statements about God, whatever grammatical form they take, cannot be literally true of God but are, at best, to be understood metaphorically, with a transferred meaning (*translative*).⁸

Despite their willingness to advocate this Dionysian position on the poverty of theological language, the Chartrains, in practice, joined with other scholastic theologians in this period in the effort to work through the difficulties bequeathed by Boethius, Augustine, and the Greeks. They did make the effort to come up with cogent definitions of the all-important terms for describing God positively. In the event, it was not the Chartrains themselves but Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers who provoked the most intense disputes on theological language at this time.

THE ABELARDIAN CHALLENGE

Despite his keen interest in semantics as a professional logician, Abelard proved surprisingly unsuccessful in arriving at definitions of the key terms needed for Christology and Trinitarian theology. His handling of *natura*, *substantia*, *essentia*, and *persona* is polyvalent in the case of each of these terms. In the fields of logic and mathematics, for Abelard, *natura* and its adverbial and adjectival forms mean or imply a necessary order, according to which things have to be as they are. As applied to phenomena, nature means a habit (*habitus*) or disposition (*dispositio*), denoting the phenomenon's concrete mode of being, which endures and serves as that being's cause or continuing principle of activity and which is not exhausted by its ingredients or by the way the being acts. In this sense, nature in act

⁸ Nikolaus M. Häring, "Die theologische Sprachlogik der Schule von Chartres im zwölften Jahrhundert," in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, *Miscellanea mediaevalia*, ed. Albert Zimmerman, 13:2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), pp. 930–36.

can be distinguished from nature as the ground of a creature's being. Also, the nature of a genus can be distinguished, on this basis, from the nature of any of its individual members. The idea of nature, in the created order, as a force the creator grants to creatures enabling them to function, to reproduce, and to act as secondary causes underlies Abelard's understanding of nature in the sense of natural law, both as a moral norm and as a mode by which man can come to a knowledge of God through the creation. At the same time, Abelard the ethicist uses the term *natura* both to refer to the human condition as corrupted by sin and to the pristine state of man which was thereby corrupted. At no point in his works does he offer a definition of nature that is self-consistent or that can be understood with respect to the divine nature.⁹

Abelard's definitions of *essentia* are also polyvalent. Sometimes he means by this term essence as contrasted with existence, existence in this context referring to the state in which a being can be modified by accidents. At other times, however, he means by essence a being's mode of being more generally, which would include, not exclude, its actual mode of being as conditioned by accidents. Essence, for Abelard, can also mean a thing's intrinsic nature, as in the phrase *natura rerum*, the law of nature as it applies to the being's created endowment. In this sense, essence cannot be separated from the being's existence. On the other hand, Abelard also uses *essentia* to denote an entity's ground of being, which in turn he understands both as its formal cause and as its material cause. Despite these discrepancies, it is clear that the need to define this term arises in the first instance, for Abelard, as a means of grasping the nature of created beings. What essence may denote as applied to uncreated being is a matter which he never systematically discusses, notwithstanding his attribution of this term to the deity. Further, he sometimes equates essence and substance, using these terms interchangeably with respect to God, while at other times, he distinguishes substance, understood as essence, from *essentia*, understood as existence. When he equates *essentia* with existence, in the context of Trinitarian theology, he also equates *persona*, or Trinitarian person, with this *essentia*-as-existence. This practice is quite confusing, because Abelard also stresses, in the same context, that the persons of the Trinity share the same essence and substance, in passages where he treats *essentia* and *substantia* as

⁹ Jean Jolivet, "Éléments du concept de nature chez Abélard," in *La filosofia della natura nel medioevo* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1966), pp. 297-304; David E. Luscombe, "Nature in the Thought of Peter Abelard," in *ibid.*, pp. 314-19.

synonymous.¹⁰ To compound his difficulties still further, he also borrows the Boethian definition of person as the individual substance of a rational nature,¹¹ thus annexing *substantia* both to the attributes that distinguish each Trinitarian person from the others and to the common Godhead which They share. And, at the same time, he insists that, in applying the term substance to God, in either of these senses, we cannot use it in the normal Aristotelian sense of an entity capable of modification by accidents.¹² While explaining what *substantia* does not mean, with reference to God, Abelard never truly clarifies what he thinks it does mean in that connection.

Confusing terminology is only one of Abelard's problems in the development of a semantics adequate to the tasks of theology. Abelard is frequently depicted as having been attacked, for personal reasons, by monastic critics who failed to understand him, who garbled what he had said, or who attributed to him positions not his own.¹³ There are, however, technical features of his logic and semantics which his scholastic confrères at the time were perfectly capable of grasping,¹⁴ and which modern critics have also noticed, which raise serious questions about its utility as a tool in theological discussion. Abelard's larger goal is to show that revealed statements about God and the data they convey can be presented in such a way as to display their conformity with the laws of predication. At the same time, his semantics is not basically geared to an epistemology that connects the human psychology of knowledge with the realities that exist outside of the human mind.¹⁵

¹⁰ Jean Jolivet, "Notes de lexicographie abélardienne," in *Aspects de la pensée médiévale: Abélard. Doctrines du langage* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1987), pp. 132–37; *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard*, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982), pp. 41, 296–320; Jolivet, intro. to his trans. of Peter Abelard, *Du bien suprême* (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1978), p. 15.

¹¹ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "scholarium"* 2.105, ed. Constant J. Mews in Peter Abelard, *Opera theologica*, CCCM 11–13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969–87), 13: 459.

¹² J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 119–20, 145–67.

¹³ For a good summary of the literature on this point, see Jean Jolivet, "Sur quelques critiques de la théologie d'Abélard," *AHDLMA* 38 (1963): 7–51; Edward Filene Little, "The Heresies of Peter Abelard," University of Montreal Ph.D. diss., 1969, pp. 136–85.

¹⁴ On this point, see above, ch. 2, pp. 54–55, 85.

¹⁵ On this point, see above, ch. 2, p. 55 n. 48, to which may be added Jean Jolivet, "Abélard entre chien et loup," *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 20 (1977): 319; *Arts du langage*, pp. 44–45, 67–72, 74–77, 95–104, 229–335; Bruno Maioli, *Gilbert Porretano: Dalla grammatica speculativa alla metafisica del concreto* (Rome: Bulzoni, 1979), pp. 33–36; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 119–20; Richard E. Weingart, *The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 11–31.

Rather, he is moving toward a formal logic whose goal is an analysis of intramental concepts and an intramental validation or invalidation of the propositions and arguments made up of the words that signify these concepts. While at an initial remove, many concepts derive from extramental realities, this is not the prime signification which they possess. For, these extramental realities may come into being and pass away. Once we have obtained our concepts of them from them, they are no longer needed for the work of the logician. Also, some nouns, such as indefinite nouns, can refer meaningfully to things that have no existence. The meanings words acquire are conventional, imposed on them by the speakers who use them; they do not signify naturally. This signification by imposition exists at two levels, for Abelard. There is the denomination or appellation, the significance of the actual thing (*significatio rerum*). There is also the signification of the concept derived from the thing (*significatio intellectum*). The perfection of the signification lies in the latter mode of signification, since it is only at this level that the sign can be used in a logical proposition and hence understood.

This theory has an advantage, in Abelard's estimation. For, left to a system of purely real signification, we would be confined to verbal signs that might refer to non-significant things. But, with logical signification, in his sense, we can find meaning in all the parts of speech in whatever propositional contexts they may be used, parts of speech, moreover, which not only manifest meaning but which also can engender it. In one respect, Abelard's logic and semantics may be regarded as post-Aristotelian *avant la lettre*, for he expands the range of logic and does not subordinate it to modes of verification lying outside its own formal scope. In another respect, however, this logic and semantics restrict their own utility, since the question of how words may correspond with the things they originally signified, the question of how the logician's *intellectus* may correspond with realities outside his own mind, is not the point of Abelard's analysis of signification at all. And, if logic thus makes no claims about ontology in the sense of the world of created nature, the same can be said *a fortiori* in the case of theological statements. Ultimately, Abelard is forced to concede that statements about the Trinity must be understood figuratively,¹⁶ and that the norm governing their use is theological appropriateness.¹⁷ Yet,

¹⁶ Jolivet, "Abélard entre chien et loup," p. 319; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 119–20.

¹⁷ Jolivet, *Arts du langage*, pp. 280–81.

as in the notorious case of his analogy of bronze, a seal made of bronze, and the impression made by the seal in wax for a Trinity composed of persons Who are coeternal and consubstantial,¹⁸ he is often unequal to the task of providing cogent analogies in the event, a fact noted not only by his monastic critics¹⁹ but also by contemporaries who had frequented the schools²⁰ as well as by modern scholars.²¹ In sum, Abelard never comes to grips with the basic lack of aptitude of a logic and semantics of the type he develops for the work of theological clarification and defense to which he assigns it.

Yet, for all these problems, there was one particular application of theological language made by Abelard that engendered more controversy than any other, his attribution of the nouns power, wisdom, and goodness to the persons of the Trinity as proper names. Abelard is sensitive to the idea that there are some divine properties, such as eternity, that inhere in the Godhead in general, while others can be used to distinguish the personal traits of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In his view, power, wisdom, and goodness are perfectly adequate to the latter task. He supports this claim by multiplying citations to the text of the Bible in which the Trinitarian persons are referred to by his preferred names.²² This position provoked acute irritation in Abelard's critics, and with excellent reason. For, they noted, if we apply to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit the terms power, wisdom, and goodness as Abelard urges, then it is impossible to make sense out of all the other biblical passages where these terms are used to refer to more than

¹⁸ Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 4.90–93, 4.102, 4.106, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 12: 308–10, 315–16, 317–18; *Theologia "scholarium"* 2.112–18, CCCM 13: 462–66; *In Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 1:20, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 11: 70.

¹⁹ The *capitula* drawn up against Abelard at the council of Sens in 1140 describe this bronze seal analogy as a "horrienda similitudo." The text is ed. by Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 12: 473.

²⁰ Thus, Otto of Freising observes à propos of Abelard, "The analogies he used were not good." *Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa* 1.48 (46). trans. Christopher C. Mierow (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 83.

²¹ Jolivet, *Arts du langage*, pp. 308–20; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, p. 115; Walter Simonis, *Trinität und Vernunft: Untersuchung zur Möglichkeit einer rationalen Trinitätslehre bei Anselm, Abaelard, den Viktorinern, A. Günther und J. Froschammer* (Frankfurt: Josef Knecht, 1972), pp. 54–57.

²² Peter Abelard, *Theologia "summi boni"* 1.2.5, 3.1.1–51, ed. Constant J. Mews, CCCM 13: 88, 157–59; *Theologia christiana* 1.1–4, 1.7–35, 3.112, 4.47–50, 4.118–19, 4.154–56, 4.161–5.3, CCCM 12: 72–87, 236, 286–87, 324–25, 342–47; *Theologia "scholarium"* 1.30–93, 2.135–36, CCCM 13: 330–56, 475. The best analysis is by Eligius M. Buytaert, "Abelard's Trinitarian Doctrine," in *Peter Abelard*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), pp. 127–52.

one of the Trinitarian persons, or to a person other than the one to Whom Abelard assigns the name, or to God in general. Abelard does not deny that all the Trinitarian persons possess all of these attributes. He is also aware of some of the theological problems that arise from his insistence that they are, none the less, proper names of the Trinitarian persons. Thus, he notes, all three attributes are involved in the incarnation of Christ, since that event manifests God's power, wisdom, and goodness equally to man. Given this position, it is hard to see why it was the second person of the Trinity Who was incarnated, and not the first or the third.²³ Similarly, it is hard to explain why power should beget wisdom, and why goodness should proceed from power and wisdom, and not vice versa.²⁴ Still, even having ventilated these questions, questions which he cannot answer, Abelard continues to argue for the propriety of these terms as personal names.²⁵

Contemporaries such as Hugh of St. Victor, Gilbert of Poitiers, William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, Clarenbald of Arras, Robert Pullen, and Robert of Melun were convinced that Abelard was wrong but were unable to pinpoint just how he had erred and how he might effectively be refuted. Hugh agrees that the terms power, wisdom, and goodness apply both to the persons of the Trinity individually and to God in general. But he does not succeed in explaining clearly the semantics of how this would work and he can scarcely repress his feeling that the contestants are engaged in meaningless word games.²⁶ Gilbert charges Abelard with tritheism for his effort to confine the three attributes preclusively to the three Trinitarian persons. In turn, he himself stresses the unity of God so heavily as to state that the persons of the Trinity can be distinguished from each other only numerically,²⁷ a point that raised doubts about his own orthodoxy, or at least about the propriety of his own numerical argument. For their part, the Chartrains find

²³ Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 4.68, CCCM 12: 296.

²⁴ Ibid., 4.118–19, CCCM 12: 324–25.

²⁵ Ibid., 4.47–50, CCCM 12: 286–87.

²⁶ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis fidei christianae* 1.2.5–12, 1.3.26–31, *PL* 176: 208A–211A, 227C–234C. The best analysis is by Johann Hofmeier, *Die Trinitätslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor dargestellt im Zusammenhang mit den Strömungen seiner Zeit* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1963), pp. 188–91, 193–95, 197–268. See also Edmund J. Fortman, *The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), p. 190; Jakob Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor* (Würzburg: Andreas Göbel, 1897), p. 127; Jørgen Pedersen, "La recherche de la sagesse d'après Hugues de Saint-Victor," *Classica et mediaevalia* 16 (1955): 91–133. All these authors note the inconclusiveness of Hugh's critique of Abelard.

Gilbert's critique of Abelard fully as unacceptable as they find Abelard's position itself. William of Conches observes that power, wisdom, and goodness are names that are not exclusive to the Trinitarian persons. But, given his own interest in distinguishing the cosmological functions of these persons and in analogizing them with the Platonic One, Nous, and World Soul, he sees the division of labor here as acceptable and can find no way of distinguishing between his own cosmological approach and Abelard's salvific and charismatic treatment of the Trinity.²⁸ An anonymous writer of the mid-twelfth century with palpable connections to the Chartrain tradition agrees that the entire Trinity is involved in any action of power, wisdom, and goodness undertaken by God and that these names cannot be applied to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit exclusively. None the less, he holds that there are still grounds for assigning them primarily to these respective persons. While conceding at least this much of the Abelardian argument, he seeks to analogize these terms to the human soul's faculties of willing, knowing, and capacity. In both cases, he notes, these activities operate in and through each other.²⁹

This argument, while it mitigates the exclusivity of the Abelardian attribution of power, wisdom, and goodness to the Trinitarian persons, raises the question of whether the author has thereby succumbed to another Abelardian claim which the Chartrains vigorously disputed, the conflation of an Augustinian-style view of the Trinitarian persons as distinguishable by Their relations to each other with an economic view of these persons as distinguishable in their manifestation of Themselves to man, whether in the order of the cosmos or in the order of grace. Abelard himself fails to see the difference between these two perspectives. He repeatedly juxtaposes his power-wisdom-goodness argument with the description of the Trinitarian persons as distinguished by paternity, filiation, and procession. He even calls the former model a distinction based on relation (*relative*).³⁰ In general, the Chartrains draw a

²⁷ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boethius de Trinitate* 1.3.53–54, 1.5.39, 2.2.72–80; *In Boethius contra Eutychem et Nestorium* 3.65–74, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring in *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966), pp. 113, 145, 178–80, 285–87.

²⁸ William of Conches, *Philosophia mundi* 1.6–12, ed. Gregor Maurach (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1974), pp. 10–14. On this point, see Heinrich Flatten, *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches* (Koblenz: Görres-Druckerei, 1929), pp. 180–84.

²⁹ Haijo Jan Westra, ed., *The Commentary on Martianus Capella's De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris* 5.424–54, 11.1–63 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), pp. 107–08, 245–47.

sharp distinction between these approaches and reject out of hand the idea that the category of relation can be applied to the deity. As Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbald of Arras see it, relations are nothing but Aristotelian accidents, which can inhere only in substances subject to these predicaments. God cannot be viewed as a substance in this sense, they maintain. He is beyond substance.³¹ Promising as is this combination of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism, Thierry at once compromises it, by attributing substance to the deity anyway, and by stating that the divine substance is the common essence which the Trinitarian persons share.³² And, despite his zealous effort to rule out relations and accidents of all kinds as apposite to the Trinity, he admits that the distinction among paternity, filiation, and procession does work and that it is acceptable, even though it is based on the intratrinitarian relations of the persons.³³ The chief problem of the Chartrains in coming to grips with Abelard is that their vocabulary is almost equally imprecise. Their arguments have a way of canceling each other out. As well, Clarenbald adheres to the Boethian definition of person as the individual substance of a rational nature cited by Abelard, although it means that there would be three substances in the Trinity. This idea is compatible neither with the notion of substance as a supra-substantial divine essence, on the one hand, nor with substance as created being subject to modification by accidents,

³⁰ Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 3.174, 4.50, 4.154–56, CCCM 12: 260, 287, 342–43; *Theologia "scholarium"* 1.21–27, 1.30–68, CCCM 13: 327–30, 330–45. This point has been noted by Buytaert, intro. to his ed. of *Theologia christiana*, CCCM 12: 415–51; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, p. 161.

³¹ Thierry of Chartres, *Commentum super Boethii librum De trinitate* 1.8–9, 2.67–4.21, 4.29, 5.1–12; *Lectiones in Boethii librum De trinitate* 1.28–29, 1.35–38, 1.45, 2.1, 2.35–37, 4.13–18, 4.32, 5.15–16, ed. Nicholas M. Häring in *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971), pp. 64–65, 89–95, 101, 103, 110–13, 140–41, 143–44, 147, 154, 166–67, 190–92, 197, 217–18. On these points, see Enzo Maccagnolo, *Rerum universitatis: Saggio sulla filosofia di Teodorico di Chartres* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1976), pp. 54–56, 74, 171–72. Clarenbald of Arras, *Tractatus super librum Boethii De trinitate* praefatio 20, 1.9–12, 1.24, 1.51–54, 2.42–43, 3.1, 3.14, 3.16–17, 3.31, 3.35–36, 3.38, 3.41, 3.44–92, 5.1–11, 5.17, 6.2, 6.5–12, in Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., *Life and Work of Clarenbald of Arras, a Twelfth-Century Master of the School of Chartres* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1965), pp. 73, 89–90, 95, 97, 104–06, 124, 132, 144–45, 146, 151–52, 156, 159, 159–76, 176–79, 181, 182, 183–84. On these points, see Wilhelm Jansen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De trinitate: Ein Werk aus der Schule von Chartres im 12. Jahrhundert* (Breslau: Müller & Sieffert, 1928), pp. 119–34.

³² Thierry of Chartres, *Comm. super Boethii De trin.* prologus 10, 5.4, pp. 60, 114.

³³ *Ibid.*, 4.3, p. 96.

on the other, the two definitions of substance which he joins Thierry in defending.³⁴

The stern rejection of relation as applicable to God, even though it is brought in through the back door in their acceptance of the relational formula for the Trinity, may be read as an anti-Abelardian tactic on the part of the Chartrains. But they cite it primarily as a means of attacking Gilbert's numerical argument. Among the relations or accidents that Thierry and Clarenbald mention, they single out the accident of number for special attention. Aside from the fact that number is an accident, they note, the sheer addition of one integer to another integer which has no difference from the other integers to which it is added does not provide a clear enough distinction among the Trinitarian persons. In addition, Gilbert's argument raises the question of why we should stop at three persons, or why there needs to be more than one person in the Godhead at all. Thierry and Clarenbald respond with a Trinitarian argument of their own, which tries to address these concerns. It is also based on mathematics and tries to yoke mathematics to a recognition of the relatedness of the Trinitarian persons to each other, which they find lacking in Gilbert's teaching. This argument is grounded on the principle that unity can serve as the mathematical foundation of equality-in-difference. The formula they adopt is: $1 \times 1 = 1$. As Thierry and Clarenbald interpret this formula, in engendering the Son, the Father produces a being fully equal to Himself. The same is the case in the joint procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. The whole point of this analysis is summarized under the heading of the names of the Trinitarian persons which Thierry and Clarenbald borrow from Augustine: unity, equality, and connection (*unitas, aequalitas, conexio*).³⁵ While it stands as a vigorous attempt to reinsert reciproc-

³⁴ Thierry of Chartres, *Commentarius in Boethii librum contra Eutychem et Nestorium* 2.11, 2.14, 3.68, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring in *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971), pp. 235, 248; Clarenbald of Arras, *Tractatus super librum Boethii De trin.* 1.8, 5.12–14, pp. 89, 179–80. Another member of this group, William of Conches, *Dragmaticon* 1, trans. Maccagnolo in *Rerum universitatis*, pp. 246–63, adds another definition of substance, namely, being without any specifications, which he thinks is applicable to God.

³⁵ Thierry of Chartres, *Lectiones* 3.10, 7.5–7, pp. 179, 224–25; Clarenbald of Arras, *Tractatus* 2.34–40, pp. 120–23. On this mathematical argument, see Gillian R. Evans, "Alteritas: Sources for the Notion of Otherness in Twelfth-Century Commentaries on Boethius' *Opuscula sacra*," *Bulletin Du Cange* 40 (1975–76): 103–13; Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Creation and Creator of the World according to Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of Arras," *AHDLMA* 22 (1958): 157–69;

ity into the understanding of the Trinitarian persons, this argument has the demerit of failing to square with the Chartrains' own announced rules. Having rejected relation, in general, and the accident of number, in particular, as apposite to the deity, they then reimport mathematics into the discussion, as well as relation, but without succeeding in justifying these departures from their stated principles.

It was not only the bolder thinkers, like Gilbert and the Chartrains, but also those who were more conservative or who sought to accommodate more than one contemporary viewpoint, like Robert Pullen and Robert of Melun, who grappled valiantly but unsuccessfully with the problem of names apposite to the deity as it had been posed by Abelard. Of the two, Robert Pullen is certainly the less circumspect and the more contradictory. At the beginning of his *Sentences*, Robert Pullen raises the question of whether the term *substantia* can be applied to God, and also, what significance the very term *deus* has. If we follow Aristotle, he says—the only option he canvasses—neither the terms substance nor accident can be attributed to God. Accidents are conferred upon beings by something or someone else. But God receives nothing from any being outside of Himself. Further, substance refers to beings subject to modification by accidents. Since God is immutable, He cannot be altered by accidents and hence He cannot be called a substance. Having banished both of these terms from the lexicon of theology, Robert goes on to note that the noun *deus* can have no meaning at all. Here he shifts from the Aristotelian understanding of created substances as his base line to the definition of a noun as a part of speech given by the ancient grammarians. As Donatus and Priscian have said, a noun is a part of speech that signifies a thing in its substance and its quality. But, as Robert has already indicated, both substance and accidental qualifications are equally inapposite to the deity. The conclusion which follows from Robert's conflation of Aristotle and the grammarians is that it is impossible to speak about God at all.³⁶

It would seem that, if a theologian comes to this conclusion and if, like Robert, he is either uninformed about the possibility of negative theology or not interested in pursuing it, his only responsible course of action would be to close up shop and go in for some other line of work. Since, as we know, these disquisitions on

Édouard Jeuneau, "*Lectio philosophorum*": *Recherches sur l'École de Chartres* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1973), pp. 10–11, 81–82, 93–97.

³⁶ Robert Pullen, *Sententiarum libri octo* 1.1, 1.4, *PL* 186: 675A–B, 680C, 682A.

theological language occur at the beginning of the lengthiest sentence collection written in this period, Robert Pullen clearly did not take this logical next step, which his semantics would appear to make unavoidable. Having taken the pains to raise the question of the significance of theological language in the manner just indicated, he proceeds to drop it with a dull thud, and goes on as if he had never taken it up. He goes right ahead and uses the key, and problematic, terms in Trinitarian and Christological discourse, although without ever defining them or indicating the sense in which they apply to the deity. Thus, notwithstanding his earlier remarks on substance, he states that there is a divine substance which is the single essence shared by the Trinitarian persons. The term essence remains undefined. In any event, and this is Robert's critique of Abelard, the divine substance is reflected in God's immensity, beauty, and omnipotence, and also in His power, wisdom, and goodness. These three latter terms are not to be identified with particular Trinitarian persons. Rather, these persons are identified and distinguished from each other by the attributes of paternity, filiation, and procession. These are traits which the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess from all eternity. Thus far, what Robert has accomplished can be compared with the practice of the school of Laon on this subject. He has merely stated the standard Latin formula but without explaining why it is apposite and why Abelard's terminology is not. Robert wraps up this portion of his counter-assertion—for it is a counter-assertion and not a counter-argument—by remarking, confusingly, that the filiation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit occur according to substance (*secundum substantiam*), even though he had initially placed substance, whatever he means by it, on the side of the Godhead in general and not on the side of the proper names of the Trinitarian persons.³⁷ He may simply be trying to affirm here the consubstantiality of the persons, and no more. But his location of this point at the juncture where he places it does not make it clear that this is what is intended.

Robert makes only one passing attempt to indicate what his theological terms mean, in an effort that has the sole effect of telling the reader what these terms do not mean. The divine substance, he notes, is different from substance as the term applies to human beings. In the latter context, each person is a single substance. This is not the case with the Trinity. Abandoning the problem of how

³⁷ Ibid., 1.3–7, *PL* 186: 676C–689C.

substance and person differ in the Trinity, Robert goes on to argue for the definition of human substance he has proposed, against dialecticians who think that substance should refer to the human race in general and not to its individual members.³⁸ Robert wraps up these considerations by observing that language is sometimes used properly and sometimes improperly. Without exploring that point any farther, he adds that the properties of the Trinitarian persons are not affects (*affectae*) and know nothing of predicaments. Having stated what a divine person is not, or what He lacks here, Robert concludes that these ideas are matters of faith which transcend the capacity of the human mind to understand in any way,³⁹ a statement which says more about Robert's visible lack of adeptness in handling the assignment than about the efforts that had been made, and were being made currently, to do so.

In the light of Robert's handling of the Trinity, it may not be surprising to find that his attack on the terms needed to explain Christology is equally self-defeating. According to Robert, both the divinity and the humanity of the incarnate Christ may be described as substances, each of which is an essence.⁴⁰ As with his treatment of the divine substance in Book 1 of his *Sentences*, here he makes no effort to endow Christ's divine substance with any positive meaning. Its relationship to His divine person is not clarified, something that must be done if a theologian is to succeed in explaining why it was the Word, and not one of the other Trinitarian persons, Who took on human nature in the incarnation. All that Robert gives us here is the repeated statement that there are two substances in the incarnate Christ, humanity and divinity, or, alternatively, three substances, a human body, a human soul, and the Word.⁴¹ This three-substance theory is one that Robert inherited from the school of Laon.⁴² We will also find it cropping up in the work of some of Robert's contemporaries, where it is equally confusing. Aside from Robert's inability to decide how many substances there are in the incarnate Christ, a fact that does not enhance his positive exposition of Christology, the three-substance model has two other disadvantages. It treats the Word, as a divine person, as the equivalent of the divine substance, neither of which terms is explained. And, with respect to the human Christ, it departs from Robert's earlier

³⁸ Ibid., 1.3, *PL* 186: 676C.

³⁹ Ibid., 1.3, *PL* 186: 679C–D.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 3.15, *PL* 186: 784A–B.

⁴¹ Ibid., 2.10, 3.18, 3.20, *PL* 186: 734B–C, 787A–789C, 792C–D.

⁴² *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 182, ed. Lottin in *Psych. et morale*, 5: 128.

announced definition of the human substance as a human individual who is also a person. In neither his earlier nor his later use of substance, as applied to human nature, and in neither his twin-substance nor his three-substance version of Christ's incarnate nature does Robert indicate how, or if, his language can rule out the heresy of Adoptionism. All in all, Robert Pullen's handling of theological language is seriously defective and his application of his inconsistent or unspecific language to the themes to which he assigns it has nothing to recommend it. While he is less oblivious to the problem, as a problem, than the Laon masters, he does not advance an inch toward the goal of explaining what is wrong with Abelard's semantics and what is better about his own counter-proposals.

In comparison with Robert Pullen, Robert of Melun makes some notable headway in addressing these intractable problems. He devotes extended and repeated attention to the question of theological language, which he takes up at no less than three points in his *Sentences*. Yet, while he strives to use his key terms consistently, and succeeds in doing so to a fair degree, he leaves a number of them undefined and he sometimes contradicts himself or misses the opportunity to capitalize on some of his most valuable arguments. Robert is a critic of Abelard to some degree. But he is reluctant to discard the Abelardian legacy altogether. His simultaneous loyalty to Hugh of St. Victor, and to Hugh's essentially economic view of the Trinity in creation and redemption, also impedes Robert from making the fullest use of some of his most helpful findings.

Robert begins his consideration of theological language in general at the start of the first book of his *Sentences*, under the heading of the understanding of the language of the Bible. Here, he notes, words are to be understood both literally and with the three traditional spiritual senses used by exegetes. He continues by listing six conditions which need to be taken into account in assigning these spiritual meanings.⁴³ At the same time, he asserts in these prefatory remarks that all theological language is metaphorical, not literal, and that negative theology is more accurate at times than positive theology, in principle.⁴⁴ Without entirely clarifying where he stands amid this range of possibilities, Robert goes on to note that some terms, such as "to be" and "good" have a different

⁴³ Robert of Melun, *Sententie* 1.1.6, ed. Raymond-M. Martin in Robert of Melun, *Oeuvres*, 4 vols. (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1932-52), 3 part 1: 170-79.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.3.3, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 19, 21, 26-30.

denotation as applied to God and to creatures.⁴⁵ The same might well be said of terms such as essence, substance, and nature, which Robert needs to use in some detail in his theology. While he tries to use them as clearly and consistently as he can, he does not provide any definitions of their meaning with respect either to the deity or to created beings.

None the less, Robert firmly yokes substance to essence and nature, and applies these terms, synonymously, to the single divine being possessed equally by the three Trinitarian persons.⁴⁶ Some of the names that refer properly to this divine substance they share, such as justice, or goodness, or the name of creator, are terms that reflect God's manifestation of Himself in His creation. Other terms denoting the divine substance, such as simplicity or immutability, refer to His nature as such. In both of these cases, Robert argues, the attributes denoted are shared fully by all the Trinitarian persons. In the case of the first group, the economic names that describe God's relationship to creatures, the relations involved are not accidental. For, while the universe itself is mutable and full of phenomena subject to modification by predicables, God Himself is changeless.⁴⁷ Now, as for the notorious power-wisdom-goodness formula of Abelard, Robert asserts that these attributes are essential properties of God. They pertain to the substance of the Godhead, in the sense he has just indicated. They are not proper names of the Trinitarian persons. For, if they were the proper names of these persons, they would yield three different essences. The result would be tritheism. Further, and here rejecting Abelard again, Robert argues that power, wisdom, and goodness are not relative terms. They are, rather, convertible and equal. They are not parts that make up a whole, or individual members of the genus to which they belong. At the same time, they are useful terms because they are analogous to human qualities, which facilitates their comprehension, and they are more fitting than any other divine attributes in the category they inhabit in describing the manifestations of the Trinity to man.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Ibid., 1.5.45–46, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 258–76. This point has been studied carefully by Peter W. Nash, "The Meaning of *Est* in the *Sentences* (1152–1160) of Robert of Melun," *MS 14* (1952): 129–42, who concludes, we think accurately, that Robert tends to confuse *esse* as such with *esse a se*, leading him to treat creatures as passing shadows of the divine being.

⁴⁶ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.2.2, 1.3.3–7, 1.5.44, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 268; 3 part 2: 31–46, 254–55.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 1.3.3, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 31–39.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1.2.5–7, 1.3.2, 1.5.39–40, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 274–92; 3 part 2: 10–18,

Robert, however, cannot let Abelard go completely. Like Hugh, he wants to argue for the acceptability of the power-wisdom-goodness model as a set of proper names for the Trinitarian persons in some way. His proposal is to argue that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do possess these properties, respectively, in a special, preeminent, way, even though each of these persons participates, to a lesser degree, in the attributes exemplified in that special way by the other two persons.⁴⁹ Valiant as it is as an effort to salvage the least defensible features of the Victorine and Abelardian legacies on power, wisdom, and goodness, Robert's reasoning at this point fails to persuade the reader that his position does not stand in contradiction to his assignment of these properties to the Godhead as such, despite the huge amount of space he devotes to the effort to make this case.⁵⁰

The force of this contradiction is to leave in abeyance the sense Robert assigns to the idea of person, as it is applied to the Trinity. Confusion is not allayed by his other inconsistencies on that subject. In his introductory remarks concerning the conditions affecting the reading of the biblical text in its spiritual senses, he includes *persona* as one of them, defining it à la Boethius as the individual substance of a rational nature.⁵¹ But, he also states that, in Trinitarian discourse, none of the Boethian definitions of person are helpful or apposite and that the specific problem with the particular definition earlier cited is that it yields three substances, that is, three deities.⁵² His own preferred definition of person in the Trinitarian context is a fairly content-free one, the differences men can discern among the three persons (*discretum discernens*), a formula which leads him to slide away from what those differences actually are to the modes by which men may know them and may signify what they know.⁵³ And, in the Christological section of his *Sentences*,

241–46. These points are well developed by Ulrich Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre des Robert von Melun* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald Verlag, 1964), pp. 85–93, 119–38.

⁴⁹ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.3.19–30, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 67–97. Raymond-M. Martin, “Pro Petro Abaelardo: Un plaidoyer de Robert de Melun contre S. Bernard,” *RSPT* 12 (1923): 308–33 makes Robert more of a supporter of Abelard here than he was.

⁵⁰ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.6.1–20, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 285–314; Ulrich Horst, “Beiträge zum Einfluss Abaelards auf Robert von Melun,” *RTAM* 26 (1959): 314–26; *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre*, pp. 111–18.

⁵¹ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.1.6, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 176; Horst, “Beiträge,” pp. 314–21.

⁵² Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.3.11–13, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 51–57.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1.3.14, 1.3.16, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 57, 64–65.

which remains unedited, the manuscript evidence indicates that he reverts to the Boethian "individual substance of a rational nature" despite its acknowledged difficulties.⁵⁴

There is still the problem of whether the traditional formula of unbegotten-begotten-proceeding can offer a cogent solution to the question of how the Trinitarian persons are different from each other, despite the difficulties associated with the Aristotelian conception of relation as an accident, which the Chartrains emphasize so heavily. Robert is one of a few theologians of his time to find a way out of this dilemma in Augustine's *De trinitate* 5.16, which he cites specifically, and with great pertinence, to this point. There, as he notes, Augustine had pointed out that we can think about the concept of relation in more than one way. We can, to be sure, view it as an Aristotelian accident. As such, Augustine agrees, it is not and cannot be an attribute of the deity. But Aristotelian logic is not our only resource here. There is also the notion of relative nouns, as discussed by the classical grammarians. In defining and illustrating the concept of relative nouns, Donatus and Priscian include examples such as father-son and master-slave. Such examples have their limits as analogies of the relations among the Trinitarian persons in that they are drawn from human relations that involve priority and posteriority, cause and effect, or circumstance. Augustine prefers pairs of relative nouns such as left-right, or light-dark, because they can be understood relatively (*ad aliud*) while also lacking a temporal or causal dimension. As Robert points out, this type of reasoning allows us to appreciate relations among the Trinitarian persons that are permanent and that never change, a point which enables him to supply a rationale for his support of the traditional Latin formula not found in Robert Pullen.⁵⁵ He concludes, therefore, that it is proper to apply the names unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding to the Trinitarian persons, in a manner that would not be apposite if they were applied to the divine essence.⁵⁶

Having attained, at this juncture, a position of decided advantage, Robert at once proceeds to abandon it. Having established that paternity, filiation, and procession do provide adequate proper names for the Trinitarian persons and having appreciated the value of Augustine's grammatical rescue mission for the concept of relation, his argument now reflects the fact that his main concern is not

⁵⁴ Martin, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 57–58 n.

⁵⁵ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.3.3, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 37–39.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.3.8–9, 1.4.23–24, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 47–49, 150–51. On this point, see Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre*, pp. 140–72.

the understanding of how these interrelations work. Rather, he wants to consider why we use the terms denoting the divine essence in the singular form of the noun, even though they refer to attributes possessed by all three Trinitarian persons, unlike the relational terms, which are used in the singular because they denote the individual properties of the persons. Robert reasserts the point that the persons can be described in terms of their properties. But then, notwithstanding the grammatical argument he has appropriated from Augustine, he returns to the idea that relations cannot be enduring properties, on the basis of the Aristotelian notion of relation as an accident. Robert does not explain why he has withdrawn from the beachhead which Augustine had helped him to win. Nor does he resolve the self-contradiction on the idea of relation in his own argument.⁵⁷

And, for all the help that Augustine is able to provide for the resolution of the vexing questions with which Robert wrestles so inconclusively, his larger reading of the *De trinitate* works at cross purposes to Robert's goal. He takes up one of the analogies Augustine had noted in the human soul, not the memory-intellect-will example but the *mens-notitia-amor* one developed at an earlier point in Augustine's argument. Instead of seeing the parallels with the relational terms which he accepts—and then rejects—as appropriate proper names of the Trinitarian persons, he presents the Augustinian analogy as unacceptable because it conflicts with his own notion that each of the Trinitarian persons possesses His personal attributes in a special and preeminent way. He fails to see that here, and even more so in the case of the memory-intellect-will model, Augustine might not be as hard to accommodate to that claim as Robert thinks. Robert also maintains that Augustine's argument does not differentiate the persons sufficiently. Another objection is that Robert wants to treat one of the three analogous terms, the human intellect alone, as the image of God in man. He ignores the fact that Augustine regards the three terms in his analogies as functions inhering in a single subsistent mind which indeed is viewed as the image of God in man. All in all, Robert makes rather heavy weather of Augustine's *De trinitate*, misunderstanding and garbling this text although he could have put it to more constructive use here.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.5.1–41, 1.6.21–25, 1.6.28–30, 1.6.40–42, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 163–246, 316–24, 327–31, 348–55.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.4.9–14, 1.6.43–49, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 110–28, 367–68; Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre*, pp. 172–80, 181–84.

A central blind spot in Robert's treatment of theological language with respect to the Trinity is his inability to grasp the fact that Augustine is not talking about the economic Trinity at all in *De trinitate*. This same problem helps to account for his backing and filling on the subject of relation, which prevents him from seeing that it is the relations associating the persons with each other and distinguishing Them from each other in Their unmanifested state that is the focus of the Augustinian argument concerning relative nouns. Aside from this economic bias, reinforced by his adherence to both Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor, Robert's theology suffers here from his contradictions on the definition of person and his inconsistencies in the handling of the power-wisdom-goodness problem. If he is a mitigated Abelardian on both of these points, he gives full credence to the utility of Abelard's bronze seal analogy,⁵⁹ despite its incompatibility with a Trinity viewed as consubstantial and coeternal. He does achieve a clear yoking of the terms essence, substance, and nature and a consistent assignment of them to the shared attributes of the Godhead. He also targets effectively the problem implicit in the Boethian definition of person as the individual substance of a rational nature, even if he remains unwilling to disembarass himself of it systematically. He does recognize the fact that there is more than one way to think about relation, and that one can use this concept meaningfully in Trinitarian theology, having noted the limitations of Aristotelian logic in that context. This, too, is an insight which he does not exploit as fully and positively as he might have done.

Several of the more constructive features of Robert of Melun's treatment of theological language—at least potentially—can also be found in the two theologians of the period who contributed most heavily to the eventual argument against Abelard's semantics developed by Peter Lombard, Walter of Mortagne and the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. The *Summa sententiarum* has generally been regarded as Peter's most immediate source in this connection,⁶⁰ with Walter seen as a source for that work.⁶¹ This may well have

⁵⁹ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.4.3–9, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 101–10.

⁶⁰ Ludwig Ott, "Die Trinitätslehre der *Summa sententiarum* als Quelle des Petrus Lombardus," *Divus Thomas* 21 (1943): 159–86.

⁶¹ Marcel Chossat, *La Somme des Sentences: Oeuvre de Hugues de Mortagne vers 1155* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1923), pp. 83–89; Ludwig Ott, "Die Trinitätslehre Walters von Mortagne als Quelle der *Summa sententiarum*," *Scholastik* 18 (1943): 79–90, 219–39; "Walter von Mortagne und Petrus Lombardus in ihren Verhältnis zueinander," in *Mélanges Joseph de Ghellinck, S.J.*, 2 vols. (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1951), 2: 646–97. Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor*,

been the line of filiation, although it is worth remembering that Walter's teaching was directly available to Peter, aside from its textual accessibility; and, in some respects, he prefers Walter's treatment to that of the *Summa sententiarum*.

Walter expressly states that he has framed his *De trinitate* as a refutation of the view that power, wisdom, and goodness can be used as proper names of the Trinitarian persons.⁶² These attributes, along with attributes such as justice, refer to the single divine essence or substance. They do not signify diverse properties in God Himself, but the diversity of His effects as He operates in creatures.⁶³ The persons Who exist in this unity of the divine substance are what the Greeks call *hypostases*, or subsistent manifestations of the Godhead.⁶⁴ This being the case, for Walter, he raises the question of whether, since the operations of God are carried out by the entire Trinity, we have to say that the Son engenders Himself. Walter answers in the negative. The operations of the Trinity, he observes, are understood in the relation of the Trinity to creatures. Although the actions of the Trinitarian persons are inseparable, some are more appropriate to one person than to another.⁶⁵ Walter accepts the application of relative terms to the Trinity, although not in the connection of the Trinity to the creation, since created things are mutable and God is not. Despite his statement that the Trinitarian operations are understood in their relation to the creation, Walter accents the unique appositeness of the terms unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding, which refer to the relations of the Trinitarian persons to each other and which must be distinguished from terms, such as love or charity, which apply substantially to all the persons.⁶⁶ As another example of this last point, Walter cites the Augustinian analogy of *mens-notitia-amor*, which he sees as a clear parallel of the intratrinitarian relations of paternity, filiation, and procession. These relations, in either example, are functional correlatives, not relations that are accidental, as they may inhere in creatures.⁶⁷ When it comes to the definition of Trinitarian person as the "individual substance of a rational nature," Walter holds that Boethius is just plain wrong. His definition

pp. 224–25, sees Hugh as Peter's source here, but that is because he writes before scholars had determined that Hugh was not the author of the *Summa sententiarum*.

⁶² Walter of Mortagne, *De trinitate* 13, *PL* 209: 588D–590B.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 1, *PL* 209: 577B–C.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 2–3, *PL* 209: 577C–578B.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 5, *PL* 209: 560A–581A.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 7–8, *PL* 209: 583A–584C.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 9, 11, *PL* 209: 584D–586A, 586C–587C.

leads to three substances, that is, three deities. Despite its formulation six centuries earlier, Walter dismisses it as a "profane innovation."⁶⁸ As to what a person really is, Boethius having been rejected, a *persona*, for Walter, is the name of the properties (*nominum proprietates*) that distinguish the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit from each other.⁶⁹

There is much that Walter does not attempt here. He does not discuss the grammatical rationale for the relational terms that he sees as appropriate proper names of the Trinitarian persons. He has not factored eternity into the nature of those relations. He has therefore not explained fully what distinguishes intratrinitarian relations from relations as the accidents inhering in creatures. He has not defined substance or essence. None the less, he uses these latter terms consistently and applies them clearly to the attributes of the Godhead in general. He makes it clear why power, wisdom, and goodness belong in the latter category. If he claims that the functions of the Trinity are understood in relation to creatures, he also takes a notable step in the direction of reappropriating the Augustinian, and Latin, accent on the understanding of the relations of the Trinitarian persons vis-à-vis each other as the foundation for a set of relational proper names that are truly unique to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively. He also is crisp, cogent, and unhesitating in his willingness to jettison a Boethian definition of person that simply does not work. In short, Walter makes some important contributions to the resolution of the anti-Abelard debate.

In some respects the author of the *Summa sententiarum* consolidates these gains and in others he takes a step backwards. As with Walter, he does not define the terms substance and essence. He tends to use them consistently, but is less wholehearted than Walter in this respect. He agrees that the divine essence and substance are the same thing, adding that the unity of the divine essence and substance is not changed or infringed upon by God's action in the mutable created universe through His governance or disposition (*dispositio*). While the author also defines the divine substance as God's effects in nature,⁷⁰ he more typically equates substance, essence, and nature with the Godhead as such, in contrast with the Trinitarian persons Who share in it. He agrees with Walter in

⁶⁸ Ibid., 6, *PL* 209: 581A–582A.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 12, *PL* 209: 588A–C.

⁷⁰ *Summa sententiarum* 1.4, *PL* 176: 48C–49A.

upholding the appositeness of the analogy of *mens-notitia-amor* as relations among the Trinitarian persons, expanding it to include Augustine's point that these relations are eternal and unchanging.⁷¹ With Walter, however, he has missed Augustine's grammatical rationale for the admissibility of relation, so understood, to Trinitarian theology.

In any event, having laid this foundation, the author notes that we must distinguish the terms that signify the unity of substance and nature in the deity, such as omniscience or eternity, which are predicated of God substantially (*dicuntur secundum substantiam*) from those that apply properly to the persons of the Trinity, such as unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding, which signify the properties that distinguish the persons (*significant proprietates quibus personae distinguuntur*) vis-à-vis each other. These latter terms, he adds, are predicated of the persons appropriately because the attributes in question inhere only in the individual persons which they denote.⁷² They are used relatively (*relative*), with respect to each other. They do not refer to anything accidental, since the intratrinitarian relations are permanent.⁷³ As for power, wisdom, and goodness, they belong clearly under the heading of the terms denoting the attributes of the deity as such. They are not acceptable as proper names of the persons.⁷⁴

The main area in which the author of the *Summa sententiarum* backtracks, in comparison with Walter of Mortagne, is in his handling of the problematic Boethian definition of person. He is well aware of the objection that can be leveled against it, and which had been so leveled by Walter and others, namely, that it entails three substances, that is, three deities. But he is too timid to junk this definition entirely. His proposal is to redefine it, so that its semantic force is limited (*restringitur significatio*). According to his own redefinition, Boethius's formula denotes persons who are distinct with respect to their properties but not distinct substantially.⁷⁵ The effect of this new definition is to leach the meaning out of Boethius's formula by changing it so much that it stops saying what he intended it to mean. For, the author's own positive definition of a person is that a person is a property (*proprietas*). This claim he anchors by the citation of authority in the phrase "in essence unity

⁷¹ Ibid., 1.6, *PL* 176: 51A–52D.

⁷² Ibid., 1.7, *PL* 176: 53A–B.

⁷³ Ibid., 1.9, *PL* 176: 55C–D.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 1.10, *PL* 176: 56D–58D.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 1.9, *PL* 176: 56C–D.

and in the persons property" (*in essentia unitas, et in personis proprietates*). He adds that the Greeks use the term *hypostasis* to denote the Trinitarian persons and that the Latins translate *hypostasis* as *substantia*. This is an application of the idea of substance which he rejects. The properties in God, he insists, are the relations in God, which are not the same thing as the divine substance, a point on which he concludes his analysis of theological language as applied to the Trinity, with a reprise on the unique appropriateness of the unbegotten-begotten-proceeding formula for the definition of the personhood of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.⁷⁶

Although the author of the *Summa sententiarum* waffles on the Boethian definition of person, retaining it while at the same time emptying it of its original meaning, and although he does not attempt to define his other key terms, he does make an energetic if imperfectly realized effort to use them consistently. He clearly assigns substance, essence, and nature to the side of the Godhead while squarely situating person on the side of the intratrinitarian relations, seen as eternal. He uses Augustine effectively, if not exhaustively. And, he shows some awareness of the terminological discrepancies between the Greek and Latin Trinitarian formulae, displaying an understanding of how these discrepancies had helped to muddy the waters. At the same time as he makes significant gains in these respects, however, he dissipates many of them when he turns to the application of the lexicon he has developed for Trinitarian discourse to the task of explaining the constitution of the incarnate Christ.

The author's biggest semantic problem, in the context of Christology, is the term *substantia*. In the incarnation, he notes, the Word, Who is both a divine person and a possessor of the divine nature, took on a human nature. We recall here that, in speaking of the divine essence and nature above, he had rigorously equated these two terms with the divine substance. Exactly what the relationship between Christ's divine substance and His divine personhood may be is not spelled out in this analysis. The author moves on to observe that there are two natures in the incarnate Christ, divine and human. Whether the terms essence and substance have a human denotation, and whether they are univocal with the way these terms are to be understood of the divine nature, or whether they are to be understood equivocally, or analogously, is a question he likewise bypasses, proceeding to the statement that there are

⁷⁶ Ibid., 1.11, *PL* 176: 59B–61C.

three substances in the incarnate Christ, a human body, a human soul, and the Word.⁷⁷ We recognize the formula found in the school of Laon, which has also cropped up in the Christology of Robert Pullen. Its difficulties are manifest, especially in the light of the lexicon which the author of the *Summa sententiarum* has been trying to develop. For, the Word is understood as a person, the second person of the Trinity. It is this person and not one of the other two persons, and not the divine substance in general, that undergoes incarnation. How Christians are to grasp the force of that belief, given the three-substance formula, is indeed difficult to see. It is likewise difficult to know what to make of this formula as it applies to human nature, at least if one wants to adhere to the hylemorphic notion of the human *substantia* inherited from Aristotle.

The author's problems are intensified when he raises the next question, of whether Boethius's "individual substance of a rational nature" is useful in understanding the humanity of Christ. As we have noted, he was unsettled as to its applicability to divine persons. In this context, he rejects Boethius's definition of person because it would confine personhood to Christ's human soul alone. Two difficulties would flow from that position. First, the definition would conflict with the author's own Aristotelian presupposition that human beings are composed of bodies as well as souls. Equally serious, if the soul alone could be equated with the human person, then, in the incarnation, the Word would take on a human person, whether or not that human soul had already been united with a human body. The result would be an individual containing two persons, an idea difficult to sustain conceptually and also an index of the heresy of Adoptionism. This heresy is a doctrine that the author plainly rejects. And so, along with it, he dismisses the Boethian definition as meaningful for human beings. He concludes that it would be pertinent only to spiritual beings, such as angels, that lack bodies.⁷⁸

It is clear that the author's main concern in these passages is to rule out heresies attached to Christ's nature. But, in expressing that concern, he confuses the terminology which he had used for the Trinity. He offers no advice on whether the term *substantia* can be used in the same sense both for God and for creatures, and, if not, how it should be understood in each case. He is equally ambivalent in his application of substance to human nature, contradicting the

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1.15, *PL* 176: 70C–D.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 1.15, *PL* 176: 71A–B.

idea that substance stands for the union of body and soul in man with the notion that substance can be applied to the infra-substantial physical and spiritual components that combine to constitute a human being.

THE LOMBARDIAN RESPONSE

While we can certainly trace the influence of both Walter of Mortagne and the *Summa sententiarum* in Peter Lombard's handling of theological language, Peter takes on a much wider assignment in this connection than any of the predecessors and contemporaries whom we have already considered. As we will see below, he felt a serious need to take stock of the semantics of Gilbert of Poitiers, no less than the terminology of Abelard. Of concern here was not only Gilbert's numerical distinction among the Trinitarian persons but his semantics more generally, as they applied to other aspects of the divine nature and to Christology. Peter also joins with many theologians of his time in seeking a definitive means of banishing the Abelardian power-wisdom-goodness argument from theological discussion. In some respects he employs the same tactics in dealing with the teachings of both of these masters. Most succinctly stated, his ability to bring John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* to bear on Trinitarian theology enables him to pinpoint exactly the differences between the Greek and Latin approaches to the Trinity that underlay, and beclouded, much of the debate, both in Abelard's formulation of his teaching and in the arguments of his would-be opponents. On the Latin side, Peter takes the tack of focusing on Augustine and of mining his *De trinitate* more exhaustively than any of the theologians of his time. In the effort to re-Latinize the doctrine of the Trinity he is thus better equipped than other thinkers who had dismissed, or garbled, or misunderstood their Augustine. In appealing to the resources of the two most philosophical of the theologians representing the Greek and Latin traditions, respectively, Peter seeks to find, and to clarify, a vocabulary adequate to bear the speculative weight of the doctrines it would be called upon to bear. He reflects a strong confidence in the ability of theologians, even with the limited philosophical resources currently available, to develop and to use with precision and consistency just such a vocabulary. And, many of the arguments he works out in response to Abelard, whom he regards as the Trinitarian theologian of the day most in need of refutation, also proved to be of great utility when he turned his attention to Gilbert.

Peter grounds his case against Abelard in the Trinitarian theolo-

gies of Augustine and John Damascene because, by comparing these two prototypical exponents of Latin and Greek theology, he is able to show, clearly and convincingly, just what had led Abelard astray.⁷⁹ Abelard, he notes, had confused the Latin and Greek understandings of the Trinity. Damascene made it clear to the Lombard that Abelard had identified himself primarily with the Greek effort to understand the economic Trinity, the Trinitarian persons as They manifest Themselves to man, both cosmologically and charismatically. At the same time, Abelard had seen the need to distinguish between the attributes that we can assign to the single simple divine essence and those we can apply to the Trinitarian persons. Augustine focused Peter's attention on the fact that, in addressing the second part of that assignment, the Latin tradition insisted on a point that Abelard has not taken with sufficient seriousness, the need to understand the relations of the Trinitarian persons among Themselves, quite apart from anything They might choose to manifest of Themselves to man. With this distinction between the Latin and Greek approaches clearly laid out, Peter is able to show that Abelard's doctrine of the Trinity is inadequate to the explanation of the Trinity in either of these modes. Abelard, he agrees, had been correct in seeing that some terms apply to God as such, while other terms apply properly to the Trinitarian persons individually. Now, the names power, wisdom, and goodness are not proper names as applied to the persons of the Trinity. For they do not display what is unique to each of these persons in the internal family relationship which He enjoys with the other two persons. Nor do these terms apply properly or exclusively to the ways in which one, and only one, of the Trinitarian persons manifests Himself to man, since they denote attributes common to the divine essence which they share.

Peter's strategy in developing this argument against Abelard can be seen, first of all, in the way in which he organizes his material in the first book of his *Sentences*. As we have seen, in considering the schemata of contemporary systematic theologians in chapter 2 above, many of those who lead off with the deity begin with the

⁷⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* l. d. 3. c. 1.5, d. 8. c. 4–c. 8.1–3, d. 19. c. 2, d. 22. c. 5, d. 24. c. 6–d. 25. c. 3.4, d. 26. c. 3, c. 8, d. 27. c. 2.3, d. 30. c. 1.1–7, d. 33. c. 1.1–10, d. 34. c. 1.1–9, c. 4.2, 3rd ed. rev., ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols., (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81), 1: 70, 98–101, 101–03, 160, 179–80, 189, 195, 203, 204–05, 220–22, 240–43, 245–46, 246–50, 253. On this whole question, see Ermenegildo Bertola, "Il problema di Dio in Pier Lombardo," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 48 (1956): 135–50; Johannes Schneider, *Die Lehre vom dreieinigen Gott in der Schule des Petrus Lombardus* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1961), pp. 145–48, 181–82, 226.

divine nature and then treat the Trinity. Peter does the reverse. In discussing the Trinity first, he gets his basic vocabulary in place and indicates the particular content he is going to give to the troublesome key terms at issue. This done, he next takes up the unity of the Godhead which the Trinitarian persons share, and the various ways in which different subsets of divine names under this heading can be understood. As noted, power, wisdom, and goodness are included in this particular subdivision of Peter's theological lexicon. The are treated as such, before he continues with the modes by which the deity governs the universe, a topic which then leads directly into the subject of the creation, which he addresses in Book 2.

At the outset, and repeatedly in Book 1, Peter emphasizes the point that the reason for writing about the Trinity is to show that God is one in essence and plural in His persons. With Walter of Mortagne, the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, and Robert of Melun, he firmly annexes substance and nature to essence as ways of speaking about the Godhead. Unlike any of these masters, however, he endows these terms with a solid content. For him, essence means absolute being, the fullness of being. Insofar as essence can be compared with anything else, it is not to be contrasted with existence but with non-existence. Peter's reading of Augustine and John Damascene points him to the understanding that, in Latin, essence and its synonyms are the equivalent of the Greek *ousia*. Essence, in his view, is actually a better term than substance in this connection, although substance may be used with this sense, à propos of the Godhead. The chief features of the divine essence are characteristics of God in and of Himself. He is eternal, incommutable, immutable, and simple. He is being as such, and alone may be so called (*Deus ergo solus dicitur essentia vel esse*). Being is not an attribute of God, for Peter, but a statement about His very nature. This divine nature is utterly transcendent of created beings, which have a beginning, even in the case of those that have immortal souls, and which are changeable, subject to modification by accidents. Even when created beings are spiritual, they too lack simplicity and immutability. The term *substantia* must thus be applied to created beings in a manner different from the way it is applied to God. Peter acknowledges that substance refers properly (*proprie*) to created beings subject to change. The term, thus, can be applied to the deity only with caveats and restrictions, of the type he has indicated. But, with that understanding, *substantia* can be equated with the divine *essentia*.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 2. c. 1–c. 2.3, d. 8. c. 1–8, 1: 61–63, 95–103. The quotation is at d. 8. c. 1.7, 1: 96. Peter's accent on *essentia* as the key to his doctrine

Having made this point, Peter indicates that, along with *substantia*, *natura* is to be yoked with essence, on the side of the Godhead; it is not to be used to denote the Trinitarian persons.⁸¹ The term *natura* also refers to the created universe, since it describes the character of concrete individual beings, whatever that character may happen to be, so long as it is intrinsic to the being in question.⁸² The consideration of how God's existence and nature may be known from an inspection of created nature which prefaces immediately Peter's discussion of the Trinity is designed to do three things at once. Outside of validating St. Paul's claim that the invisible things of God may be seen through the things that He has made, the proofs give Peter an opportunity to lay a foundation for his anti-Abelardian argument by contrasting the composite and changeable beings in creation with the omnipotent, omniscient, and supremely good creator. This argument goes beyond the offering of physical and metaphysical proofs of God's existence to the annexation of the attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness to the divine simplicity, from the outset.⁸³ A second anti-Abelardian tactic built into Peter's proofs is his next move to the vestiges of the Trinity in creation. He begins by emphasizing that these are similitudes, not substantial participations of creatures in the incommutable and simple substance of the Trinity. Further, the analogies found in the philosophers are mere pointers which fall short of imparting a real knowledge of the Trinity. The best created analogy of the Trinity is the mind of man, as Augustine had developed that theme in his *De trinitate*.

Peter gives a more comprehensive and more finely nuanced treatment of the Augustinian argument in this section of his *Sentences* than we find in the work of any of the contemporary masters who invoke it. There are three features of his handling of this subject which make it stand out from other current accounts. In the first place, he considers both sets of Augustinian analogies, *memoria-intellectus-voluntas* and *mens-notitia-amor*. Secondly, he takes careful account of the problem of how relation may be understood, and goes farther than anyone else in exploring both the advantages of

of the names of God has been aptly noted by Cornelio Fabro, "Teologia dei nomi divini nel Lombardo e in S. Tommaso," *Pier Lombardo* 4 (1960): 79-81; Étienne Gilson, "Pierre Lombard et les théologies d'essence," *Revue du moyen âge latin* 1 (1945): 61-64; Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 25-30, 224-26.

⁸¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 2. c. 4.2, d. 34. c. 1, 1: 64, 246-50.

⁸² Ibid., 1. d. 3. c. 1.1, 1: 68-69. On *natura* here, see Johann Schupp, *Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1932), pp. 15-23.

⁸³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 3. c. 1.1-6, 1: 68-70.

the grammatical reformulation of this idea by Augustine and the limits as well as the powers of relative nouns in the Trinitarian context. Finally, he brings Damascene to bear on the definition of *persona* with which he emerges and on the ways in which it is appropriate as applied to the Trinitarian persons.

Peter begins with the analogy of memory, intellect, and will. This serves as a useful analogy in that these three functions are not three lives, three minds, three essences but are mental operations that are distinct, as well as being functional correlatives of each other. They coinhere in a single subsistent mind. With Augustine, he accents the point that analogy is not identity. The human mind remains unequal (*licet impar*) to the Trinity. The mind is a rational spirit attached to a body, while God is spiritual and incorporeal. A human being possesses these three faculties, but together they do not comprise the sum total of his being, while the Trinitarian persons do constitute God's whole being. The human being exercising these three mental functions is a single person, while the Trinity is three persons. Still, a powerful source of comparability lies in the fact that in both the divine and human analogates the three functions are understood with reference to each other. In the human no less than in the divine case, the interrelations involved are sharply distinguishable from those pertaining to Aristotelian accidents: "These three may be called one substance, and that is because they exist substantially in the same mind or soul, not as accidents in a subject, which can come and go" (*Haec tria dicantur una substantia: ideo scilicet quia in ipsa anima vel mente substantialiter existunt, non sicut accidentia in subiecto, quae possunt adesse et abesse*).⁸⁴

In support of this point Peter cites Augustine's *De trinitate* 9.4, which no one else at the time who appealed to Augustine's argument had thought of using. He does so because he finds the discussion of relative nouns in *De trinitate* 5.16 too weak for his purposes. For, relatives such as left and right or light and dark involve spatiality and sensory perception, neither of which pertains to the mental faculties of man on which the Trinitarian analogy is based. *A fortiori*, neither spatiality nor sense perception applies to the Trinity itself. As Peter stands alone in recognizing, Augustine himself had indicated the limits of his own grammatical argument. He had arrived here at an argument based instead on man's mental faculties, faculties seen as structured intrinsically into man's very being, and not as accidents that may or may not be attached to it.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 1. d. 3. c. 1.7–c. 3.2, 1: 70–75. The quotation is at d. 3. c. 2.8, 1: 74.

This argument addresses the critique of the concept of relation made on the side of Aristotelian logic as well as the critique that could be made on the side of grammar, and provides an analogy on which the interrelations of the Trinitarian persons, structured not only intrinsically but also eternally into their divine being, can be solidly grounded.

With this powerful argument in place, it may not seem immediately apparent why Peter thinks it desirable to advert as well to the *mens-notitia-amor* analogy, especially since, in Augustine's *De trinitate*, it is treated as an argument less finally persuasive than the one Augustine builds on the foundation of *memoria-intellectus-voluntas*. For Peter, the chief limitation of the *mens-notitia-amor* analogy is that it is impossible to make the same case, on the human side, for relations that are intrinsic to the beings that possess them as can be made for memory, intellect, and will. He prudently does not try to extend that analysis of relation to this analogy. What appeals to him about the *mens-notitia-amor* model is that it conjures up the image of a parent and a child as the analogates of the noticing mind and the object of knowledge and love of which it takes cognizance, and of the love passing between them, while asserting their equality and consubstantiality and the complementarity of their joint interactions. In some respects, Augustine's analogy of the lover, the beloved, and the love that unites them might have served Peter's purpose equally well. But he prefers the *mens-notitia-amor* model, at least with the reading he gives to it, because it points to the ways in which the Trinitarian persons, in their eternal relations to each other, can be distinguished by the particular roles they play vis-à-vis each other.⁸⁵

Having found a way to include the concept of relation within his analysis of the Trinitarian persons, while excluding the limits attaching to relative nouns and to Aristotelian accidents alike, Peter is now well positioned to clarify the meaning of the term *persona* as applied to the Trinity. In general, this task is going to require a set of names that are both proper to each person and which can signify the divine essence, but in such a way as to display "what pertains properly to the individual persons, and which is attributed relatively to each of them" (*illa quae proprie ad singulas pertinet personas, relative ad invicem dicuntur*).⁸⁶ Insofar as the names attached to the Godhead signify the divine essence, they signify the divine substance, and may be attributed *substantialiter* to the per-

⁸⁵ Ibid., 1. d. 3. c. 3.3–c. 4, 1: 74–77.

sons when, but only when, it is the divinity each person shares with the other persons that the speaker wants to denote. In coming to grips with the problem of how substantial attribution of divine names would work in this connection, Peter notes that this is a linguistic problem that occurs both in Greek and Latin. Where the Latins speak of three persons in the Trinity, the Greeks speak of three *hypostases*, which the Latins have translated as *substantiae*. He freely indicates that Boethius is the villain of the piece here. But, he continues, such an understanding of substance is inapposite. Substance, as he has already pointed out, belongs properly to the divine essence, the Godhead, and not to the Trinitarian persons; the Boethian translation of the Greek has confused the issue and should be discarded, lest we emerge with Sabellianism or some other tritheistic heresy.⁸⁷ Since we Latins, unlike the Greeks, use substance to refer to the divine essence, it may not be used to refer to the things that the Trinitarian persons do not have in common. By contrast, the names of the persons must refer to properties unique to each person (*nomine proprietas personae intellegatur*). These properties are paternity, filiation, and procession. *Proprietas* as a definition of *persona*, he adds, is clearer than *substantia* and less confusing than *hypostasis*. He expatiates on the dangers connected with *hypostasis* in particular, observing that "poison lurks under this noun" (*sub hoc nomine venenum latere*). To illustrate the latter point, he brings forward a citation from Jerome where that authority tries to argue against the Arians using the language of *hypostasis*. The unedifying spectacle of Jerome unsuccessfully wrestling with this problem is an argument for purging such terminology from the lexicon of Latin theology.⁸⁸ On the other hand, the personal properties of paternity, filiation, and procession are clearly understandable as the names denoting the relations among the persons, names which can indeed be used properly of one, and of only one, of the persons. Reminding the reader that these are eternal relations, and not predicables, Peter shows that even Damascene, the source for the Greek alternative to Latin Trinitarian theology on whom he relies, can be used as a positive support for the position he is defending. Quoting Damascene, he reports him as stating that "the *hypostases* do not differ from each other according to substance, but according to their charac-

⁸⁶ Ibid., 1. d. 22. c. 5.1, 1: 179. The same point is made at *Sent.* 1. d. 21. c. 1, 1: 174–75.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 1. d. 23. c. 1–c. 5, 1: 181–86.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 1. d. 25. c. 2.1–d. 26. c. 1.1, 1: 192–97. The quotation is at d. 26. c. 1.1, 1: 197. On this point, see Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 61–64, 93–96, 98–99.

teristic idioms, that is, their determinative properties" (*Non differunt ab invicem hypostases secundum substantiam, sed secundum characteristicum idioma, id est determinativas proprietates*).⁸⁹ With this argument, and the joint authority of Augustine and Damascene anchoring it, Peter rests his case on the significance of the term *persona* as applied to the Trinity and decisively rules out Trinitarian names that do not display relationships among the persons which are unique to each person alone and which do not speak to the eternal structure of the Trinitarian family in and of itself.

This argument clearly obviates the ascription of power, wisdom, and goodness as personal names of the Trinitarian persons. But Peter has more to say on the side of the names given to the divine unity which they share. Here, he accents the total equality of the persons. None of the persons surpasses the others in His greatness, His eternity, His wisdom, His power, His goodness, or in any of the other attributes of the simple divine essence. Peter uses Damascene to hammer in the point that the fullness of divine perfections is found entirely in each of the Trinitarian persons.⁹⁰ This line of argument is leveled as much against Robert of Melun as against Abelard and his more intransigent defenders. But Peter also shares with Robert a concern with several other dimensions of that question, which he raises in order to rule out the debate over universals as relevant to a consideration of the divine nature. He agrees, with Robert, that the Trinitarian persons cannot be called "parts" of a "whole" called the Trinity. Nor can They be described as items that belong to the same genus, possessing a subordinate status with respect to the larger collective entity of which they are members. Nor can the divine essence be regarded as a material cause or a metaphysical substratum of what is common to the three persons, a point inspiring Peter to take issue with Augustine.⁹¹ Nor is the

⁸⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 26. c. 2–d. 29. c. 4, 1: 197–219. The quotation from Damascene is at d. 27. c. 3.1, 1: 205. Peter repeats the same quotation at *Sent.* 1. d. 33. c. 1.8, 1: 243, resuming the larger argument at that point in d. 33. c. 1–d. 34. c. 17, 1: 240–50. Similar language occurs in his *Sermo* 21, where he applies the argument about persons as properties to the analogy of memory, intellect, and will, *PL* 171: 435B–436B; this would enable us to date that sermon to the period following his reading of Damascene in the early 1150s. Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 118–23, 144–48, 166, 181–82, while positioning Peter's definition of person well in relation to most theologians of his time, omits the material he derives from Damascene.

⁹⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 19. c. 1–6, d. 20, d. 31–32, d. 34. c. 3–4, 1: 159–63, 172–74, 233–39, 251–53. A similar point is made about God's goodness in *Sermo* 4, *PL* 171: 357C.

⁹¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 19. c. 8, 1: 166.

divine essence a generalization derived from the similarities among the persons, as with men who may share the same sex or physical complexion. Peter uses Damascene here to show that these ways of conceiving of the deity import the debate over universals into theology in an incorrect way, thereby indicating his familiarity with the terms of that debate even as he relegates it to philosophy. While the divine essence cannot be regarded as an abstraction derived from the Trinitarian persons, or as existing on a higher plane of reality, Peter recognizes the grammatical aptness of nouns, such as *homo*, which can refer both to mankind in general and to individual members of the human race. But the capacity of nouns to signify both in general and in particular in the case of created beings which are both individuals and participants in larger conceptual entities must be denied of the deity, since He is not that kind of being.⁹² Peter's handling of these issues is both fuller, more pointed, and more streamlined than Robert's.

Having spelled out these particulars as they affect Trinitarian theology specifically, Peter is interested in placing his theory of theological language on a wider canvas. Since his lexicon is now in place, the sense that he gives to the terminology he uses here is unambiguous. He outlines three subdivisions within theological language. The first includes the terms which he had addressed first, the names applying to the Trinitarian persons individually, properly, and exclusively, the names which signify Their interpersonal relations, along the lines of the Augustinian analogies and the relations of paternity, filiation, and procession.⁹³ Next, there are the names that denote the divine essence in its unity. In addition to terms such as eternal, immutable, and simple, which refer to God in and of Himself, there are other terms that belong in this category, because they can be predicated of the single divine substance, but which also refer to God as He manifests Himself to man. Peter places power, wisdom, and goodness in this group, along with justice and the like.⁹⁴ Here, he raises two other questions, both of which are also aired by other contemporary theologians but not so systematically. One is the matter of terms applied to God in the singular or in the plural, a matter also taken up by Robert of Melun. There is, to begin with, the noun "Trinity." It is grammatically singular. Yet, it applies to none of the persons of the Trinity as

⁹² Ibid., 1. d. 19. c. 5–c. 9, 1: 163–69.

⁹³ Ibid., 1. d. 22. c. 1.1, c. 5.1, d. 23. c. 2–c. 5, d. 25. c. 1–d. 27. c. 3.1, 1: 178, 179, 182–86, 190–205.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 1. d. 22. c. 3, c. 5, d. 31–32, d. 34. c. 3–c. 4, 1: 179, 223–39, 251–53.

individuals but to all of them simultaneously. Further, it is attributed to Them as a collective noun but not to any of Them substantially.⁹⁵ All names, Peter continues, that are applied to God substantially are used in the singular. Names referring to that single *substantia* can also be applied in the singular to the Trinitarian persons, but only when one is referring to the attributes that each person shares with the others. This usage is not proper with reference to the attributes denoting each member of the Trinity's personal singularity.⁹⁶

This line of analysis concerning singular and plural or collective nouns leads Peter to his final question within his second subdivision, the appropriateness of mathematical language as applied to the deity. As we recall, Gilbert of Poitiers had advanced the view, against Abelard, that the persons of the Trinity could be distinguished only numerically. The Chartrains had attacked this argument, using against it the weapons forged by Aristotelian logic. Asserting that accidents cannot be attributed to God and that number is an accident, Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbald of Arras had rejected Gilbert's position, while at the same time substituting for it a mathematical argument of their own, the $1 \times 1 = 1$ model by which unity engenders equality and the two engender connection. This Chartrain formula appears to be just as numerical a claim as Gilbert's. Now Peter likewise rejects the idea that God is conditioned by accidents or that He is understandable in terms of them, although, as we have seen, he succeeds in finding a way of including relation, detached from its understanding as an accident, within his Trinitarian theology. His concern with the propriety of mathematical language in connection with the Trinity derives partly from the felt need to respond to Gilbert and the Chartrains on this point. It also arises from the fact that Damascene had offered a numerical analysis of the Trinity which Peter also finds problematic and in need of interpretation.

In addressing the point that the Trinitarian persons share an identity of substance, Peter is, initially, drawn up short by a line he quotes from Damascene, "the *hypostases* are said to differ by number, and not by nature" (*numero enim, et non natura, differre dicuntur hypostases*).⁹⁷ The problem, as Peter sees it, is either that Damascene seems to support the Porretan and Chartrain mathematical argu-

⁹⁵ Ibid., 1. d. 22. c. 3, 1: 179.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 1. d. 23. c. 1.1–3, 1: 181–82.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 1. d. 19. c. 9.3, 1: 168.

ments, which Peter rejects, or that he seems to support the idea that the divine nature is a universal, while the *hypostases* are particulars, which Peter also rejects. After wrestling with this issue, he concludes that the overall tenor of Damascene's Trinitarian theology is such that he cannot be thought of as a realist in this context; rather, he is merely saying that the divine essence can be attributed to all the Trinitarian person in the same way, and at the same time, and that the divine essence is the same thing whether this term is used to refer to the persons together or individually.⁹⁸ As to the matter of differentiating the Trinitarian persons by number, Peter advises caution about how we understand this idea. One way of viewing number is the listing of items—this, that, and the other—because each one is different from the others. An example, which Peter does not use but which would illustrate his point, is an apple, a pear, and a banana in the same fruit basket. This notion of number clearly will not do for the Trinity. Another way of viewing number is as it is used in enumeration or computation, when we are talking about more than one instance of the same type of thing, and we want to indicate how many of them there are, or which particular item in the assortment we are discussing. Using our fruit example, we might enumerate one, two, or three apples in a basket of apples in this way. Now Damascene, according to Peter, means this latter type of numerical thinking. But still, the argument can be accepted only with strict caveats. For one thing, as Peter has already noted, the individual items in this numerical illustration do exist as individual members of a genus, in our example, the genus of “apple-ness.” And, as he has explained above, the persons of the Trinity cannot be viewed as members of a genus called “deity.” Further, the numerical argument must also be qualified—and this is a point which Peter makes against both Gilbert, Thierry, and Clarenbald—in that the distinction it posits is insufficient, for it does not include the personal properties that differentiate the Trinitarian persons from each other. The same qualification, he notes, should extend to our appropriation of the Augustinian notion of unity, equality, and connection or concord as Trinitarian names.⁹⁹ In addition, this type of numerical distinction does not mean that there is quantitatively “more God,” more truth, more power, more of any aspect of the divine essence, when two or three of the persons are considered together than when a single divine person is being

⁹⁸ Ibid., l. d. 19. c. 9.3–6, 1: 167–69.

⁹⁹ Ibid., l. d. 19. c. 10.1–3, 1: 169.

regarded alone. We are not talking, here, about quantitative additions to the qualities possessed by any of the divine persons when we think of them in terms of number, Peter stresses. Nor are we thinking or speaking of a differentiation in number that is reducible to the monad which is the conceptual substratum of all numbers. For the threefold character of the structure of the deity is not reducible in any way. Nor is the perfection of any of the Trinitarian persons enlarged by our adding in the others.¹⁰⁰

Ultimately, the value of using numerical language in speaking about the divine nature and the Trinity, for Peter, is not that it can substitute for a discussion of the essence of the Godhead or the personal properties of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Rather, and with the restrictions he indicates, it can supplement our understanding of the other divine names. In speaking of God as one, or as three, Peter essentially treats number in a privative, not in a positive sense. The idea of God's oneness is designed to exclude any notion of polytheism, or any thought that there is more than one Father, one Son, and one Holy Spirit. As for the notion of plurality as applied to the Trinitarian persons, it does not refer to quantitative diversity, addition, or multiplication, but is designed to rule out singularity or solitude.¹⁰¹ Here, Peter is making an effort to detach the unity of God from the sense that the deity, in and of Himself, is alone. In God's capacity as being as such, rather, the deity exists as a consortium, a society. And so, when we say that the Trinitarian persons are distinct with respect to Their personal properties we do not posit diversity of Them in the sense of alienation.¹⁰² The utility of Peter's reflections on number as a source for the divine names is that it serves as a vehicle for his understanding of the ultimate metaphysical reality as a state of intimate, loving, relatedness. One can have a transcendent deity, he concludes, without having a deity Who is cold, detached, and aloof.

Having treated the names attributable to the Trinitarian persons vis-à-vis each other and the names attributable to the divine essence in its transcendent state, Peter next turns to the third general subdivision under which he considers theological language, moving to the terms which we can apply to God with respect to time (*ex tempore*) and in relation to creatures (*relative ad creaturam*).¹⁰³ Tem-

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 1. d. 19. c. 11–c. 12, d. 31. c. 2.9–c. 6, 1: 170–71, 228–32.

¹⁰¹ This point has been discussed with sensitivity by Brady, at *Sent.* 1: 187 n.

¹⁰² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 24, 1: 187–89.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 1. d. 22. c. 3, 1: 179.

porality is involved here not because God Himself changes, but because He interacts with creatures which themselves come into being and pass away, and undergo modifications. Divine names expressing such interactions include terms such as creator, lord, refuge, and the like. These terms indicate God's impact on a world which is altered by His governance both in the cosmological and the charismatic orders, in events which do not alter God Himself.¹⁰⁴ Peter assents to the view that individual Trinitarian persons may take on particular functions in Their relations with the creation and that some divine names under this heading, such as redeemer or gift, may apply specifically to the person entrusted with these missions.¹⁰⁵ But his emphasis in his handling of theological language in this subdivision is that the names of God we use here are used of the deity as such. He concludes the third part of his general analysis of this subject with a consideration of those names of God used with reference to creatures that are to be understood metaphorically (*translative, per similitudinem*), such as mirror, splendor, character, and figure.¹⁰⁶ It is clear from the relative weight that he assigns to other aspects of the problem of theological language that Peter does not think we need to enlarge on the theme of metaphor and to qualify the force of positive names of God and, by extension, the force of affirmative statements about God.

THE PORRETAN CHALLENGE

Much of the emphasis in the foregoing pages has reflected Peter's desire to attack Abelard, as the Trinitarian theologian of the day most in need of refutation. It can certainly be said that Peter goes farther than anyone else at the time to expose the inadequacies of Abelard's power-wisdom-goodness model and the more basic confusion between the deity as transcendent and as manifested on which it rests, offering a clearer and more cogent rationale for his critique and for the positive doctrine he puts forward than is true of other actual or would-be anti-Abelardians. To the extent that Abelard's mode of denominating the Trinitarian persons falls off the theological agenda in the sequel, we can give Peter much of the credit for that outcome. But Abelard was not the only major

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 1. d. 30. c. 1–c. 2, 1: 220–23.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 1. d. 22. c. 3, 1: 179. On this point, see Ludwig Ott, *Untersuchung zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik*, Beiträge, 34 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1937), p. 266; Schneider, *Die Lehre*, p. 111.

¹⁰⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 34. c. 5.2, 1: 254.

contender in the field. Even more problematic, in many ways, was Gilbert of Poitiers. As we have seen, in his own attempt to refute Abelard, Gilbert offered a mathematical understanding of the distinctions among the Trinitarian persons which some contemporaries, including Peter, found wanting. But Gilbert threw an even greater and more intractable challenge into the arena of theological language thanks to his development of a semantic theory so original as to be positively idiosyncratic and very difficult for contemporaries to understand. Quite apart from a vocabulary that is rebarbative, that invents new terms, and that uses existing terms in standard Latin with Gilbert's own meanings attached to them, Gilbert's semantics created severe problems when his lexicon was applied to theology. To some extent, Gilbert himself was aware of these difficulties and sought to address them. The disciples he attracted during his own lifetime also saw some problems with his vocabulary and made notable efforts to disentangle the substance of his teaching from the lexical company in which it travelled. With respect to Gilbert's theology and semantic theory, Peter has sometimes been seen as a critic, pure and simple, and even as the *peritus* responsible for drafting the charges leveled against Gilbert at the Consistory of Paris in 1147 and the Council of Rheims in 1148.¹⁰⁷ This view is a distortion of the facts. In some areas, to be sure, Peter follows the lead of the early Porretans in criticizing Gilbert's theological terminology. But, in others, he finds Gilbert's definitions

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, H. C. van Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1966), p. 95; Fabro, "Teologia dei nomi divini," pp. 77–93; Nikolaus M. Häring, "Petrus Lombardus und die Sprachlogik in der Porretanerschule," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 113–27; "San Bernardo e Gilberto vescovo di Poitiers," in *Studi su S. Bernardo di Chiaravalle nell'ottavo centenario della canonizzazione* (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1975), pp. 87–88; "The Porretans and the Greek Fathers," *MS* 24 (1966): 190; Jean Leclercq, "Textes sur Saint Bernard et Gilbert de la Porrée," *MS* 14 (1952): 107; Lauge Olaf Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta's Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180*, *Acta theologica danica*, 15 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), p. 33; Ludwig Ott, "Petrus Lombardus: Persönlichkeit und Werk," *Münchener theologische Zeitschrift* 5 (1954): 110; reprised as "Pietro Lombardo: Personalità e opera," *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 11–12; Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 121–23, 145–48, 181–82, 226. On Peter's purported role in helping to draw up the charges against Gilbert, see Franz Pelster, "Petrus Lombardus und die Verhandlungen über die Streitfrage des Gilbertus Porreta in Paris (1147) und Reims (1148)," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 68–69, 72. This latter point has been convincingly refuted and the primary role of Godescalc of St. Martin in that connection has been emphasized by Gillian R. Evans, "Godescalc of St. Martin and the Trial of Gilbert of Poitiers," *Analecta Praemonstratensia* 57 (1981): 209 and Häring, "San Bernardo e Gilberto," pp. 77–78.

of terms accurate and helpful, and makes use of them himself.¹⁰⁸ Peter's relationship to Gilbert of Poitiers on this whole subject is a much more nuanced one than has usually been appreciated.

Gilbert produced both a metaphysics and a semantic theory in the commentaries on the theological *opuscula* of Boethius which he composed between 1135 and 1142,¹⁰⁹ a period during which he taught both at Chartres and Paris. In his account of beings, Gilbert distinguishes their formal aspect, which he calls their *quo est* or *subsistentia*, from their concrete individuality, which he calls their *quod est* or *subsistens*.¹¹⁰ In his consideration of the *quo est* of beings, Gilbert expressly distances himself from the doctrine of universals. We cannot extrapolate the *subsistentia* of a being from that individual being, he argues, combining it with similar extrapolations from other individual beings, to produce an abstract idea that refers to an abstract being, or even meaningfully to the individual beings from which it has been derived. What other contemporary thinkers, whether realists or nominalists, called universals, he regards as useless concepts, inapposite in metaphysics and logic alike.¹¹¹ For Gilbert it is a waste of time to compare the *subsistentia* of

¹⁰⁸ For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Marcia L. Colish, "Gilbert, the Early Porretans, and Peter Lombard: Semantics and Theology," in *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la logica modernorum*, ed. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), pp. 229–50; "Early Porretan Theology," *RTAM* 56 (1989): 58–79. To the accounts of the council of Rheims cited there, now add Marjorie Chibnall, intro. to her ed. and trans. of John of Salisbury, *Historia pontificalis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. xl–xli.

¹⁰⁹ For the dates, see Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta*, p. 63.

¹¹⁰ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boethius de Trinitate* prologus secundus 6–7, 1.2.1–2, 1.3.38; *In Boethius de Hebdomadibus* 1.27–29, 1.32–35, 1.37, 1.53, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring in *The Commentaries on Boethius of Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966), pp. 58–59, 78, 109, 193–95, 199. For the literature assisting an understanding of Gilbert's metaphysics and semantics, see Colish, "Gilbert," p. 231 n. 8. To these references may be added Lambert M. DeRijk, "De quelques difficultés de nature linguistique dans le vocabulaire de Gilbert de la Porrée," in *Actes du colloque Terminologie de la vie intellectuelle au moyen âge*, ed. Olga Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), pp. 19–25.

¹¹¹ This point has been interpreted correctly by Evans, "Godescalc of St. Martin," p. 205; *The Mind of St. Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 185; Bruno Maioli, *Gilberto Porretano: Dalla grammatica speculativa alla metafisica del concreto* (Rome: Bulzoni, 1979), pp. 341–61; Christopher J. Martin, intro. to "The Compendium Logicae Porretanum ex codici Oxoniensi Collegii Corporis Christi 205: A Manual of Porretan Doctrine by a Pupil of Gilbert's," ed. Sten Ebbesen et al., *CIMAGEL* 46 (1983): xvii–xxiii, 6; Lauge Olaf Nielsen, "On the Doctrine of Logic and Language of Gilbert Porreta and His Followers," *CIMAGEL* 17 (1976): 45–46; *Theology and Philosophy*, p. 51; Sofia Vanni Rovighi, "La filosofia di Gilberto Porretano," in *Studi di filosofia medioevale*, 2 vols. (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1978), 1: 229–36. This position supersedes the view of Gilbert as a realist maintained by Ermenegildo Bertola, "La scuola di Gilberto de la Porrée,"

one being with the *subsistentia* of another being, for each *subsistentia* inheres in the being to which it belongs in a radically singular way. The thrust of Gilbert's teaching as a metaphysician is to emphasize the utter individuality of each being, at the level of its *quo est* as well as its *quod est*. For Gilbert, in both aspects, beings possess a uniqueness that is irreducible, a uniqueness of a sort that other thinkers might be inclined to grant only to beings that are persons.

Having laid out this highly original doctrine of being, Gilbert is also concerned with using language precisely, naming the two levels of being with nouns that parallel their respective abstractness and concreteness.¹¹² Thus, he holds, an abstract noun such as *humanitas* is properly applied to the *subsistentia* of a particular man, while a concrete noun such as *homo* is properly applied to his concrete *subsistens*, the level of his being which can be modified by accidents. It is not proper to say "*homo est humanitas*" because such a statement confuses and conflates the two distinct aspects of being to which the two nouns refer. Even with respect to created beings, this semantic theory has its weaknesses. Gilbert is forced to use abstract nouns to signify the *subsistentia* of these beings, even though he holds that the *subsistentia* is not susceptible of abstraction from them. Also, most created beings are composite. For instance, the body and soul, the ingredients that make up the concrete *subsistens* of a human being, are thus sub-concrete, infra-subsistent on the level of being. Yet, *corpus* and *anima*, the only nouns available for denoting them in Gilbert's lexicon, are nouns no less concrete than the noun *homo*, which applies properly to the fully subsistent being which they compose. Thus, despite Gilbert's concerted effort to use language so that the abstractness and concreteness of terms reflect the metaphysical status of the aspect of being which they denote, he is not entirely successful in enforcing the strict parallelism between language and reality that he seeks. Gilbert has available to him two kinds of nouns, abstract and concrete, with which to denote three levels of being, the *subsistentia*, the *subsistens*, and the infra-subsistent components in a composite *subsistens*.

in *Saggi e studi di filosofia medioevale* (Padua: CEDAM, 1951), pp. 19–34; Aimé Forest, "Gilbert de la Porrée et les écoles du XII^e siècle," *Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie* 36 (1934): 101–10; A. Hayen, "Le concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée," *AHDMLA* 11 (1936): 39–102; and Richard J. Westley, "A Philosophy of the Concretized and the Concrete: The Constitution of Creatures according to Gilbert de la Porrée," *Modern Schoolman* 37 (1960): 270–71.

¹¹² Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. de Trin. prologus secundus* 12, 1.1.10–34, 1.3.16, 1.3.26–27, 1.3.30, 1.3.36, 1.3.38, 1.3.45–48, 2.1.21; *In Boeth. de Hebd.* 1.32–35, 1.57–69, pp. 60, 72–78, 106, 107–08, 109, 111–12, 167, 194, 199–202.

This is not a problem which Gilbert addresses forthrightly in his semantic theory. Nor does he come to grips with the need to explain how abstract nouns referring to collective objects of knowledge signify, a difficulty he leaves to his disciples.¹¹³ But he does take into account some of the problems involved in his wish to make nouns correspond rigorously to the aspect of being they denote in philosophy and, even more so, in theology. Gilbert is sensitive to the semantic limits of speech in the various scholarly disciplines, and in no sense seeks to be a grammatical reductionist in his application of these disciplines to theological questions. There are gaps, he notes, between things, the concepts we form of them, and the words in which we express those concepts; the words are like images reflected in a mirror.¹¹⁴ Moreover, language itself is far from univocal. The same terms have different meanings in grammar, logic, and natural philosophy.¹¹⁵ Our language labors under still greater difficulties in theology. Gilbert asserts repeatedly that theological statements involve a transferred meaning (*dictio translata, proportionali transsumptione, ratione proportionis*) and that they are paradoxes (*paradoxa*) and symbolic indicators (*emblemata*).¹¹⁶ He criticizes heretics for a too-literal application of human language to the deity,¹¹⁷ and recommends intellectual humility, affirming that faith precedes knowledge and that understanding depends on divine grace.¹¹⁸ Yet, if Gilbert acknowledges that theological statements are analogous and not exhaustive signs of what they signify, he does not state

¹¹³ Ebbesen et al., ed., "*Compendium Logicae Porretanum*," *CIMAGEL* 46 (1983); Martin, intro. to "*Compendium*," pp. xviii–xlv; Nielsen, "On the Doctrine of Logic and Language," pp. 40–69.

¹¹⁴ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. de Trin.* prologus primus 2, prologus secundus 1.3.21–24, pp. 52, 65–68; the image of the mirror is at 1.3.26, p. 69.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.3.47, 2.1.1–2, 2.1.5, 2.1.34; *In Boeth. de Hebd.* prologus 8–9; *In Boethius contra Eutychen et Nestorium* 1.1.2, 1.58–61, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring in *The Commentaries on Boethius of Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966), pp. 111, 163, 164, 170, 184–85, 243, 254–55.

¹¹⁶ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. de Trin.* 1.1.11, 1.2.36–46, 1.2.89, 1.4.28, 1.5.20–21, 1.5.39, 2.1.1–2, 2.1.5, 2.1.34, 2.2.2, 2.4.6; *In Boeth. de Hebd.* 1.58–64, pp. 72, 85–88, 98, 119, 120, 143, 147, 161–64, 170, 200–01. Good discussions of this point are found in Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta*, pp. 33, 35, 38–39; Häring, "Petrus Lombardus," pp. 113–27; Maioli, *Gilberto Porretano*, pp. xxvi–xxx, 3–24, 36–46, 73–75, 179–240; Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 103–27, 130–36; Martin Anton Schmidt, *Gottheit und Trinität nach dem Kommentar des Gilbert Porreta zu Boethius, De Trinitate, Studia Philosophica*, supplementum 7 (Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1956), passim and esp. pp. 6–10, 11–14; Michael B. Williams, *The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the Trinity as Found in His Commentaries on Boethius* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1951), pp. 77, 78, 128.

¹¹⁷ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. de Trin.* prologus secundus 8, 20, pp. 59, 62.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.1.1, 1.1.3, 2.1.9, pp. 70, 71, 164.

precisely where and how the analogies they contain fall short. In practice, notwithstanding his conventional disclaimers, he goes right ahead and invokes the semantic rules he had developed for discussing creatures in speaking about the creator, even though they are not truly apposite to Him. The most notorious case in point, and parallel with his assertion that it is proper to say "*homo non est humanitas*" is his statement that "*Deus non est divinitas*," although he repeatedly avers that God is a radically simple being Whose *quo est* is identical with His *quod est*. Unlike created beings, God has one, and only one, level of being. God's divinity inheres essentially in God; He is all His qualities.¹¹⁹ Thus, in applying the distinction between *deus* and *divinitas* to the deity, Gilbert implies a parallelism between God and creatures and a distinction between the *quo est* and the *quod est* in God which he flatly rejects. Similar difficulties are found in his handling of the key theological terms substance, nature, and person.

Gilbert would have been happy to dispense with *substantia* altogether, since it is not equivalent either to *subsistentia* or to *subsistens* in his own lexicon.¹²⁰ Since the term substance is in the creed, however, he cannot avoid it. He is aware of the fact that, in Aristotelian natural philosophy, substance comes closer to his own *subsistens* than it does to his *subsistentia*. For, like Aristotle's substance, Gilbert's *subsistens* refers to the level at which beings can be modified by accidents.¹²¹ Now God, he agrees, cannot be modified by accidents. None the less, he sometimes calls God an *essens sive subsistens*.¹²² But elsewhere, in an equally inapposite way, he sometimes equates the divine substance with *divinitas* or *deitas*, abstract terms that point to the divine *subsistentia*.¹²³

Despite these ambiguities, Gilbert uses the equation between *substantia* and *divinitas* to attack the Trinitarian theologies of Abe-

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 1.2.96, p. 99.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 1.4.6, p. 119.

¹²¹ Ibid., 1.4.99, p. 135.

¹²² Ibid., 2.1.17–19, 2.1.45–46, pp. 166, 172.

¹²³ Ibid., 2.1.18–20, 2.1.24, 2.1.45, 2.1.54, 2.1.73, pp. 116, 166, 168, 172, 174, 179. This confusion is perpetuated by students of Gilbert purely on the level of philosophy. Unsure of whether *substantia* refers properly to the *quo est* or the *quod est* of beings, they seek to extend its significance to both, according to the intentions of the speaker and the propositional context in which he uses the term. Yet, they regard the reference of nouns to the qualities inhering in the *subsistens* as improper. On this point, see Irène Rosier, "Les acceptations du terme 'substantia' chez Pierre Hélie," in *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la logica modernorum*, ed. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), pp. 315–16.

lard and Augustine alike. Against Abelard, he argues that power, wisdom, and goodness, like other abstract nouns, should be attributed to the single divine substance and essence of the deity. If viewed as properties of the individual Trinitarian persons, these traits would be reduced to accidents inhering in three different beings at the level of *subsistens*. The differences among the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, he insists, are not substantial or essential but numerical only; They all possess power, wisdom, and goodness in the same way. In Gilbert's terms, the problem with Abelard's Trinitarian theology is that he has collapsed the divine *quo est* into the divine *quod est*, emerging with three deities. In Gilbert's estimation, Augustine has done exactly the reverse, collapsing the divine *quod est* into the divine *quo est* in his analogies of the Trinity in the human soul. As he sees it, if we view the Trinity as parallel with the *mens*, *notitia*, and *amor* in the human soul, we would reduce God to a monad and blur the distinctions among the Trinitarian persons.¹²⁴ But, if this line of reasoning provides a language in which Gilbert can criticize Trinitarian theologies he dislikes, it does not enable him to develop a positive Trinitarian theology that is comprehensible, one that does not lay him equally open to the charge that he has failed to distinguish the persons of the Trinity adequately from each other, and one that does not violate his own philosophical rules.

If Gilbert's handling of substance is problematic, the same can be said for his treatment of nature and person. His difficulties are compounded here by the Boethian point of departure he takes. In one of his definitions of nature, Boethius includes substance as one of the concepts that nature embraces. Gilbert rejects this idea. He wants to be able to apply *natura* to God as a simple, immutable, and purely spiritual being. He thinks, correctly, that it would confuse matters if he also applied *natura* to substances made up of matter and form, which can be modified by accidents.¹²⁵ On the other hand, in speaking about created beings that are composite and that are subject to accidents, Gilbert thinks that *natura* is appropriate as well, and that it is attributed properly to these beings at the level of

¹²⁴ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. de Trin.* prologus secundus 14, 1.3.45–48, 1.3.53–54, 2.1.51, 2.2.71, pp. 60, 111–12, 113, 173, 178. Stephan Otto, "Augustinus und Boethius im 12. Jahrhundert," *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 26 (1963): 18–21, 24–26 has argued that the motive for Gilbert's critique of Augustine was the desire to substitute a metaphysically based understanding of the Trinity for one drawn from the inspection of creatures. He ignores the semantic issues in Gilbert's analysis.

¹²⁵ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. contra Eut.* 1.1–36, 1.56–61, 1.92–100, pp. 242–49, 254–55, 261–63.

subsistens.¹²⁶ In speaking about the incarnate Christ, Gilbert concludes that one must use *natura* in both senses of the word, understanding His divine nature as His pure and simple divine essence while understanding His human nature as His concrete composite phenomenal humanity.¹²⁷ Yet, on the level of Christ's human nature, how can a nature that happens to be a human being be distinguished from a human person? And, can the term *persona* be applied comprehensibly both to Christ as God and to Christ as man? Gilbert wrestles with these questions,¹²⁸ but does not fully answer them.

Gilbert begins by rejecting the Boethian definition of a person as the individual substance of a rational nature, as did some other theologians of the time, largely as a way of criticizing Abelard's anthropology.¹²⁹ Gilbert finds unacceptable the equation of the human person with the human soul which this Boethian formula entails. For him, a human person is a human *subsistens*, a combination of body and soul in man that is neither a casual nor a separable assemblage of parts nor a new amalgam, a *tertium quid* whose ingredients each lose their own properties while uniting to inhere in an individual human being. Although it is a composite, a human person is, for Gilbert, a single being that is a *res per se una*.¹³⁰

Vigorous as is this defense of the human person as a psychosomatic unit, it brings various difficulties in its train, which Gilbert does not dispel. First, given his definition of nature on the human level, it is hard to see how a man's human nature can be different from his human person, since Gilbert equates both the nature and the person with the man as a concrete *subsistens*. Second, it is hard to see how a man's human nature can be part of a wider human community, except mathematically. Finally, having proposed his own definition of the human person, Gilbert states that it does not apply to theological persons (*non convenit theologicis personis*).¹³¹ To be

¹²⁶ Ibid., 1.83–91, 2.2, pp. 260–61, 265.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 1.100–03, pp. 263–64.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 2.9–10, 2.18–19, pp. 266–68. As Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, p. 163, has aptly noted, "The nature of the distinction between nature and person remains an unclarified problem with Gilbert."

¹²⁹ This point is rightly stressed by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1: 102–04. Abelard's position on the human soul, its separability from the body, and its introduction into the body after the body is created, is brought out clearly by Thaddeus Kucia, "Die Anthropologie bei Peter Abelard," in *Petrus Abaelardus (1079–1142): Person, Werk, Wirkung*, ed. Rudolf Thomas (Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1980), pp. 224–27.

¹³⁰ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. de Trin.* prologus secundus 12; *In Boeth. contra Eut.* 2.20–3.18, pp. 60, 268–75.

sure, Gilbert makes this assertion because, in his view, a person is not necessarily simple or purely spiritual. A person can be modified by accidents. It is a *subsistens* in a way that the deity is not. Yet, having stated that the persons of the Trinity are not substances, properties, or relations, he insists on the idea that they are distinct as persons,¹³² although without having endowed the idea of theological person with any comprehensible positive content.

If Gilbert does not offer a cogent positive exposition of Trinitarian theology, the confusion entailed by his vocabulary is at its most acute in his treatment of the hypostatic union. In this area there are two polemical agendas at work in Gilbert's thought. On the one hand, he wants to attack Abelard for a Christology which Gilbert sees as involving a too-divisible and too-adventitious view of the communication of idioms in the incarnate Christ.¹³³ On the other, he wants to detach the *assumptus homo* formula for describing the incarnation from the Adoptionist idea that the *homo* assumed by Christ was a man already in existence.¹³⁴ But Gilbert's semantic criteria make these tasks intractable indeed. Gilbert argues that the incarnate Christ has a single divine *persona*, here equated with the divine essence and distinguished from that essence as found in the Father and the Holy Spirit only numerically. This divine essence unites with a human *subsistens*. At this juncture Gilbert stresses three main points. First, the human aspect of the incarnate Christ contains all the properties of a human body and a human soul. Once united to the Word, it remains united to the Word. It is the subsistent *homo* that Christ assumes, Gilbert stresses, not *humanitas* since *humanitas* would lack the specific individuality of the man Jesus. Second, the composite being resulting from the hypostatic union is not a *tertium quid*. It retains all the properties of both man and God, neither of which is changed by the union. Third, in taking

¹³¹ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. de Trin.* 1.5.39, p. 147.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 2.2.72–80; *In Boeth. contra Eut.* 3.65–74, pp. 178–80, 285–87.

¹³³ Good treatments of this point are found in Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta*, p. 448; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1: 102–04; Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 163–89; Robert F. Studeny, *John of Cornwall, an Opponent of Nihilianism: A Study of the Christological Controversy of the Twelfth Century* (Vienna: St. Gabriel's Mission Press, 1939), pp. 89–91.

¹³⁴ Good treatments of this point are found in Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta*, pp. 404–44; Nikolaus M. Häring, "Sprachlogik und philosophische Voraussetzungen zum Verständnis der Christologie Gilberts von Poitiers," *Scholastik* 32 (1957): 373–98; "San Bernardo e Gilberto," pp. 78–87; Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 163–89. For the patristic developments that encouraged such a view, see Auguste Gaudel, "La théologie de l'Assumptus Homo: Histoire et valeur doctrinale," *RSR* 17 (1937): 64–90.

on manhood, Christ does not take on a preexisting human *persona*, and this, for two reasons. First, a *persona* is, by definition, a *res per se una*. No person can be duplex. Both before and after the incarnation, then, Christ can have one *persona* only, His divine *persona*. Second, and since this is the case, what Christ assumes in the incarnation is, simultaneously, a human body and a human soul, the ingredients that make up a human *subsistens* (*ea quae sunt hominis*), neither of which existed either separately or conjointly prior to the moment of the incarnation.¹³⁵

As Gilbert sums things up, a person cannot take on a person in the incarnation, since no person can be duplex. Nor can a nature take on a nature. For, if it was the divine nature that was incarnated, it would be impossible to explain why it was Christ Who became man and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, since They share the same nature. Nor could Christ have assumed a general human nature, otherwise the man Jesus would not have been an individual human being. Nor can a nature take on a person, for here the lack of differentiation among the Trinitarian persons would be combined with the Adoptionist heresy. So, Gilbert concludes, in the incarnation, a divine person took on a human nature.¹³⁶ But, his vocabulary makes it difficult to grasp exactly what he means by this formula. As we have seen, on the human level, the difference between a person and a nature is all but invisible, as Gilbert defines these terms. In stating that the Word assumes *homo*, not *humanitas*, he wants to stress the individuality of the human Christ. But this makes it hard to see how the human Christ is consubstantial with other human beings. And, if He is not, the universality of His saving work is severely compromised. On another level, Gilbert says that the Word assumes *homo* when what he really means to say is that the Word assumes an infra-human and as yet unattached body and soul. In this latter connection, he is as far from Christological nihilism as he is free from Adoptionism. But, at the same time, he uses his terms inconsistently, and in ways that allow them to be wielded against him.

While Gilbert's modern defenders have vindicated his orthodoxy,¹³⁷ it is certainly the case that he left a tangled legacy to

¹³⁵ Gilbert of Poitiers, *In Boeth. contra Eut.* 4.21–127, pp. 292–314.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.108, p. 310. The best analysis of Gilbert's Christology and its problems is found in Häring, "Sprachlogik," pp. 373–98 and Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 163–89.

¹³⁷ See, in particular, Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta*, pp. 77, 318–64; Margaret T. Gibson, "The *Opuscula Sacra* in the Middle Ages," in *Boethius: His Life, Thought and*

his successors. The fact that this was so gave Gilbert's disciples pause, and inspired his earliest pupils, those working within Gilbert's own lifetime, to reassess the utility of his semantics as applied to theology. Adaptation of Gilbert's views, on the part of the early Porretans, begins almost immediately, and can be traced in disciples of Gilbert active in the Paris region in the 1140s.

We may mention in passing a commentary on the Pseudo-Athanasian creed dating to the early 1140s which, aside from finding problems in Gilbert's notorious phrase "*Deus non est divinitas*,"¹³⁸ preserves his reasoning and his terminology, even when it is contradictory,¹³⁹ because there is no consensus as to whether it was written by an early Porretan or by Gilbert himself.¹⁴⁰ Certainly not from the hand of Gilbert is the *Sententiae divinitatis*, written shortly after 1148. While more correctly defined as a theological eclectic, the author is an identifiable adherent of the Porretan tradition on the issues that concern us here. There are several noteworthy points at which he backs off from Gilbert's language. As with Gilbert, he has an anti-Abelardian brief, and for the same reasons. He agrees with Gilbert's distinction between abstract and concrete nouns as applied to God, and with the principle that the divine properties are in the divine persons essentially. But he departs decisively from the *deus non est divinitas* formula, in the following words:

For is not divinity God and nothing other than God? I answer that divinity is God and nothing other than God, by an act of reason but not by the form of speaking, by reason of faith, not by reason of human philosophy.¹⁴¹

Influence, ed. Margaret T. Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), p. 223; Nikolaus M. Häring, "Notes on the Council and Consistory of Rheims (1148)," *MS* 28 (1966): 39–59; "Petrus Lombardus," pp. 113–27; "Sprachlogik," pp. 373–98; "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée, Bishop of Poitiers (1142–54)," *MS* 13 (1951): 1–40; "The Porretans and the Greek Fathers," *MS* 24 (1966): 181–209.

¹³⁸ Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., "A Commentary on the Pseudo-Athanasian Creed by Gilbert of Poitiers," c. 33–39, 47–48, *MS* 27 (1965): 35–37, 38–39.

¹³⁹ "Commentary," c. 14–16, 45–47, 108–16, pp. 32–33, 38–39, 48–50.

¹⁴⁰ Häring, "Commentary," pp. 23–31, ascribes the work to Gilbert, while Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, p. 44, thinks that it was written by an early follower of his.

¹⁴¹ Bernhard Geyer, ed., *Die Sententiae divinitatis: Ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertischen Schule* 4.5, Beiträge, 7:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1909), pp. 68*–69*: "Nonne divinitas est Deus et non aliud a Deo? Respondeo, quod divinitas est Deus et non aliud a Deo, actu rationis, sed non forma loquendi, ratione fidei, non ratione humanae philosophiae." More on this point can be found at 6.1.4, 6.25, pp. 160*–63*, 170*–71*.

The author treats *natura* as referring to *subsistentia*.¹⁴² He does not, however, discuss the specific sense in which substance, essence, person, and properties apply to the deity. In his Christology, he opposes the idea that the incarnate Christ is composed of separable parts,¹⁴³ and he repeats Gilbert's assertion that "*non persona personam, nec natura personam, nec natura naturam, sed persona naturam assumpsit*."¹⁴⁴ At the same time, he retains the Boethian definition of person as the individual substance of a rational nature, which Gilbert rejects, and he abandons Gilbert's distinction between *homo* and *humanitas* in considering Christ's assumption of a human body and a human soul. He states, although without explaining why, that in this context the two terms mean the same thing, and that they obviate equally Christ's assumption of a preexistent human person.¹⁴⁵

Much more thoroughgoing reassessments of Gilbert's theological language were made by other early disciples of his. The author of a treatise entitled *Invisibilia dei*, dating to ca. 1150, makes his own swift response to the semantic and dogmatic controversies to which Gilbert's views had recently led at Rheims. Our author has an extremely lively awareness of both the philosophical and the theological issues which these views had raised. His treatise leads off with the Pauline idea that the invisible things of God are known through the creation, which yields information about God to man through his reason and his senses.¹⁴⁶ This observation is a curtain-raiser for the author's main theme, the correct grammatical and logical ways of expressing that knowledge. With Gilbert, he argues that composite created beings can best be denoted by distinguishing their durable and informing features, expressed by abstract nouns, from their concrete manifestations, susceptible to accidents, expressed by concrete nouns.¹⁴⁷ What is striking, in his formulation of this point, is the author's rejection of the Gilbertian terms *subsistentia* and *subsistens*. He has evidently come to the conclusion that they are a losing proposition, so he kisses them goodbye and moves on without a backward look. He agrees with Gilbert that every subject (*res*) is singular and that no subject is universal.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴² *Sent. div.* 4.5, pp. 69*–70*.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 69*.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.1, 4.2, pp. 53*, 57*.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.2, 6.2.1, pp. 55*, 163*–64*.

¹⁴⁶ Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., "The Treatise 'Invisibilia dei' in MS. Arras, Bibl. mun. 981 (399)," *RTAM* 40 (1973): 118.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 40, 49–50, pp. 124, 126–27.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 59–60, 62, pp. 128–29.

Yet, here too, he departs from Gilbert in admitting the cogency and utility of universal concepts, such as the idea of genus. He defines the universal as a substantial likeness among things that differ by their species, citing the *Topica* of Boethius as his authority.¹⁴⁹ Since he agrees with Gilbert that no *res* is a universal, how does he interpret the Boethian universal which he admits? The author's solution is to distinguish between the predication of an abstract noun properly (*per se*) and its predication with reference to something else (*per aliud*). If, for example, one refers to the *humanitas* that inheres in Peter as an individual human being, one predicates *humanitas per se*; if one refers to the *humanitas* that links Peter with other human beings, one predicates *humanitas per aliud*. *Per aliud* predication is also a way of handling Peter's sub-personal attributes, such as the accidents that may modify his body, although in this case the nouns used may be concrete.¹⁵⁰

This argument provides an ingenious way of supporting the overall tenor of Gilbertian semantics while remedying some of its literal limitations. The author also thinks that one needs a still more precise and exclusive way of denoting the radical uniqueness of individual beings than Gilbert had provided, one that goes beyond a person's proper name. After all, the terms *humanitas* and *homo* can be applied properly to more than one human being. The name Peter has likewise been given to more than one man. None of these nouns denotes precisely what makes a particular man named Peter a *res per se una*. The term that does the job, in the author's view, is his *Petritas*, his "Petrerness,"¹⁵¹ an interesting and perhaps pregnant formula, and one that reveals the author's willingness to coin neologisms and to break the enforced parallelism between abstract and concrete nouns and the things they represent that marks Gilbert's thought as well.

The author of *Invisibilia dei* is willing to depart even farther from Gilbert in his theological language and method. He takes more closely to heart than Gilbert the announced limits of a vocabulary framed to describe composite created beings as adequate for speaking about an utterly simple deity. His solution, and it is one not envisaged by Gilbert, is to draw on the Pseudo-Areopagite's analysis of the *via affirmativa* and *via negativa*.¹⁵² When it comes to the affirmative way, he notes, the created order tells us that there is a

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 62–65, pp. 129–30.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 66–68, pp. 131–32.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 74, p. 132.

¹⁵² Ibid., 40–43, pp. 124–25.

gap between nature and the human intellect, since the mind can separate by abstraction things that are conjoined in nature. This thought provides him with an analogy for the transference of our human way of thinking and speaking to the deity, and one which accents its limits. Affirmative statements about God, the author stresses, should not be understood literally. Thus, instead of trying to enforce a rigid grammatical parity between theological and non-theological language which simply does not work, he underscores instead the disparities between these two vocabularies and the necessarily partial, or metaphorical, significance of anything positive we say about God. This argument, as well as his case for the *via negativa*,¹⁵³ relies heavily on Dionysius. It reflects the author's marked alteration of Gilbert's semantics, although it is a change made in aid of Gilbert's metaphysics.

The author is also responsive to critics who had held that Gilbert's merely numerical distinction among the persons of the Trinity was not satisfactory. He abandons Gilbert on this point, in favor of a position that Gilbert had opposed, the idea that the Trinitarian persons manifest distinct properties which can be viewed as relations, especially paternity, filiation, and procession. Had the author stopped there, he would have been able to marshal powerful support from Augustine. But, throwing away that advantage, he compares these relations with accidents inhering extrinsically in a subject without changing its basic nature.¹⁵⁴ In this way, then, while the author seizes correctly on a weak feature of Gilbert's Trinitarian doctrine, his substitute position creates as many problems as it solves.

One final, and important, departure from Gilbert in *Invisibilia dei* can be seen in the sources on which the author relies. As noted, he draws on Dionysius in a thoroughly un-Gilbertian way. Equally striking is his total omission of Hilary of Poitiers, one of Gilbert's favorite authors. The source the author mines the most heavily is Boethius, also a favorite of Gilbert's, but he draws a more authentically Aristotelian logic from Boethius than Gilbert does. At the same time, there is an obvious point of connection between the author and Gilbert in the heavy stress on grammatical and logical analysis, of a specifically Gilbertian type, visible throughout the treatise. None the less, this dependence is coupled with the author's desire to jettison confusing Gilbertian terminology, to abandon Gilbertian

¹⁵³ Ibid., 44–45, pp. 125–26.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 124, 127–29, pp. 144–45.

positions that are hard to defend, and to find less controversial ways of carrying forward some of the essentials of Gilbert's project, in the teeth of criticism.

Still more noteworthy, in these respects, since they were written before the Council of Rheims had given Gilbert's theology its fullest notoriety, are the two early Porretan sentence collections composed in Paris shortly after the Parisian chapter of Gilbert's teaching career was ended by his move to the bishopric of Poitiers in 1142. We have encountered these sentence collections, framed as *reportationes* of Gilbert's teaching, in chapter 2 above, since they outline a full-blown course in systematic theology. As we have noted, the authors devote full and specific attention to the problem of theological language in their schemata, assigning the first of their fourteen books to that topic in general and considering its particular application to Trinitarian and Christological language in Books 2 and 3. Like the author of the *Invisibilia dei*, these early Porretan sentence collectors show how Gilbert's earliest pupils accepted, or altered, his semantics and its theological ramifications. Both of these authors are sensitive to the need to define the capacities and limits of theological language more clearly than Gilbert does. Both of them move away from a strict adherence to his terminology in favor of a more traditional vocabulary. They tend to agree with the substance of Gilbert's theology on the Trinity and on Christology, but think that the language in which he had advanced it is counter-productive, a fact indicating that these problems troubled Gilbert's followers no less than his critics, and that this was the case well before matters came to a head at Rheims. The authors' strategy is to replace Gilbert's lexicon with a more familiar one, a move which they justify in theory before they apply it in practice. In their prefatory remarks, they observe that theological language must be both true and apposite. Appositeness is to be found in words that derive from the authority of the saints (*ex aliqua auctoritate sanctorum*).¹⁵⁵ Newfangled, idiosyncratic terms (*novitates sermonum*) are to be shunned.¹⁵⁶ The authors follow this guideline by pointedly ignoring the vexed question of whether *deus* is *divinitas*, by avoiding

¹⁵⁵ Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., "Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* I" 1.1–2, *AHDLMA* 45 (1978): 108; "Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti episcopi Pictavensis* II: Die Version der florentiner Handschrift" 1.1–4, *AHDLMA* 46 (1979): 46–47. John Marenbon, "A Note on the Porretani," in *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 353 n. 2 does not discuss the content of these works.

¹⁵⁶ *Sent.* I 1.4, p. 108; *Sent.* II 2.35–36, pp. 53–54.

Gilbertian terms such as *subsistentia* and *subsistens*, and by employing language consistent with patristic usage. They also try valiantly, if not always successfully, to define clearly and to use consistently the terms they substitute for Gilbert's.

The authors observe that *substantia* has been applied both to the Trinitarian persons and to the divine essence They share. They are aware of the fact that, in Latin theology, substance has been used as a translation and synonym of *hypostasis* or person in Greek. But, in Greek theology, they note, substance means *ousia*, the single essence shared by the divine persons.¹⁵⁷ These authors go farther than any Latin theologians of the time before Peter Lombard in grasping this critical distinction. They decide, furthermore, to follow the Greek usage systematically, applying *substantia* to the unity of the divine essence exclusively. They can thus explain how the Greek term *homoousion* may be rendered by the Latin *consubstantialis*,¹⁵⁸ without getting bogged down in the different semantic functions of abstract and concrete nouns, or in the question of whether the properties of the Trinitarian persons are attributes comparable to those that modify created beings, which bedevils Gilbert's handling of this issue.

The early Porretans capitalize on this notable clarification of the idea of substance, but then, in their treatment of nature and person, they abandon the high ground they have won. Ignoring Gilbert's *subsistentia* and *subsistens* in connection with the two latter terms, they retain only his definition of a person as a *res per se una*. As to the semantic content of that formula, they state that personal properties are simply whatever properties distinguish one person from another. This argument shows that they, like Gilbert, are dissatisfied with Boethius's definition of a person as the individual substance of a rational nature. But, compared with Gilbert's floundering about on *persona* and his emergence with a formula which, as he frankly admits, is useless with respect to the Trinitarian persons, their own definition marks a salient improvement, since it places no restrictions on what the properties may be in different kinds of persons. The authors thus provide a term capable of being used appositely for divine and human persons alike.¹⁵⁹

In contrast with Gilbert, who allies nature with person, our authors transfer *natura* decisively into the camp of *substantia* as essence, as they have already defined it. With these tools in hand,

¹⁵⁷ *Sent.* I 2.14, 2.36, pp. 110–11; *Sent.* II 2.1–4, pp. 47–48.

¹⁵⁸ *Sent.* I 2.6, p. 110; *Sent.* II 2.4, 2.6, p. 48.

¹⁵⁹ *Sent.* I 2.9, p. 112; *Sent.* II 2.9, p. 49.

one would expect them to arrive at a less ambiguous explanation of the hypostatic union than the one they in fact provide. With Gilbert, they argue that the incarnation did not produce a new *tertium quid*,¹⁶⁰ that the Word assumed simultaneously a human body and a human soul and not a preexisting human person,¹⁶¹ and that, once the union had taken place, the divine and human components were not partible.¹⁶² They also quote Gilbert's maxim, "*nec natura naturam nec persona personam nec natura personam sed persona naturam assumpsit*."¹⁶³ But, in support of this formula, they get ensnared in the reasoning which they offer in place of Gilbert's. Although they reiterate Gilbert's definition of a person as a *res per se una*, they fail to see why it provides the most economical answer to the question of why one person cannot assume another person. Instead of simply saying, as Gilbert does, that a duplex person is a contradiction in terms, the early Porretan response, which is not really explained, is that Christ's divinity would be diminished in the incarnation if one person had assumed another person.¹⁶⁴ Also, having annexed substance to nature, the authors find it hard to defend the idea that a nature did not take on another nature. Indeed, they argue at cross purposes against the principle they are trying to support at this juncture, by stating that there are two substances in the incarnate Christ, the divine *substantia* and the human *substantia vel natura*, equating the latter term with Christ's *humanitas* composed of body and soul.¹⁶⁵

On the divine side, the difficulty with this vocabulary is apparent. It makes it impossible to explain why it was the Son Who was incarnated, rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit, since all three possess the same divine nature, substance, and essence. If this were not problematic enough, the early Porretans also appeal to the language of the school of Laon by saying that there are three substances in the incarnate Christ, the Word, a human body, and a human soul.¹⁶⁶ Aside from contradicting their own two-substance position, this claim muddies the distinction between nature and

¹⁶⁰ *Sent.* I 3.6, p. 123; *Sent.* II 3.6, p. 56.

¹⁶¹ *Sent.* I 3.5, 3.10, p. 123; *Sent.* II 3.5, p. 56.

¹⁶² *Sent.* I 3.16, p. 136; *Sent.* II 3.8–16, pp. 57–58.

¹⁶³ *Sent.* I 3.3, p. 122; *Sent.* II 3.3–5, p. 56.

¹⁶⁴ *Sent.* I 3.3, pp. 122–23.

¹⁶⁵ *Sent.* I 3.7, 3.10, pp. 123, 124; *Sent.* II 3.5, p. 56.

¹⁶⁶ *Sent.* I 3.16, p. 126. The author of *Sent.* II 3.7, p. 56, confines himself to the three-substance theory, thus regarding the body and soul of the human Christ as substances before they were united with each other and with the Word; he refers to them indifferently as substances and as natures.

person in the deity, a distinction on which the defense of the Gilbertian formula depends, while at the same time, it confuses the sense of *substantia* as that term applies to the infra-substantial physical and spiritual ingredients making up the man Jesus. To complicate matters still farther, one of the sentence collectors uses, indifferently, three phrases to describe the hypostatic union. The first is "a person assumes a nature" (*persona assumpsit naturam*), or, sometimes, "a person assumes human nature" (*persona assumpsit naturam humanam*). The second is "God was made man" (*deus homo factus est*). The third describes the union as "the conjunction of divinity and humanity" (*coniunctio divinitatis et humanitatis*).¹⁶⁷ The author quite evidently fails to see that, both in Gilbertian terms and in ordinary Latin, these propositions make different, and incompatible, claims. In addition, the third formula comes close to stating the principle, which both authors join Gilbert in rejecting, that, in the incarnation, a nature takes on a nature. So, while the goal of the early Porretans' handling of theological language is clearly to disembarass Gilbert's teachings of Gilbert's terminology, they do not manage to attain this objective entirely.

THE LOMBARDIAN RESPONSE

Peter Lombard's position with respect to Gilbert and his early disciples is a twofold one. In his view, Gilbert, even more than Abelard, has locked himself into a vocabulary which, aside from being idiosyncratic and confusing, does not permit the kind of clear distinctions between God and creatures which Trinitarian and Christological theology demands. At the same time, Peter is perfectly willing to take a leaf from the book of the early Porretans, and to unshackle the Gilbertian doctrines of which he approves both from Gilbert's own terminology and from the lexical ambiguities still remaining in the language of his early disciples. Peter finds that the combined assistance of Augustine and Damascene is just as helpful in addressing this part of his agenda in the area of theological language as it is in refuting Abelard. He is deeply conscious of the need for a consistent, precise, and comprehensible language, whose semantic aptitudes and limits are clearly delineated and systematically applied. In positioning himself vis-à-vis Gilbert and the early Porretans, he rejects a view of the poverty of language so acute as to reduce all theological statements to metaphor or to

¹⁶⁷ *Sent.* I 3.16, 3.28, pp. 126, 128.

gibberish, or to the *via negativa*. On the other side, he rejects as arrogant and sophistic the claim that human linguistic conventions, new or old, can encompass the divine reality.¹⁶⁸ Peter's response is to use the traditional language of the creeds, under the guidance of patristic writers whose own approach to theological language is a speculative one, and who are able to explain what they mean by their terms in ways both wide and specific enough to enable language to function as it must function in theology, without forcing it into any one, preemptive, philosophical mold. In this connection, the criteria Peter invokes in making his choices are lucidity, consistency, and theological utility.

There are certain areas in which Peter follows Gilbert's lead. He agrees with Gilbert that God is a radically simple being, in contrast with creatures that may be composite, physical, and modified by accidents. Following the Porretan sentence collectors, but with more rigor, he annexes the terms substance, nature, and essence, as the Latin parallels of the Greek *ousia*, to the divine nature viewed in its absolute unity and simplicity, making use of Damascene to clarify and to expand on a point which they had not been able to elaborate in such detail.¹⁶⁹ Peter also explains the advantages of a doctrine of God that includes His operations as well as His essence, which had inspired the author of the *Invisibilia dei* to reimport Augustine into the discussion. But, drawing on Damascene here as well, Peter takes the argument much farther. He grounds it on two complementary contrasts. The first is the contrast between God's immutability and the changeable world of nature. The second is the contrast between the enduring, unconditioned, differentiation and coinherence of the unmanifested Trinity and the ways in which God manifests Himself, as the Godhead primarily, in the economy of His creation and redemption.¹⁷⁰ Both of these contrasts are based on eternity as a central attribute of God, a principle that allows Peter to dispose of Gilbert's objections to Augustine and to specify

¹⁶⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 23. c. 1.3, 1: 182; *Tractatus de Incarnatione* 1.6, 1.8, 1.9.1-2, ed. Ignatius C. Brady in *Sent.* 2: 59*, 60*, 61*-63*. This latter text incorporates parts of Peter's commentary on St. Paul that were subjected to revision in the light of his later teaching in the *Sentences*.

¹⁶⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 2. c. 1-c. 3, d. 3. c. 4, d. 4. c. 2.1-4, d. 8. c. 8.31, d. 19. c. 7-c. 10, d. 23 c. 3.1, c. 4.2, d. 25. c. 1.1, c. 2.2-5, d. 27. c. 3.1, d. 33. c. 1.3, 1: 60-63, 67, 77, 79-80, 103, 165-69, 182, 185, 190, 192-94, 205, 241.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 1. d. 3. c. 1.5, d. 8. c. 4-c. 7, c. 8.1-3, d. 19. c. 2, d. 34. c. 4.2, 1: 70, 98-101, 101-03, 160, 253. The issue, as Peter sees it, involves more than a stress on God's immutability as a means of mediating between Bernard of Clairvaux and Gilbert. Cf. Bertola, "Il problema di Dio," pp. 135-50.

the limits, as well as the powers, of Augustine's psychological analogies. The relations among the persons of the Trinity, he shows, are not passing accidents but are personal properties structured permanently into the eternal inner life of the Trinity.¹⁷¹ And, man's way of knowing willing, remembering, and loving, to which the functions of the Trinitarian persons can be compared, is time-bound, sequential, and rooted in a body. Between the conception, the desire, and the consummation falls the shadow, for man, but not for the timeless Trinity.¹⁷² Peter thus emerges with a stable lexicon with which he can articulate and address metaphysical issues in Trinitarian theology ignored by the shriller critics of Gilbert, and one which enables him to explain the differences between God and creatures and the distinctions in the personal properties of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit better than Gilbert and his followers.

Peter also eliminates some of the problems in the language which Gilbert and the early Porretans had used in the field of Christology. His substantive position is much closer to Gilbert's in this area than it is in his Trinitarian theology. With Gilbert, Peter maintains that Christ did not assume a preexistent human person but a human body and a human soul, "the soul and body in which man subsists" (*anima et caro in quibus subsistit homo*), which were not conjoined prior to their union with the Word, which were assumed by Christ at the same time, and which remained united to Him thereafter.¹⁷³ With Gilbert and the Porretan sentence collectors, as well as Walter of Mortagne and Robert of Melun, he rejects the Boethian definition of person as the individual substance of a rational nature, both as objectionable in and of itself and as a way of criticizing Abelard, maintaining that neither man's soul nor his body can denominate his whole person. Peter uses this same argument to support a claim which the earlier Porretans and the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* had made, but had not defended, the idea that we may use either *homo*, *humana natura* or *humanitas* to denote the infra-personal human components assumed by Christ. As Peter

¹⁷¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 22. c. 5, d. 24. c. 8, d. 25. c. 3.3-4, d. 26. c. 3.1, c. 8, d. 27. c. 2.3, d. 30. c. 1.1-7, d. 33. c. 1.1-10, c. 3.3-5, d. 34. c. 1.1-9, 1: 179-80, 189, 195, 203, 204-05, 220-22, 240-43, 245-46, 246-50.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 1. d. 3. c. 2-c. 3.8, d. 19. c. 3-c. 4, 1: 72-76, 161-63.

¹⁷³ *Tract. de Inc.* 1.31, 2: 75*; see also *Sent.* 3. d. 2. c. 1.1-c. 3.1, d. 3. c. 4.2-4, d. 5. c. 1.1, c. 2.1, c. 3.1, 2: 28-29, 30-31, 36-37, 41, 46, 47. This point has been brought out well by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1; 84-89, 136-37; Jean Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires des maîtres parisiens au XII^e siècle: Étude historique et doctrinale*, 2 vols. (Paris, Études Augustiniennes, 1975), 1:83-85.

sees it, in this particular context, it would be as mistaken to restrict the appositeness of any of these terms as it would be to deny that the incarnate Christ possessed a human soul. He links this semantic directive to an economic argument derived from Damascene, which permits him to expand on an important corollary of the hypostatic union to which the Porretans gave short shrift. Just as Christ assumed both a body and a soul, in order that both body and soul might be redeemed, so the consubstantiality of the incarnate Christ with other human beings denoted by the terms *humana natura* and *humanitas* serves as a bridge between His own identity as a human being and His redemption of mankind. Looked at as a phenomenon of created nature, that is to say, the human Christ is both a unique individual man and a member of the human race. Thus, it is appropriate to use both *homo* and *humanitas* to refer to His *humana natura*.¹⁷⁴

Peter gives thorough consideration to Gilbert's view that a person assumes a nature in the incarnation, which he supports. But he rings several changes on this theme, on the basis of the distinction he draws between a divine *persona* and a human *persona*. For Peter, a divine person enjoys consubstantiality with the divine nature or essence as such. On the other hand, a human person cannot be equated with or exhausted by his *humanitas*. Peter's contrast between a Trinity in which the addition of another person to a person already there does not yield "more God," and the quantitative enlargement that occurs when one item is added to another member of the same genus already present, is to be remembered here. Aside from this basic difference between divine persons and human persons, the incarnate Christ does not possess a human *persona* for Peter any more than He does for Gilbert. Thus, it is correct to say that a person assumes a nature in the incarnation. Peter, like Gilbert, rejects Adoptionism. But, since he gives a clearer and fuller content to *natura* on the human side of Christ's constitution, he has a better defense against the charge of Christological nihilianism, in that it is *aliquid natura*,¹⁷⁵ and on two human levels, individual and generic, that the Word took on humanity in the incarnation.

¹⁷⁴ Peter Lombard, *Tract. de Inc.* 1.4, 2: 58*; *Sent.* 3. d. 2. c. 1.4, c. 2, d. 5. c. 3.2-4, 2: 28-29, 47-49. Cf. Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 118-23, who argues incorrectly that Peter departs from Gilbert in supporting this Boethian definition of *persona*.

¹⁷⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 10. c. 1-c. 2, 2: 72-76. This point has been noted correctly by Brady, *ad loc.*, p. 73 n. 1 and in his "Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings of Peter Lombard," *Antonianum* 41 (1966): 454-79; Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta*, p. 417; Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 261-74.

Peter also agrees that the divine nature cannot take on a person, since what Christ assumed was infra-personal. Nor can a person be a composite. At the same time, Peter accepts the idea, which Gilbert rejects, that the divine nature can take on a human nature. As Peter understands this idea, he associates it with a principle he shares with Gilbert, the notion that no *tertium quid* results from the hypostatic union; the properties of the two natures are not blended or confused. He offers two arguments in support of this idea. First, in the case of the divine Christ, the fullness of the divine nature dwells in His divine person. And second, in the case of the human Christ, *natura* denotes adequately the infra-personal components that are united to the Word as well as the human Christ's more general connection with the rest of mankind. Peter's preferred formula for describing the hypostatic union is to say that "the person of the Son assumed human nature, and that the divine nature was joined with a human nature united in the Son" (*et personam Filii assumpsisse naturam humanam, et naturam divinam humanae naturae in Filio unitam*).¹⁷⁶ Given the care with which Peter defines and uses his terms, the meaning of this language to him, and to the reader, is perfectly clear. Adding to his elucidation of the hypostatic union his clarification of the term *persona* and a soteriological concern not found in Gilbert, Peter joins him in rejecting any notion of the communication of idioms in the incarnate Christ that would denature the divine and human components or treat them as partible or as accidental.

There is one other major area in which Peter's familiarity with the language of both Gilbert and the early Porretans enables him to clarify and to correct a confusing pair of opinions which he himself had shared with the latter masters, along with Robert Pullen in one case and along with the school of Laon, Robert, and the *Summa sententiarum* in the other, but which he rejects decisively in his *Sentences*. One is the view that the incarnate Christ can be understood as possessing three substances, the Word, a human body, and a human soul.¹⁷⁷ The other is the idea that the incarnate Christ has two substances, divinity and humanity.¹⁷⁸ The encounter with Gilbert and his disciples made Peter realize that the twin-substance

¹⁷⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 5. c. 1.10, 2: 45. For the whole passage, see *Tract. de Inc.* 1.4, 1.14–21; *Sent.* 3. d. 5. c. 1.2–12, 2: 57*–58*, 64*–68*, 42–46.

¹⁷⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sermo* 43, *PL* 171: 559B–C.

¹⁷⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sermo* 7, 9, 12, 55, 99, *PL* 171: 371C, 382A, 396A, 605D–606B, 806B. The same *gemina substantia* language occurs in Peter Lombard, *In Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 1:3, *PL* 191: 1307C.

language, despite its Augustinian roots, was not acceptable, because it might imply that there was no difference between the person of the Son and the divine substance which He shares with the Father and the Holy Spirit. At the same time, it might suggest that the human Christ was a human substance, that is, a human person already in existence when He was joined to the Word.¹⁷⁹ As for the three-substance theory, Peter concludes that it too must be abandoned, because it involves an improper attribution of *substantia* to the infra-substantial body and soul that the Word assumes.¹⁸⁰

In these several ways, Peter Lombard reflects a certain dependence upon Gilbert and the Porretans, even as he seeks to criticize their use of theological language. In substance, Peter's Christology has more in common with Gilbert's than it does with the Christology of any of his other contemporaries. He is a critic of Gilbert's Trinitarian theology. Peter joins Robert of Melun in going beyond the narrow Aristotelian understanding of the idea of relation, taught by Gilbert and others, expanding on and refining this point in comparison with Robert. In specifying the positive content of the properties of the Trinitarian persons, he makes far more pointed the application of the Augustinian argument based on the analysis of relative nouns. Peter also does more than any of his contemporaries to expose the limits of Gilbert's numerical handling of that subject, as well as the treatment given to it by his would-be critics in the school of Chartres. Even in those areas where he disagrees with Gilbert and his disciples, however, he has learned from them how to pose many of the issues which they raise concerning the language appropriate to the speculative doctrines of the Christian faith, where theological terminology is so crucial. The very difficulties embedded in Gilbert's own lexicon, which provoked the clarifications and retrenchments made by his pupils, were also an indirect inspiration to the Lombard in his own quest for alternative language that was understandable and that was adequate to the assignments that theologians needed to impose upon it. In this respect, the questions raised by Gilbert and the Porretans were fully as important as those raised by Abelard, in setting the agenda to which Peter responded in developing his own constructive address to the problem of theological language. Thanks to his efforts, to the extent that twelfth century scholastics attained a

¹⁷⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 6. c. 3.5, d. 7. c. 1.13–17, 2: 54, 63–64.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 3. d. 2. c. 2.4, d. 6. c. 2.5, c. 3.1, c. 3.6, d. 7. c. 1.4–9, 2: 29, 51, 52–53, 54, 60–62.

common theological vocabulary capable of performing its doctrinal tasks prior to the reception of Aristotle, that outcome was a consequence of the Lombard's ability to meet the challenges made by Gilbert and Abelard more successfully than anyone else at the time.

CHAPTER FOUR

SACRA PAGINA

There is no doubt that medieval Christian thinkers saw the Bible as the book of books and its study as the discipline of disciplines. Nor is there any question of the privileged position which exegetes in the twelfth century, as in previous centuries, gave to certain portions of the biblical text. In the Old Testament, their favorite section was the Book of Psalms, and in the New Testament, it was the Epistles of St. Paul. The Psalms were seen as a guide to the Christian life, while St. Paul was appreciated for the doctrinal richness of his teachings and was revered as a model theologian. In the first half of the twelfth century, these two subdivisions of the Bible received more sustained attention than did any other parts of the Old and New Testaments. They now did so, however, from more than one quarter. The twelfth century continued to witness interest in both the Psalms and St. Paul on the part of monastic exegetes. As had always been the case, their goal remained to excite unction and compunction in the minds of their monastic audience, and their treatment of these texts drew on the meditative and homiletic techniques embedded in monastic *lectio divina*. At the same time, the emergence of scholastic theology in the first half of the century created a new demand for a different kind of biblical exegesis, a more systematic and detached study of the text geared to the needs of doctrinal debate, and to the training of professional theologians. The scholastics seized on the Psalms and St. Paul for these purposes. For them, these portions of the Bible were not only key sources of Christian doctrine, whether moral or dogmatic, but also complex and composite segments of Holy Scripture whose interpretation often required the help of other resources. Further, the relation of the parts to each other, and to the whole, demanded investigation. Hence, the exegesis of the Psalms and the Pauline epistles were a test case for the developing hermeneutic principles which the professionalizing of the liberal arts, no less than the professionalizing of theology itself, brought to the fore in the reading of the biblical text.¹

¹ The best introduction to this subject is Jean Châtillon, "La Bible dans les écoles du XII^e siècle," in *Le moyen âge et la Bible*, ed. Pierre Riché and Guy

Among these scholastic exegetes of the Psalms and St. Paul in the first half of the twelfth century, Peter Lombard holds pride of place. Like his *Sentences*, Peter's commentary on the Psalms, composed before 1138, and his *Collectanea*, or commentary on Paul, written between 1139 and 1141, became instant classics in their own sphere. In the schools of theology they at once became the most frequently cited, copied, and studied exegetical works produced in the twelfth century. Peter's exegesis was swiftly dubbed the *Magna glossatura*, outpacing both the earlier *Glossa ordinaria* of the school of Laon and the *Media glossatura* of Gilbert of Poitiers, as well as contemporary and immediately subsequent Pauline glosses, whether of Abelardian, Porretan, or Victorine provenance.² Peter's commentary on the Psalms likewise decisively replaced the Psalms gloss of Gilbert of Poitiers and that of the *Glossa ordinaria* as the

Lobrichon (Paris: Beauchesne, 1984), pp. 163–97. See also Heinrich Denifle, "Quel livre servait de base à l'enseignement des maîtres en théologie dans l'Université de Paris?" *Revue thomiste* 2 (1898): 149–61; Artur Michael Landgraf, *Introduction à l'histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante*, ed. Albert-M. Landry, trans. Louis-B. Geiger (Montreal: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1973), p. 47; Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. rev. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), ch. 1–4; "L'Exégèse biblique du 12^e siècle," in *Entretiens sur la renaissance du 12^e siècle*, ed. Maurice de Gandillac and Édouard Jeuneau (Paris: Mouton, 1968), pp. 273–83; "The Bible in the Medieval Schools," in *Cambridge History of the Bible: The West from the Fathers to the Reformation*, ed. G. W. H. Lampe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 2: 197–220; Gillian R. Evans, *The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Wilfried Hartmann, "Psalmenkommentare aus den Zeit der Reform und Frühscholastik," *Studi Gregoriani* 9 (1972): 313–66. A good summary of monastic exegesis is provided by Jean Leclercq, "Écrits monastiques sur la Bible aux IX^e–XII^e siècles," *MS* 15 (1953): 95–106. Older but still useful guides include Artur Michael Landgraf, "Zur Methode der biblischen Textkritik im 12. Jahrhundert," *Biblica* 10 (1929): 445–74; "Familienbildung bei Paulinenkommentaren des 12. Jahrhunderts," *Biblica* 13 (1932): 61–72, 164–93; "Untersuchungen zu den Paulinenkommentaren des 12. Jahrhunderts," *RTAM* 8 (1936): 345–68.

² H. H. Glunz, *History of the Vulgate in England from Alcuin to Roger Bacon: Being an Inquiry into the Text of Some English Manuscripts of the Vulgate Gospels* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), pp. 219–24; Châtillon, "La Bible dans les écoles," pp. 192–93; Jacques-Guy Bougerol, *La théologie de l'espérance aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1985), 1; 9; Werner Affeldt, *Die weltliche Gewalt in der Paulus-Exegese: Röm. 13, 1–7 in den Römerbriefkommentaren der lateinischen Kirche bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), p. 138; Z. Alszeghy, *Nova creatura: La nozione della grazia nei commentari medievali di S. Paolo* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1956), pp. 8–11, 23–24; Guy Lobrichon, "Une nouveauté: Les gloses de la Bible," in *Le moyen âge et la Bible*, ed. Pierre Riché and Guy Lobrichon (Paris: Beauchesne, 1984), pp. 109–10. These authors correct the position, stated by Smalley, *Study*, pp. 51, 64–65 and Margaret T. Gibson, *Lanfranc of Bec* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 54–61, who stress the continuities between the *Glossa ordinaria* and Peter Lombard's exegesis to the point of obscuring his differences from his predecessors.

scholastic commentary of choice, in a field marked by fewer competitors, for this portion of the Old Testament. While all the medieval testimonials to the Lombard's fame mention these two works side by side with the *Sentences* as his chief contributions to learning, he was known in some quarters, even beyond the schools, as an exegete primarily. The anonymous author of a book list compiled by a monk in the diocese of Arras in the last third of the twelfth century, who attaches comments to the titles he catalogues, has this to say about him:

Peter Lombard, the Parisian scholastic, later bishop of the same city, is judged to be preferred most greatly over all the masters of his time and expositors of the Scriptures because, thanks to the sharpness of his intellect and the assiduousness of his labor, he shed light on so many things in explaining the Scriptures that the teaching of the doctors has become merely the glossing of his readings and the effort to understand his teachings.³

In grasping why that outcome was the case, the Lombard's handling of the Psalms and the Pauline epistles, in comparison with the other scholastics of his time who glossed these texts, will reveal what most scholastic readers wanted out of biblical exegesis and why they preferred his work to its alternatives. The scholastic exegetes with whom Peter will be compared are those falling within the period ca. 1115 to ca. 1160. In the case of Psalms exegesis, there are more apparent connections between monastic and scholastic authors than is true for the glosses on St. Paul, and so a swift comparison between these two groups of authors will be made as well, to indicate their similarities and differences.

Of these two segments of the Bible, the Book of Psalms had a far more extensive tradition of commentary from the patristic period up to the twelfth century. Many more commentaries on Psalms were produced by twelfth-century monks than commentaries on St. Paul, for the obvious reason that the glossing of Psalms could be and was seen as an adjunct to the chanting of the Psalter in the monastic liturgy. The Psalms continued to be read, and meditated upon, as a source of moral edification by the monks, as well as being read typologically, pointing ahead to the life and teachings of

³ Nikolaus M. Häring, "Two Catalogues of Medieval Authors," *FS* 26 (1966): 211: "Petrus Langobardus scholasticus Parisiensis, postea eiusdem civitatis episcopus, magistri sui temporis et Scripturarum expositoribus eo maxime preferendus iudicatur quod ingenio sagaci et usu assiduo tanta in exponendis Scripturis luce claruerit ut pene magisterio doctoris non egeat qui glosarum ipsius lectioni animum intendere voluerit." For the date and provenance of this catalogue, see pp. 195–97, 206–08.

Christ in the New Testament. To this older agenda, inherited from patristic times, the twelfth-century scholastics attached a new interest. To be sure, the scholastics retained the practice of reading the Psalms polysemously, with an eye to both ethics and Christology. The new perspective they brought to the Psalms was the desire to understand this book of the Bible in conjunction with systematic theology. They brought to it and read out of it a concern with dogmatic topics and an interest in evaluating the interpretations given to the text by the earlier authorities, Anglo-Saxon and Carolingian as well as patristic, helped in some cases by methods of thought derived from the study of the liberal arts.⁴

PSALMS EXEGESIS: THE MONASTIC APPROACH

The continuities and discontinuities between monastic and scholastic Psalms exegesis in our period can be illustrated clearly by four examples, chosen from a range of monastic authors who wrote both before and after Peter Lombard. The works selected for this comparison are those by Letbert of Lille, Bruno the Carthusian, Pseudo-Bruno of Würzburg, and Gerhoch of Reichersberg. These authors express a variety of forms of contemporary monasticism, ranging from the older Black Monks to a representative of a new, reformed order. The comparison also draws on men who received their education in the convent and on one who taught as a secular master at a leading cathedral school before entering the monastery. Without in any way exhausting the possibilities among monastic expositors of the Psalms in the first half of the twelfth century, these four will give us a representative sampling of them.

Letbert of Lille, whose *In Psalmos LXXV commentarius* was written in ca. 1100–10,⁵ clearly addresses his work to his fellow monks, urging them, in his gloss on Psalm 45:11, to use meditation on this text as a means of focusing their attention on their cloistered calling and turning away from worldly concerns.⁶ While Letbert addresses Christological and ecclesiological issues, the balance of his exegesis is weighted more toward tropology than toward typology; he centers on the personal moral message which the text holds for the individual monastic reader. Letbert offers no *accessus* to the Book of

⁴ Hartmann, "Psalmenkommentare," pp. 313–66.

⁵ For Letbert's biography and the date of his work, see A. Wilmart, "Le commentaire sur les Psaumes imprimé sous le nom de Rufin," *R. bén.* 31 (1914–19): 258–76.

⁶ Letbert of Lille, *In Psalmos LXXV commentarius* 45:11, *PL* 21: 830C–D. This text is printed among the works of Rufinus of Aquileia.

Psalms as a whole and gives a brief introduction only to a few individual Psalms. He glosses each verse of the text, frequently bringing in other books of the Bible to help explicate it. Letbert does not mention overtly any of the many patristic authorities on whom he draws. In this sense, his commentary is a veritable catena of unacknowledged patristic readings. Augustine is a favorite of his. He never discusses the readings of these authorities and sometimes ignores the fact that they may provide alternative interpretations of the same biblical passage.⁷ Occasionally he garbles his patristic citations. But, principally, they are used as *scholia* to clear up confusing references in the text, or as theological authorities who answer questions and who thus close off discussion of them.

Another monastic exegete of the Psalms, but one who displays a familiarity with some of the developments occurring beyond the walls of the convent, is Bruno the Carthusian. His *Expositio in Psalmos* was probably written between 1141 and 1154,⁸ after he had become a Carthusian. It has a decidedly monastic flavor, although Bruno's concern with current events and the range of his reading may reflect a carryover of the mentality of the secular master he had earlier been at the cathedral school of Rheims.⁹ An index of his scholastic background is a mode of handling authorities that is rather more sophisticated than that of Letbert. Bruno brings in non-Christian as well as patristic sources.¹⁰ He does note occasions when authorities disagree or when a single authority gives more than one reading of the same line, and makes his own selection. But, in such passages, he does not explain the reasons informing these choices.¹¹ Bruno tends to cite authorities very sparingly and in an essentially decorative way, at times to provide *scholia* on difficult words or phrases but largely to sum up aptly a point he wants to make. He also takes pains to criticize unnamed "philosophers" who draw Plato into their disputes about the Trinity, although without indicating why he thinks this is inappropriate. He praises, instead, ecclesiastical leaders who take pedagogical initiatives by travelling about to share their teachings. The example of

⁷ A good example is at Ps. 70:15, *PL* 21: 934C, where the alternative readings are ignored.

⁸ Damien Van den Eynde, "Complementary Note on the Early Scholastic Commentarii in Psalmos," *FS* 17 (1957): 149–72. Van den Eynde's dating has been contested by Valerie I. J. Flint, "Some Notes on the Early Twelfth-Century Commentaries on the Psalms," *RTAM* 38 (1971): 80–88.

⁹ Châtillon, "La Bible," pp. 173–75.

¹⁰ Bruno the Carthusian, *Expositio in Psalmos* 73, *PL* 152: 1009B. Here, his authority is Josephus.

¹¹ Bruno the Carthusian, *In Ps.* 77, 91, *PL* 152: 1045D–1049A, 1130A–C.

Dionysius the Areopagite in France, which he gives to illustrate this latter group, suggests a veiled attack on Peter Abelard.¹² More central to Bruno than these sallies is the monastic focus of his commentary. His style is hortatory. He sometimes poses rhetorical questions as if speaking aloud, suggesting that the text was written for, or redacted from, an oral exposition. He refers to his readers as hearers, *auditores*.¹³ Further, in his prologue, he compares the Psalms with musical instruments, with which man sings God's praises, treating the text as an adjunct to the liturgical chanting of the Psalms in the monastic *opus dei*.¹⁴ He does not comment on every passage of every Psalm but freely refers to lines that he does not gloss, reflecting his assumption that the entire Psalter is in the minds and ears of his audience. Bruno indicates that the text bears several levels of meaning, the historical, the typological, the moral, and the mystical.¹⁵ In practice, he gives scant attention to the historical sense and to the typological. The role of such events in the life of Christ to which the Psalms may point is to teach the reader how to act and how to pray, to incite his piety and devotion.¹⁶ In this case, then, the author, despite his scholastic background, gives pride of place to his monastic orientation.

The contrast between monastic and scholastic Psalms exegesis can be seen even more clearly in the next two examples. Pseudo-Bruno of Würzburg wrote his *Expositio Psalmorum* in ca. 1150, well after the glosses of Peter Lombard and of other scholastic commentators. He draws on their work, selecting what he wants from them and ignoring what he finds uninteresting or irrelevant. In that latter category he includes the identification of the authorities they cite and the analysis which they apply to these citations. What he does, instead, is to content himself with their conclusions, incorporating them into his own largely moral exegesis. The place the author accords to the Psalms in the context of the monastic life is vividly indicated in his offering of a prayer, reflecting on the message of the Psalm just discussed, at the end of each of his glosses, as well as by his prayerful ejaculations inserted here and there in the body of the gloss itself. The same focus is also reflected in the conclusions he draws and in the allusions he makes. In glossing Psalm 86:4 on the subject of vigils, he reads the text as a criticism of

¹² Ibid., 106, *PL* 152: 1205B–C, 1211D.

¹³ Ibid., 105, *PL* 152: 1198B.

¹⁴ Ibid., prologus, *PL* 152: 637B–638B.

¹⁵ Ibid., *PL* 152: 638B–639A.

¹⁶ A good example is *ibid.*, 21, *PL* 152: 723C.

monks who fail to maintain their alertness at the night services;¹⁷ and he repeatedly praises monastic *simplicitas* over secular learning, seen as the secular folly which monks should leave behind them.¹⁸ Likewise, he thinks that the swallows mentioned in Psalm 103:18 signify "*monachorum parvitatem*," the deliberately chosen powerlessness of monks who have rejected the inheritance of the mighty, while the swallows' nest signifies the monastery itself, built so that its inhabitants can sing God's praises.¹⁹ Clearly, the Pseudo-Bruno's aim is to draw on and to simplify the work of his predecessors, while applying it to the stimulation of collective and individual monastic devotion.

Another monastic example who was familiar with the scholastic as well as the monastic glosses on the Psalms and who produced the lengthiest commentary of the century on this Old Testament book is Gerhoch of Reichersberg. His *Expositiones in Psalmorum*, dating to between 1144 and 1167/68, is likewise aimed at the edification of monks and canons and the enrichment of their prayer life. But it also tackles another aspect of the monastic agenda, the improvement of the quality of religious life in the cloisters of the older monastic orders. Hence, Gerhoch seeks to harness Psalms exegesis to the reform of moral and institutional problems within the contemporary church.²⁰ While he pays some attention to the typological reading of the Psalms, his accent is ethical and his style is homiletic. He cites both recent and contemporary authors, in large chunks, scholastic and monastic alike, as well as patristic and classical authors. Sometimes the authorship of these citations is mis-attributed; sometimes the citations are to the point and at other times not. The most noticeable stylistic feature of Gerhoch's exposition is extensive digression. These digressions are not scholastic-type *quaestiones* inspired by the biblical text but examples of the author's tendency toward free association. Subjects on which he expatiates, which may or may not be connected with the themes in the Psalms being glossed, include the liturgy, ethics, ecclesiastical and monastic discipline, canon law, history sacred and profane, legends, anecdotes, current events, and dogma. In the latter case, Gerhoch takes up some dogmatic points controverted at the time

¹⁷ Pseudo-Bruno of Würzburg, *Expositio Psalmorum* 86:4, *PL* 142: 287C.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 70:17, 91:6, 93:8, *PL* 142: 268A, 341C, 345C.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 103:18, *PL* 142: 373D.

²⁰ Good general orientations on this work are provided by Peter Classen, *Gerhoch von Reichersberg: Eine Biographie* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1960), pp. 114–21 and Damien Van den Eynde, *L'Oeuvre littéraire de Gerhoch de Reichersberg* (Rome: Antonianum, 1957), pp. 291–329.

on which he takes a stand, such as the contritionist-confessionist debate concerning penance. Here, he clearly sides with the confessionists, attacking contritionism as a Greek heresy.²¹ Sometimes his doctrinal observations reinforce the current consensus, as in his remarks on the need for human collaboration with God's grace in man's justification and in the remission of his sins.²² But doctrinal excurses of this sort do not reflect an effort on Gerhoch's part to develop a theology out of Psalms or to work out the relationship between the content of any one of the Psalms and the theology of the Psalter more generally. Rather, they reflect the fact that, as an exegete, he has a mind like a grab-bag. He has a tendency to get sidetracked all too easily. This digressive trait is more evident in the earlier sections of his commentary, which are much fuller in all respects than are the later sections. By the time he reaches the end of the gloss, Gerhoch appears to have run out of steam, and contents himself with citing authorities, whether acknowledged or not, one after the other, without even writing any continuity between them.

PRE-LOMBARDIAN SCHOLASTIC PSALMS EXEGESIS

The scholastic glosses on the Psalms dating to our target period have a decidedly different appearance, as can be seen by a consideration of the three most important precursors of Peter Lombard in this connection, the Pseudo-Bede, the *Glossa ordinaria*, and Gilbert of Poitiers. The identity of the Pseudo-Bede is not known, but internal references in his work to contemporary events, such as the investiture controversy, enable us to date it to the turn of the twelfth century. The fact that the author is a school theologian is visible in the technicality of the doctrinal issues he discusses, whether as central points in his exegesis or as excurses on the Psalms. He displays a notable tendency to make logical distinctions and to use grammatical analysis, as well as to draw widely on patristic and classical authors.²³ One striking feature of the Pseudo-

²¹ Gerhoch of Reichersberg, *Expositionis in Psalmarum* 31:5, in *Opera inedita*, 2 vols in 3, ed. Damien and Odulph Van den Eynde and Angelinus Rijmensdael, with Peter Classen (Rome: Antonianum 1955–56), 2 part 1: 52–56.

²² *Ibid.*, 31:1, 2 part 1: 6.

²³ A good general description is provided by G. Morin, "Le pseudo-Bède sur les Psaumes et l'*Opus super Psalterium* de maître Manegold de Lautenbach," *R. bén* 28 (1911): 331–40. See also Bernhard Bischoff, "Zur Kritik der Heerwagenschen Ausgabe von Bedas Werken (Basel, 1563)," in *Mittelalterliche Studien: Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur Schriftkunde und Literaturgeschichte* (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1966), 1:112–17. I would like to thank Dr. Margaret T. Gibson for this last reference.

Bede that sets him apart from the monastic exegetes and that also reveals his scholastic colors is his interest in the Book of Psalms as a part of the Bible and in the question of authorship connected to it. Is the Book of Psalms a single book, as Cassiodorus says, or five books brought together under one heading, as Jerome maintains? The author holds that this is a single book, although one written, as Hilary of Poitiers states, by several different authors, as is clear from the headings to each individual Psalm.²⁴ This conclusion reveals an exegete who does not hesitate to engage in controversy, for the more typical view of the authorship of the Psalms, Jerome and Hilary excepted, from the rest of the church fathers up through the scholastic exegetes of the early twelfth century, was that David had written them all.²⁵

After a lengthy introduction to the Book of Psalms as a whole, the Pseudo-Bede gives a brief explanation of each Psalm before commenting on it. His exegesis accents overall themes. He considers each Psalm as a whole, and, once he has indicated what it is saying in general, he confines himself to lemmatizing the few phrases in each that may present difficulties. He agrees that the Psalms bear a historical, moral, and mystical meaning. But it is the typological significance of the text, especially its Christological dimensions, that attract his primary attention. The breadth of his reading is visible in the range of authorities he cites, as is his attitude. He urges that philosophers have much of value to say on the immortality of the soul,²⁶ and cites *scholia* from Horace, Lucan, and Macrobius.²⁷ His patristic authorities, however, are infrequently cited by name and are treated as scholiasts more than as theologians. Pseudo-Bede does not systematically adduce authorities and investigate the reasoning behind their conflicting readings or interpretations. He tends to offer the opinions he takes from them without analysis, as his own position. Sometimes he presents an alternative reading but without indicating where it comes from and whether it is compatible with the other reading or readings he has given, and, if not, what reasons exist for choosing among them. There are other areas in which the Pseudo-Bede, for all his evident contributions, would be found wanting by a scholastic reader. In a substantial number of cases, Psalms 94 through 100 and Psalms

²⁴ Pseudo-Bede, *De Psalmorum libro exegesis* prologus, PL 93: 477B–D.

²⁵ I am indebted to Theresa Gross-Diaz, in a personal communication of April 5, 1990, for this information.

²⁶ Pseudo-Bede, *In Ps.* 87, PL 93: 960B.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 9, 34, 89, 103, PL 93: 541C–D, 655D, 966C, 1005B.

112 through 150, the author gives no commentary at all apart from his introductory summary of the Psalm. And, in making theological excursions from the text, his position is as noncommittal as it is unexceptional. He does not take sides on the doctrines expounded.

Another important precursor of Peter Lombard's commentary on the Psalms, and one that had an impressive shelf-life in the twelfth century and after among readers whose needs were often less professionally oriented than those of the scholastic theologians, is the *Glossa ordinaria*, composed by Anselm of Laon and his associates between ca. 1080 and ca. 1130.²⁸ It is not known when, during that period, the gloss on the Psalms was produced, or who the glossator responsible for it was. In its appearance, the *Glossa ordinaria* offers a marked contrast both with the work of the Pseudo-Bede and with that of Gilbert of Poitiers and that of the Lombard, in that it does not take the form of a continuous commentary. Rather, it is a text of the Bible supplied with interlinear and marginal glosses. The glossator opens his commentary with a flourish, giving Jerome's preface to the Book of Psalms. He then quotes Jerome, Cassiodorus, Augustine, and Remigius of Auxerre on the nature of the Psalms, what the number of Psalms signifies, their sequence, and the idea, taken from Augustine, that they should be read with a Christological reference, or with reference to the church and the kinds of people who comprise it. For these various categories of people, the Psalms offer moral guidance on what is required for penance, justice, and eternal life.²⁹

The glossator neither comments on each verse, nor does he give

²⁸ On the authorship of the *Glossa ordinaria*, the seminal work was done by Beryl Smalley, *Study*, pp. 46–66 and more recently confirmed by Ermenegildo Bertola, "La 'Glossa ordinaria' biblica ed i suoi problemi," *RTAM* 45 (1978): 34–78; R. Wielockx, "Autour de la *Glossa ordinaria*," *RTAM* 49 (1982): 222–28; Lobrichon, "Une nouveauté," pp. 105–07; Margaret T. Gibson, "The Place of the *Glossa ordinaria* in Medieval Exegesis," in *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, ed. Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 5–27; "The Glossed Bible," intro. to the facsimile reprint of the editio princeps of *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, Adolph Rusch of Strassburg, 1480/81 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), 1: vii–xi; A brief description of the main features of the *Glossa ordinaria* is provided by Evans, *Language and Logic*, pp. 41–47.

²⁹ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria* prologus, editio princeps, 4 vols. (Strassburg: Adolph Rusch?, c. 1481), 1: unpaginated. Also found in *PL* 113: 841A–844C. Princeton University Library, Ex 1.5168.1480. An anastatic reprint with introduction by Karlfried Froelich and Margaret T. Gibson has been published (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), as noted in note 28 above. I will also give references to the *PL* edition, although its weaknesses are acknowledged, for the convenience of readers lacking access to the first edition or its reprint. I would like to thank Dr. Gibson for her assistance in locating the copy of the *Glossa ordinaria* in the Princeton collection.

the reader a sense of the overall message of each Psalm. What he does do is to single out particular words and passages that he wants to discuss, leaving to the reader the task of contextualizing them. His explanations are of two types. Either they are *scholia* clarifying difficult phrases, or they are restatements of what the Psalmist has said, in the glossator's own words, or in the words, or in the paraphrased sense, of a chosen authority. The author occasionally supports or elaborates on the point by referring to other biblical texts. The authorities on whom he draws the most heavily, usually one for each passage lemmatized, are Augustine and Cassiodorus. Other patristic authors to whom he appeals are Basil, Gregory the Great, Theodore, and Jerome. Among the post-patristic writers, his favorites are Bede and Remigius. Most of the time his citations of these authorities paraphrase their opinions. But at times the glossator offers a fragmented quotation, of a type that makes his references a mere finding tool. Following the example of the Carolingian exegete, Florus of Lyon,³⁰ he gives the first few words of the quotation and the last few words, with the phrase "*usque ad*" in between to indicate his omission of the main body of the quotation.

As for the content of his exegesis, the glossator adheres to both the Christological and the moral reading of the Psalms as prescribed by Augustine. The ethical and dogmatic conclusions he draws from the text are, for the most part, theologically unexceptional, and rarely touch on the debated issues of the day. He shows no interest in moving beyond the simple statement of a theological point into a fuller exploration or a speculative analysis of it. His tendency to gloss individual words or phrases militates against a commentary on the overall meaning of a given Psalm, as a text that has a beginning, middle, and end and that conveys a specific message. It also militates against the understanding of the Psalmist's mode of argument or rhetorical strategy. These traits lead to a treatment of the Psalms that is considerably more banal than what can be found in many of the patristic exegetes on whom the glossator relies. There is only one point at which a current theological concern surfaces. In his gloss on Psalm 44, the author offers a liturgical, ecclesiological, and Mariological observation reflecting the contemporary effort to bind Mariology more closely to reflection on the church. This Psalm, he notes, is sung on the feast of the Virgin, in the liturgy for the induction of virgins into the monastic life, on feasts of the apostles and on Christmas day. While it speaks

³⁰ Florus of Lyons, *Expositio in Epistolas beati Pauli*, PL 119.

of the church in general, he adds, it refers to Mary in particular, as the type of the church wedded to Christ at His incarnation.³¹ This passage is the exception that proves the rule. Nowhere else in this gloss can one read it as an index of theological interests specific to the twelfth century.

Although the glossator, in his prologue, notes the existence of diverse patristic opinions, he is basically not interested in dealing with conflicting views in the body of his gloss. He is far more likely to accent the concord of opinions when he can, as is the case, for instance, with Psalm 105 and whether the phrase “*alleluia, alleluia*” in the first verse belongs there. As he points out, Cassiodorus, following Jerome, says it does and explains that *alleluia* here is repeated for emphasis, on the analogy of the phrase “Amen, amen I say unto you,” found in the gospels. Augustine, he observes, agrees with this point, and adds that the *alleluias* belong at the beginning of this Psalm and not at the end of the previous one, because none of the Greek codices of Psalms that he has consulted places these words after Psalm 104.³² This is one of the few passages in the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Psalms reflecting any interest in the active comparison of different authorities on the same passage, or in the consideration of the reasoning that lies behind their opinions, or in suggesting the scholarly criteria to bear in mind in deciding which view to follow.

Aside from this particular instance, there is little evidence on the glossator’s part of a real interest in offering any advice on how to read the text. Rather, the *Glossa ordinaria* on Psalms can be described less as a pedagogical tool for the training of scholastic theologians than as a catena of the individual patristic and later opinions which the author finds most helpful for each of the words or phrases he chooses to lemmatize. In citing his authorities, he is typically more interested in the conclusions they reach, especially if they are expressed in a concise, maxim-like form, than in the reasoning that has led the authority to his conclusion. In cases where the glossator uses the *usque ad* formula for abbreviating his quotations, it is impossible for the reader, in the absence of additional research on his own part, to see how the authority has gotten to his destination. The glossator never refers to the context in which the authority had written. He tends to overlook the theological and philosophical issues which his authorities had often addressed in

³¹ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 2: In Ps. 44; PL 113: 911B–C.

³² *Ibid.*, 2: In Ps. 105; PL 113: 1022A–B.

their Psalms commentaries. He adheres instead to the task of offering his own moral and typological exegesis in a spare, economical manner, without giving his own or his authorities' reflections on the significance of the ethical, Christological, or ecclesiological points which he extracts from their works and presents in a condensed and lapidary fashion.

The Psalms commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers, written between 1110/11 and 1117, was initiated while Gilbert was studying with Anselm of Laon. It incorporates and expands on the *Glossa ordinaria*, emphasizing the same authorities. It preserves the balance between ethics and Christology found in that gloss on the Psalms. Gilbert does not display here the interest in dialectic and semantics that surfaces so forcefully in his later commentaries on Boethius. In his glosses on the Psalms, he is less inclined than the *Glossa ordinaria* to indicate by name the authorities whose views he summarizes. Still, the earlier scholarship on Gilbert's as yet unedited Psalms commentary accents the continuities between it and the *Glossa ordinaria*, except for the fact that it is a continuous commentary and not a set of marginal and interlinear glosses on the Biblical text.³³ However, the recent work of Theresa Gross-Diaz has shown that Gilbert can truly lay claim to being the first seriously scholastic commentator on the Psalms. In this respect, he is the single most important precursor of Peter Lombard. Not only does Gilbert eschew the devotional and hortatory approach to the Psalms typical of the monastic exegetes, as do the Pseudo-Bede and the *Glossa ordinaria*, he also systematically targets specific scholastic concerns not emphasized by these two authors, which will be developed more fully by the Lombard in the sequel.

One place where the winds of change can be felt immediately is in Gilbert's *accessus* to the Book of Psalms. He agrees with the Pseudo-Bede, Jerome, and Hilary, against the prevailing opinion, that the book is an anthology, but he goes much farther than they do. Not only is the Book of Psalms a composite book, he argues, it is also an anthology composed of different types of Psalms.³⁴ Some, for

³³ H. C. van Elswijk, "Gilbert Porreta als glossator van het Psalterium," in *Jubileumbundel voor Prof. Mag. Dr. G. P. Kreling O.P.* (Nijmegen: Dekker & Van de Vegt N.V., 1953), pp. 292–303; *Gilbert Porreta: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1966), pp. 46–47; Bruno Maioli, *Gilberto Porretano: Dalla grammatica speculativa alla metafisica del concreto* (Rome: Bulzoni, 1979), p. xxiii.

³⁴ Theresa Gross-Diaz, personal communication, April 5, 1990; "Information Management in the Twelfth Century Schools: The Psalm Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers or, 'Gilbert, We Hardly Knew Ye'," unpublished paper delivered in

example, are penitential Psalms; others praise and celebrate the deity; still others invoke God's aid against the speaker's enemies; still others pray for comfort in times of tribulation. The Psalms of these diverse types, Gilbert notes, are not placed together in the Book of Psalms according to their thematic character, but are scattered throughout the book. As a composite text, he points out, the Book of Psalms has a rather haphazard scheme of organization, both from the standpoint of the list of putative authors given and from the standpoint of the subject matter of the Psalms themselves. As an exegete, he recognizes that some readers may wish to pursue a study of the different groups of Psalms thematically, tracing the development of the theme from one Psalm to another within the group. In order to facilitate investigations of this sort, Gilbert supplies both a verbal and a visual key for indexing and cross-referencing the different subdivisions that can be made within the larger body of the text. In his prologue, he explains what the categories are and which Psalms pertain to each of them, and he reinforces these verbal finding tools with visual markers in the early manuscript versions of his commentary.

At the same time, Gilbert is really the first scholastic exegete of the Psalms to develop theological *quaestiones* out of the text, in the context of his prevailingly Christological and moral emphasis. Further, he consistently yokes these two exegetical agendas to each other in a coherent manner, both in terms of form and content. These features of his exegesis are found in both of the two redactions of his gloss. The earlier of these gives very abbreviated lemmata, to which it then appends a running commentary combined with *quaestiones*. In the second version, dating to Gilbert's years of teaching at Paris, each page offers, in a double column format, the entire text of each Psalm and, next to it, Gilbert's commentary and *quaestiones*, with the authorities he cites flagged in the margins. In addressing the content, Gilbert begins by noting that the Psalms speak of Christ, and that they refer to Him both in the head and the

briefed form at the 24th International Congress of Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, MI, May 6 1989; "The Psalms Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers: From *lectio divina* to the Lecture Room," Northwestern University Ph.D. diss., 1992, pp. 63–115, 116–68, 211–55 for the treatment of this commentary's mise-en-page, its *accessus* with the issues of authorship and order of the Psalms, and the independence of Gilbert from the *Glossa ordinaria*, respectively; "From *lectio divina* to the Lecture Room: The Psalms Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers," in *The Place of the Psalms in the Intellectual Culture of the Middle Ages*, ed. Nancy van Deusen (Binghamton: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, forthcoming). I am indebted to Dr. Gross-Diaz for allowing me to consult these papers and her dissertation prior to publication.

members. So, the Psalms must be read not only with reference to the life of Christ in the New Testament, which they forecast, but with reference to the moral lives of the Christians who make up the church, His body. Now, these Christians are both perfect and imperfect. The latter group is the audience to which the Psalms are aimed, in order to draw them from imperfection to perfection.³⁵

This general observation sets the stage for Gilbert's actual exegesis of each individual Psalm. In handling Psalm 1, he speaks of conforming oneself to the new man, possible only through Christ. This injunction prompts an analytical excursus into the nature of vice and virtue. Gilbert shares in the contemporary consensus, in which temptation was distinguished from sin and sin was located in the voluntary consent of the moral subject. His three-part formula, embracing thought, delectation, and consent (*cogitatio, delectatio, consensus*) reprises one of the standard vocabularies for these stages used by scholastics of the day.³⁶ In considering the choice of virtue, he accents not only the rejection of evil that it entails but also the acceptance of God's law as the law of one's own being, as well as perdurance in the good, while seeking goodness not with a sense of sadness, fear, or duress, nor with an eye to its fruits, but for itself alone. The proper motivation is the desire for the *honestum*, not the *utile*. If one acts for this reason, according to Gilbert, one will be enriched by the grace of Christ and bear good spiritual fruit, as well as receive remission of sins and eternal life.³⁷ The moral subject's judgment and counsel, his conscious and voluntary choice and inner motivation are central, in this mini-treatise on the psychology of the ethical life which Gilbert extracts from the description of the virtuous man in the first Psalm. It is clear that he is not content just to sum up the content of each Psalm and to anchor his points with the well-turned phrase of one authority or another.

Gilbert's handling of Psalm 2 accents Christ's spiritual power in vanquishing His enemies and the enemies of Christians striving for virtue today, in a reading that softens the military imagery in this text. In this Psalm, Christ is held up not only as a protector but as a model. It is His patience and confidence that arm Him, which virtues the Christian should imitate.³⁸ Another moral lesson that hinges on Christ emerges in Gilbert's account of Psalm 3. The

³⁵ Maria Fontana, ed., "Il commento ai Salmi di Gilberto de la Porrée," *Logos* 13 (1930): 284.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 286–87.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 288–90.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 290–94.

David and Absalom story referred to here is to be read as a type of Christ and Judas. At the same time, it is an appeal to humility; those cast down will be raised up and glorified. One can also derive insight into human psychology from this Psalm, Gilbert notes. Each person possesses, within his soul, the conflicting drives of David and Christ, on the one side, and of Absalom and Judas, on the other, manifested in man's rational and irrational impulses, respectively. The contest between these drives can be seen as a battle between the angels and the devils over man's soul, Gilbert concludes, but it is clear that he prefers the more psychological account of this psychomachia.³⁹ These brief glimpses, all that the present state of Gilbert's Psalms gloss research allows to readers dependent on the printed texts, make it clear that he is decidedly interested in developing a real theology out of his exegesis of the Psalms and that he is concerned with making both the text of Psalms itself and his own gloss easy to use for students interested in a more analytical approach to this book of the Bible than characterizes the *Glossa ordinaria*.

PETER LOMBARD ON THE PSALMS

Peter Lombard's commentary on the Psalms has typically been seen as standing in the tradition of the *Glossa ordinaria*, so firmly that it can be regarded as a mere re-elaboration of it.⁴⁰ If such were the case, it would be difficult to grasp why his commentary on Psalms was the scholastic gloss of choice for this part of the Bible. In understanding why such was the case, we need to highlight his differences from the *Glossa ordinaria*, even though he certainly makes extensive use of it. We also need to show how he capitalizes on some of the concerns and techniques of Gilbert's Psalms commentary and expands on them. To begin with, like Gilbert, Peter provides his commentary with an elaborate *accessus*, designed to do several things at once.⁴¹ Heading his agenda is the desire to reassert

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 294–300.

⁴⁰ Evans, *Language and Logic*, pp. 44–45; Joseph de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," in *DTC* (Paris: Letouzy et Ané, 1935), 12 part 2: 1953.

⁴¹ A. J. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages* (London: Scolar Press, 1984), pp. 47–48, 54; A. J. Minnis and A. B. Scott, ed., *Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism, c. 1100-c. 1375* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 69–71, although the latter misdates Peter's exegetical works. See, most recently, Marcia L. Colish, "Psalterium Scholasticorum: Peter Lombard and the Emergence of Scholastic Psalms Exegesis," *Speculum* 67 (July 1992): 531–48.

the claim that David was the sole author of all of the Psalms.⁴² This opinion contradicts what the Pseudo-Bede had said, in the name of a more prevalent tradition. Its defense is going to require some fancy footwork indeed in the body of the commentary, as Peter tries to explain away the authorship of Asaph, Heman, Ethan, and the other names attached to the titles of some of the Psalms. So, it demands a clear rationale. Peter seeks to provide one by way of addressing other points he makes in his *accessus*. The objective or intention of the author, he states, is to teach the reader how to behave well, and so to attain eternal life. Duties vary at different points in a person's life. The number of the Psalms is therefore coordinated with the six ages of man, followed by the seventh age, that of the resurrection.⁴³ The book can also be subdivided into three units of fifty Psalms apiece, corresponding with the Augustinian themes of penance, justice, and eternal life. He gives examples of each type of Psalm, with the incipits of Psalm 50, Psalm 100, and Psalm 150 respectively. As a *summa* of the ethical life, the Psalms, Peter says, were fittingly written by David, who was both a prophet and an evangelist, inspired by the Holy Spirit, who spoke of the coming of Christ and the church, and a sinner who himself experienced God's forgiveness and learned humility when he repented.⁴⁴ Peter thus yokes the issues of the author's intention, the subject matter of the Psalms, and their number, to the purported authorship of David.

As to the nature of the book itself, he disagrees with Jerome, thinking it should be called a single book and not an assemblage of books. To clarify this point he compares the Psalms with the Acts of the Apostles and with the Epistles of Paul. All three of these parts of the Bible are composites, but Psalms and Acts have a unified theme. For this reason, Peter sides with Cassiodorus's ruling that the Book of Psalms should be referred to in the singular.⁴⁵ Here, Peter goes beyond other exegetes who followed the lead of Cassiodorus by importing his own textual analysis into the question. Having discussed the author and his intention, Peter moves on to the *materia* and *modus tractandi* aspects of his *accessus*. On the first point, he agrees entirely with Augustine and previous commentators that the subject matter is Christ and that

⁴² Peter Lombard, *Commentarium in Psalmos Davidicos* prologus, PL 191: 55A, 57C–D, 59B–C.

⁴³ Ibid., PL 191: 56A–B.

⁴⁴ Ibid., PL 191: 57C–D.

⁴⁵ Ibid., PL 191: 58A–B.

the Psalms should be read typologically as well as morally, in that Christ is the new Adam, the source of the new man who replaces fallen man. But he adds his own twist to this tradition. In referring to Christ as the head of the body which is the church, he observes that the Psalms speak sometimes of Christ according to His divinity, sometimes according to His humanity, and sometimes metaphorically (*per transumptione*); he gives examples of each mode, citing Psalm 109, Psalm 3, and Psalm 21 as respective illustrations of each of them. Similarly, the Psalms speak of the church in three ways, referring to the perfect, the imperfect, and those evildoers who are merely nominal members of the fold.⁴⁶ Peter thus expands the range of ethical categories of Christians to whom the Psalms are addressed or of whom they speak; and he associates this theme with the issue of theological language.

Moving to the *modus tractandi*, Peter agrees with Gilbert that the order of the Psalms in the book reflects a mode of organization at odds with the order in which they were written. He follows Gilbert's notion that the Psalms naturally fall into subdivisions according to their themes, and that they could be regrouped in sequences which show their interrelations with the other Psalms in the sub-group of which they are a part, logically or chronologically. In addition to offering the same kind of key as Gilbert provides in his preface, as well as in his introduction to the individual Psalms,⁴⁷ Peter offers an explanation of how the Psalms lost the more cogent arrangement which he thinks they originally had. The prophet Esdra, he states, faced with salvaging the Psalms when the library at Babylon burned down, put them together in their current order. Still, by flagging the cogent sub-groups and by cross-referencing the Psalms within them, wherever they are presently located in the text, Peter, like Gilbert, hopes to aid the reader keen on following the development of ideas in the Psalms in each unit. In addition, for Peter, this provision of a key is a means of conceptually reconstituting the original format of the book as it is believed to have been.⁴⁸

Peter thinks that the first Psalm is a compendium of all the main themes in the Psalms more generally, and he therefore gives it extended consideration. A glance at this commentary of Psalm 1 will be useful in situating his approach in relation to that of the

⁴⁶ Ibid., *PL* 191: 59C–D.

⁴⁷ E.g. *In Ps.* 21, 129, *PL* 191: 225B–266C, 1167B.

⁴⁸ Ibid., prologus, *PL* 191: 59D–60B; Minnis, *Medieval Theory*, pp. 54, 140, although Minnis does not note Peter's dependence on Gilbert here.

Glossa ordinaria and Gilbert. The first Psalm, Peter affirms, states the central ideas found in the Book of Psalms as a whole, with respect to the author's intention, his subject matter, and his *modus tractandi*. The Lombard observes that the Psalm is divided into two parts, the first speaking about the *beatus vir* and drawing the reader to his happy state by describing it in an appealing way; while the second part speaks of the punishment of the wicked, frightening the reader away from his behavior. Further, the author contrasts the virtuous man with Adam, reminding the reader of the loss of Eden and of his own inability to rid himself of sin without God's grace. Once he has been put on the road to salvation by God, he can exult, even though he faces difficulties along the way. The Psalm, Peter continues, refers to the three forms of resuscitation from the death brought about by sin which the Lord provides, "in the house, at the gateway, in the tomb" (*in domo, in porta, in sepulchro*).⁴⁹ Next, the Psalmist describes the seat of the wicked, by which he means the giving of bad example, the teaching and the practice of sin. The first man sinned three ways, in thought, word, and deed. And so, what was brought about by the first man, Adam, must be removed by the new Adam, Christ.⁵⁰ This thought leads Peter, at the end of his preface to Psalm 1, to give, in germ, a summary of the analysis of the psychogenesis of ethical acts which he, like Gilbert, develops in the body of his gloss. Adam, he notes, sinned in thought, in intention, and in act; in word, doctrine, and custom (*cogitatione, voluntate et actu, verbi, doctrina vel consuetudo*).⁵¹ First, he embraced temptation in thought, in the initial motion of the soul (*primus motus animae*), which is venial. Then, he embraced the delectation and consent (*delectatio et consensus*), which are mortal. The sin resides in the mind's voluntary consent to temptation; and this sin is then what Adam expressed in deeds, words, and habits.⁵²

Here, in the preface, Peter offers not only a detailed analysis of the psychology of ethical choice consistent with but fuller than that of Gilbert, he also combines it integrally with his description of the Psalmist's *modus tractandi*, providing a rhetorical as well as a thematic analysis of Psalm 1 that can serve as a model for the *accessus* he gives to the Psalms, both individually and collectively. In so doing, he draws on most of the same sources used by the *Glossa ordinaria* and Gilbert, adding only Alcuin to the citations from Jerome,

⁴⁹ Peter Lombard, *In Ps. 1 prologus*, *PL* 191: 60A.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, *PL* 191: 62A.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, *PL* 191: 60C.

⁵² *Ibid.*, *PL* 191: 60D.

Cassiodorus, Augustine, Bede, and Remigius on which they call. But he has put the entire question of what the exegesis of the Psalms is out to accomplish on a much more solid and clearly articulated foundation.

Moving from the preface to the text of Psalm 1 itself, Peter does something else that sets his exegesis apart, and that he repeats in his handling of all the Psalms. Rather than giving the gist of the Psalm and then merely lemmatizing individual words or phrases, without showing how they occur in the text, he quotes each verse in full, and then discusses the meaning of each verse. In that connection he addresses the significance of the individual words or phrases that he thinks merit attention, or expands on the theological issues which he thinks warrant more extended treatment. Thus, for example, in Psalm 1:1, he observes that the *beatus vir* who does not respond to the counsels of the impious is a man who does not live in a condition of estrangement from God (*regio dissimilitudinis*). In analyzing that state, he takes pains to make it clear that man's occupancy of this zone does not result from an involuntary, cosmic, Neoplatonic "fall of the soul" but that it is the consequence of man's exercise of moral choice.⁵³ Or, another example, at Psalm 1:2, he explains that the law which the virtuous man meditates on day and night is Christ.⁵⁴

In deriving these explanations, Peter draws on other passages of the Bible and on the authorities cited by the *Glossa ordinaria* and Gilbert, especially Cassiodorus and Augustine. But he uses these sources more integrally and less telegraphically. Rather than being cited to close off discussion, they are brought into the gloss to trigger their own, and Peter's, more extended reflections on the meaning of the Psalm. The whole tenor of Peter's gloss is to seek, and to find in his authorities, ways of opening up the text, ways of dilating on its theological content, and ways of making connections

⁵³ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 1:1, *PL* 191: 61B. One finds a similar understanding of *regio dissimilitudinis*, as the generic state of sinful man, stated repeatedly in the Lombard's sermons. See *Sermo* 4, 12, 13, 21, 23, 36, 55, 99, 111, 112, *PL* 171: 357A–B, 397A, 404D, 435D–436A, 445C, 525C, 601C, 850D, 857C. It also occurs in Peter's *In Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas* 2:23, *PL* 192: 126C–129A. For the evolution of this theme from its Neoplatonic beginnings to this very generic Christian sense in the twelfth century, see J. C. Didier, "Pour la fiche *Regio dissimilitudinis*," *Mélanges de science religieuse* 8 (1951): 205–10; Étienne Gilson, "*Regio dissimilitudinis* de Platon à Saint Bernard de Clairvaux," *MS* 9 (1947): 108–30; Margot Schmidt, "*Regio dissimilitudinis*: Ein Grundbegriff mittelhochdeutscher Prosa im Lichte seiner lateinischen Bedeutungsgeschichte," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Theologie und Philosophie* 15 (1968): 63–108.

⁵⁴ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 1:2, *PL* 191: 62B.

between it and other parts of the Bible where similar moral teachings are presented, especially the Pauline Epistles. His strategy is the antithesis of that of the *Glossa ordinaria*, which seeks to explicate disconnected lemmata as concisely as possible. Instead, Peter always relates the points he makes on each passage to the central theme of the Psalm, as he has spelled it out in his *accessus*. He also clearly leads the reader along the itinerary that he had mapped out in that *accessus*, indicating when his comment on the first part of the Psalm, on the virtuous, has been completed, and he is ready to pass on to the second part, on the iniquity of the wicked.⁵⁵ The relation of the parts of the Psalm, and of his gloss on it, to the whole, is always kept firmly before the reader's eyes.

The features of Peter's exegesis of Psalm 1 which we have just examined are standard for his treatment of all the other Psalms. At the same time, here and elsewhere in this work Peter elaborates a method and a theological content that are specific to this commentary on the Psalms and that set it apart from preceding glosses. He goes farther in developing theological *quaestiones* out of the text of Psalms than any other exegete of his time. Sometimes he presents an early version of a doctrine which he develops or changes later in his career, and sometimes he offers a position that already articulates a basic teaching that he retains and that appears in much the same shape in his *Sentences*. A good example of the first type is his handling of penance in his gloss on Psalm 4:6. Here, he describes penance as involving the three Augustinian stages of contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which he calls *poenitentia*, *lamentum*, and *satisfactio* or *opera justa*, the third stage involving the decision to abandon the life of sin and to change one's inner attitude.⁵⁶ He does not, however, raise the burning question, which made penance a richly disputed topic in this period, of when, in this sequence of events, the penitent receives God's forgiveness, although Peter was later to come down squarely on the side of contritionism. His analysis of the same subject in his gloss on Psalm 33 likewise reflects no differentiation, as yet, among the stages in the sacrament, in Peter's current thinking.⁵⁷ Another case in which Peter's Psalms commentary serves as a trial run for an argument which he later changes is the question of whether Christ's human nature should receive worship (*latria*) or only veneration (*dulia*), which arises in his gloss on Psalm 98:5. There, he asserts that our adora-

⁵⁵ Ibid., *PL* 191: 64A.

⁵⁶ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 4:6, *PL* 191: 87B–C.

⁵⁷ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 33, *PL* 191: 319C–321A.

tion of the human Christ should properly be *dulia*,⁵⁸ a view he reverses in the *Sentences*,⁵⁹ thanks largely to the fact that he was later sensitized to this issue by his reading of John Damascene, who had not been available to him when he wrote the Psalms gloss, as well as by a fuller consideration of Augustine on the subject.

Also striking are the passages where the exegesis of the Psalms affords Peter the opportunity to work out fully developed theological positions which he continued to teach. One noteworthy case in point is the nature of the four moral states in which mankind will be resurrected at the end of time, which recurs in his discussion of Last Things in the *Sentences*.⁶⁰ At Psalm 1:6, commenting on the statement that the impious will not rise up in the judgment, he begins by observing that there are two resurrections, the resurrection of the soul, when we rise up from sin, and the resurrection of the body, in the next life. There will be four orders of people in the latter state, he affirms, drawing on Jerome and Augustine. Some, like the apostles and other saints, will judge but will not be judged themselves. Others, like the infidels and those who have persevered in sin up to the end, do not judge and are not themselves judged either. The reason why neither of these groups will be subjected to judgment at the end of time is that they have already been judged. The saints have already won Heaven, thanks to their supererogatory virtue, while the infidels and obdurate sinners have already condemned themselves to perdition. Finer discriminations are needed, however, for the other two groups of people. One of these orders contains people who are judged and saved, as middling good (*mediocriter boni*). The other contains people who are judged and condemned, as middling evil (*mediocriter mali*). So, he concludes, among both the damned and the saved there are two registers of souls, one of which contains people whose posthumous fate is sealed before they die, and the other of which contains people with grayer areas in their moral lives, whose ultimate destinations in the hereafter are not decided immediately but which are determined eventually, after further evaluation or purgation.⁶¹

In explaining this doctrine, Peter goes beyond his sources, adding an analogy of his own devising to clarify the status of the

⁵⁸ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 98:5, *PL* 191: 895B.

⁵⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 3, d. 9, c. 1-c. 6, 3rd ed. rev., ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81), 2: 68-71.

⁶⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4, d. 47, c. 3, 2: 538-40.

⁶¹ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 1:6, *PL* 191: 64C-65C.

two classes of the damned and saved. The former may be compared with two kinds of criminals within a principality. One is the criminal who breaks the law of the land, on some particular point. The other is the rebel who, rejecting the authority of the law and the government as such, seeks to overthrow it. The prince, Peter notes, fitly punishes the second type of criminal in a different way than he punishes the first, and more harshly. Since the rebel, in effect, has committed an act of war against the prince, he is put down by force of arms; for he has rejected the jurisdiction of the law and its processes over himself in the very act of rebelling. On the other hand, the first kind of criminal is proved to be a lawbreaker and is sentenced in the context of judicial deliberation.⁶² As for the two classes of the saved, the perfected saints do not need judgment, since they have already gone beyond the requirements of the Gospel. They have demonstrated their commitment and their irreproachable virtue and fidelity by their deeds and sufferings. Those who are middling good have died in a state of repentance but their record is mixed. They require further reparation and purgation before being received into Heaven.⁶³

The foregoing account is certainly the most elaborate example of a doctrine developed out of Psalms exegesis that Peter carries over into his mature theology. Other examples that might be cited, which he treats with greater concision, are his handling of the hypostatic union, the idea of substance, and the modes of fear in the moral life. At Psalm 64:5, he crisply states that the Word assumed human nature in a unity of person (*unitas personae*). Christ, he observes, did not assume a human person; rather, He assumed the nature of man (*naturam quippe hominis assumpsit*).⁶⁴ As for *substantia*, at Psalm 68:2 Peter sets forth a definition that avoids a specifically Aristotelian understanding of the term and that makes it available for proper attribution both to creatures and to the Deity. All kinds of substances, he asserts, can be viewed as beings that possess the qualities intrinsic to themselves (*eo ipso quo sunt*). Thus, not only are men, animals, the earth, and the heavens substances, so is the divine nature shared by the persons of the Trinity. In short, Peter here equates a being's substance with its inborn nature, whatever kind of nature that may be.⁶⁵ Although examples could be multiplied, a third, and final illustration under this heading is Peter's

⁶² Ibid., *PL* 191: 65C–D.

⁶³ Ibid., *PL* 191: 66B–67B.

⁶⁴ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 64:5, *PL* 191: 584B.

⁶⁵ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 68:2, *PL* 191: 627B–D.

doctrine of the four kinds of fear in the moral life, one which was widely held in this period, and which he extracts from the line in Psalm 127 where those who fear the Lord are called blessed. The four kinds of fear are worldly or human, servile, initial, and chaste or filial. The first involves fear of bodily harm or loss of worldly goods, and is an unworthy motive for moral action. Servile fear involves actions undertaken so as to avoid punishment. It may provide negative reasons for doing good, but its motivation is not sufficient to win blessedness. Initial fear, the fear of the Lord that is the beginning of wisdom, begins to exclude servile fear from the soul and to substitute for it the motive of charity. For its part, chaste or filial fear is motivated by love alone. It inspires us not only to flee from evil but also to walk in faith. Only those who possess this fourth type of fear, Peter concludes, are united to Christ.⁶⁶ In all these cases, and in others that might be cited, Peter uses his exegesis of the Psalms to articulate in brief theological positions to which he gives more extended elaboration, along the same lines, later in his career.

There are three other areas in which Peter's Psalms commentary is a rehearsal for the theological teaching he develops as a systematic theologian, areas in which we can see him working out his theological method as well as the substance of his theology. These dimensions of his Psalms gloss include his querying of the accuracy of the biblical text, his application of the *artes* to its explication, and his handling of the authorities whom he more typically harnesses to that task, especially when he detects real or apparent conflicts among them. In the first case, the accuracy of the text, Peter stands out, among contemporary exegetes of Psalms, in his concern for textual corruptions or the tamperings of previous readers in their very act of transmitting the text. The point may be as minor as the title of a Psalm, as is the case with his gloss on Psalm 40. Here, he claims, Jerome changed the title from *In finem psalmus David* to *In finem intellectus filiis Core*. At the root of his objection is both the desire to insist on David as the author of all the Psalms as well as his concern with Jerome's alteration of this title. Some codices of the Psalms, he notes, contain the information that Jerome effected this change; others do not. Peter also observes that the Hebrew and Septuagint Greek versions of the Psalms lack Jerome's new title, but that Haimo of Auxerre and the *Glossa ordinaria* mistakenly follow Jerome. He himself argues that Jerome's tampering with the

⁶⁶ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 127:11, *PL*: 1161D–1162D.

title constitutes an interpretation of the biblical text, and not just a translation or transmission of it. Jerome, in his view, was providing a historical gloss on the Psalm, since the sons of Core at one point entered David's service. This fact helps us to date the composition of the Psalm. The gloss was then, incorrectly, incorporated into the title proper. In any event, Peter proposes to read this Psalm as pertaining to the life of Christ. From this standpoint, he asserts, what is important about Core is that the name can be interpreted as meaning Calvary, the place of the crucifixion. Now Jerome himself, in his gloss on Psalm 84, is the source of the latter *scholium*, while Augustine, in his comment on Psalm 85, concurs in that view.⁶⁷ Three things are of interest in this textual analysis. First, there is Peter's concern with uncovering mistakes in the transmission of the text and in accounting for how they occurred. Second, there is his felt need to criticize his own immediate sources, Haimo and the *Glossa ordinaria*, for their own failure to question Jerome in the light of the information available about his interpolated title. Third, there is his technique of cross-referencing his authorities in their comments on other Psalms to derive the reading he chooses for the problematic reference to Core.

A second example, which likewise displays Peter's interest in comparing alternative texts of the Psalms, is his handling of Psalm 67:9, which refers to Sinai. Peter observes that the Roman Psalter, along with Augustine and Cassiodorus, read Mount Sinai here. On the other hand, the Septuagint, which he is following, omits the word "Mount." To sort out this problem, Peter goes back to the demonstrative pronoun linked to Sinai in the Hebrew text of Psalms, which, he notes, can be understood to refer to the word "Mount." Peter has relied on Jerome for this philological *scholium*.⁶⁸ The whole passage reflects his awareness that the text of the Psalms has a history, in both liturgical and strictly biblical forms, and in a variety of languages, as well as his own inclination to rely on pre-Vulgate texts, such as the Septuagint, as closer to the original Hebrew version.

The third instance in which Peter deals with a discrepancy in the text is a far more dramatic one. It involves a passage which one of his authorities, Augustine, flags down and explains in a manner not noted by the *Glossa ordinaria* or by any other Psalms commentator of this period who glossed the line in question. The problematic line is

⁶⁷ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 40 prologus, *PL* 191: 407D–409B.

⁶⁸ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 67:9, *PL*: 191: 605C.

in Psalm 70:17 "Because I am not acquainted with business dealings, I will enter into the mighty deeds of the Lord" (*Quoniam non cognovi negotiationes, introibo in potentias Domini*). Now, there was a tradition of assessing the morality of mercantile activities derived from Anselm of Laon and his followers, although it arose from their comments on 1 Thessalonians and not Psalm 70. Anselm sees a flat contradiction between the mercantile profession and salvation, arguing that merchants are invariably motivated by greed and that they practice fraud and deception. Two of his disciples, however, while taking the point that greed and fraud are vices, soften and actually reverse Anselm's negative judgment by pointing out that not all merchants are in fact afflicted by these vices. Lacking such sinful motivations, which lie in men and not in the professions they practice, merchants can be virtuous people who perform a useful social function.⁶⁹ While the glossator responsible for the Psalms in the *Glossa ordinaria*, like the rest of his *équipe*, was associated with Anselm of Laon, it does not occur to him to adopt either the negative or the positive assessment of the morality of commerce produced by the Laon masters. His solution to this problem is a non-solution; he simply ignores this line in Psalm 70 and does not gloss it.

On the other hand, the Lombard is familiar with the handling of commerce by Anselm and his disciples, and clearly sides with those who reject Anselm's opinion of merchants. In so doing, he also reflects a more thorough familiarity with Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, which uncovers and resolves the difficulties in Psalm 70:17 with a textual analysis of Augustine's own. Peter agrees that the merchant who is inspired by greed alone and who lies about the value of the goods he buys or sells is a perjurer and a blasphemer, who cannot truly sing the praises of God and who would be a hypocrite to try. He also agrees that these vices inhere in men, and not in the professions they practice, which can indeed be conducted without these vices. For all professions can be exercised both virtuously and viciously, depending on the intentions of the practitioner. As with all other professions, so with commerce, he concludes, "for the art knows nothing of vice" (*ars enim nescit vitium*).⁷⁰

The basic source for the reading of Psalm 70:17 that inspires this analysis is in certain fourth-century versions of the Psalms which

⁶⁹ Marcia L. Colish, "Another Look at the School of Laon," *AHDLMA* 53 (1986): 20–21.

⁷⁰ Peter Lombard, *In Ps. 70:17*, *PL* 191: 652A.

provided the text used in the Milanese Psalter,⁷¹ a fact indicated by Augustine. In his own commentary on this Psalm, Augustine notes that, in a number of exemplars familiar to him, the line reads "Because I am not acquainted with literature" (*Quoniam non cognovi litteraturam*) and that others give *numerationem* for *litteraturam*. Augustine concedes that it is difficult to reconcile these discordant textual variations. Having already argued that intentionality conditions the morality of commerce in a gloss on *negotio*, he finds a happy resolution of the dilemma represented by *numratio* and *litteratura*. These terms, he points out, can also refer to professions, the mathematical and literary disciplines of the liberal arts, which arts, he concludes, even as with mercantile activities, can be practiced honestly or dishonestly.⁷²

This information, supplied by Augustine, suggests that Peter is working with a pre-Vulgate text of Psalms, possibly one deriving from one version of the Psalter or another, since the Vulgate restores *litteraturam* for *negotiationem* and transfers the word to verse 15 of the Psalm. It might be noted parenthetically that *litteraturam* turns out to be just as problematic a reading in that locus as is *negotiationem*. Modern Scripture scholars have replaced both words with *numerationem*, to yield the following reading in the English of the Revised Standard Version of the Bible: "My mouth will tell of Thy righteous acts/ Of Thy deeds of salvation all the day/ For their number is past my knowledge./ With the mighty deeds of the Lord God I will come,/ I will praise Thy righteousness, Thine alone" (Psalm 71:15-16). This reading makes altogether more sense than anything that Peter, or Augustine, are able to provide on the basis of the information available to them. None the less, Peter's resolution of the moral issue embedded in the problematic line as he reads it is of considerable interest in twelfth-century terms, for it indicates a familiarity with Augustine on his part that is highly specific and to the point, and one that recognizes his widening of the scope of the professions to which the general ethical principle at stake can be applied. Augustine's witness to the fact that Jerome was capable of introducing what he believed to be corrections, as well as corruptions, into the Vulgate text of the Psalms receives a hearing, in Peter's gloss, which it does not receive in the work of other contemporary exegetes, a fact which points in turn to a thorough and independent study of Augustine's *Enarrationes in*

⁷¹ Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 70, ed. D. Eligius Dekkers and Joannes Fraipoint, CCSL 39 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956), editorial note *ad loc.*, p. 956.

⁷² Ibid., *Sermo* 1.17-19, CCSL 39: 954-58.

Psalmos on the Lombard's part, and one that goes well beyond the attention which that work received elsewhere in this period.

Not only does Peter use his authorities more independently than is the case with other Psalms commentators, as the above-mentioned example suggests, he also uses a wider range of sources and he approaches them more critically. There are a number of points at which he brings forward his knowledge of the classical authors and of contemporary development in the liberal arts to help unravel difficult passages. Sometimes his glosses betray a reading of the classics to which he does not refer overtly. Such a case is his comment on the injunction in Psalm 36:28 to depart from evil and do good. Cassiodorus here remarks, he notes, that the two-part structure of this line suggests that conversion is a process that takes some time. Peter himself adds the observation "for no one becomes beautiful all at once" (*nemo repente fit pulcher*), an unacknowledged echo of Juvenal's comment, on the obverse of the point, that "no one ever became bad all at once" (*nemo repente fuit turpissime*).⁷³ In interpreting another double, or two-part statement, the promise in Psalm 71:13-14 that the souls of the poor will be saved, they will be redeemed from their debts; Peter treats the passage as an example of an equipollent argument,⁷⁴ a logical technique in the armory of dialecticians since the second half of the eleventh century.

More typically it is the patristic and Carolingian authorities in the Christian tradition on whom he draws. Peter is much more sensitive than the other scholastic glossators of the Psalms to the need to compare alternative interpretations of the biblical text, to assess the reasoning of the authorities, to decide whether their readings are compatible, and, if he judges that they are not, to offer a principled reason for choosing the authority he accepts, while at the same time providing criteria for the reader's own evaluation of sources.⁷⁵ There are a number of cases where he finds the alternative views of different authorities compatible. One reason for such compatibility, when Peter sees it, is that different authorities can be read as referring to different aspects of the same phenomena. Thus, at Psalm 10:3, he notes that there are two theories on how the moon gets its light, one saying that the moon possesses its own light and the other saying that it derives its light by reflection from the sun. Since the interpretation Peter gives to this Psalm is ecclesiological, he argues that both of these theories apply to the church. The first

⁷³ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 36:28, *PL* 191: 374B; cf. Juvenal, *Sat.* 2.83.

⁷⁴ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 71:13-14, *PL* 191: 663D.

⁷⁵ Glunz, *History of the Vulgate*, pp. 214-15.

theory refers to the spiritual legacy of the church, which enables it to shine as a channel of grace. But the church has a physical dimension as well, which is suggested by the second theory, since, in this respect, it derives its light from Christ, the sun of justice. Thus, both interpretations make sense, allegorically.⁷⁶ In the case of another example, the line "your eyes see justice" in Psalm 16:3, Peter observes that Alcuin reads "eyes" here as the divine illumination that enables our physical eyes to see, while Augustine interprets "eyes" as the eyes of the heart. Since man possesses both a physical and a spiritual nature, these opinions are both acceptable as referring to one or another of these natures.⁷⁷ It may be noted that the *Glossa ordinaria* also presents these two opinions, but without discussing the differences between them or whether or not they can be reconciled.⁷⁸ A third example of compatible readings seen as applying to different aspects of the same reality occurs in Psalm 43:28. As Peter points out, Alcuin and Jerome interpret the line "Rise up, o Lord, and come to our assistance," as a prayer to God to lift us from earthly to heavenly concerns by causing us to recognize that this conversion will occur through His grace and not through our own merit. Augustine and Cassiodorus read the line as a prayer to Christ offered by the martyrs, asking Him to initiate the second coming and the heavenly resurrection of their own tormented bodies, and to end the persecution of those still alive. These two readings, he holds, are perfectly compatible, as applying to Christians in general and to a particular subset of Christians at the same time.⁷⁹

In glossing other passages of the Psalms, Peter offers another mode of reconciling discrepant readings, here referring to a general exegetical principle for interpreting the Psalms which he had outlined in his *accessus* to the book as a whole, the notion that the text yields more than one level of meaning. On one level, the text refers to Christ or the church; on another level, it offers moral lessons. Thus, for instance, the "difficult paths" mentioned in Psalm 16:5 can mean the passion and crucifixion endured by Christ, as Augustine has it, and also the virtues that men acquire with difficulty, as Jerome and Augustine, in another passage, maintain.⁸⁰ The same combination of typology and tropology, connected by the idea that

⁷⁶ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 10:3, *PL* 191: 148C–149A.

⁷⁷ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 16:3, *PL* 191: 179A.

⁷⁸ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 2: *In Ps.* 16:3; *PL* 113: 866B.

⁷⁹ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 43:28, *PL* 191: 435B–436B.

⁸⁰ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 16:5, *PL* 191: 180C.

Christ's behavior gives man a model to follow, controls Peter's reconciliation of Augustine's moral reading of Psalm 54 and the Christological reading given by Cassiodorus, Jerome, Alcuin, and the *Glossa ordinaria*, at various points in this Psalm.⁸¹ Along the same lines, tropology and anagogy can be combined in different but compatible interpretations. At Psalm 110:10, Peter observes, Cassiodorus, Alcuin, Haimo, and the *Glossa ordinaria* read the praise of God referred to in the text as man's movement from fear of the Lord to wisdom in the present life, while Cassiodorus also sees it as the confession of praise offered to God by the saved in the life to come, when they are fully liberated from evil and can adore God eternally. These readings Peter clearly sees as complementary since they speak to two stages in man's life which the polysemous structure of the text itself is here addressing.⁸²

Peter also confronts cases where authorities disagree and where he finds a need to make choices between positions that cannot be reconciled. Sometimes his decisions are informed simply by common sense and the need for clarity. Thus, in his prologue to Psalm 104, he points out that, while both Augustine and Cassiodorus divide this Psalm into six parts, they make the divisions in different places. As he sees it, Cassiodorus does a better job of following the logic of the Psalm's argument in his subdivision than Augustine does, and this is his reason for following the former and rejecting the latter.⁸³ The authorities are not necessarily compatible in their interpretations of difficult lines, either. This is the case with Psalm 72:16. Commenting on the false happiness of the wicked, the Psalmist contrasts it with the afflictions he has undergone as he strives to follow the path of virtue. The comparison, he notes, is pointed, and poignant; and in the line in question the Psalmist says that this subject is one he has tried hard to understand, and that it was too difficult for him to grasp (*Existimabam ut cognoscerem hoc; labor est ante me*), at least until he considered the final destiny of the wicked and virtuous alike. What is the object, the *hoc*, referred to in this sentence? Peter points out that both Cassiodorus and Alcuin think that it means more than one thing. One reading is that it is the truth, and that the Psalmist is indicating that he possessed only the first grade of wisdom at the point when he applied this statement to himself. The same authorities, however, say that the line can also

⁸¹ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 51:1, 51:15, 54:25, *PL* 191: 509A–510A, 512A–513A, 517A.

⁸² Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 110:10, *PL* 191: 1008A–C.

⁸³ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 104 prologus, *PL* 191: 945D.

refer to foolish people who had debated against God and who have now been converted away from that practice. Peter himself is not taken by either of these opinions, finding the second, in particular, inappropriate (*inconueniens*). Instead, he moves to a different view, put forth by Augustine and Alcuin, which says that the Psalmist had vainly sought to understand God's justice and the fact that evil people sometimes enjoy earthly happiness. But now, he has put the matter of earthly requital behind him as a mystery that cannot be resolved in earthly terms, but only in the light of the posthumous outcome.⁸⁴ In this case, Peter's preference stems from his own desire to read the line lemmatized in the context of the argument of the Psalm as a whole. The third opinion reflects such a reading, and it thus makes better sense out of verse 16 than the decontextualized or irrelevant interpretations offered in the first two opinions cited. The fact that a single authority, Alcuin, has given all three readings as possible is an index of the fact that authorities are not always working at the top of their form in interpreting the Bible. They may need to be cited against themselves in the effort to discover the sense of the text.

In the examples just considered, Peter engages in a critique of some authoritative readings by showing that other authorities make a more convincing case for the alternative opinions they present. There are also instances in his Psalms commentary where he takes issue with authorities on his own account, disagreeing with them because, in his own view, they are in error. Thus, at Psalm 51:4, which states that God will destroy evil men in the end, remove them from their tabernacles, and root them out, Augustine, Cassiodorus, and the *Glossa ordinaria* understand the tabernacles to mean the secular vainglory of which God will deprive the wicked. Peter disagrees with this reading. In his view, the tabernacles refer to the church, in which the wheat and the tares are mingled in this life. Later on, God will purge the wicked from the church and save the good. Peter offers this interpretation as his own opinion, which he prefers because he thinks it makes better sense of the Psalm, read ecclesiologically, than the opinion of the authorities cited.⁸⁵

In the foregoing example, Peter's preference stems from his exegetical agenda. There are other cases in which his rejection of certain authorities is based on a difference in doctrinal outlook. One of his favorite authorities, Augustine, comes in for this kind of

⁸⁴ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 72:16, *PL* 191: 674A–675A.

⁸⁵ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 51:4, *PL* 191: 497B–D.

criticism on more than one occasion. In commenting on the Psalmist's hatred of lying at Psalm 5:6, Peter gives a reprise of Augustine's *Contra mendacium*, crisply repeating his definition of a lie, in that work, as a false statement made with the deliberate intention to deceive. But, while Augustine goes on to classify eight types of lies, of increasing seriousness, before ruling out the acceptability of lying for any reason at all, including, *a fortiori*, pious fraud, Peter takes a rather different tack. He distinguishes three, not eight, types of lies, and finds some lies permissible. One type is, precisely, the pious fraud, of the sort perpetrated by the Hebrew nurses in the book of Exodus who thereby managed to save the infant Moses from the wrath of Pharaoh. This deception he praises as prudent and legitimate, although he modifies this argument in the *Sentences*. A second type of lie he admits is one that Augustine defines not as a lie but as a falsehood told without blame, the joke or tall tale told merely to amuse, which deceives no one. Peter's third type of acceptable lie, however, is also one that Augustine flatly rejects. This occurs in a situation where a person remains silent when asked a question, answering which might cost him his life. This action, or failure to act, is acceptable, according to Peter, because the provocation is so extreme, and also because the person in question is not actually making a false statement.⁸⁶ For Augustine, on the other hand, silence can be equated both morally and semantically with speech. In circumstances when silence conveys an understood message or an understood response to the questioner, one can lie by remaining silent. Further, for Augustine, no provocation whatever justifies lying. In this case, then, Peter does not hesitate to take a far softer line on lying than Augustine does, on the grounds that Augustine's rigor is unrealistic and unacceptable.

Another area in which Peter joins some contemporary theologians in softening the harshness of Augustine's teaching is the morality of sexual relations in marriage. He has much more to say on this topic both in the *Collectanea* and in the *Sentences*, but his Psalms commentary already indicates the later directions of his thought. Like every other Christian thinker in his period, Peter was confronted by the Augustinian account of the transmission of original sin from parents to children through the unavoidable sexual feelings accompanying the procreation of offspring. In Augustine's case, this doctrine was linked to the opinion that the experience of lust itself was a consequence of original sin, which remained a part

⁸⁶ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 5:6, *PL* 191: 98A–D.

of human nature even in the case of Christian spouses redeemed by faith and baptism and joined in holy matrimony, a state in which he listed offspring as one of the goods of marriage which must not be frustrated. None the less, Augustine held that the sexual pleasure experienced by spouses was always tainted and at least venially sinful. Like many of his contemporaries, Peter wrestled with the perceived contradictions in this Augustinian doctrine. In addition, he felt a need to defend marriage, and the sexual relations leading to procreation, against the Catharist heresy. In glossing Psalm 50:6, "I was conceived in sin," he states his agreement with Augustine's account of the transmission of original sin. But, he takes sharp exception to the condemnation of the sexual relations of spouses as inevitably sinful. Not so, says Peter. These relations are exempted from sin because they serve the goods of marriage; and, in marriage, this work is chaste (*Nam hoc opus castum in conjunge*).⁸⁷

In looking at Peter as an exegete of the Psalms more generally, then, one can see in this maiden venture the earmarks of the scholastic theologian he was to become. One can also see his understanding of biblical exegesis as the training ground for the making of professional theologians, even though he did not, apparently, compose this gloss as a teaching text and lectured on the Psalms only at the end of his career in the classroom, at the instance of his pupils. The exegetical method he develops in this, his earliest work, sets him head and shoulders above the other available scholastic commentators on the Psalms in addressing the needs a non-monastic audience. While he stands in the tradition of the *Glossa ordinaria* and Gilbert of Poitiers, using many of their sources and ideas, the degree to which he handles his assignment differently is striking. First and most noticeably, he expands on Gilbert by providing an *accessus* to each Psalm as well as to the Book of Psalms as a whole, analyzing the argument in every Psalm, its rhetorical structure, and its role as an illustration of the overall themes informing the Book of Psalms in general, as well as its function as a unit in the particular subset of Psalms to which it belongs thematically and to which it is keyed. He then quotes and comments on each line of each Psalm, avoiding a hit-or-miss approach or an arbitrary selection of lemmata. His use of authorities goes beyond that of his immediate predecessors, both in depth, range, thoroughness, and pertinence. He is concerned with presenting and citing their views fully, and without ellipsis. He is eager to explore their reasoning, using it to open up

⁸⁷ Peter Lombard, *In Ps.* 50:6, *PL* 191: 487D–488A.

theological reflection rather than to terminate it with an *ipse dixit*. He notes the areas where the authorities disagree. Sometimes he shows that they can be reconciled, as speaking to the moral or the typological levels which, he agrees, the text possesses, or to different but complementary aspects of a single problem. At the same time, he accepts the fact that some disagreements are not capable of being reconciled. When this is the case, he offers his own reasonable suggestions for why one opinion should be preferred to another. His criterion is generally to prefer the opinion that makes the most sense out of the text. He does not hesitate to reformulate or reject an authority whose views fail to square with Peter's own theological opinions. There are a few places where Peter brings the *artes* to bear on exegesis and where he reflects on the problems deriving from textual variations and corruptions. But his chief goal, consistent with his moral, Christological, and ecclesiological reading of the Psalms, is to work out an ethical and dogmatic theology on such topics as the nature of Christ, on human nature, especially man as the image of God, on virtue, vice, sin, and the sacramental remedies for it in penance and marriage. These topics link his exegetical ruminations on the Psalms with his later work as a systematic theologian, whether he retains his early views or modifies them in the light of his ongoing research and reflection.

In all these respects, Peter's commentary on the Psalms lays a foundation for his commentary on the Pauline Epistles, a work which provides a still more acute index of his achievement as a scholastic exegete, in an area where the competition was more abundant and in which the theological stakes were considerably higher. In this exegetical field, many more of the entrants were scholastic than monastic writers. In this field, as well, the differences in approach between authors in these two professions are even more sharply etched than is the case with the exegesis of Psalms. Briefly put, monastic commentators on St. Paul approach him with precisely the same goals in view as they bring to the Psalms. While they do not fail to note the doctrinal points made by the apostle, their chief concern is Paul's ethical teaching and the inculcation in their monastic readers of the devotional attitudes suitable to their calling. Two such monastic authors, William of St. Thierry and Hervaeus of Bourg-Dieu, illustrate well the range of monastic approaches to Pauline exegesis found in Peter Lombard's day.

PAULINE EXEGESIS: THE MONASTIC APPROACH

William's gloss on Romans 3:27, "piety is the true wisdom" (*pietas est vera sapientia*)⁸⁸ is the theme song of his entire commentary. Written between 1138 and 1145, this work takes specific issue with the scholastics, personified for William by Peter Abelard, whom he does not name but whom he clearly identifies with the wisdom of the worldly philosophers, the profane novelties, and the vain presumption which he writes in order to repress. His introduction recognizes that many theological questions have arisen, in his time, out of the text of Romans. His objective, as he puts it, is not to enter into these debates, debates concerning matters that transcend the human mind, but rather to quell them with ammunition drawn from the fathers, above all Augustine. Adhering to the most authoritative sources in the tradition, which he in no sense seeks to put to the test, he plans to rephrase them in his own words, without indicating which source he is citing. William pointedly notes, as well, that he will refrain from decorating his work with references to the poets and the fabulists. He wants merely to write in all humility for the sake of stirring up the reader's piety, reinforcing this aim with a prayer offered up to God as he concludes these prefatory remarks.⁸⁹

Both the style of the commentary which follows and William's exegetical emphasis carry forth this announced project. In a homiletic and repetitive vein, interlarded with pious ejaculations, he passes lightly over the more speculative doctrines of Paul in Romans and lets the weight of his commentary fall on the moral corollaries which he sees as flowing from Paul's teaching on justification. Given these purposes, William feels that he can dispense with a general introduction providing an *accessus* to Romans, and moves ahead without further ado to the glossing of every line. His emphasis can clearly be seen in his handling of some of this epistle's most famous passages. In glossing Romans 1:19, for instance, where the apostle states that the invisible things of God can be known through the creation, William makes no effort to enter into a positive discussion of the scope and character of natural theology. Indeed, this is a subject that he wants to ventilate as little as possible. The message he wants to convey in his comment on this line is that, given what Paul has said, the gentiles cannot be

⁸⁸ William of St. Thierry, *Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos* 3:27, *PL* 180: 579D.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, praefatio, *PL* 180: 547A–548D.

excused for failing to know and to do what is morally correct.⁹⁰ Continuing, he takes sharp issue with the philosophers who claim that they can discover God's eternity, immutability, intelligence, intelligibility, wisdom, and truth through a rational examination of the creation,⁹¹ in a diatribe that completely loses touch with Paul's positive statement in this passage. Unlike Paul, William wants to argue that men can come to a knowledge of God only through grace, and not through an inspection of nature, a position that leads him to skew Paul's own argument. At the same time, William wants to inspire moral conversion in his audience. This goal leads him to focus repeatedly on a constellation of ideas concerning moral choice and moral behavior. He accents the point that inner intention is more important than external ethical action, that sin and virtue lie in consent, that the faith that justifies is the faith that works in love, that God expects man to cooperate with Him in the working out of his salvation.⁹² Despite William's heavy reliance on Augustine, the moral theology with which he emerges emphasizes human free will much more than either Paul or Augustine does, in his effort to stress the moral responsibilities of his readers and in his desire to exemplify, in his own person, the teacher's proper role of consolation and exhortation.⁹³

It is true that William's place in the theological debates of his time and his zealous attack on Abelard may account for the special pleading that distorts his reading of Romans. Our second monastic example, Hervaeus of Bourg-Dieu (ca. 1080–ca. 1150) was a figure less in the limelight, who had less of a public image to defend. His commentary on Romans may thus be used to gain a sense of what a more standard and less tendentious monastic exegesis of that epistle would convey. The exact date of his work is not known, but it clearly post-dates the Pauline commentaries of Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard, because Hervaeus makes use of their introductory remarks in his own *accessus*. As with these scholastic exegetes, Hervaeus explains why the Epistle to the Romans is the first epistle given in the New Testament, although it was not the first one written by Paul. He observes that Paul wrote it, along with his other epistles, to instruct and remind the newly founded churches about the gospel. Other than that, he does not expatiate on the

⁹⁰ Ibid., 1:19, *PL* 180: 558C.

⁹¹ Ibid., 1:24, *PL* 180: 558D–560B.

⁹² Ibid., 3:20, 3:24–25, 3:38, 7:19, 7:22, 8:27–30, 12:1–2, *PL* 180: 577D, 578D, 581A–B, 621A–C, 622A–B, 640A, 669C–672A.

⁹³ Ibid., 12:4–7, *PL* 180: 672C–674C.

particular circumstances in the Roman church to which Paul speaks here, unlike both Abelard and the Lombard. While he notices that faith is a main theme of this epistle, this fact is less important to him than the moral consequences of belief. Paul, in his estimation, wrote to teach the Romans "how they should live and believe" (*quomodo vivant et credant*).⁹⁴ But faith is only the foundation of the virtues. The final cause of the epistle is morals, the conducting of the contemporary twelfth-century audience to beatitude. For this reason it is less important, for Hervaeus, to try to contextualize Paul's message in his own time, for the community to which he wrote, than it is to extract from the epistle the general features of his ethical teaching, which apply to the present, so that current readers will receive ethical guidance.⁹⁵

Hervaeus is even less forthcoming than William in referring to patristic authorities and, like him, is completely uninterested in indicating that their readings may disagree. He chooses what he wants from the exegetical tradition, without naming his sources, and weaves this material seamlessly into his own commentary, presenting it as his own opinion. His chief stylistic tactic is repetition, hammering in his points over and over again with references drawn from other books of the Bible to aid the reader's reflection. Like William, he shies away from dogmatic speculation and looks primarily for the moral message that can be extracted from the Pauline text. In handling the *invisibilia dei* passage, for instance, Hervaeus acknowledges that natural reason can discern, by means of the creation, that the creator is eternal and omnipotent. God is known best, he adds, through his noblest creation, man, although this knowledge is not sufficient for salvation. The main point he wants to make in glossing this passage is not to specify the relations between reason and revelation. Nor is his main goal to consider either the modes of human knowledge or the analogies of the deity in nature and man. Rather, he wants to stress that, given man's dignity, his fall, and his redemption, man should strive for the highest good.⁹⁶ Throughout his commentary, the moral theology developed by Hervaeus is largely unexceptional. Although he tends to read Paul on the flesh and the spirit in a more dualistic manner than the sense of the text might indicate, he offers a generic, and even a banal, exhortation to moral activism that depresses Paul's

⁹⁴ Hervaeus of Bourg-Dieu, *In Epistolam ad Romanos* praefatio, *PL* 181: 594A.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, *PL* 181: 595A–596C.

⁹⁶ Hervaeus of Bourg-Dieu, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 1:19–24, *PL* 181: 609B–611C.

emphasis on faith and that largely avoids the complexities in his treatment of grace and free will.

PAULINE EXEGESIS AMONG THE LOMBARD'S SCHOLASTIC
PREDECESSORS AND CONTEMPORARIES AND THE LOMBARD'S
COLLECTANEA

In turning from the monastic commentators on Paul to the scholastic predecessors and contemporaries of the Lombard, we find ourselves in an environment where it was seen as necessary to associate Pauline exegesis with a different set of concerns and to approach Paul with a different exegetical method. For, in the eyes of the scholastics, Paul, more than any other New Testament writer, was both a source of Christian doctrine and the first major interpreter of it. In addition to being a model theologian, he was an authority who conveyed the Christian message differently to the different communities to which he had preached. Hence, he had not always written with the same emphasis, and he needed the help of other resources in his interpretation. More than any other biblical author, therefore, Paul was a test case for the development of hermeneutical strategies that could, at the same time, clarify his own theology, sort out the tradition of Pauline commentary and extract what was truly helpful, and use the findings so obtained as a foundation for theological speculation and construction. In grasping why Peter Lombard's *Collectanea* was deemed by other scholastic theologians of his century to have met the challenges posed by Pauline exegesis better than any other, we will need to compare it, as we have done with his Psalms commentary, with other scholastic exegeses of Paul available in his time. Similarly, our target period will be ca. 1115 to ca. 1160. In so doing, we will consider four main areas. First, there is the physical format and presentation of the material in the commentary itself. Next, there is the exegete's address to the text, how he discovers what Paul has said and how he introduces the text to his readers. Thirdly, we will consider the exegete's solution of problems in the text and his handling of authorities in so doing. And, finally, we will assay the way in which Pauline exegesis serves as a means by which the author develops his own theological outlook.

The physical format of the *Collectanea* is, initially, its most noticeable feature, especially if one comes to it after examining other Pauline commentaries of the period. Commentators at this time typically used, in some combination, the continuous or running commentary, the gloss on individual words or phrases, and the

theological question drawn from the text for more extended discussion.⁹⁷ In most cases the gloss and the question hold pride of place, threatening to usurp the continuous commentary and even to ignore the text of the epistle itself. To make use of such works, the reader has to have a copy of Paul along with the commentary, in order to see how, or whether, the glosses or questions are related to the sense of the epistle. In contrast, Peter gives the reader Paul's entire text, quoted in coherent subdivisions. He begins by offering a running commentary on each of these subdivisions, before lemmatizing individual passages he wants to gloss or developing theological questions. He thus offers a better balance than any exegete of his time between the general need for an understanding of Paul's argument and the more technical requirements of scholastic readers.⁹⁸ The only contemporary exegete of Paul who also quotes chunks of the apostle's text before adding his own analysis is Hervaeus of Bourg-Dieu. But, as we have noted, Hervaeus wrote after Peter Lombard and may well have derived this idea from him.

Also, as we have seen above, Hervaeus is not interested in positioning his reading of Paul in the tradition of patristic and more recent commentary. In this respect as well the *Collectanea* has a format that makes it much easier to use than its competitors. From the *Glossa ordinaria* to Robert of Melun's *Quaestiones de epistolis Pauli*, most exegetes use the "*usque ad*" technique of Florus of Lyon to cite their authorities, offering only the first and the last few words of the quotation. Thus, the citation is a mere finding tool. In order to use it, the reader has to have a library as extensive as that of the exegete. On the other hand, Peter gives either a complete quotation of the passage cited, or a detailed paraphrase of it, so that the reader can follow Peter's argument without having to look up references at every turn. In making both Paul and the authorities adduced fully available to the reader, the *Collectanea*, as a commentary, is a one-stop operation. And, from the very earliest manuscripts, the information is displayed visually in the manner just described. Its format alone thus makes the *Collectanea*, physically, the most usable work of Pauline exegesis of the period.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Gustave Bardy, "La littérature patristique des '*Quaestiones et responses*' sur l'Écriture sainte," *Revue biblique* 41 (1932): 210-36, 341-69, 515-37; 42 (1934): 14-30; Bernardo C. Bazán, "La *quaestio disputata*," in *Les Genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales: Définition, critique et exploitation* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1982), pp. 33-34; Lobrichon, "Une nouveauté," pp. 93-114; Smalley, *Study*, pp. 42-86; Ceslaus Spicq, *Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen âge* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1944), pp. 62-108.

⁹⁸ Lobrichon, "Une nouveauté," pp. 109-10.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Closely related to Peter's responsiveness to the needs of readers in this respect is his desire to present the epistle as a text, and Paul as an author, whose aims and strategies of argument require explanation if the reader is going to grasp the epistle's sense. Now, all twelfth-century exegetes possessed the brief introductions to the books of the Bible, including the Pauline epistles, provided by Jerome. Many of them, like the authors of the *Glossa ordinaria*, are content merely to repeat these potted introductions. The Lombard aligns himself with another group of exegetes, including Peter Abelard, who instead supply their own elaborate *accessus ad Paulum*, using the same approach as other scholars of the time to the texts they sought to interpret.¹⁰⁰ While Abelard and the Lombard share this taste, and while they indeed cover much of the same ground in their assessment of the circumstances in which Paul had written, the nature of Paul's audience, and the subdivisions of his argument, the Lombard stands out for the degree to which he lets his *accessus* control his actual reading of the text. For his part, Abelard tends to forget his introductory remarks almost at once, rushing off onto a host of peculiarly Abelardian theological tangents in the body of his commentary, many of which have only the most tenuous connection with the agenda of Romans, the one Pauline epistle which he glosses, as he has outlined it. This fact makes it clear that Abelard's real reason for studying Romans is to use Paul *ex post facto* to support some of the idiosyncratic and controversial positions which he had already taken.¹⁰¹

This same approach influenced two other mid-century scholastic exegetes, Robert of Melun and the anonymous Abelardian author

¹⁰⁰ On this development in general, see Edwin A. Quain, "The Medieval *Accessus ad auctores*," *Traditio* 3 (1945): 215–64, who makes passing reference to exegetes on p. 261 nn. 1 and 2. More recent treatments which include discussions of *accessus* to books of the Bible in the twelfth century include Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship*, ch. 1–2 and Minnis and Scott, ed., *Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism*, pp. 69–71, although both confine themselves to Peter's commentary on the Psalms without discussing his Pauline glosses. For the Lombard on St. Paul, see Marcia L. Colish, "From *sacra pagina* to *theologia*: Peter Lombard as an Exegete of Romans," *Medieval Perspectives* 6 (1991): 1–19; "Peter Lombard as an Exegete of St. Paul," in *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, ed. Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 71–92.

¹⁰¹ Peter Abelard, *Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* prologus 1.1, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert in Peter Abelard, *Opera theologica*, CCCM 11–13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969–87), 11: 43–55 for the *accessus* and Abelard's other introductory remarks. His departures from this agenda in the body of the work have been noted by Buytaert, *ibid.*, pp. 17–20; Rolf Peppermüller, *Abaelards Auslegung des Römerbriefes*, Beiträge, n.F. 10 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972), pp. 10–24.

of the text known as the *Commentarius Cantabrigdensis*. Both know, and use, the Abelardian and Lombardian *accessus*. And, both follow Abelard's lead in presenting it and then abandoning it in the pursuit of their own theological excursions, some of which drift perilously far from the Pauline mainland. To be sure, Peter also makes excursions of his own in his theological questions on the Pauline epistles. But he is careful to root them in Paul's context and to steer the reader firmly back to Paul when he is finished. Peter's treatment of exegesis as a primarily rhetorical assignment in this sense reflects his desire to present Paul to his readers as a working theologian, and not just as a source of theological raw materials.

This commitment also requires, for Peter, an understanding of Paul in his own time and place, and a literal reading of his text. It must be stressed here that it was the scholastic exegetes, such as Peter, who were chiefly concerned with retrieving a literal and historical reading of the text. This point may require some insistence, because the prevailing views on this subject still rely heavily on the work of scholars who have paid it inadequate attention. For instance, Henri DeLubac and Ceslaus Spicq stress the pervasiveness of the taste for a polysemous reading of the Bible in the twelfth century, and ignore or soft-pedal those forms of exegesis which do not fit into this mold.¹⁰² The impulse toward literal exegesis is credited by Beryl Smalley to the Victorines.¹⁰³ But, in giving them the credit, she pays insufficient attention to two facts. The first is that the literalism of the Victorines, their quest for the *hebraica veritas*, was confined to the Old Testament; it did not extend systematically to the New Testament. And second, they sought to recover the historical sense of Scripture not for the purpose of doctrinal analysis but in order to build a contemplative superstructure on top of that foundation.¹⁰⁴ A partial corrective to the traditional picture of twelfth-century exegesis has been supplied by Marie-Dominique Chenu and Gillian Evans, who accent the ways in which scholastic exegetes imported into their work the technical contributions of

¹⁰² Henri DeLubac, *Exégèse médiévale: Les quatre sens de l'écriture*, 2 parts 1-2 (Paris: Aubier, 1961-64); Spicq, *Esquisse*, pp. 70-71; "Pourquoi le moyen âge n'a-t-il pas davantage pratiqué l'exégèse littérale?" *RSPT* 30 (1941-42): 169-79.

¹⁰³ Smalley, *Study*, pp. xvii, xxi, 83-195.

¹⁰⁴ Grover A. Zinn, "Historia fundamentum est: The Role of History in the Contemplative Life according to Hugh of St. Victor," in *Contemporary Reflections on the Medieval Christian Tradition: Essays in Honor of Ray C. Petry*, ed. George H. Schriver (Durham: Duke University Press, 1974), pp. 138-44, 146-58. See also Châtillon, "La Bible," pp. 186-88, 194.

their colleagues in the liberal arts.¹⁰⁵ But this style of exegesis might, or might not, associate itself with a primary interest in the literal or historical level of the Pauline text. On the other hand, the scholastics wanted to grasp the literal sense of Paul's teaching because they wanted to use it as a basis, and a model, for dogmatic speculation and construction. Their interest in the historical setting in which Paul had written derived largely from their perception that this background was a help in understanding what he had said, and also from their desire to place Paul in historical perspective as a means of contextualizing his teachings. It was the scholastic exegetes, and above all Peter Lombard, who promoted this idea in its most widespread form, as an adjunct to getting their Pauline theology straight.

In this connection, too, Peter's reading of Paul is striking in comparison with that of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. The *Glossa ordinaria* offers a no-frills summary of Paul, or, at least, of those lines which the glossator lemmatizes; but he sometimes gives Paul a polysemous reading. The glossator is generally content to rephrase what Paul, or some patristic reader of Paul, has said, in his own words, and rarely goes much farther.¹⁰⁶ Gilbert of Poitiers, whose glosses on Paul date to ca. 1130, is even more consistently interested in connecting the literal and allegorical senses of the text.¹⁰⁷ And, while independent in other respects, Abelard's commentary on Romans, dated provisionally to the years 1135–39, does not depart from the Laon tradition on this point.¹⁰⁸ By contrast, apart from a single passage in 2 Thessalonians on the Antichrist, the Lombard's exposition of Paul pays rigorous attention to the letter and to the historical context of each Pauline epistle.

The most sustained example of the Lombard's contextualization

¹⁰⁵ Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 329–37, 344–45; Evans, *Language and Logic*, passim.

¹⁰⁶ Evans, *Language and Logic*, pp. 41–47.

¹⁰⁷ Vincenzo Miano, "Il Commento alle Lettere di S. Paolo di Gilberto Porretano," in *Scholastica: Ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome: Pontificum Athenaeum Antonianum, 1951), pp. 171–78; Maurice Simon, "La Glose de l'épître aux Romains de Gilbert de la Porrée," *RHE* 52 (1957): 68–70. For the date of this work, see Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta*, pp. 57–58; Maioli, *Gilberto Porreta*, pp. xxxiii. I have not inspected the manuscripts myself.

¹⁰⁸ Damien Van den Eynde, "Les écrits perdus d'Abélard," *Antonianum* 37 (1962): 468; confirmed by Buytaert, CCCM 11: 16; Peppermüller, *Abaelards Auslegung*, p. 10; "Exegetische Traditionen und theologische Neuansätze in Abaelards Kommentar zum Römerbrief," in *Peter Abelard*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), pp. 117–19. For the date, see Buytaert, CCCM 11: xxii–xv.

of Paul is his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. As with previous scholastic commentators on this text, he reprises Jerome's brief introduction, which observes that Paul wrote to a group of converts from Judaism, that he wrote in Hebrew not in Greek, and that he attacked the vice of pride. The *Glossa ordinaria* stops there, and it is only at verse 7:8, where the apostle refers to Melchisedech and the Levites, that the glossator makes any effort to connect Paul's actual argument to this stated agenda.¹⁰⁹ For his part, Peter takes the argument of Jerome found in the *Glossa ordinaria* as his starting point but goes on from there, with a full and detailed introduction of his own, in which he emphasizes the point that Paul's whole strategy in Hebrews is to remind the Jewish converts of the Old Testament events and prophecies which have been fulfilled in the revelation of Christ. Peter urges that Paul is, indeed, the author of Hebrews even though his salutation in this epistle differs in style from those prefacing his other epistles, notably by omitting reference to his name and his status as an apostle. This tactic, according to Peter, is a deliberate omission on his part. Following Jerome, he observes that Paul was sensitive to the fact that his name was hateful to the Jews. Hence, he does not identify himself, lest this opinion prevent his readers from profiting from his message. Likewise, Paul's omission of his status as apostle is designed to teach a lesson in humility, since the major thrust of the epistle is that faith is sufficient, and that the Jewish converts cannot pride themselves on their former status as the chosen people or on their observance of the ceremonial law. Peter notes as well that Paul has written this epistle in Hebrew, and that it displays a style more eloquent than in his other epistles (*et longe splendidiore et facundiore stylo quam aliae resplendeat*). This fluency is attributable to the fact that Hebrew is his native language. As Peter observes, the apostle's overall strategy in Hebrews is to emphasize the connections between the truths adumbrated in the Old Testament and those perfected in the New, "as if there, as a shadow, and here, as the truth" (*quasi ibi umbra, hic veritas*).¹¹⁰

This preface sets the stage for Peter's thoroughly typological analysis of Paul's Old Testament references. Conscious of the fact that this is Paul's own tactic, he amplifies on it himself. At Hebrews 1:8–12 and again at 1:12–14 he weaves additional quotations from

¹⁰⁹ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 4: *Epistola ad Hebraeos* praefatio; PL 114: 643A, 655A–B.

¹¹⁰ Peter Lombard, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos* argument, 1.1–7, PL 192: 399A–401A: The quotations are at 400B and 401A respectively.

the Psalms into the main body of Paul's text, and combines them with other Old Testament passages that bolster the apostle's own technique of argument.¹¹¹ At chapters 7 and 8 Peter explores in detail the parallels between Melchisedech and Christ and between the Levitical priesthood and the Christian priesthood, accenting as well the superiority of the latter in that it is not confined to any one tribe or group; further, the sacrifice of Christ is greater than the sacrifices offered by the Old Testament priests in that it is the sacrifice of God's own son for the whole human race, rather than the sacrifice of a purely created being for a limited community.¹¹² Throughout, and responsive to Paul's intentions, Peter preserves a balance between the continuities linking the old and new covenants and the consummation of the former in the latter. For its part, the *Glossa ordinaria* makes no comment on why Paul interlards his argument with references to the Psalms and other passages from the Old Testament and tends to emphasize the differences between the two covenants while omitting their continuities.

There are two coevals of Peter who, although they paraphrase his introductory remarks, ignore the Pauline agenda which those remarks announce, in their actual handling of the text. The Abelardian author of a commentary on the Pauline epistles called the *Commentarius Cantabrigdensis*, produced between 1141 and 1153, alludes to Paul's main theme in passing only twice, in a gloss otherwise notable primarily for the heavy attention it pays to dogmatic matters and for its unusual number of digressions and irrelevancies. Glossing Hebrews 5, he asks how the Old Testament sacrifices remitted sin. On Abelard's authority, he responds that they did so only partially, saving their practitioners from Hell and assigning them to Purgatory instead. What he really wants to talk about are the differences between these two posthumous states. Similarly, he argues, circumcision, even in its own time, was less efficacious than baptism in the Christian dispensation. The author goes on to note that Christ received both rites even though He needed neither. In these passages, the relations between the Old and New Testaments stressed by Paul slip away into discussions of Last Things and Christology which are not germane to Paul's argument in this context.¹¹³ The author's only other effort to re-

¹¹¹ Ibid., PL 192: 410C–414A.

¹¹² Ibid., PL 192: 447B–460C.

¹¹³ In *Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, in *Commentarius Cantabrigdensis in Epistolas Pauli e schola Petri Abaelardi*, ed. Artur Michael Landgraf, 4 vols. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1937–45), 4: 724–25, 734. On the dating of this commentary, see Landgraf's analysis, 1: xv.

spond to Paul's agenda is also found in his gloss on the same chapter. How, he asks, are we to understand the idea that Abraham is our father in faith? The question suggests to him the idea that faith, not circumcision, was salvific in Old Testament times since some men, like Abraham, were saved by their faith before circumcision was instituted. So far, so good. But, from this point he moves to an idea which Paul could not have addressed, a critique of monks who devote their wits to the praise of poverty, from which he segues to a recapitulation of the *aut liberi aut libri* topos as treated by Jerome and Theophrastus. This batch of apparent *non sequiturs* is loosely strung together and connected to Paul by the thought that people should do whatever they do for the right moral reasons, not for reasons that may be externally applauded or condemned, a conclusion which the glossator caps with a quotation from Jerome which is actually a citation of Gregory the Great.¹¹⁴ As this passage illustrates, Abelard was not always fortunate in his disciples. Nor, in this case, is Paul or the reader seeking to discover his concerns in Hebrews.

Another exegete of Hebrews in our target group is Robert of Melun, whose commentary on Paul dates to ca. 1145–55 and who draws on both the Lombard and on Abelard. Robert's interests stray even farther from Paul's text than do those of the Cambridge commentator. He raises only two questions that even touch on it, the comparison between Melchisedech and Christ and the sense in which Abraham is our father in faith. His treatment of the first question is extremely abbreviated, both as a comparison and as a contrast, while he fails to take Paul's point about the second. Discussing how various *figurae* can be understood as descent from the loins of Abraham, Robert treats the connection between Abraham and the rest of mankind physically, not in terms of faith. Robert's chief concern here is how this connection can be true of Christ since Christ lacked original sin, which is transmitted physically through the loins of the parents.¹¹⁵ With this problem we drift perilously far both from Paul's subject matter and his meaning. While Robert's commentary is replete with other debates and questions, none of them bears any particular relationship to the text of Hebrews.

The glossing of Paul's Epistle to the Romans also supplies good

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 4: 738–41.

¹¹⁵ Robert of Melun, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, in *Quaestiones de Epistolis Pauli*, ed. Raymond-M. Martin (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1938), pp. 302–04. For the date, see Martin's analysis, pp. lvi–lvii.

examples of Peter's willingness to let a literal and historical reading of the text, as well as Paul's own theme, direct his theological reflections on it, in a manner that stands out from that of other contemporary exegetes. His sense of Paul's agenda in this epistle enables him to connect passages of Romans often treated as separate items by other commentators. Peter recognizes that they are related to each other in Paul's argument. Connected passages, which he reads conjointly in this way, are Paul's injunctions on obedience to worldly authority in Romans 13:1–6¹¹⁶ and his criticisms of chambering and wantonness later in that chapter and of Jewish dietary practices in chapter 14.¹¹⁷ The *Glossa ordinaria* deals with Romans 13:1–6 in an extremely perfunctory manner, simply restating Paul's advice in the form of a deductive syllogism and adding Augustine's idea that rulers must be obeyed as a punishment for sin.¹¹⁸ Abelard turns this portion of his commentary into a mini-treatise on political theory, designed to defend the subject's right to resist a tyrant, defined as a usurper, who therefore lacks divine authorization.¹¹⁹ The fact that Paul is neither advocating nor even considering the rights of subjects in this passage escapes Abelard's attention. Robert of Melun focuses his attention on another non-Pauline concern, the distinction between secular and ecclesiastical authority.¹²⁰ So does the Victorine author of the *Quaestiones et decisiones in Epistolas divi Pauli*, dating to the years 1155–65, in raising the question, which he fails to answer, of whether a ruler should be obeyed if his commands contravene the will of God.¹²¹

Apart from introducing issues that had not been on Paul's mind in Romans, none of these exegetes tries to explain what Paul's advice on rulership is doing in this particular epistle. The reverse is the case with the Lombard. He sees Paul's main goal in this passage as the repression of pride and the inculcation of humility, which is part of the wider message of Romans.¹²² Paul is here

¹¹⁶ Peter Lombard, *In Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 13:1–6, *PL* 191: 1503D–1506C.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 13:13–14, 14:1–3, *PL* 191: 1510B–1513A.

¹¹⁸ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 4: *Epistola ad Romanos* 13:1–6; *PL* 114: 512C.

¹¹⁹ Peter Abelard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 13:1. *CCCM* 11: 286.

¹²⁰ Robert of Melun, *In Epistolam ad Romanos* 13:1 in *Quaest. de Ep. Pauli*, pp. 152–54.

¹²¹ *Quaestiones et decisiones in Epistolas divi Pauli* q. 299–301, *PL* 175: 505A–C.

¹²² Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* prologus, 13:1–6, *PL* 191: 1300C–1302A, 1503D–1506C. Affeldt, *Die weltliche Gewalt*, pp. 139–46, 153–66, 189–98, does not distinguish adequately between the Lombard's handling of this text and that of his immediate predecessors and successors.

addressing the men who wield authority as well as their subjects. Rulers, he notes, are being enjoined by the apostle to acknowledge their dependence on God and their responsibilities to their subjects. They have a divine mandate; and they will be held accountable for the way they exercise it. Subjects are being enjoined to patience and obedience, in recognition of the fact that rulers have to punish evildoers. On both sides, Peter observes, Paul is talking about duties, not rights. In particular, Paul is emphasizing the need for concord within the Roman Christian community, composed as it is of both pagan and Jewish converts. Whatever their origins, the members of the Roman church should live in harmony under their leaders, whichever element happens to be represented more strongly in the leadership; and the leaders should govern without fear or favor toward one group or another in the community.

Peter then goes on to read Paul's advice about feasting and foodstuffs in the next section of Romans as a follow-up of the apostle's more general teaching on community relations. Peter gets the idea that Paul's views on eating in Romans are conditioned by the needs of the pagan and Jewish converts from the *Glossa ordinaria*¹²³ and goes on from there. *Roma la golosa* was evidently alive and well in the first century A.D., he points out, and the apostle was well aware of that fact. His attack on overindulgence in food and drink is thus aimed specifically at the formerly pagan Romans; he urges them instead to make their natural needs the measure of their intake and, otherwise, to treat food medicinally. For Paul, the Jewish converts also have their own culturally induced blind spot with respect to food, and he directs his remarks about the supersession of the Mosaic dietary laws to them. In commenting on these passages Peter is concise and to the point. He is concerned only with linking Paul's advice to both segments of the Roman community to each other and to the wider theme of Romans. On the other hand, other twelfth-century exegetes of Romans tend to get sidetracked by this part of the epistle. Abelard uses his exegesis of Romans 13:13 to flaunt his knowledge of Ovid as an authority on the connection between feasting, drinking, and sexual excess.¹²⁴ On the Jewish dietary laws, he brings forward an irrelevant comparison of authorities who disagree on the propriety of eating the flesh of animals used in pagan sacrifices.¹²⁵ Paul does take up that subject, but not in Romans 14. Although the

¹²³ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 4: *Ep. ad Romanos* 13:13; PL 114: 514B.

¹²⁴ Peter Abelard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 13:13, CCCM 11: 295.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 14:23, CCCM 11: 307–11.

Cambridge commentator does not gloss that theme in Romans, he does, at length, in his commentary on 1 Timothy. Picking up on the point that food should be used medicinally, he considers how various authorities have classified foods in this respect. He is fascinated and bewildered by the fact that Ambrose listed garlic as a medicine, not as a food. After wrestling with this point for some time, he concludes that Ambrose's bizarre tastes are a consequence of his Lombard origins.¹²⁶ This is, no doubt, a fascinating window into the world of medieval gastronomic trivia. But it cannot be said that this commentator, or Abelard either, has shed much light on why Paul is interested in food in Romans, in contrast with Peter Lombard.

Peter's consistent interest in contextualizing Paul and in allowing Paul's goals and rhetorical strategies to control his own interpretation does not mean that Peter regards a literal and historical reconstruction of Paul as his sole obligation. There is another dimension to Peter's handling of Paul which must be appreciated, the application of historical criticism to Paul as a biblical writer. As we have noted above, both canonists and theologians in the early twelfth century were developing historical and other modes of criticism as it attached to patristic and other post-biblical authorities in the effort to ascertain how weighty their authority was, how generally it had been intended, and the degree to which it could be magnified or relativized in aid of contemporary needs and debates. What is less well known is the fact that exegetes such as the Lombard were willing to extend the same kind of criticism to Paul himself. In so doing, they show a keen sense of the changes which the church had undergone over the centuries, changes in its beliefs and doctrinal emphases no less than changes in its institutions. Like others in this group, Peter accepts this phenomenon of change, not necessarily as a sad departure from the apostolic age held up as a timeless norm, but rather as a natural development, and one that permits us to see that what made sense in the *ecclesia primitiva* may not be appropriate in the here and now. Peter's historical criticism of Paul, in this sense, partakes more of the contemporary theologians' "moderns versus ancients" conception of the primitive church than it reflects the canonists' desire to modernize or reinvent the primitive church as an ideal. A few examples will serve to illustrate this point.

To begin with, there are cases in which Peter treats develop-

¹²⁶ *In primam Epistolam ad Timotheum* 4:34, in *Comm. Cant.*, 3: 579.

ments in church history simply as facts we need to know in order to understand what Paul is saying, in a manner fairly neutral with respect to Paul's authority. Thus, in commenting on the apostle's warning against building doctrine on false foundations in Romans 15:15–22, Peter observes that Paul was referring here to the pseudoapostolic tradition and the apocrypha, which had not yet been weeded out of the biblical tradition, since Paul wrote prior to the establishment of the canon of Scripture.¹²⁷ Another comparatively neutral historical *scholium*, but one suggesting the transitoriness of the church's institutional arrangements, is Peter's discussion of the women whom Paul addresses or refers to in his epistles, as exercising a leadership role in the church, and his reaction to Paul's countervailing rule that women remain silent in church. In commenting on this apparent contradiction at 1 Corinthians 14:34–40, he sees the injunction to silence as conditioned, for this particular community, by the apostle's desire to correct moral and doctrinal error which had been spread by the teaching of women immediately before his composition of the epistle. Here, then, Paul's rule is a tactic designed to correct a local abuse and is not a general prohibition. Customs of this type, Peter concludes, are not fixed, in contrast to the substance of the gospels.¹²⁸

The silence of women recurs in 1 Timothy 2:12–15, and here it is a theme which Peter orchestrates rather differently. In this passage, he accounts for Paul's rule as a corollary of the subjection of wives to husbands as a punishment for original sin. But his main point is to criticize Paul, who goes on to say that women can none the less be saved through childbearing. Peter regards this claim as ludicrous. He does not hesitate to explain why. Like men, he observes, women will be saved by their faith, their love, and their persistence in virtue, whether they are married or single, fruitful or barren. Childbearing cannot be regarded as salvific, since it is a natural biological function found in women as such regardless of their beliefs. At 1 Timothy 3:5–6, Peter notes that Paul himself had no objection to the then-current practice of ordaining women as deacons, a fact which Peter then uses to undercut the apostle's apparent relegation of women to purely domestic roles.¹²⁹ It might

¹²⁷ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos*, PL 191: 1524C.

¹²⁸ Peter Lombard, *In I Epistolam ad Corinthios*, PL 191: 1672B–C.

¹²⁹ Peter Lombard, *In I Epistolam ad Timotheum* 2:12–15, 3:5–6, PL 192: 340A–342C, 345D–346A. The moral equality of the sexes in the Christian life is a point he also makes at *In Epistolam ad Colossenses* 3:6–17, PL 192: 282D–283A.

be noted, as a footnote to the Lombard's exegesis of 1 Timothy, that the Cambridge commentator enthusiastically endorses his critique of Paul on women. Yoking it with an opinion of Abelard's, he amplifies Peter's point about female leadership in the church by observing that abbesses nowadays perform functions similar to those of the female deacons of Paul's time; and, furthermore, abbesses fitly exercise the teaching office in the church.¹³⁰ This argument, like Peter's, uses historical criticism to point up Paul's apparent inconsistency. The argument underscores the exegete's own preference for one aspect of Paul's teaching, seen as normal to Paul, over another, seen as an aberration from that norm, bringing to bear on the text the fact that institutions and the rules governing women, in this case, do change, and appropriately, over time.

There are two other contexts, marriage and the coming of Antichrist, in which Peter imposes a much more stringent mode of historical criticism upon Paul in the effort to limit the force of his authority. In his commentary on 1 Corinthians, where Paul concedes marriage but urges that those who can remain celibate, like himself, Peter pointedly dismisses the apostle's preference for celibacy and uses the occasion to develop a treatise on marriage that highlights the essentials of the position on marriage which he later develops in the *Sentences*. Peter insists that marriage is a good thing and a sacrament which was instituted in Eden before the fall. Marriage is grounded in the present consent of the spouses. Their sexual relations, when ordered to the ends of marriage, are either not sinful at all or at most minimally sinful and excusable. Customs regarding marriage have changed over time. This being the case, Paul was mistaken in regarding marriage not as a requirement but as an indulgence. In truth, Peter states, the reverse is the case; it is continence that is the indulgence. Marriage, after all, is the calling followed by the many. Theologians and preachers, from Paul to the present, he implies, have a duty to address the realities in the lives of most believers. After all, continence requires a special grace which God concedes to very few, a fact which Paul ought to have kept in mind. Peter hastens to add that marital chastity and fidelity are also charisms and gifts of God, but they are distributed more widely. Given the fact that the apostle is aware of all this, Peter finds Paul both logically and theologically inconsistent in his advocacy of the celibate life.¹³¹

¹³⁰ *In primam Ep. ad Timotheum*, in *Comm. Cant.*, 3: 251, 261, 274–76.

¹³¹ Peter Lombard, *In I Ep. ad Corinthios* 7:1–28, PL 191: 1585D–1597A.

But how is it, Peter asks, that the apostle has arrived at these misguided conclusions? It is at this point that Peter detonates the exegetical time-bomb that he has dropped. Paul's counsel on all of these matters, he points out, was predicated on his belief that the second coming of Christ was imminent, a belief that encouraged him to advise against marital entanglements for those who were single. Now, this belief about the impending end of the *saeculum* is, to be sure, a historical datum about Paul and his times. But, Peter continues, as we are well aware, this world is very much still with us. Thus, we can and should adjust our perspective on marriage and celibacy accordingly. Not even Paul deprived married people of future glory, he observes, implying that Paul's teaching is not wholly consistent even judged in the light of its now superseded eschatological expectations. But the full force of Peter's historical criticism of Paul on marriage in 1 Corinthians is to use it to qualify Paul's theological authority on this subject to the point of dismissing it and to legitimate his own sharp departures from Paul on the theology of marriage.¹³²

In addition to misinforming Paul's views on marriage, his teaching on the imminent end of the age yields some other difficulties which Peter seeks to iron out, with the effect of scaling down Paul's authority, by means of historical criticism. The problem is located in the discrepancies between Paul's handling of the Antichrist in 1 and 2 Thessalonians. In his *accessus* to these epistles, Peter acknowledges the fact that Paul was responding to the Thessalonians' curiosity about Last Things, and the errors they had embraced on that subject. The content of the two epistles, he notes, is quite similar, even redundant. Whence, it remains unclear (*licet obscure*) why Paul felt the need to repeat himself.¹³³ This is especially obscure given the inconsistent descriptions of Antichrist in these two epistles. The difficulties involved lead Peter to depart from his usual exegetical practice. This is the one place in his commentary on Paul where he adds to a strictly literal reading of the text a spiritual dimension, for reasons which will now be apparent. In 1 Thessalonians, Paul depicts Antichrist as a supernatural being, who will reign for three years before being killed by the Archangel Michael. On the other hand, in 2 Thessalonians, he identifies the

¹³² Ibid., 7:29–35, *PL* 191: 1597B–1598D. For Peter's fuller views on marriage, see *Sent.* 4. d. 26–d. 42, 2: 416–509.

¹³³ Peter Lombard, *In Epistolam I ad Thessalonicenses* argument; *In Epistolam II ad Thessalonicenses* argument, *PL* 192: 287D–290A, 311A–312C. The quotation is at 311A.

Antichrist with the Roman Empire of the first century A.D. The fall of the Antichrist is thus equated with the downfall of the Roman Empire as a world power. This discrepancy had been noticed in the *Glossa ordinaria*. The glossator had amplified on the account in 1 Thessalonians, drawing on Daniel for additional information on the Antichrist and the Apocalypse, but he had repeated the Roman imperial version of the story in glossing 2 Thessalonians without trying to square these two accounts.¹³⁴ Peter seconds his strategy on 1 Thessalonians, bringing additional Old Testament prophetic material to bear on Paul's scenario in that epistle.¹³⁵ But he takes a rather different tack on 2 Thessalonians. Warming to his task, he advises his readers that Paul was not forecasting the fall of Rome as an actual historical event. Paul was, no doubt, upset by the persecution inflicted on Christians by the emperors during his time. But Peter was aware that the Roman Empire later declared Christianity its official religion and protected the church. Thus, an understanding of Rome different from the one offered by Paul must be supplied in order to remedy the limitations of Paul's view read literally.

Peter's solution is to associate Rome, in 2 Thessalonians, not with the political imperium of Nero but with the spiritual imperium of the Roman church, and to turn Paul's argument around by 180°. The fall of Rome cannot mean the future political collapse of an empire that has not been in existence for centuries. Rather, it means the falling away of the churches from the Christian faith and from obedience to Rome. The sense of Paul in 2 Thessalonians would thus be that Christ will not return to judge the world until all Christians have apostasized and all churches have fallen into schism. Peter has recourse to Augustine and Haimo of Auxerre for this interpretation. He depoliticizes the 2 Thessalonians account still further by refusing to identify Antichrist with any human leader, whether of church or state. The Antichrist, he says, will be the son of the devil, but by imitation not filiation. He will arise in Babylon, out of the tribe of Dan, as the Old Testament foretold. But this notion must be read broadly, to include the Greeks as well as the Jews. For, just as Christ possesses a fullness of divinity, so the Antichrist possesses a fullness of malice, and his activities embrace all the sons of pride of whatever nation. The key point Peter makes is that the reign of Antichrist represents a negative spiritual condi-

¹³⁴ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 4: *Epistola I ad Thessalonicenses* 4:15, 5:3; *Epistola II ad Thessalonicenses* 2:3, 2:6–7; *PL* 114: 618D–619B, 622A–D.

¹³⁵ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. I ad Thess.* 5:1–11, *PL* 192: 306A–308A.

tion, which mankind will help to bring about by allowing faith to wane and charity to grow cold. In so arguing, Peter rejects Paul's equation between Antichrist and the historical Nero. His spiritualizing of the idea of Antichrist permits Peter to treat Nero not as the literal Antichrist but as a type of the Antichrist to come. To be sure, Nero's activities, like those of the other persecuting emperors, were evil and can be seen as having been inspired by the devil. But, Peter concludes, "Nero and the others are shadows of the future, that is, Antichrist, just as Abel and David were figures of Christ" (*et sunt Nero et alii umbra futuri, scilicet Antichristi, sicut Abel et David fuerunt figurae Christi*).¹³⁶ This resolution of the problem of Nero as Antichrist found warm support from Peter's immediate successors.¹³⁷

In developing this theology of Antichrist, Peter does not confine himself to contextualizing and relativizing Paul's belief in the light of superseded apostolic expectations and the warping experience of persecution. He goes on from there to reinterpret the whole subject as pointing to a more general, and a less purely institutional, mystery of evil in which the infidelity of the churches is paralleled by the falling away from faith and charity on the part of individual Christians. He thus finds a way of handling Paul's treatment of Antichrist in 2 Thessalonians that is compatible with the account in 1 Thessalonians while expanding Paul's more historically limited political position into a universal moral doctrine, thus yoking his historical critique of Paul with a constructive theology of Antichrist, and one which draws on other post-biblical authorities and on his own ingenuity in the interest of clarification.

This leads us to another striking feature of Peter's *Collectanea* in comparison with other commentaries on Paul dating to our target period, his use of patristic and more recent authorities, both to provide a running commentary on the text and to assist in the unravelling of problematic passages. His recourse to such authorities for the light they shed on Paul is both deft and apposite. In particular, he is more concerned than are other scholastic exegetes of Paul during his time with confronting the fact that the authorities may not agree in their interpretation of Paul. When this is the case, Peter seizes on the fact as an opportunity to explain, by his

¹³⁶ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. II ad Thess.* 2:1–16, *PL* 192: 317B–321D. The quotation is at 318C. At 318D–319A Peter refers specifically to Nero and to the Augustinian point that he would have to be kept alive miraculously or resurrected specially in order to serve, literally, as the Antichrist. With Augustine, he finds this idea ridiculous.

¹³⁷ *In secundam Epistolam ad Thessalonicenses* 2:1–16, in *Comm. Cant.*, 3: 539–41; Robert of Melun, *De Epistola ad Thessalonicenses prima* 2:7, in *Quaest. de Ep. Pauli*, p. 296.

own word and example, how theological reasoning can be brought to bear on the conflicts among the authorities. In this connection, we see in his work as a Pauline exegete the same kinds of methodological concerns that he displays in his Psalms commentary and that surface even more systematically in his *Sentences*. In Peter's case, there is an organic relationship between his study of the *sacra pagina* and the teaching of systematic theology, from the standpoint of methodology no less than from the standpoint of doctrinal development.¹³⁸

Consistent with his handling of conflicting authorities on all subjects in the *Sentences*, Peter's treatment of this problem in his exegesis of Paul accents two important methodological principles, which were often ignored by his contemporaries. In the first place, he finds it insufficient to resolve conflicts by the tactic of nude countercitation. The inadequacy of that method is plainly visible in the *Glossa ordinaria*. The glossator responsible for the Gospels of Matthew and Mark takes exception to Origen on salvation and on angels, and seeks to neutralize him by citing Augustine or Bede against him. But the commentary does not stop to explain why Origen's position is unacceptable and why Augustine and Bede are preferable.¹³⁹ On the other hand, Peter explains the reasoning that leads his authorities to the conclusions they adopt, giving his readers the capacity to judge the merits of those conclusions. At the same time, he is aware of the fact that the same authority sometimes contradicts himself. This circumstance may result from the rhetorical requirements of the arguments made by the authority at various points in his oeuvre. It may result from the fact that he has

¹³⁸ The most important studies of these interrelations have been made by Ignatius C. Brady, in his prolegomena to Books 3 and 4 of the *Sentences*, 2: 8*-52*, coupled with his edition of three texts reflecting Peter's earlier exegetically derived positions on the incarnation, the Eucharist, and marriage, *ibid.*, pp. 53*-87*, which can be compared with his handling of these themes in his reworking of Rom. and 1 Cor. and in the *Sentences*. This material supplements Brady's earlier discussions of Peter's life and works in "Peter Lombard: Canon of Notre Dame," *RTAM* 32 (1965): 277-95 and "Peter Lombard," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), 11: 221-22. On the double redaction of the *Collectanea*, see also Jean Leclercq, "Les deux rédactions du prologue de Pierre Lombard sur les Épîtres de S. Paul," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 109-12; Ermenegildo Bertola, "I commentari paolini di Pietro Lombardo e la loro duplice redazione," *Pier Lombardo* 3: 2-3 (1959): 75-90. On the connection between exegesis and theology in the Lombard, see also Glunz, *History of the Vulgate*, pp. 232-58; Gillian R. Evans, *Old Arts and New Theology: The Beginnings of Theology as an Academic Discipline* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 42. These treatments of the point supersede Smalley, *Study*, p. 75.

¹³⁹ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 4: *In Matthaeum* 25:48, *In Marcum* 1:2, 3:29; *PL* 114: 166D, 179C, 193C.

genuinely changed his mind. But these considerations need to be taken into account in deciding whether the authority's views in one case cancel out his views in another, or whether the problem in Paul's text on which one is seeking help from the authority can be resolved within the framework of that authority's thought more generally. Some examples will illustrate how Peter handles issues of this type.

At Romans 2:3–6, for instance, he grapples with the question of whether the sin against the Holy Spirit can be remitted. Some say, he observes, that this sin cannot be remitted because the souls of such sinners are so hardened by despair that they cannot feel the need or the desire for penance. Others say that the sin cannot be remitted because such sinners do not actually do penance, even though they are capable of it. Peter adduces Augustine on Matthew in support of the first position and Augustine on Mark in support of the second. Now, Peter has another resolution of the question that he wants to advance and he rests his case on a third argument, made by Augustine on John. There, Peter notes, the sin against the Holy Spirit is held to be irremissible not because the sinner cannot or does not repent; he can indeed repent, but he does so rarely and with great difficulty. This conclusion Peter finds the most persuasive of the three and also compatible with the broader outlines of both Augustinian and Pauline theology. For, to say that this type of sinner could not repent would be to undercut his own freedom to respond to the grace of repentance. Equally, if not more important, it would limit the freedom and power of God to extend mercy in converting the sinner. This example is a nice index of the Lombard's awareness of the fact that Augustine is not a monolithic source, and also of the fact that one can discover, through an analysis of his reasoning in assorted *loci*, which Augustinian position is not only the most Augustinian, on the basis of its theological consistency with his *idées maîtresses*, but also which Augustinian position sheds the most light on Paul.¹⁴⁰

Another case of conflicting authorities is one which required far more of a virtuoso turn to resolve, the vexed debate between Augustine and Jerome, arising from the text of Galatians, over whether the apostle Peter had dissimulated his beliefs, as a missionary tactic, and whether Paul had been right in criticizing him on that account. This had been a sticky issue from the patristic period onward, not only because it raised the question of whether apostles

¹⁴⁰ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 2:3–6, *PL* 191: 1340A–D.

can lie, or err, but also because Porphyry had seized on this text, and the clash it provoked, as a means of taxing the Christians with being immoral and inconsistent. Jerome had stated that Peter had dissimulated his faith in participating in Jewish dietary practices, while Augustine had rejected that possibility out of hand. The Lombard's first line of attack is to bring the Acts of the Apostles to bear on Galatians. Acts, as he notes, shows that, on another occasion, Peter ate the flesh of animals used in pagan sacrifices, but without having participated in those sacrifices or having approved of them. This kind of dietary practice, he continues, is permitted elsewhere by Paul if it does not give scandal. By analogy, then, in Galatians Peter was fully aware of the suspension of the Jewish dietary laws by the new dispensation but he followed them in this instance so as not to alienate the people he sought to convert. Peter here was acting out a species of Paul's own advice, to become all things to all men for the sake of winning souls. With this reasoning in mind, Peter argues that we can say that Jerome is literally correct in stating that the apostle Peter behaved like a Jew, when he was a Christian. But Augustine is even more correct in stating that Peter's behavior was not mendacious. In the Lombard's view, Peter's actions were above board (*honestas*) because they were guided by good intentions. For his part, Paul was misinformed. His own intention to preach the gospel vehemently was a good intention, although on this occasion it had prevented him from grasping what Peter was really doing. Therefore, Paul was wrong to attack Peter. Peter's missionary zeal was also good, but it too had prevented him from seeing that, in the new dispensation, Jewish and gentile practices are not matters of indifference and that his missionary tactics might therefore be counterproductive. Thus, the Lombard treats both apostles as well-intentioned, although he does not think that either apostle translated his intention into appropriate action in the case at issue. He also sees the merits of the positions of both Augustine and Jerome, although with a preference for Augustine's.¹⁴¹

A comparison between the Lombard and other contemporary exegetes of Galatians shows how much his analysis of the patristic authorities on this passage helped to clear the air. The Cambridge commentator thinks that Peter can be excused because he was not truly lying, and because of the difficulties attached to evangelizing the Jews. His gloss on this text gives no indication that there is a

¹⁴¹ Peter Lombard, *In Epistolam ad Galatas* 2:14, *PL* 192: 109D–114A.

patristic debate on it.¹⁴² But Robert of Melun has clearly profited from the Lombard's exegesis. After reviewing his reasoning, Robert supplies an elegant refinement on it. He concludes that both apostles behaved in ways that can be thought of as wrong, externally. But both can be excused, because they acted in good conscience, and there were mitigating factors in each case.¹⁴³ Robert thus retains the balance between correct intention and appropriate action central to the Lombard's analysis but invokes the principle of dispensation and the lesser of the two evils as a way of reconciling Augustine and Jerome. And, like the Lombard, Robert shows how Paul's authority can be weighed and judged, and relativized, in the light of post-biblical authority and the ingenuity of the expositor.

While it is typically the confrontation of conflicting authorities or the effort to extract theological principles from the time-bound perspectives of the apostolic age that engender these displays of ratiocination, there are also cases in which the Lombard draws on the disciplines of the trivium as tools of analysis in his Pauline exegesis. As we have already seen, his *accessus* to each epistle exerts a firm control over his handling of his commentary in each case, suggesting the centrality of the discipline of rhetoric for him as a source of hermeneutical principles. Less pronounced, but also present, are his appeals to logic, although it has to be said that they are sparing in comparison with the Abelardians and Porretans. Both metaphor and logical analysis help Peter to gloss Romans 8:20–23, where Paul describes the entire creation as groaning and travailing as it awaits salvation. Now, the proper subject of salvation is man, not the rest of creation, says Peter. So, what does the phrase “all creation” mean here? It can be regarded, he observes, as a universal (*universale locutione*). But it is a universal not in the sense that it collects the individual traits of all beings but rather in the sense that it collects all the traits of the singular beings, namely men, who are to be saved; for all aspects of human nature—mind, body, and spirit—are saved. At the same time, since he is composed of mind, body, and spirit, man is a microcosm of the rest of creation, and it is saved, metaphorically, in him.¹⁴⁴ There are two passages in the same epistle where the Lombard rephrases the text at issue in the language of cause-effect relationships. In commenting on the point that one man brought sin into the world and one man redeemed it,

¹⁴² *In Epistolam ad Galatas*, in *Comm. Cant.*, 2: 351.

¹⁴³ Robert of Melun, *In Epistolam ad Galatas* 2:11, in *Quaest. de Ep. Pauli*, pp. 245–46.

¹⁴⁴ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 8:20–23, *PL* 191: 1444C–D.

he argues that the role of Adam and Christ as causes is not isomorphic. While Christ is the sole cause of the redemption He effects, Adam is not the sole cause of damnation when it occurs, since the actual as well as the original sins of Adam's posterity are involved. Also, the potentiality for damnation does not always get actualized, since God's grace can overcome sin and does in some men.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, in glossing the point that the law gives rise to sin because of man's inability to adhere to it, Peter also treats the topic in the language of cause-effects relationships. The law, he notes, is not the efficient cause of sin, but rather the occasion of sin.¹⁴⁶

The examples discussed thus far have shown some of the ways in which Peter uses the *artes*, the authorities, and his own knowledge and ingenuity to provide a literal and historical understanding of Paul. The *Collectanea* also provides excellent documentation of his use of Paul as a resource for the development of his own theological views, in relation to the scholastic concerns and controversies of the day. One hotly debated topic, already noted above, which was given much publicity by the career of Abelard, was the proper role of philosophy in the theological enterprise. Peter takes a definite stand on this subject in his Romans commentary, quite pointedly against Abelard as well as against critics of Abelard of the stamp of William of St. Thierry. As a sequel to the idea that the *invisibilia dei* can be known though created nature, Peter remarks that some divine attributes are accessible to natural reason (*ratione naturale*), including God's eternity, omnipotence, and goodness. The best of the pagan philosophers, he adds, taught that God was incorporeal, incommutable, and simple. Reprising Plotinus and Porphyry, as transmitted by Marius Victorinus, he continues, the same philosophers held God's happiness to lie in His being, life, and thought (*esse, vivere, intelligere*), three activities which, although distinct, are united in His being.¹⁴⁷ This deft introduction of the earliest Latin Christian Neoplatonist on the Trinity into the debate provides Peter with ammunition against Abelard's own appeal to Neopla-

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 5:15–16, *PL* 191: 1392D–1394B.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 7:12–13, *PL* 191: 1420B.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 1:19–23, 11:33–36, *PL* 191: 1326B–1329A, 1495A. This substitution of one Neoplatonic triad for another is ignored by Johannes Schneider, *Die Lehre vom dreieinigen Gott in der Schule des Petrus Lombardus* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1961), pp. 21–22. For the transmission of Victorinus, see David N. Bell, "Esse, Vivere, Intellegere: The Noetic Triad and the Image of God," *RTAM* 52 (1985): 5–43. For the range of contemporary readings of the *invisibilia dei* passage, see Artur Michael Landgraf, "Zur Lehre von der Gotteserkenntnis in der Frühscholastik," *New Scholasticism* 4 (1930): 261–88.

tonism to support the claim that the doctrine of the Trinity is not a mystery of the faith requiring revelation, but a philosophical idea equatable with the One, Nous, and World Soul. The same argument arms Peter for his attack on Abelard's notorious denomination of the Trinitarian persons as power, wisdom, and goodness. This passage reveals a Peter Lombard who is far from unappreciative of the philosophical issues embedded in contemporary dogmatic controversies, and far from being an obscurantist, as he is so often type-cast. At the same time, he makes it clear in his discussion of predestination, at Romans 1:7 and 8:29,¹⁴⁸ that he dissociates himself from Abelard's effort to recast this theme into the logical problem of necessity, possibility, and future contingents. And, he agrees with Paul at Colossians 2:48 that we should not be deluded by the beguiling speech of philosophers, a reading which, as followers of Abelard, the Cambridge commentator and Robert of Melun energetically protest.¹⁴⁹

If his exegesis of Paul affords Peter the opportunity to cross swords with recent and current antagonists, it also gives him the chance to pilot the reader along the current of the contemporary mainstream. A salient case in point is his interpretation of Paul on justification in the Epistle to the Romans, where he states, firmly and crisply, the contemporary consensus position.¹⁵⁰ In discussing the faith that saves the Romans, whether of pagan or Jewish background, Peter makes three main points about justification. First, nothing man knows or does before God grants him faith can increase his merit. Second, faith can be understood in three ways. There is faith as the intellectual assent to theological propositions. There is faith as the acceptance of someone's word as trustworthy. Neither of these kinds of faith justifies; for the devil possesses faith of this sort. To be salvific, faith must combine assent and trust with the love that informs the good deeds bonding Christians to each other and to God. Justifying faith, then, is the faith that works in love. Peter's third point is that, while good works done before or without faith have no merit, good works done in faith and love do have merit, even if the intention to perform them is frustrated by circumstances that prevent their expression in external deeds. As

¹⁴⁸ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 1:7, 8:29, *PL* 191: 1310B–1311D, 1449B–1450B.

¹⁴⁹ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Colossenses* 2:48, *PL* 192: 270D–272B; *In Epistolam ad Colossenses*, in *Comm. Cant.*, 3: 490–91; Robert of Melun, *In Epistolam ad Colossenses*, in *Quaest. de Ep. Pauli*, pp. 264–65.

¹⁵⁰ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 1:8–10, 3:19–4:8, *PL* 191: 1322D–1325A, 1358D–1367C.

he sums up this analysis at Romans 3:27, Peter states “for the intention makes the deed good, and faith directs the intention,” underscoring thereby yet another hallmark position in the mid-twelfth-century theological consensus.¹⁵¹

In Romans 6:12–14 and 7:7–8, Peter provides the psychological understanding that undergirds that intentionalist outlook in another statement of the contemporary consensus, this time on the psychogenesis of ethical acts.¹⁵² In an analysis whose substance and language can be found widely in this period, including Peter’s own gloss on Psalm 1, as noted above, and one which reappears in the *Sentences*, Peter subdivides the stages of ethical choice into three, labeled temptation (*propassio*), contemplation of the temptation or delectation (*delectatio*), and the conscious decision to succumb to it (*consensus*). While man, after the fall, is inclined to sin, Peter stresses that this inclination is not itself sin; nor is its outcome in sin inevitable. Neither is temptation a sin. For, the desires that lead to temptation arise in the moral subject involuntarily. It does not lie within his power to prevent them from occurring. Where he does exercise judgment and voluntary choice is in the next two stages. At the point of *delectatio*, once he has recognized the fact that the temptation is, indeed, a temptation to sin and not just a feeling whose pursuit is morally good or neutral, he has the option of entertaining it or rejecting and resisting it. The outcome of his choice in the *delectatio* stage is seen in the final, or *consensus* stage. If the subject has voluntarily assented to the *propassio* through *delectatio*, then he commits himself to it at the point of *consensus*. Consent, for Peter, is where the essence of the sin lies, and this, irrespective of whether or not the subject has translated the sinful intention into action.

These are just two examples out of a number of passages in Peter’s commentary on Paul where the doctrine stated is not only Peter’s own, but an opinion of mid-twelfth-century theology more generally. While he certainly draws on his glosses on the other Pauline epistles in the same way, his mining of his Romans gloss in the construction of his systematic theology is particularly notice-

¹⁵¹ For the contemporary consensus on intentionalism in the moral life, see, in particular, Robert Blomme, *La doctrine du péché dans les écoles théologiques de la première moitié du XII^e siècle* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1958), passim and esp. pp. x, 15–87, 165–217, 223–94, 330–35, 343–59; also Artur Michael Landgraf, “Die Bestimmung des Verdienstgrades in der Frühscholastik,” *Scholastik* 8 (1933): 1–40; Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, vols. 1–5 (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1948–59), 2: 494–96.

¹⁵² Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 6:12–14, 7:7–8, *PL* 191: 1407C, 1416D.

able. It has been tracked carefully by Ignatius C. Brady, the most recent editor of the *Sentences*, in his annotations of that text. Themes from Romans that resurface in the *Sentences* in more or less the same form include Peter's analysis of the sin against the Holy Spirit, justification, and the psychology of ethical choice, which we have already discussed, and also original sin, the nature of actual sin, grace and free will, and Christ's human nature. In some cases Peter expands on what he has said in his Pauline gloss; in other cases he streamlines his treatment of the topic. He may combine the material in his gloss with additional citations and reflections. But he generally relies on the gloss in these areas to provide building blocks for the *Sentences* as well as a guide to how the theological questions should be put, and which authorities to call upon in answering them.¹⁵³

Peter's commentary on Paul, finally, allows us to chart the interplay between his exegesis and his systematic theology in areas where his teaching changed and developed over time. A particularly accessible case in point is the Christology which he propounds in his gloss on Romans, for here we have editions of his earlier and later versions of the Roman commentary as well as his ultimate position in the *Sentences*. Peter's remarks on Christology in Romans 1 in the first redaction of his Romans gloss are straightforward, and show little awareness of the debates on theological language inspired by the contemporary study of Boethius's theological tractates.¹⁵⁴ But the second redaction of the gloss and the final edition of the *Sentences* show that Peter had been sensitized to these issues by his reading of Gilbert of Poitiers and John Damascene in the 1140s and early 1150s. His encounters with these two sources can be dated with certainty within this period.¹⁵⁵ Gilbert was well

¹⁵³ Ignatius C. Brady, prolegomenon to *Sent.* 2: 12*-13*, 19*.

¹⁵⁴ Peter Lombard, *Tractatus de Incarnatione*, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, in *Sent.* 2: 54*-76*.

¹⁵⁵ Gilbert's work was known to the Lombard not only textually but through the Paris chapter of Gilbert's teaching career, from ca. 1137 until his departure to receive the bishopric of Poitiers in 1142. Peter also knew the work of Gilbert's earliest disciples in the Paris area, as well as being one of the *periti* involved in the consistory of Paris in 1147 and the council of Rheims in 1148, at which Gilbert's views were subjected to official scrutiny. On this, see Marcia L. Colish, "Gilbert, the Early Porretans, and Peter Lombard: Semantics and Theology," in *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la logica modernorum*, ed. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), pp. 229-50; "Early Porretan Theology," *RTAM* 56 (1989): 58-79. For the dating of Peter's encounter with the work of John Damascene, see Eligius M. Buytaert, "St. John Damascene, Peter Lombard, and Gerhoh of Reichersberg," *FS* 10 (1950): 323-43.

known for the terms *subsistentia* and *subsistens* which he applied, respectively, to the formal aspects of beings and to their concrete, phenomenal aspects. While he asserted that this distinction did not extend to the deity, he none the less attributed these terms to the deity. This was confusing enough. But Gilbert also had to grapple with the term *substantia*, because it was in the creed. He was uncomfortable with it, especially as regards the incarnate Christ, since it did not mean the same thing as either *subsistentia* or *subsistens* in his own lexicon. His solution is really a non-solution, and it is one shared by his earliest disciples—the attribution of *substantia* both to the divine and to the human natures of Christ.¹⁵⁶ This problematic Porretan idea is echoed in the second redaction of Peter's gloss on Romans 1:3 in the phrase "we recognize therefore the twin substance of Christ" (*Agnoscamus igitur geminam substantiam Christi*).¹⁵⁷ As we have noted above, this is language which he shares not only with the Porretans but with a number of other contemporary theologians. Peter does refer to John Damascene in this passage, but he has not yet absorbed all the implications of his position. As we can see in the *Sentences*, however, Peter later realized that the Porretans had taken over the ambiguous vocabulary of Boethius. Damascene clarified for him the fact that the Greeks meant the divine essence by *substantia*, and that, if one accepts that definition, it should be used consistently and exclusively with that denotation. So, in the *Sentences*, he drops the twin-substance language, despite the fact that it goes back to Augustine. He uses *substantia* to refer only to Christ's divinity, and employs the terms *humana natura* or *humanitas* to denote His humanity.¹⁵⁸

Gilbert had also offered an understanding of the communication of idioms in the incarnate Christ which we have discussed in chapter 3 above and which we can see reflected, in part, in the second rescension of Peter's Romans gloss, and reworked in the *Sentences* under Damascene's influence. As will be recalled, Gilbert's formula runs: "A nature does not take on a nature, nor a person a person, nor a nature a person, but a person takes on a nature" (*Nec natura naturam, nec persona personam, nec natura personam, sed persona*

¹⁵⁶ Colish, "Gilbert," pp. 231–38.

¹⁵⁷ Peter Lombard, *In Ép. ad Romanos* 1:3, *PL* 191: 1307C. The same language occurs in sermons of Peter dating to the same period in his career. See Peter Lombard, *Sermo* 7, 9, 12, 55, 99, *PL* 171: 371C, 382A, 396A, 605D–606B, 806B.

¹⁵⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 2. c. 1–c. 3, d. 3. c. 4, d. 4. c. 2.1–4, d. 8. c. 8.31, d. 19. c. 7–c. 16, d. 23. c. 3.1, c. 4.2, d. 25. c. 1.1, c. 2.2–5, d. 27. c. 3.1, d. 33. c. 1.3; *Sent.* 3. d. 2. c. 1.4, c. 2, d. 5. c. 3.2–4, d. 6. c. 3.5, d. 7. c. 1.13–17, 1: 60–63, 67, 77, 79–80, 103, 165–69, 182, 185, 190, 192–94, 205, 241; 2: 28–29, 47–49, 54, 63–64.

naturam assumpsit). For Gilbert, a nature cannot assume a nature in the incarnation. If this were the case, the human Christ would not have been the individual man He was. Also, it would be impossible to explain why it was the Son Who was incarnated and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, since they share the same divine nature. As for why a person cannot take on a person, Gilbert adverts to his definition of a person as a *res per se una*. No person can be duplex, by definition; no being can have more than one person. The *persona* of the incarnate Christ is His single, divine, *persona*. Gilbert's arguments on the first two parts of his formula explain why he thinks a nature cannot take on a person in the incarnation. But he also rejects the third possibility because it would open the door to Adoptionism, by suggesting that the Word assumed a human being already in existence. Thus, Gilbert concludes, a divine person took on a human nature, but it is a nature which he understands as a human *subsistens*, the body and soul which make up this particular man but which were not attached either to each other or to the Word prior to the incarnation.¹⁵⁹

Peter takes much of this doctrine to heart. In the second redaction of his Romans commentary, he agrees that "God took on a human nature in the unity of His person; . . . for He did not assume the person of a man, but the nature" (*Deus humanam naturam in unitate personae suscepit; . . . non enim accepit personam hominis, sed naturam*).¹⁶⁰ In the *Sentences*, he continues to reflect on this idea and sees a problem in understanding Christ's human nature only as the concrete individual *subsistens* of the man Jesus. His reading of Damascene makes it clear to him that, if Gilbert is followed on this point, the incarnation would have consequences for no one but Jesus. The man Jesus would have no necessary connection with other human beings, and the universality of the Savior's work would be severely compromised. Importing this soteriological dimension of the doctrine into Gilbert's formula, the rest of which he continues to find persuasive, Peter argues, finally, that the *natura* understood in the phrase *persona assumpsit naturam* must refer both to the individual *homo* that results from the union of Christ's human body and soul at the moment of His conception and His wider *humana natura* or *humanitas*, in order to ensure both His concrete historicity and His consubstantiality with the rest of the human race.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Colish, "Gilbert," pp. 237–39.

¹⁶⁰ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 1:3, *PL* 191: 1307B. This language is repeated at 1312A–1313C.

¹⁶¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 2. c. 1.4, c. 2, d. 5. c. 3.2–4, 2: 28–29, 47–49.

The commentary on Romans yields another excellent example of a doctrine whose development we can track in Peter's thought by comparing it with the *Sentences*, the nature of Christ's saving work in the atonement. Here, we lack an edition of the relevant section of the first redaction of his Romans gloss; but the text of the second redaction shows that, at the time when it was written, Peter was still a supporter of the "rights of the devil" mode of viewing this problem,¹⁶² and that he shared some of the views of Anselm of Canterbury, who had opposed the "rights of the devil" position in his *Cur deus homo*, although without winning many supporters in the immediate sequel. At Romans 5:8–10, Peter begins by noting that, since God is omnipotent, He could have redeemed mankind some other way than by the incarnation and passion of Christ. He agrees that the way that God in fact chose was more appropriate (*convenientior*) than any of the other possibilities. One reason why this is the case is that the misery of fallen man lies in his ability to grasp the hopelessness of his situation and his own full responsibility for it. This realization leads him to despair over the loss of eternal life, and to frustration over the fruitless desire to possess it. Since Christ is the Son of God and hence immortal, He can extend that immortality to man, freeing man not only from mortality itself but also from despair and frustration. Christ turns man's despair and frustration into hope.

At the same time, according to Peter, Christ is proof against the devil. He agrees with those theologians who maintain that the devil's sway over man is not just. The devil wields power, but not legitimate authority over man, a situation which God tolerates, even though it constitutes a usurpation of His own authority. Now, for Peter, Christ overcomes the devil, not by brute force, not by a military or political exercise of divine omnipotence, but through His justice. Christ is wholly good, wholly blameless as a man. His undeserved sacrifice on the cross is a just recompense to God for the evil man has done, repaying God over and above man's debt. His action is suitable, because Christ serves as a moral example as well as a redeemer. God wants man to imitate Christ by following the path of justice, not force. Christ, for Peter, must be a God-man in

¹⁶² Good general accounts of the proponents of this theory are provided by D. E. de Clerck, "Droits du démon et nécessité de la rédemption: Les écoles d'Abélard et de Pierre Lombard," *RTAM* 14 (1947): 32–64; "Questions de sotériologie médiévale," *RTAM* 13 (1946): 150–84; Jean Rivière, "Le dogme de la rédemption au XII^e siècle d'après les dernières publications," *Revue du moyen âge latin* 2 (1946): 101–02; Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 161–81.

order for this justice to be effective. If He were not a man, He could not have been put to death. If He were not God, He would not have had the capacity to offer an infinitely acceptable gift that was certain of reception by the Father, since the Father and Son are already united with each other in the bond of love.¹⁶³

This analysis, in Peter's *Romans* gloss, shows an Anselmian approach by accenting the idea that justice must be served, not only in the sense that the damage done to God's honor by man's fall must be repaired, but also in the sense that Christ's justice must be imitated by man. As with Anselm, Peter sees Christ as imputing to man a gift which Christ Himself has earned. This imputed gift is something objective, eternal life and freedom from the devil as an external ruler. Christ's saving work also brings a subjective gift to man, the substitution of hope for sinful man's frustration and despair.

Now, if we compare this analysis of the atonement with Peter's treatment of the same topic in his *Sentences*, we will be able to see a striking reformulation of his teaching, marked by two notable features. First, he has been deeply influenced by the more subjective and affective understanding of the atonement found in such contemporary theologians as Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter Abelard. Second, and as a consequence of that fact, while he retains some vestiges of the "rights of the devil" theory, he dramatically reinterprets it.¹⁶⁴ Peter's point of departure in the *Sentences* is that Christ won man's redemption through His ethical merit as a man, a merit reflecting the fact that, at all times in His life, His will was in perfect conformity with the will of God. So important is this point, for Peter, that he adds the claim that the passion of Christ was not itself necessary. It was important, to be sure, but only because it illustrated what every other act and intention of the

¹⁶³ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 5:8–10, *PL* 191: 1384D–1387A. Peter gives the same opinion in *In Ep. ad Hebraeos* 1:11–18, *PL* 192: 420B–424A.

¹⁶⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 18. c. 1–c. 5, 2: 111–29. Good accounts of Peter's teaching on the atonement in the *Sentences* include Fritz Büniger, "Darstellung und Würdigung der Lehre des Petrus Lombardus vom Werke Christi (Sentent. III, dist. 18–20)," *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* 49 (1902): 92–126; J. Patout Burns, "The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory," *Theological Studies* 36 (1975): 285–304; Robert S. Franks, *The Work of Christ: A Historical Study of Christian Doctrine*, 2nd ed. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1962), pp. 167–76; J. Gottschick, "Studien zur Versöhnungslehre des Mittelalters," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 22 (1901): 35–67; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 2: 170–253, 338; Jean Rivièrre, "Le mérite du Christ d'après le magistère ordinaire de l'église, II: Époque médiévale," *RSR* 22 (1948): 234–38. For a more detailed account, see chapter 7 below, pp. 459–70.

incarnate Christ manifested throughout His life, His perfect obedience and perfect humility. While the passion did not increase the perfect merit that Christ already had, in a qualitative sense, merely giving Him another occasion to reflect that merit, the drama and pathos of Christ's sufferings displayed His love for His fellow men as well as His obedience to God. This love energizes human beings, empowering them to reorder their own loves, to respond to the grace of God, to love Him in return, and to extend love to their human neighbors. Once man's love has been reoriented in this way, he is able to reject the false loves that lead him into sin. His bondage to sin is broken; and he is now ready to tread the paths to glory that lead to beatitude. As Peter sees it, the devil's power is nothing other than the bondage to sin that lies within the soul of fallen man. The devil has been radically internalized and made a function of man's psychology of sin.

This theory of the atonement requires, for Peter, a Christ Who is a God-man, but for reasons different from those advanced by Anselm, by the traditional defenders of the "rights of the devil" position, and by the Peter of the Romans gloss. Christ must be a man, he argues, otherwise He would not have been able to turn around the hearts of other men and motivate them to love in response to His own love. Christ must be God so that He Himself remains immune from sin. His perfect merit is the merit Christ earns as a man; but what guarantees it is the special divine grace that the Word grants to the human Christ thanks to Their intimate union. This sinlessness is important not because it assuages God's anger or His wounded dignity, and not because it is needed in order to change God's mind about man. Rather, Christ's sinlessness is important because it enables Him to possess, and to display, the perfect humility that inspires and empowers the change of heart required for man's liberation.

While Peter's commentary on Romans is thus a rich source for doctrines which he modifies or abandons in his later work, no less than for positions that he later retains, other Pauline epistles also inspired him to articulate ideas which he set aside in the *Sentences*. With other theologians in his period, Peter is a vigorous defender of the doctrines of the real presence and concomitance in treating the Eucharist. He likewise stresses the need for its reception in the salvation of Christians. While he shares the orthodox consensus view that the Eucharistic elements are changed into the body and blood of Christ at the time of the consecration, he is just as hard pressed as are his compeers in finding adequate language in which to describe that change. In his exegesis of 1 Corinthians, he is also

concerned with the question of what would be received if the consecrated elements were consumed by a mouse, a topic that had been in the theological literature since the Carolingian age and which had been given a new and polemical currency by the use of the idea, on the part of Berengar of Tours and more recently by the Cathars, that the mouse receives Christ's body and blood. As with other contemporary theologians, Peter, in his Pauline exegesis, feels a need to refute this attack on the real presence doctrine.¹⁶⁵ In glossing 1 Corinthians 11:20–25, Peter tacitly invokes the distinction between the consecrated species, the sacrament alone (*sacramentum tantum*), and the body and blood of Christ, the sacred reality which the sacrament contains (*res sacramenti*). He also articulates the view that only a communicant who possesses faith in the real presence actually receives the *res sacramenti* and not the mere *sacramentum tantum*. While he admits that he cannot explain how the sensible attributes of the consecrated elements can inhere in entities which no longer exist as bread and wine after the consecration, he supports the idea that a mouse which accidentally consumes them receives just the physical attributes of those elements.¹⁶⁶

By the time he wrote the *Sentences*, however, Peter's thought had changed on this topic, and in two respects. First, he now is certain that the change which the elements undergo is a substantial change, not an accidental or a formal one. The accidents of bread and wine remain. In addressing the problem of how they can do so, he contrasts two opinions. One view states that, by an act of God, these accidents are capable of enduring although the material being that subtends them has now been changed substantially. Partisans of the second view think that a certain amount of the substance of the bread and wine remains after the change instituted by the consecration, sufficient to provide a material substratum in which the accidents can inhere. As Peter notes, this second opinion is contradicted by the authorities who say that the change from bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ is full and complete. Peter does not himself resolve this debate in the *Sentences*,¹⁶⁷ perhaps not surprisingly, given the exiguousness of the philosophical vocabulary pertinent to this task available prior to the reception of

¹⁶⁵ On this whole debate, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 2: 207–22; Gary Macy, "Of Mice and Manna: *Quid mus sumit* as a Pastoral Question," *RTAM*, 58 (1991): 157–66; "Berengar's Legacy as a Heresiarch," in *Auctoritas und Ratio: Studien zu Berengar von Tours*, ed. Peter Ganz et al. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1990), pp. 55–67.

¹⁶⁶ Peter Lombard, *In I Ep. ad Cor.* 11:20–25, *PL* 191: 1638C–1645D.

¹⁶⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 11. c. 2.5–10, 2: 298–99.

Aristotle. He has, none the less, clarified the issues to a fair extent, spelling out what the two opinions cited entail and where their problems lie, in comparison with his address to this question in his 1 Corinthians commentary. On the other hand, and despite the continuing interest in it shown by other theologians of the day, he now concludes that the reception of the Eucharist by a mouse is an utterly frivolous subject, which does not even merit discussion. He treats it with peremptory dismissiveness: "What then does a mouse receive? What does it eat? God knows!"¹⁶⁸

A final example of a doctrine on which Peter's thought underwent change, a change which we can document by comparing his *Collectanea* with his *Sentences*, is the hypostatic union. In this case, he moves from a definite position in his Pauline exegesis to a more circumspect and openended one in his systematic theology. The hypostatic union is a question of considerable importance, both in its own dogmatic right and because Peter's teachings were subjected to criticism on this topic after his death. Opponents taxed him with having advocated Christological nihilianism, or the view that, in His human nature, the incarnate Christ was nothing. This position simply cannot be found in the *Sentences*, where Peter outlines the three leading theories of the hypostatic union taught during his time, the *assumptus homo* theory, the subsistence theory, and the *habitus* theory. He indicates that all three of them are orthodox; all three of them receive support from the authorities; and all three are problematic. He leaves the question open.¹⁶⁹ Recognition of the fact that he had done so was what ended the controversy about his alleged teaching on this subject, leading to the vindication of Peter's orthodoxy at the Fourth Lateran council in 1215. Now, of the three opinions, the one hardest to defend against the charge of Christological nihilianism was the *habitus* theory. In holding that Christ took on a human nature the way a person puts on a habit or garment, its proponents made themselves liable to the charge that the humanity of the incarnate Christ was merely accidental and adventitious, in their teaching.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., d. 13. c. 1.8, 2: 314: "Quid ergo sumit? Quid manducat? Deus novit!" Noted by Macy, "Of Mice and Manna," p. 160 n. 16. For further discussion of this point, see chapter 8 below, p. 581.

¹⁶⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 6–d. 7, 2: 49–66. On this debate, see Horacio Santiago-Otero, "El nihilianismo cristológico y las tres opiniones," *Burgense* 10 (1969): 431–43; Walter H. Principe, *William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), 1: 9–12, 68–70; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 2 part 1; 84–89, 121, 136–37. For a more detailed

There was, however, a point in Peter's career when he seriously entertained the support of the *habitus* theory, his gloss on Philippians 2:1–8. Drawing here on both Augustine and Boethius, he reviews four modes of change. Change occurs, in the first place, when an accident modifies a subject. Another kind of change occurs, for instance, when food is eaten and is assimilated into the body of the eater, transformed substantially into his flesh and his energy. A third type of change is the kind in which neither substance nor accidents change, as when a ring is placed on a person's finger. Finally, there is change in which accidents change, not in their nature but in their form, in acquiring a different shape or appearance. A change of this last type occurs when a person puts on a garment which then takes on the shape of the wearer's figure. In Peter's view, in the Philippians gloss, this fourth kind of change, the kind of change associated with the *habitus* theory, is an adequate description of the hypostatic union, explaining how the Word could take on the form of a servant without His divinity being diminished thereby.¹⁷⁰ At the same time, Peter emphasizes elsewhere in the same passage that the manhood Christ took on was fully real and that He possessed a fully human body and a fully human soul; further, neither His divine nor His human nature was changed by the fact of His incarnation.¹⁷¹ This assertion clearly blunts the force of a nihilianistic reading of his espousal of the *habitus* theory in the Philippians gloss. But its presence there, despite his decisive later change of mind in the *Sentences*, may suggest how his critics decided that he was, and had remained, an advocate of that theory.

Peter's *Collectanea* thus shows, even more extensively than his commentary on the Psalms, the centrality of his study of the sacred page as the context in which he first began to work out his theological method and his doctrinal positions, both those he later retained and those he altered during the course of his career, whether in response to continuing reflection and additional research, in reaction to contemporary opinions he found problematic, or in accord with the prevailing consensus. Both his substantive explanations, his handling of authorities, and the accessibility of his

account of the three opinions and the Lombard's analysis of them, see chapter 7 below, pp. 417–27.

¹⁷⁰ Peter Lombard, *In Epistolam ad Philippenses* 2:1–8, *PL* 192: 235A–D. Cf. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* q. 73, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, *CCSL* 44A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975), pp. 209–12; Boethius, *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* 4–7, in Boethius, *The Theological Tractates*, ed. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 92–120.

¹⁷¹ Peter Lombard, *In Ep. ad Philippenses* 2:1–8, *PL* 192: 231D–234C.

ideas to the reader in the format and emphasis of his gloss help to explain the popularity of the Lombard as a scholastic commentator on Paul. In drawing on the disciplines of the *artes*, his terminology is clear, straightforward, and easy to understand. His position on the utility of philosophy and natural reason in theology, on the one hand, and their limits, on the other, is circumspect, knowledgeable, and moderate. Therein lies much of the success of his appeal to non-Christian sources, in an age when other exegetes were using a bizarre or rebarbative lexicon or were invoking philosophy and the *artes* in defense of highly questionable conclusions. There are other features of Peter's exegetical work which also recommended themselves to contemporary readers. There is his rigorous adherence to the *accessus* method, which controls his commentary on each Pauline epistle, giving the reader a clear road map so that he always knows where he is in Paul's itinerary. There is also Peter's balanced combination of the continuous commentary, the glossing of individual words and phrases, and the development of theological *quaestiones* on a more extended basis.¹⁷² Peter gives more attention to questions and to theological speculation than do his immediate predecessors. At the same time, in comparison with his immediate successors, his questions are related more integrally to the continuous commentary, and the reader is never allowed to lose sight of the text from which the questions are derived, as a text. However long an excursus he may make, Peter always guides the reader firmly back to Paul's argument. And, however much he may disagree with Paul's emphasis or take stands on controversial issues in his questions, they never become *non sequiturs* or theological flying Dutchmen. Further, Peter aims systematically at reading the text of Paul literally and historically, and interpreting it *ad mentem Pauli*, whether he subjects it to historical criticism or not. He adduces more authorities in resolving vexed questions than either his predecessors or his successors, taking many cues from his forerunners on where to look for help but engaging in his own wideranging personal research. He chooses his authorities aptly and he analyzes and deploys them perceptively. He is thoroughly committed to the task of showing the reader how to evaluate them when they conflict.

¹⁷² The mix among the gloss, the question, and the continuous commentary, and the sources for each, as well as the shift in taste toward the question by the end of the twelfth century, are treated by Smalley, *Study*, pp. 42–86; Lobrichon, "Une nouveauté," pp. 93–114; Bardy, "La littérature patristique des '*Quaestiones et responses*,'" *R. biblique* 41: 210–36, 341–69, 515–37; 42: 14–30.

All these traits enabled the Lombard to put his own personal stamp upon his work as a biblical exegete. They helped, as well, to shape his approach, and that of his students, to the wider tasks of theological system-building and doctrinal construction which he takes on later in the *Sentences*. The intimate and organic connection he maintains between these related forms of theological study make it clear why his fellow scholastics received his exegetical work with such enthusiasm. It also helps to clarify how that exegetical work could play the integral role which it certainly did play in his own approach to theological education. His address to the *sacra pagina* thus made it possible for the Lombard to set biblical exegesis and systematic theology alike on a decisive new course.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

When one comes to Book 1 of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard from the other systematic theologies of the day, one is struck immediately by three of its features. First is the sheer amount of space that Peter devotes to the doctrine of God. This distribution of effort reflects his desire to give sustained attention to a subject that is of absolute theological primacy, and one that had engendered many current controversies that required careful, thorough, and well-informed analysis. It was necessary to clear a path through these debates so that the theologian, and the readers he served, could fix their gaze on God as the supreme being and the supreme good Who alone is worthy of enjoyment as an end in Himself. A second feature of his treatment of God in the first book of the *Sentences* that sets it apart from the work of his contemporaries is the scheme of organization he uses. As we have noted in chapters 2 and 3 above, Peter solves thereby many of the problems of overlap, redundancy, lexical unclarity, and logical inconsistency that mar the writings of other theologians of the day. Peter begins with man's knowledge of God and proofs of God's existence. He moves next to the distinction between nature and person in the Trinity. He concludes with an extended consideration of the divine nature as such and in its principal attributes, both God as transcendent and as unmanifested, and God as the creator and sustainer of the universe. Aside from being neat and orderly, this division of the material provides Peter with an economical means of highlighting the third, and most important, feature of his doctrine of God, his focus on God as absolute being, inexhaustible and unbounded by His workings in man and nature. The Lombard's goal here is to reclaim, for western Christian thought, a theology of divine transcendence, yet one that, at the same time, radically de-Platonizes the doctrine of God.

Ermenegildo Bertola, the modern scholar who has done more than any other to call attention to this dimension of Peter's theology, sees his achievement as a successful effort to mediate between a too-abstract doctrine of God on the part of Gilbert of Poitiers and a too-concrete doctrine of God on the part of Bernard of Clairvaux.¹

¹ Ermenegildo Bertola, "Il problema di Dio in Pier Lombardo," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 48 (1956): 135-50. Bertola is closely seconded by Giuseppe

There is much more to the story than this. Quite apart from the transcendental and Platonizing features of Bernard's theology which Bertola's interpretation ignores,² the accent on the divine essence in Peter's thought which he rightly stresses must be seen, more broadly, as a critique of the limitations of the economic view of the deity quite common in western theology at this time, no less than as a critique of an immanent or emanational understanding of God that would confuse the creation with the creator or that would make His actions responses to internal necessities of His own being. In this respect, Peter's doctrine of God needs to be positioned no less firmly vis-à-vis those of Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Abelard, and the Chartrains. Even without these polemics, the focus on the divine essence holds an appeal for Peter on other levels. It permits him to cut directly to the metaphysical implications of the doctrine of God, which he sees as having a profound and enduring interest and importance. This, in turn, enables him to develop a mode of *intellectus fidei* that provides a metaphysical rationale for the donnée of revelation on God. And, while his anti-Platonism anticipates an Aristotelian metaphysics and theology in certain respects, making his doctrine of God in Book 1 of the *Sentences* hospitable to Aristotelianism avant la lettre, Peter's doctrine of God does not sacrifice a living God, a God of agency, on the altar of a God as essence.

Peter's organization of his material in the first book of the *Sentences*, and some of his doctrine of the Trinity, have been discussed already, in chapters 2 and 3 above, under the headings of the theological enterprise and the problem of theological language.³ There, we emphasized the schematic neatness and clarity of his approach, both in disposing swiftly and definitively of issues he feels a need to treat, but not to expatiate on at length, and in allocating large amounts of space to doctrines and debates that

Lorenzi, "La filosofia di Pier Lombardo nei *Quattro libri delle Sentenze*," *Pier Lombardo* 4 (1960): 24–28. Other scholars who have noted this emphasis on the divine essence in Peter's theology include Cornelio Fabro, "Teologia dei nomi divini nel Lombardo e in S. Tommaso," *Pier Lombardo* 4 (1960): 79–81; Étienne Gilson, "Pierre Lombard et les théologies d'essence," *Revue du moyen âge latin* 1 (1945): 61–64; Ludwig Hödl, *Von der Wirklichkeit und Wirksamkeit des dreieinigen Gottes nach der appropriativen Trinitätstheologie des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1965); Johannes Schneider, *Die Lehre vom dreieinigen Gott in der Schule des Petrus Lombardus* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1961), pp. 25–30, 224–26.

² Good treatments of these aspects of Bernard's doctrine of God are found in Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Platon à Cîteaux," *AHDLMA* 29 (1954): 99–106; F. A. Van den Hout, "Pensées de Saint Bernard sur l'être," *Cîteaux* 6 (1955): 233–40.

³ See above, pp. 79–80, 119–31.

required extended discussion. We also noted the logic of his handling, at the outset, the connected questions of the powers and limits of reason and of philosophical argument in establishing the existence of the deity, both as a single supreme being and as three and one, as a means of refining and correcting Hugh of St. Victor, on the one side, and Abelard, on the other. His definition of the terms to be applied to the divine nature as such, and to the Trinitarian persons in Their relation to each other, and his specification of a concept of relation for this purpose that avoids the limits of both relative nouns, in the grammatical tradition, and of relations understood as accidental modifications of substance, in the tradition of Aristotelian logic, sets the stage, lexically speaking, for his critique of the theological terminology of both Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers, and the Chartrains. It also enables him to reassign functions attributed by theologians of a Neoplatonic or economic bent to individual Trinitarian persons to the deity as such, without foregoing a crisp and lucid understanding of the personal distinctions within the Trinity from a strictly intratrinitarian vantage point. While recalling that schematic considerations and the need to develop and to use a clear and consistent vocabulary set much of Peter's agenda here, especially given the state of play when he entered the field, in the present chapter we need to move beyond these considerations to the positive doctrine of God which they undergird.

MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD: PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

The first issue in positive theology which Peter takes up, having stated at the outset that God is one, in essence, and three, in persons,⁴ is the question of what sort of positive knowledge of God may be possessed by man. It is notable that Peter never ventilates the doctrine of the *via negativa*. Positive knowledge is the only kind of knowledge of God that he considers. He first lays out the evidence of Scripture, and then the evidence available through natural reason, culminating in proofs for the existence of God and analogies of the Trinity in created nature, and their limits. This overall mode of attack is traditional. As Peter himself notes, it is grounded in Augustine's *De trinitate*. As has been pointed out, many of the same authorities are cited in support of the same, or similar, epistemolog-

⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 1. d. 2. c. 2.1, 3rd ed. rev., ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81), 1: 62.

ical claims by contemporaries such as Hugh of St. Victor, the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, Abelard, and Robert of Melun.⁵ Yet, Peter puts his own order on this material and uses this standard topos as a means of taking a stand on the knowability of God that is distinctive, amid the range of current treatments of the subject. Unlike Hugh, Robert, and Abelard, in laying out the Old Testament and New Testament testimonies to God's existence as three and one, he does not multiply citations. His technique, rather, is to streamline this operation, paring it down to those biblical texts that anchor his point most effectively, and then to move on.⁶ His treatment of this part of the topos is altogether much leaner than that of other contemporaries who invoke it, and his address to the Old Testament witnesses lacks the air of anti-Jewish polemic sometimes found in writers of the Abelardian school who make use of the same material.

Even more his own is Peter's handling of the proofs of God's existence, and of His nature as three and one, available from a consideration of the created universe. To begin with, this topic was one that not all scholastic theologians in the first half of the twelfth century felt obliged to treat. No member of the school of Laon, for instance, takes it up. Nor do Gilbert of Poitiers or his earliest disciples. While Abelard and his followers are deeply committed to the idea that pagan philosophers, especially the Platonists, are witnesses to the doctrine of the Trinity, the proof of God's existence, as such, does not interest them. Aside from the Lombard, the three theologians of the day who do offer proofs of God's existence are Hugh of St. Victor, Robert Pullen, and Robert of Melun. It is worth comparing the Lombard's approach to theirs.

HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, ROBERT PULLEN, ROBERT OF MELUN

The earliest of these three twelfth-century efforts to prove God's existence, and, in many ways, the least useful, is Hugh's. As was noted above in chapter 2, a large part of the difficulty with Hugh's proofs lies in the location which they occupy in Book 1 of his *De sacramentis*. Concerned as he is with the way God manifests Himself to man in the work of institution and restitution, and the accessibility to man of knowledge of God as so mediated,⁷ Hugh launches his

⁵ Noted by Brady, *ad loc.*, 1: 63; Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 12–13, 15, 21–23.

⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 2. c. 4–d. 3. c. 1.1, 1: 63–69.

⁷ These tendencies in Hugh's theology have been noted by Roger Baron, *Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1957), p. 139; Johann

project in the *De sacramentis* not with God as the ontological ground of the world and man but with an account of creation in which the emergence of creatures in the order put forth in Genesis jostles uncomfortably with the creation as a means of access to a creator held to have produced all creatures at the same time, despite the way that this process is described in Genesis. In the effort to explain how primordial causes differ from God, Hugh backs up to provide a brief introduction to the Trinity, and how it may be known, thus waiting until the third part of Book 1 to develop his proofs.⁸ He situates them in the context of the two modes of access man has to the knowledge of God, revelation and a rational consideration of the natural world, each of which in turn can be subdivided into two parts, internal and external. With respect to God's work of institution in the natural order, the physical world serves as an external and visible source of information about God as the creator, accessible to human reason, although reason cannot go the full distance here, since the physical world cannot show God to be three and one. The correlative internal mode of rational investigation which yields a knowledge of God is the mind's examination of itself, since the mind of man is made in God's image. These two forms of rational inquiry, external and internal, provide the basis for Hugh's proofs of God's existence. Hugh offers three proofs. The first is addressed to the mind's examination of itself. This examination shows that the human mind can grasp transcendental ideas and perfections, and can harbor concepts such as eternity and immutability which it cannot find in its own experience. Thus, a higher cause possessing these perfections must be posited to exist to account for the ideas about them which man finds within his own mind. Two proofs then flow from the mind's examination of the visible world. Here, Hugh invokes the argument from motion to a first, incorporeal, and immutable mover and the argument from design to an intelligent and benevolent orderer. In all these cases, inductive logic leads to a deity with the attributes required to serve as the cause of effects ascertainable by reason in the mind of man and in the created universe.⁹

Hofmeier, *Die Trinitätslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor dargestellt im Zusammenhang mit den trinitarischen Strömungen seiner Zeit* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1968), pp. 108–91, 193–95, 197–268, 297–303; Jakob Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor* (Würzburg: Andreas Göbel, 1897), pp. 37–39, 47–57; Christian Schütz, *Deus absconditus, Deus manifestus: Die Lehre Hugos von St. Viktor über die Offenbarung Gottes* (Rome: Herder, 1967), pp. 22–89.

⁸ See above, pp. 57–60.

⁹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis fidei christianae* 1.3.10, PL 176: 222A–223B. Good discussions of these proofs are provided by Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre*,

The deity in question, however, is the deity as such, not a deity at the same time three and one. Bearing in mind that Hugh has inserted these proofs into the *De sacramentis* following his introductory remarks about the Trinity and man's knowledge of it, his conclusions leave the reader wide of that mark. Rallying to the task that still awaits him, Hugh next considers in what respect reason can know that the first cause is also three persons. He appeals to Augustine's *De trinitate* for two arguments designed to tackle this assignment. One of these is far less responsive to the question than the other. Hugh first invokes Augustine's distinction between the Son as the Word eternally generated in the mind of the Father (*verbum occultum*) and the Word as revealed and as physically accessible to man (*verbum manifestum*).¹⁰ In so doing, he fails to note that the Augustinian point is addressed to the consubstantiality and coeternity of the unmanifested Son with the Father, an argument developed by Augustine against the Arians, and that it does not provide a third term, which is needed if he is going to provide a rational argument for, or an analogy of, the Trinity, whether in created nature or in the human mind. Abandoning that tack, and understandably so, Hugh then moves to one of Augustine's three-term analogies of the Trinity in the human mind, the mind, its notice of itself, and its love of itself (*mens, notitia, amor*).¹¹ While potentially not as useful as the analogy of memory, intellect, and will developed by Augustine further along in his *De trinitate*, the Augustinian analogy that he has chosen points to the inner life of the Trinity. This is a fact which Hugh fails to appreciate. Referring next to the Trinitarian formula *ingenitus-genitus-procedens*, as a parallel to *mens-notitia-amor*, he then treats both relational formulae as comparable to the names power, wisdom, and goodness, as applied to the Trinitarian persons, without seeing that he is conflating and confusing an economic view of the Trinity with a view of the Trinity *in se* in which the attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness do not serve to distinguish any one of the Trinitarian persons from the others.¹² At the same time, Hugh does not indicate how the *ingenitus-genitus-procedens* formula can be grasped by the human

pp. 61–77; Kilgenstein as reprised by Urbain Baltus, “Dieu d’après Hugues de St.-Victor,” *R. bén.* 15 (1898): 109–23, 200–14.

¹⁰ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.3.20, *PL* 176: 225A–B.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1.3.21, *PL* 176: 225B–D.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1.3.22–24, 1.3.26–31, *PL* 176: 226A–D, 227C–234C. Hugh makes a similar conflation of these two ways of viewing the Trinity in his *Tractatus de trinitate*, ed. Roger Baron in “*Tractatus de trinitate et de reparatione hominis* du MS. Douai 365,” *Mélanges de science religieuse* 15 (1961): 112.

mind from an inspection of itself or of created nature, the epistemological framework which he is using as the context for this inquiry. Nor does he indicate whether wisdom, power, and goodness are rational data, and, if so, whether they can be classified as internal or external. Other problems accompany Hugh's analysis. While he certainly wants to exempt the deity from change and from accidents,¹³ he does not display any sensitivity to the fact that the idea of relation, which he invokes in discussing both the *mens-notitia-amor* and the *ingenitus-genitus-procedens* formulae, requires any definition or qualification, despite the current debate this very point was exciting and despite the fact that Augustine himself treats it specifically in the *De trinitate*, Hugh's major source here. Also, although he had stated that reason cannot know that God is three and one in full, he does not follow Augustine's lead in indicating where any of these Trinitarian arguments or analogies falls short.

Looked at as a whole, then, Hugh's treatment of the proofs of God's existence, and of His nature as three and one, offers a scrappy and incomplete initiation into this topic while, at the same time, it points to the wider organizational and lexical burdens under which the *De sacramentis* labors. Hugh's most positive contribution lies in the examples of *a posteriori* reasoning from effects to causes as a means of establishing the deity as the basis for phenomena which the human mind can perceive in itself and in created nature. He does not succeed in capitalizing on this advantage, or even in adhering to his announced agenda in dealing with the Trinitarian part of this self-imposed assignment. He does not make full use of the patristic and contemporary resources apposite to the issues he raises. And, insofar as his handling of the Trinitarian analogies and names is designed to set up his treatment of Trinitarian theology more generally, whether as positive doctrine or as anti-Abelardian critique, it points to his pervasive terminological vagueness and to his tendency to confuse the Trinity *in se* with the Trinity *ad extra* and to emphasize the latter so heavily that the deity as such, in His transcendent determinations, whether as Godhead or as Trinity, gets lost in the process.¹⁴

¹³ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.3.25, *PL* 176: 227A–C.

¹⁴ A good crisp assessment of this point is provided by Edmund J. Fortman, *The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), p. 190. See also Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre*, pp. 114–27; A. Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique et Hugues de Saint-Victor*, 2 vols. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1895), 1: 302–05; Jørgen Pedersen, "La recherche de la sagesse d'après Hugues de Saint-Victor," *Classica et mediaevalia* 16 (1955): 103–04, 106; Jerome Taylor, comm. on his trans. of Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 113–14.

If Hugh of St. Victor tries manfully to provide a coherent epistemological framework for his proofs of God's existence, which is only partially sustained in the execution, Robert Pullen offers the most laconic of such contemporary proofs, while making no attempt whatever to explain why he takes the trouble to do so or what connection, if any, this exercise has with the rest of his doctrine of God. Unlike Hugh, Robert places his proof at the very beginning of his *Sentences*. He offers a single and very simple proof. All things that exist require a cause, he notes; and things that come into being and pass away require a first cause without beginning or end.¹⁵ This proof reprises a familiar Augustinian-Platonic emphasis on eternity as a prime attribute of the deity, in contrast with the transience marking beings in the temporal order; it is not an argument from design, as is asserted by F. Courtney.¹⁶ In any event, having offered this proof, Robert makes no effort to take the Augustinian high road on the role of reason in eliciting natural or psychological arguments either for the Trinity or for the doctrine of God more generally. His proof is followed immediately by a remark on theological language that challenges the appositeness and semantic coherence of the very noun *deus*;¹⁷ then, ignoring the lexical obstacle which he has placed in his own path, he proceeds to talk about the deity, and the Trinity, as if he had never made this point, and with as slight an appreciation of the need to define and to use terms clearly and consistently or to address contemporary debates on this subject as the members of the school of Laon. His proof thus stands at the head of his *Sentences*, inert. It is not drawn into any kind of logical, epistemological, or theological connection with anything else he has to say about God. Robert Pullen evidently leads off with the proof because he feels that it is appropriate to include one. But he offers his readers no insight into why he thinks this is the case, or what relation, if any, the proof is supposed to have to the rest of his theology of the divine nature, either substantively or methodologically. On the question of rational *indiciae* of the Trinity he has nothing to say.

The third mid-twelfth-century theologian to offer a proof of God's existence, Robert of Melun, combines it with a defense of philosophy as a source for the doctrine of the Trinity along Abelardian lines. His location of his discussion of these points reflects his

¹⁵ Robert Pullen, *Sententiarum libri octo* 1.1, *PL* 186: 674D–675A.

¹⁶ F. Courtney, *Cardinal Robert Pullen: An English Theologian of the Twelfth Century* (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1954), pp. 55–56.

¹⁷ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 1.1, 1.4, *PL* 186: 675A–B, 680C, 682A.

modified adherence to the schema of Hugh's *De sacramentis*. Notwithstanding his dependence on Hugh and Abelard, Robert emerges with an approach to the proof of God's existence that is genuinely fresh, in comparison with Hugh and Robert Pullen. As we have noted in considering the schema of Robert of Melun's *Sentences*, he takes over Hugh's broad conception of sacrament as its conceptual foundation, and orders his theology under two headings, the sacraments of the Old Testament and the sacraments of the New Testament. Instead of giving separate and express treatment to what reason and pagan authorities supply about God's work of institution, Robert assimilates this topic into his treatment of the creation account in Genesis, a topic which he, like Hugh, takes up before he addresses the nature of the creator, whether in His divine nature as such or under the heading of Trinitarian theology.¹⁸ While this mode of address reflects Robert's perpetuation of Hugh's overlapping of chronology, cosmology, and epistemology, Robert does move up his consideration of the role of rational proofs in establishing God's existence and nature to a somewhat earlier point in his first book.

Robert makes a valiant initial attempt to salvage and to combine the basic positions of Hugh and Abelard on the knowability of God by human reason and on the utility of the pagan philosophers in this connection. Given the opposition between those two masters on these subjects, is not surprising to note that Robert's effort here does not meet with full success. In support of Abelard, he tries to yoke Augustine's acknowledgement of the help he received from the books of the Platonists to the claim that, when the philosophers treat the same subjects as the Bible, we can accept this pagan witness as referring to the divine essence.¹⁹ Although he concedes that the philosophers do so imperfectly, and although he ignores the fact that Augustine in the passage cited is referring to the incarnation of Christ and to the limitations of the Platonists in this connection, and not to the existence of God or to the Trinity, he proceeds to affirm that the pagan philosophers, especially the Platonists, support the doctrine of the Trinity. It is this Trinitarian position, as articulated by the Platonists, he asserts, that St. Paul was referring to in the Epistle to the Romans when he spoke of the *invisibilia dei* as knowable through the phenomenal world. Without

¹⁸ See above, pp. 72–76.

¹⁹ Robert of Melun, *Sententie* 1.1.5, ed. Raymond-M. Martin, in Robert of Melun, *Oeuvres*, 4 vols. (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1932–52), 3 part 1: 168–69.

pausing to ask whether the Platonic triad of the One, Nous, and World Soul can truly be described as an aspect of the visible creation, and without taking account of the critics of Abelard's application of this idea to the Trinity or of Abelard's own softening of the line he takes on the World Soul in his later works, Robert concludes that the objections of pagans to the doctrine of the Trinity are groundless, on their own testimony, as are the objections of the Jews on the basis of the evidence for the Trinity in the Old Testament.²⁰ While this effort to vindicate Abelard may satisfy Robert, the reasoning on which he bases it involves a misappropriation of both Paul and Augustine and a reverence for Abelard that is more enthusiastic than it is circumspect.

Robert's next move is to try to conflate this alleged textual evidence of the Platonists' defense of the Trinity with Hugh's account of man's four ways of knowing God, both through nature in an interior and exterior sense, and through revelation in an interior and exterior sense. In so doing, however, he departs from Hugh's epistemology in three ways. First, as we have just seen, he accords far more weight to the argument from Platonic theology and cosmogenesis than Hugh is willing to grant. Second, he argues that man's interior rational knowledge of God, achieved through his inspection of ideas in his mind that do not derive from man's experience of created nature, can be obtained only with the aid of divine illumination. Hugh himself does not impose this stipulation on man's rational knowledge, whether internal or external. Finally, Robert asserts that all the modes of knowledge of God available to man in this life remain incomplete.²¹ Now, if one were to place the Hugonian analysis of natural reason and revealed knowledge within Hugh's wider framework of the modes of knowledge, adding to them contemplation and the knowledge of God enjoyed by the saints in the next life, something which Robert does not do here, then this claim could be sustained. However, in its own sphere, Hugh treats the *a posteriori* demonstration of a perfect, eternal deity, an immutable prime mover, and a benevolent and intelligent creator as an activity that natural reason can accomplish, and accomplish on its own.

Despite the maladroitness of this mélange of Hugh and Abelard with which it is associated, the proof of God's existence provided by Robert is a rather original one. The most striking thing about it is

²⁰ Ibid., 1.2.8–9, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 292–307.

²¹ Ibid., 1.3.2, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 6–10. For Hugh on this point, see M. L. Fuehrer, "The Principle of Similitude in Hugh of St. Victor's Theory of Divine Illumination," *American Benedictine Review* 30 (1979): 80–92.

that Robert situates it within a discussion of causality in general. There are three types of causes, he observes, first, final, and intermediate. First causes are so called because they are the first to have effects; final causes are so called because they are the last to have effects. This way of posing the issue indicates that Robert views causation from a temporal standpoint, not according to the order of being. In this sense, he continues, intermediate causes have more in common with first than with final causes, in that they initiate causation in their own sphere of activity and competence. Quoting Hugh here, Robert describes them as primary causes within their own genera (*in suo genere prime cause*). This statement, however, is accurate of intermediary causes only in an operational sense, for they receive their capacity to function as causes from the first cause. Robert cites the example of parents, who take the initiative in engendering offspring, offspring who are the effects of their parents' causal actions. But the capacity of the parents to undertake these causal actions is derived from the first cause. As causes, the parents are not absolute within their own sphere, since they act "in conjunction with the first cause" (*cum adiuncto prime cause*). Now the first cause, which is absolute, is God alone. No other causes are coeternal with Him. Other causes may work through motion or the transference of their own being to their effects, as is the case with the engendering of offspring by parents. But God, as a cause, remains unchanging, a point Robert anchors with a quotation from Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* 3.9. God, Robert concludes, does not transfer His own *esse* to other beings when He creates them, when He exercises His direct causation upon them, or when He empowers them to act as intermediary causes. This being the case, the first cause must have a necessary existence.²²

Both this analysis of causation and the idea that God can create without distributing His own divine essence to other beings are destined to crop up elsewhere in Robert of Melun's doctrine of God, and we will encounter them again below. With respect to his proof of God's existence, Robert's use of these principles bears comparison with the proofs of Robert Pullen and Hugh of St. Victor. Unlike both of these masters, Robert of Melun looks not at the effects in nature that require causal explanation, but at the behavior, and limitations, of secondary or efficient causes in nature. His intermediate causes need both empowerment and assistance on the part of the first cause. Insofar as he endows this first cause with other attributes that distinguish it from other beings, the attributes

²² Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.2.1, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 263–65.

on which he focuses are not eternity, as with Robert Pullen, or supreme intelligence and benevolence, a status as the prime mover, or transcendent perfections, as with Hugh. Rather, he emphasizes the immutability and incommutability of the divine essence in God's activity as a cause. This last point is a link between Robert of Melun and Peter Lombard, as is the fact that Robert develops a proof that has an integral connection with other features of his doctrine of God. At the same time, in moving from Robert to Peter we move to the most elaborate arguments for God's existence to be found in mid-twelfth-century theology.

The Lombard

Peter's positioning of his proofs for God's existence reflects, in the first instance, a rejection of the strategy adopted by Hugh and by Robert of Melun and a willingness to take a leaf from the book of Robert Pullen. From his point of view, it does not make sense to begin with the creation. Rather, after determining what can be known about God and proved about His existence and nature, the first step is to clarify the meaning of theological language as applied to the deity, so that a cogent distinction between the Godhead and the Trinitarian persons can be drawn. Following that, the attributes and activities of the deity as such can be explored, including His role as creator. This plan of attack inspires Peter to place his proofs quite early in Book 1 of his *Sentences*. As noted, he leads off with some lexical clarifications, stating at the outset that *essentia* applies to the divine nature rather than to the Trinitarian persons. He then presents a trim and carefully selected assortment of Old and New Testament testimonies to the Trinity. At this juncture he does not raise the question of the testimony supplied by the pagan philosophers, a topic he takes up later, so his omission of it here must be seen as quite deliberate. Instead, he moves directly from the witness of biblical revelation to a consideration of how God's existence and nature may be known from a rational examination of the created universe.

The warrant Peter offers for the plausibility of rational proofs is a twofold one. Both Augustine and Paul have affirmed that God has left His traces in His visible creation. In particular, Peter draws heavily on the Epistle to the Romans and on his earlier gloss on the *invisibilia dei* passage in the *Collectanea*. This being the case, it may be helpful to recall how Peter handles that text as an exegete. As was noted in chapter 4,²³ Peter's gloss on the *invisibilia dei* passage

²³ See above, pp. 212–13.

serves as an occasion for him to attain two interlocking objectives at the same time, the critique of Abelard and the articulation of his own positive position on the utility of pagan philosophy in acquiring a knowledge of God. Peter firmly rejects the association of the One, Nous, and World Soul with the Trinity, and, with it, Abelard's claim that the doctrine of the Trinity is not a mystery of the faith for which revelation is required, but a teaching fully available to reason and found in the Platonists. For his part, Peter does not scorn either the philosophers or the appeal to reason here. Natural reason is an epistemic reality for Peter, and one that affords access to a knowledge of a number of divine attributes. These include God's eternity, omnipotence, goodness, incorporeality, simplicity, and incommutability. And, he agrees, the best of the pagan philosophers concur in the idea that reason is capable of establishing these conclusions. As for the Trinitarian claim, Peter deftly shifts to another Neoplatonic triad, that of *esse, vivere, intellegere*, a principle made available by Marius Victorinus. Actually, the triad of being, life, and thought had first been applied to the deity by Candidus, the Arian antagonist whom Victorinus sought to refute. It accorded well with the Arian view that God the Father exists on a higher metaphysical plane than the Son, since *esse* has to be seen as a metaphysical substratum for any of the activities that the being in question may engage in.

Sensitive to that point, Victorinus himself, in the course of his debate with Candidus, changed this initial Neoplatonic triad to another one, the triad of moving, thinking, and acting (*movere, intellegere, agere*).²⁴ This latter triad was a more serviceable support for an orthodox doctrine of the Trinity in which all three persons are seen as metaphysically equal and in which their activities are mutually coinherent. While Peter, in his Romans gloss, does not reveal a familiarity with this shift in Victorinus's argument, even though his own doctrine of the Trinity would have made him sympathetic to it, his citation even of this first triad, against Abelard's triad, is more than a debater's point and more than a display of his own philosophical erudition. It reflects, as well, a pervasive and underlying concern with the salvaging of a doctrine of the

²⁴ Marius Victorinus, *Ad Candidum Arrianum* 19; *Adversus Arrium* 1.4, 1.43, 1.52–53, 3.4, 3.7–11, 3.17, 4.13–15, 4.21–22; *De Homousio* 3, in Marius Victorinus, *Opera theologica*, ed. Paul Henry and Pierre Hadot, CSEL 83: 1 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1971), pp. 36–37, 59–60, 133–34, 148–51, 197–99, 202–11, 222–24, 243–48, 256–59, 281–82. The changed triad also appears in Marius Victorinus, *Commentarium in Epistolam Pauli ad Philippenses* 2:68 in *Opera exegetica*, ed. Franco Gori, CSEL 83:2 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986), p. 188.

Trinity that sees the definition and description of the Trinitarian persons as confined, rigorously, to the traits each person uniquely possesses vis-à-vis the other two persons. With this, Peter's example here also reflects his thoroughgoing distaste for a treatment of the Trinity that would ascribe to any of the individual persons attributes that, in his view, apply properly and exclusively to the divine nature as such.

· Peter's extended reference to his own commentary on Romans, as a curtain-raiser to his proofs of God's existence, thus makes a telling and pointed statement. What he undertakes to prove here is to be proved about the Godhead, not about individual Trinitarian persons. What is to be proved about the deity, also, is to be proved by natural reason from the sensible evidence of the creation, and it finds corroboration in pagan philosophy. On the other hand, pagan philosophy does not and cannot provide proof of the doctrine of the Trinity. At best, it can provide analogies, not demonstrations. This established, Peter offers four proofs of God's existence, which also specify some of the deity's prime attributes. The first combines two of the *a posteriori* proofs offered by Hugh of St. Victor. Observing, with Robert Pullen, that all created beings must have causes since they are incapable of causing themselves, he yokes the argument from effects to a first cause with the argument from design; the coherent order of nature in which these effects of the first cause are disposed bespeaks the existence of a first cause that is, at the same time, an intelligent cause. Peter's second proof could also be described as an *a posteriori* proof, although it subtly moves him from induction to a more analytical mode of reasoning. Created beings are mutable, he notes; they must hence derive their being from a ground of being that is immutable. The analysis of being itself serves to undergird Peter's third and fourth proofs. The inspection of being yields the conclusion that it exists in a hierarchical order, with graduated degrees of excellence. Thus, there must be a supreme being, and one that is not merely the highest being at the top of the chain of being, but still part of the chain. Rather, a being that is truly supreme would have to transcend all other beings, whether corporeal or spiritual. As well as possessing degrees, and this moves Peter to his fourth proof, created being displays the characteristics of changeability and compositeness. These traits also point to the need for a creator that is a single, simple essence, not composed of diverse parts, not subject to change, and not subject to modification by accidents. The prime attributes of the deity that have been elicited by means of these proofs are the deity as first cause, as intelligent, as immutable, as one, and as simple. The theme of

immutability has received the most attention, playing a key role in both the second and the fourth proofs. With this group of divine attributes in hand, Peter finds that, by analyzing their implications, he can derive the attributes of omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness as well, as traits inhering in the Godhead.²⁵ This conclusion arms him, from the very beginning, for his more extended later attack on Abelard's ascription of power, wisdom, and goodness as proper names to the Trinitarian persons.

The proofs also require further commentary as an index of Peter's approach to the doctrine of God more generally. Peter evidently takes the examination of created nature as his point of departure. But his proofs are metaphysical as well as physical proofs. He is concerned less with examining the ways in which created beings act than with considering the structure of created being and what it requires as a necessary metaphysical substratum. In treating the deity as that necessary ground of being, he is as interested in delineating the respects in which the divine mode of being is radically different from, and transcendent of, the world of created being as he is in showing the ways in which the world of created being is ontologically dependent upon God and connected to Him. This emphasis points to a sharp contrast in tonality between Peter's proofs and those of Hugh of St. Victor and Robert of Melun. Unlike Hugh, Peter is not presenting himself in these proofs primarily as a natural theologian eager to show how God manifests Himself in the creation. And, unlike Robert, when he thinks about causation he thinks about more than the conditions enabling beings to act in particular events. He thinks as well, and more fundamentally, about the conditions that enable them to exist at all. His analysis of priority and posteriority in the treatment of causation is not based on the notion of temporal sequence. It is based on the order of being, not on the order of time. Peter's proofs thus display more than a deft strategist at work, laying the foundations for the polemics he wants to conduct later in Book 1 of the *Sentences*. More fundamentally, they bespeak Peter's felt need to assert a doctrine of God whose role as the necessary ground of being of everything else that exists in no sense infringes on the unconditioned transcendence of the divine essence. In recapturing divine transcendence, Peter in no sense opts for a God Who is the One beyond being. Rather, his God is pure and untrammelled being, in all its force, being as such. Peter's placement of the

²⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 3. c. 1.1-6, 1: 68-70.

deity on this metaphysical plane is important, in its own right, in reimporting this emphasis, purged of Platonism, into twelfth-century theology. It also lays the groundwork for his approach to Trinitarian theology and for his analysis of the divine attributes which he develops later in Book 1 of the *Sentences*, as well as for his handling of the relations between God and the world throughout his theology.

Having offered his proofs for God's existence and nature, Peter next considers the related questions of whether, and how, the creation offers proofs of the Trinity, through its vestiges in creation. Here, he begins forthrightly by remarking that, in this connection, we cannot treat of proofs, but only of similitudes. He emphasizes that vestiges of the Trinity are to be understood as analogies of the Trinity. They are not to be viewed in any sense as substantial participations of God, whether of the incommutable, simple substance of the Godhead or of the personal characteristics of any of the Trinitarian persons.²⁶ With respect to the Godhead, the divine essence, by definition, cannot be divided and conveyed to other beings since it is simple, unitary, and incommutable. Any kind of emanationist or participationist understanding of God's relation to the world would contradict that fact, and lead to a quasi-panteism. As for the Trinitarian persons, Peter has already alluded to this point in his Romans gloss and he develops it *in extenso* below. The determinations of the Trinitarian persons lie in Their relationship to each other, not in Their relations with creatures. As for the vexed question of the alleged testimonies to the Trinity in the pagan philosophers, Peter now pulls the issue out into the open and gives his final opinion on it. While the philosophers, he says, may have noted some of the Trinitarian analogies, "they saw the truth as if through a shadow and from afar, and they were deficient in their grasp of the Trinity" (*quasi per umbram et de longinquo viderunt veritatem, deficientes in contuitu Trinitatis*); and this because the contemplation of creatures is not sufficient to provide knowledge of the Trinity "without the teaching and the revelation of inner inspiration" (*sine doctrinae vel interioris inspirationis revelatione*).²⁷

This being the case, Peter follows the lead of Augustine's *De trinitate* in seeking analogies of the Trinity above all in the human mind. In comparison with Hugh of St. Victor, who uses the same tactic, Peter is more authentically Augustinian, and in two ways. In the first place, he gives full weight to the analogy of memory,

²⁶ Ibid., c. 1.7–8, 1: 70–71.

²⁷ Ibid., c. 1.9, 1: 71.

intellect, and will, as well as bringing in the analogy of *mens*, *notitia*, and *amor*. Secondly, he pursues, with Augustine, the limits of these analogies as well as their suggestive force as similitudes. Memory, intellect, and will provide a good analogy, Peter observes, because we have here not three lives, three minds, or three essences. Each of these faculties is the function of the same, single, subsistent mind. Each is distinct, although they are functionally interrelated. With Augustine, Peter emphasizes the point that this analogy falls short of the Trinity, for the single human mind in which memory, intellect, and will inhere is a rational spirit attached to a body and conditioned, in its modes of knowledge and action, by that fact, while God is pure spirit and incorporeal. Striking a note which he plans to treat much more fully in the sequel, he adds that these three mental functions are understandable with respect to each other and that, in this connection, their names are relative nouns; the relationships involved are not to be seen as the accidental qualifications of substances, which can come and go. Here, he cites the precise passage of Augustine's *De trinitate* 9.4 where Augustine speaks directly to the problem of relatives from both a logical and a grammatical standpoint.²⁸

Peter spells out the limitation of this analogy still farther. A man possesses these three faculties of memory, intellect, and will, but together they do not comprise the sum total of his being. On the other hand, the three Trinitarian persons do comprise the totality of God's being. There are three of them, and no more. On another level, the man who possesses these three mental faculties is a single human person, while there are three persons in the Trinity.²⁹ In comparing this line of argument with Augustine's own elaboration of the limits of his own analogy in the final book of the *De trinitate*, one can detect a notable difference in emphasis between Peter and his chosen authority here. What fascinates Augustine above all is the analysis of the functional similarities and dissimilarities between the Trinity and the human mind. Indeed, it is in this context that he works out much of his psychology of human knowledge. For Peter, on the other hand, it is the arguments drawn from the structure of being that exert the most powerful attractive force on his imagination. He looks at the human mind and at the Trinity both from the standpoint of their essence, not their modes of operation.

As we have noted, Peter is not content to rest his case on the analogy of memory, intellect, and will. He also adverts to the

²⁸ Ibid., c. 2, 1: 71-74.

²⁹ Ibid., c. 3.1-2, 1: 74-75.

analogy of *mens*, *notitia*, and *amor*. Strictly speaking, in the light of what he has already set forth, Peter does not need this second analogy in order to complete his argument, at least if he were content to argue merely by recycling Augustine's *De trinitate*. While it is true that much of the force of his analysis here derives from the fact that he has mined that text with more pertinence, point, and circumspection than Hugh of St. Victor, his introduction of the *mens-notitia-amor* analogy at this juncture and the way in which he handles it indicate that Peter is establishing his own priorities in the use of his Augustinian materials. This point is a constant reminder of the fact that, in understanding Peter as a theologian, we have to pay attention to how his mind works on and with his authorities. We learn very little about his intellectual temperament by the mere statistical listing of his citations. With respect to the *mens-notitia-amor* analogy, it appeals to Peter as a way of concluding his treatment of the Trinitarian similitudes because he sees in it the image of a parent, a child, and the love passing between them. To be sure, he could have used the analogy of the lover, the beloved, and the love that unites them, which Augustine also includes in his *De trinitate*, for this purpose. But the relation between *mens* and *notitia* is preferable, for Peter, because it suggests a more conscious and intellectualistic mode of regard. At the same time, in this analogy, we do not have a relationship between two distinct essences, as is the case with the lover and beloved and the parent and child alike. Rather, we have the mind's own intellectual acknowledgement of itself. In Peter's estimation, this makes the *mens-notitia-amor* analogy a more fitting similitude of the consubstantial Trinitarian persons. There is still another reason why Peter prefers this analogy over the lover, beloved, and love model. In the latter analogy, it is impossible to envision the love relationship as always having been in place, rather than as having come into being when the lover and beloved met. On the other hand, the mind's self-knowledge and self-love can be seen as continuous and permanent determinants of the mind itself, and not as having begun at a particular moment in the mind's history. The *mens-notitia-amor* analogy is thus better able to illustrate the relations of the Trinitarian persons, which are eternally structured into Their being.³⁰ And, for Peter, relatedness, whether seen in the analogy of the mind knowing and loving itself or in the analogy of the love and knowledge bonding two human persons, is the highest and most perfect reality of all. It may be significant that while, with Augustine, Peter can

³⁰ Ibid., c. 3–c. 4, 1: 75–77.

find areas where the analogy of memory, intellect, and will falls short, he suggests no limitations at all to the analogy of *mens*, *notitia*, and *amor* with which he brings this part of his argument to a close.

NATURE AND PERSON IN THE TRINITY

As we have already had occasion to observe, Peter next makes a forthright and clearheaded decision as to how to proceed. Instead of moving on to the divine nature as such, followed by the Trinity, and instead of moving back and forth between these two subjects, as do many theologians of the time, and confusingly so, Peter's goal is to clarify how the Trinitarian persons should be understood before turning to the divine essence, considered first in and of itself and next in terms of the ways in which it relates itself to the universe and to man. He proceeds in this fashion because, given his chosen mode of attack on Trinitarian theology, and given his objections to the terminology of Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers, and of many theologians who sought to criticize these masters, he needs to address the problem of theological language systematically, and at length. This question received extended consideration in chapter 3 above. Here we may reprise the essential points that Peter establishes. First, he rigorously equates the divine substance and nature with the divine essence, which he uses consistently to refer to the Godhead shared by the Trinitarian persons and not to the persons individually. He stresses that this divine essence is immutable, eternal, incommutable, simple, and incomparable, and that, in this respect, "God alone is called essence or being" (*Deus ergo solus dicitur essentia vel esse*).³¹ God utterly transcends created beings. Further, Peter treats being not as an attribute of God but as a description of His nature as such. This view of God distinguishes Him from created beings, including spiritual beings possessing immortal souls, since the latter are changeable, they come into existence at a particular point in time, and they are capable of being modified by accidents, of developing vices and virtues, and of acquiring learning and the arts, and are subject to shifting inclinations and passions. In contrast, God is, always and totally, His own qualities. There is nothing in God that is not God, the only conclusion compatible with the radical unity and simplicity of the Godhead.³²

This doctrine serves not only to differentiate God clearly from creatures, it also provides Peter with the foundation on which he

³¹ Ibid., d. 8. c. 1.7, 1: 96.

³² Ibid., c.1–c. 8, 1: 95–105.

builds his distinction between nature and person in the Trinity. He stresses that each of the Trinitarian persons possesses the divine essence fully, and in precisely the same way. His argument here, it will be recalled, undergirds his handling of the mathematical claims about the Trinity put forth by both Gilbert, Thierry of Chartres, and Clarenbald of Arras; he shows thereby that the Trinitarian persons are not numerical parts of a whole, or items of the same type collected together, or quantitative additions to the divinity that any one of Them possesses. This same outlook also inspires Peter to modify Augustine in urging that the divine essence cannot be seen as a metaphysical substratum for the Trinitarian persons, understood as existing on a different level of being from Them, and one more fundamental or abstract.³³ This point is worth emphasizing, for it was misinterpreted later in the twelfth century by Joachim of Fiore, who took Peter to be saying exactly the opposite of what he did say. Joachim claimed that Peter advocated a quaternity composed of the divine essence, as one item, and the persons of the Trinity, as three other items. This charge was formally rejected at the Fourth Lateran council in 1215; and, while Joachim's treatise against the Lombard was suppressed and has not survived, his position can be reconstructed from teachings found elsewhere in his work, from a pseudonymous and intransigent Joachite defender of it writing in the early thirteenth century, and from the documents of the council itself.³⁴ In sharp contrast with that erroneous reading given to his teaching by the Joachites, Peter insists that the divine essence shared by the Trinitarian persons, is the one and identical divine essence, that They each possess it perfectly and in the same way, and that terms predicating that divine essence can be applied substantially to the Trinitarian persons only in Their capacity as co-essential sharers of it and not

³³ Ibid., d. 19, c. 8, 1: 166.

³⁴ See the *Liber contra Lombardum*, ed. Carmelo Ottaviano (Rome: Reale Accademia d'Italia, 1934), pp. 74–76, 78–80, 111–250 and the editor's comm. at pp. 81, 83–86. Other reconstructions supporting the fact that Joachim and his followers radically misinterpreted Peter are Antonio Crocco, *Gioacchino da Fiore: La più singolare ed affascinante figura del medioevo cristiano* (Naples: Edizioni Empirico, 1960), pp. 103–39; E. Randolph Daniel, "The Double Procession of the Holy Spirit in Joachim of Fiore's Understanding of History," *Speculum* 55 (1980): 469–70; Giovanni Di Napoli, "Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 71 (1979): 621–63, 675–85; Fortman, *The Triune God*, pp. 196–97; Harold Lee, "The Anti-Lombard Figures of Joachim of Fiore: A Reinterpretation," in *Prophecy and Millenarianism: Essays in Honour of Marjorie Reeves*, ed. Ann Williams (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 129–42; Bernard McGinn, *The Calabrian Abbot: Joachim of Fiore in the History of Western Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 165–68.

in Their personal determinations.

For Peter, the personal traits that do distinguish the members of the Trinity from each other and that enable us to distinguish between person and nature in the deity are, exclusively, the relations structured eternally into the Trinitarian family that are specific and unique to each person vis-à-vis the other persons. In articulating this dimension of his Trinitarian theology, Peter achieves two goals at the same time. One is to reassert the Latin Christian emphasis on the unmanifested Trinity as the prime metaphysical reality. To this end, it is the relations of the Trinitarian persons to each other, as unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding, which are constitutive, differentiating them and bonding them to each other in a timeless and transcendent way, apart from anything They may reveal of Themselves to man in the cosmological or charismatic orders. Peter's insistence on this point reflects his distaste for an economic view of the Trinity that would limit what we can know about the Trinity or what is interesting about the Trinity to what the Trinity may choose to manifest about Its individual or collective interactions with nature and man. To put the point another way, in recovering the unmanifested Trinity in this manner, Peter is saying that the Trinity, as unmanifested, is none the less not a Trinity that remains entirely hidden from man and unknowable except through negative theology or mysticism. For, as he shows so clearly, one can reflect upon and appreciate the Trinity *in se*, by means of positive theology, particularly if one rejects the translation of *hypostasis* as *substantia* and the Boethian definition of *persona* as applied to the Trinitarian persons, which yields three deities, and if one makes a careful point of spelling out the differences between the relations that are eternal properties of the Trinitarian persons vis-à-vis each other and the concept of relation derived both from Aristotelian logic and the grammar of relative nouns.

Peter's second objective is closely related to this first one. If the properties of the Trinitarian persons are eternal, immutable, and transcendent, they are also properties unique to each of the persons as an individual; they apply to no other person within the Trinity. It is the ability of Trinitarian names to measure up to this criterion that defines their literal admissibility as Trinitarian names, for Peter. Other names, and the aspects of being they denote, cannot distinguish one Trinitarian person from another. Hence, they can apply properly only to the divine nature as a whole. While a large part of Peter's motivation in developing this position is his desire to rule out power, wisdom, and goodness as proper names of the Trinitarian persons, as Abelard and others taught, he anchors the

point in a wider discussion of the characteristics of the divine nature that are one in the Trinity, subdividing them into several categories. First, there are the determinations of the deity as a pure and perfect essence, the deity Who is being as such, viewed quite apart from other beings that may come into being and pass away. Immutability, unity, eternity, simplicity, incommutability, and the like provide the concepts and language enabling us to consider the common essence shared by the Trinitarian persons in this radically transcendent sense. Next, there are the determinations of the divine nature that God manifests in His creation and governance of the universe. Omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness, and the traits that can be extrapolated from these principles, are apposite here. Likewise, these traits are forms of agency in which all the Trinitarian persons share jointly and fully whenever they are exercised. On another level, the interaction with human beings in the order of redemption, all three persons of the Trinity are also coactive, although here one or another of Them may act as the delegate of the Godhead. In this category Peter places such forms of agency as are denoted by nouns such as judge, redeemer, sanctifier, and gift. Yet, although particular Trinitarian persons may be entrusted with these roles, when They carry them out, They do so on behalf of the entire Trinity, bestowing divine justice, or divine grace, as such, and not the qualities unique to Themselves as individual Trinitarian persons. For, as Peter has already clarified, the properties unique to each Trinitarian person are not His activities *ad extra*.³⁵ Finally, there are the figurative ways of appreciating the deity's interactions with the world and man, denoted by terms embodying a transferred meaning, such as splendor, mirror, character, and figure. These require relatively little investigation, for Peter, and they do not impinge that heavily on his Trinitarian theology or on his doctrine of God. Indeed, in addition to accenting the unity of the Trinity in action, at both the transcendent and at the manifested levels of reality on which the deity acts, Peter seeks to avoid collapsing the former into the latter, and he wants to preserve as large a zone of affirmative and literal positive theology as he can.

While much of the subject matter treated by the Lombard under the heading of Trinitarian theology is formulated, in the first instance, under the rubric of the problem of theological language, for

³⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 14. c. 2, d. 22. c. 3, 1: 127–28, 179. This Lombardian position, maintained against the more economic understandings of the Trinity in Peter's day, is treated well by Hödl, *Von der Wirklichkeit und Wirksamkeit der dreieinigen Gottes*.

reasons which we have indicated, the positive doctrine of the deity as three and one that emerges from this consideration provides him with tools for addressing other questions pertinent to Trinitarian theology which other scholastics either ignored or to which they provided different answers. In this connection it is remarkable how narrowly some of the leading theologians of the day cast their nets. Gilbert of Poitiers has absolutely nothing to say about the doctrine of God in general, or, indeed, about the Trinity, except to press it into the Procrustean bed of his own idiosyncratic vocabulary. While the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* modifies some of Gilbert's arguments, he too confines Trinitarian theology to the subject of theological language. The same can be said for Robert Pullen. Aside from the vexed question of the comparison of the Trinity to the Platonic triad of One, Nous, and World Soul and the problems resulting from their attribution of power, wisdom, and goodness specifically and preeminently to the Trinitarian persons, and aside from their persistent application of the inapposite analogy of the bronze seal to the Trinity, Abelard and his disciples have little to add to Trinitarian theology either. In addressing himself to the doctrine of the Trinity more broadly, therefore, Peter finds a need to engage in discussion with other contemporary theologians, and not merely these more highly publicized controversialists.

One of these larger questions to which he devotes attention is the engendering of the divine persons. God the Son, it is agreed, is begotten, God the Father unbegotten. But, can it be said that God engenders Himself? The Abelardian power-wisdom-goodness model provides neither a clear answer to this question, nor an answer to the question of why one of these divine attributes should be envisaged as engendering, or as flowing from, another. Abelard raises this problem more than once, without being able to resolve it.³⁶ The author of the *Summa sententiarum*, on the other hand, draws a distinction between divine person and nature here. While God can be said to engender God in the sense that the Father, as a Trinitarian person, engenders the Son, as a Trinitarian person, it is erroneous, he maintains, to say that the deity engenders either Himself or another deity, since this would conflict both with God's unity and eternity.³⁷ Peter is aware of the form in which both theologians put this issue. He is sympathetic to the handling of it given in the *Summa sententiarum* and to the author's indication that Augustine's

³⁶ Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 4.118–19; *Theologia "scholarium"* 2.148–68, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert and Constant J. Mews in Peter Abelard, *Opera theologica*, CCCM 11–13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969–87), 12: 324–25, 13: 480–89.

³⁷ *Summa sententiarum* 1.11, *PL* 176: 59D–61A.

De trinitate can be used helpfully here. He develops this topic in rather greater detail, however. Agreeing that, if we say that God engenders Himself, we would be admitting that there is more than one God and that there is something prior to God, he adds, citing Augustine, that this claim is unacceptable because no entity engenders itself. This principle is a principle of being, in general. In the case of created beings, it is valid because all such beings are caused by other beings. In the case of God, it is valid because He is being as such, uncaused, existing in and of Himself.³⁸ Here, Peter shows his propensity for putting questions pertaining to the doctrine of God on a metaphysical level. At the same time, he recognizes that this may not be sufficient to quell those voluble and argumentative thinkers (*garruli ratiocinatores*) who insist on framing the question in the form of tricky propositions designed to entrap the unwary. As they would have it, if God the Father engenders God, then He engenders a God Who is either God the Father or a God Who is not God the Father. If the latter, then there is more than one God. If the former, then He engenders Himself. Peter's solution is to reformulate the first hypothesis by inserting into it a qualifying term, so that it now asks if God the Father engenders God the Son. Having done so, he can proceed without being constrained, by the form of the proposition, to argue either for ditheism or for the self-generation of the Father, since it can be shown that, although the Father and Son are distinct as persons, and are related to each other as persons by their respective paternity and filiation, they are identical in their divine aseity, with respect to their possession of the divine nature.³⁹

Having shown his colors in the field of logic, Peter makes a point of reminding the reader of the distinction between the divine substance and essence and the divine persons which he has already drawn. While the divine substance and essence can be predicated of all three persons of the Trinity, we cannot predicate a triple personhood of the divine essence without tritheism. With this point kept firmly in mind, we can conclude that the Father does not engender Himself. To do so would be to engender another God. What He engenders is not another God but another person.⁴⁰ Along the same lines, Peter asks whether the Father engenders the divine essence, whether the divine essence engenders the Son, whether the divine essence engenders the divine essence, and

³⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 4. c. 1.1, 1: 77–78.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 1.4, 1: 78. On this point, see also Fortman, *The Triune God*, pp. 196–97.

⁴⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 4. c. 2.1–3, 1: 79–80.

whether the divine essence is neither engendering nor engendered. Having taxed his opponents with confusing the Godhead with the Trinitarian persons and having drawn the clear distinction between them that he draws, Peter proceeds to answer all these questions with a firm "no." The questions, and others like them, are *mal posée*, because they ignore the fact that engendering, and being engendered, are activities that apply, and can only apply, to the Trinitarian persons, and not to the divine essence or substance. Peter concludes this protracted analysis by making three main points. First, and here following Augustine's *De trinitate* 5.7.8, he reminds the reader that the terms Father and Son are relative terms that do not refer to the divine substance. Next, insofar as one can find other texts in Augustine and other authors on the Trinity, such as Hilary of Poitiers, who are less precise in their use of language, he urges that they be understood in the sense of the first Augustinian citation he has given. Finally, he anchors his conclusion by remarking that, in order to emphasize that substance does not engender substance in the Trinity, we should say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are of the same substance as the Father (*eiusdem substantiae cum eo*), capping this observation with a quotation from Augustine's *Contra Maximinum* not brought to bear on this argument by any of his contemporaries to hammer in the idea that the same argument applies to the Holy Spirit as to the Son.⁴¹

The foregoing topic is a good example both of Peter's outlook and of his methodology. While he may initially seize on a point as raised by another recent theologian, he expands on it, connecting it to wider issues and bringing a broader range of authorities and a more penetrating analysis to bear on it. And, while clearly adept at logic, he dislikes the attempt in some quarters to try to collapse metaphysical questions into dialectical ones, especially when the logical propositions used fail to make the proper distinctions in the terms at issue. These same traits inform his handling of a related question, discussed even more widely in the period, as to whether the Father generates the Son by will or necessity. On this point, Augustine had stated that neither was the case, in his *De trinitate*. Some theologians, such as Roland of Bologna and the authors of the *Summa sententiarum* and *Sententiae divinitatis*, are content simply to restate Augustine's conclusion and to let it go at that.⁴² Robert of Melun seeks to go beyond this mode of Augustinian *ipse dixit* by

⁴¹ Ibid., c. 2.4–d. 5. c. 3, 1: 80–88. The quotation is at d. 5. c. 2.17, 1: 87.

⁴² Roland of Bologna, *Die Sentenzen Rolands*, ed. Ambrosius M. Gietl (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1969 [repr. of Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1891 ed.]),

offering some reasoning in support of the same conclusion. To say that the Father engenders the Son either by will or necessity, he notes, would be to imply that there is some cause or constraint under which the Father operates, which is inadmissible. Engendering by nature, on the other hand, requires no such limitations. This is not to say, Robert adds, that the Father did not want to engender the Son. To be sure, He did want to do so; but the conclusion makes it clear that He did so freely.⁴³ On the other side of the debate stood one of the followers of Gilbert of Poitiers, whose response to the question of whether the Father engenders the Son by will or necessity was not “neither” but “both;” according to him, the Father exercises His will here, but in a manner not in contradiction with His nature, and of necessity, but with a necessity not involving constraint.⁴⁴

Amid this spectrum of views, Peter comes the closest to Robert of Melun both in his conclusions and in his mode of attack on the problem, although with a crisper sense of the need to refute the Porretan position. In comparison with Robert, and others who join him in supporting Augustine here, he feels a need to put the question into the framework of the divine nature more fully. He begins by anchoring the answer “neither” with the same Augustinian text that other contemporaries use, but goes on from there. As for the claim that God acts of necessity, he agrees that it is inadmissible, since God does nothing under constraint. Nothing at all, not even His own nature, forces Him to act in any particular way. As for the claim that the Father engenders the Son by will, the problem with an affirmation of this statement is that, if the Father could will to engender the Son, and since His will is unconstrained, He could also will not to engender the Son. This conclusion cannot be sustained, for, as Peter has already explained, engendering and being engendered are eternal and unchanging personal determinations of the Father and Son. In any event, Peter asks, is not God’s will identical with His very being? Yes, he answers, in the sense that everything that is in God is God. He has no attributes that are not His, by nature. But one can also answer this question negatively. For, just as God does not will personally everything that happens in the created universe, this particular reality is not one

p. 31; Bernhard Geyer, ed., *Die Sententiae divinitatis: Ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertischen Schule* 6.B.2.5, Beiträge, 7:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1909), p. 165*; *Summa sent.* 1.7, PL 176: 53C–54C.

⁴³ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.4.17, 1.4.19, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 133–35, 139–90.

⁴⁴ Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., “Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* I” 2.37, *AHDLMA* 45 (1978): 119.

subject to His will. Willing involves making a decision. Decision-making is an activity that occurs in time. There was not and cannot be a prior decision on the part of the Father at some point in time to engender the Son. For, to admit that conclusion would be to grant the Father priority to the Son, in point of time, or in point of power. But, the Father and the Son are equal in power, and equal in eternity, although They manifest these qualities, in Their mutual interrelations, as begetter and begotten.⁴⁵ This argument serves to emphasize at the same time God's freedom, in the sense of His exemption from both internal and external constraints, and the idea that the transcendent Trinitarian relationships are eternal and are not occasioned by time and circumstance. At the same time, Peter can reemphasize, against the Abelardians, the point that no Trinitarian person is preeminent in any one of the determinations of the divine essence, even as he thereby criticizes current heretics who deny full divinity to the Son.⁴⁶

In addition to this painstaking consideration of the relation between the Father and the Son, stemming as it does not only from the challenge of Christological heresies in this period but also from the debates among orthodox theologians, Peter displays a deep concern with the theology of the Holy Spirit. Not only does he devote extended attention to the intratrinitarian status of the Spirit but he also has much to say about His mission *ad extra*. The first of these concerns springs both from the ongoing need to defend the western doctrine of the double procession of the Holy Spirit against the Greek church and from Peter's more general interest in finding a purely intratrinitarian way of defining the Holy Spirit as a Trinitarian person, in aid of his larger project of clearly distinguishing divine persons in Their unmanifested state from the divine nature. At the same time, he reflects a contemporary interest in the role of the Holy Spirit in the religious lives of Christians. The attention he pays to this subject stems from a felt need to explore it more fully. But it was also triggered, to a very considerable extent, by the handling of the Holy Spirit by Abelard. Peter's treatment of the Holy Spirit indicates that he has paid careful attention to the dossier of authorities assembled by Abelard on this topic, both in the *Sic et non* and in his successive theological works, and also that the tactic of brute denunciation used by critics of Abelard's position, such as Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St. Thierry, did not constitute an adequate mode of refutation that could still pay

⁴⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 6. c. 1–d. 7. c. 2.3, 1: 89–94.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, d. 9. c. 1–c. 5, 1: 103–10.

honor to Abelard's desire to emphasize a feature of Trinitarian theology whose importance Peter freely conceded.

The Critique of Abelard

Because Abelard's teaching on the Holy Spirit supplies such vital background, both positively and negatively, for Peter's own, and because the contemporary polemics surrounding it often sparked more heat than light, it is worth outlining this debate, noting both the constants in Abelard's position and the shifts in his treatment of it over time. To begin with, a large part of the problem lay in the fact that Abelard's doctrine of the Holy Spirit was tied in with his assertion that the doctrine of the Trinity could be known by natural reason, and that Plato's *Timaeus* and other philosophical works in the Platonic tradition served to document that claim. This position is one which Abelard stated with no qualifications in his earliest theology, the *Theologia* "*summi boni*".⁴⁷ Another complication is that from the outset, Abelard invoked the doctrine of *fabula* or *involucrum*, the exegetical technique of peeling away metaphorical veils to arrive at a core of doctrine that had itself been framed in allegorical terms by its author, to explain his reading of the Platonists. This technique was associated in the contemporary mind with the doctrine of creation, stemming from the *Timaeus*, currently under investigation by thinkers associated with the school of Chartres.

Two points must be made about this association, or lack of it, between Abelard and the Chartrains, especially since it engendered confusion at the time, confusion which is still with us in some quarters. In the first place, there is a detectable family resemblance among the thinkers committed to the Chartrain project, despite their individual differences, and irrespective of whether they themselves studied or taught at Chartres,⁴⁸ a family resemblance that distinguishes them from Abelard. The Chartrains have two principal traits in common. First, they are not primarily interested in theology, either Trinitarian theology as such or the charismatic

⁴⁷ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "summi boni"* praefatio, 1.5.38–39, ed. Constant J. Mews, CCCM 13: 85, 98–99. The preface states plainly, p. 85, "quod fidem trinitatis omnes homines naturaliter habent." Cf. Walter Simonis, *Trinität und Vernunft: Untersuchungen zur Möglichkeit einer rationalen Trinitätslehre bei Anselm, Abaelard, den Viktorinern, A. Günther und J. Froschammer* (Frankfurt: Josef Knecht, 1972), pp. 43–49, who claims that, while Abelard goes farther in this direction than anyone in his time, he is not a total rationalist.

⁴⁸ The repeated attempt to torpedo the idea of the school of Chartres by Richard W. Southern, "Humanism and the School of Chartres," in *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 61–85; *Platonism*,

activities of the divine persons in the religious lives of Christians. Rather, they are cosmologists. Their chief interest in the Trinity is as a source of cosmic causation. After considering the way the universe was brought into being, the Chartrains stop discussing the deity and turn their attention to their real subject, the structure and function of the phenomenal world. In the second place, in reading the *Timaeus* and related philosophical literature, they are dealing with texts whose authors presented teachings on natural science and cosmogenesis in the form of allegory and myth. Thus, the Chartrains' use of *involucrum* as an exegetical technique is addressed to the task of finding the literal meaning set forth indirectly by these texts.

On the other hand, Abelard is primarily a theologian. He is deeply interested in the Trinity, which constitutes most of what he has to say in his *theologiae* under the heading of faith, the beliefs that Christians have to possess in order to be saved. He is also deeply interested in the charismatic role of the Holy Spirit in the Christian life. While he does address cosmogenesis in his *Hexaameron* and while he does not hesitate to bring philosophy to bear on that subject, the *Hexaameron* is a late work of his, undertaken in response to queries from Heloise and her nuns, which situates the subject in the exegetical tradition of Genesis commentary. As a theologian Abelard is not particularly concerned with the structure and function of the physical universe. Unlike many sentence collectors of the period, he does not deal with the creation in his theologies. Secondly, while he invokes the language of *fabula* and *involucrum*, his use of it is quite different from that of the Chartrains. Where they seek to extrapolate literal truths about cosmology from pagan authors who expressed themselves allegorically, Abelard seeks to read literal statements from the Platonic philosophers as assertions of theological truths about the Trinity, found in revelation, which, all other

Scholastic Method, and the School of Chartres (Reading: University of Reading, 1979); and "The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 113–37, has, in our view, been refuted successfully by Peter Dronke, "New Approaches to the School of Chartres," *Anuario de estudios medievales* 6 (1969): 117–40; Nikolaus M. Häring, "Paris and Chartres Revisited," in *Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis*, ed. J. Reginald O'Donnell (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 268–329; and Hans Liebeschütz, "Kosmologische Motive in der Bildungswelt der Frühscholastik," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, 1923–24, pp. 110–43. The most recent guide to the literature of this debate, which also criticizes Southern's thesis, is Olga Weijers, "The Chronology of John of Salisbury's Studies in France (Metalogicon, II. 10)," in *The World of John of Salisbury*, ed. Michael Wilks, *Studies in Church History, Subsidia*, 3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 114–16.

Christians held, were mysteries of the Christian faith. In the twelfth century itself, a double confusion was perpetrated by William of St. Thierry. Reading with more prejudice, haste, and zeal than comprehension, he accused Abelard of reducing Trinitarian theology to physical science, while at the same time he accused William of Conches of teaching a rationalist doctrine of the Trinity.⁴⁹ This confusion, on one side or another, has been perpetuated by some modern scholars,⁵⁰ although we are indebted to a distinguished host of others for sorting out the differences between Abelard and the Chartreans in this connection.⁵¹ This is not to say that the

⁴⁹ William of St. Thierry, *De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis*, PL 180: 333A–D.

⁵⁰ See, for instance, Hennig Brinckmann, "Verhüllung ('integumentum') als literarische Darstellung im Mittelalter," in *Der Begriff der Repräsentation im Mittelalter: Stellvertretung, Symbol, Zeichen, Bild*, ed. Albert Zimmermann (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), pp. 321–22, 328–29; Wilfried Hartmann, "Manegold von Lautenbach und die Anfänge der Frühscholastik," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 26 (1970): 78–79, 82; Edward Filene Little, "The Heresies of Peter Abelard," University of Montreal Ph.D. diss., 1969, pp. 191–92, 222–30; Enzo Maccagnolo, trans., *Il Divino e il megacosmo: Testi filosofici e scientifici della scuola di Chartres* (Milan: Rusconi, 1980), p. 74; Simonis, *Trinität und Vernunft*, pp. 51–53; Anneliese Stollenwerk, "Der Genesiskommentar Thierrys von Chartres und die Thierry von Chartres zugeschriebenen Kommentare zu Boethius 'De trinitate'," University of Cologne Ph.D. diss., 1971, pp. 5–8, 37.

⁵¹ Among the scholars who have clarified this point may be noted Joseph A. Dane, "Integumentum as Interpretation: Note on William of Conches' Commentary on Macrobius (1, 2, 10–11)," *Classical Folia* 32 (1978): 201–15; Peter Dronke, *Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), pp. 14–67, 100–13, 178; Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchiere [Fumagalli] and Massimo Parodi, *Storia della filosofia medievale da Boezio a Wyclif* (Bari: Laterza, 1989), pp. 214–15, 226; Tullio Gregory, "Abelard et Platon," in *Peter Abelard*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), pp. 42–46, 51; *Anima mundi: La filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres* (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1955), pp. 126–32; "Il *Timeo* e i problemi del platonismo medievale," in *Platonismo medievale: Studi e ricerche*, Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo, studi storici, 26–27 (Rome: Sede dell'Istituto, 1958), pp. 122–50; "L'anima mundi nella filosofia del XII secolo," *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 30 (1951): 494–508; Édouard Jeuneau, "L'usage de la notion d'*Integumentum* à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches," in "Lectio philosophorum": *Recherches sur l'École de Chartres* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1973), pp. 127–79; Lawrence Moonan, "Abelard's Use of the *Timaeus*," *AHDLMA* 56 (1989): 33–41, 55–72; Brian Stock, *Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard Silvester* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 43–62; Winthrop Wetherbee, *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 30–34, 36–48; intro. to his trans. of Bernard Silvestris, *The Cosmographia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 10–12. See also Eileen Kearney, "Peter Abelard as a Biblical Commentator: A Study of the Expositio in Hexaemeron," in *Petrus Abaelardus (1079–1142): Person, Werk und Wirkung*, ed. Rudolf Thomas (Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1980), pp. 199–210; Ludwig Ott, "Die platonische Weltseele in der Theologie der Frühscholastik," in *Parusia: Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger*, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt: Minerva GMBH, 1965), pp. 308–15; J. M. Parent, *La doctrine de la creation dans l'école de Chartres* (Paris/Ottawa:

comparisons between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with the Platonic One, Nous, and World Soul are unproblematic, in either of these quarters. But it helps considerably to see that a different set of problems is associated with the Abelardian and with the Chartrain projects.

Considering the reactions to his *Theologia "summi boni"*, Abelard appears to have nuanced his position on the Holy Spirit in his later works. In the *Theologia christiana*, while continuing to argue that the Platonic doctrine of the World Soul is a *fabula* or *involucrum*, in his own sense of the term,⁵² he now describes the Holy Spirit more guardedly as endowing the universe with life, as it were (*quasi vitam universitatis posuit*) and emphasizes that the Holy Spirit is not on an ontological level subordinate to that of the Father and the Son but that He is consubstantial with the Father and Son.⁵³ But if Abelard draws back somewhat in his second *theologia*, he returns to the fray in his third theological work, the *Theologia "scholarium"*, trying to advance his cause with new arguments and expanding his brief to include the Son as the Platonic Nous side by side with the Holy Spirit as the Platonic World Soul. He restates his earlier position on the pagans' rational grasp of the doctrine of the Trinity, which, he states, they foreshadowed fully as much as the doctrine of monotheism. Evidently, however, he is now willing to concede that more than reason was required. The Platonists, he now asserts, were recipients of divine grace, enabling them to perceive and to teach the Trinitarian faith in all its details.⁵⁴ This effort to cast Plato as a Christian inspired by grace is bolstered by Abelard with two new and equally shaky arguments. In one section of this work, Abelard seeks to exculpate Plato's theology from the charge of subordinationism by arguing that, for Plato, the Nous and World Soul were coeternal with the One and that they were on the same metaphysical level.⁵⁵ This misconstruction of Plato is accompanied by citations from other philosophers whose theology, as Abelard presents it, is compatible with the doctrine of the Trinity. Among these he cites Seneca, who, as a Stoic, was both a monotheist and a monist,

J. Vrin/Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1938), pp. 37–58, 70–81; J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 67–68; Stollenwerk, "Der Genesiskommentar," pp. 49–50; Haijo Jan Westra, intro. to his ed. of *The Commentary on Martianus Capella's De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), pp. 23–33.

⁵² Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 1.98–107, CCCM 12: 112–17.

⁵³ Ibid., 1.71–78, 1.96, 1.123, CCCM 12: 101–04, 124.

⁵⁴ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "scholarium"* praefatio, 1.94–103, 1.107–09, 1.123–34, CCCM 13: 313–14, 356–58, 360–61, 368–73.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 2.174, CCCM 13: 492.

treating as authentic the correspondence between Seneca and St. Paul forged in the fourth century.⁵⁶ While Abelard continues to describe the Platonic Nous and World Soul doctrine as an *involutum*, he also continues to read a literal Platonic teaching as a statement about Christian theology,⁵⁷ although he softens this assertion to some extent by stating that all theological statements and all applications of logic to theology need to be understood not literally but metaphorically (*translative*).⁵⁸ This disclaimer notwithstanding, however, his conclusion remains “that all men may have faith in the Trinity by nature” (*Quod fidem trinitatis omnes homines naturaliter habeant*).⁵⁹ And, the functions which Abelard ascribes to the Son and the Holy Spirit in the *Theologia “scholarium”* are scarcely free from difficulties. As the embodiment of the Platonic Nous, the Son, he says, can be understood as the exemplary forms of created beings in the mind of God, while the Holy Spirit, as the World Soul, is the providential order in which God disposes the creation, as well as the donor of charisms to men.⁶⁰

Now, there was more than one way to handle the idea of exemplary causes in the tradition of Christian Platonism. One could, with Augustine, equate them with the mind of God, making them neither Platonic forms understandable as prior to or independent of the deity nor as primordial causes brought into being by the deity with which He shares the work of creation. Or, with John Scottus Eriugena, one could regard them as created and creative, in the second category of John’s divisions of nature. Both of these possibilities were considered by Hugh of St. Victor and by the Chartrains. Abelard does not really indicate where, in this tradition, he wants to position his own view of exemplary causes and whether, or how, he can deal with the problem of making the Son less than coeternal with the Father and as distinct enough from creatures so that He cannot be seen as identical with the forms of individual substances. As for the Holy Spirit as World Soul, Abelard wants to maintain that He is equal with the Father and the Son, and that, in this respect, He proceeds from both of Them. Yet, the Holy Spirit is treated here as an aspect or an effect of creation, and not as a creative force Himself. Since the sole functions Abelard grants to Him have to do with the management of the created universe and

⁵⁶ Ibid., 1.198, CCCM 13: 403–04.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 1.147–48, CCCM 13: 379–80.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 2.80–93, CCCM 13: 447–58.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 2.182–83, CCCM 13: 497, continuing on this point through 2.184, p. 498.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 1.37, 2.172–73, CCCM 13: 333, 491–92.

with the inner lives of Christians, it is not at all clear how the Holy Spirit can be seen as coeternal with the Father and the Son, and not as coming into being in order to undertake these cosmological and charismatic assignments once the world and man have been created. Abelard's Holy Spirit would seem to have had no role at all prior to the creation of the universe and man. His activities seem to depend on the existence of a temporal, phenomenal order.

Abelard does not resolve any of these problems in his *Theologia "scholarium"*, but he does make one final attempt to soften his position in his *Dialectica*, the last work in which he takes up any of these arguments. Here, he does draw a distinction between the Holy Spirit as a member of the Trinitarian family, coeternal, consubstantial, and coequal with the Father and Son, and the Holy Spirit as manifested in the creation. This Trinitarian person can be differentiated, as a being, from His functions in time, with respect to human beings. In the *Dialectica*, Abelard drops entirely the cosmological dimension of the work of the Holy Spirit as described in the *Theologia "scholarium"* and, with equal, if late-blooming prudence, he leaves out the Son or Nous as a provider of exemplary forms. He also now treats the Platonic World Soul as an allegorical reference to the way in which the Holy Spirit spreads His gifts in the souls of believers, rather than describing it as a literal parallel to the third person of the Trinity.⁶¹

In comparing Abelard's handling of the Holy Spirit, in any of these incarnations, with Peter Lombard's doctrine of the Trinity as manifested, four points are immediately noticeable. In the first place, Peter rejects early on the notion of the manifestations of the Trinity, as known by revelation, as having any anticipations or parallels in the pagan philosophers or as accessible to human reason by nature. Rather, as we have seen, it is the divine nature of the unmanifested Trinity which natural reason and earlier philosophy are able to clarify. When it comes to the manifested Trinity, Peter is an unabashed fideist. In this connection, he expresses the orthodox consensus of his time. Secondly, Peter is not interested in talking about cosmology, in any sense, under the heading of the activities of the individual Trinitarian persons. He deals with the creation in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, and God's governance of the world, later in Book 1, under a different heading altogether, that of the activities of the Godhead as such, in which all the Trinitarian

⁶¹ Peter Abelard, *Dialectica* 5.1.4, 2nd ed., ed. L. M. DeRijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970), pp. 558–59. These shifts in Abelard's position are also noted by Dronke, *Fabula*, p. 178.

persons jointly and equally share. Thirdly, he draws heavily on a point he had made earlier, the incommutability and transcendence of the Trinitarian persons, in Their divine nature, vis-à-vis other beings, to strengthen the distinction, hinted at by Abelard in the *Dialectica*, between the Holy Spirit as unmanifested and as manifested in His charisms. And, finally, Peter expands considerably on the mission of the Holy Spirit to man, in comparison both with Abelard and with other contemporary thinkers who take up this topic, with the possible exception of Rupert of Deutz.

Peter's opening salvo is the observation that, in His mission to man as sanctifier in the temporal order, just as in His intratrinitarian role in the eternal order, the Holy Spirit proceeds equally from the Father and the Son. In both respects, He can be called love (*amor, caritas, dilectio*) in a special sense. Although, to be sure, we can say that "God is love," as the apostle John does, with reference to the divine nature as such, and with reference to all the persons of the Trinity as well. Yet, in His intratrinitarian role, and this harks back to Augustine's Trinitarian analogies, the Holy Spirit is the love bonding the Father and the Son and flowing from both of Them. In this understanding of the Holy Spirit as love one has a being fully consubstantial with the persons Whose love He is. And, in contrast with Abelard's handling of the Holy Spirit, whether as goodness or as the World Soul, one has, in this determination, a rock-solid defense against the position of the Greeks. One also has a way of explaining why the terms begotten and unbegotten do not refer appropriately to the Holy Spirit in this context, since the flow of mutual love makes comprehensible another mode of derivation, namely double procession.⁶² While Peter takes from other theologians, notably Abelard and the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, a number of cues as to which authorities to make use of here, his argument on the double procession of the Holy Spirit against the Greeks calls upon an authority he names as Jerome, but who has been identified by Ignatius Brady as Syagrius, author of the *Regulis definitionum contra haereticos*, on the point that the unbegotten-begotten language is not appropriate to the Holy Spirit, and why. As Peter notes, "Jerome" has a different understanding of these terms from Augustine, the authority on whom all western theologians rely. Augustine means by *ingenitus* underived from anyone else. "Jerome," on the other hand, means by *ingenitus non-genitus*, that is to say, not born, leaving the way open to the idea of procession. For its part, the term *genitus* has to be ruled out, for the

⁶² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 10–d. 13, 1: 110–25.

Holy Spirit, otherwise there would be more than one Son in the Trinity. As Brady has noted, the Lombard is the only theologian of his time to have known and to have made use of Syagrius, and his application of this authority makes possible a clearer exposition of the doctrine in question that anyone else achieves.⁶³

In His mission to men, as well, Peter argues that there is a double procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, and that, although the task of diffusing charity into the hearts of men and enabling them to love both God and their neighbors is the work of the entire Trinity, this mission is entrusted by the entire Trinity to the Holy Spirit. There are two central points Peter wishes to emphasize in developing this position. First, since the Holy Spirit is equal to the Father and the Son, in carrying out His charismatic activities He communicates the grace of the whole Trinity. Secondly, and here he relies heavily on Bede and on his own earlier argument, Peter stresses that what the Holy Spirit gives is divine grace. He gives the gift of grace; He does not communicate Himself or the divine essence as such to the believers who receive His charisms.⁶⁴ Here, Peter harks back to the distinction between God's essence, as incommutable, and the personal determinations of the Trinitarian persons vis-à-vis each other, on the one hand, and, on the other, the effects of divine action as manifested in the created world and in the sanctification of Christians. This distinction must be preserved in order to avoid any trace of pantheism or participationism in considering the interactions between God and creatures. In speaking of the Holy Spirit as the love bonding believers to each other, and to God, therefore, Peter means, strictly, the effects of the Holy Spirit, which assist man in developing the virtue of charity and other virtues. The notion of the Holy Spirit as charity in His mission to man was later rejected by Thomas Aquinas and some other thirteenth-century scholastics.⁶⁵ In taking that line, they appear to have read Peter as the participationist that he decidedly was not, and either objected to his position on that account or wished to advance a different way of viewing the effects of grace, under the headings of created grace or Aristotelian *habitus*.

Understanding the reception of the Holy Spirit in the sense that Peter gives to that idea, he next raises the question of whether

⁶³ Brady, *Sent.* 1: 125 n. *ad loc.*

⁶⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 14. c. 1-c. 2, 1: 126-28.

⁶⁵ Noted by Fortman, *The Tribune God*, p. 197; Edward A. Synan, "Brother Thomas, the Master, and the Masters," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies*, 2 vols., ed. Armand A. Maurer et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 2: 227.

believers who receive this gift can transfer it to other men. Peter comes down squarely on the negative side of this debate. People who receive the gifts of the Spirit, he argues, do so according to a purely human capacity. They do not become divinized in the event. Insofar as they accept these gifts in order to minister to other people, the ministers, in that capacity, serve only as instruments through whom God communicates His grace to others. It is always God Who gives the gifts of the Holy Spirit, whether He does so in a direct way or through human agents.⁶⁶ Peter's handling of this point illustrates well, and reinforces, his temperamental disinclination to view the Christian's incorporation into the order of grace through the gifts of the Holy Spirit as anything more than his achievement of his full humanity.

Pausing briefly to observe that the Holy Spirit both gives and is given, His temporal procession being both His own *donatio* and an *operatio* of God as such,⁶⁷ Peter moves on to the point that this temporal mission is twofold, and this in two respects. First, and in this connection there is a parallel here with the temporal mission of the Son, there is the visible mission of the Holy Spirit, in the form of a dove, as well as His invisible workings in the souls of men. Second, the first stage of His temporal mission, like the Son's, occurs in the historical past, during the earthly life of Christ, while the second, or current stage, takes place in the ecclesiastical dispensation, following Christ's resurrection and sending forth of His apostles.⁶⁸ In the case of both the Son and the Holy Spirit, then, there is an eternal process of filiation, or spiration, as the case may be, and a two-stage temporal mission. At the same time, Peter is careful to alert his reader to a point he plans to develop in detail in the third book of the *Sentences*. The temporal missions of the Holy Spirit are not strictly analogous to those of the Son. For in the case of the manifestation of the Son to mankind, we have the union of the Word, as a Trinitarian person, with human nature in the incarnate Christ. This personal union continues to be the mode by which the Word interacts with mankind in the ecclesiastical dispensation.⁶⁹ The same is not the case with the Holy Spirit. This contrast has been inserted here to reinforce the observations made by Peter above, concerning the difference between the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit Himself. In completing his discus-

⁶⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 14. c. 3, 1: 129–30. For the debate on this issue, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 1: 169–85.

⁶⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 15. c. 1.1–3, 1: 130–31.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, d. 16. c. 1.1–2, 1: 138–39.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, d. 15. c. 5–c. 8, d. 16. c. 4–c. 5, 1: 134–37, 139–40.

sion of the invisible mission of the Spirit in the hearts of the faithful, he continues to insist on this distinction. The Holy Spirit does not communicate Himself, as the divine substance. His gifts are not to be understood as pantheistic substitutions of divine virtue for human capacity. Rather, they are to be understood as forms of empowerment, stimuli enabling the believer to develop moral and spiritual potentialities that are strictly human. These gifts are given as He wills, and not to the same degree in all people. When they are received, we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is "in us" in the same way in which our natural created spirit is part of our natural human constitution. Reminding the reader that this whole topic of the temporal mission of the Holy Spirit is one of those areas in which we speak of God in a relative sense with respect to time (*de his quae relative dicuntur de Deo ex tempore*), he concludes his discussion of the Holy Spirit, fuller by far than what we find in other contemporary theologians, by observing that he plans to treat these gifts further, in another place.⁷⁰ This he does, as we will see below in chapter 8, in his consideration of man's moral life.

THE DIVINE NATURE IN RELATION TO THE CREATION

The remaining topics dealing with the doctrine of God which Peter addresses in Book 1 of his *Sentences* all concern features of the deity looked at from the standpoint of the divine nature as such, rather than from the perspective of the Trinity. He has carefully laid the foundation for all the questions he treats here, in his earlier discussion of the total coinherence of all the divine determinations in the divine essence and also in his insistence on the point that the incommutable deity remains transcendent of, and unconsumed by, His manifestations of Himself to other beings or His interactions with them. In one way or another, these principles inform Peter's handling of all the questions remaining under the heading of the deity, questions which are all, in this sense, interconnected in his presentation of them. There are three principal issues which he treats here, all responsive to contemporary debates, and all providing occasions for Peter not only to offer his solutions to these debates but also to put his own distinctive doctrine of God to work in so doing. These issues all involve the way in which the deity interacts with the world and could be taken up in any order. We will consider first the problem of God's ubiquity; then the relation

⁷⁰ Ibid., d. 17. c. 1–d. 18. c. 5.2, 1: 141–59. The quotation is at d. 18. c. 5.2, 1: 189.

between God's foreknowledge, predestination, and providence and freedom and contingency in the created order; and, finally, the most vexed question of all in this area, the question of whether God could do better, or different, than He does.

God's Ubiquity

While God's ubiquity was not a topic that inspired accusations of heresy in this period, it did draw considerable attention, and it affords an excellent vantage point from which we can view approaches to the divine nature in the early twelfth century, and what Peter thought needed clarification in this area. Early in the century, a number of theologians took a stand on God's ubiquity that made them liable to the charge of an immanentism so unqualified that it was indistinguishable from pantheism. Anselm of Laon typifies this problem, without being conscious that such is the case. He states that "the divine essence is essentially in all things" (*divina essentia essentialiter sit in omnibus*). At the same time, he contradicts himself later in the same passage by stating that God's presence in creatures "is not to be understood essentially" (*non est intelligendum essentialiter*).⁷¹ Anselm's followers compound the difficulty. Agreeing that God is in all creatures *essentialiter*, they add, without explanation, that this essential divine presence may occur in different ways in different creatures and that this presence may be thought of as well as the divine power and substance (*potentia, substantia*).⁷² A similar position is taken by Robert Pullen, who holds that God is ubiquitous "not only potentially but also essentially, not as divided into parts but as completely everywhere" (*non solum potentialiter sed et essentialiter, non per partes divisus, sed ubique totus*), although without His purity being affected or His infinity being circumscribed spatially.⁷³

Understandably, some theologians in our period were made more than a little nervous by such claims and sought ways of retaining the idea of God's ubiquity that would not force them to fall into this kind of pantheistic morass. Early in the century, Honorius Augustodunensis offered one sort of solution. God dwells everywhere, *potentialiter*, he argues, although substantially He

⁷¹ Anselm of Laon, *Sententie divine pagine* 1, ed. Franz P. Bliemetzrieder in *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, Beiträge, 18:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919), p. 5.

⁷² *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 286, 288, 315, ed. Odon Lottin in *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, vols. 1–5 (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1948–59), 5: 232, 233, 251.

⁷³ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 1.9, *PL* 186: 689C–690A. The quotation is at 689C.

dwells in the intellectual heaven.⁷⁴ Honorius essays no explanation of what any of these terms mean, which may be the reason why this particular effort to combine God's ubiquity with His transcendence had no takers later in the century. For his part, Hugh of St. Victor gives a critique of the pantheist reading of God's ubiquity and little else. God, he argues, is not substantially or essentially present in corporeal beings. Since He is infinite, He cannot be physically circumscribed.⁷⁵ This treatment of the problem confines the ubiquity issue to creatures that have bodies. And, while it denies the pantheist mode of divine ubiquity, Hugh does not indicate if there is a positive concept of divine ubiquity that he can support. In relation to Hugh, the author of the *Summa sententiarum* takes one step backward and one step ahead. He agrees that God cannot be localized and that God is pervasive in the universe, substantially. He states that what he means by "substantial" in this connection is not the presence of God's essence in creatures, but rather God's effects in the order and disposition of mutable beings, as a cause and *per dispositionem*. Yet, despite this apparent backing away from total immanentalism, he continues to insist that the divine substance is everywhere (*Haec divina substantia ubique tota est, et in ipsa sunt omnia*).⁷⁶ If he is serious about the qualifications he makes, one wonders why he retains an idea of substance that leads him to this contradictory conclusion. For his part, the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, agreeing that God cannot be bounded spatially and that He is immutable, urges that He is not omnipresent in the world *essentialiter*; rather, He is ubiquitous as the sustainer of the universe, *per sustentationem*.⁷⁷ But, on the manner in which God performs this function he remains silent.

The author in Peter's environment who comes the closest to him in offering a positive alternative to an essentialist or substantialist way of understanding divine ubiquity, and who presents an account that bears some relation to the rest of his doctrine of God, is Robert of Melun. He situates this question in the context of God as cause, in relation to created beings as causes, and in the context of God as a being in comparison with the *esse* of other beings. He draws the same kind of distinction here as undergirds his handling

⁷⁴ Honorius Augustodunensis, *Elucidarium* 1.10, ed. Yves Lefèvre in *L'Elucidarium et les lucidaires: Contribution, par l'histoire d'un texte, à l'histoire des croyances religieuses en France au moyen âge* (Paris: É. de Boccard, 1954), p. 362.

⁷⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.3.17, *PL* 176: 224B–D. Noted by Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre*, pp. 91–102.

⁷⁶ *Summa sent.* 1.4, *PL* 176: 48B–49A. The quotation is at 48B.

⁷⁷ *Sent. div.* 6.A, pp. 156*–158*.

of these related issues in his proof of God's existence. According to Robert, in understanding God's mode of presence in the universe, one must differentiate between what is being, simply (*quid sit aliquid simpliciter esse*) and what is being by derivation from something else (*aliquid ex aliquibus esse*). Simple, underived being is necessary being (*ipsum esse necesse est*) and is God. Now, he continues, we can attribute the word *esse* properly both to God and to creatures, depending on whether we are using the term to denote simple or derived being, respectively. Whichever choice we make, we then have to use *esse* with a transferred meaning (*translatio verborum*) in applying it to the other kind of being. Robert then offers a lengthy discussion of the propriety of the similitudes that result, when the verbal traffic goes in either direction, including a consideration of the *via negativa*. But his whole line of argument is designed to refute the claims of those theologians who defend the idea that God shares His essence with creatures, that He is substantially present in the creation, or that He serves as the form of created beings. The differences between simple, underived being and created being which he has outlined make this kind of arrangement a metaphysical impossibility. As Robert concludes, God is not ubiquitous by His essence, but by His governance and by His effects in the creation.⁷⁸ An unusual way of posing the question in itself, Robert's handling of the ubiquity problem is also interesting in that, while he presents it, in the first instance, as a metaphysical issue, he resolves it largely by means of a semantic argument.

As we turn from Robert of Melun to Peter Lombard on God's ubiquity and His mode of presence in creation we note a similar interest in rejecting an immanent or pantheistic approach to the subject and a similar concern with avoiding the blurring or mixing of two different types of being. For his part, however, Peter attacks the problem in a different way, and positions it on a wider canvas. He begins by observing that God can be in other things by essence, power, and presence. As for the first, there is one and only one non-divine being with which God unites Himself essentially. This is the man Jesus in the incarnation of Christ. Both the human and the divine natures of Christ are retained, without being blended into a *tertium quid* in the hypostatic union. Just as the incarnate Christ is, metaphysically speaking, *sui generis*, so this case is the unique instance of God's essential union with a creature, and is the exception that proves the rule. Peter mentions this exception in order to

⁷⁸ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.5.46–55, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 258–76. A good treatment of this point is found in Ulrich Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre des Robert von Melun* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald Verlag, 1964), pp. 294–317.

get the topic of God's essential union with creatures off the agenda more generally, as a fundamentally inappropriate way of regarding God's presence in the world. With respect to other existing beings, he continues, God is present in them as the ground of their being. He exercises this ontological function without thereby serving as their form or definition. With this analysis of the divine ubiquity, grounded in the structure of being, in place, Peter proceeds to use it to explain how God can be present in all times and places without being conditioned or circumscribed by location or change.

Moving beyond God's presence, in this sense, in the order of creation, Peter also considers His presence in the order of grace. To be sure, the dwelling of the deity in the saints by grace has to be distinguished from His ubiquity in the universe, since all creatures require a ground of being without exception, and in the same way, while not all men are saints and, even among those who are, their charisms differ. The point of contact or carryover between the order of creation and the order of grace, for Peter, is the idea that God exercises His power in these two zones in directly parallel ways. In neither area does He communicate His essence or substance. Rather, what He communicates is His power (*virtus*). And, in both cases, He communicates this *virtus* in such a way as to leave intact the creaturely status of the beings to which, or to whom, He communicates it. Just as there is no blending or merging of the divine nature with the natures of created beings in the world, so His dwelling in the saints through His grace in no sense divinizes them or alters their purely human status. Harking back to the observations he had made on the temporal mission of the Holy Spirit, Peter emphasizes that God's relationships with the world, whether direct or indirect and whether all-inclusive or centered on the elect, do not involve the participation of one kind of being into another kind of being.⁷⁹ And, as to Peter's positive understanding of God's presence in the world and in the inner life of man, he offers here, as we have seen, the distinction between essence and *virtus*, a notion he specifies still more clearly by distinguishing, with respect to God's love, its eternity and immutability *secundum essentiam*, and its distribution to different people differently, *secundum efficientiam*.⁸⁰ In all these respects, Peter's treatment of the ubiquity question is even more broadly gauged than Robert of Melun's. It provides a corrective to immanentism that rests on his clear and systematically

⁷⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 37. c. 1.1–c. 3.5, 1: 263–68. A good discussion is found in Ludwig Ott, *Untersuchung zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik*, Beiträge, 34 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1937), pp. 208–11.

⁸⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 32, 2: 184–87. The quotations are on p. 186.

applied distinction between the transcendent deity, incommutable in His essence, and the effects of His working in nature and grace, which both grounds all created beings in a metaphysically prior order of being and empowers those human beings who are called and chosen to attain the fullness of their human nature.

God's Foreknowledge, Province, and Predestination and Free Will and Contingency

Another constellation of questions concerning the divine nature in God's relation to the world that received wide attention in the first half of the twelfth century was the problem of God's foreknowledge, His providence, and His predestination in relation to free will, the agency of secondary causes, and contingency. In addressing this topic, twelfth-century thinkers had a range of authorities on whom to draw, authorities who accented different aspects of the problem and who harnessed it to different agendas. Even within the same author one could find a different emphasis, at different points in his oeuvre. Augustine, one of the most important of these resources, had drawn a sharp distinction between God's foreknowledge, as neutral, and His providence, as affording a sizeable space for the agency of secondary causes, in the effort to place the sole responsibility for moral evil on the misdirected use of human free will, in his early and in his anti-Manichean works. Later, faced with the need to refute the Pelagians, he had retained the notion of God's foreknowledge as neutral, and, while also retaining the idea that His providence includes both events He causes directly in the natural order and those effected by other agents, he had emphasized predestination as God's direct causation in the order of redemption and had decreased the scope of free will. Another important authority in this area was Boethius. While familiar with Augustine's treatments of this problem, he sought, in his *Consolation of Philosophy*, to include fate within the scenario, as the bearer of good and bad fortune but as operating under the ultimate control of the deity, while emphasizing the rational transcendence of the turmoil and suffering that misfortune could bring in the light of that broader understanding of it. Earlier, however, he had treated these issues in a much more strictly logical manner, in his translation of and commentary on Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, the *locus classicus* of the Stagirite's treatment of necessity, possibility, and contingency. Aristotle himself was concerned in this work both with the modes of causation and contingency that occur in the natural order, which can be tested empirically, and with possibility and necessity in

the order of logic. For his part, Boethius as a commentator had accented the logical side of Aristotle's analysis, and had not hesitated to reformulate some of the Stagirite's arguments, turning them into propositions verifiable in terms of formal logic and not in terms of their empirical testability.

In examining the approaches taken to these questions by Peter, his contemporaries, and his immediate predecessors, one is struck by the one-sidedness of the address of many of them to the resources provided by both the theological tradition and the school tradition on these matters. A number of authors touch only on a few aspects of the problem and omit much else. Some confine themselves only to the implications of the doctrine for man's moral life or salvation. There is not a clear consensus, across the period, as to which divine attribute this constellation of ideas should be seen as illustrating. In some quarters, a purely logical approach is taken, to the point of excluding the theological dimensions of the topic. Some authors get hopelessly tangled up in formulations of the subject that leave them impacted with the detritus of their own poorly framed questions. In the judgment of Calvin Normore, Peter Lombard's handling of this subject was the most influential of any thinker of the twelfth century, and deservedly so. Not only does Peter display a wide-angle approach to it, a sureness of touch as to how to address it, and solid arguments against the positions with which he disagrees, but his positive treatment of the doctrine grounds it firmly in the principle of God's knowledge.⁸¹ This strategy enables Peter to take account of the idea of possibility in the fields of logic and natural philosophy without confining it to those modes of thought, thus drawing together the Boethian-Aristotelian emphasis of his principal antagonist, Abelard, with a stress on the importance of the subject from the perspective of the divine nature, on the theological side of the debate.

Since Abelard set so much of the agenda here, it is worth beginning with his attack on the problem. The first and most important point to be made is that Abelard viewed this whole issue primarily as a logical, not as a theological, one. He takes it up, initially, in his early logical works, written before he decided to move on to theology. When he did make that transition, he retained the logical mode of handling it. This fact is worth noting, in and of itself. Equally

⁸¹ Calvin Normore, "Future Contingents," in *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzman, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 363–64. Normore rightly associates this position with Peter's stress on God's freedom.

important is the kind of logic that Abelard draws out of, or applies to, his Boethian-Aristotelian materials. In this connection, his understanding of the scope of logic itself needs to be recalled, since it affects powerfully his overall method and also the kinds of claims he would be able to make for his logical arguments on this subject when he transposes them into his theological works. Notwithstanding the fact that he begins by commenting on the Aristotelian texts available in the Latin school tradition, Abelard takes from Boethius and sharpens a Stoic-Megaritic approach to logic as a formal art. In his earliest works, he confirms that, for him, logic is a science of concepts, not a mode of analysis whose goal is to seek verification of its conclusions in the world of nature or in the ontological order. Concepts may, initially, derive from things. But, once in the mind, they are usable, comprehensible, and meaningful in propositional form apart from things. It is the formal structure and relations of the propositions and the terms that comprise them that determine the truth claims they make. Asserted initially in his commentaries,⁸² these same principles are developed by Abelard in his own logical treatises, both in his express statements defining the nature and scope of logic as such⁸³ and, implicitly, in his reformulations of syllogistic arguments drawn from his authorities, in which arguments that involve priority and posteriority in time, or conditions that are verifiable empirically, are converted into propositions and syllogisms that display exclusively logical relations.⁸⁴ The fact that Abelard's logic is not envisioned by him as capable of establishing any truth but the intrapropositional truth of formal logic has received general recognition from modern students of his philosophy.⁸⁵ The fact that a logic understood as a science of discourse,

⁸² See, for example, Peter Abelard, *Editio super Porphyrum; Glossae in Categorias; Editio super Aristotelem de Interpretatione*, ed. Mario Dal Pra in Peter Abelard, *Scritti di logica*, 2nd ed. (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), pp. 5, 61, 84–85, 105–06, 110–13.

⁸³ Peter Abelard, *Logica "ingredientibus"*, ed. Bernhard Geyer in Peter Abelard, *Philosophische Schriften*, Beiträge, 21:1–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919–27), 21 part 1: 17, 20–21, 28–29, 60–61; 21 part 2: 112–15; 21 part 3: 307–10, 320–22; *Logica "nostrorum petitioni sociorum"*, ed. Bernhard Geyer in Peter Abelard, *Philosophische Schriften*, Beiträge, 21:4 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1933), p. 585, *Dialectica* 2.1.1.4, 2.28, pp. 153–60, 163–64, 210–13.

⁸⁴ Peter Abelard, *Dialectica* 3.1.4, 4.1.2 ff., pp. 270–309, 469–532.

⁸⁵ Dal Pra, intro. to his ed. of *Scritti di logica*, pp. xxi–xxiii; Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchieri [Fumagalli], "La relation entre logique, physique et théologie chez Abélard," in Peter Abelard, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), pp. 153–63; *The Logic of Abelard*, trans. Simon Pleasance (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), pp. 13–23, 28–36; Geyer, comm. on his ed. of *Philos. Schriften*, 21 part 4: 621–33; Jean Jolivet, "Abélard entre chien et loup," *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 20 (1977): 312–18; *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard*, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982), pp. 19–22, 44–45, 67–72, 74–77, 96–104, 229–335; Martin M.

not as a science of things, a logic understood as having jurisdiction only within its own realm and as unable to establish truth anywhere else, would make an imperfect instrument of theological analysis, does inspire Abelard at times to argue that theological language is metaphorical, or to invoke arguments from theological appropriateness. But it does not dampen his enthusiasm for the claim that dialectic, "to which the judgment of all truth or falsity is subject" (*cui quidem omnis veritatis seu falsitatis discretio ita subiecta est*), should be used to demonstrate the teachings of the Catholic faith and to refute heretics.⁸⁶

The first theological topic to which Abelard gives logic this somewhat ambiguous assignment, on his own accounting of it, is God's providence and future contingents. Abelard takes up this issue for the first time in his *Logica "ingredientibus"*, where he indicates, by his very address to it, his desire to treat it as a topic in formal logic. He urges that the subject of future contingents be taken out of a temporal framework altogether. Past, present, and future, to be sure, are conditions that occur in nature. But the problem, he argues, should be treated on a conceptual and not on a natural level.⁸⁷ Our concepts, whatever their content, exist as if in the present. This report, from the precincts of logic, is used by Abelard to reinforce the analogy made in Augustine's *Confessions* between the soul's present memory, attention, and expectation as reducible to the soul's present action and the eternity of God, dwelling in the eternal present. But Abelard's analysis, unlike Augustine's, is based on the workings of propositional logic, not on those of human psychology. One can, he notes, argue against those who think that God's providence is undermined by natural contingency and human free will, equating God's providence with universal divine determinism. This can be done, he shows, as Augustine had done it, by distinguishing between providence and predestination. As he reads this distinction, providence is understood as God's foreknowledge of what will happen, whether good or

Tweedale, *Abailard on Universals* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 93–95, 130–37, 185–88, 210; Richard E. Weingart, *The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 11–31. The principal dissenters are DeRijk, intro. to his ed. of *Dialectica*, pp. xxiii–xxviii, xl, lv–lix, xcv–xcviii and Lucia Urbani Ulivi, *La psicologia di Abelardo e il "Tractatus de intellectibus"* (Rome: Storia e Letteratura, 1976), pp. 85–93, 95–100, who follows DeRijk in holding that the achievement of a purely formal logic was Abelard's goal but that he did not actually arrive at that destination.

⁸⁶ Peter Abelard, *Dialectica* 4.1 prologus, p. 470.

⁸⁷ Peter Abelard, *Logica "ingredientibus"*, 21 part 1: 26–27.

bad, whether caused by God Himself or by the actions of men or other secondary causes. On the other hand, predestination is confined to God's determination of those things He wills to occur by His own direct agency, specifically the granting of grace to the elect. As with the late Augustine, Abelard holds that this grace has two aspects. It prepares the elect to respond to God's call and it helps them to persevere in it. Strictly speaking, predestination is the grace of preparation, and it can be distinguished from the gift that makes salvation possible once that initial grace has been received. Since predestination has this consequence, we can say that its causative effect is always good. Now God knows from all eternity which men He will endow with grace. He also knows which sins men will commit, although He does not cause them.

This Augustinian attack on the question is in no sense the whole story, for Abelard; nor, in his estimation, is it the most interesting way to address it. He next introduces Boethius's reprise of the key chapter in Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, where a more strictly physical and logical account of necessity, possibility, and contingency is provided. In chapter 9 of that work, Aristotle frames the issue in terms of a sea battle that may or may not be fought tomorrow. There is always the possibility that the captains may cancel the battle because the rulers they represent have settled their differences. Or, hostilities may still prevail, but bad weather may prevent the battle from taking place. The natural or human contingencies involved in these possibilities lie within the structure of natural laws and the nature of man. But whether or not they will be activated so as to prevent or call off the battle is a matter of chance or contingency. With this analysis in mind, Abelard now distinguishes providence from fate. Fate he sees as the natural necessities built into the physical order. Fate is ineluctable in the sense that, once the relevant physical laws of cause and effect are set in motion, the outcomes flowing from them will necessarily follow. God knows that these consequences will occur if these physical laws are activated, since He created the universe with the natural laws in question. At the same time, agreeing with Aristotle and Boethius, Abelard observes that there are areas of contingency and human choice here which determine whether or not these natural laws, and their consequences, will be activated in a particular instance. He adds that there are also physical events which God permits to happen—miracles, for instance—even though they occur outside of the causal nexus of the laws of physics. This observation aside, along with Aristotle and Boethius, he accents the idea that creatures, as they are created, possess certain built-in capacities to do

or to refrain from doing what they choose. Giving an Aristotelian example here, he notes that a man, by nature, is capable of sitting down, but whether he will do so at a particular moment is a matter of choice, not necessity, on his part. The same analysis applies to a man's capacity to sin. The fact that God knows how the man will exercise this capacity does not mean that God causes him to sin, just as God does not personally cause the other outcomes that are effects of contingencies.

Thus far, Abelard has shifted an initially Augustinian argument preoccupied with grace and predestination to an Aristotelian argument for possibility and contingency as compatible with a universe in which natural laws impose their own physical necessities. He now proceeds to shift his argument once again. Still another way of handling the problem is to transpose it from the realm of necessity, possibility, and contingency as they operate in the natural order to the realm of modal propositions. This option is even more attractive to Abelard, since, once the subject has been reformulated in these terms, the propositions in which they are framed express the ideas of possibility and necessity and their relationships according to the formal structure of the propositions used. The conclusions flowing from these propositions can be evaluated in terms of whether they follow logically from their antecedents quite independent of times, places, and conditions that may or may not exist in the physical or metaphysical order. From this perspective, Abelard now seeks to expose the logical fallacy of the claim that God errs if it can be shown that anything can happen in a way different from the way in which it does happen. The rule he invokes here is this: if the antecedent is possible, the consequent attaches the judgment "Yes, it is possible" to the proposition itself, not to the subject matter or content stated by the antecedent. His treatment of this rule is a clear articulation of the strictly logical approach to the problem of possibility and necessity he is taking at this juncture, an approach which he also advocates as more elegant and satisfactory than the ones that he had set forth before presenting it.

If one applies this kind of formal logical analysis to the question of foreknowledge and predestination, as defined above, it follows that propositions admitting of possibility and contingency can be constructed from propositions in which foreknowledge is asserted. Also, as Abelard points out, it depends on how the word "differently" (*aliter*) is used in propositions that hypothesize on whether things could have turned out differently from the way they do turn out. *Aliter* can be used as a relative term, and also as a negative term. Its causal force is stronger in the latter usage. In the former

case, when *aliter* is used as a relative term, the presence of logical possibility can be entertained without a contradiction with foreknowledge, in stating a contingent claim. The use of hypothetical syllogisms to structure the propositions in question here itself emphasizes the formal quality of the logical analysis involved.⁸⁸

It is perfectly obvious what Abelard is trying to accomplish in this handling of the question of God's foreknowledge and future contingents in the *Logica* "*ingredientibus*". In moving from a theological account derived from the late Augustine to a physical account derived from Aristotle to a strictly logical account of the issues, to which he is guided by Boethius, he places his arguments in, what is, for him, an ascending order of importance and persuasiveness. Even though Abelard gives a far more elaborate treatment of the *De interpretatione* formulation of the problem than Boethius does in his commentary on that work, taking it through its paces in great detail, and offering a host of variant syllogistic forms in which the ideas involved can be stated, situating them within the larger context of the logical rules for affirmation, negation, and contradiction, and yoking them to an express discussion of hypothetical syllogisms, equipollent propositions, and their probative force, he ends by reducing the Aristotelian position to the position of formal logic far more systematically than Boethius does. Abelard grants more authority to formal logic than to anything else in his handling of this problem, reading across Aristotle and across Boethius himself to obtain a more consistently post-Aristotelian logic than his sources provide. He shows his instinct for moving away from theological reasoning, in redefining the divine nature, or propositions which refer to it, as part of the subject matter of formal logic. While Abelard does admit that the debate at issue can be approached in other ways, the other alternatives are clearly less compelling and persuasive, for him. Above all, the logical sense of propositions is his point of conclusion, whatever sense they may have in the world of physical or metaphysical reality.

Abelard also takes up these same questions in his *Theologia* "*scholarium*". His argument here is similar to that in the *Logica* "*ingredientibus*" except for the fact that he frames the issue of future contingents here along the lines of Aristotle's account of the sea battle in *De interpretatione* 9, giving attention to the claims made in terms of natural law as well as in terms of formal logic. The main differences between his initial treatment of the subject and this one are that, in the *Theologia* "*scholarium*", Abelard wants to accent

⁸⁸ Ibid., 21 part 3: 426–47.

man's freedom and responsibility in the moral life under the heading of contingency; and he wants to emphasize more strongly the point that God can suspend the natural law when He performs miracles. From a logical standpoint, as well, Abelard here frames the question of the compatibility of God's eternal foreknowledge and contingent events in the light of the nominalist theory of the univocity of the noun in its signification, although its consignification in statements using the past or future tenses of the verb may reflect shifts in our knowledge or our description of what the noun signifies.⁸⁹

Abelard returns to the argument offered in the *Logica* "*ingredientibus*" for a third time in his most mature logical work, the *Dialectica*, there offering a refinement on it.⁹⁰ He reprises the point that past, present, and future are categories irrelevant to God, since He lives in the eternal present. He also repeats the observation that God so ordains things that some events are capable of occurring contingently, and that, when this happens, these contingencies do not conflict with divine providence. Nor do events which, as God ordains them, occur of necessity as consequences of the laws of nature which He put in place. In this work, Abelard moves as well from the Augustinian and Aristotelian arguments to attach the idea of possibility to the logical relations between antecedent and consequent propositions that formulate the alternatives in hypothetical form. At the same time, in the *Dialectica* Abelard admits that the idea of necessity also attaches properly to actual natural outcomes, and that, even propositionally, a future contingent can only be defended as a possibility. This conclusion imparts a rather more Aristotelian coloration to his handling of necessity and possibility than he had given to it in the *Logica* "*ingredientibus*". Another shift is that, in the *Dialectica*, he omits the distinction between God's foreknowledge and God's causation in treating divine providence. He collapses these two ideas into a view of providence that takes it to mean God's legislation for, and action in, the natural order, and not merely God's oversight of that order. The theme of predestination and grace likewise departs from Abelard's agenda in this work. These shifts in emphasis notwithstanding, the bottom line for his handling of the entire question, both early and late, remains formal logic, not the divine nature.

⁸⁹ Peter Abelard, *Theologia* "*scholarium*" 3.5, 3.87–116, CCCM 13: 526, 536–47. This nominalist feature of Abelard's argument has been brought out by William J. Courtenay, *Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power* (Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina, 1990), pp. 44–50. I am indebted to Professor Courtenay for this reference.

⁹⁰ Peter Abelard, *Dialectica* 2.2.10–11, pp. 217–22.

The vast majority of theologians in the first half of the twelfth century found the Abelardian attack on God's foreknowledge and future contingents unacceptably narrow, and even reductionistic. There are several whose objections are grounded in the logic of Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, and who either fail to take Abelard's point about the advantages of formal logic or who are aware of his claims for it and reject them in favor of a logic that could give equal weight to proofs verifiable in the world of real being. What we should probably describe as a pre-Abelardian approach to the issue is found in one of his erstwhile masters, William of Champeaux. God's providence and predestination are the only questions he is known to have raised concerning the divine nature. His handling of the second topic offers a straightforward summary of the position of the late Augustine, with one very striking exception. William agrees that God, from all eternity, grants to His elect the grace of preparation, justification, and perfection. Where he departs from Augustine, a move that will attract unfavorable notice elsewhere in this period, is in stating that, since God knows ahead of time who will use free will to consent to the good, He chooses these people as His elect.⁹¹ In handling providence, William equates it with causation, understanding it in the Aristotelian sense, as the physical laws of nature. He does not bring foreknowledge to bear on this topic, treating it along the lines of *De interpretatione* 9. He agrees that the natural order contains effects that follow necessarily from their natural causes, and that this same natural order also contains beings capable of exercising free choice or of acting contingently. Since this is the arrangement established by God's providence, it is not in conflict with that providence.⁹² Another author in our period, and one who would have had available Abelard's fullest arguments on this point but who reflects a preference for the *De interpretatione* account, is a disciple of Gilbert of Poitiers, working in Paris in the early 1140s. He frames the problem in terms of the distinction between natural events that occur as the result of absolute necessities, stemming from the endowments or limitations of the given natures of the beings involved, and natural events conditioned by the choices of free agents or of other contingencies that can also be seen as a part of the natural range of possibilities which they enjoy. He agrees that God provides for both kinds of events

⁹¹ *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 240, ed. Odon Lottin in *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, vols. 1–5 (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1948–59), 5: 199–200.

⁹² *Ibid.*, no. 237–38, 5: 195–98.

even though He does not cause either kind directly.⁹³

Much more typical, among objections to Abelard's teaching, is the idea that God's providence ought to be considered as a theological problem, under the heading of the divine nature. Many theologians of the day seek to reroute this topic and to take it up in the context of their discussion of one divine attribute or another. Until Peter Lombard tackled the question, they arrived at no consensus as to which divine attribute was its natural habitat. In addition, few give sustained or well-rounded attention to the problem and some encumber it with difficulties of their own invention. A good reflection of these traits can be seen in Anselm of Laon and his followers. On predestination, Anselm shares with William of Champeaux the problematic claim that God foresees which of the persons whom He justifies will persevere, and that He grants them election on that account.⁹⁴ While not as critical of Augustine on this point as William, Anselm's formulation of it suggests that the deity predestines such people because of their foreseen merits, rather than giving them the grace of preparation that enables them to acquire merit. As for the wider issue of providence, predestination, and human freedom, Anselm treats it under the heading of God's will. Here, he says, we can distinguish the will of God's essence (*voluntas essentie*), as manifested in the order and disposition of the universe, the good will of God (*voluntas dei bona*), operating in His saints and inspiring them to love God and their fellow man, and the will of God through precept (*voluntas dei pro precepto*), that is, the moral rules God lays down for men. Anselm adds that, while man is obliged to obey God's will in all three areas, and while God foresees whether or not a man will do so, He does not constrain human freedom in that foresight.⁹⁵ This analysis, scanty as it is, manages to compound two major problems. First, and this reminds us of Anselm's handling of the divine ubiquity, is his equation of the natural order with God's essence. Second, he does not seem to appreciate the fact that, while men can reject God's grace and His moral law, exempting themselves from the laws of nature does not constitute an option for human beings. In any event, Anselm is not particularly interested in God's relation, as a cause, to the natural order. His real interest, so far as it goes on this topic, lies in its moral implications only.

⁹³ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 2.41–45, p. 121.

⁹⁴ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 11, ed. Odon Lottin in *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, vols. 1–5 (Louvain: Abbays de Mont-César, 1948–59), 5: 22.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 31–32, 34, 5: 33–35.

Other masters associated with Anselm of Laon appear to have been sensitive to the difficulties with his teachings here and, at some points, offer rectifications, clarifications, or amplifications of it. One of the things they share with him is the treatment of God, as cause, in relation to created agents, under the heading of God's will. The will of God, they observe, can be understood four ways, as efficient, approving, conceding, and permitting (*efficiens, approbans, concedens, permittens*). God's efficient will constitutes His direct causative action, and also His indirect causation in cases where man is given the capacity to function as an efficient cause in his own sphere. God exercises His approving will when He looks with pleasure on something He finds gratifying, or, at any rate, when He chooses not to prevent or impede something He finds less appealing. God's conceding will comes into play when He gives His express permission for an event caused by a secondary agent, an event of which He approves. God's permitting will can be seen at work when He allows something to occur even though He does not approve of it. In this fourth sense, we can say that God permits evils to occur. And, in the wider sense of this fourfold distinction, we can differentiate God's precepts and prohibitions from His counsels, although they are all species of the unitary will of God which moral agents remain free to disobey.⁹⁶ In discussing providence the Laon masters reprise the distinction made in their definition of God's fourfold will, observing that this is simply another way of looking at what God does vis-à-vis the world and that His arrangements include the existence of free agents, capable of functioning as secondary causes in the field of moral action, and that God's foreknowledge does not annul the freedom of such agents or prevent Him from tolerating the unpleasing things He may permit them to do. In contrast, God's predestination is confined to what God causes directly with respect to the salvation of the men He elects. Anselm's followers return here to an authentically Augustinian version of this doctrine of election while affirming that the grace granted by means of it requires man's cooperation.⁹⁷ Here, all concern for contingency in the natural order has receded from view

⁹⁶ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 290, 294, 5: 235–37, 240; *Sententie Anselmi*, ed. Franz P. Bliemetzrieder in *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, Beiträge, 18:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919), pp. 63–64. The source of this argument is Anselm of Canterbury's *De concordia* and philosophical fragments, as has been noted by Gillian R. Evans, *Anselm and a New Generation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 133–34.

⁹⁷ *Sent. Anselmi*, pp. 90–92; *Sentences of Probable Authenticity*, no. 115; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 299, 304, 5: 94, 241, 243.

in favor of a purely moral analysis of the problem. And, while human free will is assumed, it is not really explained. The other salient difficulty with the school of Laon on this subject is the overlaps and redundancies in the fourfold subdivision of the divine will which they outline.

Another set of problems is imported into this topic by Honorius, who takes it up under the heading of God's omniscience. God, he states, has known the past, present, and future from the moment of creation—a confusing point, since it makes it seem as if God's omniscience came into being only when the world did.⁹⁸ Honorius adds that the universal plan was always present in God's mind, making it difficult to see in what sense the past of the universe could have been known by God. Honorius makes a conflation here between the idea of creation in the mind of God, an idea known eternally, and its phenomenal reification in time.⁹⁹ It is on this decidedly shaky foundation that he proceeds to erect his consideration of foreknowledge and predestination. Honorius is as abrupt as he is straightforward here. He offers a bare-bones summary of Augustine on both points. God knows whatever will happen, he notes, whether by His own direct causation, by His indirect action, or by the contingent actions of free agents. Nothing happens without a cause, although the cause is not always a necessary cause. For its part, predestination involves the direct causation of God and it determines, of necessity, who will be saved.¹⁰⁰ Honorius does not offer any express analysis of providence here. The difficulty in his account lies not so much in its highly abbreviated nature as in the confusion between God's eternal knowledge and the divine knowledge and action in time on which it is grounded.

A similar problem afflicts Hugh of St. Victor's handling of God's foreknowledge, providence, and future contingents, exacerbated, in his case, by the heavily economic view of the deity that he maintains. He begins his discussion of this topic by stating that God's foreknowledge implies the existence of the creation, for, if there had been no created universe, there would have been nothing for God to foreknow. What Hugh fails to notice, initially, is that this position makes the creation necessary to the creator. When this difficulty does come to his attention, he finds that he has painted himself into a corner by his manner of posing the question. It does not occur to Hugh that the content of what God foreknows may be independent

⁹⁸ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.13, p. 363.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.15, p. 363.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.21–31, pp. 413–16.

of attributes that are intrinsic to His nature or necessary to Him. A related difficulty stemming from Hugh's formulation of the issue is that it constrains him to limit God's foreknowledge to events that are going to take place, or that are going to come into being at a future time, while admitting that God does not foreknow what is not to be, even though it is possible to include the latter under the heading of alternatives which He may have considered and rejected. Along the same lines, Hugh understands a contingency as something that was possible before it came into being, at the point when it had not yet eventuated. His analysis here forces him to exclude from the category of contingency events, or actions, that have the capacity to be, or not to be. It also fails to provide him with an adequate distinction between contingencies that occur through the agency of secondary causes possessing the God-given capacity to choose, and events not yet in being which God will cause directly when He brings them into being. It cannot be said that Hugh has profited very fully from the range of accounts of contingency available during his time, whether they accent ethics, physics, metaphysics, or logic.¹⁰¹

One thing clear about Hugh, however, is that he is primarily interested in how this whole question factors into the doctrine of predestination. Although he is not concerned with the cosmological dimensions of the subject, he does draw a clear, and largely Augustinian, distinction between providence and predestination. By providence he means the provision by God of what creatures need and what is good for them, both now and in their future state. While this definition is generic enough to encompass the laws of nature and the moral law, Hugh does not specify whether God's role here is direct or indirect, or what freedom of action remains for the creatures so provided. For Hugh as for Augustine predestination is the preparation of grace. It can be seen as a particular subcategory of providence under which God personally decides whom He is going to elect, and gives these people the necessary grace. The principal contrast Hugh draws here is between predestination, as God's decision to do what He is going to do directly, in the order of grace, and God's foreknowledge of what He is going to permit. While in tune with Augustine here, Hugh gives an analysis of the relevant terms that is rather jejune by Augustine's standards.¹⁰²

Two other mid-century theologians who likewise confine them-

¹⁰¹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.2.14–18, *PL* 176: 211D–213B.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 1.2.19–21, *PL* 176: 213B–D. On this point, see Heinrich Köster, *Die Heilslehre des Hugo von Sankt-Viktor: Grundlagen und Grundzüge* (Emsdetten: Heinr. & J. Lechte, 1940), pp. 120–29.

selves to the implications which this topic has for man's moral activity and salvation are Robert Pullen and the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. Robert offers a treatment of providence and foreknowledge that is uncharacteristically laconic, for him, one that stresses the difference between knowledge and causation. As he notes, God knows, from all eternity, what is happening in the present and what will happen, contingently, in the future, without thereby causing these events, events which Robert presents, exclusively, as the outcomes of man's moral choices. He has nothing to say about causation in the physical order and little to say about either providence or predestination.¹⁰³ The *Summa sententiarum* takes up this question under the heading of God's wisdom, treating God's knowledge of what is, of what will be in the future, of His own governance of the universe, and of whom He plans to save. Despite this forthright beginning, the author's analysis meanders into a number of relatively trivial issues and is curiously inconclusive. He follows Augustine and Boethius in saying that divine foreknowledge is neutral, not causative. Having established that point, what he does with it is to argue that God can foreknow unimportant matters without losing sight of major ones. He next moves to the question of whether God can foresee what is not going to happen. Leaving that question open, he moves to predestination, his real subject here. Predestination, he stresses, involves God's direct causation, in contrast with His foreknowledge, which may or may not include matters in which God plans to act directly. The main issue he wants to raise about predestination is to confirm Abelard's opinion that God cannot adjust, upward or downward, the number of people He predestines to salvation.¹⁰⁴

This view was being challenged, even by masters positively influenced by Abelard in many respects, such as Roland of Bologna. Roland is uncomfortable with the idea that God cannot save more people than He does save, or empower more people to please Him than He does. Roland fails to find a convincing argument that enables him to allay his disquiet on this score, even though he draws a distinction between God as an intrinsic cause and God as an extrinsic cause that might have offered at least a partial solution.¹⁰⁵ Nor does Roland see that his claim that God can foreknow, or permit, more than He does might provide him with a

¹⁰³ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 1.13. 1.15, 1.16, *PL* 186: 700B–702C, 708D–710C, 714B–718B.

¹⁰⁴ *Summa sent.* 1.12, *PL* 176: 61C–62C.

¹⁰⁵ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 62–67.

parallel argument.¹⁰⁶ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* offers better grounds for supporting Abelard here than Roland gives for rejecting him, grounds with which Roland was evidently not acquainted. He treats the problem as a logical one. God cannot alter the number of people whom He predestines, he urges, because, were He to do so, God would be contradicting His own eternal decree, which is impossible. This conclusion, he observes, can be seen as one instance of the larger logical point that God can do anything except what is self-contradictory.¹⁰⁷

While there was no consensus among theologians in this period about which divine attribute provided the most cogent context within which to consider providence, foreknowledge, predestination, and future contingents, Robert of Melun is unique in taking up this constellation of ideas under a number of different headings at the same time, namely, God's will, God's knowledge, and God's power. In the first two of these instances, his treatment of the topic can be seen as an extension of the analysis of God as cause, in relation to created causes, which looms so large in Robert's doctrine of God. He first addresses the question from the perspective of God's will. His argument bears some traces of the teaching of the school of Laon, but it is far more circumspect and streamlined. God's will, he begins, can be equated with God's essence and, as such, regarded as the first cause. Both the world order and the moral order, which God wills and causes, are orders in which some creatures function as causes in their own genus or sphere of activity. The latter comprises the realm of contingency and freedom, and it is compatible with the divine order. In this context Robert also considers the differences between what God wills directly, what He wills through intermediaries, and what He permits, using the distinction among God's operation, precept, prohibition, and permission that had become the standard replacement for the subdivisions in God's will offered by the Laon masters.¹⁰⁸

Robert next takes up the same subject under the rubric of God's knowledge. Just as is the case with God's will, so His knowledge is identical with His being; and God's being is eternal. It is also unchanging, in contrast with the knowledge of other beings, who can learn and forget. With this foundation laid, Robert supports the position that God cannot foreknow more than He does fore-

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 67–84.

¹⁰⁷ *Summa sent.* 1.12, *PL* 176: 63A–64D.

¹⁰⁸ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.2.2–3, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 265. On this argument, see Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre*, pp. 283–93.

know, by definition, while at the same time he argues that this conclusion does not place limitations on God. The things God foreknows that He will do are things which He none the less disposes freely. Robert agrees that foreknowledge is neutral and not determinative. It includes events which, God knows, will occur contingently, and which He allows to occur contingently. God also foreknows what He will cause directly, such as the predestination of the elect. With Augustine, on this latter point, Robert defines predestination as the grace of preparation, and contrasts it with God's governance of the world order.¹⁰⁹ Abbreviated as it is, this account preserves a good balance between the cosmological and theological dimensions of the subject.

The most elaborate discussion of this topic in Robert's theology is the one he takes up under the heading of God's power. He begins by distinguishing, for purposes of comparison, among the ways in which power is exercised among men. All are indirect. There is the case of a ruler who orders his subject to do something, moving the subject to act on the basis of his authority, although the subject is the person actually performing what has been ordered. Then, there is the case in which one person contributes to an outcome carried out by someone else, by helping to finance it or by making needed materials or conditions available. Thirdly, one person may act as the supervisor of a project, directing the other people who do the actual work. Robert suggests that these indirect modes of exercising power bear some analogy to the ways God exercises His power in human affairs, but he does not pause to offer concrete theological illustrations of the point. Rather, he moves on to discuss two other ways in which the deity exercises His power in the world. First, He creates the universe out of nothing. In this connection, God is the sole author or cause. Second, God puts into place the natural operations and actions proper to man. Robert agrees that it is God alone Who endows man initially with these capacities, and that He conserves man's ability to make voluntary choices as well as to translate those choices into actions. But the collaborative role of God in these processes does not conflict with human free will. Robert draws a useful distinction here between man's exercise of volition in the carrying out of his natural activities, on the one hand, and the function of human free will in the order of grace, on the other. He also distinguishes modes of human behavior in these two orders where direct divine causation is needed and where it is

¹⁰⁹ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.6.20, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 315–16. On this argument, see Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre*, pp. 252–82.

not. He also observes that, whether God acts directly or indirectly in man's moral activity, He is not the subject of that activity and He is not responsible for the use man makes of the deity's own collaboration or empowerment. And, while he concedes that God sometimes enables human beings to go beyond their own strength, Robert's emphasis in this entire account is on the idea that, in both man's spiritual and moral life, God has arranged matters so that man can act with his own powers, just as natural phenomena can act in terms of their natural causative powers.¹¹⁰ While Robert thus brings a physical dimension into play in this discussion, his emphasis rests on man's moral liberty in relation to God's power, although he does not associate this point, at this particular juncture, with the doctrine of predestination.

Robert's threefold treatment of the question has the merit of enabling him to explore most of the dimensions of the problem of foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and contingency, although it also has a disadvantage. In none of the contexts in which he brings it up does he address all the relevant aspects of the problem. A certain amount of repetition is also, of necessity, involved in his inability to decide whether God's will, God's knowledge, or God's power has a better claim than the others as the most appropriate home for the topic. To a certain extent this redundancy and lack of decisiveness cancel out the breadth of vision which Robert brings to the subject, in comparison with the often quite sketchy treatment it receives at the hands of most other theologians of the period. But, perhaps the most important weakness of Robert's argument, to which he does not advert openly but which has the effect of undermining his whole analysis from the start, is the fact that he supports Abelard's view that wisdom, power, and goodness inhere in the individual persons of the Trinity in a preeminent way, and are appropriate personal names for them. If this claim is taken seriously, in the present connection, then one would have to admit that, in two of Robert's three analyses of foreknowledge, predestination, and contingency, he is really talking about the properties of the first two persons of the Trinity individually, and not about the Godhead in general. Robert never acknowledges the fact that, if he wants to maintain his position on the Trinity, that very position seriously

¹¹⁰ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.7.33–36. This citation derives from a portion of Robert's work that remains unedited. Our account is based on the analysis of the doctrine in the manuscripts provided by Raymond-M. Martin, "El problema del influjo divino sobre las acciones humanas, un siglo antes de Santo Tomás de Aquino," *La Ciencia tomista* 5 (1915): 178–93; Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre*, pp. 228–44.

compromises his intended handling of these features of the divine nature in its relationship with the creation and with man.

In that very connection, Peter Lombard makes his own attack on this problem perfectly plain. The question of God's foreknowledge and related matters is the first topic he takes up after completing his discussion of the Trinity. He states crisply that this subject, and all the questions that follow in the remainder of Book 1 of the *Sentences*, treat of God with reference to the divine substance possessed in common by the Trinity.¹¹¹ He also shows his colors at once by aligning himself with theologians such as Honorius and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* by treating this constellation of ideas under the heading of God's knowledge, recognizing that it is easier to annex to this mode of analysis the related questions concerning God's causation than it would be if one tried to cover the necessary ground under the heading of His will or power. Peter begins, typically, by giving his definitions of the key terms. In so doing, he makes it clear that, in handling this topic, his chief focus is going to be on the divine nature as a theological and metaphysical reality. While God's role as a cause in the physical order is going to receive some attention and while care is going to be paid to the logical consistency of his arguments, and to those of thinkers whom he criticizes, Peter never lets the reader forget that he is writing about God here, and that the subject at issue is not a mere pendant to, or illustration of, the sciences of natural philosophy or logic.

God's knowledge is one and simple, he begins. Yet, it can be thought of, in relation to man and the creation, in terms of foreknowledge, disposition, predestination, and wisdom. Foreknowledge is God's knowledge, from all eternity, of all things that will happen, whether for good or for ill. Disposition can be regarded not only as God's general governance of the universe but also as His foreknowledge of the laws of nature that He will put in place before He creates them. Similarly, predestination covers the preparation of grace which God grants directly to His elect and His salvation and coronation of them with bliss in the next life, as well as His knowledge from all eternity of which human beings they will be. Wisdom, finally, is God's knowledge of all things, whether past, present, or future.¹¹² Having mentioned the dimension of time in setting forth these definitions, Peter next addresses a set of problems with which Hugh of St. Victor and Honorius had wrestled

¹¹¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 35. c. 1, 1: 254.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, c. 1–c. 6, 1: 254–58. On predestination as the grace of preparation in the Lombard, see Johann Schupp, *Die Gnadenehre des Petrus Lombardus* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1932), pp. 105–15, 141–58, 204–06.

ineffectively. Supposing that there were no temporal order at all, and hence no future in which events not yet in being might take place, and given that God's knowledge is one with His essence, would this not mean, he asks, that God's very being would be in jeopardy? Peter answers this question in the negative. As he observes, when we speak of God's foreknowledge, disposition, and predestination with respect to the created world and man, we speak in a relative sense (*relative, ad aliquid*), just as we do when we refer to the deity as the creator. Such activities vis-à-vis other, created, beings as these relative terms denote in no sense exhaust or diminish the infinite reservoir of being as such which the divine nature possesses, prior to and apart from the creation. Further, there are two ways of regarding foreknowledge. First, if we consider the subject matter, the future, on which God's foreknowledge is exercised, as capable of being there, or not, then His foreknowledge can be understood as relative to the future. But, secondly, if we think of the knowledge that God possesses, with which He is able to know the future when it eventuates, then we speak of His knowledge with respect to His essence, whether or not the temporal world exists at all, or any particular eventuality that may take place within it. In any event, since He is eternal, God knows all things from eternity. His knowledge is not limited by the temporal order applying to creatures.¹¹³

This solution responds effectively to the dilemmas propounded by Hugh and Honorius and at the same time addresses the question, raised but not answered by the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, of whether God foreknows those future contingents that are not going to eventuate. For, as Peter continues, he next makes the point that, in the second sense of foreknowledge which he has just indicated, God's knowledge is of His essence; it would be incorrect to say that, because He knows all things, all the things that He knows are God or that they share in His essence. Here, he stresses, we have to distinguish between what God is, and what God has in His presence or has within Him. As an illustration of that point, Peter notes, God knows who the elect are; but the elect are human, not divine. They are in God's presence, not His nature. Similarly, God knows the evils that will occur, without being identified with them, just as He knows the good things that will occur and that He will approve, good outcomes which, in this case, He helps along, to a greater or lesser extent, being partially or wholly an *auctor* as well as a knower. For the creation and the temporal order are from

¹¹³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 35. c. 7–c. 9, 1: 255–58.

God. They are not of God; that is, they are not of the same nature as God. Here, Peter acknowledges the utility of Abelard's distinction between the univocal signification of a noun and the differing consignifications it may have in statements using the past, present, and future tenses of the verb. He also indicates the limitations of this argument, from his own perspective.¹¹⁴ What is strikingly Lombardian about this whole analysis is Peter's success in finding a cogent substitute for the reduction of this problem to an exercise in formal logic. At the same time, he retains a philosophical no less than a theological perspective on it, by grounding the subject in the metaphysical distinction between God viewed in His transcendent essence and God viewed in those aspects of His being that He displays in His relations with other beings.

Peter moves on, then, to a series of other questions pertinent to God's foreknowledge that had been raised and, in his view, answered unsatisfactorily by other masters. He deals in a swift and streamlined manner with God's foreknowledge and its relationship to causation, relying here on Augustine and other patristic sources and not on Boethius and Aristotle. Foreknowledge, he agrees, is not causative. There are some things that God knows, contemplating them in His own mind before He brings them into phenomenal existence as their one and only cause, as is the case with the created universe. In this example, He causes the things He knows, not vice versa. In the case of contingencies, such as the willed actions of created beings who possess free will, God foresees the consequences of contingent actions but does not cause them. His lack of direct causation here is in no sense a failing or imperfection in the divine

¹¹⁴ Ibid., d. 36. c. 1–c. 5, d. 41. c. 3, 1: 258–63, 293. Peter's use of this Abelardian, or more generally nominalist, idea is noted by Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 93, 96, 99; Artur Michael Landgraf, "Nominalismus in den theologischen Werken der zweiten Hälfte des zwölften Jahrhunderts," *Traditio* 1 (1943): 192–94, 199; Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 43–44, 53; Courtenay, *Capacity and Volition*, pp. 53–55; "Nominale and Nominalism in the Twelfth Century," in *Lectionum varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux*, ed. Jean Jolivet et al. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1991), pp. 17–20, 23–29. For more on this topic, see Marcia L. Colish, "Peter Lombard and Abelard: The *Opinio Nominalium* and Divine Transcendence," *Vivarium* 30 (May 1992): 139–56. Stephen F. Brown, "Abelard and the Medieval Origin of the Distinction between God's Absolute and Ordained Power," in *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, ed. Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 199–215, reprises both Abelard's position and the Lombard's argument against it, treating that argument correctly as one that criticizes Abelard for failing to distinguish between God's power and God's will. On the other hand, Brown does not note either the Lombard's contribution to the ordained/absolute power distinction or the appeal made by both Abelard and the Lombard to the *opinio nominalium*.

nature, or in the divine foreknowledge. For He chose to create beings with free will and He knows how they will freely exercise it.¹¹⁵ This section of Peter's discussion both rebukes authors who feel that they need five times as much space to treat the same subject and reminds the reader that the divine nature is the perspective from which he thinks it ought to be examined. The exercise is designed to enlighten the reader about God, the subject of this book of the *Sentences*, not about the behavior and constitution of creatures.

Another feature of God's foreknowledge that requires discussion, not only in and of itself but because of its bearing on predestination, is its immutability and its exhaustive coverage. As Peter observes, God's knowledge, like His essence, cannot change, enlarge, or diminish. God may direct His attention to this or that subject, or not, without changing His knowledge. Since He is omniscient and always has been, He knows things that have not yet occurred in the temporal order, and beings that have not yet come into existence. In the case of contingent outcomes, He knows whether or not they will occur. With respect to such future events, beings, and outcomes, this does not mean that God knows them better when they do occur. For, while they are conditioned by time, He is not; He has always been omniscient. In this respect, God cannot know more than He knows because that would be a self-contradiction, a point on which Peter agrees with the author of the *Summa sententiarum*.¹¹⁶

As for predestination, Peter notes, reminding the reader of his definition of terms at the beginning of this section of Book 1 of the *Sentences*, predestination is included in what God foreknows but it is different from foreknowledge. Foreknowledge is not causative, while predestination is causative, referring specifically to God's direct decision to extend the grace of preparation and perseverance to those people He chooses to save.¹¹⁷ Here Peter summarizes the standard late Augustinian teaching that was the consensus position on predestination in this period. At the same time, he uses the argument just developed on the immutability of God's foreknowledge to criticize versions of that teaching that he finds aberrant or problematic. In the first place, there is the question raised by Abelard and debated by the author of the *Summa sententiarum* and by Roland of Bologna as to whether God can alter the number of the

¹¹⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 38, 1: 275–79.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, d. 39. c. 1.1–c. 4.3, d. 41. c. 3, 1: 280–83, 292–93. On this point, see Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 54–55.

¹¹⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 39. c. 4.3, 1: 283–84. Peter makes the same point in *Sermo* 112, *PL* 171: 860C: See Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 55, 57–60.

elect. Given the way in which Peter has framed his argument here, he can dispose of the idea that God could make such a change as a non-question, not only from the standpoint of God's will but also in the light of God's immutable omniscience. Just as God does not alter His eternal decree, so, since He knows eternally what that decree will be with regard to His elect and since His knowledge never changes, the alteration of God's arrangements here is a non-possibility.¹¹⁸ There is also the question of the relation between election and the behavior of the elect. Here, Peter wants to criticize the position of William of Champeaux and Anselm of Laon. For the elect, predestination enables them to be justified, to live uprightly, to resist temptation, to persevere in the good, and to attain beatitude in the next life. God foreknows that the elect will respond appropriately to the grace He extends to them, just as He knows that the reprobate will fall into sin, although in the first case He actively prepares the elect for their salvation while He prepares nothing for the reprobate. But, Peter insists, with Augustine and against Anselm and William, God does not choose the elect because He foresees that they will respond positively to His grace and earn merit. Rather, what He foresees is the fact that His grace will provide the elect with the enabling condition for their acquisition of merit after the fact.¹¹⁹ Before leaving this topic it should be noted that, while Peter, like the majority of theologians of his time, takes a strongly Augustinian line on predestination, there is one important respect in which they all depart from Augustine here, a point that also will condition their handling of the theme of grace and free will. There is no trace whatever of Augustine's doctrine of the irresistibility of grace to be found in any of these twelfth-century theologians, a calculated omission that deserves to be understood as a criticism of Augustine on their part.

In the case of God's foreknowledge and related matters, as can be seen from the above, Peter demonstrates clearly that this constellation of ideas can be treated in as sweeping a manner as need be from the perspective of God's knowledge. He succeeds in addressing a broad range of substantive questions, raised in a variety of contexts by other theologians, irrespective of whether the masters in question approach them from the standpoint of logic, Aristotelian or Abelardian, causation, or other divine attributes. Throughout, he grounds his support for the compatibility of contingency and free will with divine foreknowledge, and with the existence of

¹¹⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 40. c. 1, 1: 285–86.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 2.1–d. 41. c. 1, 1: 286–92.

direct divine causation in some areas, not on the relations between necessity and possibility in natural philosophy or in formal logic but in the distinction between the transcendent God and the God Who acts, in a variety of ways, in the world He created, but without being exhausted or consumed by His economic role. Peter's resolutely metaphysical address to this question enables him to put it on as philosophical a foundation as is true for Aristotle or for Abelard, although it is a metaphysical foundation, and one that also affords a good vantage point from which to consider the specifically theological dimensions of these problems as well.

Can God Do Better or Different Than He Does?

Much the same can be said for Peter's handling of the single most controversial question concerning the divine nature to be agitated in this period, can God do better or different than He does, which Abelard brought to the fore and which his opponents met with only mitigated success in attacking before it was seized on by Peter. Organically related, both in content and style, to his handling of the problem of necessity and possibility, although not presented in his logical works, Abelard's defense of the position that God cannot do better than He does is first stated in his *Theologia christiana*, then developed in a somewhat modified form in his *Theologia "scholarium"*, and then reprised with only a modest change in his commentary on Romans.

While Abelard does draw on arguments from theological appropriateness in addressing this issue, he relies more heavily on a propositional formulation of the question which, on its own accounting, appears to have been aimed against the contemporary master, Joscelyn of Soissons. Joscelyn argued that, if things happen otherwise than as God foresees, God would be capable of being mistaken. In attacking this position, Abelard first takes up and then abandons a highly useful Augustinian idea, found in the *Enchiridion*. There, Augustine argues that God's omnipotence means God's ability to do whatever He wills. This understanding of divine omnipotence was known to other contemporary theologians from the school of Laon to the author of the *Summa sententiarum* and beyond. Among its advantages, it makes it possible to rule out actions requiring a physical body, as well as sinning, lying, or other forms of immoral behavior that would constitute imperfections were they to be divine options, without thereby limiting God's power.¹²⁰ Abelard first accepts this distinction between God's will

¹²⁰ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 63–64; *Summa sent.* 1.13–14, *PL* 176: 64D–70B. On this

and God's power in the *Theologia christiana* but then makes no effort to apply it constructively.¹²¹ He moves, rather, to another distinction. God's power can be viewed in two ways, he observes. There is His providence, through which He establishes the world order, and His counsel, exhortation, admonition, approval, or disapproval, which God directs specifically to human beings as moral agents, to whom He may wish to accord His grace. Now, Abelard continues, human beings are bound by God's arrangements in both respects. They are not exempt from the laws of nature; and they also must abide by God's moral law. Abelard is not concerned, at this juncture, with man's freedom or lack of it within these dispensations. Rather, the question he wants to raise is whether God's arrangements themselves, in either area, are the best possible ones. Could God have enacted a better law of nature or a better moral law? Abelard answers in the negative, offering three reasons. First, he notes, the contemplation of the possibility that God's natural or moral law could have been different, and better, would cause a great deal of anxiety to man, from which God is kind enough to exempt him. Second, it would not be fitting for us to think of God as able to do better, but as none the less not doing so. And third, the specific lack of theological appropriateness attaching to the second point lies in the fact that it would derogate from God's goodness. If God can do better than He does, and fails to do it, then He cannot be regarded as supremely good. Or else, it would mean that He is supremely good but that this goodness is capable of being impeded by an insufficiency of power to act on God's part.

Abelard now moves to supplement this argument from theological appropriateness with an argument from logic, saving the best for last in his own strategy of debate as he had on the subject of necessity and possibility. To do better than God does, he asserts, is a logical impossibility, given the claims made by an antecedent proposition which states that God is good, omnipotent, and benevolent, an antecedent which, in Abelard's view, makes logically necessary a consequent proposition which states that God always makes the best possible use of these qualities. Having started with the Augustinian distinction between God's power and will, which he abandons despite its utility, Abelard now collapses God's power into His will because he thinks that this conclusion follows

point, see Ivan Boh, "Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences," in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives*, ed. Tamar Rudavsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 185–211; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 126–32.

¹²¹ Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 5.17–57, CCCM 12: 354–72.

logically, a maneuver that has not been seen as logical by all of his commentators.¹²² Perhaps more problematically, Abelard's handling of this question as a logician forces God to act in a certain way, which Abelard deems to be the best possible way, out of an internal necessity of His own nature. As he puts it, "what He wills, He must will necessarily, and what He does, He must do necessarily" (*Quae vult, necessario velit, et quae facit, necessario faciat*). Logical necessity constrains God's behavior, behavior which, he states, takes place inevitably (*inevitabiliter*).¹²³ Thus, as Abelard would have it, God was constrained to create the universe, to create it the way it is, to share His beatitude with his creatures, and to provide them with the particular moral laws and modes of salvation that He has provided. God's freedom, in this analysis, is sharply circumscribed by God's goodness.

Reactions to Abelard's argument in the *Theologia christiana* were not slow in coming. In some respects the most interesting objection of all came from the early Porretans, who could have used it equally well against Abelard's teaching on necessity, possibility, and future contingents. The Porretans appear to have been the only theologians in this period who were sensitive to the technical features of Abelard's logic, and willing to turn it against him. As they observe, Abelard's logic is a formal logic. Its project is to establish what is logically verifiable within the intramental world of predication, inference, and the interrelations of propositions. It is not a logic that claims it can verify its conclusions in the world outside the mind, and it does not seek to do so. Thus, hoisting Abelard on his own petard, they point to the intrinsic limits of the logic he taught as an instrument of theological research. That megaton bomb having been detonated, the Porretans go on to argue that God could have made things better, not in the sense that He could have exercised greater power or wisdom in making the arrangements that He did make, but in the sense that the creatures which He made are themselves imperfect, and could be better than they are.¹²⁴

No doubt more of a virtuoso turn than the more conservative

¹²² Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 120–24, 126–32; Weingart, *Logic of Divine Love*, pp. 32–33. Paul L. Williams, *The Moral Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), pp. 5, 63–84, ignores these logical claims entirely.

¹²³ Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 5.42, CCCM 12: 366.

¹²⁴ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 2.38–39, p. 119; Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., "Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* II: Die Version der florentiner Handschrift" 2.38–42, *AHDLMA* 46 (1979): 54.

theologians of the day could manage, this Porretan line of argument had no notable repercussions. Much more typical of the reaction against Abelard is the critique of Hugh of St. Victor. Hugh translates Abelard's argument into an entirely theological one. In his estimation, Abelard has gone overboard in his defense of God's unbounded goodness, to the point of failing to do full justice to God's power and freedom. He urges that these latter two attributes need more support. Hugh also stresses the point that only the creator is perfect, without realizing that it is not responsive to Abelard's claim that the creation and the moral law are the best possible.¹²⁵ Perhaps a more serious weakness in Hugh's analysis is that he does not clarify why one divine attribute should be preferred over another, or sacrificed if it is seen to conflict with another aspect of the divine nature. The desire to accent God's power or freedom, in his own case, thus seems to be just as much a matter of the theologian's own arbitrary taste as the exaggerated emphasis on God's goodness which Hugh ascribes to Abelard.

Another contemporary effort to come to grips with the *Theologia christiana* argument and also one that is largely unresponsive to Abelard, even though it seeks a more middle of the road position, is the one made by Robert Pullen. He agrees that God could have made a world different from the one He did make. Leaving aside the claim that the world He made is the best possible one, which Abelard defends, Robert focuses on the argument that, having decided to make the world we have, God is not going to abdicate from His providential rule over it, by destroying it and creating the different world He could have created. Thus, Robert concludes, God wills nothing other than what he does, in fact, ordain.¹²⁶ This conclusion, we may note, does not consider the issue of whether God can will something other than what He does will. It subsumes the divine attribute of goodness, and even of power, under the heading of God's *de facto* choices. Robert assumes here, without making it explicit, the Augustinian idea that God's power can be understood as His capacity to accomplish what He wills. But, his emphasis on the point that God will not recede from what He has accomplished distracts Robert from the task of demonstrating that there were other choices which God could have made.

The author of the *Summa sententiarum* also appeals to Augustine here, in a more overt and systematic way. He agrees that God's

¹²⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.2.22, *PL* 176: 214A–216D. This argument is noted by Kilgenstein, *Die Gotteslehre*, pp. 212–23.

¹²⁶ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 1.15, *PL* 186: 710C–D, 712D–714B. This argument is noted by Courtney, *Robert Pullen*, pp. 75–80.

omnipotence should be understood in the light of His ability to do whatever He wills, as well as in the absence of conditions that would impose limitations on the deity. He treats the question of whether God could do better than He does as a pendant of that analysis. The fact that God willed the present arrangements, for this master, does not mean that God's options were limited, or that He was constrained to make the choices that He made. God could not be wiser or better than He is. But He could have created a world with better physical or moral laws.¹²⁷ How that conclusion is related to the premise that God is all-wise and supremely good, however, the author does not succeed in establishing. The issue, for him, is less the defense of God's omnipotence as such than the way in which God chooses to display it. But his answer ultimately rests, as Hugh's does, on a personal preference for the idea of God's freedom.

Under the pressure of criticism, particularly from those contemporaries who argued that his accent on God's goodness was incompatible with God's omnipotence, Abelard returned to the fray with another effort to coordinate these divine attributes in the *Theologia "scholarium"* and in his Romans commentary. In responding to other masters cool to his effort to frame the problem in terms of logic, he pays more attention, in the *Theologia "scholarium"* version of his argument, to the question of which divine attribute deserves the most attention.¹²⁸ He continues to maintain that God's power and goodness are correlative. If we say that God could do better—or worse—than He does, we deny His goodness. But, if we deny His capacity to do whatever He wills, we deny His omnipotence. In the effort to resolve this dilemma and also to remove the question from the logical context of possibility and necessity, Abelard now appeals to a Platonic argument which he had not used before.¹²⁹ Plato, he notes, defended the idea that God could not have made a better world because God is perfect. Hence, He acts perfectly. The perfection of the deity thus entails the perfection of His will and His exercise of that will, which subsumes both God's power and His goodness. These attributes, Abelard continues, along with God's rationality and justice, are hence reflected in everything He does, and in everything He refrains from doing.

In this version of the argument, while Abelard still frames his account in the language of antecedent and consequent proposi-

¹²⁷ *Summa sent.* 1.14, *PL* 176: 68A–70B.

¹²⁸ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "scholarium"* 3.27–64, *CCCM* 13: 511–27.

¹²⁹ Moonan, "Abelard's Use of the *Timaeus*," pp. 30–33, 72–74, gives a good analysis of this point.

tions, he has shifted his emphasis from logic to metaphysics. He also shifts his focus from the world order, as it displays a divine providence that cannot be improved on, to the justice with which God operates in the order of redemption. This latter tactic is designed, presumably, to make it more difficult for critics to object to his conclusions, an *ad hominem* response to contemporaries who concerned themselves only with the theological and not also with the philosophical aspects of the problem. In the event, this strategy leads Abelard to tackle the question in the *Theologia "scholarium"* in a more theological manner than he had in the *Theologia christiana*. The effect of this reformulation of the issue is that Abelard now accents God's control over all things and the absolute justice, as well as the omnipotence, with which He operates. As Abelard poses the question in the *Theologia "scholarium"*, while God can act differently than He does, He does not do so, not because He is logically constrained to act as He acts but because His ordinance stands above any such necessity, flowing as it does from the perfection of His nature. Such, at least, is Abelard's conclusion in this second version of his argument. He rings one final change on it in his Romans gloss, where he shifts the emphasis to yet another divine attribute, while preserving the rest of his account in the *Theologia "scholarium"*. Here, he defends the best of all possible worlds position on the grounds that it is a corollary of God's wisdom.¹³⁰

Despite the fact that several of Abelard's disciples rushed to his support,¹³¹ Abelard's reformulation of his argument in the *Theologia "scholarium"* and the Romans gloss still left some problematic features of it open to criticism. There is the difficulty of claiming that one divine attribute should be given pride of place over the others. And, although Abelard moves to a metaphysical argument based on God's perfection, it is no clearer, in the *Theologia "scholarium"*, that God has been freed from acting under the necessity of His own nature than it is, in the *Theologia christiana*, that He is free from the necessities of propositional logic. Further, the best of all possible worlds position fails to take account of the imperfections in the created order, a reality of which his mentor, Plato, was all too well aware. These problems, and others in Abelard's handling of the question in the *Theologia "scholarium"*, were noticed by one by his

¹³⁰ Peter Abelard, *Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 1:20, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 11 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), p. 69.

¹³¹ Thus, Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 25, 49–61; *Sententiae Parisiensis* I, ed. Artur Michael Landgraf in *Ecrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), pp. 20–26.

most trenchant mid-century critics, Robert of Melun.

Robert takes Abelard's Platonic argument and turns it on its head. As he points out, Plato taught that there was an ontological gap between the perfect deity, and also between the perfect exemplary forms which the deity used in the creation, on the one hand, and the created world of time, matter, and multiplicity, on the other. The split-level universe proposed by Plato means that the phenomenal world can never measure up to its ideal form. This analysis neatly disposes of the claim that we are living in the best of all possible worlds. Robert next directs attention to Abelard's argument from God's perfection to the consummate justice of His ordinances in the moral order. He appeals here to the doctrine of progressive revelation. The moral arrangements which God ordains for His people may be as good as possible, in the sense of being responsive to their needs and capacities at a particular point in time, in the estimation of the deity. But that situation may only hold for the time being. As with the Mosaic law, which provided a new and fuller ordinance in comparison with the rules governing the Jews beforehand, it is capable of being superseded, by a subsequent divine ordinance.¹³²

Adept as is Robert's critique of the most recent of Abelard's arguments, so far as it goes, it is also the case that, while capitalizing on it and on the contributions of a number of other recent and current theologians, Peter Lombard provides the period's most elaborate, refined, and knowledgeable defense of the claim that God can do better than He does. Peter clarifies arguments that had been garbled in the work of Abelard's defenders and critics alike. He brings a wider range of authorities to bear on the issues, and discusses a larger number of their implications. He makes a number of helpful new distinctions. He places the question firmly under the heading of divine omnipotence, while making it possible to give other divine attributes their due without collapsing one into another or establishing hierarchies among them inappropriate to a deity Who is simple and Who possesses all His essential determinations in exactly the same way. Above all, Peter finds a way of releasing God from the axiological necessitarianism with which Abelard had encumbered Him, whether logically or metaphysically. His solution to this problem, with which he concludes his consideration of the divine nature in Book 1 of the *Sentences*, is also

¹³² Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.7.1–29. This text comes from the unedited portion of Robert's *Sentences* and our account is dependent on the manuscript evidence as reported by Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre*, pp. 207–28, 245–46.

one that calls upon and reinforces the liberation of the doctrine of God from an economic theology, a goal that is one of his chief objectives throughout that book.

In launching his discussion of God's omnipotence, Peter refers to the Augustinian distinction between God's power and will as a means both of correcting the treatment given to it by some of his contemporaries and of expanding on it considerably in his own theology.¹³³ He agrees that God's omnipotence means not that He can do everything, but rather that He can do whatever He wills, except for actions that reflect weakness, imperfection, change, or limitation of any kind. God's omnipotence also means, for Peter, that there is no passive potency in God; God is a fully realized being.¹³⁴ In Peter's view, this does not suggest that God can do whatever He wills Himself to be able to do, for that would also be true of men. Nor does it suggest that He makes whatever He wills to make. For He has not made anything outside of the things He did make, so that the gap between power and will implied in posing the issue in these terms does not apply in this case. What this doctrine does mean, according to Peter, is that God can accomplish whatever He wants to accomplish, whether He wills it to occur directly or indirectly. These distinctions which the Lombard has drawn between what the phrase "whatever He wills" means in these different statements make the point that not every kind of willing serves as a correct interpretation of the divine nature. As Ivan Boh has well said, the Lombard here is offering "a further refinement on that notion of omnipotence which is based on the connection between the possibility of action and acts of will."¹³⁵

With this foundation laid, Peter moves next to the refutation of the most recent version of Abelard's argument that God cannot do better than He does. As he describes the position to be attacked, it runs like this: God always acts justly and for the good. If He did anything differently, He would be acting in opposition to these values. With respect to this claim, Peter observes that it is true that what God does do is good and just. But, this fact imposes no constraints on the other things that He might do. Nor does it limit His capacity to have done other things which He has not chosen to do. Nor does God's justice constrain Him. True, He only does do things that are compatible with justice. But He remains free not to

¹³³ The best treatment of this subject is Boh, "Divine Omnipotence," pp. 193-200. See also Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 39-41.

¹³⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 42, 1: 294-98.

¹³⁵ Boh, "Divine Omnipotence," p. 196.

behave in this way. A similar line of reasoning applies to what God ought to do, although here, too, Peter observes that “ought” is a tricky word to apply to the deity because, strictly speaking, He does not “owe” anybody anything. Throughout this discussion, it is God’s freedom to act as He chooses that Peter emphasizes as the proper understanding of divine omnipotence, in opposing the idea that God cannot act differently than the way He does act because His reasons are excellent and because He decided to act in these ways from all eternity. Peter agrees that God’s reasons for doing whatever He does are eminently right and reasonable. None the less, God is under no constraint to act in this way.

Peter next takes up the objection that, if God could do no differently than he does, He would be acting against His own foreknowledge. Here he brings to bear on the objection his earlier analysis of foreknowledge, in which he had argued that God’s omniscience includes the range of options out of which He selects the actions that He decides to perform. At this juncture, he charges other thinkers with twisting the sense of the Augustinian definition of divine omnipotence. As he shows, what Augustine had in mind was not the reduction of God’s power to the scope of whatever it is that He actually wills to do, but rather a distinction between will and power. Peter himself expands on the sense of that distinction. It means, he says, not only that God is capable of doing whatever it is that He wills, but also that whatever He can do always remains more, in principle, than what He actually does do. In short, and this is his most creative accomplishment in entering the lists against Abelard on this whole subject, Peter shows that the thrust of Augustine’s definition is not to ground a theodicy argument. Rather, it is to ground, more fundamentally than even Augustine himself recognized, the implied distinction between God’s ordained and absolute power. God’s radical freedom is to be located under the latter of these two headings.¹³⁶ While the Lombard does not actually use the terms *potentia ordinata* and *potentia absoluta*, this is the manifest sense of his text. He has staked a clear claim on this terrain and it is one he proceeds to exploit systematically in the argument that God always remains free to act differently than the way in which He has chosen to act. The point is a special application of the principle, in Peter’s doctrine of God, that the transcend-

¹³⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 43, 1: 298–303. This point has been noted by Courtenay, *Capacity and Volition*, p. 55; Beonio-Brocchieri [Fumagalli] and Parodi, *Storia della filos. medievale*, pp. 254–55.

ent divine essence is never exhausted by the the ways in which the deity has chosen to display Himself in His interactions with His creation.

With this equipment in hand, Peter proceeds to clear away the problems that remain. One Abelardian *quidam* here, whose identity we have not been able to ascertain, had cited a passage from Augustine's *Eighty-Three Different Questions* to defend the claim that God cannot do better than He does, a passage which, as Peter shows, is inapposite. In the citation at issue, Augustine is referring to the Father's generation of the Son, His own equal, as an action incapable of being improved on. This point, Peter notes, is irrelevant to the question of whether God could have improved on created beings that do not share His substance.¹³⁷ Now, the beings God created are creatures, with created limits. Peter shows an appreciation of this point, which has its parallel in the argument of Robert of Melun, but he presents it as an amplification of the line taken by the anonymous Porretan and the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, so as not to give backhanded support to the Platonic world view. If the universe were as good as it might be, it would be perfect, he observes. But only God is perfect. If creatures were also perfect, this would infringe on the uniqueness of the attribute of perfection as a divine property, making the creation equal to the creator. Since it does not partake of the divine nature, the created universe cannot enjoy this type of equality with it. Now, among those creatures with created limits, he continues, some are capable of improvement, whether through their own efforts, the assistance of God, or both. Quite apart from that, had God chosen to do so, He could have created beings incapable of sinning. He could have provided arrangements in the natural law that might have afforded better conditions of existence for creatures, just as He could have decreed a mode of redemption different from the one He did select. All these examples refer to the quality of life for creatures, not the wisdom and power of the creator, or His capacity to have constructed alternative arrangements.¹³⁸

There is one more objection Peter wants to deal with before going on to another dimension of the relations between God's power and His will. Some people say that God cannot now do what He once did, citing as their clinching argument the idea that, since Christ was born, crucified, and resurrected once and for all, He cannot be reincarnated, recrucified, and resurrected again. Against

¹³⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 44. c. 1.2, 1: 304.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, c. 1.3–4, 1: 304–05.

this claim, Peter points out that God is eternal and immutable. The fact that God chose to do all these things once only does not mean that He could not do them again. In the defense of this extreme example of his general point about the omnipotence of God, Peter brings forward the nominalist argument concerning the verb, which parallels the nominalist argument concerning the noun to which he appeals in considering God's foreknowledge and contingency. Just as the nominalists held that the noun has a unitary signification, although it can consignify when it is used in propositions in conjunction with verbs in different tenses, voices, or moods, so they held that the verb signifies two things, an action and a time when the action takes place. Irrespective of the time, the verb signifies a single action. The time of the action is a consignification which does not alter the proper signification of the verb. Hence, for the nominalists, with respect to the understanding of nouns and verbs alike, one can say that whatever was true once is true always (*semel est verum, semper est verum*). Peter concurs in this analysis. On the analogy of the action signified by the verb, he points out, God's power is always the same. What He was able to do in the past, He is able to do in the present or the future (*Deus semper posse et quidquid semel potuit id est habere omnem illam potentiam quam semel habuit*).¹³⁹ This conclusion, connected as it is to the nominalist understanding of verbs, is used by the Lombard not to advance the claims of logic but rather to undergird the fundamentally metaphysical address he takes to the question of God's power. It is perhaps Peter's most pointed and rigorous application of the principle that God's omnipotence always transcends His actual use of it.

Peter now moves to the consideration of other issues in the relation between God's power and God's will. He has a substantial number of points to make about the divine will in this connection. He begins by observing that God's will is spoken of with respect to the divine essence. For God, to be and to will are one and the same; just as to be and to be good are identical in God. At the same time, God is not exhausted by whatever He wills, just as the fact that He knows everything does not mean that He is everything He knows.

¹³⁹ Ibid., c. 2, 1: 305–06. The quotation is at c. 2.4, 1:306. His comparison of God's power with the signification of the verb is at c. 2.3, 1:106: "Verba enim diversorum temporum, diversi prolata temporibus et diversis enim adiuncta adverbiiis, eundem faciunt sensum, ut modo loquentes dicimus: Iste potest legere hodie; cras autem dicimus: Iste potest legisse, vel potuit legere hieri; ubi unius rei monstratur potentia." For modern scholars who have also noted Peter's use of the nominalist understanding of the verb on this context, see the citations in n. 114 above, p. 287.

Rather, we should understand this point about God's will as saying that, like His knowledge, which is of His essence, His will can be directed to this or that subject, subjects which are distinct from Himself, created, and changeable, and of which His will can be regarded as the first cause.¹⁴⁰

As with most theologians of his time, Peter also understands the divine will under the headings of precept, prohibition, permission, operation, and counsel. The particular change he rings on this standard teaching, and it is a function of his desire to avoid collapsing the divine will as the divine essence into the divine will as God's chosen exercise of the options He selects vis-à-vis His creation, is to view these distinctions as signs of the divine will, signs that are not to be confused with their *significatum*. These signs are ways in which the simple and unchanging God manifests Himself externally.¹⁴¹ Here, Peter has called upon the Augustinian distinction between signs and things, from the *De doctrina christiana*, transferring it from a verbal to a theological level. With this semantic support for his theology of divine transcendence in place, Peter states the contemporary consensus position in arguing that God's ability to tolerate the breaking of His moral law and the rejection of His grace by sinners does not conflict with or limit His will. Since this is the arrangement He decided to put in place, the exercise of their free will by intelligent beings cannot be seen as frustrating God's desires. Peter also agrees with the consensus in stating that God's permission of sin does not make Him morally responsible for it.¹⁴² Once more, Peter firmly guides this topic back to the principle that God does everything that He wills, and that this fact places no limits on divine omnipotence. And, while God's will as eternal cannot be resisted, the signs of that will in prohibition, precept, permission, and counsel can be rejected by the free moral agents He has chosen to create.¹⁴³

Peter brings in one final example of this same general point, which has the effect of ending his treatment of God's nature on a moral note, and one that attacks one of Abelard's most notorious teachings in the field of ethics as well. Human free will may be good will, he notes, and it may yet seek something that is against God's plan, as is the case when filial piety urges a child to will the health

¹⁴⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 45. c. 1–c. 4, 1: 306–09.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, c. 5–c. 7, 1: 309–12. On this point, see Schneider, *Die Lehre*, pp. 44–49.

¹⁴² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 46. c. 1–c. 7, 1: 312–21. For other contemporary treatments of this topic, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 1 part 2: 204–81.

¹⁴³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 47, 1: 321–24.

of a parent who is seriously ill and whom God wills to die. Thus, the good will of men may or may not be congruent with the will of God. At the same time, God's will may be served by human bad will. This was so in the case of the people responsible for the crucifixion of Christ, who did, *pace* Abelard, act out of bad intentions. As with his general analysis of permission above, Peter reminds the reader that this does not mean that God caused their bad will. Likewise, men of good will are not gratified by the contemplation of the sufferings of Christ on the cross or the sufferings of the martyrs, although they are able to appreciate the fact that these sufferings are permitted by God for man's redemption and edification.¹⁴⁴ As this final series of questions reflects so clearly, the thoroughgoing aim of restoring the transcendent dimension to the deity which informs so consistently Peter's doctrine of the Trinity and doctrine of God alike also has the effect, as he moves to the doctrine of creation and of man in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, of providing a zone of independence for God's creatures that is fully compatible with God's omnipotence, omniscience, and perfectly realized being.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., d. 48. c. 1–c. 4, 1: 327–38.

CHAPTER SIX

THE CREATION, ANGELS, MAN, AND THE FALL

The topics covered by Book 2 of the Lombard's *Sentences* were all controversial in his day, sometimes massively so. At the same time, the contestants ranged on the different sides of the debates were not always the same ones, for each of these subjects. In the case of angels, man, and the fall, the latter topic including the effects and transmission of original sin, the problems arose from the disagreements found within the traditional authorities and their twelfth-century adherents, and, in some cases, from deep internal inconsistencies within individual authorities, which contemporary theologians sought to reconcile with greater or lesser success. Although Augustine is a weighty presence throughout Book 2, the rest of the cast of characters, both ancient and modern, fluctuates considerably from one part of this book to another. So do the problems Peter Lombard wants to target and the particular thinkers, in each area, whom he wants to criticize, support, or improve on. In this respect, there is no one set of central imperatives, no one overarching theme tying together his treatment of the topics in this book, as there is in the case of his doctrine of God in Book 1. Also, he displays different degrees of conservatism and originality as he moves from one of these topics to another, and different degrees of profundity in his exploitation of his sources. For these reasons, and despite the evident thematic connections that tie them together, these subjects in the Lombard's theology are grasped most comprehensibly when treated one by one.

THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION

With respect to the doctrine of creation, the agenda was set, not only for Peter but also for his mid-century confrères, by the challenge raised to the traditional exegetical account of creation in Genesis commentary and to the more speculative treatment of the subject found in the patristic tradition by the theories of creation presented by thinkers associated with the school of Chartres. Despite their individual variations in handling it, their project was to develop a Platonic or Neoplatonic understanding of the creation, a task no one had essayed since John Scottus Eriugena in the ninth

century, and at the same time to see whether, and how far, it could be integrated with the hexaemeral account in Genesis. While the members of this school thus drew upon biblical materials and while more than one of them framed his speculation in the form of Genesis exegesis, they were united with each other, and opposed to other thinkers of the time, in approaching this entire subject from the standpoint of natural philosophy, not of theology.¹ The contemporary response to the Chartrains was a varied one. Some theologians, like Honorius Augustodunensis, Rupert of Deutz, and the members of the school of Laon, worked too early in the century to have been aware of the writings of the Chartrains. Others, like Robert Pullen, were chronologically positioned to have been able to take them into account but failed to do so. Still others, like William of St. Thierry, reacted with rhetorical denunciation but with a highly imperfect grasp of the Chartrain project. Still others, like the Porretans, were well aware of what that project was. Had not their master, Gilbert of Poitiers, taught and studied at Chartres for many years and served as chancellor of its school? But they contented themselves with laconic objections to the Platonizing of creation without proposing a cogent refutation or alternative to that approach. There were also a number of theologians, including Peter Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, and Robert of Melun, who took serious account of the Chartrain doctrine of creation and serious exception to it, at some points. They sought to delineate the areas in which they found it wanting, and the areas in which they found it useful, while trying to yoke it to a more traditional exegetical or patristic treatment of the subject. Peter Lombard can be placed in this last group. For his

¹ This common orientation has been rightly stressed, for the school as a whole, and for its individual members, by A. Clerval, *Les Écoles de Chartres au moyen-âge du V^e au XVI^e siècle*, Mémoires de la Société archéologique d'Eure-et-Loir, 11 (Paris: R. Salleret, 1895), pp. 267–68; Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Creation and Creator of the World according to Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of Arras," *AHDLM* 22 (1958): 146; Häring, ed., *The Life and Work of Clarenbald of Arras, a Twelfth-Century Master of the School of Chartres* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1965), p. 50; Helen Rodnite [Lemay], "Platonism in the Twelfth-Century School of Chartres," *Acta* 2 (1975): 42–52; "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Guillaume de Conches' Glosses on Macrobius: Text and Studies," Columbia University Ph.D. diss., 1972, pp. 50–51; Enzo Maccagnolo, *Rerum universitatis: Saggio sulla filosofia di Teodorico di Chartres* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1976), pp. 227–50; Ludwig Ott, "Die platonische Weltseele in der Theologie der Früh-scholastik," in *Parusia: Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger*, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt: Minerva GMBH, 1965), pp. 308–26; Anneliese Stollenwerk, "Der Genesiskommentar Thierrys von Chartres und die Thierrys von Chartres zugeschriebenen Kommentar zu Boethius 'De trinitate'," University of Cologne Ph.D. diss., 1971, pp. 34–36.

part, he is less interested in mediating between the traditional and the Chartrain approaches to creation than are some members of that group. But, at the same time, he offers a more coherent and surefooted treatment of creation than any of them do, even when he is drawing heavily and constructively upon them.²

The Chartrain Challenge

Since it was the Chartrains who threw down the gauntlet, it makes sense to begin with the series of creation accounts which they provided, mostly between the 1130s and the mid-1150s. A consideration of their teachings here will remind us of the fact that there was not only a range of Platonisms abroad in the land in this period but also of the variety of approaches taken to the Platonic tradition within this single movement.³ The master in this school who appears to have been the first to have supported a Platonic view of creation was its celebrated head in the early twelfth century, Bernard of Chartres. In a previously unpublished gloss on Plato's *Timaeus*, in the Latin translation of Chalcidius in which it was read in this century, convincingly attributed to Bernard by its discoverer, Paul Edward Dutton, he is quoted as stating that the three principles of creation are God, matter, and the forms (*deus, hile et ideas*),⁴ exactly the view that John of Salisbury ascribes to him in the *Metalogicon*.⁵ As for the nature of the forms, Bernard holds that they are eternal, once created, but that they are not coeternal with God. They exist in His mind before the creation of the phenomenal world but are His products, posterior to Him. Thus far, Bernard's forms sound much like the exemplary causes of John Scottus Eriugena. But, unlike them, they do not participate in creating phenomenal beings directly. Rather, for Bernard, this role is assigned to the *formae nativae*, forms which are images or reflections of these archetypes and which do the actual work of informing matter.⁶ As

² This position of Peter in the contemporary debates on creation is brought out well by Ermenegildo Bertola, "La dottrina della creazione nel *Liber Sententiarum* di Pier Lombardo," *Pier Lombardo* 1:1 (1957): 27-44.

³ This point is articulated clearly by Peter Dronke, *Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), and is stated with particular crispness on p. 8.

⁴ Paul Edward Dutton, "The Uncovering of the *Glosae super Platonem* of Bernard of Chartres," *MS* 46 (1984): 213.

⁵ John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 4.35, ed. Clement C. J. Webb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), p. 205. John makes the same point in *Met.* 2.20, p. 107, although he erroneously states that the idea goes back to the Stoics.

⁶ Dutton, "The Uncovering," pp. 213-19.

for matter itself, Bernard does not appear to have treated the question of whether it is eternal or created.

On all these matters later Chartrains held definite, and often incompatible, opinions. No doubt the most problematic account of creation produced by anyone in this tradition is that of Bernard Silvestris, in that he offers the most thoroughly Platonic, or Neoplatonic, treatment of creation, not to mention one that includes ideas idiosyncratic to him, combining his ingredients in a rich and syncretic broth. For some kinds of readers, he complicates matters by presenting his ideas not in a treatise or commentary but in an allegorical poetic narrative-cum-dialogue, the *Cosmographia*. In this work, Bernard Silvestris by no means rules out the doctrine of preexistent matter and proposes a God who does not act directly in the work of creation, subcontracting it instead to an assortment of subordinate created emanations or theophanies.⁷ In addition to his dependence on Neoplatonism for the notion of creation by sub-divine intermediaries and his adherence to the Platonic notion of the preexistence of matter, Bernard Silvestris draws as well on the Stoic idea of a cyclical cosmos undergoing endless cycles of creation, destruction, and recreation. This cyclical idea of the cosmos is an essential foundation for his creation scenario. For, at the point when his story begins, we are not about to witness the first or the only creation that ever will be, but rather the present round of the cycle, now, as it were, at ground zero, or at ground zero plus one, since there are already a few theophanies on the stage of the action when Bernard sweeps open the curtains.⁸

In particular, the two characters who supply the matter and form out of which most creatures are made, Silva and Noys, are present from the very beginning. So are several other theophanies, while yet other theophanies emerge during the course of the story to lend a helping hand. Silva represents matter which, at this stage, is unformed or primordial. In some respects she is the heroine of the

⁷ Scholars have reached consensus on these traits, for the most part. On this work, see in particular Clerval, *Les Écoles*, pp. 259–61; Heinrich Flatten, “Die ‘materia primordialis’ in der Schule von Chartres,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 40 (1931): 58–65; Étienne Gilson, “La Cosmogonie de Bernard Silvestris,” *AHDLMA* 3 (1928): 5–24, although Gilson sees the character Noys as coessential with the deity and, at the same time, as identical with the subordinate Neoplatonic *Nous*, p. 12; Theodore Silverstein, “The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris,” *Modern Philology* 46 (1948): 92–116; Brian Stock, *Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard Silvester* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 15–16.

⁸ Bernard Silvestris, *Cosmographia*, ed. Peter Dronke (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978); trans. Winthrop Wetherbee (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). Dronke offers a good summary of the story in his preface, pp. 29–48.

Cosmographia, for it is her desires, her longing to receive the impress of form, that get the action started, triggering the arrival of Noys. She does this through the mediation of Natura, the daughter of Noys, who makes Silva's complaint known to her mother. When Noys arrives she brings with her the exemplary forms of all, or most, created beings. The task of joining them to matter is accomplished by a number of other theophanies, under the guidance of Noys. Just as Natura mediates the complaint of Silva, so she acts as the mediator of the forms to matter. She also orders the four elements to dispose themselves for the reception of form and arranges the elements in their allotted stations with respect to each other. It is a still more indirect level of theophany which is responsible for the actual union of matter and form. Noys gives birth to Endelichia or Anima. She marries Mundus, who is born of Silva. It is this marriage of Anima and Mundus that engenders all created beings except man, although, when they do appear, they issue from the womb of Silva.

This obstetrical anomaly aside, Bernard Silvestris next proceeds to the creation of man, the most interesting of the creatures for him. Man has a mode of genesis unique to him, and in two respects. While the immediate progenitors of other beings are Anima and Mundus, the theophanies that serve the analogous functions in man's case are Urania and Physis. Urania, or heavenly wisdom, supplies the human soul, and Physis, or the laws of physical nature, supplies the human body. This part of the scenario suggests that man's body is special, with respect to other corporeal beings, just as his soul is. Also special is the fact that, in this case alone, the permission of the deity must be obtained for the emergence of this particular creature on the part of the theophanies responsible for engendering him. The deity consents; but neither here nor elsewhere does he play a direct role in creation. The job is done by Physis and Urania in collaboration with Natura.

It is easy to see why a twelfth-century Christian reader might find this account of creation unsettling. The creator God has been all but banished from the action. Creation, according to Bernard Silvestris, is accomplished, rather, by a series of secondary theophanies or by the tertiary theophanies which they engender. Moreover, since the cosmos is eternal and the creation just described is not unique but only one of an endless series of creations which recycle both the matter and the forms used in the preceding creations, the notion of a God Who alone is eternal is impossible to sustain. There was no point, in Bernard Silvestris's account, when God was the only being in existence. In all these respects, it can be

seen that Bernard has made no effort at all to accommodate his treatment of creation to the account in Genesis. Nor does he raise the question of whether purely spiritual creatures, such as angels, exist, what their status is if they do, and when and how they were brought into being. Nor does he speculate on whether any of the creative theophanies in the *Cosmographia* are comparable to or coordinate with the persons of the Trinity. The role he assigns to Anima makes her rather less prominent a figure than the *anima mundi* is in Plato's *Timaeus* or in the work of other Chartrains, since she is only one of several forces which collaborate in the union of matter and form. Also, Anima here plays no role at all in man's creation. His soul or mind is derived, rather, from Urania. While Bernard Silvestris devotes extended attention to man and makes him a special case among creatures, and while Bernard's accent throughout his discussion of man is on the pure naturalism of his origin and constitution, the uniqueness of his genesis makes it as impossible for man to be viewed as a microcosm of nature in general as it is for him to be viewed as having a soul created by God in the divine image and likeness.

Bernard Silvestris has some additional reflections on the World Soul, the human soul, and the biblical God in his commentary on Martianus Capella, which both fail to cohere with each other and with his philosophy in the *Cosmographia*. In glossing the first book of Martianus, he says that the ancients held that, just as the world is a vast body from which all corporeal beings derive, so the world has a soul which animates that body. From it all created souls derive, and to it they return. Plato, he adds, called this spirit the *anima mundi*. Vergil agreed with Plato's view. For both Plato and Vergil, the *anima mundi* is subordinate to God. At the same time, Bernard states that this same spirit is referred to in both the Old and New Testaments as the spirit of God. This is the spirit said to have hovered over the deep in Genesis and this spirit is the one in Whom St. Paul says we live and move and have our being.⁹ Bernard Silvestris does not spell out whether he thinks that the biblical God, or the Holy Spirit, can or should be assimilated to the subordinate Platonic *anima mundi*. He just leaves matters at that. On the other hand, his account of the functions of the World Soul here would give it a special responsibility for the souls of men, of a sort that Anima lacks in the *Cosmographia*.

⁹ Bernard Silvestris, *Commentarius in Martiani Capellae, De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* 1.18, trans. Enzo Maccagnolo in *Il Divino e il megacosmo: Testi filosofici e scientifici della scuola di Chartres* (Milan: Rusconi, 1980), pp. 564–67.

Not all the Chartrains were willing to go as far in the direction of Platonism, or of originality, as Bernard Silvestris. His confrères in the school were much more interested in trying to coordinate their findings as readers of philosophical texts with their beliefs as Christians and with the creation account in Genesis. This is certainly the case with Thierry of Chartres. He wants to integrate the Trinity, understood economically and with each person performing distinct cosmic functions, into the work of creation. He takes a more creationist than emanationist line. He believes in a single creation, but one occurring in two stages, with God engendering everything at once but then developing it, according to the hexaemeral plan of Genesis, by means of seminal reasons. God, for Thierry, remains the remote cause, the ground of the being and capacities of created beings. He holds the *anima mundi* to be a purely naturalistic force and he does not equate it with the Holy Spirit.¹⁰ Thierry elaborates some of these points in his successive commentaries on the *De trinitate* of Boethius, and also in his treatise on the hexaemeron. The latter work, as might be expected, offers a fuller description of creation, although in it he changes his opinion on one important issue, the eternity of exemplary forms, and his adherence to the Genesis format means that he does not discuss the creation and nature of angels.

In all his commentaries on Boethius, Thierry makes the point, also reiterated in his hexaemeron, that God is the *forma essendi*, meaning by that term not form in the Aristotelian sense of the particular form of any created substance and not in the sense of a divine immanentalism but just the reverse. He means that God is the ground of being of creatures, of both their matter and their form and of the coinherence of that matter and form in each creature. This notion is accompanied by a clear distinction, derived by Thierry from Boethius, between the mode of being possessed by the creator and that possessed by creatures.¹¹ While, in this respect,

¹⁰ Good orientations to Thierry are provided by Clerval, *Les Écoles*, pp. 254–59; Charlotte Gross, “Twelfth-Century Concepts of Time: Three Reinterpretations of Augustine’s Doctrine of Creation *Simul*,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 23 (1985): 328–31; Häring, “The Creation and Creator,” pp. 146–53; Édouard Jeuneau, “Un Représentant du platonisme au XII^e siècle: Maître Thierry de Chartres,” in “*Lectio philosophorum*”; *Recherches sur l’École de Chartres* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1973), pp. 77–86; Maccagnolo, *Rerum universitatis*, pp. 26–28, 30–37, 42–49, 227–50; J. M. Parent, *La doctrine de la création dans l’école de Chartres* (Paris/Ottawa: J. Vrin/Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1938), pp. 54–58; Stollenwerk, “Der Genesiskommentar,” pp. 34–36, 38–46, 49–67.

¹¹ Thierry of Chartres, *Commentum super Boethii librum De Trinitate* 2.16; *Lectiones in Boethii librum De Trinitate* 2.35–37; *Glosa super Boethii librum De Trinitate* 2.18;

creation is the work of “one God alone” (*uno solo deo*) and while the entire Trinity creates unformed matter, forms it, and governs it, each Trinitarian person is assigned a particular role to play in Thierry’s account. In this respect, he argues, one can speak of four causes of earthly substances, God’s power as the efficient cause, God’s wisdom as the formal cause, God’s goodness as the final cause, and the four elements as the material cause.¹² The unformed matter, according to Thierry, is created all at once, at the first moment of creation.¹³ As for the forms, he wavers. In his commentary on Boethius, he insists that God creates both primordial matter and the forms, and that those who think “that neither form nor matter is created depart from the truth” (*quod nec formam nec materiam creatam esse a veritate devians*).¹⁴ On the other hand, in his hexaameron, he states that the forms of all things are engendered from all eternity.¹⁵ This eternity would be compatible with his understanding of God’s wisdom as the formal cause. But Thierry does not clarify whether these forms, so understood, are an independent category of being which, like God, is eternal but distinct from Him or whether they are ideas in His mind, identical with Him. Nor does he explain whether this eternal engendering of the forms is to be understood along the lines of the Father’s eternal engendering of the Son in the unmanifested Trinity, or in some economic sense of the term vis-à-vis creation. In any event, and leaving aside how or if this next point squares with his view of God’s goodness as the final cause, Thierry presents the *anima mundi* as the force that brings matter and form together and endows creatures with the natural capacities they have.¹⁶ He understands this force in a thoroughly naturalistic sense, and in this respect scholars who exempt Thierry from Platonic subordinationism here are on the mark. He does observe, however, and unhelpfully, that Christians call this force the Holy Spirit.¹⁷

The creation account of William of Conches has much in com-

Tractatus de sex dierum operibus 32, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring in *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971), pp. 73, 166–67, 272, 569. This point is noted by Maccagnolo, *Rerum universitatis*, pp. 26–28; Gangolf Schrimpf, *Die Axiomenschrift des Boethius (De hebdomadibus) als philosophisches Lehrbuch des Mittelalters* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), pp. 57–62; Stollenwerk, “Der Genesiskommentar,” pp. 73–79.

¹² Thierry of Chartres, *Tractatus* 1, 3, pp. 555, 556–57. The quotation is on p. 555.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 5, p. 557.

¹⁴ Thierry of Chartres, *Commentum* 2.28, p. 77.

¹⁵ Thierry of Chartres, *Tractatus* 5, p. 557.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 26, p. 566.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 27, 29, pp. 566, 567.

mon with that of Thierry of Chartres. His model is even more creationist than emanationist and he draws an even sharper distinction between the creator and the created capacities with which He endows other beings. William finds a clearer and less problematic way of dealing with the forms than Thierry does. While his use of Trinitarian language is even less theological than that of Thierry, since he is interested in the deity only in His role in getting the universe in motion and providing it with its built-in natural aptitudes, his use of the terminology of power, wisdom, and goodness to describe the activities of the Trinitarian persons in this connection made William the brunt of the charge of Abelardianism on the Trinity at the hands of William of St. Thierry, even though he took pains to indicate his differences from Abelard on the question of whether these terms are proper names of the Trinitarian persons.¹⁸

William develops his ideas across a series of works, growing more nuanced after the attack on his *Philosophia mundi* and very cautious indeed in his final work, the *Dragmaticon*. He first broaches the subject of the creation in his *Glosae super Platonem*. There, along the same lines as Thierry, he announces that there are four causes of creation, the divine essence as the efficient cause, the divine wisdom as the formal cause, the divine goodness as the final cause, and unformed matter as the material cause.¹⁹ With respect to the formal cause, he makes two important distinctions that differentiate his handling of this topic from Thierry's. As God's wisdom, this cause is an archetype of the entire creation, he argues. It is eternal and immutable and has always resided in God's mind. When God

¹⁸ Good orientations on William of Conches are provided by Clerval, *Les Écoles*, pp. 264–65; Dronke, *Fabula*, pp. 100–03; Heinrich Flatten, *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches* (Koblenz: Görres-Druckerei, 1929), esp. pp. 90–96, 126–34, 180–84; Tullio Gregory, *Anima mundi: La filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres* (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1955), pp. 49–58, 72–97; “L’Idea della natura nella scuola di Chartres,” *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 31 (1952): 433–42; Gross, “Twelfth-Century Concepts,” pp. 334–37; “William of Conches: A Curious Grammatical Argument against the Eternity of the World,” *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, 11, ed. Phillip Pulsiano (Villanova: Augustinian Historical Institute, 1986), pp. 127–33; Jeauneau, “*Integumentum*,” in “*Lectio philosophorum*,” pp. 151–61, 171–72; Maccagnolo, intro. to *Il Divino*, pp. 66–68; Gregor Maurach, comm. on his ed. of William of Conches, *Philosophia mundi*, Bk. 1 (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1974), pp. 55, 58; Joseph Moreau, “‘*Opifex, id est Creator*’: Remarques sur le platonisme de Chartres,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 56 (1974): 35–49; Ott, “Die platonische Weltseele,” pp. 318–26; Parent, *La doctrine de la creation*, pp. 37–43, 70–76; Rodnite [Lemay], “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” pp. 38, 40–42, 49–54, 56–60, 64–72. William's treatment of power, wisdom, and goodness as Trinitarian names has been erroneously equated with Abelard's by John Newell, “Rationalism at the School of Chartres,” *Vivarium* 21 (1983): 21.

¹⁹ William of Conches, *Glosae super Platonem* 1.32, ed. Édouard Jeauneau (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965), p. 98.

decides to engender the creation, two other formal principles arrive on the scene. The divine archetype serves as the exemplar of the *formae nativae* which, in turn, are the informing principles of individual substances. Also, in a similar way, God produces seminal reasons. William sees these seminal reasons not so much as a means of accounting for the arrival of new kinds of creatures after the sixth day of creation but as a means of describing a continuous creation in which creatures are given the capacity to function as secondary causes. His distinctions here, with respect to the idea of form, enable him to retain the notion of an archetypal cause identical with and coeternal with the deity without sacrificing the notion of created forms that do not partake of the divine essence.²⁰ With respect to the material cause, William rejects Plato and agrees with Thierry that primordial matter is not eternal or preexistent but created, and created *simul* at the first moment of the creation.²¹ With respect to the final cause, William calls it the *anima mundi* and treats it exclusively as a force of nature that gives creatures life and motion and the ability to carry out their natural physical functions. As to whether it can be called the Holy Spirit, he observes that some people think so. He himself remains non-committal, saying that he neither denies nor affirms this claim.²² But, in the sequel, he makes it very clear that the *anima mundi* as he envisions it has to be distinguished sharply from any of the Trinitarian persons and from created beings as well. Unlike the Son or the Holy Spirit, the *anima mundi* is neither engendered, nor does it proceed. Unlike the phenomenal world, it is not created. The verb he uses to describe the presence of the *anima mundi* in the world is *excogitare*, meaning produced by thought.²³ While William thus avoids a confusion between the *anima mundi* and the deity, either as creator or as the Holy Spirit, it is still not entirely clear what relationship it bears to the deity. It is not created. But does it share coeternity with God? Or, is it to be understood as an effect of God that is given its assignment only when the phenomenal world comes into being, as the providential law of nature He ordains? On these matters William remains silent.

Further clarifications are provided by William in his *Philosophia mundi*. Here, he reiterates the position on unformed matter and on forms that he had already articulated.²⁴ But he begins by observing

²⁰ Ibid., 1.32, 1.37, 1.45, pp. 99, 104–05, 113.

²¹ Ibid., 1.60, 2.94, pp. 130–31, 260.

²² Ibid., 1.71, pp. 144–47. The quotation is on p. 147.

²³ Ibid., 1.74, pp. 148–50.

²⁴ William of Conches, *Philosophia mundi* 1.22, ed. Maurach, pp. 27–33.

that, while we should learn what we can about the creator by investigating the creation, the knowledge we can gain thereby remains imperfect.²⁵ He holds out analogous limits for theological language. While the Trinitarian persons can be called power, wisdom, and will, these terms, especially the third one, must be understood metaphorically (*translative*), not literally. Moreover, these are not proper names exclusive to each of the persons, since They share equally in the qualities involved and work cooperatively in all Their actions.²⁶ William of St. Thierry clearly did not take account of these disclaimers in charging that William of Conches was teaching the same Trinitarian doctrine as Abelard. Nor did he read far enough into the *Philosophia mundi*; for he completely misses William's next point.²⁷ William returns to the question of the *anima mundi* and whether it can be equated with the Holy Spirit. He notes that there are two answers that have been given to this question. Some say that the *anima mundi* is the Holy Spirit, which vivifies everything in the world. Others say that the *anima mundi* is purely natural, and not a supernatural force, implanted in creatures and giving them their natural vigor and aptitudes. He refers readers to his gloss on Plato where, as we have just seen, he refrains from deciding between these two positions and in which his own handling of this force suggests that he has a purely naturalistic understanding of it. In the *Philosophia mundi*, William offers a clarification of that last point. Since God wills to create a world in which creatures can operate as secondary causes and since will, with the caveats and limits noted above, can be ascribed to the Holy Spirit, one can associate the *anima mundi* with the mission of the Holy Spirit. But, he insists, this is not to say that the transcendent Holy Spirit immanentizes Himself in the work of the *anima mundi*. Rather, William concludes, we have to see the *anima mundi* as an effect of the Holy Spirit.²⁸

In the first book of his *Elementorum philosophiae* William repeats and nuances still farther his discussion of the Trinity and the *anima mundi* in his earlier works. He states that God is the sole creator, an activity in which all the Trinitarian persons collaborate equally, and that all the qualities of the Trinity inhere equally in all the persons. He adds that nothing precedes or is coeternal with the deity.²⁹ This last point sweeps away the possibility that the *anima*

²⁵ Ibid., 1.4, pp. 10–11.

²⁶ Ibid., 1.10–11, pp. 13–15.

²⁷ William of St. Thierry, *De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis*, PL 180: 333A–D.

²⁸ William of Conches, *Philos. mundi* 1.15, pp. 15–16.

²⁹ William of Conches, *Elementorum philosophiae* 1, PL 90: 1129A–1130B.

mundi is eternal. In rounding up opinions on the *anima mundi*, William notes once more that some seek to equate it with the Holy Spirit and that others treat it as a purely natural force (*naturalem vigorem*) infused in things by God as part of their natural endowment, enabling them to carry out their functions. Adding a third opinion, he notes that still others see the *anima mundi* as an incorporeal substance which gives animate beings their souls individually. This third opinion, which we have found in Bernard Silvestris's Martianus gloss, he rejects. Once more, he takes no official stand on the other two positions, although what he has said in the *Philosophia mundi* as well as in the present work would appear to favor the second view.³⁰

In William's final work, the *Dragmaticon*, abandoning the effort to develop the potentially fruitful distinction between the deity and His effects, whether seen as the natural law He ordains or as the beings He creates, he fights a rear-guard action. He rejects his earlier description of the Trinity as power, wisdom, and will. Using the tactic of many of Abelard's critics prior to the Lombard, he cites biblical passages in which these names are applied to Trinitarian persons other than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, respectively.³¹ William also abandons all reference to the *anima mundi*. In this sense, his final response to criticism is not to try to refute it definitively but to back off from the project which had inspired it.

There were two other mid-century Chartrains, writing after Bernard Silvestris, Thierry of Chartres, and William of Conches who sought to take account of, and to rectify, the overstatements, misstatements, or unclarities which they found in the writings of these masters. They did so with only partial success. One is an anonymous Chartrain whose commentary on Martianus Capella has been ascribed, by some scholars, to Bernard Silvestris. The internal evidence in this text, however, has enabled its editor to make a convincing refutation of that claim, since, while the author glosses some of the same points as Bernard does in his own commentary on the same work, he does so at different lemmata; and, he certainly moves away from some of the positions taken by Bernard. The author has clearly profited from the controversy provoked, willy-nilly, by William of Conches, for he takes pains to agree with him that power, wisdom, and goodness are not proper names of the

³⁰ Ibid., 1, PL 90: 1130B–1131D. The quotation is at 1130C.

³¹ William of Conches, *Dragmaticon* prologus, trans. Maccagnolo in *Il Divino*, pp. 244–45.

Trinitarian persons but refer to attributes which they all share.³² He glosses the name Endelichia, which, as we have noted, Bernard Silvestris equates with Anima as the female half of the theophanic couple who combine form and matter in all creatures except man, in his *Cosmographia*. Our author allows that Endelichia is the mother of Psyche, meaning that incorporeals, like the soul, cannot have material causes. Endelichia, he adds, is not a theophany, not God, and not a person of the Trinity.³³ After raising and rejecting the Platonic theory that souls preexist their union with bodies, proposing instead that souls, like everything else, are created, and created *simul*,³⁴ he turns to the problem of the World Soul. The *anima mundi*, he argues, is not to be identified with the deity. Nor is it the substance of created souls. Rather, it is a natural power that animates the whole world.³⁵ The author then, confusingly enough, caps this position, which is largely a reprise of William of Conches', with a gloss on the World Soul supportive of what Bernard Silvestris says in his Martianus commentary, and one which contradicts what he himself has already stated. In language very close to Bernard's, he compares the World Soul to the spirit animating the world, understood as a vast body, the spirit which is the source of all souls and to which they return. He equates this spirit with the divine spirit that governs the creation. As both prophets and philosophers have said, he adds, it endows creatures with the capacity to perform their natural functions. The author does not raise here the issue of the Trinity, or the charisms of the Holy Spirit. But, while he stresses above that the *anima mundi* is neither the deity nor a theophany of the deity, he now identifies the World Soul with God. The term *anima mundi*, he concludes, confusingly enough, "plainly signifies the deity" (*Deum esse aperte significat*).³⁶ It cannot be said that this effort to square Bernard Silvestris with William of Conches is a success.

The last Chartrain writer within our time period, Clarenbald of Arras, makes a valiant attempt to seize the initiative once again, to treat the range of issues addressed by other masters in the school who proposed accounts of creation, and to set his own stamp on this enterprise by de-Platonizing it somewhat and by adding some

³² Haijo Jan Westra, ed., *The Commentary on Martianus Capella's De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Attributed to Bernard Silvestris* 5.424–54, 11.30–62 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), pp. 107–08, 246–47.

³³ Ibid., 6.420–30, p. 143.

³⁴ Ibid., 6.508–48, pp. 146–47.

³⁵ Ibid., 8.311–17, p. 183.

³⁶ Ibid., 8.991–1025, pp. 205–06. The quotation is at 8.1025, p. 206.

original ideas of his own.³⁷ Framing his discussion as a commentary on Genesis, he begins by comparing Genesis with other books of the Old Testament and analogizes their arrangement with the books of the Roman law. After discussing prophecy and inspiration as means of access to the biblical text, Clarenbald offers a proof of God's existence, as the first cause, and one that might be seen as a criticism of the *Cosmographia*. Since the universe exists, with its multiple phenomena, elements, and humors, and since it cannot have been created by nature itself, or by chance, it requires an artificer (*artifex*). Since this artificer must be supremely intelligent and omnipotent, as well as being prior to all else, he cannot have been a man, or an angel, and must be God.³⁸ Before going on, it is worth pointing out that Clarenbald's use of the term *artifex* in no sense means that he sees creation as the imposition of forms, whether created or not, on preexistent matter. He is a real creationist and an opponent of theophanic intermediaries. This point will emerge more clearly below. Second, it is worth noting Clarenbald's acknowledgement of the existence of angels, and of their status as intelligent and incorporeal beings. But, having referred to them here, he proceeds to ignore them in the rest of his commentary. This is not just because the commentary takes the form of a hexaameron and angels are not mentioned in the creation account in Genesis. It is also a consequence of the fact that none of the thinkers engaged in the Chartrain project felt a need to discuss angels or to indicate where beings of this type fit into their understandings of creation. This being the case, Clarenbald's mention of angels is a teaser for an analysis which he does not provide.

In turning to the creation, after establishing that it derives from God and from no other power, Clarenbald follows the line of assigning different parts of the work to different persons of the Trinity. His argument here resembles Thierry's more than that of William of Conches, for he omits both William's disclaimers concerning the full collaboration of the persons of the Trinity in everything They do as well as the power, wisdom and will model that brought William so much grief. Clarenbald rings two important changes on this theme, in comparison with both of these masters. He omits reference entirely to the Holy Spirit, confining himself to the creative activities of the Father and the Son only. As

³⁷ A good introduction is provided by Häring, "The Creation and Creator," pp. 169–81; *Life and Works of Clarenbaldus*, pp. 50–53.

³⁸ Clarenbald of Arras, *Tractatus super librum Genesis* 9–10, ed. Häring in *Life and Works*, pp. 229–30.

for the natural functions ascribed by Thierry and William to the *anima mundi*, a force also notable by its absence from Clarenbald's commentary, he retains these functions but reassigns them to the Son and to the seminal reasons. He also re-Augustinizes the seminal reasons, in terms of the scope he grants them. At the same time, he collapses the seminal reasons into the exemplary forms, or vice versa, ignoring the useful distinctions between these two types of formal principles that had been drawn by William of Conches.

In Clarenbald's creation scenario, God the Father retains His role as the creator of primordial matter, which, he agrees, is not coeternal with God, but is created all at once, and which comes into being in a state of pure potentiality (*possibilitas absoluta*).³⁹ God the Son, for His part, combines in His creative office two functions, both those associated by other members of the school of Chartres with the divine wisdom and those they assign as well to the *anima mundi*. The Son, according to Clarenbald, acts by absolute necessity (*necessitas absoluta*). By this he means that He acts completely alone. The Son is the force that providentially imposes forms on matter, moving it from the state of pure potentiality to the state of fulfillment, in which it can be known by the human mind. In addition, the Son supplies the created substances thereby brought into being with seminal forms. These seminal forms have been present in the mind of God from all eternity.⁴⁰ At this point, it would appear that Clarenbald is confusing two ideas which it might be more helpful to consider separately. On the one hand, he regards primordial matter as an entity incapable of being grasped by the human mind because it is lacking in form of any kind. This notion appears to depend on the epistemological assumption that the mind comes to a knowledge of material beings by abstracting their formal components from them. From this point of view, it could be argued that there is a first level of formal determination of matter, when inchoate matter is resolved into the four elements and when these elements are placed in relation to each other, prior to their combination and union with substantial forms, in the creation of individual beings. There is a step in Bernard Silvestris's *Cosmographia* account that addresses this concern. For his part, Clarenbald seems to need such a step in his own scenario, but he does not include one. He moves immediately to the seminal reasons, which are determinations not of primordial matter but of actual creatures.

In identifying the seminal reasons with ideas in the mind of God,

³⁹ Ibid., 17, 38, pp. 233, 242. The quotation is at 17, p. 233.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 18–23, pp. 233–36.

Clarenbald follows an Augustinian argument designed to refute the idea that exemplary causes, not seminal causes, are coeternal with God but independent of Him. The same argument is a useful weapon to be wielded against the Eriugenian understanding of exemplary causes as created and creative, posterior to the deity but eternal once brought into being. It is certainly possible to defend the idea that both exemplary causes and seminal reasons are present in the mind of God from all eternity, and that neither of them is put into play until He decides to create the universe. But, if one wants to make this point, it is desirable to do so without ignoring the fact that these two sets of formal principles have two kinds of functions, in Augustine's account. What Clarenbald does, even as he assigns to the Son the task of informing matter, is to impose three duties on the seminal reasons. They take over the *anima mundi's* task of endowing creatures with their natural aptitudes, enabling them to operate as secondary causes in their own sphere of activity without further recourse to the creator. And, with Augustine, he also sees the seminal reasons as explanations of new kinds of creatures that may arise after the sixth day of creation. Even more so, he agrees with Augustine that the seminal reasons can also explain the capacity of creatures to sustain divine miracles without annulling their natural limits under normal circumstances, and as providing for the supernatural aptitudes of animate beings, in the order of grace.⁴¹ In all these connections, while the Son acts with *necessitas absoluta*, the seminal forms act with a *necessitas complexionis*, that is, they act not completely alone but in conjunction with other beings, natural or supernatural as the case may be.

To sum up, Clarenbald's treatment of creation is, on one level, an effort to avoid snares in which some of his Chartrain brethren became entangled, particularly with reference to the createdness or uncreatedness of the forms, the World Soul, and the Holy Spirit. On another level, it is an effort to go beyond Genesis by showing that the deity, at least in the persons of the Father and the Son, relates Himself to the world in four ways. Prior to and independent of time, He operates formally, in conceiving of the forms of all things, and informally, in the creation of unformed matter. In time, He operates formally, and in two ways, actualizing matter as a state of pure potentiality by informing it, and by endowing the beings so produced, through the seminal reasons, with their capacity to carry out their natural functions. And, also in time, and again through the power of the seminal reasons, He operates so as to

⁴¹ Ibid., 28, pp. 338–39.

redeem it, by endowing it with the capacity to function in the supernatural order, as a vehicle of or as a collaborator with divine grace. Clarenbald's importation of a richer Augustinian understanding of seminal reasons into his account enables him to provide a more broadly gauged treatment of God in relation to the creation than is true of the other Chartrains, even though his elimination of the Holy Spirit truncates his doctrine of God. He takes a clear stand against emanationism and created intermediaries as playing any role in the process of creation. His treatment of the forms accents their uncreated status and identity with the divine mind, but he is less precise and helpful than is William of Conches, with his distinction between archetypal form, on the one hand, and created *formae nativae*, on the other. Perhaps a larger problem lies in Clarenbald's terminology. While his distinction between the Son's *necessitas absoluta* and the *necessitas complexionis* of the seminal reasons as causes offers a nice, and an original, way of differentiating causation at two distinct metaphysical levels, his use of the term *necessitas* in each case bears with it the disturbing implication that, whichever of these types of causation is at issue, the causal agent in question acts in response to a necessity of its own being. This would be to deny to the deity freedom, and to the creation contingency and free will.

The Response of the Scholastic Theologians

As the theologians of the day confronted the assorted doctrines of creation issuing from these Chartrain authors, they had good reason to feel inspired to seek alternatives to them. True, there were those, such as the Porretans and Roland of Bologna, who may have been impressed by the intemperate and misinformed outburst of William of St. Thierry against William of Conches, or who had no temperamental inclination to explore the alleged compatibilities between Plato's *Timaeus* and Genesis, or who had no real interest in creation as a subject or in the debates it had occasioned in the exegetical and patristic traditions. For the Porretans, it was sufficient to denounce "the philosophers" who say that the three principles of creation are matter, form, and the demiurge and to substitute the assertion that the principles of creation are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that God creates everything *ex nihilo*, without offering any explanation or elaboration on that statement.⁴² Roland is not hostile, but merely unenthusiastic.

⁴² Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., "Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* I" 13.2, *AHDLMA* 45 (1978): 162.

Although he draws on Augustine's Genesis commentaries, he uses them to raise more cosmological question than he has any interest in trying to answer. The only remotely physical issue he addresses is what the term "day" means in the Genesis account. Since it was impossible to have "days" in the literal sense of the word before the heavenly bodies were created, he suggests that it should be read metaphorically.⁴³ This mild flicker of intellectual curiosity is the exception that proves the rule in a description of creation that is as abbreviated as it is jejune.

But there were other theologians left unsatisfied by the Chartrain project, for other reasons. Some of them were sensitive to the internal contradictions within the Chartrain accounts, both individually and collectively. Some could see the philosophical and theological problems which the Chartrain positions bore in their train. There is also the undeniable fact that there were issues which the theologians regarded as important, or controversial, or necessary to discuss, which did not figure in the Chartrains' writings, or which did so in a deeply problematic way. Angels, for instance, are mentioned in the school of Chartres only by Clarenbald of Arras, and by him only in passing. Angels, however, were a subject which the theologians felt a pressing need to debate. True, their metaphysical status and the question of when they had been created were of interest. But the prime concerns of the theologians here were the fall of the angels and the confirmation in evil and good of those who had rebelled and remained loyal to God, as well as the functions and missions of angels in the economy of salvation. But, before one could proceed to discuss these matters, it was necessary to stake out a terrain in the scheme of creation where the angels could be positioned. The hexaemeral tradition offered no guidance here. Neither did the Chartrains. Even more alarming was the comparative disinterest of the Chartrains in man, the crown of creation, and the hinge on which everything else in a systematic theology would have to turn. The only Chartrain to have devoted extended attention to the creation and nature of man was Bernard Silvestris. To be sure, the allegorical trappings attached to his account might not be pleasing to every taste. But more disquieting and unacceptable still was his relentlessly naturalistic understanding of this subject. Moreover, even among those Chartrains who wrote commentaries on Genesis as a vehicle for their teaching,

⁴³ Roland of Bologna, *Die Sentenzen Rolands*, ed. Ambrosius M. Gietl (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1969 [repr. of Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1891 ed.]), pp. 104–10.

creation was the whole story. Those Chartrains who took the trouble to usher man onto the stage were not interested in his fall and its consequences, topics which any responsible theologian felt impelled to treat. So, not only did the Chartrains' own works suffer from internal difficulties, their coverage of subjects which the theologians felt a need to address was woefully inadequate. And, the theological tradition, which the Chartrains largely ignored, itself supplied a wealth of debated issues related to the creation which required sorting out as well, a point quite evident from the consideration of those twelfth-century theologians who tackled the creation well before it became necessary to respond, in one way or another, to the Chartrain challenge.

Even in as lapidary, as unspeculative, and as unscholastic an early twelfth-century theologian as Honorius Augustodunensis one catches a sense of the questions which the patristic and more recent theological tradition had posed concerning creation, which mid-century theologians would find a continuing need to consider, and then some. It is not Honorius's technique to display the conflicts of authorities openly, or even to name the authorities he uses to anchor his own opinions. But the questions he takes up, however abruptly he treats them, are the tips of massive theological icebergs in one form or another. He raises seven major points. First, he notes that God had the plan of creation in mind before He reified it phenomenally.⁴⁴ Honorius follows Augustine here, although without framing the issue in terms of exemplary forms, which, as we have seen, could be done and had been done by Augustine and others. Next, Honorius notes that God "speaks" to create, an observation derived from the rhetoric of the creation account in Genesis and one that leads Honorius to state that this is the sense in which the Father creates everything in the Word.⁴⁵ Here, too, the point suggests a range of amplifications on the Son as the Logos of the creation that invites theological no less than philosophical reflection. Honorius agrees with the idea of creation *simul* although, following Hilary of Poitiers here, he maintains that God organized and assigned creatures to their places during the next six days.⁴⁶ Hilary was by no means the only authority to offer an opinion here, and the views of Augustine, Gregory, Isidore of Seville, and Bede

⁴⁴ Honorius Augustodunensis, *Elucidarium* 1.15, ed. Yves Lefèvre in *L'Elucidarium et les lucidaires: Contribution par l'histoire d'un texte à l'histoire des croyances religieuses en France au moyen âge* (Paris: É. de Boccard, 1954), p. 363.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 1.16, p. 364.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 1.20, p. 364.

received considerable attention from the theologians as well.

Another question Honorius raises is why God created animals, both as such and also disgusting or pestiferous animals such as insects and worms. In addressing the first part of the question he opines that, foreknowing that man would fall and that fallen man would needs be carnivorous, God created animals, although He intended men to be vegetarian in their prelapsarian state. While perhaps intriguing to those moderns who see eating lower on the food chain as morally virtuous and ecologically responsible, this question bears in its train a host of other reflections in which Honorius does not indulge, but which interested the church fathers, on the physical differences in human nature brought about by the fall. The problem of the insects and worms, on which, as both questioner and respondent, he draws on Ambrose's *Hexaemeron* and Augustine's Genesis commentaries, affords an opportunity for him to indulge in a mini-theodicy and an assertion of the intrinsic goodness of the entire creation,⁴⁷ themes orchestrated more fully elsewhere by the ancients and moderns. Honorius is also interested in Eden. He feels quite certain of its location, in Hebron, and also of the propriety of describing it under the classical literary topos of the *locus amoenissimus*.⁴⁸ On both counts, the subject was controversial. Winding up with man, Honorius's last two questions raise matters of considerable speculative interest. Why was man created? In Honorius's view, and here he supports Anselm of Canterbury against the authority of Augustine, God did not create human beings to make up the number of the fallen angels.⁴⁹ Not all theologians agreed. As his final point, about man, and this is one which, thanks to Isidore of Seville, he develops more elaborately than anyone else in his generation in an argument that fell on attentive ears later in the century, Honorius states that man is the microcosm. He is a combination of matter and spirit. Moreover, his body is made up of the four elements and can be analogized with the physical universe with respect to his organs, senses, and humors. Not only that, man is the microcosm because ADAM is an acronym of the cardinal points on the compass.⁵⁰ This, too, is a

⁴⁷ Ibid., 1.66–67, pp. 372–73.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1.68–69, p. 373.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 1.57, p. 371. For the debate on this subject in the twelfth century, see Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 52–61.

⁵⁰ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.58–64, pp. 371–72. The richness of Honorius's exposition of the microcosm theme, by early twelfth-century standards, has been signaled by Lefèvre, p. 115 n. 1.

subject rich in speculative possibilities on which the theological tradition had much to offer, a tradition which the successors of Honorius in Peter Lombard's generation could legitimately feel had been marginalized or ignored by the Chartrains, however accommodating they might be toward those Chartrain doctrines that they might feel were worth trying to salvage.

A good example of a theologian who was well aware of the Chartrain project and responsive to some of its concerns, while at the same time interested in speaking to a number of the theological issues which the Chartrains failed to address, is Peter Abelard. He is also responsive to some of the debates on creation inherited from the patristic tradition, and from the exegetical tradition as well. While there is passing mention of one or two points relative to creation in his *Theologia "scholarium"*, Abelard addresses this subject most fully not in connection with systematic theology but in his *Hexaemeron*, a work written fairly late in his career and in response to a request from Heloise and her nuns, who sought his help in their understanding of the creation account in Genesis. The audience for which this work was written may perhaps account for the way Abelard approaches his task here. As commentators have noted, he adopts a rather conservative mainstream hermeneutical method, closely modeled on that of Augustine's *De genesi ad litteram*, being, if anything, rather more literal in his reading of the text than Augustine is. And, in considering issues raised by both Augustine and the Chartrains, he tends to follow the former rather than the latter.⁵¹

Abelard composed the *Hexaemeron* during the same period in which he was making the final or semi-final revisions of the *Theologia "scholarium"*. Yet, on a couple of key points, his doctrine of creation in the exegetical work has to be seen as more fully and circumspectly developed, even though he does not import it into the most mature version of his theology. Abelard holds that there is a two-stage process in the creation. First, God creates the four elements out of nothing. There is no preexisting matter. Then, God imposes order on this matter. In the account given in the *Theologia "scholarium"*, Abelard comes as close as he gets to the Chartrains by

⁵¹ Good orientations are provided by Eileen Kearney, "Peter Abelard as Biblical Commentator: A Study of the Expositio in Hexaemeron," in *Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142): Person, Werk und Wirkung*, ed. Rudolph Thomas (Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1980), pp. 199-210; Mary Foster Romig, intro. to her ed., "A Critical Edition of Peter Abelard's 'Expositio in Hexameron'," University of Southern California Ph.D. diss., 1981, pp. xvii-xxvii; J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 132-44; Richard E. Weingart, *The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 30-35.

assigning to the Son and the Holy Spirit different functions in this ordering process. In that work, he describes the Son as equivalent to the exemplary causes in the mind of God, with which matter is informed in the creation; he gives to the Holy Spirit the role of providing the natural laws that endow creatures with their natural capacities.⁵² In the *Theologia "scholarium"*, as in Abelard's earlier theologies, this account is muddled by his lack of clarity concerning the equatability of these two persons of the Trinity with the Platonic Nous and World Soul as emanations, and by the question, which his economic approach to the Trinity raises, of whether these persons participate in the substance of created beings. In his *Hexaameron*, on the other hand, when Abelard addresses this second stage of creation in which matter is formed and disposed, he speaks only of the forms as divine ideas. He backs off from the definition of them as the Logos, as second person of the Trinity, or as archetypes whose relationship to the deity's eternity and exclusive creativity needs to be explained. At the same time, he distinguishes between the primordial forms in the mind of God and the forms which are actually united with matter to produce created substances. These latter forms, as well as matter, are created, he states.⁵³ In this way, he preserves the deity's transcendence, but without clarifying the relationship between the one level of forms and the other. In the *Hexaameron*, as well, Abelard takes another prudent step. The Holy Spirit and World Soul alike vanish from the scene as the force of nature endowing created beings with their natural capacities. Nor does Abelard call upon seminal reasons, in either the Chartrain or the purely Augustinian sense, to perform this function. Instead, he assigns it to a power which he simply calls the force of nature (*vis naturae*), which avoids the problems of possible misunderstanding evoked by these other two terms. This language appears to have been original to Abelard.⁵⁴

If Abelard shows a selective use of Augustine thus far, this trait is also visible in his handling of other features of his creation account. He is not interested in the question of creation *simul*, either in the form in which it was taught by Augustine or any of the other patristic or later authorities, or in the form which it was given by some of his contemporaries. It is not that Abelard disagrees with any of these theories overtly. He simply does not take the question

⁵² Peter Abelard, *Theologia "scholarium"* 1.37, 2.172–73, ed. Constant J. Mews, CCCM 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987), pp. 333, 491–92.

⁵³ Peter Abelard, *Hexaameron*, ed. Romig, pp. 10–11, 24–25.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15, 51–54. For Abelard's originality here, see Romig, intro., pp. xxiv, xlvii–xlviii.

up at all, proceeding to the organization of creatures according to the hexaemeral plan. Nor is he interested in the question of whether the "days" in Genesis should be understood in anything but the literal sense.⁵⁵ At the same time, he is content to let man remain in his traditional biblical location in the creation on the sixth day. Abelard emerges as a strong supporter of Augustine as an opponent of astral determinism in his treatment of the creation of the heavenly bodies, drawing on the *City of God* here as well as on Augustine's Genesis commentaries. With Augustine, he argues that the movements of the heavenly bodies are indeed determined themselves, by the laws of nature that govern them, but that they do not control the fortunes of men or limit the contingencies that occur elsewhere in the universe.⁵⁶ The other physical issue of a speculative nature that Abelard raises is whether plants have souls. Here, he introduces a range of opinions on all sides, reviews them carefully, and eventually declares that it is impossible to make a positive determination of the question. While leaving it an open one, he points out that his doctrine of *vis naturae* makes it possible to explain the behavior of plants whether they have souls or not.⁵⁷

While Abelard indicates the theologian's strong interest in devoting a major section of the *Hexaemeron* to the subject of man, most of what he has to say on it is devoted to the fall, and we will take it up under that heading later in the present chapter. He has remarkably little to say on the question of why man was created and what human nature was like before the fall. He contents himself with noting that man was given an immortal soul made in God's image, and that he possessed goodness in the sense that all created things are good.⁵⁸ But, and this reflects his major departure from his Augustinian model, his chief goal in explaining the creation in general, and the creation of man in particular, is not to defend the goodness of the physical world or to propose a theodicy. As Abelard sees it, God creates man and makes him the crown of creation out of love for man and in order to manifest His own glory.⁵⁹ The entire account of creation that he has provided in the *Hexaemeron* is designed to move the reader to penance for the sin that led to the loss of paradise. Abelard's inquiry here, and this may well refer back to the monastic readers for whom he writes, is ultimately a moral and not a scientific or speculative one.

⁵⁵ Peter Abelard, *Hex.*, p. 11.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 55–60.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 51–55.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 85.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

This fact, in addition to the scanting or omitting of topics which theologians wanted to investigate more fully in connection with the creation, and the fact that Abelard's doctrine of creation is dealt with in a separate treatise and not coordinated with the enterprise of systematic theology, may well account for the lack of resonance which Abelard's *Hexaemeron* had among the scholastics of his time. With the exception of Roland of Bologna, none of Abelard's disciples took up the subject of the creation. So, the Abelardian trail ends here. Much more important, as efforts to address both the issues raised by the Chartrains and by the patristic tradition in this period were the works of Hugh of St. Victor, the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, and Robert of Melun. These efforts are massive, if not entirely successful, and they constitute the major models which Peter Lombard used, approved, or weighed in the balance and found wanting.

It has been generally acknowledged that Hugh of St. Victor was familiar with the Platonic doctrine of creation in the *Timaeus* as well as the interpretations being given to it by the Chartrains active up through his time, and that he was basically unsympathetic to this entire proposal. Instead, he posits God alone, not the demiurge, matter, and form as the principle of creation. To the extent that he invokes any Platonic terminology here it is used as a rhetorical embellishment. Decorating the idea that man's soul is spread evenly through his body, Hugh may invoke the notion of the World Soul as ubiquitous in the world. Or, describing Christ as the perfect moral exemplar and chief instigator of man's redemption, he may refer to Him as an archetype. But this does not mean that Hugh is associating himself with the Chartrain project. Quite the reverse is the case. His directionality is a different one. Man's redemption, not cosmology, is his focus.⁶⁰ And, while he certainly displays a keen interest in trying to find alternatives to some of the speculation of the Chartrains, reviving, for example, the Augustinian version of the doctrine of creation *simul*, he treats the Genesis account from a narratological perspective in the light of what man can learn about God from it and not as a literal statement of how the world

⁶⁰ Noted by Gregory, *Anima mundi*, pp. 47–48; Christian Schütz, *Deus absconditus, Deus manifestus: Die Lehre Hugos von St. Viktor über die Offenbarung Gottes* (Rome: Herder, 1967), pp. 130–62; Jerome Taylor, intro. to his trans. of Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 22–29; Winthrop Wetherbee, *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 32, 49–62.

was created.⁶¹ His emphasis throughout is not scientific but sacramental, in the broad Hugonian sense of that term.

In obtaining the objectives he seeks, Hugh is hampered here by two main problems, terminological and organizational. He uses certain terms necessary for the discussion of creation, attaching several meanings to them, without indicating which sense is to be understood in a particular context. A good example of such a key term is *natura*.⁶² Sometimes Hugh means by "nature" the archetype, or the exemplar of all things residing in the mind of God and serving as the model He uses when each created being is informed. There are difficulties in his handling of just this definition itself. Hugh opens his *De sacramentis* with what reads as a reprise of the *Periphyseon* of John Scottus Eriugena, locating the exemplars or primordial causes at John's second level of nature, the created and creative. Hugh makes this point, however, in the same breath in which he states that God alone is the creator.⁶³ And, in the *Didascalicon*, Hugh calls this primordial pattern the divine idea that creates rational beings without intermediaries, identifying it with Christ as the Logos.⁶⁴ Further, shortly after Hugh's first assertion in the *De sacramentis*, he observes that the primordial causes are uncreated.⁶⁵ This effort to come to grips with the exemplars fails miserably. The reader is left in the dark as to whether Hugh thinks they are created or uncreated, sharers of God's creative power or not, identical with the divine mind, above it, below it, or equal to it as the second person of the Trinity. "Nature" understood as archetypal causation alone thus spreads confusion in its wake. But Hugh also uses this term in the generic Boethian sense of the characteristics proper to a being of whatever sort, which differentiate it from other beings. He also uses "nature" to mean the creative fire (*ignis artifex*) which, in turn, is the power imparted to created beings enabling them to

⁶¹ Gross, "Twelfth-Century Concepts," pp. 325-28; A. Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique et Hugues de Saint-Victor*, 2 vols. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1895), 1: 321-28.

⁶² Noted by Erich Barkholt, *Die Ontologie Hugos von St. Viktor*, Inaugural-Dissertation, University of Bonn, 1930, pp. 19-20; Roger Baron, "L'Idée de la nature chez Hugues de Saint-Victor," in *La filosofia della natura nel medioevo* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1966), pp. 260-63; Philippe Delhay, "La nature dans l'oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor" in *ibid.*, pp. 272-78.

⁶³ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis fidei christianae* 1.2.2-3, 1.5.4-5, *PL* 176: 206C-207D, 248C-249B.

⁶⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon: De studio legendi* 1.1, 1.4, 1.5, appendix C, ed. Charles Henry Buttner (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1939), pp. 4, 11, 12, 134-35.

⁶⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.4.26, *PL* 176: 246B-C. Barkholt, *Die Ontologie*, p. 11 sees uncreated primordial causes as the only type of primordial causes to which Hugh refers.

accomplish the generation of other created beings, with a sense more restricted than, but analogous to, the *vis naturae* of Abelard.

Organizational problems also plague Hugh's account of creation, as we saw above in chapter 2, where the schematic confusion in the first part of Book 1 of the *De sacramentis* was noted.⁶⁶ This confusion stems from Hugh's uncertainty as to whether to follow the creation account in Genesis in his own table of contents. He advocates this idea because he claims that it reflects the way man comes to a knowledge of the creator through the creation. But, at the same time, the Genesis account says nothing about exemplary causes, which he feels a need to treat even if he does so unsuccessfully, and spiritual beings such as angels. Hugh does not choose between hierarchy and hexaameron as his organizational principle; he tries to combine them. And so, he starts with the exemplary causes. Whether they are uncreated or created, they come first. As for angels, Hugh states that they were created before the emergence of the visible world.⁶⁷ At the same time, he says that primordial matter was the first thing to be created,⁶⁸ which would put it ahead of angels and created causes, if any. Hugh devotes a great deal of space to the repetition of these conflicting claims, more space, indeed, than he assigns to the phenomenal order next on his agenda. One has the sense that he has recourse to the doctrine of creation *simul* more as an effort to vaporize this problem of priority than as a means of resolving the physical discrepancies in the account of the visible creation in Genesis, as was the case with Augustine.⁶⁹

If, on the one side, the Chartrain approach to creation serves as an agenda with which Hugh wants to disagree and for which he wants to find substitutes, Anselm of Laon and his disciples serve as the main contemporary theologians with whom he wants to take issue, on the other. The one and only point on which Hugh agrees with the Laon masters is the idea that matter is not eternal.⁷⁰ In other respects the Laon masters take a rather different tack in treating the sequence in which the creation occurred. Rather than trying to coordinate the idea of creation *simul* with the literal hexaemeral account in Genesis, they reject both of these principles

⁶⁶ See above, pp. 57–62.

⁶⁷ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.1.2, 1.1.4–11, 1.1.13–30, *PL* 176: 187C–188B, 189C–195C, 197B–206A.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.5.2–3, 1.5.6, *PL* 176: 247A–248C, 249C.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.5.4–5, *PL* 176: 249B.

⁷⁰ Anselm of Laon, *Sententie divine pagine* 4, ed. Franz P. Bliemetzrieder in *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, Beiträge, 18:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919), p. 11.

in favor of a hierarchical account of creation. While he and his disciples ignore the issue of exemplary causes, Anselm follows Bede in urging that the Genesis account should be read not literally but figuratively (*propter figuram*).⁷¹ Dispensing specifically with the concept of creation *simul* in whatever form it had been advocated, Anselm and his followers think it is logical to hold that spiritual beings were created first, with the hierarchy of creation descending from the more rarefied of them on down to material beings. Hence, angels were created first, emerging in accordance with the Gregorian hierarchy of nine orders, with the seraphim on top. Next, human souls were created by God, and then the lesser beings.⁷² Hugh's attempt to salvage both creation *simul* and the six-day account does not fare very well as a critique of this logically and ontologically coherent departure from the patristic exegetical tradition on the part of the Laon masters.

Hugh next moves to the creation of man, more interesting to him in any case than the perplexities attending the physical world. Here, too, he finds himself in opposition to the school of Laon. Just as that school does not hesitate to reject tradition on the sequence of the creation, so too Anselm feels free to jettison the Augustinian opinion that man was created to make up the numbers of the fallen angels. While agreeing here with Honorius and with Anselm of Canterbury against Augustine, he does not cite any of the authorities on the opposite side of the debate and does not indicate his reasons for the position he takes.⁷³ Hugh stoutly rejects this view and sides with Augustine.⁷⁴ While making up the numbers of the fallen angels would presumably be a sufficient reason for the creation of man, in Hugh's estimation it is not the only reason. He agrees with Abelard in stating that God created man to display His benevolence.⁷⁵ But the most compelling reason is that, by knowing, serving, and loving God man may attain beatitude.⁷⁶ Hugh has two

⁷¹ Ibid., 4, p. 12.

⁷² Ibid., 4; *Sententie Anselmi* 2, ed. Franz P. Bliemetzrieder in *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, pp. 13–14, 49; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 308, ed. Odon Lottin in *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* vols. 1–5 (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1948–59), 5: 244; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, ed. Heinrich Weisweiler in "Le recueil des sentences 'Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur' et son remaniement," *RTAM* 5 (1933): 260.

⁷³ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4, p. 15.

⁷⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.5.33–34, *PL* 176: 262A–264A. This view is also followed by Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 270–71; *Summa magistri Rolandi* c. 27, ed. Friedrich Thaner (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1962 [repr. of Innsbruck, 1874 ed.]), pp. 113–14.

⁷⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.6.1, *PL* 176: 263B.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 1.2.1, *PL* 176: 205B–206C.

other major points to make about the creation of man. Man was given a body as well as a soul in order to show that, in and through man, both aspects of the created universe would be elevated to share God's glory.⁷⁷ And, finally, he argues that we cannot know exactly when the human soul was created. All we can know is that it was created after the angels had come into being and after the formation of the human body into which it is infused. The soul is not preexistent and is created *ex nihilo*. At the very moment of its creation, Adam's soul was joined to his body.⁷⁸ In claiming that we cannot know when this event takes place, Hugh here seems to be refusing the help which the hexaemeral account, which he is trying to salvage as much as he can, might plainly offer. This last point is an index of the difficulties he gets into by trying to do everything at once.

For his part, the author of the *Summa sententiarum* leads off with a ringing denunciation of Platonism: "As Plato said, there are three principles [of creation], matter, form, and the demiurge. But the Catholic faith believes that there was one principle, one cause of all things, namely God" (*Cum Plato dixerit tria esse principia: materiam, formam, opificem; fides Catholica unum principium credit esse omnium rerum causa fuit, Deus scilicet*).⁷⁹ Unlike the Porretans, who hold the same position and decline to expatiate on creation, he follows Hugh's effort to do so. He also recapitulates Hugh's notion that the animate creation was brought into being so that man could know, love, and serve the creator and hence be glorified, and that man's combination of body and soul draws the whole universe into this process.⁸⁰ At the same time, he offers a more effective way of combining the hierarchical and hexaemeral principles. Perhaps seeing in Hugh's handling of primordial causes in the *De sacramentis* a cautionary tale, he omits them at this juncture. As his initial topic he takes up primordial matter, yoking it with the creation of angels. The angels and the four elements, he states, were created *ex nihilo* and at the same time.⁸¹ This constitutes the only simultaneity he is willing to concede in the creation. Without arguing the point pro and con, he simply drops the question of creation *simul* after this point. Something he adds, however, and to which he gives sustained and cogent treatment is the question of how angels are different in their nature from the deity, although he takes it up not

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1.6.2, PL 176: 264C–D.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 1.6.3, PL 176: 264D–265B.

⁷⁹ *Summa sententiarum* 2.1, PL 176: 79C.

⁸⁰ Ibid., PL 176: 79C–80C.

⁸¹ Ibid., PL 176: 81A–B.

in his treatise on angels in Book 2 of his *Summa* but in Book 1, under the heading of God. The deity, he notes there, is immutable and unconditioned by time and space. Like God, angels are spiritual beings and, like God, they are incorporeal and hence share His inability to be conditioned by space. But, once brought into being, they are conditioned by time, and they are changeable, capable of being moved by affections, such as joy or sadness, and capable of learning what they did not know. Also, while they are able to inhabit bodies in connection with their duties, they lack the divine attribute of ubiquity.⁸² Helpful as these remarks are, they would have been even more serviceable had the author included them in his treatise on angels.

Between angels and men, the author presents a very swift summary of the creation, reverting here to the hexaemeral model and displaying little interest in coming to grips with the physical discrepancies presented in the Genesis account. With respect to various creatures he offers a range of opinions, without choosing among them. Or, he urges one opinion as more probable, but without explaining why. He is clearly not inspired by this part of the assignment and disposes of it in two brief chapters, getting it out of the way so that he can concentrate on his real subject, the creation, fall, and restoration of man.⁸³

Considering his interest in man, the author has remarkably little to say about man's nature as such, except duly to report that the human soul is made in God's image, as can be seen in the Trinitarian analogies it bears.⁸⁴ The main topic that exercises him before he proceeds to the fall is the creation of Eve. Here is where he raises, somewhat belatedly, the subject of primordial causes and seminal reasons, although he does not give the latter this name expressly. After noting that Eve's creation from Adam's rib provides a type of the church born of the blood and water issuing from the side of the crucified Christ, a point he shares with Roland of Bologna⁸⁵ which goes beyond the standard Augustinian reason other theologians give concerning the marital companionship symbolized by this mode of engendering Eve, he agrees with Augustine's theory of primordial causes as ideas in the mind of God, not separate from Him or prior or posterior to Him. These causes are not created agencies. They are to be distinguished from the causes

⁸² Ibid., 1.5, *PL* 176: 50C–51A.

⁸³ Ibid., 3.1–2, *PL* 176: 89A–91A.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 3.2, *PL* 176: 91A–92B.

⁸⁵ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 110–16.

inserted by God into individual creatures, enabling them to reproduce naturally and also to be the vehicles of miracles. It is this latter point, the capacity of created beings to function as the vehicles of miracles, which serves as the link between this topic and the creation of Eve and which explains why the author brings up these causes in that context. Adam's body was endowed with the capacity to function as the instrument of a miracle, the creation of Eve's body from his rib. Eve's soul, like all human souls, was created by God.⁸⁶ Now, this understanding of seminal reasons is, to be sure, helpful here. The project of the author of the *Summa sententiarum* in handling the creation account would have been better served, in general, had he introduced this discussion of primordial and seminal causes earlier on, perhaps just prior to the creation of the angels in the hierarchical portion of his second book. Had he done so, he would have laid the foundation for the explanation of Eve's creation, which he provides in Book 3, and which requires him to backpedal in his exposition of it. If his handling of the creation of Eve is unusual in that respect, it is also *sui generis* in that this is the only question concerning Eve that he raises at all. He omits, for instance, the more basic issue of why Eve was created in the first place.

A third mid-century theologian who, like the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, is strongly influenced by Hugh of St. Victor and who, like both of those masters, seeks to offer a cogent alternative to the Chartrain approach to creation, which he clearly dislikes, is Robert of Melun. Robert takes a much more systematically hexaemeral line than either of these two authors. He is a strong proponent of the Augustinian theory of creation *simul*, both before the event and in the event. At the same time, he seeks to connect this doctrine to the theme of causation that bulks so large in his treatment of the deity. Rejecting both the idea of exemplary causes, the idea of preexistent matter or form of any kind, and the notion that there are any creative intermediaries between God and the world, he stresses that God is the first cause and the only cause of creation, against both Plato and Aristotle.⁸⁷ The forms as well as the matter are created, according to Robert. Instead of a threefold principle of creation, he puts forward a single creator who creates everything all

⁸⁶ *Summa sent.* 3.3, PL 176: 93A–94B.

⁸⁷ Robert of Melun, *Sententie* 1.1.19, 1.1.20, 1.2.1, ed. Raymond-M. Martin in Robert of Melun, *Oeuvres*, 4 vols. (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1932–52), 3 part 1: 210–12, 223, 263. On this point, cf. Ulrich Horst, *Die Trinitäts- und Gotteslehre des Robert von Melun* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald Verlag, 1964), pp. 84–85.

at once by a threefold operation, "in the creation of the unformed material substratum of material things, in the formation of creatures, and in the disposition of what has been formed" (*in omnium informi creatione, in creatorum formatione, in formatorum dispositione*).⁸⁸ As with Augustine, Robert emphasizes the point that God brought time itself into existence at the same moment in which He created everything else. This notion makes it impossible to hold that there is a sequence of any kind in creation. But it does not mean that God's manifestation of His simultaneous creation in time, or His own subsequent action in time or with time, refers to a creation that was initially imperfect and that was perfected later on. Here, Robert draws a useful distinction among things that are perfect according to their nature, such as a baby born with all his fingers and toes; things that are perfect according to time, such as the same baby grown to adulthood, having realized all his capacities as an adult; and things that are perfect universally. Only God, Who is not subject to development, is perfect in the third sense. But this does not detract from the perfection, in the first two senses, of creatures that can and do change.⁸⁹ This analysis deftly resolves the dilemmas in which Hugh embroils himself in the handling of exemplary causes and simultaneous creation.

On the other hand, Robert is less adept in dealing with the cosmological and physical problems in which the Genesis account of creation abounds. He expressly repudiates the natural philosophers (*physici*) but does not make effective use of the help available in the patristic tradition in sorting out these inconsistencies. In some cases where he has a clear preference for one opinion over another, as in the composition of the stars as fiery in makeup and as similar, in this respect, to the sun, where he follows Plato, he offers no reasons for preferring this view over its alternatives.⁹⁰ Most of the time, as with the question of why the waters above the firmament stay up there and do not fall down, he cites a range of opinions without indicating a need to choose among them.⁹¹ Robert's disinterest in answering most of the cosmological questions which he raises makes the reader wonder why he raises them in the first place. Like Hugh, his main concern is to extract moral and spiritual significance from these natural phenomena; regardless of why the waters above the firmament stay there, they stand

⁸⁸ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.1.19, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 210. On God's creation of form as well as matter, see also 1.1.21–23, 3 part 1: 224–30.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.1.19–20, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 213–21, 223.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.1.28, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 245.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 1.1.25, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 235–37.

for the higher forms of charity, he concludes.⁹² And, in the case of his other example, he takes up the nature of the stars primarily to join Abelard in a long Augustinian attack against astral determinism.⁹³ The detailed chapter headings which Robert supplies in his *Sentences* indicate that he planned to devote extensive attention to the nature of man before the fall, concentrating on his soul, and that he planned to offer a lengthy treatise on original sin, and he does so. But his treatment of the creation of man is remarkably truncated. He reprises the position of the *Summa sententiarum* and of Hugh in stating that man was created to know, serve, and love God and hence to win beatitude. This point leads him into a digression which in turn leads him to end his discussion of the creation of man on a peculiar note. Having observed that man's beatitude is God's objective in creating him, Robert acknowledges that not all men attain beatitude. Does this mean that God's intentions, with respect to those men who are not saved, are fraudulent or frustrated? No, he answers, since beatitude can be gained only with man's free will and cooperation.⁹⁴ This may be the case, but his answer is not responsive to the question he has posed and it does not address the vexing issue of what purpose is served by the creation of those human beings who will not be saved. If his account of creation is problematic when it comes to most of the natural phenomena he discusses and when it comes to man, the most serious deficiency in Robert's presentation of this subject is his omission of angels. This is a decision on his part that reflects his desire to follow the hexaemeral model strictly. But it leaves a gap in his analysis of the created universe which mid-century theology found unacceptable.

The theologians discussed above are the only ones worth treating in detail as a backdrop for Peter Lombard on the creation, since they are the ones who set the agenda in this period. None of the other masters at work in his time offers any fresh or additional insights or announces any new problems. Other than giving the same reason as Hugh, Robert, and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* for the creation of man as an opportunity on his part to know, love, and glorify God,⁹⁵ the only contribution made to this subject by the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* is to lay out and

⁹² Ibid., 1.1.27–28, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 239–43.

⁹³ Ibid., 1.1.28, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 246–56.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 1.1.30, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 259–62.

⁹⁵ Bernhard Geyer, ed., *Die Sententiae divinitatis: Ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertischen Schule* prologus, Beiträge, 7:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1909), p. 6*.

attribute clearly three of the four prevailing theories of creation *simul*. There is Augustine's view that all creatures were made simultaneously, Gregory's view that God made unformed matter all at once but that He formed it sequentially, and Isidore's view, which agrees with Gregory's, but which adds that the formation of matter took six days. The author omits Bede here while siding with Gregory, adding the Augustinian seminal reasons at the moment when creatures are formed and agreeing with Hugh that the hexaemeral account was written that way for man's instruction.⁹⁶ As for Robert Pullen, he is both extremely sketchy and unusually incoherent in handling the creation. He tries to combine the view of creation *simul* with creation in a six-day sequence in which it would make sense to ask when individual creatures came into being.⁹⁷ He is both vague and contradictory in treating man. Opposing the idea that man was created to make up the numbers of the fallen angels, he says that the reason was that the universe would have been less perfect without man, but does not explain why he thinks this is the case.⁹⁸ In addressing the question of the preexistence of the human soul he confuses it with the question of when the bodies of fetuses become ensouled. Here, he argues that the human soul is added to the body at the point when the body comes into existence. Presumably he means by this the moment of conception. At the same time, however, he supports the rule in Exodus on the penalty for causing a miscarriage, which regards the act as homicide only if the fetus is ensouled and has already moved in the womb, which would take place about five months into the pregnancy.⁹⁹ Robert Pullen is not at the top of his form on any of these subjects. Perhaps his most unusual contribution to contemporary discussions of creation is his treatment of Eden. He joins Honorius and the school of Laon in giving a description of it as a classical *locus amoenissimus*, going into far greater detail on this point than anyone else. Robert locates Eden with precision on the banks of the river Nile, commenting in depth on its climate and giving a full catalogue of its flora and fauna. He takes this geographical situation of Eden literally, adding a warning he is unique among his compeers for providing, while suggesting, possibly, that the quest for Eden may have been a motivation inspiring the pilgrims and crusaders now travelling to the east in large numbers. It is impossible, Robert stresses, to

⁹⁶ Ibid. 1.1.1–3, pp. 8*–12*.

⁹⁷ Robert Pullen, *Sententiarum libri octo* 2.1, *PL* 186: 717C–719A.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 2.16, *PL* 186: 741D–743B.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 2.7, 2.9, *PL* 186: 727B, 731A–733C.

recover Eden. However far and wide the traveller may search, however many seas and deserts he may cross, and with whatever *labor improbus* he may reconnoiter the territories watered by the Nile, he will never find it.¹⁰⁰

The Lombard on Creation

We are now in a position to assess how Peter Lombard situates himself in the contemporary debates on creation. He certainly can be said to display no sympathy at all for the Chartrain project. He uses the resources of both philosophy and theology to show how and why he finds it misguided. In proposing an alternative approach, he relies heavily on the exegetical and patristic traditions. He shows himself to be thoroughly conversant with the recent treatments of the subject, with which he does not hesitate to agree, or disagree, selectively. There is one feature of Peter's treatment of creation that is, for him, unusual. As Ignatius Brady has pointed out very clearly in his annotations to this part of the *Sentences*, Peter reveals a dependence on intermediary sources, such as patristic *catenae*, that is quite atypical of his methodology more generally. This same fact can be detected from the form of his patristic citations on the subject of creation. While his normal standard is to name the author and the work and to quote or to paraphrase the text cited, exploring the reasoning that has brought the authority to his conclusion, here he merely mentions the authority's name and gives the nub of his opinion. It is certainly true that the authorities he presents in this fashion often have more to say on the questions at issue than Peter indicates. It is not clear why the Lombard departs from his usual working habits in treating the creation. At the same time, and despite the limits in his deployment of his materials in this context, he presents a streamlined and no-nonsense account of creation that is essentially hexaemeral in plan. He takes a firm stand on vexed questions such as exemplary causes and creation *simul* and does not hesitate to reject the Augustinian tradition on these points. Also thoroughly un-Augustinian is his position on why man was created, and his lack of interest in theodicy. In many other areas he uses Augustine, along with other patristic sources, constructively. His creation account shares many of the ideas found in Hugh of St. Victor, the *Summa*

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 2.19, *PL* 186: 746B–747B. The allusion to Vergil's *Georgics* occurs at 747A. Cf. *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 58, whose author does not think that he can specify the location of Eden.

sententiarum, and Robert of Melun. But he manages to achieve something that is more than any of these masters accomplishes, an account of creation that fits angels coherently into the picture and that finds a way of combining the hexaemeral plan with both a modified version of creation *simul* and a sense that creatures should be discussed in an order that speaks to the order of their metaphysical constitution.

Peter begins by juxtaposing the idea, which he attributes to Bede and which he intends to support, that there is a single cause of creation, God, with the Platonic notion of three principles, "that is, God, and the exemplar, and matter, and the latter uncreated and without beginning, and God acting like an artisan, not as a creator" (*Deum scilicet, et exemplar, et materiam; et ipsa increata, sine principio, et Deum quasi artificem, non creatorem*).¹⁰¹ In attacking this claim he plans to reject all three parts of it, starting with the notion of God as *artifex*. A creator is to be distinguished from an artisan in that a creator alone can make things out of nothing, while an artisan makes things out of existing matter. God can do both; but creatures can only do the latter. Aside from that, we can distinguish between creating and making in that human and other created makers must exercise motion, or heat, or some other change in the maker himself in the process, while God creates while remaining totally unchanged.¹⁰² Next, Peter attacks another version of the Chartrain position, which he attributes to Aristotle, the idea that there are three principles of creation, seen as material, formal, and efficient causes, all eternal. It is this erroneous notion which has led some people to accept the eternity of both form and matter, an idea that Peter, along with Robert of Melun, rejects. This same idea, the Lombard observes, has led some people to equate the Holy Spirit with the efficient cause or with the cause that combines form and matter.¹⁰³ As the doctrine of God developed in Book 1 of the *Sentences* makes plain, for Peter it is totally unacceptable to divide up the work of creation among the Trinitarian persons since, in the act of creation, it is the divine nature common to the persons that is at work. It is also a divine nature that remains transcendent. It cannot be equated with the forces of nature which it brings into

¹⁰¹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 2. d. 1. c. 1.2, 3rd ed. rev., ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81), 1: 330.

¹⁰² Ibid., c. 2–c. 3.1–3, 1: 330–31. Noted by Newell, "Rationalism at the School of Chartres," p. 121 n. 49.

¹⁰³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 1. c. 3.5, 1: 331. Noted by Bertola, "La dottrina della creazione," pp. 32–33.

being. Peter takes pains to remind his readers of these points, citing John Chrysostom and his own gloss on the Epistle to the Hebrews to undergird it still further.¹⁰⁴

As he moves to the next item on his agenda, the question of why the creation was brought into being at all, Peter shows the influence of Hugh of St. Victor, and, even more so, of the *Summa sententiarum*, when it comes to the creation of spiritual beings and man, while at the same time he puts his own stamp on the subject. He agrees that God created rational beings so that they could come to a knowledge of the supreme good. In knowing God, they would love Him; in loving Him they would possess Him; and in possessing Him, they would enjoy Him. Praising and serving God would also lead to their enjoyment of Him. Everything else in the world, in turn, was made for man's sake, for man to use and enjoy with the ultimate enjoyment of God in view.¹⁰⁵ Agreeing with the Victorine notion of man's purpose, Peter adds to it a purpose for the other beings in the creation, whether material or spiritual, and connects the whole question to the Augustinian theme of use and enjoyment which he gives to the entire *Sentences*. This analysis also gives him more solid reasons than those supplied by the author of the *Summa sententiarum* for rejecting Hugh and Augustine on men making up the numbers of the fallen angels as the reason for their creation. Although he does not refer to the passages in Augustine's *Enchiridion* and *City of God* where this claim is defended, Peter indicates that he is aware of the Scriptural foundation on which Augustine sought to base it. He argues that Augustine has misconstrued the Bible in drawing this conclusion from the passages in question. So, man was not created to make up the numbers of the fallen angels both because the other positive reasons Peter has cited are the principal ones (*causae praecipuae*) and because the alleged Scriptural basis of the Augustinian claim never existed (*nonnulla existit*).¹⁰⁶

There is also another point where Peter corrects or expands on the Victorine legacy before moving on to the six days of creation, his handling of the question of why the human soul was joined to a body. He offers three reasons, the first and third stated straightforwardly and the second given more elaborate treatment. The first is that it is God's will, which we cannot question. The third is that, with the body and the mind both serving God, we may more greatly merit the crown of beatitude. The second is the man as

¹⁰⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 13. c. 7.2–5, 1: 394–95.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, d. 1. c. 4.1–7, 1: 322–33.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, c. 5, 1: 334.

microcosm argument, although Peter does not use this term expressly. With Hugh and the *Summa sententiarum*, he agrees that, in uniting matter and spirit in man, God enables the whole creation to be glorified in the love of God which man displays. He adds another note to this argument. The intimate communion between mind and body in the human constitution helps man to see how he can commune with a higher spiritual being, and illustrates by analogy the future association of the human soul and God.¹⁰⁷

Peter's assignment, following this discussion, moves from the why of creation to the when and the how. His chief guides at the outset are the authors of the *Summa sententiarum* and the *Sententiae divinitatis*. With the former, he yokes the creation of the angels to the creation of primordial matter at the beginning of the hexaemeral account. And, with the latter, he rejects Augustine's version of creation *simul* in favor of the principle that the angels and the elements were the only things created all at once. After that, he holds, God produced the other specific created beings in the course of six days. As he develops the second phase of this creation scenario, Peter shares with Robert of Melun the idea that the forms God used were created, no less than the matter, and reimports Augustine's seminal reasons into the story.¹⁰⁸

In weaving the angels into the limited doctrine of creation *simul* that he defends, Peter introduces two related considerations. One is the felt need to refute the position of Origen, reported by Jerome, Augustine, and John Cassian, that angels existed before the creation of time. Peter's analysis appears to stem from a strong, and generic, desire to attack the more spiritualistic teachings of Origen, an attitude common in this period in itself and as an anti-Catharist tactic, for there was no contemporary *quidam* among the orthodox theologians who took this position. Another view he wants to repudiate is that the angels can be identified with the wisdom created before all creatures, referred to in Ecclesiastes 1:4 as distinct from the Son as the uncreated wisdom of God. Peter's combined strategy for disposing of these two positions at once is to use Genesis 1:1 as a countercitation to the Ecclesiastes text. He argues that the "heaven" in the heaven and earth created in the beginning refers to the angels while "earth" refers to the confused and unformed matter that was the first physical entity which God brought forth. He extends the principle of creation *simul* to the angels and to

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., c. 6.1–5, 1: 334–35.

¹⁰⁸ A good discussion is provided by Bertola, "La dottrina della creazione," pp. 35–40.

unformed matter and, after carefully considering the various versions of that doctrine, concludes that this is as far as it can be taken. As with the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, his reason for rejecting Augustine here is that the Gregorian or Isidorian accounts display more conformity with the text of Genesis.¹⁰⁹

Yet, Peter returns to Augustine's Genesis commentary for help on how we can understand the unformed matter. He reflects his awareness of an issue that Clarenbald of Arras had also found problematic, the presumed difficulty of the human mind in grasping anything material that has no form. Here, he calls upon the analysis of negative and privative terminology which Augustine had developed to explain the meaning of darkness and the void against the Manichees, who endowed them with real significance as aspects of the evil material creation. With Augustine, he agrees that these terms refer not to species but to the absence of species, the absence of species of any kind, in the case of the void, or the absence of the species of the reality to which it is correlative, that is, light, in the case of darkness.¹¹⁰ This is a topic which none of the other current masters who discuss creation had thought of commenting on. Peter also reimports Augustine's seminal reasons into the account, as created forms or causes. Using Alcuin to anchor his sequential view of creation, once the angels and primordial matter have come into being, he proposes four modes of divine operation in the creation. First, God creates all things eternally in the Word. Peter understands this to mean that God possesses the plan of the creation in His mind from all time. When He chooses to manifest this plan, God does so in stages. First, He creates the angels and the unformed matter *simul* and *ex nihilo*. Then, in the work of the six days, He produces individual creatures out of the unformed matter and the forms which He creates for this purpose. Finally, he inserts the seminal reasons He has prepared into these creatures to take care of future developments after the sixth day, both in the production of new kinds of beings and in the capacities of created beings to carry out their natural functions.¹¹¹ As to the days of creation themselves, Peter disagrees sharply with the position expressed by Roland of Bologna. The days referred to in Genesis are to be understood literally as lasting twenty-four hours. As to why the days begin in the evening and not in the morning, he follows Hugh of St. Victor in his one departure from literalism here, in saying

¹⁰⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 2. c. 1–c. 3, d. 12. c. 1.2, 1: 336–39, 384–85.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, d. 12 c. 3–c. 4, 1: 387–88.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, c. 6, 1: 388–89.

that this notion stands, as a mystery (*pro mysterio*), for man's movement from the darkness of sin to the light of redemption.¹¹²

The passage just cited is the one and only occasion in which Peter treats the creation account in Genesis as a source of moral and spiritual edification. It is atypical of the straightforwardness with which he handles this subject in general. If he is not particularly concerned with ethics under this heading, neither is he drawn to cosmology or natural philosophy as such. He goes about his business with conscientiousness and also with brevity. He is not interested in whether the Genesis account has anything in common with philosophical accounts of creation and is far less intrigued by its physical problems and inconsistencies than Augustine is. There are only two issues he raises in discussing the work of the six days that could be described as remotely speculative. On the question of the waters above the firmament, and why they stay there, he opts for the explanation of Augustine, who says that these waters exist in the form of tiny droplets which can remain suspended in the air, on the grounds of common sense.¹¹³ And, on the question of the creation of vermin and poisonous animals, he draws a distinction. Pestiferous creatures, now harmful to man, were not harmful in the original creation; the nuisance they now inflict is a punishment for sin. As for vermin such as maggots, which, following classical biology, Peter holds to be generated spontaneously out of carrion, they were indeed created during the six days, before the death of any animal whose carcass could engender them, but only potentially (*potentialiter*).¹¹⁴ Consistent with the wish to draw brisk and down-to-earth conclusions and to curtail reflection on matters for which no answers are available is Peter's handling of Eden. What we can know about it, and all we need to know about it, is that Eden is meant to be understood both spiritually and materially, since man has both a spiritual and a physical nature, that it can be seen as a type of the church, that it was located in the east, and that it was a *locus amoenissimus* whose specific attributes we cannot describe. He pointedly refrains from further speculation on the subject.¹¹⁵

If Peter manifests a disinclination to wear the hat of the natural philosopher in his discussion of the work of the six days, he at least operates in a manner consistent with that intention, refusing to

¹¹² Ibid., d. 13. c. 4–c. 5, 1: 391–92.

¹¹³ Ibid., d. 14. c. 4, 1: 396.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., d. 15. c. 3–c. 4, 1: 401.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., d. 17. c. 5.1–4. 5, 1: 413–14.

ventilate questions which he feels cannot be answered. He does resolve the questions that he chooses to raise. On the other hand, he is far more successful in handling the larger metaphysical issues concerned with cosmogenesis, and this partly because of his elimination of issues, such as exemplary causes, which he finds unnecessary and fraught with confusion, and partly thanks to his effective way of integrating angels into a creation account that otherwise remains guided by Genesis and the exegetical tradition. While in some respects Peter is less venturesome on creation than on man and on many other topics that he takes up in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, he none the less shows his ability to reflect independently and selectively on that tradition. And, as a theologian, he is marching to the beat of the contemporary drummer in being primarily concerned, in this connection, not with the structure and function of the physical universe but with angels and human beings.

ANGELS AMONG THE LOMBARD'S SCHOLASTIC PREDECESSORS AND CONTEMPORARIES

Angels were a subject on which there was a good deal of contemporary consensus among early and mid-twelfth-century theologians. To a striking degree they were in accord not only on what the important questions were concerning angels, but also on the correct answers to those questions. They occasionally differed on the best way to defend the conclusions they drew. One topic on which there was some disagreement, which we have considered above, was when the angels were created. Wherever they came down on that issue, most of the theologians were in agreement on their metaphysical constitution. Although Honorius compares their nature with the element of fire, and one member of the school of Laon says they have rarefied bodies, and while Roland of Bologna is inconclusive on whether they have a material constitution or not,¹¹⁶ most other theologians subscribe clearly to the idea that angels, created *ex nihilo*, are purely spiritual beings, although Hugh of St. Victor muddies the waters somewhat by calling them spiritual substances, without indicating what he means by "substance" in this context.¹¹⁷ The only contemporary master to raise and to answer

¹¹⁶ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.27–31, p. 366, although he also asserts that they are spiritual at 1.24, 1.26, p. 366; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 305, 5: 243; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 85–86.

¹¹⁷ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 50; Peter Abelard, *Hexaemeron*, p. 10; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, ed. Artur Michael Landgraf in *Écrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard* (Louvain:

the question of how these completely spiritual beings are different from God is the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, who, as we have seen, does a good job of it, locating the differences in the capacity of angels to change and to be conditioned by time, and to be subject to affections.¹¹⁸ There is agreement on the idea that the angels are disposed in nine ranks, with the seraphim on top, following the angelic hierarchy of Dionysius the Areopagite, although Gregory the Great is sometimes brought in as well to support this point.¹¹⁹ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* believes that only the good angels are graded but that there is no hierarchy among the fallen angels.¹²⁰ His view is atypical. One of the early Porretans notes that these spiritual beings can assume the bodies of men in carrying out their duties, and that, when they do so, they are capable of engendering children, acting as *incubi*. He rehearses the patristic debates on the metaphysical status of such children and whether they can be saved, declining to give an answer despite Augustine's assurances on this point.¹²¹ But he appears to be alone among the mid-century masters in worrying about this issue.

Of greater interest in this period are the angels' possession of intelligence and free will and their moral exercise of these faculties in their fall, or in their decision not to fall, as the case may be. There is no dispute concerning the rationality and freedom of the angels as such. Nor is there dissent from the Augustinian opinion that they do not exercise these faculties in choosing the good without the assistance of divine grace.¹²² Hugh of St. Victor distinguishes between the spirituality and immortality which all angels possess equally and their reason and will, which he thinks they possess to different degrees.¹²³ All these ideas set the stage for the theme of the fall of the angels and its effects. Those masters who raise the question of when that fall took place agree that it occurred

Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), p. 222; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.15–16, p. 164; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.5.9, *PL* 176: 250D; *Summa sent.* 2.2–3, *PL* 176: 81D–83A; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.2, *PL* 186: 719A.

¹¹⁸ *Summa sent.* 1.5, 2.2–3, *PL* 176: 50C–51A, 81D–83A.

¹¹⁹ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.24, 1.26, p. 366; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 103–04, *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 230; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.29, 13.37–47, pp. 166, 167–69; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.5.33, *PL* 176: 262B–D.

¹²⁰ *Summa sent.* 2.5, *PL* 176: 85C–87B.

¹²¹ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.31, p. 166.

¹²² *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 50; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 85–104; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 222; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.15, 13.36, pp. 164, 167; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.5.9–14, 1.5.24–28, *PL* 176: 250D–252A, 257A–259B; *Summa sent.* 2.3.4, *PL* 176: 83A–85C.

¹²³ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.5.9–14, *PL* 176: 250D–252A.

immediately after the creation of the angels.¹²⁴ The concerns, and the debates of the theologians, fall rather on three other matters: What happened to the fallen angels? Are the good angels incapable of sin? And, why is it that the fallen angels can never be saved? Looming large on their agenda is the desire to refute Origen's teaching that conversion and backsliding remain continuing possibilities for all spiritual beings, angels included.¹²⁵ While the theologians, to a man, oppose Origen, they differ as to the best argument to bring to bear against his position. At the same time, they seek to add to the dossier of patristic refutations from the work of more recent masters.

Early in the century, Honorius gives a rather thorough review of these problems. As he sees it, the fallen angels are confirmed in evil. They have lost the capacity to will the good. Some of them are cast into Hell, where they torment the damned; others inhabit the dark air above it and are active on earth, seducing the weak and testing the elect. After the last judgment, all the fallen angels will be assigned to Hell. They are powerful, powerful enough to carry out these nefarious roles, but not so powerful as the good angels. Their major limitation after the fall lies in their will. Their inability to will the good is one reason why they cannot be saved, in Honorius's view. But another reason, and one he derives from Anselm of Canterbury's *Cur deus homo*, is that, granted God's chosen method of saving mankind, it could not have been extended to angels. Christ could not have taken on an angelic nature, since each angel is the object of a particular creation on God's part, a genus unto himself, in effect. There is no generic angelic nature as such. Had Christ taken on some one angel's nature, that angel would have been the only one He could have redeemed. Further, Honorius adds, salvation means salvation from death and angels, whether fallen or not, are immortal once created. The salvation of angels is thus a contradiction in terms. Likewise, for Honorius, the good angels are confirmed in good. They are free from evil desires.¹²⁶

On the other hand, the members of the school of Laon, recognizing that, if God had willed to save the fallen angels, He would not have been constrained to do so on the analogy of His chosen mode

¹²⁴ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.32–37, p. 367; *Summa sent.* 2.3.4, *PL* 176: 83A–85C. The author of the *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 53, does not think that the exact timing of the angels' fall can be known.

¹²⁵ For the patristic background on this issue, see Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 110.

¹²⁶ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.38–41, 1.42–44, 1.48–49, 1.50–56, pp. 367–68, 368, 369–70, 370.

of redemption for man, find this argument problematic and do not see the Anselmian and Honorian *Cur deus non angelus* position as convincing. Agreeing that the angels are confirmed in evil or good, as the case may be, they argue that the sin of the fallen angels is irremissible because their dignity was higher than that of man and they experienced no external temptation, as man did, and which can be seen as a mitigating factor, in man's case.¹²⁷ Given the general subscription of these masters to the principle that the essence of the moral act lies in inner intention, which they develop elsewhere, they make heavy weather of trying to explain why the lack of external temptation on the part of the angels should make such a critical difference in their case.

Both Honorius and the school of Laon received some support in the sequel. The author of the Abelardian *Ysagoge in theologiam* agrees with Honorius, arguing that the sacrifice of a God-angel would have been required for the salvation of the fallen angels, along the lines of the passion of Christ. This action would have been irrelevant since the angels are already immortal. Perhaps the most interesting feature of his argument is that, in order to make it, he departs from the Abelardian doctrine of man's redemption in stating his case.¹²⁸ Two of the early Porretans, on the other hand, follow the Laon masters, being equally unable to explain why the lack of external temptation should make any difference, for the angels.¹²⁹

While picking up on the destination of the fallen angels as a fiery inferno or as a zone of dark and murky air, locations which he sees as alternatives between which he cannot choose, the author of the *Summa sententiarum* raises another problem flowing from the fate of angels after their fall or, alternatively, their decision not to fall. He asserts, against Origen, that the angels are confirmed in malice, or virtue, respectively. This being the case, he notes that both groups would appear to have undergone a serious limitation on their free will, because, in each case, an entire category of ethical action has now been closed to them. The author is sensitive to this problem. Following Hugh of St. Victor, however, he sees this as a real

¹²⁷ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 15–18, 50–54; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, pp. 256–57.

¹²⁸ *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 227–28.

¹²⁹ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.74, p. 174; Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., "Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* II. Die Version der florentiner Handschrift" 13.74, *AHDLMA* 46 (1979): 105. This dependence on the school of Laon at this point should be noted as a correction of Marcia L. Colish, "Early Porretan Theology," *RTAM* 56 (1989): 69.

limitation only on the free will of the fallen angels. He also reprises the Laon masters' critique of the *Cur deus non angelus* argument and gets hopelessly tangled up in it.¹³⁰ For his part, Robert Pullen, while he agrees that the angels are confirmed in evil or good, goes on to raise a question with respect to the good angels and their capacities. Should we think, following Augustine, that the good angels were given the incapacity to sin, the *non posse peccare*, of the saints in Heaven or, following Jerome, should we confine the state of *non posse peccare* to God alone? Robert sides with Jerome. He maintains that the good angels do retain some vestige of the capacity to sin although sinning is almost impossible for them, because they have become too habituated to virtue actually to do so. With regard to the parallel question of whether the fallen angels retain any vestige of the capacity to will the good, and why they cannot be saved, Robert airs it but does not answer it.¹³¹

A few other topics, of a lesser order of interest, arise under the heading of angels. Hugh of St. Victor, declining to speculate on how many angels there were and how many fell, does, however, suggest that there are the same number of good and bad angels at any given moment as there are human beings, since each man has his own personal guardian angel and tempter. Hugh asks, further, whether all the good angels act as messengers to and protectors of men, or only those in certain angelic ranks. He gives a thorough outline of the debate on this subject, although he does not take a stand on it.¹³² This latter topic is also addressed by the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, who disagrees with those authorities who maintain that God uses only the lesser orders of angels as messengers. In his view, all the ranks of angels are sent. He agrees with Hugh, and ultimately with Gregory the Great, on the idea of personal guardian angels and demons but does not take up the matter of their number. Nor does he wish to return to the problem of *incubi* and their offspring.¹³³ He does, however, raise a question not tackled by many of his contemporaries, that of where the angels were created. Ignoring the fact that in his own teaching that angels and unformed matter were created *simul*, before the rest of the universe was given phenomenal form, he has a means of answering this question by

¹³⁰ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.5.31–32, *PL* 176: 261A–262B; *Summa sent.* 2.3.4, *PL* 176: 83A–85C.

¹³¹ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.2–6, *PL* 186: 719A–726A.

¹³² Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.5.31–33, *PL* 176: 261A–262D. This willingness at least to raise controversial questions on angels is ignored in the account of Hugh's angelology in Mignon, *Les origines*, 1: 339–73.

¹³³ *Summa sent.* 2.6, *PL* 176: 87C–88C.

noting that no "place" of any kind as yet existed, he wrestles with the question and then abandons it, unanswered.¹³⁴

The Lombard on Angels

This was the contemporary state of play on angels when Peter Lombard composed the section of Book 2 of his *Sentences* dealing with this subject. With respect to his coevals and immediate predecessors, his angelology is richer and more ample, even as he corroborates the points on which consensus existed at this time. He draws together insights from a wider range of treatments of this topic than is true of any other mid-century master. He also shows a theoretical interest in the subject which reflects his use of the author of the *Summa sententiarum* as his major guide, while at the same time he goes more deeply into it than does this master or any of his other compeers. In terms of what he omits, Peter also indicates which questions concerning angels he regards as frivolous or unanswerable. Even when he is drawing the most closely on the work of other theologians, he frames his ideas in his own language and sometimes introduces distinctions of his own that enable him to pose and to resolve problems more clearly.¹³⁵

Peter prefaces his account of angels with a crisp indication of what subjects he plans to take up and in what order. He proposes to treat when angels were created, where, their original nature, the effects on the angels of their fall or the lack of it, their ranks, gifts, duties, and names. The first two questions are correlatives. Taking a leaf from the book of the *Summa sententiarum*, and doing its author one better, he reviews his doctrine of the creation *simul* of angels and the elements, prior to the creation of the rest of the universe, and adds that the locus of the angels was the heaven or empyrean, which was the third and last item created *simul* along with the angels and primordial matter.¹³⁶ As for the created nature of angels, Peter supports while expanding on the consensus view, stating that they have a simple essence that is indivisible and immaterial, a status as persons, rationality including memory, intellect, and will, and free will, which he defines here as the freedom of the will to choose either good or evil on its own "without violence or

¹³⁴ Ibid., 2.1, *PL* 176: 81C–D.

¹³⁵ The best treatment of Peter Lombard on angels to date is Ermenegildo Bertola, "Il problema delle creature angeliche in Pier Lombardo," *Pier Lombardo* 1:2 (1957): 33–54.

¹³⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 2. c. 1–c. 6, 1: 336–41.

constraint'' (*sine violentia et coactione*).¹³⁷ But, going back to the issue of whether there are respects in which all angels are the same and respects in which they are different, aired by Hugh of St. Victor, Peter puts the question in his own terms. Are angels all the same in their essence, wisdom, and free will, that is, their substance, form, and power? He answers that, with regard to their essence as rational beings, as persons, as immaterial, as simple, and as immortal, they are all the same. Nevertheless, they exist in different grades of tenuousness and different degrees of wisdom and will.¹³⁸ Peter has added here the notion of gradations within the substance of the angelic nature, as well as within their exercise of that nature, a move that grounds the principle of angelic hierarchy metaphysically as well as psychologically. He indicates his view that the hierarchical principle is universal in creation, since it applies to spiritual beings in both of these ways as well as to material beings.

While the ability to exercise free will in any direction, without constraint, is a native endowment of the angels, some angels used it to fall, which they could do on their own, and others used it meritoriously, which they could not do unless grace were added. The point that Peter wants to make here, agreeing with Augustine on Genesis, is that nothing in the creation, including the angels who fell, is intrinsically evil. In support of this principle he does not hesitate to yoke Origen's *On Ezechiel* with Augustine as an authority however much he may share in the contemporary antipathy to Origen in other respects.¹³⁹ As for the natural rational capacity of the angels before the fall, it was, according to Peter, threefold. The angels knew that they were created, and by Whom, and for what purpose. They also naturally shared a love of God and of each other, although this was not yet a love that earned merit. They were blessed in their innocence, rather than in the sense of the blessedness enjoyed as a future state by those spiritual beings who persevere in virtue. In this respect, and here Peter makes a distinction applied more generally to the creation by Robert of Melun, the angels were perfect before the fall in that they had everything they needed and that was appropriate to them at the time. But they were not perfect in the sense that they had not yet actualized the potential capacity for glorification which they possessed. Nor were they perfect in the absolute sense in which only God is perfect.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Ibid., d. 3. c. 1.2, 1: 342; repeated at d. 4. c. 2, 1: 252.

¹³⁸ Ibid., d. 3. c. 2.1-2, 1: 342.

¹³⁹ Ibid., c. 4.1-11, 1: 343-47.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., c. 5-d. 4. c. 4, 1: 348-51.

Next comes the fall of the angels. Peter confirms the consensus position on its effects, but finds his own way of explaining why the good angels persevere in virtue and why the fallen angels cannot be saved, a position which avoids the problems of both the *Cur deus non angelus* argument of Anselm of Canterbury and the absence of external temptation argument of Anselm of Laon. The fall of the angels involves either conversion (*conversio*) or aversion (*aversio*). The converted angels, Peter argues, are confirmed in the love of God and are illuminated by Him so as to be granted a fuller wisdom, and are given the grace which now enables them to be just and to acquire merit. The averted, who fell through envy, are confirmed in that vice and also in hatred. Their minds are blinded, not just by their own malice but by the removal of grace. They are corrupted by guilt and made unjust. Now, both kinds of angels retain free will. But, Peter draws a distinction here that addresses some of the difficulties raised but not answered by both the author of the *Summa sententiarum* and Robert Pullen in this connection. The reason why the fallen angels cannot be saved is that, in order to exercise their will toward the good, they would need to have the gift of divine grace. And, grace has been removed from them as a consequence of their fall. So, since God does not choose to alter this state of affairs, they are incapable of improving. The good angels, on the other hand, are capable of improving, growing perfected in the love of God and in their obedience to Him; and this is possible because God grants them the cooperating grace without which no rational creature can improve and attain merit (*gratia cooperans, sine qua non potest proficere rationalis vel meritum vitae*). They also do so by using their free will to collaborate with God's grace. Grace is the key, in this analysis, for without it the angelic will cannot make those choices that contribute to merit. Peter agrees with those who say that the prize the converted angels win is itself the grace enabling them to enjoy the good.¹⁴¹ But his real achievement here is to take the consensus view that merit-bearing choices, even for the angels, require the support of grace and to expand it into an argument that can refute the Origenist theory of openended conversion or aversion without undermining the free will of the angels. In the final accounting, it is the divine decision to extend grace, or to withhold it, that is the critical factor in an equation that leaves the fallen angels in a condition of permanent moral stasis while it extends to the good angels the capacity for glorification. Peter's earlier definition of angelic free will also enables him to resolve a

¹⁴¹ Ibid., d. 5. c. 1–c. 5, 1: 351–53. The quotation is at c. 3. 1: 352.

problem raised by Robert Pullen under the heading of whether the good angels have the *non posse peccare*. He sides with Robert and Jerome in assigning this condition to God alone. He agrees that the angels after the fall have the capacity to will only good, or evil, and not their opposites. But, insofar as they now experience no conflicting desires, the angels' capacity to will good, or evil, as the case may be, with no violence or constraint, has been intensified, not limited; although, as he has argued, for the good angels the ability to translate good intentions into good, and meritorious, actions requires the collaboration of grace.¹⁴²

The good angels continue to do just that, and to carry out the missions God assigns them. As for the fallen angels, who, Peter notes, are graded even as the good ones are, *pace* the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, they are thrown into the dark and murky air to consort with their depraved associates, or are sent to Hell to torment the damned. Peter does not specify where the dark and gloomy air is located, keeping an open mind on this question, but allowing that the demons dwelling there can return to earth to tempt mankind and to play the roles assigned to them in the time of Antichrist. The main point he wants to make about the work of the fallen angels is that, as devils, their powers as tempters will increase in the last days, in some cases, while in other cases, their powers will be diminished, the demons in the second group having been bested by the saints.¹⁴³ He adds that, if some demons will grow or diminish in their malicious powers, they will not lose their intelligence, just as they will not be deprived of free will.¹⁴⁴ Peter closes this section of his account by noting that the good angels can take on visible corporeal form in the conduct of their missions, and that the authorities do not resolve the question of what the metaphysical status of those bodies may be or what happens to them after the angels no longer need to use them.¹⁴⁵ He also observes that demons may enter into the bodies and minds of men in performing their nefarious work. When they do so, he maintains, they are present in human beings not substantially (*substantialiter*) but in their effects.¹⁴⁶ On the subject of *incubi*, Peter, along with most of his contemporaries, declines to comment.

Citing Dionysius, and bringing in Gregory as well, he also re-

¹⁴² Ibid., d. 7. c. 1–c. 4, 1: 359–61.

¹⁴³ Ibid., d. 6. c. 1–c. 7, 1: 354–58.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., d. 7. c. 5–c. 9, 1: 361–65.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., d. 8. c. 1–c. 2, 1: 365–68.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., c. 4. 1: 369–70.

ports the consensus position on the nine orders of angels, headed by the seraphim. But he expands on this common doctrine. The nine ranks of angels are led by the seraphim burning with love, outranking the cherubim, in order to point the lesson, for man's instruction, that love is greater than knowledge. Also, the angels are divided into three subsets of three, to reflect the Trinity. The virtues expressed by the angels in each rank are gifts common to all the angels, although they are manifested preeminently by the angels in each particular rank. The rank order itself, according to Peter, was established after the fall, although the metaphysical gradations of angelic substance for which he had argued earlier provide a philosophical rationale for this development. Sharply disagreeing with Honorius, who claims that each angel is *sui generis*, Peter thinks that there is more than one angel in each rank and that the angels in each order are graded, just as the ranks are.¹⁴⁷ Returning to a point that he had made under the heading of why man was created, he repeats the idea that men were not intended to form a tenth order of angels, or that they were created originally with such a status. Man would have been created and redeemed, he reiterates, even if the fallen angels had not fallen. The redeemed who win beatitude, further, receive it as human beings, not as angels.¹⁴⁸

Turning from this critique of Augustine and of Hugh of St. Victor to another issue which Hugh had discussed inconclusively, the question of whether all ranks of angels or only some angels are sent on divine missions, Peter joins the author of the *Summa sententiarum* in supporting those authorities who state that all ranks of angels are sent. He offers his own amplification of this point. While all ranks are sent, the angels highest on the angelic hierarchy, especially archangels such as Raphael, Gabriel, and Michael, who are specifically named, receive the choicest assignments.¹⁴⁹ Aside from functioning as messengers, Peter agrees, angels are sent to guard individual human beings, just as demons are allowed to test and torment them. In addressing the claim made by Hugh that the number of angels and devils must therefore be the same as the number of human beings in existence at any given moment, he registers disagreement. We do not need to posit that hypothesis, he states, since individual angels and devils can perform their respective assignments for more than one person at the same time.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., d. 9. c. 1–c. 5, 1: 370–75.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., c. 6–c. 7, 1: 375–76.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., d. 10. c. 1–c. 2, 1: 377–79.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., d. 11. c. 1, 1: 379–81.

Peter concludes his treatise on angels by considering the gifts of the good angels. The principal issue he takes up under this heading is whether the good angels continue to grow in love and knowledge, in merit and reward, from the time of their confirmation in the good up to the time of the last judgment. Or, are they perfected, with no subsequent change, at the moment of their confirmation? To be sure, he had already laid the foundation earlier on for the answer he provides here, in his contrast between the effects of their confirmation on the good and the fallen angels, respectively. But now Peter introduces a useful distinction, and one not found in any of his authorities, which permits him to support both of these alternatives at the same time. The same distinction also enables him to emphasize the point that angels can be differentiated from God despite their purely spiritual constitution. Since angels live in time, he observes, and since they do not have foreknowledge, they do grow in knowledge. They become informed of events that occur in time, as these events come to pass. In this kind of knowledge of external events, then, they can and do grow. On the other hand, in their contemplation of God they are confirmed, once and for all, and this knowledge does not change. With respect to their love and merit, the good angels are not enlarged as to its quality. But they can grow in their opportunities to exercise these virtues. In handling objections to this last point, Peter shows that it is fully compatible with the combination of the temporal development of angelic knowledge and the changeless state of divine contemplation that characterizes the epistemic modes of angelic activity.¹⁵¹ While Peter has clearly profited from the distinction drawn between angels and God by the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, he puts his own stamp on this final topic concerning angels by differentiating among modes of angelic activity and by resting his case on the chief metaphysical attribute which created beings lack in comparison with the creator, a theme which he had earlier developed in his doctrine of God in Book 1 of the *Sentences* and had anchored there with an appeal to John Damascene: everything in the creation is changeable, in one way or another. Only God is immutable. This, more than the issue of substantial composition, is the basis on which he draws his final conclusions on what is specific and unique to the angels.

In sum, while raising a wider range of questions on angels than his contemporaries do and while providing more of the questions which he raises with lucid and defensible answers, Peter does far

¹⁵¹ Ibid., c. 2, 1: 381–83.

more than to summarize the consensus view of angelology in his time. He takes a clear stand on disputed issues and finds fresh ways of posing and resolving many of them. His most important and characteristic contribution in this subdivision of his theology can be seen in his treatment of the gifts of the good angels and whether they change or not, and in his explanation of the irremissibility of the guilt of the fallen angels. In each case, he associates his solution with a more basic theme in his theology as such, in addition to developing a mode of attack different both from that of contemporaries and from the authorities on whom he and they rely. In the first mentioned case, the principle he invokes is the immutability of the divine nature and the mutability of created beings, as fundamental definitions of these two kinds of being. In the case of the fallen angels, and their differences from the good angels, the principle he invokes is the idea that all good actions require the assistance of grace, and that God grants, and subtracts, His grace according to His own will. This idea is also one that Peter will develop systematically in his handling of God's relationship with man, both before and after Adam's fall, and it is a signature of Peter's in the field of ethics more generally. In these ways, and in contrast to contemporaries who ignored angels, or who treated them in a sketchy, a hit-or-miss, a fanciful, an illogical, or an inconclusive manner, Peter presents a well organized, inclusive, and coherent angelology, which targets effectively the aspects of this subject most of interest to theologians in the middle of the twelfth century and which, at the same time, integrates angelology comprehensively into the rest of his theology.

HUMAN NATURE BEFORE THE FALL: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

In turning from angels to man before the fall, we move from an area in which there was a considerable degree of consensus among theologians in the first half of the twelfth century to one in which there was a good deal of disagreement. Not all scholastics regarded human nature as such as an issue of particular interest. Indeed, despite their renown, or notoriety, as speculative thinkers in other areas, the Abelardians and Porretans tend to give this subject extremely short shrift. Among those theologians who do devote extended attention to the subject, there is agreement that the main issues requiring investigation are the nature of man's physical and intellectual activities before the fall, the structure of the human soul, man's rationality, free will, and virtue, and, to a somewhat

lesser degree, the question of whether female nature is equal to male nature or is its inferior. Within these areas, however, they disagree quite sharply, both in their substantive conclusions, the relative importance they grant to these topics, and the authorities and rational arguments on which they rely. In this connection, Peter Lombard offers a defense of the principle that human nature as such is an important issue, a defense stronger than that found in any other contemporary theologian. At the same time, his understanding of human nature offers a striking de-Platonizing of that subject, in comparison with some of the period's leading thinkers.¹⁵² In this respect, while he draws heavily on Hugh of St. Victor for the formulation of the issues he wants to discuss and for a sense of where in the theological tradition to look for his sources, Hugh is also the contemporary theologian of whom he is the most critical.

Of all the topics pertinent to human nature before the fall, the one on which there is the most consensus, and the one that attracts the least speculative attention from the masters of his time up to Peter, is man's physical nature and life in Eden. The main point which, they agree, is the single most important one is man's sexuality before the fall. They also agree that the single most important authority on this subject is Augustine, Augustine, that is, in his anti-Manichean and pastoral incarnation and not Augustine the anti-Pelagian. In the works written to refute the Manichean conception of the human body, and procreative sexuality, as evil, and in works of his mid-career aimed at counseling married people or those preparing for marriage, Augustine stressed that marriage, and sexual reproduction, were an original part of God's plan. In these works, as well, Augustine had in mind the aim of refuting the position of Origen, who had taught that the body, and hence sexual differentiation itself no less than the sexual procreation of offspring, were consequences of original sin, ideas which, in one form or another, were finding a resonance in some of Augustine's more

¹⁵² The best introduction to this object, at least for the Lombard's psychology, is Ermenegildo Bertola, "La dottrina lombardiana dell'anima nella storia delle dottrine psicologiche del XII secolo," *Pier Lombardo* 3:1 (1959): 3-18. See also Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle*, p. 295; Joseph de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," in *DTC* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1935), 12 part 2: 1194-96; Richard Heinzemann, *Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele und die Auferstehung des Leibes: Eine problemgeschichtliche Untersuchung der fröhscholastischen Sentenzen- und Summenliteratur von Anselm von Laon bis Wilhelm von Auxerre*, Beiträge, 40:3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1965), pp. 63-68; Giuseppe Lorenzi, "La filosofia di Pier Lombardo nei *Quattro libri delle Sentenze*," *Pier Lombardo* 4 (1960): 32-34, who follows Bertola closely; Johann Schupp, *Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1932), pp. 15-23.

ascetic contemporaries. Twelfth-century scholastics follow Augustine's lead here, and on two related points. First, they agree that, before the fall, human sexuality would have lacked the attributes of desire and pleasure. It would have been exercised subject to the rational will of the partners, as devoid of lustful feeling or sensual gratification as a handshake. Secondly, they agree, before the fall, children would have been born to Eve without labor pains.¹⁵³ The only twelfth-century theologians to depart from this Augustinian position are Robert of Melun, who ignores the topic of sex altogether at the relevant location in his *Sentences*, and one of the early Porretans, who treats the question of whether sex would have been free of lust and childbirth free of pain, absent the fall, as an open one.¹⁵⁴

There is a corollary of the Augustinian position on marriage in Eden which attracts less general interest and agreement, the nature of the children who would have been born to Adam and Eve. Would they, like their parents, have been engendered as adults, or as able to walk and talk already? Augustine himself airs the matter as a possibility but takes no definite stand. Undeterred, Honorius Augustodunensis treats the walking and talking as a certainty; Hugh of St. Victor thinks the children would have inherited all the perfections of their parents but would not have been born as adults; and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* more prudently retreats to the issue of walking and talking, and, less definite than Honorius and more definite than Augustine himself, thinks that these capacities in the newborn children of Adam and Eve would have been possible, and likely.¹⁵⁵

Far less sustained attention was devoted to the other aspects of the physical life of man in Eden before the fall. It was agreed that Adam and Eve had the capacity not to die and that, before the fall,

¹⁵³ For the Augustinian background and a fine survey of twelfth-century opinions, the standard work is Michael Müller, *Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus von der Paradiesesehe und ihre Auswirkung in der Sexualethik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts bis Thomas von Aquin* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1954), pp. 19–101. His analysis and conclusions are amply supported by our own investigations. See Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 22–23, 57; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 24, 38–39; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 246, 254; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 252, 5: 26, 36–37, 203, 207, 252; Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.74–76, pp. 374–75; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 121–22; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.6.18–27, *PL* 176: 275A–281A; *Summa sent.* 3.4, *PL* 176: 94D; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.18, *PL* 186: 745D–746B.

¹⁵⁴ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.1.8, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 208; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.61–62, p. 171.

¹⁵⁵ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.74–76, pp. 374–75; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.6.18–27, *PL* 176: 275A–281A; *Summa sent.* 3.4, *PL* 176: 95A–B.

they were not afflicted with illness or physical suffering. But, what about their need to eat and their need to work? A number of theologians acknowledge the fact that the need to eat is a natural need. Before the fall, it would have been morally neutral and unproblematic, simply an indicator of the body's nutritional needs. Adam and Eve would have eaten out of natural need and with natural pleasure, but without experiencing the pain of hunger pangs.¹⁵⁶ But there was an alternative approach to this question, offered by two members of the school of Laon. They argue that Adam and Eve possessed the physical need for food and drink, before the fall, but only potentially, and not *in actu*, a view which presupposes that the fall occurred almost immediately after the creation of Adam and Eve.¹⁵⁷ There was also the opinion of Honorius, noted above under the heading of why animals were created, that vegetarianism alone was natural in Eden, and that the need to consume flesh was a consequence of the fall.¹⁵⁸ As for work, and whether it existed in Eden, or whether it was an affliction laid on Adam as a punishment for sin, this issue evokes interest only from Roland of Bologna and Robert of Melun, who have much the same thing to say although Roland is more specific. Adam, they both think, would have exercised his natural aptitude to work in Eden, plowing, sowing, and harvesting, raising his family and building a house for it, but out of pleasure in these activities in their own right, and without fatigue or heavy effort.¹⁵⁹ This view, if it failed to receive support from other masters in the mainstream, is interesting for its understanding that meaningful work is a natural need of humankind, and that performing it brings satisfaction.

In surveying man's natural endowments and functions before the fall, these physical attributes cede pride of place to man's soul. Indeed, it is primarily, and sometimes exclusively, the soul to which most mid-century theologians turn in discussing prelapsarian man. The fact that they devote so much space to this topic, treating it in much more detail than man's body, is indicative of their strongly hierarchical assumptions about the human constitu-

¹⁵⁶ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 66–67; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.6.18–29, *PL* 176: 275A–282D; *Summa senti.* 3.4, *PL* 176: 94D.

¹⁵⁷ *Potest queri, quid sit peccatum*, ed. Heinrich Weisweiler in *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in deutschen Bibliotheken*, Beiträge, 33:1–2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), p. 263; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 263.

¹⁵⁸ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.66–67, pp. 272–73.

¹⁵⁹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 121–22; Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.1.8, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 208.

tion. Here, they could and did draw on the philosophical tradition as well as on patristic writers who held, with the Platonists, that a human being was a soul using a body, or even a soul trapped in a body as its prison, or, with the Stoics, that the mind was the ruling principle of the entire human constitution. At the same time, the treatises on the human soul found in systematic theologies in this period vary quite widely in the ways their authors conceive of this subject. Sometimes they include the theme of the five senses, and sometimes not. Some of them look at the question from a primarily ethical, and others from a primarily epistemological, standpoint, while still others seek to combine these perspectives. And, the mental faculties that different masters accent are not always the same ones, although they sometimes use the same terms to describe mental faculties that they define differently.

The school of Laon, early in the century, is a good index of both the eclecticism and the lack of consensus on man's psychology visible in this period. William of Champeaux combines a more or less Aristotelian psychology with a conception of mental faculties more Neoplatonic in appearance and geared to sustain man's supernatural activities. His account of sense perception takes the Peripatetic line that the sense data impress themselves on the sense organs, which remain passive in the process. The sense organs then convey these data to the mind, which fabricates concepts, both individual and abstract, out of them. William is aware of the fact that this account makes problematic the senses of sight and hearing, since the eye and ear perceive their objects at a distance. He mentions the problem but offers no resolution of it.¹⁶⁰ As for man's mental faculties, he holds that they are threefold. There is soul (*anima*), which animates the body and supervises the physical senses, and spirit (*spiritus*), the rational faculty which frames concepts and grasps supra-sensible realities. It is in the sense of his *spiritus*, William thinks, that man was made in God's image. There is also a third faculty, intuition (*intuitus*), man's suprarational faculty, which enables him to contemplate God's essence directly. William is not clear on why this suprarational faculty, which would appear to resemble God's own mode of intellection more closely than the ratiocination performed by *spiritus*, would not provide a better locus for the image of God in man.¹⁶¹ Other Laon masters take a different tack, locating the image of God, in a traditional

¹⁶⁰ *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 242–43, 5: 200–01.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, no. 244, 5: 201.

Augustinian manner, in man's memory, intellect, and will.¹⁶² The author of the *Sententie Anselmi* offers his own faculty psychology, dividing the soul into two faculties, the rational soul focused on the knowledge of incorporeal truths, which he confusingly calls *anima*, and the sensual soul, in charge of the body and sensory knowledge.¹⁶³

A much more elaborate and important account of human psychology, if one not entirely free from inconsistencies, is the one developed by Hugh of St. Victor. He presents man as a microcosm. Since he possesses both a body and a soul, man displays God's desire to glorify both the material and the spiritual creation through the redemption of man.¹⁶⁴ This being so, one might expect to find that Hugh gives equal time to the body and soul of man before the fall. But such is not the case. Hugh is equally supportive of the view that man's soul alone is the microcosm, in that it can grasp invisible causes and also gain a knowledge of the visible world with the aid of the senses.¹⁶⁵ The soul itself is seen by Hugh as a substance, capable of being modified by accidents, without taking the body into account. The soul is where the human personality resides. The body can be called a person only indirectly, thanks to its union with the soul. While Hugh agrees with Augustine that the soul is spread evenly throughout the body, a point also reprised by the early Porretans,¹⁶⁶ it is not the combination of body and soul that is the definition of the human person for him but the individual substance of a rational nature, à la Boethius, whose union with the body to which it is joined is by no means perfect. The soul, or human person, can, for Hugh, live without a body. As a number of scholars have aptly noted, Hugh's understanding of human nature is strongly tintured by Neoplatonism.¹⁶⁷

Hugh distinguishes three forms of agency in man, mental, that is, voluntary; physical; and sensory or pertaining to pleasure. He

¹⁶² *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 312–13, 315, 5: 246–49, 251.

¹⁶³ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 55–57. Heinzemann, *Die Unsterblichkeit*, pp. 6–15 does not note these differences of opinion within the school.

¹⁶⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.6.1, *PL* 176: 263A.

¹⁶⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascal.* 1.1, pp. 4–5.

¹⁶⁶ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.56, p. 170.

¹⁶⁷ Barkholt, *Die Ontologie*, pp. 17–19, 20–21; Roger Baron, "La situation de l'homme d'après Hugues de Saint-Victor," in *L'Homme et son destin d'après les penseurs du moyen âge* (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1960), pp. 431–36; Heinzemann, *Die Unsterblichkeit*, pp. 75–82; Heinrich Ostler, *Die Psychologie des Hugo von St. Viktor*, Beiträge, 6:1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1906), pp. 26–30, 39–43, 81, 86–87; Heinz Robert Schlette, "Das unterscheidliche Personenverständnis im theologischen Denken Hugos und Richards von St. Viktor," in *Miscellanea Martin Grabmann: Gedenkenblatt zum 10. Todestag* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1959), pp. 57–61; Schütz, *Deus absconditus*, pp. 99–102.

makes it clear that he views their operations as much from a moral as from an epistemological perspective, and that the sub-rational impulses are far from neutral, in his estimation. The will is free, he observes; and it moves the body as well as the mind. But the sensory faculty can take over the mind, when the mind issues its bodily directives. If this happens, incorrect moral judgments will be made. It is only when the mind masters the sensory faculty that correct moral decisions will ensue.¹⁶⁸ Despite the hazards which the sensory faculty presents, it is noteworthy that Hugh sees this faculty, and not physical activity itself, as the seat of the problem. Man requires both the mental and the sensory faculties in order to come to a knowledge of both the visible and invisible worlds. This knowledge is desirable and valuable not, for Hugh, because it is a natural function of man as such, but because it provides him with the knowledge of God required for his spiritual well-being and for his acquisition of merit. Hugh is insistent, and consistent, in viewing man's natural faculties of soul in this kind of moral and religious perspective, adding that, while man can know the visible universe by nature, his knowledge of those invisible things that have not left their traces in the visible world depends on grace, collaborating with man's natural mental faculties. Further, these same mental faculties enable man to grasp the precepts of nature and of discipline. By this, Hugh means moral principles, as rationally ascertainable and as revealed, not the natural law in the physical sense.¹⁶⁹ For Hugh, the natural knowledge possessed by man before the fall was not derived purely from man's mental, physical, and sensory faculties working without impediment. According to Hugh, Adam had a perfect knowledge of the truth, all at once, which was reflected in his self-knowledge, his intimacy with the creator, and his knowledge of how to name the animals. This perfect knowledge, which lacked only foreknowledge, was his by divine illumination.¹⁷⁰

The most notable heir to Hugh's legacy in the area of man's psychological endowment before the fall is Robert Pullen. The subject of the human soul is one he discusses at considerable length. To the Hugonian legacy, and some of its complications, he adds a number of observations on his own. Man was greater before the fall than he is now, Robert begins, but his nature will be still greater in the future resurrection.¹⁷¹ This condition applies in

¹⁶⁸ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.6.4, *PL* 176: 265C–266A.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.6.5–6, 1.6.8, *PL* 176: 266B–268B, 268D–269B.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.6.12–15, *PL* 176: 270C–272C.

¹⁷¹ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.16, *PL* 186: 741A–B.

particular to man's soul. With Hugh, Robert calls the soul a substance, and an indivisible one, spread evenly throughout the human body. He emphasizes that the soul is not localized in any one organ, that it is not reduced or divided if a person suffers the loss of a part of his body, and that the soul is the same "size" in people of all ages and statures.¹⁷² Robert has a good deal to say about what this indivisible substance is not, but he is far from clear on what it is, and what its relationship to the body is. The soul is not of the same substance as the *anima mundi*, he notes, in a jab at some versions of contemporary Platonism. Nor is it of the same substance as the spirit of life which God breathed into Adam's body. Robert explains neither of these points. He also leaves dangling the question of whether the souls of other people are created by God, or issue from God, in the same way as Adam's soul and whether Adam's soul is consubstantial with the souls of other human beings.¹⁷³ Robert is treading on very marshy ground at this point. He appears to be drawing a distinction between *spiritus* and *anima*, but it is impossible to tell whether he means this in the same sense as William of Champeaux, since he does not define either of these terms. He does, however, argue that the parents supply the *spiritus* as well as the body to their children, which makes him a traducianist in some sense of that word.¹⁷⁴ Also, having stated that the soul is a substance, he also says that the soul and body are not two substances that blend when they are united to produce a third and compound substance. Rather, they are two aspects that cohere to make a man who remains a composite being so long as he is not dead and unresurrected.¹⁷⁵ But, then again, in the next breath, Robert calls both man's soul, and man as a composite of body and soul, substances.¹⁷⁶

These confusions in the meaning of substance with respect to anthropology and Robert's waverings on whether man is an integral unit of body and soul or a person defined as a spiritual substance, which he derives from Hugh, are left unresolved. Ignoring the debris he has left in his wake, Robert plunges on to address another topic, faculty psychology. Noting that he is focusing on the particular version of the doctrine that he gives because it frames the subject in terms of moral discretion and judgment, and that it is in this connection that God's image is found in man's soul, he gives a

¹⁷² Ibid., 1.10, *PL* 186: 690A–693A. The quotation is at 692A.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 2.9, *PL* 186: 733A.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 2.7, *PL* 186: 726A–D.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 2.10, *PL* 186: 724D.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 2.12, *PL* 186: 736D–738A. Robert's inconsistency here has been noted by Heinzemann, *Die Unsterblichkeit*, pp. 84–117.

reprise of the Aristotelian distinction among the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational faculties, or, as he puts it, *ratio*, *ira*, and *concupiscentia*. Now, there is a potential difficulty here. It was a standard consensus position, to which we have adverted above and which we will consider more fully below, that concupiscence was a consequence of the fall. Robert turns a blind eye to this fact. He does not see any need to explain the difference between concupiscence as a punishment for sin and the concupiscible faculty, in Aristotle's psychology, as a natural attribute of human beings. Moving right along, he notes that the rational faculty distinguishes good from evil. The irascible faculty distinguishes what caution should endure and what excessive zeal should reject. The concupiscible faculty tells us what to desire and what pertains to the needs of the body and to duty. While these definitions are not entirely Aristotelian, Robert joins the Stagirite in affirming that the functions of the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be conducive to virtue when they are guided by reason, and that the ability of reason to govern the infrarational faculties is what separates man from the animals.¹⁷⁷

Robert adds that men have five senses and, like Hugh, he observes that they can draw men away from virtue, if they are inordinate in their attachments and are not used under reason's guidance.¹⁷⁸ But he at once launches into an analysis of the physiology of sight that is interesting in its own right. Plato, he observes, using the sense of sight as a paradigm case for sensation in general, saw vision as a flow of light issuing from the eye, going out to the sense object, and bringing sense data back with it to the eye. On the other hand, Aristotle saw the process as occurring in reverse, with the sense object sending out data across some sort of material bridge, the data impressing themselves on an eye that receives them passively. Robert thinks that the active and passive theories of sensation, as presented by these two traditions, each tell only half of the story. Without being aware of the fact that it is the Stoic theory of sensation which tells the whole story to which he is advertising, and without referring to Augustine, who is its likeliest source for him, he argues for a combined theory of sensation in which both the sense organ and the sense object play an active role.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ Robert Pullen *Sent.* 2.11, 2.12, *PL* 186: 734D–735A, 736D, 738D. Heinze-mann, *Die Unsterblichkeit*, pp. 82–84, in stressing Robert's dependence on Hugh of St. Victor, ignores this point and the other non-Victorine elements in Robert's psychology.

¹⁷⁸ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.11, *PL* 186: 736B–D.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.12, *PL* 186: 738C–739A.

Interesting as is his discussion of sensation, and informative as it is in conveying the three ancient philosophical accounts of that process to his readers, the passage just noted is, strictly speaking, a digression in Robert's treatise on the soul, which is geared to the faculties of the soul viewed from a moral perspective. He returns to this agenda by emphasizing that intellectual assent is of the essence in moral acts. Not only must the mind consent to a sin, for example, before the body can carry it out, but there are sins that are purely mental, like pride and envy.¹⁸⁰ Less intimately connected to Robert's theme, and problematic in its own right, is his discussion of another mental faculty, imagination. He defines imagination as the representation in the mind of some sensible thing that is currently absent. Ignoring the fact that this same definition would apply equally well to a concept, from which he does not differentiate imagination, Robert adds that man shares this faculty with animals, anchoring the claim with the point that both men and animals dream. He does not indicate how we can know that animals dream, but concludes his treatment of mental faculties by noting that men can bring their rational judgment to bear on the content of their dreams while animals cannot.

There was one other essay in faculty psychology in our period, that of Robert of Melun, who calls upon another Aristotelian distinction, the distinction among the vegetative, animate, and rational souls, each in charge of a particular subdivision of human activity. His main reason for appealing to this principle is not the desire to criticize Robert Pullen's model of the concupiscible, irascible, and rational faculties but to support Abelard's Trinitarian theology and to attack the Augustinian analogy of memory, intellect, and will. His chosen substitute does not involve faculties that work in and through each other.¹⁸¹ Robert of Melun gives most of the attention he devotes to the human soul to the effort to prove its immortality, an unusual activity since this was not a debated question at the time. His dialogue is principally with Augustine and Cassiodorus here and not with any contemporary *quidam*.¹⁸² He begins with moral arguments which suggest that the nature of creatures possessing moral ends must be compatible with those ends. Since the human soul was given an innate desire for the good,

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 2.15, *PL* 186: 740C–741A.

¹⁸¹ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.6.44, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 2: 334–40.

¹⁸² The text is printed in Raymond-M. Martin, "L'immortalité de l'âme d'après Robert de Melun (d. 1167)," *Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie* 36 (1934): 139–45.

a capacity to recognize it, the ability to attain virtue and to be rewarded for it, the soul must be able to enjoy these ends eternally. Robert then offers proofs based on the metaphysical structure of the soul which align him with those contemporaries who profess a Platonizing psychology. The soul is capable of living without the body, he urges, and is the principle of being of the person to whom it belongs, the essence of that person. It lacks the kinds of mutability that affect the essences of things that are mortal. He concludes that only the deity, Who created it, can annihilate the soul. Against the claim that, as the form of the body, the soul dies with the body, he offers not a refutation but the counterclaim that this is only one of the soul's functions. When the body dies, the soul is free to do other things. To those who say that the soul is mortal because, like the body, it can be afflicted by illness, he answers that spiritual sickness is not terminal or irreversible. This may well be the case, but it does not demonstrate that the soul is immortal. In any event, these concerns delimit, for the most part, the issues that Robert wants to discuss about the nature of the human soul.

A related issue on which we also find a range of opinions and which serves as a point of transition for the theologians from man's created nature before the fall to the fall itself is free will. Everyone agrees that man was endowed with free will in paradise. But there is some disagreement over how to define it and also over its scope and capacity to win virtue for prelapsarian man. The school of Laon offers a range of opinions in defining free will. Anselm of Laon and one of his followers align themselves with Anselm of Canterbury and state that free will is the power to serve rectitude for its own sake.¹⁸³ Anselm adds that free will has two parts, approving (*approbans*) and desiring (*appetens*). The first is rational and always good (*semper bona*); it reflects man's natural desire for the good. The second draws man into sensual pleasures which may be bad as well as good.¹⁸⁴ Another view of free will found in the school of Laon and also in Bernard of Clairvaux, and one that recurs in Hugh of St. Victor, the *Summa sententiarum*, the *Sententiae divinitas*, and also Peter Lombard, is the idea that free will is threefold. It involves freedom from necessity, freedom from sin, and freedom from misery (*a necessitate, a peccato, a miseria*).¹⁸⁵ Freedom from necessity is the

¹⁸³ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine* pagine 4, pp. 27–28; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 322, 5: 253.

¹⁸⁴ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine* pagine 4, pp. 27–28.

¹⁸⁵ *Sentences of Probable Authenticity*, no. 108, 5: 87. Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 3.6–7, ed. J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais in Bernard of Clairvaux, *Opera*, 8 vols. (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1955–77), 3: 170–71. The best analyses of Bernard's doctrine are Bernard McGinn, intro. to Bernard of

natural capacity of the will to choose, to be the cause of its own actions, without any external constraint or impediment. Freedom from sin is the effective choice of the good according to the counsel of right reason. Freedom from misery adds to this choice its fruition in good action. The first of these, freedom from necessity, is substantive of the will and is indestructible; it is a gift of nature. The second and third freedoms are accidental; they are gifts of grace.

Twelfth-century scholastics who follow this last definition of free will tend to bring it to bear on the question of whether man had virtue before the fall. A good case in point is Hugh of St. Victor. Repeating the threefold definition just noted, he adds that Adam needed grace in order to exercise free will for the good. Defining virtue as "nothing other than an affection of the mind ordered according to reason" (*virtus namque nihil aliud est quam affectus mentis secundum rationem ordinatus*), he observes that virtue may be by nature or grace. Grace is both the grace of creation and the grace of restoration. The first operates in man; the second cooperates with man. All virtue, Hugh continues, must involve grace in order to be meritorious. Thus, for Hugh, Adam possessed created grace before the fall, although after the fall, man needs both kinds. And so,

Clairvaux, *On Grace and Free Will*, trans. Daniel O'Donovan (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), pp. 15–42 and Luigi Sartori, "Natura e grazia nella dottrina di S. Bernardo," *Studia patavina* 1 (1954): 41–64. See also Gillian R. Evans, *The Mind of Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 51, 159–62; Emmanuel Kern, *Das Tugendsystem des heiligen Bernhard von Clairvaux* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1934), pp. 5–9; Bernard Maréchaux, "L'Oeuvre doctrinale de Saint Bernard," *La Vie spirituelle* 17 (1927): 196–200; Armando Rigobello, *Linee per una antropologia prescolastica* (Padua: Antenore, 1972), pp. 48–61. Scholars who have seen Bernard as the source of this idea in Hugh of St. Victor, the *Summa sententiarum*, the *Sententiae divinitatis*, and Peter Lombard while discounting or ignoring the possible influence of the school of Laon include Jean Châtillon, "L'influence de S. Bernard sur la pensée scolastique au XII^e et au XIII^e siècle," in *D'Isidore de Seville à Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Études d'histoire et de théologie* (London: Variorum, 1985), pp. 268–88; Ulrich Faust, "Bernhards 'Liber de gratia et libero arbitrio': Bedeutung, Quellen und Einfluss," in *Analecta monastica: Textes et études sur la vie des moines*, 6th ser. (Rome: Herder, 1962), pp. 35–51; Erich Kleineidam, "De triplici libertate: Anselm von Laon oder Bernhard von Clairvaux?" *Cîteaux* 11 (1960): 55–62; "Wissen, Wissenschaft, Theologie bei Bernhard von Clairvaux," in *Bernhard von Clairvaux. Mönch und Mystiker* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1955), pp. 131–32; Artur Michael Landgraf, "Der heilige Bernhard in seinem Verhältnis zur Theologie des zwölften Jahrhunderts," in *ibid.*, pp. 44–62; *Dogmengeschichte*, 1 part 1: 88–168; Jean Leclercq, "S. Bernard et la théologie monastique du XII^e siècle," in *Saint Bernard théologien* (Rome: Tipografia Pio X, 1953), pp. 7–23; McGinn, intro. to O'Donovan trans. of *On Grace and Free Will*, pp. 39–42; John R. Sommerfeldt, "Bernard of Clairvaux and Scholasticism," *Papers of the Michigan Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters* 48 (1963): 265–77; Sofia Vanni Rovighi, "S. Bernardo e la filosofia," in *S. Bernardo: Pubblicazione commemorativa nell'VIII centenario della sua morte* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1954), pp. 143–45.

Adam had meritorious virtue.¹⁸⁶ This analysis, while it begins by opening the possibility that there could be natural virtue through man's exercise of reason and free will, ends by closing the door firmly on that possibility. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* and Robert Pullen follow Hugh's line of reasoning and reach the same conclusion.¹⁸⁷ This was not, however, the only position taken in the period by masters who accepted the threefold definition of free will. Robert of Melun, for instance, emphasizes the point that man enjoyed full integrity of both body and soul before the fall and argues that he could know the truth without error and that he could do the good without difficulty (*sine difficultate*); he does not raise the question of whether Adam needed grace in order to do good. Rather, what Robert wants to stress is the point that free will enables man to resist grace.¹⁸⁸ And, Roland of Bologna, who does take up the question, asserts that Adam possessed the virtue of charity before the fall and that he could seek the good "without the assistance of grace" (*absque gratia adiutrice*). He does confuse matters, however, by stating in the same passage that Adam did enjoy prevenient grace before the fall, although it did not prevent him from sinning.¹⁸⁹

A final issue, directly pertinent to the fall, on which we find a range of opinions in the first half of the twelfth century, is the nature of woman, and whether it is equal to the nature of man. Here, we encounter a striking lack of logic. Many theologians, following Augustine, emphasize the point that Eve was taken from Adam's side, and not from his head or his feet, to show that, as a wife and loving companion, she was his equal, not his superior or inferior. As with Hugh of St. Victor and Abelard, they tend to gloss the point with an eye to the sacrament of marriage.¹⁹⁰ Despite the consubstantiality of Adam and Eve, the theologians reflect an unexcogitated sexism in viewing Eve as a weaker vessel. Anselm of Laon holds that she is Adam's physical inferior, although his spiritual equal; other members of the school of Laon see Eve as less rational than Adam.¹⁹¹ Abelard also regards Eve's inferiority as

¹⁸⁶ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.6.16–17, *PL* 176: 272C–275A. The quotation is at 1.6.17, 273C.

¹⁸⁷ *Summa sent.* 3.7, *PL* 176: 98D–100B; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.20, *PL* 186: 747C.

¹⁸⁸ Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.1.8, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 207–08. The quotation is on p. 208.

¹⁸⁹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 119–20.

¹⁹⁰ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.6.35, *PL* 176: 284C; Peter Abelard, *Hex.*, pp. 78, 133–35.

¹⁹¹ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4, p. 25; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 60; *Deus du cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 262.

intellectual, not physical; he represents the tradition that Eve was made only in God's likeness, but not His image as well.¹⁹² And, several members of the school of Laon as well as Roland of Bologna think that Eve was Adam's inferior both in body and soul, and that she would rightly have been subordinated to him even if there had been no fall.¹⁹³ Hugh as well as Robert Pullen think that Eve was weaker than Adam although without specifying where the weakness lies.¹⁹⁴ None of these masters sees this inconsistency as a problematic feature of his treatment of human nature before the fall or of human nature as such.

The Lombard on Prelapsarian Human Nature

As Peter Lombard tackles the subject of human nature before the fall, he makes it plain that he is going to propose a less subordinationist model, both with respect to man and woman and with respect to the relations between body and soul. Launching the topic with his own version of the theme that man is made in God's image and likeness, he orchestrates it in such a way as to make both attributes applicable to all human beings as such. This argument can be read as a critique of Abelard and the tradition of antifeminism in which he stands here,¹⁹⁵ although, as noted, Abelard was scarcely the only proponent of female inferiority in this period. First, and characteristically, Peter defines his terms. In using the word "image" we are speaking of a created similarity that is understood in a relative sense (*relative*) with respect to its prototype, as with an image of Caesar on one of his coins and Caesar himself. The human soul resembles God in five respects: its rationality; its possession of the Trinitarian analogy of memory, intellect, and will; its natural capacity to be innocent and just; its immortality; and its indivisibility. The image of God can be seen in the human soul's formal, essential, or structural resemblance to God, while its likeness to God can be seen in its functional similarities to Him.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² Peter Abelard, *Hex.*, pp. 70–72, 77. On this point, see Mary M. McLaughlin, "Abelard and the Dignity of Women," in *Pierre Abélard, Pierre le Vénérable: Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en occident au milieu du XII^e siècle*, ed. René Louis, Jean Jolivet, and Jean Châtillon (Paris: CNRS, 1975), pp. 306–08.

¹⁹³ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 57, 60; *Voluntas Dei, relata ad ipsum Deum*, in *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 523, 5: 346; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 262; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 125–29.

¹⁹⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.7.3, *PL* 176: 287D–288B; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.21, *PL* 186: 248B.

¹⁹⁵ Stephan Otto, *Die Funktion des Bildbegriffes in der Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts*, *Beiträge*, 40:1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1963), pp. 200–06.

¹⁹⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 16. c. 1–c. 4.1, 1: 406–09.

We may note here that this argument accomplishes two things at once. It makes it impossible to ascribe either image only or likeness only to any human soul, since the structure and function of the soul are interdependent. Peter also provides another foundation, in man's psychology, for the utility of the memory, intellect, and will analogy, which he also defends persuasively, on other grounds, in his Trinitarian theology. For it is in this attribute of the soul that structure and function coincide the most clearly. Admitting that he cannot resolve the question of whether there was a time lag between the creation of Adam's body and the creation of his soul, which should not be seen as consubstantial with God despite the language of Genesis, and noting that the creation of Adam and Eve as adults was a unique event, Peter holds that, for the rest of the human race, the parents make the body as inferior causes, and then God creates the soul, and that He creates it in the body after the body is formed.¹⁹⁷

Like the creation of Adam, the creation of Eve was an exception to this rule. This being the case, it is of interest to see which aspects of that topic Peter accents and which he omits. Eve is created from Adam, he notes, so that all human beings will appreciate his common paternity of the whole human race and will love each other as blood relatives. Eve was taken from Adam's side, and here Peter follows Augustine, Hugh, and others, to indicate the particular bond of love (*consortium dilectionis*) uniting husband and wife. The relationship is one of affection and not one of superiority or inferiority as would be suggested had she been created from Adam's head or feet.¹⁹⁸ He poses another question, as to why God created Eve when Adam was asleep, answering it with the observation that this was done to avoid causing Adam any pain, before continuing with the widely held opinion that this mode of Eve's creation also signifies the birth of the church from the side of the crucified Christ. Peter concludes by rejecting the theory put forth by the author of the *Summa sententiarum* on the creation of Eve's body by the action of seminal causes, asserting that her creation was purely miraculous.¹⁹⁹ He does not describe Eve as weaker in mind or body than Adam. The subordination of wife to husband is not a theme he takes up here. It occurs primarily in his Pauline commentaries, as a pendant of the consequences of original sin, but does not appear in Peter's discussion of the original creation in the *Sentences*.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., d. 17. c. 2–c. 3, d. 18. c. 7.1–4, 1: 410–13, 420–21.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., d. 18. c. 1.–c. 2, 1: 416–17. The quotation is at c. 2, p. 416.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., c. 5, 1: 418–19.

Rather, the creation of Eve prompts him to make a brief excursus on the subject of causation, in which he distinguishes among God's direct causation in making things out of nothing, as is the case with God's creation of Eve's soul; God's direct causation in turning one thing into another thing miraculously, as is the case with the formation of Eve's body out of Adam's rib; and the action of inferior or secondary causes in created nature, such as the parents' conception of the bodies of their children, into which the souls created by God are infused.²⁰⁰ In short, the topic of Eve's created nature inspires in Peter reflections that are largely physical and metaphysical, and to a lesser extent matrimonial and ecclesiological. They are not reflections designed to justify a vision of female inferiority as a condition of the creation. In the rest of what he has to say, then, he means both male and female nature when he speaks of the nature of man before the fall.

In turning to that subject, Peter acknowledges freely that it contains many points of interest in themselves "which it is not useless to know, even if they are sometimes investigated merely out of curiosity" (*quae non inutiliter sciuntur, licet aliquando curiositate quaeruntur*).²⁰¹ He divides the topic into what we can know about man's body and soul, beginning with mortality, because it applies to both aspects of man's constitution. He agrees with the consensus here, that Adam and Eve had the capacity to die and not to die; in the fallen condition, man has the capacity to die and lacks the capacity not to die, while in the next life he will have the *non posse mori*, the incapacity to die, since death will no longer have dominion over him.²⁰² Moving to man's natural physical aptitudes and conditions before the fall, Peter agrees with the standard Augustinian view of human sexuality in Eden. Armed with this authority, he raises, and rejects, Origen's claim that the procreation of offspring would have been asexual had the fall not occurred, and agrees that, according to God's plan, the use of sex would have been free from lust and fully under the control of man's rational will. As for the children born of a sinless Adam and Eve, he finds it hard to take seriously the claim that they would have been born as adults or that they would have been born with faculties not possessed by newborn infants. Taking a less credulous line here than Honorius, Hugh, and the *Summa sententiarum*, he argues on the basis of naturalism and

²⁰⁰ Ibid., c. 5.4–c. 7.4, 1: 418–21.

²⁰¹ Ibid., d. 19, c. 1.1, 1: 421.

²⁰² Ibid., c. 1.3–d. 20. c. 3, 1: 422, with more on this subject at d. 20. c. 2–c. 6, 1: 422–27.

common sense. The frame of the womb, he observes, is too small to permit the delivery of adult-size people. If offspring of this sort were to be born, they would constitute a physical anomaly, having the size of infants and the configuration of adults. The authority who had raised this question, Augustine, had raised it as a mere possibility, by no means as a certainty, or even as a likelihood. Peter thinks it far more reasonable to suppose that the children of Adam and Eve, like other children, would have undergone gestation in the womb, and normal development from infancy to childhood to adulthood over the course of time. For, as he points out, it was mortality, not the exercise of man's natural physical functions, that was the consequence of sin. Here, he annexes gestation and growth, as natural processes, to eating, drinking, sexuality, and other natural functions that he sees as basic to human nature as such and as hence forming a normal part of life in paradise.²⁰³ In his handling of this entire topic, Peter makes it clear that natural physical functions and processes are not a defect, just as the body itself is not a defect or a consequence of sin. He makes a more solidly naturalistic application of the anti-Origen agenda here than any theologian of his time, despite the fact that he may have derived his sense of how to pose these questions from authorities from masters with a more Platonic anthropology, such as Hugh of St. Victor.

Peter also shows a willingness to speculate on contrary-to-fact conditions that cannot be verified either by reason or authority. After having borne children, he asks, would the original parents have continued to enjoy their immortality in Eden, along with their children, and their other descendants, or would they have been transferred to a celestial life, transformed not by death but by some other means, and likewise their children? The inquiry arises from the presumption that the garden of Eden was of finite size. Peter notes that Augustine, the source of this question, gives an ambiguous answer to it. He himself is willing to entertain the possibility of the celestial transfer, although he thinks that we cannot establish with certitude when and how it might have taken place.²⁰⁴ This passage is a nice index of Peter's combination of curiosity, caution, and common sense in addressing life in Eden.

Given the fact that the life of the body, in its sinless state, was "neither silly or inappropriate" (*non sit absurdum vel inconveniens*), Peter asks, by way of making a crisp transition to man's spiritual faculties before the fall, whether it would have been possible for

²⁰³ Ibid., d. 20, c. 1–c. 2, c. 4, 1: 427–28, 429–31.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., c. 3, 1: 428–29.

prelapsarian man, through his senses and intellect, to have known the truth and to have come to a perfect knowledge, perfect, that is, in the light of what a created intelligence can know. He raises an objection to this formulation of the possibilities. If sinless man underwent a learning process, this would mean that he started out ignorant, and ignorance is a consequence of sin. So, the objection continues, and it is the position of Hugh of St. Victor which Peter presents in this way, before the fall Adam possessed perfect knowledge all at once. Peter rejects this argument, and draws a distinction in so doing. The ignorance that is a consequence of sin is ignorance caused by the clouding of man's intellect so that he does not know what he ought to know. The beginning point for sinless man, on the other hand, is not a weakened intellect but one that is not yet as fully knowledgeable as it later could have become. For, it was the divine plan to translate man subsequently to an even better and worthier state, where his knowledge could be fuller and where he could enjoy a celestial and eternal good. Two levels of wisdom and goodness were prepared for man by the creator, a temporal and visible one in Eden and an eternal and invisible one in Heaven. The fact that mental and moral development are part of sinless man's natural capacities is not a defect, just as the physical development of the children he would have engendered is not a defect. As for the specific types of knowledge possessed by man before the fall, he had, according to Peter, the rational capacity to distinguish good from evil. With regard to creatures, he knew that they were created, that they were created for man to rule and enjoy, and that they yield a knowledge of the providence of God. These forms of knowledge, he adds, man retained after the fall. But Adam also had a more direct mode of knowing God, through an inner aspiration which enabled him to perceive the presence of God. This knowledge, Peter holds, is not as great as the face to face vision of God enjoyed by the saints in the life to come, but it was a knowledge that was direct and immediate, not through a glass darkly, as men currently know God in this life. Further, Adam had self-knowledge. He knew who he was, his place in the scheme of things, what his duties were, what to do and what to avoid, which, as Peter observes, made him responsible for what he did in the fall. Adam, however, did not have foreknowledge of the fall or of anything else.²⁰⁵

If Peter departs from Hugh of St. Victor's analysis of man's knowledge before the fall, he also departs from the tripartite analy-

²⁰⁵ Ibid., c. 5-d. 23. c. 4, 1: 131-50.

sis of his faculties given by Hugh and, indeed, from the Platonized or Aristotelianized faculty psychology found in other scholastics of this period. According to Peter, the soul of man has two faculties. There is an inferior power in his soul (*vis animae inferior*), which man shares with the animals and which he uses to regulate the body and sensible matters and the disposition of temporal things. There is also reason (*ratio*), the superior mental faculty, which is the intelligence that enables us to grasp higher things, whether rational or contemplative. The first or sensual soul he calls *anima* and the intellectual soul he calls *ratio*.²⁰⁶ Thus far, the twelfth-century thinker to whom he comes the closest is William of Champeaux, although William calls the latter faculty *spiritus*. But Peter does not add on a special suprarational faculty as William does. His handling of the structure of the soul appears to be all his own, in this period.

If critical of Hugh and of other contemporaries in this regard, Peter agrees substantially with Hugh and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* in handling the free will and moral capacities of prelapsarian man, and uses much the same language as they do. He maintains, as they do, that free will is the natural rational capacity to choose either good or evil without restraint, and that the choice of good is assisted by grace, in Adam before the fall, just as it is in the case of the angels. With these Victorine masters, he argues for a grace of creation, which enables Adam to resist evil but not to perfect himself in good. In order to win merit and to attain the fullest virtue of which he was capable, Adam needed cooperating grace as well. Peter draws a distinction in his discussion of Adam's need for both created and cooperating grace which amplifies on the Victorine account. The former mode of grace is not the same as the operating grace that liberates fallen man from slavery to sin. Rather, it prepares Adam to receive the cooperating grace which man needs, both before and after the fall, to develop virtue and merit. Thus, while Peter calls the virtues Adam possessed before the fall cardinal virtues, these are not understood as the cardinal virtues available to the virtuous pagans, an ethical category which neither Peter nor his Victorine sources here acknowledges to exist. For Peter, as for Hugh, the *Summa sententiarum*, and, ultimately, Augustine, man before the fall faced no impediment to the doing of the good, and nothing impelled him to do evil. The divine aid he needed in order to do good efficaciously and meritoriously was available to him. But, the only efficacious moral choice which man

²⁰⁶ Ibid., d. 24. c. 4–c. 5, 1: 453–54.

could make purely on the basis of his natural rational endowment of free will was the choice of evil.²⁰⁷

THE FALL: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

This brings us to the last major topic dealt with the Lombard in Book 2 of the *Sentences* which we plan to treat in this chapter and which we need to understand in the light of contemporary analyses, the fall itself and the effects and transmission of original sin. These issues elicited wide interest in the first half of the twelfth century and inspired a notable variety of answers.²⁰⁸ In outlining the scenario of the fall, in describing the motivation of Adam and Eve, and in considering whether one of these offenders was a worse sinner than the other, there is, indeed, considerable disagreement. Some theologians, like the author of the *Sententie Anselmi*, Honorius, Hugh of St. Victor, and Roland of Bologna, begin the story with the motivation of the devil as an exterior source of temptation, seeing him as inspired by envy of man and malice toward man.²⁰⁹ Roland observes that the devil assumes the form of a serpent because serpents inspire fear. He raises but fails to answer the question of why Eve was not afraid of the serpent or surprised to hear it speak.²¹⁰ Other masters begin with the internal temptations experienced by the first parents or by man generically, or treat them as simultaneous with the devil's external temptation. The authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum* opt for disobedience here,²¹¹ Honorius adding vainglory and Roland adding pride, and both treating the interior and exterior temptation as simultaneous.²¹² Robert of Melun is unique in seeing original sin as inspired by concupiscence, although he, like everyone else in this period, holds that this failing is a consequence of original sin more generally.²¹³

²⁰⁷ Ibid., c. 1–c. 2, d. 25. c. 1–d. 29. c. 2, 1: 450–52, 461–93.

²⁰⁸ Excellent surveys are provided by Robert Blomme, *La doctrine du péché dans les écoles théologiques de la première moitié du XII^e siècle* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1958); Odon Lottin, "Les théories du péché originel au XII^e siècle: I. L'école d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Champeaux," *RTAM* 11 (1939): 17–32; "Les théories du péché originel au XII^e siècle: II. La réaction abélardienne et porrétaïne," *RTAM* 12 (1940): 78–103; "Les théories du péché originel au XII^e siècle: III. Tradition augustinienne," *RTAM* 12 (1940): 236–74. These three papers of Lottin are reworked in his *Psych. et morale*, 4 part 1: 13–170.

²⁰⁹ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 60; Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.83–84, p. 376; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.7.1–2, *PL* 176: 287B–D; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 116–18.

²¹⁰ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 118.

²¹¹ *Sent. div.* 3.1, p. 39*; *Summa sent.* 3.14, *PL* 176: 111A.

²¹² Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.94, p. 377; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 116.

²¹³ This position is found in a portion of Robert's treatise that remains un-

Most contemporary masters break down the internal motivations to sin, assigning different ones to Adam and to Eve. Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux find Eve guilty of avarice, in the sense of the desire to know, and idolatry, in the sense of her seeking to be God's equal, the author of the *Sententie Anselmi* adding that she is culpable as well of gluttony and of tempting Adam.²¹⁴ Hugh of St. Victor sees her basic temptation as that of doubt. It is Eve's intellectual curiosity that leads in turn to her pride, avarice, and gluttony.²¹⁵ Robert Pullen has no comment on Eve's motivations, but has a clear if narrow and politically conceived theory of how Adam went wrong. Adam, according to Robert, was the ruler in Eden. As head of the household he was responsible for keeping his wife, as his subject, in line. His sin, then, was not preventing Eve from sinning and failing to use his authority appropriately.²¹⁶ To the sin of a ruler giving in to his subject the author of the *Sententie Anselmi* adds to the bill of attainder against Adam both love and the desire for knowledge. To this he attaches six other sins of which he holds Adam guilty, pride, sacrilege, homicide in the sense that his fall brought death to mankind, fornication in the sense of spiritual infidelity to God, theft, and avarice. He thereby blurs the distinction between the causes and consequences of original sin.²¹⁷ But love alone, and the placing of his love for Eve over his duty to God, is the most popular description of Adam's motivation, attracting the support of William of Champeaux, Honorius, and Hugh of St. Victor.²¹⁸

Despite the detail into which they go in assigning these motivations, and despite their possession of a theory of the psychogenesis of moral decision-making, it is noteworthy how few of these theologians integrate their general psychology of sin with their analysis of the fall in any way. The school of Laon sets the tone for what would become a widely held view, derived from Jerome and Augustine, that distinguishes temptation (*suggestio*), whether inner or outer, from contemplation of the sin toward which the temptation points

edited. We are indebted to the information supplied from the study of the manuscripts by Raymond-M. Martin, "Les idées de Robert de Melun sur le péché originel," *RSPT* 7 (1913): 700-25; 8 (1914): 439-66; 9 (1920): 103-20; 11 (1922): 390-415.

²¹⁴ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4, pp. 25-26; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 246, 5: 203; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 60-66.

²¹⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.7.10, *PL* 176: 290C-291B.

²¹⁶ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.21-22, *PL* 186: 748B-750A.

²¹⁷ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 60-66.

²¹⁸ *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 246, 5: 203; Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.91, p. 377; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.7.10, *PL* 176: 290C-291B.

(*delectatio*), and from the voluntary capitulation to the temptation (*consensus*), in which sin is seen to reside, whether or not the intention is expressed in external action.²¹⁹ But the masters of that school do not bring this doctrine to bear on their analysis of original sin. The only two contemporary theologians who do so, prior to Peter Lombard, are the authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum*. The former master observes that sin can be viewed as consisting in will or consent, or in operation. He does not clarify which of these modes constitutes the essence of the moral act.²²⁰ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* gives a clearer and more elaborate analysis. Sin, he observes, involves a failure to participate in good as well as a participation in evil. The evil involved can be of the body or of the soul, or both. In either case, both a bad intention and its translation into an evil action are required. Following Isidore of Seville, he holds that the bad will inspiring these intentions and actions can spring from either desire or fear. Sins, he continues, can be committed against oneself, one's neighbor, or God. He attaches to this point, by way of conclusion, the seven deadly sins or seven vicious intentionalities, following Gregory the Great's classification, and agrees with Gregory that pride is the worst of the lot.²²¹ This account, indeed, may even tell the reader more than he needs to know in order to understand the psychology of Adam and Eve in the fall.

Especially for those theologians who assign different motives to Adam and Eve, a related topic on which there was a wealth of patristic disagreement that is reflected in twelfth-century discussions was the question of which of the primal pair was the worse sinner. After ventilating both sides of the controversy, the author of the *Sententie Anselmi* names Adam as the greater sinner. Since Eve was less intelligent and more credulous than Adam, he holds that she was deceived, while Adam sinned deliberately, with his eyes wide open. This solution appeals, for the same reasons, to other masters such as Roland of Bologna, who also thinks that Eve is intellectually inferior to Adam.²²² Whether or not they see Eve's inferiority as mental, physical, or both, a larger number of masters subscribe to the view that she bore a heavier weight of responsibility in the fall. Neither Anselm of Laon, his followers, Abelard, nor Robert Pullen sees Eve's alleged credulity as an extenuating cir-

²¹⁹ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 85–86; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 278; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 454, 523, 5: 73–74, 222, 304–05, 346.

²²⁰ *Sent. div.* 3.1, p. 39*.

²²¹ *Summa sent.* 3.14–16, *PL* 176: 111A–114C.

²²² *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 60–66; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 125–29.

cumstance. Instead, they give her the full blame for seeking equality with God, which, in their view, was more serious than anything Adam did in the fall.²²³ Some of those who emphasize Eve's guilt feel a need to address the question of why original sin is nevertheless called the sin of Adam. Robert Pullen invokes his political understanding of the relationship of Adam and Eve here. Since Adam is the authority in charge, he has to assume responsibility for the crimes of his underlings; Eve, from Robert's perspective, has to be seen as a minor or as a legal incompetent incapable of assuming responsibility for her own actions.²²⁴ William of Champeaux, for his part, offers an explanation that draws on biology as well as law. The male sex is superior (*dignior*) not only because filiation and inheritance are determined by association with the male line, but also because the male seed is the active principle in the conception of offspring.²²⁵

There are three other positions that seek to mediate between these extremes. The Porretan view is that both sides of the debate have merit. Eve can be seen as bearing a greater guilt in that she sinned against both God and Adam, while Adam sinned only against God. Adam can be seen as being more guilty because he sinned more knowingly. Our author finds it possible to support both of these analyses without choosing between them.²²⁶ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* is more decisive. After reviewing the two positions, framed in the same way as the Porretan master presents them, he provides a solution based on an analogy. If a cleric and a layman commit the same kind of crime, he notes, the cleric is regarded as incurring a greater degree of guilt. In the case of Adam and Eve, he thinks that their guilt in the fall was equal, but that we can impute guilt to Adam more heavily. He argues for this conclusion not on the basis of sexism but on the basis of Isidore of Seville's point that sins of deliberation are worse than sins of ignorance.²²⁷ This is an ingenious answer, and one not without influence. It is also one that departs from Hugh of St. Victor's handling of the problem. Harking back to the point that Eve's temptation was the desire for knowledge and Adam's temptation was the love of his

²²³ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4, pp. 25–26; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 262; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.21–22, *PL* 186: 748A–750B; Peter Abelard, *Hex.*, pp. 70–72, 77. For Abelard's position, see McLaughlin, "Abelard and the Dignity of Women," pp. 306–08; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 42–44.

²²⁴ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.21–22, *PL* 186: 748A–750B.

²²⁵ *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 252, 5: 205–06.

²²⁶ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.64–66, p. 172.

²²⁷ *Summa sent.* 3.6, *PL* 176: 98B–C.

wife, Hugh states that it is impossible to say that either sin was worse than the other. Since we all possess both the intellectual and the affective faculties, we should view the fall of Adam and Eve not as two separate falls but as two facets of the same delict that occurs whenever any moral subject makes sinful use of free will.²²⁸

The nature of the forbidden fruit is also a subject exercising some early twelfth-century masters. Did God forbid the fruit because the fruit was itself noxious? And, why would He have wanted to bar Adam and Eve from the knowledge of good and evil? Both Anselm of Laon, the author of the *Sententie Anselmi* and Robert of Melun agree that the fruit was not intrinsically harmful. In their estimation, God forbade it to Adam and Eve not because the fruit, or the knowledge it stands for, would have been bad for them but rather as a test of obedience.²²⁹ Honorius concurs with the idea that the fruit was not harmful but worries more about the knowledge of good and evil connected with it in the text of Genesis. Following Augustine, he argues that this knowledge lay not in the tree or its fruit but, in part, in the transgression of God's orders. Adam and Eve did have a knowledge of good before they sinned; but, in their fall, they acquired the knowledge of evil as well.²³⁰

Honorius also raises two other questions concerning the fall as an event, to which he gives elaborate answers. When, he asks, did the fall take place? In response, he offers a detailed timetable of events during the sixth day of creation. Adam was created in the third hour of that day, Eve in the sixth hour. She was tempted within sixty minutes of her creation and had accomplished the temptation of Adam by the end of the seventh hour. For reasons best known to Honorius, God waited until the ninth hour of the sixth day to eject them from Eden. As for the flaming sword wielded by the angel left on guard after that time, Honorius follows Augustine on Genesis in reading this passage allegorically. The angel's sword stands for the wall of fire with which God surrounded Eden, as well as for two ranks of angels, one deputed to block man's body and the other deputed to block man's soul from returning to paradise.²³¹ Judging from the lack of resonance of these two points later in the century, we can conclude that other theologians in this period found Honorius's specificity on the timing of the fall fanciful and unnecessary

²²⁸ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.7.10, *PL* 176: 290C–291B.

²²⁹ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 25, 58; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.19, *PL* 186: 746C–D.

²³⁰ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.87, p. 376.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 1.90–91, p. 377.

and his sources insufficiently trustworthy, and also that they preferred a literal reading of the angelic guardian despite the Augustinian foundation for Honorius's account.

The Lombard on the Fall

Peter Lombard's handling of the fall shows him at his most eclectic. He does not regard any theologian or group of theologians either as his chief inspiration or as presenting the doctrine most in need of refutation. His own answers to the questions he poses can be found in a range of current and recent masters, from whom he borrows freely and selectively. He is less likely to rephrase their ideas in his own vocabulary here than is true of the teachings he presents elsewhere in Book 2 of the *Sentences*. To this mix of opinions Peter adds some reflections of his own. He also adds, it must be said, two self-contradictions, to which we will call special attention since this is a phenomenon quite unusual in his work. Agreeing with Honorius, the author of the *Sententie Anselmi*, Roland of Bologna, and Hugh of St. Victor, Peter sees the events leading up to the fall as having been triggered by external temptation, in the form of the devil's envy. In explaining why the devil tempted Eve first, Peter introduces his first major inconsistency. Notwithstanding his account of the creation of all human beings in the image as well as the likeness of God, and despite his assertion, later in his discussion of the fall, that Adam and Eve are equal in nature, he states that Eve was approached first because she was less rational than Adam.²³² He does not appear to be aware of this discrepancy or of the need to justify this departure from what he says elsewhere on the same subject. In dealing with the devil's assumption of the body of a serpent, Peter is less interested in why this particular animal was chosen than in the observation that, since the devil is a spiritual being, he needed to take on physical form of some sort in order to make his appearance to Eve and that God permitted him to do so, although he concedes that the nature of serpents makes this decision appropriate.²³³ Accenting the devil's duplicitous rhetoric, the Lombard notes that the devil appealed to the internal temptations of vainglory, gluttony, and avarice in Eve's case, agreeing here with the school of Laon. As with its earlier advocates in that school, he sees avarice as the greed for knowledge, beyond what was appropriate (*supra modum*). It is here, in the very context

²³² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 21. c. 1, 1: 433.

²³³ *Ibid.*, c. 2–c. 4, 1: 433–35.

of describing the capitulation of Eve to these temptations, that he joins the authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum* in offering a brief account of the psychogenesis of moral acts, agreeing with the Laon masters that the *suggestio* may be internal or external and that it is not temptation itself or contemplation of the temptation that constitutes the sin but *consensus*, a position which he himself had developed earlier in his commentary on the Psalms.²³⁴ Before moving to the consideration of the mode of temptation experienced by Adam, and of whether Adam or Eve sinned more grievously, he reprises an issue which he had already addressed, and in a far more persuasive way, under the heading of the fall of the angels earlier in Book 2, thereby committing his second act of inconsistency. The fact that the devil experienced no external temptation in his own fall, unlike Adam and Eve, is why he cannot be saved, Peter says here.²³⁵ It is not at all clear why he feels a need to reintroduce the fall of the angels at this point, and even less clear why he contradicts the far better answer to the question of why the fallen angels are unredeemable which he had given above.

Moving on to the different temptations of Adam and Eve and whether their guilt in the fall is also differential, he begins by agreeing with Hugh of St. Victor that the source of Eve's inner temptation was pride manifesting itself in the lust for knowledge that would make her the equal of God, and with Hugh, Honorius, and William of Champeaux that Adam's temptation was love for his wife, which caused him to depart from his obedience from God in order to please her. On the question of whose guilt was weightier, Peter feels that there is something to be said on both sides of the issue. He agrees with the author of the *Summa sententiarum* that responsibility for the fall can be imputed more strongly to Adam. But he does not think Adam and Eve were equally guilty. Rather, he sides with the theologians who place heavier blame on Eve, seeing the sin of presumption as more serious than anything Adam did. But, Peter now states, Eve cannot be excused on grounds of ignorance. She had the same nature as Adam and the same understanding of the rules which God had laid down. It would be correct to say that sin was brought into the world by a single person, Eve, even if Adam had not fallen.²³⁶ How, then, can we combine this belief that Eve was more blameworthy with the weightier imputation of sin to Adam? Peter's argument is grounded on the under-

²³⁴ Ibid., c. 5–c. 6.3, l: 436–37. See above, chapter 3, p. 214.

²³⁵ Ibid., d. 22. c. 1, l: 439–40.

²³⁶ Ibid., c. 3–c. 4, l: 441–45.

standing of ignorance, and of the faculties of the soul, which he next provides, arguments which are also unique to him, among contemporaries who take up this topic, and who also tend to bring it up in other contexts. First, Peter notes that we can distinguish between invincible ignorance, in a case where a person does not know the rules, and which excuses him from blame, and vincible ignorance, for which we are morally responsible. Vincible ignorance can be divided, in turn, into the failure to learn what we need to know when we are able to learn it, and the desire to know what we need to know when we are unable to do so. The latter is a punishment for sin. Now, neither Adam nor Eve displays invincible ignorance. Nor does either of them act in a state of vincible ignorance, of either of the two types just noted. Their sin was activated, rather, by their conscious consent, deriving from their created nature as beings possessing free will. Agreeing with the author of the *Summa sententiarum* that moral choices involve both consent and its expression in action, he departs from that master in giving both moral and psychological priority to intentionality: "It was the act of will itself that constituted the sin" (*et ipsa voluntas iniquitas fuit*).²³⁷ As to why God created human beings capable of willing evil, this is ultimately a mystery, for Peter. He declines to speculate, stating that only God Himself knows His own reasons (*Ipse novit*), and that we cannot know them.²³⁸

Having eliminated any extenuating conditions in Eve's culpability for sin by this analysis of ignorance, Peter now goes on to explain that the imputation of greater guilt to Adam can be justified by a consideration of the faculties of the human soul. Earlier, as we have seen, he had stated that there are two faculties of the human soul, *anima* or the sensual faculty and *ratio* or the rational faculty. He now subdivides *ratio* into two functions, *scientia*, which seeks knowledge for its own sake, and *sapientia*, which seeks wisdom by placing knowledge in the perspective of man's ultimate destiny. We now have three terms; and the three characters in the story of the fall, Adam, Eve, and the serpent, each represent one of the terms. The serpent stands for the movement of the sensual soul, Eve for *scientia*, and Adam for *sapientia*. Further, the marriage of Adam and Eve signifies the principle that the higher form of reason should govern the lower. The severity of a sin, Peter explains, depends on which mental faculty is involved. If one consents to the promptings of the sensual soul, the sin is quite venial (*levissimum*). If

²³⁷ Ibid., c. 5–c. 6, 1: 446–47. The quotation is at c. 6, p. 447.

²³⁸ Ibid., d. 23. c. 1, 1: 447–48.

one consents with *scientia*, then the sin is more serious. If one consents with *sapientia*, one capitulates completely to an evil which one fully recognizes to be evil. This is a mortal and damnable sin. From this standpoint, Eve's sin is less serious than Adam's since it springs from *scientia* and reflects the desire to enjoy knowledge for its own sake. In failing to govern that desire with the faculty of *sapientia* on Eve's part, and on his own, Adam commits a sin that is mortal for both of them. Closing with a reprise of the psychogenesis of sin in *suggestio*, *cogitatio*, and *consensus*, Peter suggests, by means of this analysis of faculty psychology, that consent, while equally voluntary in each case, may occur at both the *scientia* or *sapientia* levels of man's reason, with differing ethical consequences.²³⁹ And, he can argue that it is possible to combine the doctrine of Eve's greater culpability on account of her greater presumption with the doctrine that Adam bears the greater guilt, on the grounds that his consent was of a quality that took more things into account than Eve's did. Peter imputes greater guilt to Adam not because of Eve's ignorance, as does the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, for he denies that she possessed ignorance, whether vincible or invincible. Nor does Peter impute greater guilt to Adam because of his extrinsic status vis-à-vis Eve, as is the case with Robert Pullen, but because of what Adam actually did do. And, unlike Hugh of St. Victor, his citation of two mental faculties from which the sins of Adam and Eve derive is not designed to equalize their culpability but rather to find a basis for grading them hierarchically.²⁴⁰

If it is the Victorines who help Peter to frame the agenda which he then addresses in his own way in the foregoing part of his analysis, Honorius is the theologian who triggers his handling of the forbidden fruit and the knowledge of good and evil. Peter offers an explanation of this subject which goes beyond the biblical account in Genesis. There were really two trees at issue, he argues. One is the tree bearing the forbidden fruit, which, he agrees, was forbidden not because it was harmful but as a test of obedience. He cites the same Augustinian text as Honorius uses in arguing that the knowledge of evil lay in and flowed from original sin, while the knowledge of good was available to Adam and Eve before the fall, irrespective of what they ate.²⁴¹ In Peter's opinion, the tree of life

²³⁹ Ibid., d. 24. c. 6–c. 12, 1: 455–60.

²⁴⁰ Mignon, *Les origines*, 2: 33 takes up the relationship of the Lombard on original sin to both Hugh and the *Summa sententiarum* without noticing these differences.

²⁴¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 17. c. 7.1–2, d. 29. c. 4, 1: 415–16, 494.

was another tree in the garden of Eden. This tree was not forbidden. There is no reason to suppose that Adam and Eve could not have eaten of its fruit before the fall. If they did so, the reason why it did not render them immortal that Peter gives here is that they did not have the time to eat of it frequently enough for this effect to have taken hold.²⁴² Another answer which he could have given here, and which he does not give, is that the decision to eat the forbidden fruit which brought on the fall also brought on mortality as one of its consequences, a doctrine that serves to point us toward the last constellation of topics to be considered in relation to original sin, its effects and transmission.

THE EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

In the first half of the twelfth century there were three main ways of viewing the effects of original sin. One, represented most strongly by Robert Pullen, emphasized the physical consequences of sin. It is true that Robert holds that the soul is affected as well, in that it knows that it has rejected the good and thereby suffers; this self-consciousness of its own fall constitutes its punishment. But the main way in which the soul suffers is that it is united to a body that is now much more limited than it was before the fall. Despite the lengthy analysis of sensation which he provides, Robert does not comment on if, or how, man's ability to obtain true knowledge by means of the senses is included in this limitation. Rather, he accents the physical ills and sufferings to which the flesh is now heir. Mortality, sickness, pain, sensitivity to cold and heat, and a host of bodily afflictions are catalogued. Robert includes sexual concupiscence on the list. Man is now subject to sexual desire and sexual pleasure. Also, and here Robert follows the extremely late and anti-Pelagian Augustine on sex, man's sexuality now involves physical corruption in that it works with vitiated seeds; the very genetic materials have been tainted.²⁴³ Another theologian who accents the physical consequences of original sin, in this case so

²⁴² Ibid., d. 29. c. 6, 1: 495.

²⁴³ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.7–8, 2.25, 2.27–31, *PL* 186: 727D–731A, 752B–753C, 754A–764C. For the Augustinian background and its parallels with Manicheism, a charge that Augustine's Pelagian antagonists were all too ready to hurl against him in this connection, see Elizabeth A. Clark, "Vitiated Seeds and Holy Vessels: Augustine's Manichean Past," in *Ascetic Piety and Women's Faith: Essays on Late Ancient Christianity* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), pp. 291–349.

strongly that he all but ignores the intellectual ones, is the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*.²⁴⁴

A second view, taught by the Porretans but more influentially by Hugh of St. Victor and modified by Robert of Melun, emphasized the idea that original sin afflicts the soul and body equally.²⁴⁵ In Hugh's formulation of this doctrine, the chief spiritual weakness borne by fallen man is ignorance, while his body is afflicted by concupiscence. Robert agrees, and nuances this position. Instead of knowledge, there is ignorance. Instead of love of the good, there is concupiscence, which, he explains, means inordinate and misdirected love of any kind. Instead of trouble-free physical activity, there is illness, pain, and death, and the need for labor and effort. Man also suffers from the weakening of his will. Robert sees concupiscence here as the inclination to sin, in general, not so much as a result of the physical limitations under which fallen man labors but because of the spiritual disorder he has now contracted, an inclination of the will toward evil.

The members of the school of Laon also see man as afflicted intellectually by the fall and as suffering the standard physical sufferings; but they emphasize the depression of free will as the primary consequence of original sin. Agreeing with the late Augustine here, they hold that free will has now been so diminished that fallen man cannot will anything but evil without the help of divine grace.²⁴⁶ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* endorses this emphasis of the school of Laon on the depression of the will in fallen man and its consequent inability to will the good without grace. Following the definition of free will *a necessitate*, *a peccato*, and *a miseria* found in the Laon masters and Bernard of Clairvaux, he explains that the freedom from sin and from misery have now been withdrawn. At the same time, he emphasizes the point that the freedom of will *a necessitate* remains in fallen man, leaving him free to reject God's grace. He stresses the depression of the will so heavily that it becomes, for him, the single most important consequence of the fall, far outstripping the effects that original sin may have on the body or on man's ability to know.²⁴⁷ It is with this third

²⁴⁴ *Sent. div.* 3.1, p. 42*.

²⁴⁵ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.55, p. 170; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.7.27, *PL* 176: 291A; Robert of Melun, *Sent.* 1.1.18, *Oeuvres*, 3 part 1: 208–09.

²⁴⁶ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 27–28, 66–67; *Sentences of Probable Authenticity*, no. 114; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 245; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 322, 324, 335, 5: 93, 201–02, 253, 254, 260; *Deus hominem fecit perfectum*, ed. Heinrich Weisweiler in *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in deutschen Bibliotheken*, Beiträge, 33:1–2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), p. 294.

²⁴⁷ *Summa sent.* 3.7–9, *PL* 176: 99C–105A.

view, the virtually preclusive understanding of the effects of original sin as directed to man's soul and, *a fortiori*, to his free will, that Peter Lombard most closely aligns himself.

The Lombard's Position

So strongly does Peter accent the depression of free will that it is actually the only effect of original sin which he discusses in any detail. He places it above and beyond all other punishments fallen man may incur. Although fallen man retains a conscience (*scintilla rationis*) urging him to seek the good and avoid evil, free will is partly lost, in the fall, and what remains is weakened. Peter's treatment of this topic sharpens the late Augustinianism of its terms, in comparison with contemporaries, although, with the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, he staunchly resists the idea that the will cannot reject grace. Augustine's doctrine of irresistible grace finds no hearing in his theology.²⁴⁸ Peter begins by reprising the distinction among *libertas a necessitate*, *a peccato*, and *a miseria* and indicates how much he thinks free will in any of these respects remains in fallen man. Freedom from any necessity at all was a feature of the human will before the fall. This mode of free will, Peter states, going farther on this point than is conceded by the author of the *Summa sententiarum* or the Laon masters, now applies to no one but God, Who has perfect freedom. Man no longer enjoys the capacity to exercise free will without any constraints or conditions. We retain only enough free will to be able to earn punishment or reward, for "where there is no liberty, or will, there is no merit" (*ubi non est libertas, nec voluntas, et ideo nec meritum*). Freedom from sin has been obliterated by the fall. This freedom from sin, Peter notes, is what is restored in the redemption of man by grace,

²⁴⁸ Scholars who have noted both the influence and the criticism of Augustine here include Peter Iver Kaufman, "Charitas non est nisi a Spiritui Sancto": Augustine and Peter Lombard on Grace and Personal Righteousness," *Augustiniana* 30 (1980): 209–20; Schupp, *Die Gnadenlehre*, passim and esp. pp. 287–302; Pietro Vaccari, "Rapporti della concezione teologica di Pier Lombardo col diritto canonico del XII secolo," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 258–59; A. Vanneste, "Nature et grâce dans la théologie du douzième siècle," *ETL* 50 (1974): 184–214. Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle*, p. 225, has not noticed Peter's rejection of irresistible grace here. Other studies surveying the treatment of grace and free will in the twelfth century include Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 1 part 1: 51–140, 152–54, 189–96, 220–37; Lottin, *Psych. et morale*, 1: 12–31; Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1: 43–76. On conscience, see Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2, d. 39, c. 3.3, 1:556; Odon Lottin, "Les premiers linéaments du traité de la syndérèse au moyen âge," *Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie* 28 (1926): 422–59.

collaborating with the will. In the redeemed, this state coincides with the freedom to will evil as well. Peter gives careful consideration to the point made by Augustine in his *Enchiridion*, that, when man is redeemed, his free will is his will freed by grace to do the good. He contradicts it, citing Augustine's *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, where he finds a preferable solution: In redeemed man, he concludes, the will is always free but not always good. As for freedom from misery, this freedom is also lost in the fall. Man possessed it before the fall and he will possess it even more fully in the state of future beatitude. But, in the present life, no one has it. In sum, Peter argues that man retains free will only in part after the fall. It is a will that is not equally free in willing good and evil. It is freer in willing good when it has been aided by grace than it is in willing evil when it has not been redeemed, and freer in willing evil on its own account than in willing good, since it cannot will the good unless grace assists it. The grace involved is both prevenient, or operating grace, which empowers the will and prepares man to will the good, and cooperating grace, which collaborates with the will in so doing. Peter makes a full stop short of the late Augustinian doctrine that prevenient grace cannot be refused and, despite the wealth of Augustinian references with which he documents the position he expounds, he never cites any of the Augustinian texts in which irresistible grace is mentioned.²⁴⁹

As Peter continues to expand on this doctrine, he fleshes out the position which he had first stated in his Romans commentary. Another way to understand the subject, he observes, is to view operating grace as the faith that works in love, without which no one earns merit. Faith, from this perspective, is not merely intellectual assent to theological propositions or to the authority of the person proposing them. It also involves both the gift of grace enabling a person to commit himself and the desire to believe stemming from his own good will. This good will, Peter emphasizes, is prevenient to faith not by time, but by nature, as its cause. So, one has desire and good will, which are necessary components of the positive reception of the operating grace that in turn enables one to have the faith that justifies, that is, the faith working in love with the continuing assistance of cooperating grace. Although nothing done before the reception of grace is meritorious with respect to man's salvation, moral acts done with the assistance of grace do add to man's merit. The only things that fallen man can do by free

²⁴⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 25. c. 7–c. 8.11, 1: 465–69. The quotation is at c. 8.2, p. 466. See also *Sermo* 4, *PL* 171: 357C–D. Good treatments of this doctrine are found in Schupp, *Die Gnadenlehre*, pp. 37–40, 68–69, 90–105.

will alone are actions that, while they may be constructive, are ethically neutral, such as building a house or cultivating a field. In response to the theory that two different graces are at work in operating and cooperating grace, Peter argues that it is a single grace which has two different effects. This understanding of grace as an effect of God, or as an effect of the Holy Spirit in the distribution of His charisms, and not as an immanent participation of God in man or as a divinization of man, undergirds the analysis of grace and merit with which Peter concludes his discussion of free will in man as fallen and as justified. On the one hand, he sees grace as the initiation of any goodness and merit that man can acquire; and it comes from God alone. Grace is the principal cause of merit in that it excites the free will, healing and aiding it so that it becomes a good will. On the other hand, this generic grace as well as the specific gifts of the Holy Spirit are activated in us by our free will, which grace does not exclude but rather empowers. The virtues and merits which this collaboration makes possible thus become the personal moral attributes of the human being whose free will is their agency.²⁵⁰ What the Lombard has done here, and this can be seen by a careful examination of the Augustinian texts which he cites so profusely on free will and grace, is to draw on the anti-Manichean Augustine on free will as well as the anti-Pelagian Augustine on grace. Peter adds to Augustine the testimony of the Pseudo-Chrysostom. He thus arrives at a more balanced position than Augustine had developed in either of these two subdivisions of his oeuvre. The tonality Peter gives to this topic, despite his heavy dependence on Augustine is, finally, less typical of Augustine than it is of the theandric, synergistic relationship of grace and free will found in the Greek patristic tradition.

THE TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

Peter does a better job of resolving contradictions between the positions taken on grace and free will by Augustine at different points in his career than he, or anyone else in his day, could do in the case of the controverted question of the transmission of original sin. The form in which this topic was first put on the agenda of twelfth-century theology owes much to the school of Laon. The

²⁵⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 26. c. 3–c. 8, d. 27. c. 3–d. 28. c. 4, 1: 472–78, 482–91. Peter's use of the Pseudo-Chrysostom is noted by Brady, *Sent.* 1: 482 n. 2. The presence of this tonality in his treatment of grace is missed by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 1 part 2: 44–51.

Laon masters take it up initially not in the context of original sin itself but in the effort to exclude the idea that actual sins are passed on from parent to child, in glossing Ezechiel. None the less, in so doing, they articulate the range of problems attached to this question with which subsequent theologians wrestled manfully. They also expose the contradictions between Augustine's very late anti-Pelagian view of sexuality, his more moderate, pastoral line on this subject dating to the middle of his career, and the intentionalist understanding of ethical acts which he supports, as they do. Aside from Abelard, who rejected the Augustinian understanding of the transmission of original sin in any of its forms, the other theologians of the first half of the twelfth century struggled to sort out the difficulties in the Augustinian legacy from within the Augustinian tradition. However problematic they found it, none of them, including the Lombard, was able to find a satisfactory substitute for it.²⁵¹ In this respect, and while agreeing that it was necessary to refute Abelard, the major motivation in Peter's handling of the transmission of original sin was to try to make the best of an argument that had its acknowledged weaknesses but which he did not feel able to dismiss. Instead, he aims at clarifying it and shoring it up as best he can.

As the Laon masters lay out the problem, parents convey to their offspring the guilt (*reatus*) of original sin, the penalty (*poena*) of mortality and affliction which sin brings upon mankind, and the spark of future sin (*fomes peccati*) or inclination to sin that leads to actual sin. Some members of the school adhere to the anti-Pelagian argument of Augustine that the fall produced physical corruption and that man now engenders progeny with vitiated seeds, on the model of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. This corruption of the genetic materials is confined to the male seed by William of Champeaux, who follows Aristotle in viewing the male seed as the active principle in conception; other Laon masters regard the female body as just as corrupted.²⁵² Still other members of the school do not see the problem as lying in vitiated seeds, but rather in the sexual desire and pleasure that accompany the conception of offspring. But, this theory entails two problems. Augustine says, in his later works, that the sexual relations between spouses are always at least venially sinful; and some Laon masters agree with this view. But others note that believing parents, whose own origi-

²⁵¹ A good overview is provided by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 4 part 1: 155–85.

²⁵² *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 251; *Antequam quicquam fieret Deus erat* 5, in *Sentences of the School of Laon*, 5: 205, 336; *Deus hominem fecit perfectum*, pp. 295–96.

nal sin has been washed away by baptism, and who have been united in the sacrament of marriage, for the sake of whose goods, one of which is offspring, they are having sexual relations, do not sin thereby, even though these relations may, unavoidably, involve lust. Now, in the case of the first position, how can the lust experienced by the parents in the act of conception inhere in the body of the fetus conceived thereby, given that the fetus, at its current stage of development, is physically incapable of feeling lust? How can that fetus be taxed for the feelings that other people experience? The masters who argue that original sin is transmitted by the concupiscence of the parents offer no real answers to these questions.²⁵³ As for those who think that the parents' sex life is not sinful, they, too, grapple with the question of how their upright moral activity in this respect can convey sin to their children. The response to this question is that the fetus is not married and therefore lacks the exemption with respect to sexual feelings that applies to its parents, an answer which still fails to acknowledge the fact that the fetus, in any case, is incapable of experiencing these sexual feelings and, *a fortiori*, is incapable of contracting a marriage.²⁵⁴

As a refinement on this last argument, some Laon masters add the Augustinian point that parents, even if purified by baptism and cleansed of their own original sin, none the less pass on corrupted flesh to their children, using such examples as the circumcised father who sires a son born with a foreskin, or a hulled grain of wheat engendering wheat that has a hull,²⁵⁵ examples that have the effect of undercutting the vitiated seeds idea because in these cases an altered state of being is not passed on to the offspring. Despite all these problems, the Laon masters agree with Augustine that it is the bodies of children that are engendered with sinful characteristics because their parents necessarily engender those bodies sexually. But this brings another difficulty in its train. Rejecting

²⁵³ *Potest queri, quid sit peccatum; Deus hominem fecit perfectum*, pp. 265–68, 295–96; Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 32–35, 71–78; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 28; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon from the Liber Pancrisis*, no. 43–46, 5: 29–30, 38–43.

²⁵⁴ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 32–35, 71–78; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 29–30; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon from the Liber Pancrisis*, no. 43–46; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 246–50; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 521, 5: 29–30, 38, 43, 202–05, 336–37; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 259; *Dubitatur quibusdam*, ed. Heinrich Weisweiler in *Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in deutschen Bibliotheken*, Beiträge, 33:1–2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), pp. 323–24.

²⁵⁵ *Deus cuius principio et fine tacetur*, pp. 263–64; *Sentences of Probable Authenticity*, no. 117; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 335, 5: 95, 260.

traducianism, a conviction which implicitly reflects their belief that sin lies not in the body as such but in the voluntary consent of the will,²⁵⁶ they now have to explain how the pure and divinely created souls of infants, souls that are infused into the bodies engendered by their parents, contract original sin. Augustine's answer, which they find themselves perform repeating, is that the corrupted body taints the soul joined to it, just as vinegar ruins the good wine with which it may be mixed.²⁵⁷ How this serves as an analogy of a union of two entities that are not both material substances and that retain their own characteristics in that union is by no means entirely clear.

It is no doubt the problems intrinsic to the Augustinian heritage, which the school of Laon reports so faithfully, as well as his desire to push the principle of intentionalism in ethics as far as he could, that inspire Abelard to offer a counter-argument. He dispenses with the need to explain the transmission of original sin by dropping the idea of original sin itself, in effect reducing original sin to actual sin. Infants, he argues, do not have the powers of judgment and deliberation needed to exercise free will in an informed manner, any more than insane persons do. Only mentally competent persons above the age of discretion are capable of sinning. Augustine was in error here, Abelard asserts. Augustine also erred on the corollary of this point, the damnation of unbaptized infants. Despite this dismissal of original sin, and confusingly so, Abelard thinks that we bear the punishment (*poena*) for Adam's fall, even though we do not bear his guilt (*culpa*), and that children are prone to sin because their parents conceive them in carnal lust. He also agrees that a purified stock can bear tainted fruit.²⁵⁸ Abelard's rejection of original sin proved to be too extreme a solution for all but his most intransigent disciples to accept. He also turns out to be no better than the school of Laon in explaining those vestiges of the Augustin-

²⁵⁶ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 309–10, 5: 244–45; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 259.

²⁵⁷ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine* 4; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 32–35, 71–78; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 29–30; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon from the Liber Pancrisis*, no. 43–46; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 246–50; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 521, 5: 29–30, 38–43, 202–05, 336–37; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 259; *Dubitatur quibusdam*, pp. 323–24.

²⁵⁸ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, ed. and trans. David E. Luscombe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 20–22, 58–64; *In Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 5:19, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 11 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), pp. 164, 166, 170–72. Good discussions of Abelard on original sin are found in Julius Gross, "Abälards Umdeutung des Erbsündendogmas," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 15 (1963): 14–33; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 43–65, 200–02.

ian doctrine of the transmission of original sin that he retains.

A tendency to back away from Abelard and to try to resolve the problem in more Augustinian terms is found even in masters influenced by him in other respects. Roland of Bologna, for instance, does a fairly thorough job of listing the positions that have been taken on the transmission of original sin, and the objections that can be leveled against some of them, before giving his own opinion. He cites Abelard's position and offers no objection to it; but this is not the view to which Roland subscribes himself. Apart from the rejected notion that people cannot sin before the age of discretion and that, therefore, children do not inherit original sin, Roland mentions four other arguments. One is that the sin is transmitted because Adam committed it in Eden. To this, Roland says, no objection is needed because it is just plain silly. One may agree, but one may also observe that a more telling reason for dismissing this argument is that it offers no explanation on how the sin is transmitted. Nor does Roland cite an objection to the analysis by which the guilt (*reatus*) and punishment (*poena*) which Adam's sin incurred for him are extended, by imputation, to other people who have not committed any sin themselves. In the remaining two options Roland offers before presenting his own solution, he does give objections. To the claim that Adam transmitted his fallen nature to his descendants materially, he responds that sin pertains to the soul, and that the parents do not engender the souls of their children. To the claim that original sin is transmitted by the libidinous ardor of the parents, one may object again that the parents do not engender their children's souls and also that the fetus cannot experience carnal concupiscence in the womb. He adds that this theory also does not work because the fetus has no say in the mode by which it is engendered. Roland now moves to articulate his own position. Some say, he notes, that the *fomes peccati* is carnal concupiscence. He supports this idea. He then, however, goes on to define this *fomes* as located in the will and not in man's physical inclinations. Concupiscence, so understood, is the will's tendency to seek the wrong ends in matters pertaining to mind and body alike. This analysis locates original sin in the mind, although it sees original sin as having a different effect on mind and body. In the body, it leads to physical corruption and death. In the mind, it works by the consent it renders to the wrong moral use of both mind and body, and also in the fact that the soul is stained by the corrupt body with which it is now associated.²⁵⁹ In the effort to stress the will as the

²⁵⁹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 128–36.

seat of sin, Roland has forgotten a point which he had raised earlier in his account, the idea that the parents engender only the bodies, and not the souls, of their children. Since he now argues that these pure souls are tainted by their union with corrupt bodies, it is not clear why he rejects the idea that men are all material descendants of Adam, or how that theory really differs from the solution that he adopts.

A similar modification of the Augustinian position in defense of the idea that virtue and vice are located in the mind, not the body, is found in Robert of Melun. He agrees that original sin is transmitted through the sexual concupiscence of the parents, and that its effects include the inclination toward concupiscence in their offspring. But this effect, he argues, derives not from physical corruption or weakness but from the nature of original sin as a spiritual disorder, a spiritual penchant toward evil in all areas. Here, Robert wants to criticize the vitiated seeds theory. He observes that the members of the human race are not contained seminally in Adam, although they are similar to him in soul. But, he cannot explain how the concupiscent spirit gets passed to infants, as a consequence of the sexual feelings which their parents experience physically. Robert's terminology is also a bit out of the ordinary. Most theologians of the day see concupiscence, whether in the narrow sexual sense or in the wider sense of the inclination toward wrong or immoderate desires which Robert gives to the term, as the *fomes peccati*. He, instead, sees it as the punishment for sin. He also raises a new complication, suggesting a greater sensitivity to the nature of human sexuality than most theologians of the time exhibit. Not all sexual acts leading to conception, he notes, are undertaken with the same degree of sexual desire; nor are they all accompanied by the same degree of sexual pleasure. Since he holds that parental ardor is the vehicle for the transmission of original sin, he finds that, if one applies the principle of differential ardor here, one has to conclude that people are afflicted with original sin to different degrees.²⁶⁰ This is an alarming idea, and Robert does nothing to deal with its ethical or sacramental implications, at least not in the part of his *Sentences* which he completed.

If Robert of Melun wants to eliminate the vitiated seeds from the account, as too crypto-Manichean, Robert Pullen rests his case entirely on that very theory, although he grounds it rather narrowly. His argument is integrally related to the virtually preclusive

²⁶⁰ Martin, "Les idées de Robert de Melun," *RSPT* 7: 700–25, 8: 439–66, 9: 103–20, 11: 390–415.

emphasis he places on the corruption of the physical seed as the major bodily consequence of original sin. So, for Robert as well, it is not so much the parents' experience of lust as their vitiated genetic materials which give the fetus a corrupt body, which in turn corrupts the soul attached to it. Thus, children bear the guilt (*reatus*), the punishment (*poena*), and the *fomes peccati* of concupiscence transmitted by the corruption of the flesh.²⁶¹ Here, Robert ignores the objections made in the light of the baptismal and marital grace of the parents and adheres to the hardest of hard line late Augustinianism. In Robert's psychology, it will be remembered, he argues that the parents create the *spiritus* of their offspring. But he does not integrate this traducianist belief into his understanding of the transmission of original sin.

Another mid-century theologian who defends the anti-Pelagian Augustine here is the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. He agrees that the bodies of children are derived substantially from the corrupted flesh of their parents. But he is more circumspect in his handling of this idea than is Robert Pullen. He acknowledges that, in believing parents, baptism has remitted their own guilt. This fact, however, does not alter the changes in their genetic materials that remain, as a consequence of sin. Nor does it alter the fact that their sexual relations are perforce accompanied by lust. The author does not deal with the inability of the fetus to experience sexual desire or sexual pleasure, but moves on to how the corrupt fetal body infects the child's soul. It does so, he says, thanks to its intimate union with the soul. Having raised the question of the baptism of the parents, he pertinently adds the Augustinian argument concerning the hulled wheat and the circumcised father to explain why their redeemed state makes no difference.²⁶²

A much softer line is taken by the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, drawing heavily on the more moderate position articulated by Augustine in pastoral works such as *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*. He argues that, for parents, their baptism remits any guilt they would otherwise bear for the carnal concupiscence involved in their sexual relations. It is not that the ardor accompanying sex is not a consequence of sin and it is not that they can avoid experiencing it. But it is not imputed to them as sinful (*non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non imputetur*). He also argues that the *reatus* of sin is transmitted from parent to child, here combining in this term the guilt and the

²⁶¹ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 2.7–8, 2.25, 2.27–31, *PL* 186: 727D–731A, 752B–753C, 754A–764C.

²⁶² *Summa sent.* 3.10–12, *PL* 176: 105A–110A.

punishment, along with the *poena*, by which latter term he means what other masters mean by the *fomes peccati*. But, having defended the principle that the parents' sexual feelings are not counted as sinful, for them, the author offers no explanation of how that *reatus* and *poena* descend to the children. The closest he comes is to analogize it to a physical defect that can be inherited.²⁶³

Apart from treating the question of traducianism as an open one,²⁶⁴ which Robert's Pullen's teaching has also suggested was actually the case in some quarters, the other Porretan witnesses in our period make no contribution to the debate on the transmission of original sin. But Hugh of St. Victor, who gives the same report on traducianism, provides an analysis which adds a genuinely fresh point to his largely mid-Augustinian handling of that question. Further, his argument connects his position on this subject to his account of the effects of the fall and to the epistemological concerns that inform his treatment of human nature more widely. Hugh is clear in his own mind on where the human soul comes from. It is spiritual not material and it is created by God *ex nihilo*. Hugh's main point here is to stress that God infuses the soul into the body of the fetus after the body has started to develop, anchoring this point with the Exodus rule on causing a miscarriage and when it is accounted homicide. This being the case, he asks, how does the flesh contract and transmit sin and how does the body transfer sin to the soul? Now concupiscence, he reminds the reader, is the chief effect of original sin upon the body just as ignorance is its chief effect upon the soul. For the body, this means a weakened existence, an inability to engage in sexual activity without lust, even as the body now is mortal. Hugh sees the parents as creating the same kind of body in their children as they now have. He avoids the vitiated seeds idea but suggests, rather, that it is the limited fleshly endowment they have to pass on, and not the fact that they have experienced sexual desire or pleasure in engendering children, that defines the parental role here. This analysis obviates, for Hugh, the need to cope with the problem of how fetuses, incapable of experiencing lust, should be taxed with other people's feelings. As for how this weakened flesh, weakened in the sense that it disallows sexuality without lust when that sexuality becomes operational in the children, transmits sin to the soul, the link, for Hugh, is in

²⁶³ *Sent. div.* 3.2, 3.4–5, pp. 43*–45*, 47*–51*. The quotation is at 3.4, p. 47*. On this question, see Raymond-M. Martin, "La péché originel d'après Gilbert de la Porrée (d. 1154) et son école," *RHE* 13 (1912): 674–91.

²⁶⁴ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.55, p. 170.

man's epistemology. Our knowledge, as he has already explained, depends on sense data, in the external rational mode of knowledge. The physical senses have been corrupted by concupiscence. Thus, they do not function as well as they did before the fall; and this situation contributes to the ignorance which is the chief limit under which the mind labors after the fall. Hugh has produced the most intelligent solution invented in this period to the problem of how the sinful body could corrupt the mind that is its ruling principle and the seat of the intentionality that controls man's ethical life. Finally, in addressing the question of how the redeemed parents can engender children who are themselves in need of redemption, Hugh avoids the issues embedded in Augustine's examples of the hulled wheat or circumcised father. He settles for something simpler. While the grace of baptism removes the parents' guilt for their original sin, they still have to bear the punishment for sin, Hugh points out, and that punishment is concupiscence and ignorance, which they pass on to their children.²⁶⁵

The Lombard on the Transmission of Original Sin

The originality displayed by Hugh of St. Victor on the transmission of original sin did not find support in Peter Lombard. He is far more resolutely Augustinian on this subject. Indeed, he draws on some features of Augustine's early teachings in order to defend Augustine's anti-Pelagian position in this area. Peter also recognizes the need to attack Abelard and to find a way to combine the doctrine of the key role of intentionality in ethics, which he certainly supports, with the principle of the universality of original sin. He also wants to lay to rest the possibility of espousing traducianism in any form. And, he wants to coordinate his position on the transmission of original sin with the doctrine of human nature he has developed. He brings some additional authorities to bear on the large, and largely Augustinian, dossier of sources that he uses. If Peter does not succeed in ironing out all the problems in Augustine's treatment of the problem of the transmission of original sin, he makes a valiant effort to do so and he is less troubled by the implications of this topic than is true of many of his contemporaries.

There is no single recent or current theologian from whom Peter

²⁶⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.7.31–38, *PL* 176: 301B–306B. Julius Gross, "Ur- und Erbsünde bei Hugo von St. Viktor," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 73 (1962): 42–61 emphasizes Hugh's dependence on Augustine but not his originality.

takes all his cues on the transmission of original sin, but it is clear to him that Abelard needs to be shown conclusively to be wrong. His opening salvo makes this plain. Adam's sin was actual, Peter observes, because it was something he willed to do, as well as original, as the first sin and the origin of sin in mankind. In the rest of mankind, however, original sin cannot be reduced to actual sin. Under this heading, Peter attacks the "Pelagians" but the Abelardian reference is unmistakable. One can, none the less, say that original sin springs from the will, even if this statement is true only in Adam's case. Here, Peter draws on the anti-Manichean Augustine in arguing that there is nothing evil in nature, since the whole creation is good. Everything in creation, however, can be used badly. This was the case with human free will, a created good, which was used badly in the fall.²⁶⁶ This argument locates original sin in the will. But Adam is not a model for the rest of the human race in this respect. While it comes to afflict the soul in fallen man, original sin finds its way into the soul and imposes its limitations on the soul, in the form of a weakened will, and inclines the soul to commit actual sin by way of the body. Peter is a staunch defender of Augustine here, and on two counts. First, he maintains that original sin is transmitted physically because it has resulted in the vitiation of the flesh. And second, this vitiated flesh involves the reproduction of itself accompanied by carnal lust.²⁶⁷

Before going on to explain how, and why, this is the case, Peter crisply defines his terms. Does the essence of original sin lie in the guilt, the punishment, or the inclination to sin; and what is included in each of these terms? In Peter's view, original sin is defined as the guilt (*culpa*), the burden of responsibility for the fall. The punishment (*poena*), which is largely the depression of the will and the corruption of the body, is the consequence of that guilt. The *fomes peccati* is concupiscence, which Peter views broadly, as the inclination to sin in all areas. He agrees with Hugh of St. Victor that the concupiscence which is passed on to the offspring as a function of the punishment is not the lust attending the particular sexual act in which the offspring is engendered, but the general weakness of the body, and, through the body, the mind. This weakness will incline the offspring to commit actual sins when the circumstances make this possible. Thus, in Peter's view, it is unnecessary to address the objection that the fetus cannot experience

²⁶⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 30. c. 3–c. 4, c. 13, d. 34. c. 1–c. 5, 1: 496–97, 503, 525–29.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, d. 30. c. 5, 1: 497.

sexual desire or pleasure.²⁶⁸ This Victorine understanding of concupiscence also settles in advance the question of the degrees of parental ardor and hence of inherited culpability raised by Robert of Melun. Parents, Peter points out, replicate in their children the same kind of bodies as they have themselves. Addressing a question which Robert of Melun takes up and answers differently, Peter asks in what sense we are all children of Adam. It is absurd, he agrees, to think that everyone contains an actual atom of Adam's body. It was a finite body; and this would be a physical impossibility. But, we all share Adam's physical nature, in both body and mind. We can think of the passing on of physical nature from parent to child under the rubric of the seminal reasons, implanted in Adam as the first parent, and understood as Peter has treated them above, as the created causes that enable natural phenomena to perform their natural functions, such as reproduction, in this case.²⁶⁹

Peter makes crystal clear that he sees no grounds for supporting traducianism. The soul of each person, he maintains, is created, innocent, by God. The parents produce the body of their children and they do so by sexual reproduction, which is inevitably attended by sexual desire and pleasure. On this point Peter takes a softer line than the anti-Pelagian Augustine and than some of his contemporaries, and one that he associates with the sacrament of marriage as much as with the sacrament of baptism. Peter agrees that it is not possible, now, to engender children without lust, and that this lust "is always a vice and also culpable, unless it is excused by the goods of marriage" (*semper vitium est, et etiam culpa, nisi excusetur per bona coniugii*). This exemption, in his eyes, is a real one. But, while the goods of marriage exculpate the parents, the only flesh they have to pass on is the corrupted flesh which they now possess as a consequence of the fall. They pass it on to their children, perforce, and this corrupted flesh then contaminates the innocent soul which God infuses into the bodies of their children. Peter draws on Ambrose to help explain that this physical corruption is like the defects or privations which are inflicted on a person's body, changing it for the worse, which he then bequeathes to his children willy nilly. It is true, he allows, that baptized parents are released from their own original sin, but they still retain the *poena* and the *fomes peccati*, which they physically transmit to their children.

In elaborating this doctrine, Peter takes a middle position between those theologians who see the concupiscence imparted by

²⁶⁸ Ibid., c. 6–c. 13, 1: 500–03.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., c. 14, 1: 503–04.

original sin as completely washed away by the parents' baptism and those who do not see their baptism as having any effect on it at all. In his view, the parents' concupiscence is mitigated, but enough of it remains to inspire the sexual union that will transmit a corrupted body to their children.²⁷⁰ The soul, however, comes from God. Citing both the *physici* as well as Exodus 21:22–23 to make the point that the soul is infused into the body after the body has been growing in the womb, and ignoring the discrepancies among these authorities as to when, during the gestation process, the fetus is ensouled, he notes that, since the baptized parents do not create the souls of their children, they cannot transmit the spiritual cleansing which they have received themselves. It is in this light that Peter presents the Augustinian examples of the circumcised father and the hulled wheat. At the same time, the corrupt body into which the soul is infused contaminates it as well, and here Peter cites the Augustinian analogy of the vinegar and wine, without noticing the respects in which it may be a disanalogy for the union of body and soul in man, and without referring to Hugh of St. Victor's epistemological account of that contamination.²⁷¹

Original sin is thus universal, and necessary, after the fall, in that no one can avoid it. It is also voluntary, Peter claims, in that it arose from the voluntary choice of Adam.²⁷² Pausing to note that Adam's sin was the worst sin ever committed, even though it can be remitted by baptism, worse even than the sin against the Holy Spirit, which is irremissible, because of its permanent and negative effect on the entire human race and not just on Adam himself,²⁷³ he distinguishes once more between the original sin which parents transmit and the actual sin which they do not transmit.²⁷⁴ Peter then raises one final substantive question concerning original sin before concluding his discussion of this subject. Why, he asks, would God join the innocent souls that He creates to bodies vitiated by sin, knowing full well that this will corrupt the souls as well? His answer to this question ties Peter's understanding of original sin to the hylemorphic constitution of man as he had presented that doctrine in his account of creation at the beginning of Book 2 of the *Sentences*. Although the body is now weakened by sin, it was necessary to join it with the soul, he argues, even though the soul will

²⁷⁰ Ibid., d. 31. c. 2–c. 6, d. 32. c. 1–c. 5, 1: 505–08, 511–15. The quotation is at d. 31. c. 4, p. 506.

²⁷¹ Ibid., d. 31. c. 6–c. 7, 1: 508–10.

²⁷² Ibid., d. 32. c. 5, 1: 515–16.

²⁷³ Ibid., d. 33. c. 3, 1: 521–22.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., c. 1–c. 2, c. 5, 1: 517–20, 522–23.

thereby be weakened in turn, in order to retain the integral union of body and soul that is intrinsic to human nature. It is as a unit of body and soul that man was created. It is as a unit of body and soul that man fell. And, it is as a unit of body and soul that man will be redeemed and glorified; and, through him, the universe as a whole will be perfected.²⁷⁵ And so, Peter finds something providential even in the grimmest reality in the Christian doctrine of man.

Peter's most signal achievement in treating the transmission of original sin is a twofold one. First of all, while he retains both the vitiated seeds doctrine of Augustine and the idea that it is the sexual feelings of the parents that are responsible for transmitting original sin to the bodies of their children, he makes this a two-step process. Sexual desire and pleasure, vicious under other circumstances but excused for spouses in the context of their marriage, are what impel the parents to the sexual relations that lead to the conception of corrupt bodies in their offspring. The parents have no choice here, since they can only reproduce the same kind of body that they now possess. Part of the burden which they place on their children in so doing is to give them bodies which will themselves be liable to concupiscence in their sexual functioning, when the time comes. This second point, inherited from Hugh of St. Victor, enables Peter, like Hugh, to view concupiscence as a generic physical weakness brought about by the fall, and to unhinge the issue of the sensory capacities of a fetus, as a fetus, from the feelings experienced by the parents in the particular sexual union that led to its conception. It is far more debatable whether Peter succeeds in addressing Abelard's objections to Augustine. His argument that original sin is voluntary because Adam willed it in his own case is not particularly responsive to Abelard. His yoking of the Augustinian examples of the circumcised father and the hulled wheat to the anti-traducianist position is an effective argument. Despite Peter's assertion that everything in creation is good and is evil only in the way men choose to use it, his strong appeal to the anti-Pelagian theory of the corruption of man's genetic materials does leave him open to the same charge of inconsistency here as is the case with Augustine himself. While he frequently cites Augustine against Augustine in this part of his theology and while he combines Augustine's milder with his harsher position, it cannot truly be said that the Lombard has either discovered a way of resolving Augustine's inconsistencies or that, in this subdivision of his theology, he has sought, or found, a viable alternative to them.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, d. 32. c. 6, 1: 516.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHRIST, HIS NATURE, AND HIS SAVING WORK

The nature of Christ and His saving work were topics inspiring many debates in the first half of the twelfth century, debates conducted at varying levels of intensity and sparked by the proposals of different theologians. The Christological controversies of the day ranged from the intensely speculative, as was the case with the hypostatic union, to the devotional, as was the case with whether the human Christ should receive worship (*latria*) or veneration (*dulia*). A keen interest in the humanity of Christ is typical of the theology of this period, and the related issues of His moral capacities, His knowledge, and His psychology received extended attention. Aside from reflecting religious tastes that are a hallmark of twelfth-century Christian thought, these concerns are also indicative of the felt need to defend Christian orthodoxy against contemporary heretics who held that Christ's incarnation was an illusion. If the Word had never taken on human flesh, then the redemptive suffering and death of Christ on the cross was an illusion as well. Hence, theologians had a mandate to explain the reality of the incarnation and the principle that Christ was truly God and truly man. This doctrine is central to Christianity at any time. But its explication in our period was complicated by the confusion surrounding the theological language in which it would have to be done.

Peter Lombard makes a different kind of contribution to the various aspects of Christology that attracted discussion during his time. With respect to the human Christ, he is alarmed by what he perceives to be a contemporary tendency to divinize Him. Peter seeks to nuance this topic and to set limits to this inclination, in the effort to stress Christ's full consubstantiality with the rest of the human race. His efforts to do so, however, meet with only partial success. Peter's achievement is more solid in reshaping the doctrine of Christ's saving work. In a period marked by extremes of objectivism and subjectivism in the treatment of soteriology, Peter strikes a new balance. More than simply mediating between extremes, he also adds his own personal stamp to this doctrine, and makes possible the dropping of purely externalist ways of viewing the redemption, in which man is seen as the passive object of the

actions of powers outside of himself, from the agenda of mainstream theology. With respect to the hypostatic union and related issues, Peter's contribution is threefold. The clear definitions and consistent uses that he gives to the theological language needed in this area enable him to expose and dismiss what is problematic or inconsistent in the Christological lexicons of other theologians, ancient and modern. By the same token, he effectively salvages ideas of which he approves in this subdivision of theology by separating them from the confusing terminology in whose company they sometimes traveled. His third service is to lay out plainly the options existing in current theology for understanding the coinherence of the divine and human natures in the incarnate Christ. He indicates their strengths, and the support in the Christian tradition on which they can draw, and also their weaknesses, in his estimation. He does so without making a personal choice among them. This last fact is one that a few contemporaries had difficulty grasping and, with them, some modern scholars as well. Yet, on this critical doctrine of the Christian faith, Peter really does think that the three opinions he outlines can truly be maintained within the orthodox consensus. This attitude of his toward the hypostatic union is the most powerful and extended expression, in Peter's thought, of the principle, distinctive of twelfth-century theology, that the unity of the faith does not preclude diversity in the ways in which it may be explained or practiced: *diversi sed non adversi*.¹

The Hypostatic Union: Ancient and Current Understandings

The hypostatic union was second only to the doctrine of the Trinity in this period in provoking debate under the heading of the problem of theological language. It was likewise catalyzed by the intense study which Boethius's *opuscula sacra* were receiving in the schools, and by the fact that his own vocabulary was polyvalent. Theologians in this period, consequently, lacked a common understanding of the meaning of key terms such as substance, person, and nature, all of which had to be used in discussing the nature of the incarnate Christ. Complicating matters still further was the fact that Gilbert of Poitiers had used his commentary on Boethius's theological treatises as a vehicle for framing his own personal

¹ Good discussions of this theme in the twelfth century include Henri DeLubac, "A propos de la formule: *diversi sed non adversi*," in *Mélanges Jules Lebreton* = *Recherches de science religieuse* 40 (1952): 2: 27–40; Hubert Silvestre, "'Diversi sed non adversi,'" *RTAM* 31 (1964): 124–32.

semantic theory and his own idiosyncratic lexicon, which coined neologisms and which also used the standard terms in unique Gilbertian ways. The thorough study of John Damascene, as well as Boethius and the Latin fathers, which the Lombard puts to such effective use in his Trinitarian theology and in his doctrine of God more generally, also proved to be equally helpful in addressing Christology. While in the field of Trinitarian theology he regarded Peter Abelard as the thinker most in need of refutation, with Gilbert second on the list, in the field of Christology Abelard offered no more, or less, of a challenge than did other theologians to whose teachings Peter took exception. On the other hand, here Gilbert was the master who set the agenda. And, Gilbert and the early Porretans set that agenda for the Lombard in two ways. First, they offered some trenchant criticisms of positions which Peter joined them in opposing. And, second, they offered some positive ideas which he was ready to accept, subject to the purgation from them of the rebarbative language in which Gilbert had originally framed them. Armed with the weapons derived from his Greek and Latin patristic sources, from the discussions surrounding the ideas of Gilbert, and from some insights of his own, Peter was able to set forth, with great terminological precision, for the day, the three major explanations of the hypostatic union, the *assumptus homo* theory, the subsistence theory, and the *habitus* theory. He was also able to equip himself with a vocabulary helpful in handling the other topics pertaining to the incarnation on which he took a personal stand.

The *assumptus homo* theory had a long history, going back to the patristic period and also undergoing change with respect to the positions it was formulated in order to refute. Many of the church fathers, east and west, supported the idea that the Word had assumed a human nature, that He had become man, a man fully united with the Word from the first moment of His conception, and not a man already in existence, the latter view being the heresy of Adoptionism. Later, in order to counter the threat of Nestorianism, proponents of this doctrine emphasized the intimacy of the union between the two natures in the incarnate Christ and their inseparability once united in a single person.²

² The patristic background and history of this doctrine up through the time of the Lombard are given by Auguste Gaudel, "La théologie de L'Assumptus Homo": *Histoire et valeur doctrinale*," *RSR* 17 (1937): 64–90; 18 (1938): 45–71, 201–17. For a good description of the three opinions as taught in the mid-twelfth century, see Jean Bresch, *Essai sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard considérées sous le point de vue historico-dogmatique* (Strasbourg: Imprimerie de Veuve Berger-Levrault,

The subsistence theory accented, against what its proponents saw as an interpenetration of the divine and human natures of Christ in the *assumptus homo* theory so as to divinize His human nature, the idea that, in the union of the Word with a human body and soul, none of the constituents had lost its intrinsic nature substantially. The ingredients, they argued, had not merged to form a new semi-divine, semi-human *tertium quid*. Rather, in the incarnation, the Word, Who had been a simple person, now became a composite individual, with three substances joined together, divinity, body, and soul. Another version of this notion of a composite person, seen as a twin substance, found support in Augustine.

The partisans of the *habitus* theory, so called because they viewed the humanity of the incarnate Christ as a habit or garment which He puts on, could trace this theory back to biblical, patristic, and more recent authorities. The language itself occurs in the Vulgate account of Christ's emptying of Himself and taking on the form of a man, *et habitus inventus ut homo*, in Philippians 2:7. The fullest patristic discussion of this phrase is Augustine's analysis in his *Eighty-Three Diverse Questions*. There, he notes that *habitus* can be understood in several senses. There is a habit of mind, such as the mind's grasp of intellectual subject matter, which is strengthened by use. There is a habit of body, such as the strength acquired through physical exercise. *Habitus* also refers to things attached to people externally, such as clothing, weapons, or shoes. In each of these cases, the *habitus* is applied accidentally to the person in question, who might just as well not possess it. Moving on, he adds that in some cases a *habitus* changes the person who has it, as is the case with wisdom or physical strength. In other cases, what the person takes on is itself changed, while simultaneously changing him, as is true of food which, when eaten and assimilated into someone's body, becomes his bodily tissue as well as giving him energy. There is also the *habitus* which is changed while not changing the person to whom it is attached. Such is the case with a garment that assumes the shape of the person wearing it. There is a fourth case, in which neither the person nor the *habitus* is changed when the *habitus* is

1857), pp. 39–43; Walter H. Principe, *William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), 1: 9–12, 68–70; Horacio Santiago-Otero, "El 'nihilianismo cristológico' y las tres opiniones," *Burgense* 10 (1969): 431–43. This last cited essay also gives a thorough review of the scholarship on this question and on the attribution of the three positions to contemporary theologians. See also Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1: 71–104, which is weak on the Porretans; Ludwig Ott, *Untersuchung zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik*, Beiträge, 34 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1937), pp. 164–87.

taken on. The placing of a ring on a person's finger is an example. With all this in mind, Augustine asks, in what sense is *habitus* involved in Christ's incarnation? In the sense of the garment that takes on the shape of the person wearing it, he answers. With this, Augustine also argues that the human nature taken on by the Word was affected, and for the better, by its association with the divine nature. And so, in Philippians, the apostle means that, when Christ clothed Himself with humanity He did not transform it, but He conformed it to Himself, associating it with His own immortality, without changing it into His own divinity.³

As the editor of this Augustinian text and others have confirmed, the *Eighty-Three Questions* was known and cited up through the Carolingian period.⁴ Up until that time, the other major interpretation of the *habitus* theory was the one provided by Boethius, who gives it a different sense than Augustine does, the sense in which it was appropriated by John Scottus Eriugena and many of its twelfth-century supporters and detractors. In his *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, Boethius attacks the argument by which each of these heretics would reduce Christ's humanity to nothing at all (*omnino nihil*). The theology of Nestorius, he says, leads to this conclusion by making the union of divinity with humanity so adventitious that they exist side by side, and are not truly united. On the other hand, Eutyches absorbs Christ's humanity into His divinity to such a degree that there is no real human nature left in Him. Now, Boethius adds that one can say that Christ's divinity became humanity, that His humanity became divinity, or that each was modified to such an extent that neither retained its original nature, but a new *tertium quid* resulted. The first is impossible since the divine nature is immutable. The second is impossible because human nature involves a body. Just as one body cannot change into another body, so, *a fortiori*, a body cannot change into an incorporeal entity. The third is impossible since it can take place only in the merging of beings that possess a common nature, a common material substratum that serves as a bridge between them. Boethius's own solution is to compare the union of man and God in the incarnate Christ with that of the gold and gems that

³ Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* q. 73. ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, CCSL 44A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975), pp. 209–12. On this doctrine, see Tarsicius J. van Bavel, *Recherches sur la christologie de Saint Augustin: L'humain et le divin dans le Christ d'après Saint Augustin* (Fribourg, Suisse: Éditions Universitaires, 1954), pp. 34–37.

⁴ Mutzenbecher, intro. to his ed., pp. l–lix, lxxv; John Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre: Logic, Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 37, 42–45, 53, 56.

combine to form a crown, or the vesting of a man with a garment, examples in which, is his view, neither element is changed.⁵ And, although he cites Augustine's *Eighty-Three Questions*, John Scottus clearly intends the same thing as Boethius on the incarnation in describing Christ's human nature as a sandal which He puts on. His choice of this particular article of clothing is made to reflect Christ's retention of His humanity unchanged in the incarnation as well as its allegorical significance in relation to John the Baptist as His forerunner.⁶ The twelfth-century theologians who support the *habitus* theory invoke it in order to stress the point made by Boethius and Eriugena: neither the divinity nor the humanity of Christ was changed in their union. Both they and their critics also notice that another feature of the *habitus* doctrine in both its Augustinian and Boethian forms is that the union is adventitious and accidental; the two natures of Christ are partible.

As the Lombard reads these three positions, they all have problems. The chief difficulty to be alleged against the *assumptus homo* theory is that it falls into Boethius's second impossibility, and even conceivably into the danger of Eutychianism, by assimilating Christ's humanity into His divinity in the bestowing on that humanity of the blessings and exemptions that elevate the human Christ so far above other human beings that His consubstantiality with them is put at risk, a consubstantiality necessary if His life and death are to have their intended soteriological effects. Peter also sees a real problem in calling the person of the incarnate Christ a mixed one. In the *Sentences*, he regards the idea of three substances as unacceptable, although he had entertained that idea earlier in his career in one of his sermons. He had also, in his earlier Pauline exegesis, made use of the Augustinian twin substance language, although he viewed it in such a way as to avoid the confusion between the two substances. With respect to the *habitus* theory, if one follows the Augustinian explanation of it, which Peter cites in full, there is a problem in it analogous to the problem affecting the *assumptus homo* position, as he analyzes it, the change in Christ's human nature. Even in his commentary on Philippians, where he had indicated acceptance of the *habitus* theory earlier, he had never

⁵ Boethius, *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* 4–7, ed. and trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester in Boethius, *The Theological Tractates* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 92–94, 104–16, 120. The quotation is at 4, p. 94.

⁶ John Scottus Eriugena, *Commentaire sur l'Évangile de Jean* 1.29, ed. Édouard Jeuneau, *Sources chrétiennes*, 180 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1972), pp. 150, 152.

understood it in that sense himself. But the larger problem Peter sees with the *habitus* position is that it makes Christ's manhood accidental. Instead of a hypostatic union, there is the adventitious human garb, which the Word can put on and take off, and which is not really united to the person Who wears it. This being the case, an adherent of the *habitus* theory would not really be able to endorse the scriptural principle that the Word became flesh, or that God became man in the incarnation.⁷

In coming to the conclusion that all three positions, despite their biblical and patristic warrants, were problematic, Peter had before him the arguments of contemporaries who espoused one or another of the positions and whose terminology was so unclear or inconsistent that they did not, in his estimation, succeed in making their case. He also had before him Gilbert and the Porretans, whose language was not only indiosyncratic but was also an impediment in conveying their ideas. While Peter certainly repudiates the Porretan lexicon, taking a leaf from the book of some of Gilbert's earliest followers in this respect, he shares many of Gilbert's Christological positions. Indeed, he comes closer to Gilbert, substantively, than to any other contemporary theologian on the hypostatic union. And, it is both the agenda he shares with Gilbert and his criticism of Gilbert that enable him to pinpoint what he finds unacceptable in the views of other masters, whichever of the three opinions they held.

This being the case, it will be useful to reprise briefly the account of Gilbert's treatment of the hypostatic union and of the language in which he expresses it given above in chapter 3.⁸ To begin with, in his use of the term "substance," Gilbert largely seeks to apply it to the level of being on which beings are concrete and are subject to modification by accidents, or *subsistens*, in his vocabulary. He also wants to use the term "nature" to refer to beings at this level. Sometimes, however, he refers to the deity as such as a substance, using this term to refer to what would be equivalent, in the deity, to

⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 3. d. 6–d. 7. c. 3.3, 3rd ed. rev., ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81), 2: 49–66. For his earlier use of the *gemina substantia* language, see the second redaction of Peter's *In Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 1:3, *PL* 191: 1307C. This same language occurs in *Sermo* 7, 9, 55, 99, *PL* 171: 371C, 382A, 396A, 605D–606B, 806B. He refers to Christ as having three substances in *Sermo* 43, *PL* 171: 559B–C. On this point, see above, chapter 4, p. 216 and n. 157. For Peter's earlier alignment with a Boethian or Eriugenian version of the *habitus* theory, see *In Epistolam ad Philippenses* 2:1–8, *PL* 192: 235A–D. See above, chapter 4, p. 223.

⁸ See above, pp. 132–48.

the level of being he calls *subsistentia* in created beings, which refers to their formal properties. Since Gilbert holds that everything that is in God is God, that the perfectly simple deity is His own qualities perfectly, there really is no distinction that can be made between *subsistentia* and *subsistens* in God's case. Even for creatures, Gilbert holds that the *subsistentia* inheres in the being in a radically individual way and that it cannot be abstracted from that being. He also rejects the Boethian definition of a person as the individual substance of a rational nature. He does so because, in Trinitarian theology, he recognizes that this definition of person would yield three substances, that is, three Gods. In the case of human beings, he rejects Boethius on *persona* because he is a strong proponent of the view, against more Platonizing anthropologies, that the human person is not the soul alone but the integral union of body and soul, not a casual or separable combination or a new *tertium quid* but a union whose constituent ingredients retain their own distinctive characteristics. With respect to *persona* in the deity, Gilbert provides only a numerical distinction among the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He accents the unity of the deity so strongly that it is not at all clear how, or if, these persons are really different from each other and why one of them, and not the others or the whole Trinity, was incarnated. Given Gilbert's view of human nature as the concrete *subsistens* of each individual man, it is also hard to see how he can distinguish between nature and person in the case of human beings. It is likewise hard to see how individual human beings can be part of a wider human community, since, even at the level of *subsistentia*, each man's formal aspect inheres in him in a completely individual way. In any event, whether a *persona* is divine and simple, or human and a composite of body and soul, a person is a *res per se una*, a single individual being, for Gilbert.

While they may create problems in Gilbert's Trinitarian theology, this assortment of principles engenders even greater difficulties in his Christology. His chief target is the *habitus* theory and the anthropology undergirding it. Gilbert disagrees with the idea that the humanity and divinity of the incarnate Christ are partible and that their relationship is accidental. He sees this claim as modeled on a notion of the union of body and soul in man as divisible, which he also rejects. Gilbert also wants to attack the view that the *homo* assumed by the Word was a man already in existence, a position that had gotten attached to the *homo assumptus* theory despite the fact that it had originally been formulated with the express purpose of excluding Adoptionism. He sees the Word, in the hypostatic union, as both a divine person and as the divine substance. His

vocabulary does not make it possible for him to distinguish between these aspects of a Trinitarian person. This divine component unites with a concrete human *subsistens*. Gilbert insists on this latter point in order to emphasize that it was the historical man Jesus Who was involved. And so, Gilbert says that the Word united with *homo*, the concrete noun standing for this concrete *subsistens*, in contrast with the *humanitas*, the abstract noun standing for his *subsistentia*. There is, to be sure, a problem here, in that Gilbert's language, and his metaphysics, weaken the connection between the human Christ and other human beings. This tends to circumscribe the impact of Christ's saving work. In order to rule out Adoptionism, Gilbert argues that the *homo* assumed by the Word was not a subsistent man already in existence. Rather, He took on the body and soul of a man, neither of which existed before their union with each other and their simultaneous union with the Word. Once that union has taken place, one can call the ingredients that make up the human Christ a human substance composed of body and soul. While Gilbert cannot distinguish person from substance in the deity, he tries vigorously to do so in the case of the man Jesus. What Jesus contributes to the incarnation are the components of a human substance. But, while in other human beings, the combination of body and soul produces a *subsistens* that is also a person, with Jesus this is not the case. There is, to be sure, a person in the incarnate Christ, but it is the divine person of the Word. This divine person does not change when the incarnation takes place. It remains one and simple. By definition, for Gilbert, no person can be duplex, so there cannot be more than one person in the incarnate Christ. Further, for Gilbert, in the hypostatic union, both the divine and human natures remain unconfused. Neither assimilates the other, and no new *tertium quid* is produced. Thus far, the contemporary position to which Gilbert comes the closest is the subsistence theory, but with two important qualifications. For Gilbert, the person of the incarnate Christ does not become a composite *persona* at the time of the incarnation. Rather, Christ retains the same fully divine *persona* that He has always had. Secondly, Gilbert's lexicon permits him to speak of the human contribution to the incarnation as a substance. It also allows him, confusingly, to speak of the divine contribution as a substance as well, although, as noted, without being able to clarify the difference between nature and person in God. He therefore does not use the language of three substances in God, divinity, body, and soul. And, while he is firm in ruling out the idea that there is a human person in the incarnate Christ, his anthropology makes it difficult to see why the man Jesus

is not a human person after His body and soul have been united with each other and with the Word.

As Gilbert summarizes his findings, they take the form of the dictum *non persona personam, nec natura personam, nec natura naturam, sed persona naturam assumpsit*. A person cannot assume a person, since no person can be duplex. The divine nature does not assume a human person, and this for two reasons. It was a single member of the Trinity and not the divine nature as a whole Who was incarnated. Also, if He assumed a human person, one would be teaching Adoptionism. A nature does not take on a nature. Here, once again, the first part of the statement is designed to rule out the idea that the Godhead as such, and not the Word, was incarnated. The second part of the statement is designed to reinforce the point that the Word was joined to a particular human being and not to mankind in general. And so, in Gilbert's preferred formula, a divine person takes on a human nature in the incarnation. This conclusion raises as many problems as it resolves; for, given Gilbert's terminology, the difference between a human nature and a human person is all but invisible, or, at any rate, it is inexplicable. Also, it is hard to see why, if human nature is ruled out in the *nec natura naturam* part of the formula, as standing for the human race and not one historic member of it, the term *natura* should suddenly acquire the latter denotation in the *persona naturam assumpsit* part of the formula which he supports. Further, in his effort to rule out Adoptionism, or any Adoptionist leanings as he may find in contemporary proponents of the *assumptus homo* theory, Gilbert fails to see that what he really needs to say is that what the Word assumed is neither *natura* nor *homo*, but the infra-subsistent human body and soul, as yet not joined.

The early Porretans, particularly the authors of the two sentence collections written in Paris in the early 1140s, make some notable modifications in Gilbert's language in the effort to disembarass his Christology of it. At the same time, they backpedal with respect to some of Gilbert's most useful ideas. Avoiding the language of *subsistens* and *subsistentia*, they observe the distinction drawn by the Greeks and assign *substantia* in principle to the task of denoting the divine essence common to the Trinitarian persons. While they reimport into their discussion of the Trinity the idea that the Trinitarian persons are one in essence and three in operation, they proceed to confuse matters by applying *substantia* both to the divine unity and to the divine plurality, thereby undermining their ability to distinguish meaningfully between substance and person in the deity. They do not have as clearly developed an anthropology as

Gilbert but agree with him that man is an integral unit of body and soul. They also endorse his idea that what the Word took on was not a man already in existence but the body and soul out of which man is made, *ex quibus fit homo*, that once united with the Word, the human component remained attached to Him, and that neither the divinity nor the humanity of Christ was changed by their union or merged to form a *tertium quid*. They follow as well Gilbert's summary formula and assent to the principle that a divine person assumed a human nature in the incarnation.

There are, however, two signal respects in which the early Porretan sentence collectors depart from Gilbert. As to why a person cannot assume a person, they drop Gilbert's elegant and simple answer based on the definition of a person as a *res per se una* and substitute a less responsive one, the argument that, were it possible for a person to take on a person, Christ's divinity would have been diminished in the incarnation. What they seem to have in mind here is the subsistence theory notion that the incarnate Christ has a composite *persona*. They also disagree with themselves, and with Gilbert, in endorsing the three-substance model of the subsistence theory along with the *gemina substantia* of Augustine. Having made this move, they find themselves hard pressed to explain in what sense an unattached human body, or an unattached human soul, can both be called substances, or why either of them can be called a substance in its own right after they have been united. One of the authors calls these substances, indifferently, natures, which is equally difficult to explain. It is true that Boethius, and assorted twelfth-century theologians with Platonizing anthropologies, could define the soul as a substance or as a person. But the Porretans join Gilbert in rejecting Boethius on this score. Still, in supporting the idea that a person assumes a nature, they do not clarify whether they mean by "nature" here these two aspects of the human constitution viewed one by one, or human nature in its more general acceptance. At the same time the early Porretans use two other formulae, describing the hypostatic union as the conjunction of divinity and humanity and also under the statement that, in the incarnation, God became man. The first of these seems to support Gilbert's idea that, in addition to being impartible after they were joined, these natures were not confused when they were united. On the other hand, the notion that God became man makes quite different claims, whether in Gilbertian terms or in ordinary Latin, a point which the authors ignore.

One did not have to be a supporter of the subsistence theory to make use of the three-substance or two-substance language found

in the Porretans. This vocabulary can also be found in a number of other theologians in the first half of the twelfth century who associate it with one or more of the other two positions on the hypostatic union. And, while they do not use *substantia*, in Gilbert's sense of the word, with respect either to God or to man, their own theological terminology in this connection is capable of being equally inconsistent or problematic. A good case in point is Abelard, Gilbert's major target, who has been linked, and with excellent reason, to the *habitus* theory, a theory firmly connected in his own mind with a Platonizing view of human nature, which he analogizes to the hypostatic union. Just as he sees the human soul as the essence of human nature, so he accents the divine over the human natures in the incarnate Christ.⁹ Abelard's earliest treatments of the hypostatic union occur in sermons dating from his period as abbot of St. Gildas in the 1130s. In them, he demonstrates a view of the union of idioms in the incarnate Christ in which both the divinity and the humanity of Christ preexist their amalgamation, and the notion that the human component is accidental. He expresses both of these ideas in formulating one of his most deplorable analogies. The incarnate Christ, he states, can be compared with an *electrum* or alloy of two metals, in this case gold and silver representing His divinity and humanity respectively. They are fused in the incarnation, and neither ingredient changes in the process. Nor is a new *tertium quid* produced. And, they are partible. The humanity is separated from the divinity when Christ dies on the cross, just as the silver is rendered out of the alloy with the application of heat to the *electrum*.¹⁰

Later in the same period Abelard wrote commentaries on the Apostles' Creed and the Athanasian Creed in which he compares the union of idioms in the incarnate Christ with the union of body and soul in man, a body and soul which are also separable. These

⁹ The best treatments of Abelard's Christology are Richard E. Weingart, *The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 102–03, 119; J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 167–68; Paul L. Williams, *The Moral Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), pp. 105–10. Lauge Olaf Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta's Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180*, *Acta theologica danica*, 15 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), pp. 214–23 accents Abelard's differences from Gilbert and gives a truncated account. Edward Filene Little, "The Heresies of Peter Abelard," University of Montreal Ph.D. diss., 1969, pp. 231–33, 239–312 thinks that the charge of Nestorianism made against Abelard was unfounded and merely reflects the ignorance of his monastic critics.

¹⁰ Peter Abelard, *Sermo* 1, 2, *PL* 178: 385D–386A, 396A.

two natures are united—and Abelard uses the same language in both commentaries—in one person, “a person that is said to be almost unitary” (*persona quippe quasi per se una*) and which can be defined as the individual substance of a rational nature. This rational substance, in the case of both the incarnate Christ and human beings, is then joined to something else with which it makes another substance.¹¹ Abelard comes back to this point in the *Theologia “scholarium”*, where he also raises, without answering, the question of how Christ’s substance is different from His person and whether it is just the human soul, and not the body and soul as united, that is a substance. Here, he observes that the ingredients do not change in the union. Nor does the person of Christ, which is a single, divine *persona* and now, presumably, entirely and not *quasi* simple.¹² The one other question Abelard raises and which he has predictable difficulty in answering given his identification of the Trinitarian persons with the attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness, all of which he thinks were involved in the incarnation, is why it was the Son Who was incarnated rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit, or all three.¹³ More than merely reflecting problems which opponents of the *habitus* theory might ascribe to it, as involving a relationship between divinity and humanity where the two natures are partible and the humanity is adventitious, Abelard’s account of the hypostatic union reveals difficulties stemming from his own terminological imprecision, especially with respect to the terms “substance” and “person,” and from the connection between Christology and other controversial areas of his theology. As for his followers, they do no better. We find the same equivocal use of *substantia* in Hermannus. And Roland of Bologna, agreeing with the idea that the divine and human natures in the incarnate Christ are partible and with the idea that the soul of man is the essence of human nature, argues that, during Christ’s three days in the tomb, His divinity remained united with His soul only.¹⁴

¹¹ Peter Abelard, *Expositio in symbolum apostolorum; Expositio in symbolum Athanasii*, PL 178: 624A, 631A.

¹² Peter Abelard, *Theologia “scholarium”* 3.74–82, ed. Constant J. Mews in Peter Abelard, *Opera theologica*, CCCM 11–13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969–87), 13: 531–35.

¹³ Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 4.68, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 12: 296.

¹⁴ Hermannus, *Sententie magistri Petri Abaelardi (Sententie Hermanni)*, ed. Sandro Buzzetti, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell’Università di Milano, 101, sezione a cura di storia di filosofia, 31 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1983), p. 109; Roland of Bologna, *Die Sentenzen Rolands*, ed. Ambrosius M. Gietl (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1969 [repr. of Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1891 ed.]), pp. 164–65. 172–74, 191. On these figures, see Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*,

One did not have to be a defender of either the *habitus* theory or the subsistence theory to talk, with equally confusing results, about the incarnate Christ as having three substances, or, for that matter, to be able to insist, as both Abelard and the Porretans do, that the humanity and divinity in Christ remained distinct substantially. The three-substance position is found as well in the school of Laon.¹⁵ And, while a number of masters in this group, espousing the *habitus* theory, state that the Word assumed humanity like a garment (*ex vestimento*) but without His divine nature increasing or decreasing thereby,¹⁶ the school as a whole is more usually associated with the *assumptus homo* theory. This is the language which William of Champeaux uses, while also insisting that the two natures unite but without either nature changing or being involved in a substantial participation in the other. He adds, here making the point also made by Gilbert and his followers, that once the two natures were united, they remained united; Christ's divinity stayed with His body in the tomb as well as accompanying His soul in the harrowing of Hell.¹⁷ Most of all, the school's handling of the incarnation is obscured by their insensitivity to the debates on theological language that raged in this period and their disinclination to define any of the key terms they use. They are basically less interested in questions of this order than with other matters pertaining to the incarnation. They want to discuss why it was the second person of the Trinity Who was incarnated, and respond that the Son is the appropriate person for the job because He is already a manifestation of the Father.¹⁸ They also want to consider why the incarnation took place at the particular moment in history when it occurred. To this question they give a response that became standard in the period. God, they state, waited until men had the chance to internalize the fact that they could not free themselves from sin by themselves, whether through the moral law of the Old

pp. 222–28, 235–42, although he errs in thinking that Roland did not regard the divinity and humanity of Christ as partible. This judgment may result from the idea that Roland equated Christ's humanity entirely with His human soul. For a survey of contemporary discussions of the partibility of Christ's divinity and humanity in the tomb, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1: 274–88.

¹⁵ *Sentences of Plausible Authenticity*, no. 182, ed. Odon Lottin in *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, vols. 1–5 (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1948–59), 5: 128.

¹⁶ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 343, 346, 349, ed. Lottin in *Psych. et morale*, 5: 263–64, 265, 266. The quotation is at no. 343, p. 264.

¹⁷ *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 262–63, 265–66, 268, ed. Lottin in *Psych. et morale*, 5: 213, 214–215, 216.

¹⁸ Anselm of Laon, *Sententie divine pagine*, ed. Franz P. Bliemetzrieder in *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, Beiträge, 18: 2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919), pp. 39–40.

Testament or through the natural moral law.¹⁹ And, raising one more question which they leave open and whose implications they do not notice, they wonder whether the human soul of Christ was infused into His body at the moment when the body was conceived or, as the *physici* teach, at some point later, as is the case with everyone else.²⁰ Other theologians of the time who take up this question are more definite, and agree that Christ's body and soul were created and joined together simultaneously in a miraculous event, *pace* the *physici*.²¹

Another theologian who adopts the three-substance position, in the effort to oppose Adoptionism, is the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. He is an exponent of the *assumptus homo* theory,²² much more strictly than Hugh of St. Victor, the master whom he follows in most other areas of his Christology and whose confusions and inconsistencies on the hypostatic union he perpetuates. At the same time, he joins Hugh in commenting on the Mariological dimensions of the incarnation. Hugh's own handling of this subject is bedeviled by a lack of clarity.²³ In discussing the hypostatic union, Hugh uses *assumptus homo* language in stating that Christ, Who was God from the beginning, also became man, taking on a human body and soul at the same time. Neither nature was altered in the process. Yet, Hugh also uses *habitus* theory language that makes this human

¹⁹ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 283, 5: 232.

²⁰ *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, ed. Heinrich Weisweiler in "Le recueil des sentences 'Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur' et son remaniement," *RTAM* 5 (1933): 267–68. Others who adopt the same argument are Honorius Augustodunensis, *Elucidarium* 1.121–24 in *L'Elucidarium et les lucidaires: Contribution, par l'histoire d'un texte, à l'histoire des croyances religieuses en France au moyen âge*, ed. Yves Lefèvre (Paris: É. de Boccard, 1954), pp. 383–84; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis fidei christianae* 1.8.2–3, *PL* 176: 306C–307D. For the range of views inherited from ancient science on the ensoulment of embryos available in this period, see John T. Noonan, *Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists*, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 86–90.

²¹ *Sentences of Plausible Authenticity*, no. 184, 5: 129. See, on the other hand, the solutions of Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.1.5, *PL* 176: 381C; Bernhard Geyer, ed., *Die Sententiae divinitatis: Ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertischen Schule* 4.3.8, Beiträge, 7:2–3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1909), pp. 90*–91*; *Summa sententiarum* 1.16, *PL* 176: 72B–D; F. Anders, *Die Christologie des Robert von Melun* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1927), pp. xvi–xvii.

²² *Summa sent.* 1.15–16, *PL* 176: 70C–72D. The reference to the three-substance idea is at 1.16, 72B.

²³ Good accounts are found in Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 193–213; Everhard Poppenberg, *Die Christologie des Hugo von St. Viktor* (Herz: Jesu-Missionshaus Hilstrup, 1937), pp. 48–87; A. Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique et Hugues de Saint-Victor*, 2 vols. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1895), 2: 68–69, although the latter fails to note that, for Hugh, the divinity of Christ remains attached only to His human soul during the *triduum*.

nature look accidental in the incarnate Christ. He quotes Philipians and Augustine's analysis of *habitus* and agrees with him that Christ's humanity can be compared to a garment which a man may put on (*quam vestis ab homine cum induitur*).²⁴ Hugh is not clear on whether he follows the Boethian interpretation of *habitus*, in which neither what is taken on nor the person who takes it on is changed, which he claims he is supporting, or the Augustinian view that the manhood conforms to the divinity as the garment takes on the shape of the wearer, which his own treatment of Christ's humanity would suggest. Hugh is also unclear on whether these components, once united, are impartable or not. It is not appropriate, he states, and this against Abelard and other holders of the *habitus* theory, to think of the incarnate Christ as a being Who had parts. Yet, in the three days between His death and resurrection, Christ's divinity, according to Hugh, remained united only with his human soul, not his body. Hugh emphasizes the importance of Christ's retention of a human soul at all times, for soteriological reasons, so that Christ can be united with all men and extend his saving work to them.²⁵ But here, he seems to forget the point he makes about man's possession of a body as well as a soul, its necessity in man's knowledge, and its function as a link between the physical creation and man's redemption, which he offers in his analysis of human nature. The single biggest contradiction in Hugh's account surrounds his discussion of *persona*. He complains at length that there is too much confusing debate on the definition of this term. Yet, he offers no real understanding of his own use of it. On the one hand, he sees *persona* as the union of body and soul in man, and argues that there was no such human *persona* in the incarnate Christ because His human body and soul were not already joined to each other before they were united with the Word. He does not succeed in explaining why they do not form a human person when they do get joined together in the incarnate Christ, not only with each other but also with the divine nature. Here, Hugh's inability to differentiate adequately between person and nature in the deity, a problem which also haunts his Trinitarian theology, takes its toll. On the other hand, and here Hugh's Platonizing anthropology comes to the fore, he sees the soul of man alone as his *persona*, meaning that there would be a human person in the incarnate Christ from the

²⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, MS. Douai 365, fol. 74^v-75^r; MS. Douai 366, fol. 102^v-102^r, ed. Roger Baron in "Textes spirituels inédits de Hugues de Saint-Victor," *Mélanges de science religieuse* 13 (1956): 168; *De sac.* 2.1.5, *PL* 176: 381C.

²⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.1.1, 2.1.12, *PL* 176: 401B-404C, 412A-413A.

moment when He assumed the soul, irrespective of whether He assumed, or retained His connection with, a body.²⁶

Hugh adds a number of other points to this analysis of the incarnation that are less confusing. On the question of why the Son was incarnated and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, he follows the tradition set forth by the Laon masters, but adds his own twist. It is true, he observes, that power, wisdom, and goodness are all involved in the incarnation. Further, we cannot say that the other two persons of the Trinity lacked the ability to take on human flesh. But, he adds, it was more fitting for the Son to take up this assignment. If the Father or the Holy Spirit had done so, there would have been two Sons. Now, the Son already was a Son, with respect to the Father, from all eternity. He comes to men as a brother, enabling them to become sons of God as well and co-heirs of the kingdom of God.²⁷ Another point Hugh develops in his own way is the Mariology required by the incarnation. He shares the consensus view, derived from Augustine, and particularly from Augustine's doctrine of the transmission of original sin by means of the lust accompanying sexual relations and/or the vitiated seeds with which such relations must operate, which says that the Virgin Mary was cleansed of her own original sin at the moment of Christ's conception. She did not experience lust and she did not possess vitiated genetic materials. Thus, she did not pass original sin on to her child. Hugh adds to this a description of conception itself which looks to be a corruption of the opinion of Galen. Without citing his source, he states that, in normal human situations, conception occurs only when the sexual partners unite willingly, through love, and not just when sexual congress occurs devoid of love. This account of conception does carry over to the Virgin Mary, in his estimation. In her case, there was mutual love between Mary and the Holy Spirit. Also, His work in her enabled her miraculously to produce the male seed required as well as the female contribution, out of her own body alone. There was no original sin in the conception of Christ, therefore, because no relations between a man and a woman took place.²⁸ This analysis, consistent with Hugh's treatment of the transmission of original sin, puts the emphasis on Mary's lack of sexual feelings in the event.

Despite the conceptual and terminological problems it leaves

²⁶ Ibid., 2.1.9, 2.1.11, *PL* 176: 393D–399B, 401B–412A.

²⁷ Ibid., 2.1.2–4, *PL* 176: 371D–381D.

²⁸ Ibid., 2.1.5–7, *PL* 176: 381C–393B.

unsolved, Hugh of St. Victor's treatment of the incarnation was surprisingly influential. Aside from his jettisoning of the *habitus* theory language and his insistence on three substances as well as two natures in the incarnate Christ, a point that departs from his tendency to equate substance and nature when speaking about the deity, the author of the *Summa Sententiarum* follows Hugh's lead. He adds to the confusion on *persona* by reimporting the Boethian definition of person as the individual substance of a rational nature into his analysis of Christ's human nature, even though he had redefined this phrase in his Trinitarian theology. He is aware of the fact that, if this definition is accepted, one has to grant the incarnate Christ a human person, whenever His human soul was assumed, and whether with a body or not. The author sees the problem, wrestles with it manfully, and fails to solve it. He agrees that Christ's human body and soul were assumed simultaneously. But, even if one sees the *persona* as lying in the union of body and soul, the theory the author prefers, and even if one argues, against the Adoptionists, that they were not united with each other before their union with the Word, the human person still cannot effectively be eliminated. The author comes no closer than Hugh does to solving this problem. The root cause, for him as well as for Hugh, is a vocabulary whose terms he does not clearly define.²⁹ Omitting Hugh's theory that mutual love is required for conception, the author follows the rest of his analysis of the conception of Christ, adding that He was truly sinless although truly consubstantial with the rest of the human race.³⁰ Yet, despite the reminder that Christ came to redeem both the body and the soul of man, he endorses Hugh's position on the union of Christ's human soul alone with His divinity during the *triduum*.³¹ He also follows Hugh on why it was the Son Who was incarnated.³²

Less full, but equally Victorine, is Robert of Melun.³³ He returns to a positive acceptance of the Boethian definition of person, for the human Christ, despite his clear-eyed grasp of its inappropriateness when applied to the Trinity. He agrees that Christ's body and soul

²⁹ *Summa sent.* 1.19, *PL* 176: 70D–71D.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.16, *PL* 176: 73A–C.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1.19, *PL* 176: 78D–80B.

³² *Ibid.*, 1.15, *PL* 176: 70B.

³³ Raymond-M. Martin, ed. of Robert of Melun, *Oeuvres*, 4 vols. (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1932–52), 3 part 2: 55–58 n.; Martin, ed., “Un texte intéressant de Robert de Melun (*Sententiae*, libr. II, part 2, cap. cxcvii–ccxiii).” *RHE* 28 (1932): 316–17, 320–22; Anders, *Die Christologie*, pp. xxx–xxxvii, xliv–lxxxv; A. L. Lilly, “A Christological Controversy of the Twelfth Century,” *Journal of Theological Studies* 39 (1938): 225–35.

were joined to the Word at the same time, regardless of what the *physici* say about human conception. His lack of a clear distinction between person and substance in God leads him to state, confusingly, that the divine substance is incarnated in the person of the Son. He argues, also confusingly, that the humanity taken on by the Son is not a substance or a person, despite the language of Boethius on person, which he accepts. His effort to mediate between nihilianism and Adoptionism, predictably, is a failure. He says that the incarnate Christ has no parts. Yet, he agrees with Hugh that Christ's divinity remains united with His soul alone while His body is in the tomb. Robert adds a question to this topic, whether that body underwent decay in the tomb or, as with the bodies of some of the saints, it was preserved from decay miraculously. He can find no authoritative answer, but is sympathetic to the idea that Christ's human body suffered no corruption, since it was a more glorious body than that possessed by any saint.³⁴ He takes the same position as Hugh on the virgin birth and, like the author of the *Summa Sententiarum*, locates the issue in the absence of concupiscence on the part of the Virgin without speculating on the nature of normal conception.

The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* associates himself with Hugh of St. Victor on the mode of Christ's conception and on the moment at which Mary was exempted from concupiscence.³⁵ He also agrees with Hugh that there were no parts in the incarnate Christ but that He still was partible, with His divinity remaining joined to His soul alone while His body lay in the tomb.³⁶ But, this author is distressingly vague on the actual character of the hypostatic union itself. He contents himself with quoting the line that is standard in the accounts of twelfth-century theologians in their discussions of Christ's human nature more generally, "whatever the Son of God had by nature, the man had by grace" (*Quicquid habuit Filius Dei per naturam, habuit homo ille per gratiam*),³⁷ and lets it go at that.

To complete the survey of contemporary opinions which Peter Lombard had before him, there was the treatment of the incarnation by Robert Pullen. This is an area where he is at his most self-contradictory, and where the total absence of any definitions of his terms wreaks the most havoc. Robert omits certain issues which his contemporaries avidly debated, such as whether Christ's body

³⁴ Martin, "Un texte intéressant," pp. 317–19.

³⁵ *Sent. div.* 4.5.5, pp. 103*–04*.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.4.1–4. pp. 94*–99*.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.1.5, p. 75*.

and soul preexisted their union with the Word. On the hypostatic union, he offers a smorgasbord of views without indicating a preference. He states that the union is one in which the divinity and humanity are not confused in substance with each other. There are two substances, or essences, in the incarnate Christ, bound in a unity of person. Robert inappositely cites Augustine's *gemina substantia* on this point. While he does not clarify the difference between substance and person in the Word, he asserts that, in the incarnation, this *persona* was not composite. Christ had both a human and a divine will. Consistent with the notion of an integral union of Christ's two natures, Robert rejects the Victorine view and agrees with William of Champeaux and the Porretans that Christ's divinity remained united with both His body and His soul during the *triduum*.³⁸ At the same time, Robert presents as equally viable the idea that the incarnate Christ had three substances, divinity, body, and soul. He adds that the Word took on this body and soul essentially (*essentialiter*) and not in name only, attacking as heretical those who disagree. None the less, he is vague on why it was the Son Who was incarnated. He does not really notice the debate on this question. All of the persons of the Trinity are ubiquitous, he observes. As is the case with the creation more generally, They are all present in the man Jesus as well. We recall, from Robert's account of the divine ubiquity in his doctrine of God, that he holds God to be present in the creation *essentialiter*, a view he maintains without seeing that it leads down the garden path to pantheism. With respect to the Word, He is present in the man Jesus *personaliter*. But, Robert never succeeds in explaining the difference between essence and person, or between substance and person, in the Word. At some points, he treats Christ's divine *persona* as identical with the divine substance and essence. At other times, however, he treats the *persona* as the mode by which Christ's human body and soul were united with the Word, which would preclude its existence prior to the moment of the incarnation.³⁹ On this problematic note, Robert not so much concludes as ends his report on the doctrine of the incarnation.

The Lombard on the Hypostatic Union

In positioning himself in the contemporary debates on the in-

³⁸ Robert Pullen, *Sententiarum libri octo* 3.16–18, 3.19, *PL* 186: 782D–788D, 789C.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.10, 3.15, 3.16–18, 3.20, *PL* 186: 734B–C, 780D–782B, 782D–788D, 791C–D, 792C–793D.

carnation, Peter Lombard dissociates himself pointedly from theologians who fail to clarify their terms, or who use their terminology inconsistently, whether the language is of their own devising or is traditional. His own crisp distinctions between substance, essence, and nature, on the one hand, as denoting the divinity as such, and person, on the other, as denoting the properties and relations that distinguish one Trinitarian person from the other two persons, vis-à-vis each other, provides him with a useful and economical means of explaining the divine contribution to the hypostatic union. His stress on human nature as an integral union of body and soul and his strong disagreement with the Platonizing accounts of human nature professed in his day help him as well to deal effectively with Christ's humanity, not just in the constitution of Christ, as incarnated, but in His subsequent behavior. Peter is firm in rejecting the Boethian definition of person as appropriate either for divine or human persons. He is also unhesitating in his rejection of the three-substance analysis of the hypostatic union, since it conflicts with his understanding of human beings as substances whose ingredients have to be seen metaphysically as infrasubstantial. Likewise, and even though he had earlier subscribed to this doctrine as well, he dismisses Augustine's *gemina substantia* doctrine because he sees it as standing for a conflation or combination of two kinds of person in Christ, which he sees as utterly unacceptable.

In arriving at a positive position on all of these matters, and at a statement about what he thinks the incarnation is, as well as what it is not, Peter was inspired by Gilbert of Poitiers and the Porretans, both positively and negatively. Negatively, he finds Gilbert's lexicon obstructive; and he also finds some of the language which his earliest disciples substitute for it unclear. Positively, he agrees with many of Gilbert's specific Christological ideas, and disagrees with the early Porretans when they depart from their master. On the hypostatic union, Gilbert and the Porretans serve as his principal stimulus. On other matters relating to the incarnation, he takes his cue largely from Hugh of St. Victor, whether directly or indirectly. Sometimes he agrees with the Victorine position, restating it while adding his own elaborations on it. At other times, he takes sharp exception to it. In relation to all the theologians of his time, Peter's approach to Christology stands out for his frequent appeal to John Damascene. This is as true in this area of his theology as it is true of his treatment of the Trinity. From Damascene Peter draws three principal doctrines. One has to do with Christ's characteristic moral stance toward God the Father, and it will be taken up in the second section of this chapter. A second has to do with the so-

teriological reasons for the incarnation, which certainly affects the way in which Peter views the hypostatic union. The third is Damascene's doctrine of *enhypostasis*, which likewise is central to Peter's understanding of that union, in combination with what he derives from the Porretans.⁴⁰

Peter begins his account with the question of why the Son was incarnated and not the Father or the Holy Spirit. His treatment of this issue is Victorine, most clearly resembling that of the *Summa sententiarum*, although he adds his own touch. Since Christ is the wisdom of God, he observes, thereby pointing ahead to an important aspect of the doctrine of the atonement which he plans to discuss later in Book 3 of the *Sentences*, it is appropriate that He be sent to enlighten fallen man. From the very beginning, we see Peter framing the doctrine of the incarnation in soteriological terms, as Damascene had suggested to him. The Lombard then adds that it was also more suitable to send the Trinitarian person Who is Himself engendered than the Father, Who is *a nullo*. To be sure, the Holy Spirit is sent as well, and, indeed, Peter has much to say about His missions elsewhere in the *Sentences*. In explaining why the Holy Spirit was not incarnated, he follows Hugh's argument that, since the Word is already a Son, it is more suitable for Him to be the Trinitarian person Who extends to mankind the capacity to become children of God.⁴¹ He also endorses the point made by the author of the *Summa sententiarum* that the Father and the Holy Spirit are in no sense incapable of incarnation. Since God is omnipotent, this would have been possible. Without invoking the power, wisdom, and goodness language of Hugh, which, we recall, Hugh had applied inconsistently to the divine nature and to the Trinitarian persons as persons, Peter contents himself with reminding the reader that, since the work of the Trinity is one work, and since the Son is the one sent, the divinity He joins with humanity is the single divinity inhering equally in all the Trinitarian persons. This common divine action, however, can be delegated; redemption is delegated to the Son just as the task of incarnating Him is delegated to the Holy Spirit.⁴²

Moving next to the issue of what Christ took on in the incarnation, Peter reveals his sensitivity to the problems surrounding the abstract and concrete nouns raised by Gilbert of Poitiers. We recall

⁴⁰ Excellent background here is supplied by Keetje Rozemond, *La christologie de Saint Jean Damascène* (Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag, 1959), ch. 1–2.

⁴¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 1. c. 1, 2: 24–26.

⁴² *Ibid.*, c. 2–c. 3, d. 4, 2: 26–27, 37–41.

that Gilbert has insisted on the point that the Word took on *homo*, to designate a human nature at the concrete level of *subsistens* where it could be modified by accidents. *Homo*, in this context, also designates for Gilbert a specific, historical human being, the man Jesus. Peter appreciates this point, and also its problems. His own claim is that the Word took on both *homo* and *humanitas vel humana natura*. The point he wants to establish by this formulation is a double one. In the first place, the noun “man,” as the grammarians point out, and as the early Porretans had suggested, is itself capable of referring to an individual human being and to mankind in general. The second of these acceptations is, of course, also indicated by the terms humanity and human nature. Peter wants thereby to accent both the historicity of Christ’s incarnation in the man Jesus and also the consubstantiality of that man with the rest of the human race. And, just as substance and nature refer to the same aspect of divinity, so human nature can be called a substance. Peter stresses that all features of human nature, that is, body and soul, and the capacity of both to be modified by accidents, are involved here. And his reason, which he defends more consistently than the Victorines, is anchored by a citation from Damascene: “For what is not assumable is not curable” (*Quod enim inassumptibile est, incurabile est*). Christ must have a fully human body and a fully human soul in order to redeem both body and soul. And, agreeing with Gilbert, the Porretans, William of Champeaux, and Robert Pullen here, he holds that the union of Christ’s human nature with His divine nature was integral, and permanent, once it was achieved.⁴³

Peter goes into more detail than do many masters of the day in describing the manner in which this union occurred. Once again, his reading of Damascene gives him a fuller range of options for understanding this event. God the Son took on a body and a soul, he states, “but the body through the mediation of the soul” (*sed carnem mediante anima*). Damascene is the authority He cites for the idea that a material entity, such as the human body of Christ, could not with congruity unite with a purely spiritual entity, such as the deity, without the mediation of an entity, such as the human soul of Christ, which shares both a spiritual nature with the deity and the capacity to unite intimately with the body. Here, Peter takes exception to the scenario that Augustine had developed for the incarnation, in which Christ takes on a human soul, and then the body through the soul, in supporting the contemporary anti-Adoptionist

⁴³ Ibid., d. 2. c. 1.1–4, 2: 27–29. The quotation is at c. 1.4, p. 29.

position that the body and soul were created and assumed by Christ in the same instant, in a manner departing from the embryology of the *physici*.⁴⁴

In line with the anti-traducianist view that parents engender the bodies of their children while God creates their souls, Peter next turns to the virgin birth of Christ. Here, he goes beyond the views of the school of Laon and of Hugh of St. Victor, as well as his own earlier position as expressed in his sermons, where he states that Mary was exempted from the capacity to feel carnal concupiscence, as a special dispensation of the Holy Spirit, at the moment of Christ's conception. It was not merely her virginity that was retained *ante partum*, *in partu*, and *post partum* in this respect. In the *Sentences*, Peter amplifies on this doctrine in two ways. First, he maintains that Mary's exemption from the effects of original sin occurred not at the moment of Christ's conception but before that moment. In his view, the Holy Spirit prepared Mary for Christ's conception by coming to her beforehand, cleansing her both of original sin and its consequences, including the inclination to sin (*Mariam quoque totam Spiritus Sanctus in eam praeveniens a peccato prorsus purgavit, et a fomite peccati etiam liberavit*).⁴⁵ Thus, for Peter, there was a certain amount of time prior to the incarnation when Mary was unique among human beings, in gaining, ahead of time, what would later be available to mankind in baptism. But, in being freed from the *fomes peccati* as well, she enjoys a privilege that no one else is granted except the human Christ. Peter does not state how far ahead of time this dispensation was granted. But it is clear that, in comparison with other contemporary masters, even the Victorines, who thought deeply and wrote extensively on Mariology, he has extended the range of possible speculation on Mary's moral condition prior to the annunciation. Peter's amplification of this topic has another dimension as well, a rationale that accounts for his development of it in the first place. As we have seen above, in his treatment of the transmission of original sin, Peter takes a harder line than some of his contemporaries, in combining the vitiated seeds theory with the notion that the sexual feelings of the parents are the vehicle of original sin. Now, if one views the vehicle as the sexual feelings, it is clear why Mary would have to have been

⁴⁴ Ibid., c. 2.1–3, d. 3. c. 3.2–3, 2: 29–31; 36–37. On this issue, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1: 150–71.

⁴⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 3. c. 1.2–c. 3, 2: 32–35. The quotation is at c. 1.2, p. 32. For Peter's earlier position, see *Sermo* 12, 55, *PL* 171: 395D, 608A, *Sermo de adventu Domini*, ed. Damien Van den Eynde in "Deux sermons inédits de Pierre Lombard," in *Misc. Lomb.*, p. 76.

released from this consequence of original sin at the moment of Christ's conception. But, if one adheres to the vitiated seeds theory, then presumably some back-up time would be required to enable Mary to produce genetic materials, under her new dispensation, that would be as uncorrupted as those of the prelapsarian parents. The line of argument developed by the Lombard on this issue reminds us forcibly of the fact that Mariology in the twelfth century was fueled not only by the new winds of devotion blowing through western Christendom at this time but also by technical speculations in dogmatic theology.

Stressing the importance of the Virgin Mary's exemptions, because they are required in her engendering a human Christ free from original sin and its effects, but otherwise the same, physically, as other mortals, and rejecting Robert Pullen's idea that the presence of the Word in the Virgin's womb was just another instance of the divine ubiquity,⁴⁶ Peter moves on to the far more controversial issue of the coinherence of divinity and humanity in the incarnate Christ. Peter formulates this whole issue in Porretan terms, and agrees with much of the substance of Porretan teaching. The Word having assumed a human body and soul at the same time, in union with His divine person, Peter observes, it remains to ask whether *persona personam, vel natura naturam, vel persona naturam, vel natura naturam assumpserit*. He agrees with Gilbert of Poitiers that a nature cannot take on a person in the incarnation since there is no human person in Christ. To admit that He had a human person would be to teach Adoptionism. For the same reason, a person cannot take on a person in the incarnation. In addition to sharing Gilbert's anti-Adoptionist agenda, Peter agrees with him that no person can be mixed or duplex, although he does not advert to the specific Porretan definition of a person as a *res per se una*. It is also clear to Peter that Gilbert is correct in arguing that a person takes on a nature in the incarnation. As we will see shortly, what he accomplishes here is to unhinge these terms from their association with *subsistens* and *subsistentia*, which had made it so hard for Gilbert to show that a person is different from a nature both in God and in man. This step will simplify Peter's handling of this Porretan argument considerably.

Where Peter disagrees with Gilbert is on the question of whether a nature takes on a nature in the incarnation. Gilbert's objections to the affirmative on that point had been twofold. If a nature takes on a nature, he held, then it would not be possible to explain why it was the

⁴⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 3. c. 3.1, c. 3.5, 2: 35–36, 37.

Son, and not the deity in general, Who was incarnated. At the same time, it would deny the individuality and historicity of the incarnation of the Word in the man Jesus. In addition to citing a number of early church councils on this subject, which Gilbert had ignored, Peter tackles the first objection by recalling his own analysis of how terms denoting the perfections of the deity as such can be applied with propriety to the Trinitarian persons, an analysis which he develops in Book 1 of the *Sentences*. There, he had observed that this language is acceptable when one is referring to the divine essence which the Trinitarian persons share equally. It is in this sense that Christ's *divinitas* or divine nature was brought by Him into the incarnation, just as the *humanitas* which He brought into it was not different from that of His mother. At the same time, as in making the point above that the Word was united both with *homo* and with *humanitas* or *humana natura*, Peter wishes to stress here the consubstantiality of Christ with other human beings, in that they all possess a human nature that is a combination of body and soul. Once again yoking nature to the hylemorphic unit that man is, Peter concludes that we must say both that the person of the Son assumed human nature, and that the divine and human natures were united in the Son (*dicentes et personam Filii assumpsisse naturam humanam, et naturam divinam humanae naturae in Filii unitam*). When we say that the incarnation took place in the person of the Son, we are also saying that the divine nature He shares with the Father and the Holy Spirit was acting in the *hypostasis* of the Son. Peter cites Damascene here to support this analysis. As for the biblical statement that the Word became flesh, Peter does not think it can be read literally, as if to signify the convertibility of one nature into another. Rather, what it means is that the Word assumed human nature, that is, a human body and a human soul, but not a human *persona* (*hominis naturam, scilicet carnem et animam assumpsit, sed non personam hominis*).⁴⁷

This brings Peter to the task of explaining how an individual who is fully man can lack a human *persona*, a reef on which so many contemporary theologians foundered, especially if they held the Boethian definition of a human person as the individual substance of a rational nature. It is here that Peter's debt to Gilbert's Christology is perhaps the heaviest. He endorses the point that there was no preexisting human person in the incarnate Christ because His body and soul had not yet been joined to each other prior to the incarnation. What the Word took on, thus, was not a human

⁴⁷ Ibid., d. 5. c. 1.1–c. 2.1, 2: 41–46. The quotations are at c. 1.10, p. 45, and c. 2.1, p. 46, respectively.

person but the human components, body and soul, out of which a human nature would arise when they were joined to each other and, simultaneously, to the Word. Adding to this Gilbert's idea that no person can be duplex, and that no divine person can be composite, he observes that there was only one person in the incarnate Christ, His simple, eternal, divine person, which was not altered in its constitution when it accepted a human body and soul. Here, he notes, the Boethian definition of person must simply be jettisoned. It reduces the human being to his soul; and it would be descriptive only of beings like angels, who have a spiritual nature only. It also confuses substance and person. For Peter, the incarnate Christ can have a fully human nature without having a human *persona*. The lack of a human *persona* does not compromise the full humanity of Christ, since, in His humanity, He is a single, unique individual and, in possessing a human body and soul, He possesses all the faculties of a man. Once again warning that, if you look for a human person as what Christ assumed, you are succumbing to Adoptionism, he concludes by saying that, if you ask whether the manhood of Christ is a human person, the answer is "no." But if you ask whether the manhood of Christ is a human nature, the answer is "yes."⁴⁸ Thus, in responding to the question which was to engender such debate in the sequel, "whether Christ, insofar as He was a man, was a person, or, likewise, if He was anything" (*utrum Christus secundum quod homo sit persona vel etiam sit aliquid*), Peter points out that it is only the proponents of the Boethian definition of *persona*, who conflate person and substance in the human Christ, who are constrained to answer that one has denied to Christ a human substance if one denies to Him a human person. It is they who are forced to make of His humanity a *non-aliquid*. According to his own solution, on the other hand, this answer is not required. We distinguish between person and substance in the human Christ, he observes. Thus, in stating that He did not have a human person, we are in no sense asserting that, as a man, He was not *aliquid*. For He was *aliquid*: *aliquid natura*, an individual made up of body and soul.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ibid., c. 3.1-4, 2: 47-48.

⁴⁹ Ibid., d. 10. c. 1, 2: 72-74: This point is confirmed literally by the Lombard's students Peter Comestor and Odo of Ourscamp. Comestor is cited from an unpublished manuscript reporting his views by Ignatius C. Brady, "Peter Manducator and the Oral Teachings of Peter Lombard," *Antonianum* 41 (1966): 473. Odo is cited, from two unpublished manuscripts of his *Quaestiones*, by Artur Michael Landgraf, "Der Magister Petrus episcopus," *RTAM* 8 (1936): 201 n. 14; "Der Einfluss des mündlichen Unterrichts auf theologische Werke der Frühscholastik," *Collectanea Franciscana* 23 (1953): 286.

Among other things, it is precisely to obviate the possibility of Christological nihilianism no less than Adoptionism that Peter joins Gilbert of Poitiers in rejecting Boethius. But he is able to show, much more convincingly than Gilbert, why adherents of Boethius's definition of *persona* are the theologians most vulnerable to the charge of Christological nihilianism.

It is with these clarification of terminology in place and it is with the Christology he largely shares with Gilbert in hand that Peter turns to the analysis of the three opinions on the hypostatic union. We have introduced them briefly above. It will now become clear that, underlying the objections that the Lombard has to all of them is the view that they either obscure the distinction between the divine and human natures of Christ, as is true for him of the *assumptus homo* and subsistence theories, or that they deemphasize the humanity of Christ, as is the case for him of both the *assumptus homo* and the *habitus* theories. As Peter sees it, the *assumptus homo* theory and the subsistence theory both involve a blurring of the two natures. Proponents of the first theory, in analogizing the union of the two natures in Christ with the union of the body and soul in man, produce thereby an human individual who has, as well, the divine knowledge and power. Hence, they divinize the humanity of Christ even while claiming that the two natures remain distinct in Him. In effect, however, a new *tertium quid* has been produced, according to the *assumptus homo* theory, that draws upon both the divine and human natures of Christ.

The problem that Peter sees with the subsistence theory is similar, although it lies in the composite *persona* given to the incarnate Christ by defenders of this position. This kind of *persona* cannot truly be equated with the divine person which the Word has possessed from all eternity. It must, now, contain some human aspects, meaning that the divinity of Christ's *persona* has been diluted in the incarnation. How an immutable being, such as a divine person, can be altered in any way is itself deeply problematic. Equally so is the fact that, as a composite person, the Word incarnate introduces a fourth member into the Trinity. This is why the Augustinian language on the person of Christ as a *gemina substantia* must be rejected. At the same time, the three-substance language used by proponents of this position gives a false, and incomprehensible, understanding of *substantia* as it applies to Christ's human nature. True, a human being is a composite of body and soul. But, once they have been joined, they make a single substance. The infrasubstantial components that go to make up a human being cannot be called substances individually, either be-

fore or after they have been joined together. Nor can the union of divine and human natures in the incarnation be understood as the union of parts that together make up a whole. No person is made up of parts. *A fortiori*, this is true of the Word, Who was “whole” from all eternity and did not require the incarnation for His completion. Altogether, Peter finds the subsistence theory more rife with difficulties, both conceptual and terminological, than he finds the other two theories.

The *habitus* theory, in his estimation, emphasizes the divinity of Christ at the expense of His humanity, but in a manner different from the *assumptus homo* theory. Where the *assumptus homo* theory threatens to absorb Christ’s humanity into His divinity, the *habitus* theory threatens to treat Christ’s humanity as accidental, and as not integral to the hypostatic union. The two natures are regarded as partible once joined, by defenders of this theory. At the same time, if one accepts the Augustinian interpretation of *habitus*, which Peter presents in full, the human nature of Christ does not retain its integrity. While, in the case of the *assumptus homo* theory, the divinization of the humanity of Christ is seen as more substantial, and in the *habitus* theory, it is seen as more spatial and adventitious, in both cases the human Christ becomes more than human. Both of these theories, in Peter’s eyes, are hence vulnerable to the charge of Christological nihilianism, the *assumptus homo* theory by absorbing the humanity of Christ and changing it into something else, and the *habitus* theory by making it hard to see how the Word truly became man, or truly took on human nature, in such a way that the two natures were, and remained, truly united while at the same time each nature retained its own characteristics.⁵⁰

What Peter thinks he can say positively here is that the incarnate Word, as a divine person, is not made lower than the Father by the fact that a human nature was predestined to be joined to Him at a particular point in time. Likewise, we cannot say that, in the incarnation, Christ’s human nature was deified, a problem which, in one form or another, he sees in all three opinions. Both natures, he insists, retain their own character in the incarnation.⁵¹ And so, notwithstanding the detailed support of the authorities which, as Peter shows, can be brought forward to bolster each of these positions, he recommends none of them. As he puts it at the conclusion of this segment of Book 3 of the *Sentences*: “What has been said above is not sufficient for the determination of this

⁵⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 6. c. 2.1–d. 7. c. 3.3, 2: 50–66.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, d. 7. c. 2, 2: 65.

question" (*Quod predicta non sufficiunt ad cognoscendam hanc quaestionem*). Advising that the matter should not be foreclosed prematurely, or with prejudice, he urges further research and reflection.⁵²

The Debates over the Lombard's Christology

The vast majority of modern commentators have been able to take Peter at his word here, accepting the fact that he was not a Christological nihilianist and that he was not a proponent of the *habitus* theory or, indeed, of any of the three opinions which he outlines and criticizes.⁵³ There are, however, a few who make the mistake of believing the twelfth-century opponents of the Lombard who erroneously imputed these views to him.⁵⁴ The most typical claim of contemporaries who misconstrued the Lombard's Christology was to associate him with the *habitus* theory, seen, in turn, as the theory of the hypostatic union that leads most easily to nihilianism. The earliest of these critics, Gerhoch of Reichersberg, on the other hand, sometimes treats him as an adherent of the *habitus* theory⁵⁵ and sometimes as an Adoptionist.⁵⁶ Gerhoch's criticism

⁵² Ibid., c. 3, 2: 66.

⁵³ An excellent survey of these debates is provided by Joseph de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle*, 2nd ed. (Bruges: De Tempel, 1948), pp. 250–76; *L'Essor de la littérature latine au XII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, 1946), 1: 73–76; Ludwig Hödl, "Logische Übungen zum christologischen Satz in der fröhscholastischen Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 89 (1978): 291–94, 296–300, 302; Jean Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires des maîtres parisiens au XII^e siècle: Étude historique et doctrinale*, 2 vols. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1975), 1: 83–85; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1: 116–37; P. Glorieux, "L'orthodoxie de III Sent. d. 6, 7 et 10," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 137–47; Mignon, *Les origines*, 2: 53–56; Horacio Santiago-Otero, *El conocimiento de Cristo en cuanto hombre en la teología de la primera mitad del siglo XII* (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, S.A., 1970), pp. 125–26 n. 1; "El 'nihilianismo cristológico' y las tres opiniones," *Burgense* 10 (1969): 431–43; Robert F. Studeny, *John of Cornwall, an Opponent of Nihilianism: A Study in the Christological Controversies of the Twelfth Century* (Vienna: St. Gabriel's Mission Press, 1939), pp. 104–16, 145.

⁵⁴ Jean Châtillon, "Achard de Saint-Victor et les controverses christologiques du XII^e siècle," in *Mélanges offerts au R. P. Ferdinand Cavallera* (Toulouse: Bibliothèque de l'Institut Catholique, 1948), pp. 117–37; "Latran III et l'enseignement christologique de Pierre Lombard," in *Le troisième concile de Latran (1179): Sa place dans l'histoire*, ed. Jean Longère (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1982), pp. 79–81; Philip S. Moore and Marthe Dulong, intro. to their ed. of Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae*, Bk. 1 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), pp. xlii, xlv; Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 243–64, 279–361.

⁵⁵ Gerhoch of Reichersberg, *De gloria et honore Filii hominis* 7.3, PL 194: 1097B.

⁵⁶ Gerhoch of Reichersberg, *Libellus de ordine donorum Sancti Spiritus in Opera inedita*, ed. Damien and Odulph Van den Eynde, Angelinus Rijmensdael, and Peter Classen, 2 vols. in 3 (Rome: Antonianum, 1955–56), 1: 71.

began in the 1140s, and reflects a familiarity with the earlier works of the Lombard and not the most recent version of the *Sentences*, in which Peter was able to profit from the ideas of John Damascene. Gerhoch's concern is less to enter into the debates on dogmatic theology than to defend the *assumptus homo* theory, complete with a divinized human Christ, in a battle with the Greek church in which he yokes that theory to the argument that the human Christ deserves *latria* and not just *dulia*. This was a point on which the Lombard changed the position he had articulated early in his career in his Psalms commentary, under the influence of Damascene. In the *Sentences* he actually endorses the *latria* position. This change was unknown to Gerhoch, who had failed to keep up with the Lombard's more recent teachings. Gerhoch thus keeps belaboring the point, well on into the mid-1160s, that Peter is wrong on *dulia* and *latria* here, in treatises and letters addressed to his bishop and to the pope.⁵⁷ The bishop in question, Eberhard of Bamberg, was clearly better informed than Gerhoch and points out to him that he has mistaken what Peter actually says in the *Sentences*.⁵⁸ Following this well-documented reproof, Gerhoch's attacks on the Lombard subsided.

Gerhoch's letters were written in 1164, well after the final edition of the *Sentences* had become available in Germany. Conceivably, it was Gerhoch's preoccupation with the impact of the Gregorian reform movement in Germany and his own east-west polemics that account for his failure to inform himself about what was up-to-date in Parisian scholasticism. But no such extenuating circumstances excuse the garbling of the Lombard's Christology on the part of John of Cornwall and Walter of St. Victor, thinkers whose work and study in Paris put them in a position to have understood what Peter had actually taught.

John of Cornwall had himself been a student of the Lombard's in the 1150s, before Peter became bishop of Paris and gave up

⁵⁷ Gerhoch of Reichersberg, *De gloria* 7.2–3, 19.2, *PL* 194: 1097A–1111A, 1143C–1144A; *Utrum Christus homo sit filius dei naturalis et deus*, ed. Van den Eynde et al., 1: 284–87; *Epistola* 15, to Eberhard, bishop of Bamberg, *PL* 194: 547A–548C; *Epistola* 17, to Pope Alexander III, *PL* 194: 565B–566A. Good treatments can be found in Damien Van den Eynde, “De nouveau sur deux maîtres lombards contemporains du Maître des *Sentences*,” *Pier Lombardo* 1 (1955): 6–7; *L'Oeuvre littéraire de Géroch de Reichersberg* (Rome: Antonianum, 1957), pp. 6, 49–66, 78–85, 107, 157–63, 265, 274; Peter Classen, *Gerhoch von Reichersberg: Eine Biographie* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1960), pp. 89–97, 162–73, 248–72, 318–19.

⁵⁸ Eberhard of Bamberg, *Epistola* 16, to Gerhoch of Reichersberg, *PL* 193: 555B–556C, 561D–564A. On Eberhard, see Van den Eynde, *L'Oeuvre*, pp. 279–80.

teaching. The early 1170s find John back in his native England, where he taught theology, perhaps at Oxford. He composed his *Eulogium*, in which he accuses Peter of Christological nihilianism, in two redactions between 1177 and 1179. The first of these was written with an eye to the Third Lateran council, convened by Pope Alexander III in the latter year.⁵⁹ In this work, John associates nihilianism with the *habitus* theory. He was aware of the fact that Alexander was interested in repressing nihilianism, as the matter had come up at a synod convened by the pope at Tours in 1163, although no particular theologians were named in this connection. It was no secret that the pope planned to put the matter on the agenda of Lateran III. He had suggested as much in a letter written to William of the White Hands, archbishop of Sens, in 1170. At the Lateran council itself, however, no formal determination concerning the views, or alleged views, of Peter Lombard was made. John then drafted the second version of the *Eulogium*, after Lateran III had risen, in a last-ditch effort to persuade Alexander not to let the matter drop.

Despite the fact that he had frequented the Lombard's lecture-room in the 1150s and was thus in a position to know that he had abandoned the support which he had given to the *habitus* theory in his Philippians gloss, John gives an account of the *habitus* doctrine and of Peter's own position that leave much to be desired from the standpoint of accuracy. John has been characterized by his editor, Nikolaus M. Häring, as conscientious but as a thinker who did not understand the problems surrounding Boethius's polyvalent use of the terms *substantia*, *natura*, and *persona*, on which, as we have seen, so much of the debate centered. Consequently, John's description and critique of the positions he presents "frequently results in a fog of 'double talk'."⁶⁰ As John outlines the three opinions, the subsistence theory, which he attributes to Gilbert of Poitiers, and the *habitus* theory, which he attributes to Abelard, are the sources for the Christological nihilianism which he attributes to Peter. In

⁵⁹ For John of Cornwall's biography and the dating on the work, see Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., "The *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertium* of John of Cornwall," *MS* 13 (1951): 254; Eleanor Rathbone, "John of Cornwall: A Brief Biography," *RTAM* 17 (1950): 46–60; Studeny, *John of Cornwall*, pp. 1–4. The evidence is reprised by Châtillon, "Latran III," pp. 79–65. I. S. Robinson, *The Papacy, 1073–1198: Continuity and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 142–44, offers the shaky opinion that John was commissioned by Pope Alexander III to prepare a dossier on Peter's Christology in preparation for Lateran III.

⁶⁰ Häring, "The *Eulogium*," p. 255.

support of this charge, he refers to Maurice of Sully, Peter's successor as bishop of Paris, and Robert of Melun, who had taught at Paris two decades earlier, and who had opposed the Lombard. Robert's works were not available to John; and there is no evidence to show that Maurice wrote anything except the sermons that made him a favored preacher at the French royal court.⁶¹ The oddest feature of John's attack is that, although he depends on the Lombard for his reprise of the three opinions, the formula for Christological nihilianism which he uses to frame the charge against Peter, *Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid*, does not appear in the *Sentences*. This technique of interpolating lines into Peter's work, or of misreading the lines that are there and that say something different, along with his appeal to the views of masters whose writings he had not and could not have read, scarcely inspires confidence in John's reliability.⁶²

John gets off on the wrong foot at once in his prologue, by conflating the claim that Christ is not any man (*Christus non est aliquis homo*) with the claim that, insofar as He is a man, Christ is not anything (*Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid*).⁶³ In his summary of the three positions that follows, he puts an extremely Porretan construction on the subsistence theory, complete with three substances and a per-mixed *persona*, precisely the features of this position which Peter criticizes, making it extremely difficult to see how John thinks he can assimilate Peter's teaching to this one. In his account of the *habitus* theory, John presents it as saying that Christ's human nature was apparent, not real, which is not what its proponents taught, according to the Lombard. John also states that this position excludes the idea that the Word took on a human body and soul which then, as combined, had reality as a substance. This latter doctrine was one that Peter taught, although he took pains to describe the combination of body and soul in the human Christ as a human nature and not as a substance. Still, this again makes it difficult to see how the *habitus* theory as John gives it can be ascribed to Peter.⁶⁴ It must be said that John's attribution of the subsistence theory to Gilbert, as he reports it, is just as incorrect. For, unlike some of the early Porretans, Gilbert himself did not adhere to the three-substance view and he stressed the principle that a *persona* is a *res per se una*. But, no doubt strangest of all,

⁶¹ C. A. Robson, *Maurice of Sully and the Medieval Vernacular Homily* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952).

⁶² Häring, "The *Eulogium*," pp. 255–56.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

⁶⁴ John of Cornwall, *Eulogium* 1, pp. 259–61.

considering the great lengths to which the Lombard went to refute Abelard as a dogmatic theologian, John states that he inherited the *habitus* theory, and with it, nihilianism, from his master, Peter Abelard (*a magistro Petro Abailardo hanc opinionem suam magister Petrus Lombardus accepit*). John also claims that he had heard the Lombard expound this view before he became bishop, although he admits, ingenuously, that Peter advised his hearers that “this was not his own position but only an opinion” (*non esset assertio sua sed opinione sola*). And, he wraps up this decidedly weak case by observing that he has heard, through heresay evidence, that other masters continue to endorse Christological nihilianism. He supplies no information on who these masters may be.⁶⁵ This is a spectacularly poor performance for a person who had actually studied with Peter Lombard, reminding us that even the best of instruction sometimes falls on stony ground.

The second and final contemporary who sought to tar the Lombard with the brush of Christological nihilianism and to bring the charge expressly to the attention of Alexander III is a rather different kettle of fish. He is Walter, prior of St. Victor, whose *Four Labyrinths of France*, like the first redaction of John’s *Eulogium*, was written in 1177 or 1178, before the Lateran council, in the effort to influence its doctrinal outcome. Where John was a scholastic, if not a very alert one, Walter was an arch-conservative, representing a St. Victor that had decidedly fallen away from the academic distinction which it had enjoyed under Hugh and Richard of St. Victor. The abbey itself was in a parlous state in the 1160s.⁶⁶ The abbot, Ernis, had become a tyrant by 1163, setting aside the rule of the abbey in that year. By 1169 he had stopped consulting the brethren. He neglected their and his own religious life and did not even maintain a regular residence at St. Victor. Things had come to such a pass that in September of 1169, Alexander III ordered a reform of St. Victor, charging William, archbishop of Sens, and Odo, abbot of Ourscamp, with carrying it out. The desired results did not eventuate. The pope again ordered William to spearhead a reform of the abbey in February of 1172, writing as well to King

⁶⁵ Ibid., 3, p. 265.

⁶⁶ This account is based on the excellent contributions of Jean Châtillon, “De Guillaume de Champeaux à Thomas Gallus: Chronique d’histoire littéraire et doctrinale de l’école de Saint-Victor,” *Revue du moyen âge latin* 8 (1952): 139–62, 245–72; Saralyn R. Daly, “Peter Comestor: Master of Histories,” *Speculum* 32 (1957): 69–70; Dietrich Lohrmann, “Ernis, abbé de Saint-Victor (1161–1172): Rapports avec Rome, affaires financières,” in *L’Abbaye parisienne de Saint-Victor au moyen âge*, ed. Jean Longère (Paris: Brepols, 1991), pp. 186–93.

Louis VII to inform him of the problem. The result was the resignation of Ernis and the election of a new abbot, Guérin, in 1172. Discord, however, continued. Although he had been banished to a country priory, Ernis returned to Paris and created both a disturbance and a scandal by robbing the treasury of St. Victor, seizing funds that had been left there in trust by Eskyl, archbishop of Lund. Eskyl complained to Maurice, bishop of Paris, who, with the assistance of William of Sens, managed to get the property restored to St. Victor. By May of 1173 peace had apparently returned to the abbey, because when the pope wrote to St. Victor at that point, he referred to its religious calm.

While this series of conflicts did not force anyone to leave St. Victor except Ernis, and he appears to have been no loss, it was not calculated to attract scholars to join the community. After his installation, Guérin wrote to the pope complaining about the wretched state of intellectual life at the abbey, compared with the glory days of the earlier twelfth century. He suggests that Ernis was to blame for a policy of discouraging the admission of learned men who could add luster to the school. While this complaint may well have been a canard aimed at his predecessor, it is certainly true that, with the death of Richard of St. Victor in 1173, we find the school of St. Victor increasingly in a state of eclipse. It remained a center known for its preaching. But it did not produce or draw to it great works or great thinkers. Under the pretext of remaining loyal to its past, St. Victor sank into a narrow traditionalism, unresponsive to the intellectual currents of its time. The one Victorine in this period who tried to keep alive the optimism about human reason, the intellectual breadth, and the vision of Hugh of St. Victor was Godfrey, author of the *Microcosmus* and the *Fons philosophiae*. He was the exception who proved the rule. More typical of St. Victor in the last quarter of the twelfth century was its prior, Walter, known for his sermons and his pessimistic and hostile outlook on innovation of any kind. He was the author of the garbled, intemperate, misinformed, and largely plagiarized work in which he attacked Peter Lombard, along with Peter of Poitiers, Gilbert of Poitiers, and Peter Abelard, as profane innovators who had brought ruination upon theology in his time. Even Walter's editor cannot repress his distaste for the man and his work, describing it as a "mauvaise action et mauvais travail," as ineptly written, inspired by ignorance and prejudice, in a style that is "brutale, grossière."⁶⁷

⁶⁷ P. Glorieux, "Mauvaise action et mauvias travail: Le 'Contra quatuor laby-

Walter is such a confused writer that, in his introduction, he tells a tale, meant to criticize the cardinals helping Alexander III to prepare for the Third Lateran council at a consistory in Rome prior to that council, which instead redounds to his own discredit. Alexander, he observes, was considering whether to put Peter Lombard's alleged Christological nihilianism on the agenda of the council. But, some of the cardinals, who, in Walter's estimation, were "not responding rightly" (*non recte respondentes*), dissuaded him from doing so. A key figure in shaping their opinion was bishop Adam of Wales, by whom Walter means Adam of St. Asaph. According to Walter, Adam spoke up in opposition to the idea that Peter had taught nihilianism. As Walter reports the event, Adam said, "Lord pope, I, as a clerk and as a former moniter over his pupils, will defend the opinions of the master" (*Domine papa, ego et clericus et prepositus olim scholarum eius defendam sententias magistri*). He proceeded to do so, and carried the day, much to Walter's disgust.⁶⁸

Now, this Adam of St. Asaph has traditionally been identified as Adam of Balsham, better known as Adam du Petit-Pont, the distinguished logician who taught in that location for many years and who would certainly have been well acquainted with the Lombard.⁶⁹ But Lorenzo Minio-Paluello has offered a persuasive corrective to that view. Noting that Adam of Balsham wrote his major work, the *Ars disserendi*, in 1132, that he taught John of Salisbury before 1148, that he became a canon of Notre Dame, and that in this capacity, he testified against Gilbert of Poitiers at the consistory of Paris in 1147 and the council of Rheims in 1148, and that the fragments of some theological *quaestiones* which he left indicate his qualifications as a *peritus* in that connection, Minio-Paluello also points out that he died before 1159. In any event, given the fact that the regnal years of Adam of St. Asaph were 1175 to 1181, it is difficult to imagine that the king of England would have viewed as a likely candidate for the bishopric a man of the age Adam of Balsham would have been had he still been alive at the time. In the opinion of Minio-Paluello, the Adam who did actually

rinthos Franciae',” *RTAM* 21 (1954): 179–93. The quotation is at p. 180. Glorieux repeats this judgment in the intro. to his ed. of the text, “*Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae*,” *AHDLMA* 19 (1952): 192–94.

⁶⁸ Walter of St. Victor, *Contra quatuor labyrinthos*, p. 201.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Glorieux, intro. to his ed., p. 194; Daniel D. McGarry, intro. to his trans. of John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 98 n. 181. This opinion is repeated by Robinson, *The Papacy*, p. 143.

occupy the see of St. Asaph during these years was a Welshman who had, indeed, studied with Peter Lombard in Paris and who had become a canon of Notre Dame. This is the Adam to whom Walter refers in the *Four Labyrinths*. This same Adam of St. Asaph is also known to have attended the Third Lateran council.⁷⁰

While it would no doubt add piquancy to the story if Walter's Adam of Wales had, in fact, been the famous master with whom Adam of St. Asaph has been confused, the key point, which Walter evidently has not grasped, is that the Adam who spoke at the consistory in Rome was a man fully qualified to give an accurate and well-informed report of the Lombard's teaching, one better informed than Walter's own. Adam did so; and the members of the papal court were intelligent enough to recognize the fact that he knew whereof he spoke. As for Alexander, he contented himself with writing to William of the White Hands, now archbishop of Rheims, adjuring him to be on the lookout for Christological nihilism within his jurisdiction, but naming no names. At the Lateran council itself, the detractors of the Lombard behaved in so obnoxious and so underhanded a manner, not scrupling even to charge that he had obtained the bishopric of Paris through simony, that his supporters could ride the wave of revulsion they inspired to persuade the council fathers to drop the whole matter. It was the later objections to another aspect of the Lombard's Christology on the part of Joachim of Fiore and others at the turn of the thirteenth century that prompted the reinvestigation of the matter and that led the fathers of the Fourth Lateran council to open the third book of Peter's *Sentences*, which no one in authority had apparently thought of doing before this time, there to discover that he had taught Christological nihilism no more than he had taught that there was a quaternity in the Trinity. As a result, they dismissed Joachim's charge, affirmed Peter's orthodoxy by name and declared the case closed.⁷¹ And, in 1215, the same year in which the fathers of Lateran IV arrived at this judgment, the Lombard's *Sentences* were mandated as required reading for doctoral candidates in theology in the statutes legislated by the University of Paris.

But we have anticipated ourselves, and must return to Walter of St. Victor's argument, if such it may be called. To begin with, he plagiarizes John of Cornwall almost verbatim in the section of the

⁷⁰ Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "The 'Ars disserendi' of Adam of Balsham 'Parvipontanus'," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 3 (1954): 116-69.

⁷¹ Châtillon, "Latran III," pp. 85-90.

Four Labyrinths where he reprises the three opinions about the hypostatic union,⁷² in itself no recommendation. To this he adds his own lucubrations. Walter treats both the *assumptus homo* and the *habitus* theories as heretical and claims that Peter had espoused both of them, although he thinks that Peter supported the *habitus* theory more strongly.⁷³ He objects to the fact that Peter aired the problems connected with Boethius's definition of *persona* as the individual substance of a rational nature, without noting the fact that, among other things, Peter's reason for doing so was to avoid an incarnate Christ with two persons. As Walter sees it, the only way in which the human Christ can be an *aliquid* is if He has a human person. Here, he treats a position to which the Lombard had objected as one to which he adhered, even though he acknowledges Peter's point that the Word took on a human body and a human soul, and, therefore, a human nature.⁷⁴ But, why go on? Having reviewed and criticized Peter's Christology, to his own satisfaction at least, Walter moves on to the real source of the problem as he sees it. Peter, like the other three labyrinths of France, has gone astray because he is too addicted to the *artes*. He has tried to understand transcendent theological mysteries as if they could be reduced to grammatical and logical rules. He is sophist, a partisan of frivolous dialectical arguments.⁷⁵ That onslaught delivered, Walter adds, as a throwaway line before going on to the next labyrinth, that Peter also espoused many other heretical opinions about the Eucharist, which he declines to relate.⁷⁶

It would seem that Christological nihilianism, as a teaching of the Lombard, was, to some extent, a product of the overheated imaginations of men such as John of Cornwall and Walter of St. Victor, and a product of the tendency, even on the part of such members of the literate elite as these men, to rely on word-of-mouth reports rather than textual evidence. Yet, before leaving this topic, it is worth noting that it does have some basis, or at least possible basis, in the teachings of some of the Lombard's followers, notably Gandulph of Bologna and, even more importantly, Peter of Poitiers, since the latter held the chair of theology at Notre Dame from 1167 to 1193, when he became chancellor of the school. While

⁷² Robert Studeny, "Walter of St. Victor and the 'Apologia de Verbo Incarnato,'" *Gregorianum* 18 (1937): 579–85.

⁷³ Walter of St. Victor, *Contra quatuor labyrinthos* 3.1–2, pp. 246–49.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.3–6, 4, pp. 250–56, 328–30.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.7–8, pp. 256–57.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.11, p. 260.

one can no more find the claim that Christ, insofar as He was a man, was not anything, in the writings of either of these masters than one can in the Lombard's, it is the case that they accent more strongly than he does the *habitus* theory, seen at the time as the likeliest connecting link with nihilianism, especially if one stresses, as they do, the accidental character of the manhood of the incarnate Christ.⁷⁷ In this sense there was a real theological basis for the debate in the 1170s. But it is one that post-dates the Lombard's teaching and writing by two decades. And, it was a debate that could scarcely be entered into effectively by thinkers like Walter and John, who were insensitive to the problems in Boethius's lexicon that had bedeviled the mid-century discussions, just as they were unfamiliar with the more integrally Aristotelian language that informed the treatments of Christology of the mainstream theologians later in the century. In the sequel, it would be by the appropriation and use of the newly received Aristotle, and not through the tactics of a John or a Walter, that a consensus could emerge, in the early thirteenth century. This newly developed consensus was to make a reformulated version of the subsistence theory, and one embodying many of the features of the doctrine of the hypostatic union that the Lombard did endorse, the theory of choice.⁷⁸

The position held by a mid-twelfth-century theologian on the hypostatic union was important not only in and of itself but also for its influence on his other Christological teachings. There are two major indices of this fact. The first can be found in contemporary treatments of the question of whether Christ's human and divine natures, once joined, were partible and, as a corollary of that question, whether Christ's divinity remained attached to His humanity during the three days when His body lay in the tomb, separated from His soul, between His death and His resurrection. As we have seen above, it was not only proponents of the *habitus* theory but also thinkers associated with the *assumptus homo* theory who felt perfectly comfortable with the idea that Christ's divinity could not remain attached to His human body in the tomb. They accented, instead, the idea that His divinity remained attached to His soul alone during the *triduum*.⁷⁹ This position reflects, as well,

⁷⁷ Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae* 4.10, *PL* 211: 1176B–C. On this point, see Moore and Dulong, intro. to their ed. of Peter's *Sentences*, Bk. 1, pp. xliii–xliv; Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 279–361.

⁷⁸ This development has been traced magisterially by Principe, *William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union*.

⁷⁹ Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1: 273–318, although his survey omits the Porretans.

the Platonizing anthropologies found in the Abelardian and Victorine traditions alike. Among theologians prior to Peter Lombard, the only ones to insist forcibly on the point that, once Christ's divinity and humanity were united, they remained united, were William of Champeaux, Gilbert of Poitiers and the early Porretans, and Robert Pullen. Peter certainly draws on their arguments in making his own case against what he calls the "desertion of divinity" in the incarnate Christ during the *triduum*. At the same time, since he himself endorses the idea that Christ's divinity is united to His body through the mediation of His soul, he needs to develop a more finely nuanced defense of the claim that this desertion did not occur either in His soul or in His body.

Acknowledging that the soul of Christ, which mediates the hypostatic union, was indeed separated from His body in the tomb, Peter argues that, with respect to His body, Christ's divinity subtracted its protection, but did not dissolve their union, so that His dead body did not exhibit the effects of Christ's divine power during the *triduum* (*separavit se divinitas quia subtraxit protectionem, sed non solvit unionem . . . Mortuus est Christus divinitate recedente, id est effectum potentiae defendendo non exhibente*).⁸⁰ Peter then turns to attack those who say that Christ's divinity was not united to His body in the tomb, although without the manifestation of His divine power in it, as being forced to accept the conclusion that Christ thus underwent incarnation twice, once when He took on human nature from the Virgin Mary, and then when He took on a glorified human nature in the resurrection. This conclusion is not only pernicious but perfidious, since it casts doubt on the doctrine of the resurrection. Peter himself concludes that, although Christ truly died as a man, His divinity was never divided from His humanity either in body or soul.⁸¹ And, introducing a distinction derived from Damascene, he concludes further that Christ's ubiquity, during the *triduum*, depends on whether He is seen as being where He is *totus* or *totum*. *Totus* refers to Christ's divinity as a member of the Trinity, in which sense He is fully God and shares the divine ubiquity in the same way as the Father or the Holy Spirit. But, God is not all Christ is; He is also fully man. We cannot ascribe ubiquity to Christ's human nature, although He possesses fully both the divine and the human natures that He has.⁸²

⁸⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 21. c. 1.4, 2: 131.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, c. 1.5–c. 2, 2: 132–35.

⁸² *Ibid.*, d. 22. c. 2–c. 4, 2: 137–40.

The Lombard is quite consistent in defending this consequence of the doctrine that Christ's divinity and humanity were integrally united, that the union was not accidental, or one leading either to the lowering of His divinity or the divinization of His humanity. At the same time, in turning to the range of issues associated with Christ's human nature, the second test case for a theologian's application of his position on the hypostatic union, it must be said that he does not carry this principle to its ultimate logical conclusions. To be sure, Peter offers a vigorous and forthright defense of the idea that, as a human being, the man Jesus was a created being and no more. While Jesus was unique in His manner of birth and in His sharing, by grace, in a union with the Word, He also shares, by nature, the fact of being human, being born at a particular time, being capable of being predestined, and of having free will with other human beings. This individual human being, Peter stresses, had no claim on the fact that God chose to assume His body and soul; God could have chosen to assume a different human body and soul, making that other individual exactly the same kind of being as the incarnate Christ was and giving that individual the same sort of redemptive role. Further, and this point is argued against Abelard, God could have assumed the body and soul of a woman instead of a man, although, Peter notes, God's actual choice made sense since, given the *morés* of His time and place, Christ's mission was facilitated by His incarnation in masculine form.⁸³ All these assertions are made by Peter against theologians, whether on the Abelardian or the Victorine side of the debate, who see Christ's human nature as assimilated by or conformed to His divinity, in such a way that it stops being purely human. Yet, in treating Christ's human aptitudes, especially His human knowledge and His capacity to sin, Peter does not succeed entirely in pressing the logic of this position. Rather, he tends to align himself, to a greater or lesser degree, with a quasidivinized view of Christ's human nature that is more compatible with views of the hypostatic union that he does not support than with those which he defends.

CHRIST'S HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ANCIENT AND CURRENT DEBATES

Such is particularly the case with Christ's human knowledge, a topic receiving considerable attention in the first half of the twelfth

⁸³ *Ibid.*, d. 10. c. 2–d. 12. c. 4, 2: 74–83.

century.⁸⁴ The debate itself goes back to the time of Augustine and Bede. Augustine had argued that the human Christ possessed perfect knowledge, from the earliest moment of His life. Confronted by the statement in the Gospel of Luke, that, as a boy, Jesus grew in grace and wisdom, he states that this means that the omniscient Jesus merely manifested His perfect knowledge gradually, in accordance with the stages of human development through which He passed as a child and a youth. Bede rejects Augustine's argument and sees the text of Luke as one that should be read literally. For his part, there is no problem in accepting the idea that Jesus underwent the intellectual development normal to childhood, just as He underwent a standard physiological development. The particular theologian who sparked the debate in the early twelfth century was Walter of Mortagne. While there were some monastic defenders of Bede, particularly in the Cistercian tradition, who endorsed this position for devotional reasons,⁸⁵ Walter was the first scholastic to support Bede against Augustine, and on dogmatic grounds. If the human Christ were omniscient, he argues, then His humanity would be placed in jeopardy and a creature would be made the equal of the creator.⁸⁶ This claim provoked an outburst of opposition from other scholastic theologians, an outburst that also inspired them to make some distinctions not drawn by Walter. The members of the school of Laon, following the *Glossa ordinaria*, side forcefully with Augustine, adding, in a formula destined to be repeated widely, that, while the human Christ knew as much as the Word knew, His mode of knowing was different; the human Christ knew by an infusion of grace, not by nature. The Laon masters are followed on this point by the *Sententiae divinitatis*, Roland of Bologna, and Robert of Melun.⁸⁷ In essence, this position denies to the

⁸⁴ The most important survey of this subject is Santiago-Otero, *El conocimiento de Cristo*, which has superseded earlier studies such as William J. Forster, *The Beatific Knowledge of Christ in the Theology of the 12th and 13th Centuries* (Rome: Pontificum Athenaeum Internationale "Angelicum," 1958), pp. 1–25; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 2: 47–78; John C. Murray, *The Infused Knowledge of Christ in the Theology of the 12th and 13th Centuries* (Windsor, Ontario, 1963), pp. 7–19; Ott, *Die Briefliteratur*, pp. 32–47, 354–76, 379–80; Laurence S. Vaughan, *The Acquired Knowledge of Christ according to the Theologians of the 12th and 13th Centuries* (Rome: Pontificum Athenaeum Internationale "Angelicum," 1957), pp. 5–16.

⁸⁵ Santiago-Otero, *El conocimiento*, pp. 229–43.

⁸⁶ Walter of Mortagne, *Epistola ad Hugonem prioris Sancti Victoris*, PL 186: 1052B–1054B. On Walter, see Horacio Santiago-Otero, "Gualterio de Mortagne (d. 1174) y las controversias cristológicas del siglo XII," *Revista española de teología* 27 (1967): 271–83; *El conocimiento*, pp. 18–19, 58–70.

⁸⁷ *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 3: *In Isaiam* 7:5, editio princeps (Strassburg: Adolph Rusch?, c. 1481); repr. with intro. by Karlfried Froelich and Margaret T.

human Christ a truly human psychology. It is in reaction to this idea, as well as to Walter of Mortagne's position, that the Abelardians come up with another distinction. On the one hand, they cede to the human Christ even more, the vision of God during His lifetime. But, on the other, they argue, He did not possess the full understanding of God, which cannot be communicated perfectly to any created intelligence. Thus, the Abelardians conclude, while the human Christ could contemplate the divine essence, He could not do so, during His lifetime, in an exhaustive manner; and God thus retains, for the human Christ, a measure of His unknowability.⁸⁸

A still stronger effort to refute Walter, and by extension Bede, and to amplify on the teaching of the school of Laon, can be found in the position of Hugh of St. Victor. In its extremity it can be called the "maximalist" view in this debate, in the words of Horacio Santiago-Otero, who also finds not a little Apollinarianism in Hugh's doctrine. Hugh agrees with the school of Laon and Augustine that Christ's human knowledge was exhaustive, and that He possessed it from the moment when the human Christ came into being. Hugh also agrees that the human Christ has a mode of knowing different from that of the Word. The Word is wisdom; the human Christ possesses wisdom. And, the human Christ obtains this wisdom by a participation of the divine wisdom in His mind. From Hugh's point of view, this participated knowledge is not identical with the knowledge enjoyed eternally by the Word, in that a process must occur in order for the human Christ to acquire it, even if that process is an instantaneous one. Equally, however, this theory, much as it may seek to preserve the distinction between creature and creator, goes even farther than the school of Laon in obliterating a human psychology in Christ and in overtaking His humanity by His divinity. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* follows Hugh in this teaching, although he is somewhat less participationist than Hugh.⁸⁹

Judging from the position they take on the *gemina substantia* in the

Gibson (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992); also *PL* 113: 1246A; Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine*, p. 40; *Sentences of Probable Authenticity*, no. 150, 5: 114–16; *Sent. div.* 4.3.3–4, pp. 82*–86*; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 166–70; Anders, *Die Christologie*, pp. xxxviii–xliv; Horacio Santiago-Otero, "El conocimiento del alma de Cristo según las enseñanzas de Anselmo de Laon y de su escuela," *Salamancaenses* 13 (1966): 61–79; *El conocimiento*, pp. 33–56. Jean Châtillon, "Quidquid convenit filio dei per naturam convenit filio hominis per gratiam: A propos de Jean de Ripa, *Determinationes* I, 4, 4," *Divinitas* 11 (1967): 715–28, has tracked the fortunes of this formula in this period.

⁸⁸ Santiago-Otero, *El conocimiento*, pp. 18–19, 138–77.

⁸⁹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.1.6, *PL* 176: 283C–284B; *Summa sent.* 1.16, *PL*

person of the incarnate Christ, departing thereby from Gilbert of Poitiers, it may not be very much of a surprise to find that the early Porretans, in their effort to moderate Hugh's position and to strike a balance between it and that of Walter of Mortagne, do not prove to be very successful. They accord to Christ's human intelligence a knowledge of its own, distinguishable from the divine wisdom possessed by the Word. At the same time, they argue that Christ's human knowledge was infinite, perfect, and thus the equivalent of what the Word knows. The way they try to frame this distinction is to say that, although created, the mind of the human Christ possesses a representative, adequate understanding corresponding to the divine knowledge, which enables it to function as omniscient, even though it is not divine. As an effort at compromise, this account clearly cedes the ground to the maximalists.⁹⁰

Equally unsurprising is the fact that the knowledge of the human Christ is a subject on which Robert Pullen has a hard time making up his mind. His handling of this topic is an acute example of his tendency to lay out all the alternatives and to make heavy weather out of taking a stand. The result is extreme inconsistency. To be sure, he says, Christ took on humanity and He was like us in all but sin. Yet, Robert finds it incredible (*incredibile*) that the human Christ should have had to undergo a learning process, over the course of time, the way that other human beings do. But, equally, he sees it as *incredibile* that the human Christ should have had a fullness of divine knowledge, beyond what other men have and beyond what human beings need. Robert feels that the safest course is to go back to the position of the school of Laon, thus, in effect, cancelling out the last few decades of discussion. He agrees that the human Christ knew everything, from the moment of the incarnation, although He displayed that knowledge gradually. Robert distinguishes here between His physical growth and development over time and the instantaneous nature of His acquisition of knowledge. Since Christ lacked original sin, He lacked ignorance, Robert notes, while also failing to observe that this would have given the human Christ the mental aptitudes of prelapsarian man, and no

176: 72C–75A; Horacio Santiago-Otero, "La actividad sapiencial de Cristo en cuanto hombre en la 'Suma de las sentencias'," *Revista española de teología* 28 (1968): 77–91; "La sabiduría del alma de Cristo según Hugo de San Víctor," *RTAM* 34 (1967): 131–58; *El conocimiento*, pp. 81–99, 102–15, 118–21; "'Esse est habere' en Hugo de San Víctor," in *L'Homme et son univers au moyen âge*, ed. Christian Wenin (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1986), 1: 426–31.

⁹⁰ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 3.31–35, pp. 129–30; this text is not cited by Santiago-Otero, *El conocimiento*, pp. 19, 183–99, in his treatment of the Porretans.

more. Christ received a plenary infusion of divine knowledge, which, for Robert, can be compared with the capacity to perform miracles, which He also received. This knowledge does not make the human Christ divine, he asserts, since it was received by grace, not possessed by nature. Here, in making this comparison, Robert does not indicate whether he thinks that Christ's miracles stem from the exercise of His divine nature or from a special gift granted to His human nature. None the less, while advancing this claim, Robert also states that Christ did not know everything. He was, to be sure, full of grace and truth, but in the sense that, what He knew, He knew exhaustively, not in the sense of omniscience.⁹¹

The Lombard on Christ's Human Knowledge

In relation to these debates, and for all his insistence on the full humanity and creaturely status of the human Christ, Peter Lombard also ends by aligning himself with an only slightly modified version of the Laon masters' treatment of Christ's human knowledge. The participationist aspect of Hugh of St. Victor's position clearly does not appeal to him. Peter agrees that the human Christ enjoys a fullness of grace and wisdom from the moment of His conception. This created wisdom never grows, just as the uncreated wisdom of the Word never grows. Peter subscribes to the distinction between grace and nature as modes of knowledge in the human and divine natures of Christ, respectively, and also to the idea that the created wisdom possessed by the human Christ as a gift of grace transcends what other human beings can know. The human Christ, for him, did know everything that God knows. But, and here is Peter's one concession to the minimalist position, not with the same clarity and precision. The human Christ knows the same things, but less exhaustively and with less penetration than God knows them. And, He did not have all of God's power, so that He could not have translated all that He knew into fact. For example, the human Christ knew how the world was created, but He could not have created it Himself. As to why the human Christ received more knowledge than power, Peter replies, somewhat unsatisfactorily, that He was naturally capable (*naturaliter capax*) of the knowledge, but not of the power.⁹² In any event, and notwithstanding

⁹¹ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 3.21–24, 3.27–30, 4.5, *PL* 186: 793A–797C, 800C–806A, 810C–811A; Santiago-Otero, *El conocimiento*, pp. 204–26.

⁹² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 13. c. 2–d. 14. c. 2, 2: 84–91; the quotation is at d.

other aspects of his Christology, Peter is thus willing to deny to the human Christ a fully human psychology of knowledge.

OTHER ATTRIBUTES OF CHRIST'S HUMANITY

This unsymmetrical distinction between the human Christ's fullness of knowledge and the limits of His power, or His human weaknesses, is one that Peter joins other theologians of the day in following. There is general agreement, in this period, that Christ took on some of the consequences of original sin, such as mortality, the capacity to suffer hunger and thirst, to feel affection, and to feel fear, especially the filial fear of God that is a virtue. Contemporaries likewise agreed that Christ underwent a normal gestation in the womb and a normal physical development from infancy to childhood to adulthood. In these areas, the Lombard shares the current consensus and adds only a few touches of his own to it.⁹³ He supports the position that Christ suffered weaknesses of both body and soul, voluntarily and not by nature or as a consequence of sin. At the same time, in handling this topic, he makes the point, inherited from Augustine, that sensation derives not from the body but from the mind, and also that the mind uses the body as an instrument (*Omnis autem sensus animae est: non enim caro sentit, sed anima utens corpore velut instrumento*).⁹⁴ This observation is not entirely of a piece with Peter's treatment of human nature as an integral unit of body and soul in Book 2 of the *Sentences*. Here, in the effort to root the essence of moral choice in the mind, he imports a Stoic-Platonic view of man's nature into the account, which is quite atypical of his anthropology. In any event, Peter adds that, while Christ took on some human weaknesses that were expedient for Him to have and that did not derogate from His dignity or the efficacy of His mission, He did not take on all the human weaknesses that fall to mankind as a consequence of sin. This is the reason why Christ did not take on ignorance or concupiscence, both of which, Peter argues, would have impeded His mission. In these two respects, as well as with respect to His knowledge, Christ was not

14. c. 2.1, p. 91; Horacio Santiago-Otero, "Pedro Lombardo: Su tesis, acerca del saber de Cristo hombre," in *Miscelánea José Zunzunegui (1911-1974)* (Vitoria: Editorial Eset, 1975), 1: 115-25.

⁹³ Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 2: 266 ff.; Ott, *Die theologische Briefliteratur*, pp. 218-34, 400-01.

⁹⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 15. c. 1.1-c. 2, d. 16. c. 1, 2: 93-100, 103-04. The quotation is at c. 1.2, p. 93.

like us in all but sin. As for those weaknesses which Christ did accept as critical to His mission, such as the capacity to suffer and the capacity to experience temptation so that He would be able to empathize with men, Peter thinks that He did not feel these things in the same way that men do, in that He lacked the weakened will and clouded knowledge with which men have to come to grips with their afflictions and temptations. In this respect, while men undergo temptation (*passio*) and contemplation of the temptation (*pro-passio*) prior to the consent (*consensus*) which is of the essence in their moral decisions, Christ only experienced the *propassio* and the *consensus*. He was not subject to *passio* as a necessity of His nature, as men are. In these respects, as well, Christ is not like us in all but sin: His moral psychology no less than His psychology of knowledge differs from that of other human beings.⁹⁵ While, in this section of his Christology, Peter feels impelled to reject flat out the claim of Hilary of Poitiers that Christ was incapable of suffering,⁹⁶ his own handling of Christ's human weaknesses does exempt Him from full participation in the human condition. As Peter sums up this point, because Christ came to save all mankind, He accepted something from all phases of human experience, before sin and after sin, before grace and under grace, as well as in glory. From prelapsarian man he took the lack of human weakness that inclines man more to evil than to good. From man in his fallen state, Christ took on the punishment for sin and those other weaknesses of fallen humanity not demeaning to Him or obstructive in His mission. From man in the state of grace, He took on a fullness of grace. And, from man in the state of glory, He took on, in His resurrection, the *non posse peccare* and the perfect contemplation of God that characterize the saints in the life to come. Thus, the human Christ possesses both the goods of the *patria* and the goods and evils of the *via*.⁹⁷

This last point reflects another current debate, the question of whether the human Christ during His earthly life had the *non posse peccare* or, alternatively, the *posse peccare et non peccare* of prelapsarian man, or some other range of moral possibilities.⁹⁸ Some thinkers during this period extended to the human Christ during His earthly life the *non posse peccare* which, more typically, was granted by the theologians only to the deity, or to the saints in Heaven. The

⁹⁵ Ibid., c. 2.1–2, 2: 98–99.

⁹⁶ Ibid., c. 3, 2: 100–02.

⁹⁷ Ibid., d. 16. c. 2, 2: 105.

⁹⁸ See Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 1: 320–53.

masters taking the most extreme line on this question are the Porretans and Robert Pullen, who agree that Christ had the incapacity to sin. He had, to be sure, free will. Yet, on the analogy of the angels confirmed in the good by grace, He had the *non posse peccare*.⁹⁹ As we have seen above,¹⁰⁰ not all theologians thought it was appropriate to attribute the state of *non posse peccare* to the angels, Peter Lombard included. That problem aside, it was more usual, in this period, to grant, at least potentially, a greater capacity to sin to the human Christ than that accorded by the Porretans and Robert Pullen. William of Champeaux and other members of the school of Laon offer a formula here that many found persuasive. According to them, Christ in His human nature had the capacity to sin. But, the presence of the divine nature in Him conformed the human to the divine will, confirmed Him in virtue, and assured that He would not sin, by grace, to be sure, not by nature.¹⁰¹ The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* agrees with this view, although he nuances it. In his estimation, Christ accepted the possibility of sin by will, not by nature. In practice, Christ's human and divine wills were functionally joined "by habit and participation" (*per habitum et participationum*), so that, in the event, He did not sin.¹⁰² These formulations suggest how easily a support for the *assumptus homo* and subsistence theories of the hypostatic union could inform a view of Christ's free will in action that is functionally Monothelite.

On the other side of the debate stood Peter Abelard. Abelard begins by arguing strongly for the principle of Christ's free will as a man. He objects to the idea that Christ possessed this faculty but never exercised it, out of a gift of grace. For, if such were the case, a divine psychology would have replaced a human psychology in the incarnate Christ. Abelard thinks that Christ did indeed have a fully human psychology. He hopes to shed light on this point by recasting it in terms of the distinction between possibility and necessity. From this perspective, the human Christ had the capacity to sin and not to sin. But this capacity was suspended after He was united and while He remained united with the Word (*non tamen postquam unitus vel unitum est*). Just as when a natural necessity follows from a contingent action which sets a chain of cause and effect in motion, so, once the human Christ has been united with the Word, it is

⁹⁹ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 3.22–23, p. 127.

¹⁰⁰ See above, chapter 6, pp. 344–46.

¹⁰¹ *Sentences of Plausible Authenticity*, no. 185–87; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 363–64, 5: 129–30, 213–14.

¹⁰² *Sent. div.* 4.3.9, pp. 91*–94*. The quotation is on p. 94*.

impossible for the divine-human Christ to sin in any way (*modibus omnibus impossibile peccans*).¹⁰³ This pretended solution is actually no solution at all. While ostensibly trying to defend the free will of the human Christ, Abelard ends by denying it functionally in just as strong a sense as William of Champeaux, the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, the Porretans, and Robert Pullen. Further, by claiming that this free will was an option prior to the incarnation but not afterwards, he opens himself to the charge of Adoptionism.

Hugh of St. Victor takes another line of attack, and one equally problematic. On the one hand, he urges that the human Christ had the same capacity to sin, or not to sin, as Adam enjoyed before the fall. On the other hand, Hugh says that Christ was morally unlike prelapsarian man, in that He possessed no vices and experienced no inordinate inclinations or temptations. As Hugh sees it, Christ's possession of all the virtues, all at once, on the model of His possession of all knowledge, precludes any moral decision-making on His part. It is difficult to see how this conclusion squares with Hugh's premise that He had the *posse peccare et non peccare* of Adam before the fall.¹⁰⁴

The master who comes the closest to the position which the Lombard espouses, even though he follows Hugh with a good deal of fidelity on Christ's human knowledge, is the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. He accents, it must be said, even more thoroughly than Peter does, the creaturely status of the human Christ, and, with greater consistency, argues that He took on all our infirmities, ignorance excepted, apart from sin. This author does not make the distinction between expedient and demeaning infirmities. As he sees it, the human Christ had the *posse peccare*. He was capable of experiencing temptation. But, having the freedom to resist temptation, He did so. Thus, by His own act of will, assisted by grace, He brought His human will into perfect alignment with the will of God. This He could do without losing His status as a creature.¹⁰⁵

Peter, in effect, seeks to split the difference between the *Summa sententiarum* and Hugh of St. Victor. With the former, he agrees that Christ had two wills, a human and a divine. Also, with the former and against thinkers seeking to assimilate the human to the divine

¹⁰³ Peter Abelard, *Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 3:4, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 11: 98–99; the quotations are on p. 99. Hermannus follows suit and does not resolve the problem either; see Neilsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 223–28.

¹⁰⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.2.6, 2.1.7, *PL* 176: 383C, 389B–391C.

¹⁰⁵ *Summa sent.* 1.17–18, *PL* 176: 75A–78D.

will, he argues that the human will of Christ functions in the same way as the wills of other human beings. At the same time, and here he supports Hugh, he sees the human Christ as having been freed from those consequences of original sin that impede or limit the free exercise of the will in fallen man, adding, as we have seen, concupiscence to ignorance as consequences of sin that He does not take on, and which therefore do not limit His use of free will. Further, as we have noted above, he grants to the human Christ a fullness of knowledge that has the effect of exempting Him from the false judgments that might otherwise incline Him to consent to inappropriate or false goods; and he exempts the human Christ from *passio* in the psychogenesis of His moral choices. In this sense, for Peter the human Christ does not suffer the experience of the divided self. His will is not weakened; His flesh does not lust against His spirit; and the eye of His intellect is not clouded. According to Peter, the human Christ had the full power to choose evils or lesser goods. Indeed, He did not shrink from accepting the evils of physical suffering and death, because He judged them to be compatible with rational goods. Thus, Christ always exercised His human free will in perfect conformity with His divine will. He could be tempted to do otherwise, *pace* Hugh; if not, His temptation by the devil would have been meaningless. And, if not, it is impossible to take seriously His prayer that the chalice might pass from Him, along with His submission to the will of the Father. Peter concludes his discussion of this point by citing a barrage of witnesses against the heresies of Monophysitism and Monothelitism, to which his reading of Damascene has sensitized him¹⁰⁶ and which he clearly sees as a problem in the teaching of many of his own contemporaries on this subject. We can say here that, if Peter does not endow the human Christ with a moral psychology that is entirely isometric with that of other human beings, whether before or after the fall, he comes a tiny bit closer to humanizing that psychology than is true for most of the theologians of his time, even though he joins the consensus, to a very great extent, in denying to the human Christ a human epistemology. At the same time, it cannot be said that he coordinates these two dimensions of his doctrine of Christ's human nature very smoothly. For his human Christ has more than a lack of ignorance induced by original sin; He has virtual omniscience. How that latter state actually impinges on Christ's ethical decision-

¹⁰⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 17, 2: 105–11. See also the references cited above, nn. 94, 97.

making in practice is a topic which Peter does not address.

It is this impulse to dignify the human Christ, to endow Him with qualities not enjoyed by other men, to stress the exemptions from the consequences of original sin which He chose not to take on, so visible in mid-century treatments of Christ's human knowledge, His free will, and His capacity to sin, that serves as the backdrop for the change of mind Peter undergoes on the theme of *dulia* and *latria* as applied to the human Christ. On this question, early twelfth-century theologians were evenly divided, although, curiously enough, their breakdown on this subject has little to do with their position on omniscience or freedom from sin in the human Christ.¹⁰⁷ Peter gives a thorough review of the debate and the authorities who can be cited on both sides of it. In the *Sentences*, it is no longer just a question for him of whether the humanity of Christ, as such, deserves veneration or worship. While he retains a clear distinction between the creature and the creator here, he observes, on the *dulia* side of the question, that there are physical objects to which Christians rightly pay reverence, for their use in divine worship. He comes down on the side of *latria* for the human Christ, but not in an undifferentiated way. The contemporary theologian to whom he comes the closest here is Gilbert of Poitiers, in Gilbert's gloss on the Psalms. With Gilbert, he agrees that the human Christ deserves worship, but not the human Christ understood as separate from the Word or as assimilated by the Word. It is, rather, the human Christ, as human, and as united with the Word, Who should receive *latria*.¹⁰⁸ This formula seeks to strike a balance between the doctrine that the two natures of Christ are inseparable yet not to be confused, which Peter maintains in his treatment of the hypostatic union, on the one side, and his glorification of the human Christ during His human lifetime, on the other. This view he joins his contemporaries in supporting, although with more circumspection and with somewhat less unmodified enthusiasm than is the case with many other masters.

THE ATONEMENT: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

If Peter's role in the discussion of the hypostatic union was to provide clarification, which most scholastics were able to put to use

¹⁰⁷ Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 2: 132–46, although he does not note the shift in the Lombard's position or his differences from the Porretans.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 9, 2: 68–71. Brady has tracked the reference to Gilbert's unpublished gloss in his note *ad loc.*, 2: 69.

as research on the subject continued, and if his role in the development of the doctrine of the human Christ was to support, without a great deal of resistance, a consensus more impressed by His functional differences from than by His similarities with the rest of mankind, his role in the debates surrounding the doctrine of the atonement was to moderate the extreme positions taken on this subject during his time and to offer an understanding of Christ's saving work that is very much His own. The outlines of this controversy, as they had been posed by other theologians when the Lombard entered the field, had been laid down, initially, by proponents of the traditional view that Christ's saving work was to liberate man from the devil, who had gained power over man with the fall. The first major reaction against the "rights of the devil" theory had come from Anselm of Canterbury, who offered an alternative in his *Cur deus homo* which left the devil entirely out of the account, in explaining how Christ had paid the debt owed by man to God and how Christ had communicated the redemptive effects of His action to man. Another alternative to the "rights of the devil" theory which placed much more emphasis on the role of Christ in altering man's attitudes and moral capacities was offered by Peter Abelard. Abelard's view has much in common with the doctrine of the redemption taught by Bernard of Clairvaux, although neither of these thinkers appears to have been aware of that fact. The range of opinions provided by theologians in the first half of the twelfth century extended from the frank espousal of one or another of these positions to a selective combination of ideas taken from a number of them.¹⁰⁹ In this spectrum of views, Peter can be classed as one of the eclectics, yet as one who adds a decisive and original note to the mix of ideas on which he draws.

The "rights of the devil" position had the longest genealogy of any of the views of the redemption taught in the twelfth century, going back to the writings of Gregory the Great for its classic

¹⁰⁹ Good surveys are provided by J. Patout Burns, "The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory," *Theological Studies* 36 (1975): 285-304; D. E. de Clerck, "Droits du démon et nécessité de la rédemption: Les écoles d'Abélard et de Pierre Lombard," *RTAM* 14 (1947): 132-64; "Le dogme de la rédemption de Robert de Melun à Guillaume d'Auxerre," *RTAM* 14 (1947): 253-86; "Questions de sotériologie médiévale," *RTAM* 13 (1946): 150-84; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 2: 170-253; Jean Rivière, "Le dogme de la rédemption au XII^e siècle d'après les dernières publications," *Revue du moyen âge latin* 2 (1946): 102-12, 219-30; "Le mérite du Christ d'après le magistère ordinaire de l'église, II: Époque médiévale," *RSR* 22 (1948): 213-39; Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 104-06, 161-72, 176-91; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 82-94.

formulation. It had received considerable support in the intervening centuries. At the beginning of the twelfth century, it found defenders in the school of Laon, whose members are also a good source for the differences of opinion among its supporters. The basic scenario as envisioned by proponents of the “rights of the devil” theory was that man, in succumbing to the external temptation of the devil in the fall, had voluntarily placed himself under the devil’s sway, withdrawing allegiance from God and granting it instead to the devil. Having done so, man was no longer free. He lacked the ability to override the devil’s power. Hence, Christ, a Christ possessing divine power, had to be sent, since no other man, nor even an angel, would be strong enough to overcome the devil. The way in which the situation of man, and Christ’s rectification of it, was envisioned by supporters of the “rights of the devil” theory was in an entirely external, objectivist sense. Christ is not seen as changing either God’s attitude or man’s. What He changes is the outward circumstances in which man has placed himself through sin by defeating the devil, understood as an external power extrinsic to man. Christ battles against the devil, wins, and liberates man from the devil’s political control, restoring man to his proper allegiance to God. The language typically used in the “rights of the devil” scenario is that of political jurisdiction and military force. The main difference of opinion found among supporters of this theory has to do with whether the devil’s power over fallen man, which God tolerates, is just. Some hold that the devil’s sway is exercised justly (*recte*). Not only does he hold dominion over man, he also holds a right (*ius*), owing to the fact that man gave himself over to the devil freely.¹¹⁰ Other members of the school of Laon who adhere to the “rights of the devil” position, on the other hand, maintain that the devil has no true rights. Vis-à-vis God, his rule over man is not just because it is a usurpation of God’s rights over man. And, vis-à-vis man, the devil’s rule is not just either because it is grounded in fraud and deception. Thus, while the devil holds power, he does so without rights.¹¹¹ Some authors in the school nuance this point still farther, in arguing that the devil’s rule is just with respect to man but unjust with respect to God,¹¹² or that, while

¹¹⁰ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine*, pp. 41–42; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 47–48, 54, 5: 44–47, 50–51.

¹¹¹ *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, pp. 266–68.

¹¹² *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 253–58, *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 353–55, 5: 206–07, 209, 269–70.

it has been seized in an unjust manner, it is wielded justly over man because of man's consent to the devil's temptation in the fall.¹¹³

Although there are some Laon masters who give Anselm of Canterbury's doctrine of the atonement a hearing,¹¹⁴ their basic stance is to defend one variant or another of the "rights of the devil" position against his vigorous criticism of it. Anselm begins his *Cur deus homo* by clearing the deck of objections, before developing his own theory.¹¹⁵ He argues that God could not have sent an angel or a newly created sinless man to do the job, although he offers his own reasons for this claim. Man, he says, would naturally be inclined to worship and serve whoever redeemed him; and it would not be fitting for him to accord to a creature an honor belonging to God alone. Another objection he presents is the claim that, since God is omnipotent, He could have redeemed man purely out of His mercy, without requiring Christ's sacrifice on the cross. While acknowledging that God operates under no constraints, Anselm rejects this position as well on grounds of theological appropriateness. The argument from God's mercy, he says, is not fitting. For, in his estimation, it is fitting that satisfaction be made for man's sin. Some kind of *quid pro quo* for the offense to God's honor which sin represents is only fair, just, and reasonable, as he sees it. Anselm also offers a series of objections which he attacks as reflecting the Nestorian belief that Christ was not fully man, and that God would not lower Himself by taking on the weaknesses of human nature. Against these objections, he insists that Christ was fully human. The fall, he notes, occurred through an act of human free will; so must the redemption. Thus, Christ must be a man possessing free will. Further, redemption by a God-man does not lower God's divinity since it was accomplished by the human Christ. It is not unfitting for the Son of God to suffer, he adds, for Christ accepted His sufferings voluntarily. In any event, His consent to His sufferings is appropriate, given the fact that the mode of redemption selected by God was the most congruous way to achieve man's redemption. Anselm, finally, turns his fire against the "rights of the devil" theory. After outlining it and indicating his awareness of the fact that its proponents differ on the degree to

¹¹³ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 342, 5: 263.

¹¹⁴ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 343, 346, 349, 358, 5: 263–64, 265, 266, 271.

¹¹⁵ Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur deus homo* 1.3–10 in *Opera*, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: F. Frommann, 1968), 1: 50–67. On the *Cur deus homo*, see Gillian R. Evans, *Anselm and Talking about God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 126–71.

which the devil's sway can be seen as just, he observes that they all concur in viewing the redemption in military and political terms: Christ's role is to besiege and take the fort in which the devil keeps man imprisoned, and to restore man to God's rightful authority. Anselm's response to this theory is simply to reject it as irrelevant. He agrees that God allows the devil to tempt man, a permission that does not grant the devil any rights. For, in Anselm's view, to assent that there can be any justice at all in the devil's actions would be to imply that God has somehow entered into a compact with the devil, which is an utterly unseemly idea to hold about the deity.

Now, in turning to the exposition of his own positive substitute for the positions he rejects, we should note that Anselm in no sense plans to dispense with the idea of justice, or with a view of the atonement that could be described as externalist or objective. Rather, he changes the way in which he handles these principles. Having shown that man needs redemption, since he cannot obtain happiness, the end for which he was created, in the state of sin, and, having shown that man cannot achieve this redemption on his own, since nothing in his finite resources offers sufficient recompense to God for the infinite offense of man's disobedience, infinite because it was an offense against an infinite being, Anselm concludes that the atonement requires a God-man, Who is the only kind of being capable of supplying both a satisfaction acceptable to God and of communicating the effects of that satisfaction to man. Sin, in itself, consists in not rendering to God His due, a formula invoking the legal maxim *suum quique tribuere* as the definition of justice.¹¹⁶ For Anselm, justice must be served; and Christ can serve it in offering to God His voluntary and unmerited death on the cross. God is repaid in accepting this offering, not on the analogy with a monetary composition, but in terms of His honor. Anselm is sensitive to the point that nothing man does can actually increase or diminish God's honor, God being infinite. But the rendering of proper honor to Him expresses a proper attitude in creatures, which contributes to the wholeness and order of the universe.¹¹⁷ This is the level on which Anselm analyzes the objective side of the transaction, the restoration of honor to God as the service of justice, which therefore requires satisfaction as essential. Here, Christ mediates between

¹¹⁶ Anselm, *Cur deus homo* 1.11, 1: 68–69. For the whole argument, see *ibid.*, 1.11–2.20, 1: 68–133.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.15, 1: 72–74.

man and God and rectifies man's position in God's eyes, now making man acceptable to God again.

Anselm is equally an objectivist when it comes to the transmission of the effects of Christ's saving work to mankind. As with other Christian theologians, he holds that Christ's passion was efficacious in that it was a punishment He accepted although it was unmerited, since Christ was exempted from original sin. In all other respects, Christ is like other men, a point which Anselm had emphasized against Nestorian-type accounts of the atonement. But, in his own account, he describes what is an external transaction, based on Christ's nature, both between Christ and God and between Christ and mankind. When Christ offers His unmerited sacrifice to God, He thereby earns a reward from God. But, being perfectly sinless Himself, He does not need this reward. So, He transfers it to mankind. The model Anselm invokes in describing this transfer is the giving or bequeathing of a gift or an inheritance to a kinsman. The beneficiary has done nothing to earn it. It is like a windfall, which alters his credit with God by canceling a debt which man hitherto had lacked the wherewithal to pay.¹¹⁸ The key point to note here is that, for Anselm, the beneficiary has not himself been changed by the gift, existentially. He receives a good that is imputed to him as if he were better than he actually is. In this respect, Christ's redemption changes man's standing with God; it does not change man's inner life itself.

It is precisely this last point that provoked a reaction, which can be seen as much as a critique of the *Cur deus homo* as it is of the "rights of the devil" position, on the part of Abelard.¹¹⁹ Abelard develops his doctrine of the atonement in his commentary on Romans. He offers a forthright attack on the "rights of the devil" theory. The devil, he asserts, has no rights. Further, and this

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 2.19, 1: 130–31.

¹¹⁹ Good accounts of Abelard's doctrine of the atonement, which correctly see it as more than merely exemplaristic but as also efficacious, include A. Victor Murray, *Abelard and St. Bernard: A Study in Twelfth-Century "Modernism"* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), pp. 117–39, who also notes the parallels between Abelard and Bernard here; Philip L. Quinn, "Abelard on Atonement: 'Nothing Unintelligible, Arbitrary, Illogical, or Immoral about It,'" In *Reasoned Faith*, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 281–300; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 69–99; Weingart, *The Logic of Divine Love*, passim and esp. pp. 121–40, 149–50, 164–65. Briefer but also useful accounts are found in Gillian R. Evans, *Anselm and a New Generation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 164–65; Robert S. Franks, *The Work of Christ: A Historical Study of Christian Doctrine*, 2nd ed. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1962), pp. 142–49. David E. Luscombe, "St. Anselm and Abelard," *Anselm Studies* 1 (1983): 213–18 sees Abelard as closer to Anselm here than most scholars do.

against Anselm, Abelard states that God indeed does have the power, and mercy, to forgive man's sin without sacrificing His Son and killing an innocent person. The reason why God chose the mode of redemption that He did choose, in Abelard's view, was not because God needed to have His attitude toward man changed. God's love for man is unfailing. What was needed was the alteration of man's attitude toward God. Christ accomplishes this change, and He does so in two ways, according to Abelard. By his condescension and by His teaching, in word and example, Christ gives man a model to follow. And, secondly, by displaying the depths of His love for man, Christ gives man the moral power to turn around his own heart and to respond to the love which God has given to him. Through His own love for man, Christ inspires man's love for Him, and man's yearning for the divine grace He proffers, which man now gratefully receives and with which he can now collaborate, in the moral reclamation of himself in charity. The love that man is now capable of receiving and giving exceeds the wildest dreams of fallen man. Christ's loving sacrifice of Himself on the cross, which caps this teaching and example during His lifetime, in this sense was just, for Abelard, "because, in inflaming man's love for God He grants a gift greater than man had hoped for" (*quia amplius in amorem accendit completum beneficium quam sperandum*).¹²⁰ It is clear that in raising the issue of justice here, Abelard is advocating a stress on intentionality designed to replace legalism. There is no trace in his theory of the atonement of satisfaction, God's honor, or His rightful jurisdiction, of the type found both in the "rights of the devil" position and in Anselm's argument. The conversion of man's heart away from the bad intention of the sinner into the good intention required of the saved is the work of Christ in the redemption. The devil, for Abelard, never had any power over God's elect; but the elect still need to be converted. And, by both Who He is and by what He does, Christ makes effectual their salvation by energizing men morally and psychologically, by liberating their power to love.

¹²⁰ Peter Abelard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 3:26, CCCM 11: 114–18. The quotation is on pp. 117–18. Abelard's position is reiterated by his disciples. See Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 102–5; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, ed. Artur Michael Landgraf in *Écrits théologiques de l'école d'Abelard* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), pp. 158–61. For the school of Abelard on this doctrine, see David E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 158–64, 236–40; Neilsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 231–34.

Although Abelard was his *bête noire*, Bernard of Clairvaux develops a doctrine of Christ's saving work that is extremely close to his, marked by a similar disinterest in the criteria of theological seemliness that govern Anselm's reasoning in the *Cur deus homo*. Bernard is likewise disinclined to view the redemption in political or military terms along the lines of the "rights of the devil" theory. Like Abelard, Bernard accents the efficacy of Christ's action in changing man's attitude and in releasing his capacity to love God.¹²¹ At the same time, he retains the idea of the rights of the devil, while radically reinterpreting this notion. Bernard's position on the atonement has to be gathered from a number of his works, where it is brought in by way of advancing some other argument. These include his *De consideratione*, his writings promoting the new religious order of the Knights Templars, and his sermons on the Song of Songs. For Bernard, Christ does triumph over the devil. But He does so emotionally, not politically, militarily, or juridically, by emptying Himself, taking on human nature and human suffering. For Bernard, the most painful aspect of human suffering that Christ endured was not His physical agony on the cross, but the experience of rejection. By His willingness to accept these trials, which He undertakes in order to heighten His empathy with other men, Christ inspires man's love, exacting in return from man a debt which only love can repay (*Sane multam fatigationis assumpsit, quo multae dilectionis hominem debitorem tenerit*).¹²² This love, which Christ makes possible for man, enables man to turn away from the attraction of sin. It is this internal proclivity toward sin and man's bondage to it that Bernard understands as the devil's sway. He internalizes completely his interpretation of the devil in this connection. As he sees it, man is liberated not from an external power but from slavery to his own vice and ignorance. And, it is the superior attractiveness of the loving and suffering Christ that serves as the corrective, in turning around man's heart. As Bernard

¹²¹ For Bernard on the redemption, see Gillian R. Evans, "Cur Deus Homo: St. Bernard's Theology of the Redemption. A Contribution to the Contemporary Debate," *Studia Theologica* 36 (1982): 27–36; *The Mind of St. Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 152–59; Franks, *The Work of Christ*, pp. 149–55, who note the similarities with Abelard. Jean-Marie Déchanet, "La christologie de S. Bernard," in *Saint Bernard théologien* (Rome: Tipografia Pio X, 1953), pp. 78–91, notes the parallels and yet treats Abelard as a pure exemplarist. J. Gottschick, "Studien zur Versöhnungslehre des Mittelalters," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 22 (1901): 384–429, sees Bernard's view as opposed to Abelard's.

¹²² Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones super Cantica canticorum* 11.7, ed. J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais in Bernard of Clairvaux *Opera*, vols. 1–2 (Roma: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–58), 2: 58–59.

instructs his brethren in his Song of Songs allocutions, "Your affection for your Lord Jesus should be both tender and intimate, to oppose the sweet enticements of sensual life. Sweetness drives out sweetness as one nail drives out another."¹²³ This sweetness Bernard analogizes to a pleasing fragrance that is multiform, addressed to the psychological needs and responses of different sorts of men. Some are drawn by the memory of Christ's passion, some by the example of His virtue, some by His wisdom; each man receives the sweetness that will energize him.¹²⁴

The framework in which Bernard sets this doctrine in his sermons on the Song of Songs is particularly well adapted to display his understanding of the subjective efficacy of Christ's saving work and its continuation in the inner life of the Christian, since the Song of Songs is a nuptial poem which he reads as a figurative statement about the relation of the soul with Christ. The text, for him, is an itinerary of the inner life, in which Christ is the bridegroom whose kiss, given to the bride in the opening passage, awakens the soul's love and helps the hearer to activate the redemptive love which Christ bestows, enabling the soul to move through the steps of conversion and penance to the stage of growing intimacy with God. It is not just the fact of His incarnation and suffering, but also the emotional initiative which He takes, that gives man the assurance he needs to make a loving response. Further, as the example of Christ as a sweet fragrance drawing each man according to his own spiritual disposition suggests, Bernard combines an objective as well as subjective view of Christ's saving work with the understanding that Christ operates in and through each man's emotions. Christ comes to man where and how man is, and loves each person according to his own longings and needs. This theory of the atonement is not only generic, it is also individualized. As with Abelard, Bernard clearly has no interest in satisfaction, the weighing of accounts, or God's honor. These categories are utterly irrelevant to his view of Christ's saving work. His closest bond with Abelard is the fact that each combines an objective and exemplary understanding of the redemption with a highly subjective mode of its

¹²³ Ibid., 20.3–4, trans. Kilian Walsh and Irene Edmonds, *On the Song of Songs*, 4 vols. (Spenser, MA/Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1971–80), 1: 150. The Latin text at 1: 117, reads: "Sit suavis et dulcis affectui tuo Domino Jesus, contra male utique dulces vitae carnalis illecebras, et vincat dulcedo dulcissimum, quemadmodum clavum clavis expellit."

¹²⁴ Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones super Cantica* 2.6, 2.9, 6.3–4, 11.7.20, 20.2.3–4.5, 22.3.3–4.9, 1: 11–12, 13–14, 33–34, 58–59, 115–18, 133–36.

transferral to man, in which Christ efficaciously inflames the human heart and empowers it to love, and to love the good. It may be no accident that Bernard's image of sweetness driving out sweetness as one nail drives out another is an unacknowledged allusion to Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, where it speaks to erotic love, the context in which Abelard refers to the same citation in his fifth letter to Heloise, exhorting her to replace himself in her affections with the members of her monastic community.¹²⁵ The chief difference between Bernard and Abelard is Bernard's retention, if in drastically modified form, of the idea that Christ liberates man from the devil. But, as has been shown, for him this notion is purged of all externalism and militarism and it refers to man's internal, self-inflicted sin. The terrain where this liberation is effected is the inner life of man; and Bernard understands it primarily in terms of Christ's unshackling of man's affective faculty.

Faced with the alternatives presented by the "rights of the devil" theory, the *Cur deus homo*, and the sweeping rejection of both of these approaches to the redemption found in Bernard of Clairvaux and Abelard, the majority of theologians in the first half of the twelfth century responded not by aligning themselves with one or another of these positions exclusively but by effecting a combination of two of them. Exceptions to the rule are the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, who supports the "rights of the devil" argument without indicating that there is a debate, and the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, who follows Anselm in the same vein.¹²⁶ The more typical tendency toward a combination of theories cuts across the allegiances which a theologian might otherwise have felt to the master or masters whom he follows in other areas. For instance, despite his up-to-the-minute familiarity with the *Cur deus homo* argument, early in the century Honorius Augustodunensis freely combines it with the "rights of the devil" position. Declining to comment on whether the devil's power over man is just, he agrees that it exists, and argues that Christ's nature as a God-man and His unmerited suffering as a man are both required to enable Him to win victory over the devil as well as to offer a worthy satisfaction to God for man's sin.¹²⁷ The only point of his own that he adds to this combination is that both Jews and gentiles were involved in Christ's

¹²⁵ Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* 4.35.75. Cf. Peter Abelard, *Epistola* 5; the Ciceronian connection is noted by Betty Radice in her trans. of *The Letters of Abelard and Heloise* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 159.

¹²⁶ *Summa sent.* 1.15, *PL* 176: 70B; *Sent. div.* 4.1.2, p. 72*.

¹²⁷ Honorius Augustodunensis, *Eluc.* 1.104–18, 1.141–53, pp. 380–82, 387–89.

death, because He died to redeem both groups of people.¹²⁸ A more influential exponent of the mixture between the Anselmian and the “rights of the devil” theories is Hugh of St. Victor. For Hugh, Christ’s work of redemption is to make an adequate satisfaction for man’s sin, and thereby to change God’s attitude by calming His anger toward man. At the same time, Christ liberates man from the devil’s unjust and usurped power.¹²⁹ Hugh stages the anti-devil scenario in two ways. In the prologue to Book 2 of *De sacramentis*, he uses the military language traditional to this position. He envisions Christ as a princely commander, going forth into battle with His saints arrayed in His host and fighting under His banner, and the sacraments of the church as His weapons.¹³⁰ In the body of Book 1, Hugh agrees that the devil’s power is unjust vis-à-vis God, since it is a usurpation. From the devil’s point of view, his power over man is just since man ceded to him voluntarily; from man’s point of view it is unjust, since the devil defrauded man. In any event, man cannot terminate this situation by himself and needs an advocate (*patronus*). Shifting from military to forensic language here, Hugh portrays Christ as pleading man’s case with God, persuading God to turn aside His wrath and to entertain the idea of man’s redemption. Having succeeded in that plea, Christ next functions as the unmerited sacrifice that is fully compensatory in repaying God for the injustice done to Him. The one new twist added by Hugh is this: once God welcomes man back, man can simply pick up and leave the devil behind. The devil’s power, as Hugh sees it, is exercised by default. Once the divine alternative is made available to man again, the devil’s power evaporates on the spot.¹³¹

Another possible combination was to mix the “rights of the devil” position with an Abelardian or Bernardine doctrine of the atonement. Roland of Bologna and Robert of Melun take this tack. They agree that the devil holds sway over man, although unjustly, internalizing the character of that power. And, they also agree that

¹²⁸ Ibid., 1.158, p. 389.

¹²⁹ Good accounts which, however, do not note the modes in which Hugh presents the “rights of the devil” argument, are Franks, *The Work of Christ*, pp. 159–67; and Gottschick, “Versöhnungslehre,” pp. 429–36. See also Roger Baron, ed., “*Tractatus de trinitate et de reparationis hominis* du MS. Douai 365,” *Mélanges de science religieuse* 18 (1961): 111–12, 115–16; Poppenberg, *Die Christologie*, pp. 7–19.

¹³⁰ Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith* prologue 2, trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1951), p. 3. This passage is drawn from the edition on which Deferrari bases his translation, which does not occur in the Migne ed.

¹³¹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.8.4, 1.8.6–10, *PL* 176: 307D–309C, 310D–312A. The quotation of at 1.8.4, 308B.

Christ's role is to activate man's power to love, changing man's mind so that he looks in the right direction for the good and empowering his heart so that he desires it.¹³² Easily the most eclectic of the mid-century theologians on this subject is Robert Pullen, who draws on both the mixture of Anselm and the "rights of the devil" view as found in Hugh and on the Abelardian or Bernardine argument. Agreeing with Hugh, he sees Christ both as a mediator, engaged in changing God's mind, and as the giver of an acceptable gift, in His own obedience, which satisfies God. Robert likewise sees man as a captive held unjustly. His new angle on the theme of the liberation of man from the devil is that it is God the Father Who performs this function; the Father and Son agree to a division of labor here. Robert adds that, although God is in no sense constrained in so doing, He effects this liberation by the sacrifice of His Son, reverting here to the more standard assignment of duties. This mode of redemption was chosen by God, according to Robert, in order to stimulate man's love and to instruct man. As for the transmission of Christ's saving work, Robert departs from the Anselmian idea of imputation. Just as Christ changes God's mind in the initial phase of the story, so He changes man's mind and heart. Christ enables man to win redemption, by giving him the faith that works in love, and by enabling him to love, and thus to collaborate with God's grace and to earn merit.¹³³

The Lombard's Doctrine of the Atonement

Peter Lombard's treatment of Christ's saving work is even more broad-gauged than that of Robert Pullen. Like Bernard of Clairvaux, to whom he is deeply indebted, he retains the notion of the rights of the devil while radically internalizing his understanding of that doctrine. He agrees with Bernard, Abelard, Roland, and Robert of Melun in seeing the subjective change brought about by Christ in man's mind and heart as the manner in which His redemptive work is communicated to man and made efficacious in man. While Peter certainly can be positioned clearly in relation to these contemporary thinkers, he also draws heavily on his own

¹³² Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 157–62; Anders, *Die Christologie*, pp. xx–xxxv; Clerck, "Le dogme de la rédemption," pp. 253–67.

¹³³ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 4.13–15. *PL* 186: 820B–822D. Gottschick, "Ver-söhnungslehre," pp. 436–38 sees Robert's position as primarily Abelardian.

commentary on the Pauline epistles, notably his gloss on Hebrews 1:11–18 but even more on his gloss on Romans 8:10. Indeed, this segment of Peter's Christology offers an extended example of the creative interplay between his exegesis and his systematic theology, as we have also noted in chapter 4 above, for we see both a carryover of ideas found in his Pauline commentaries and a departure from them as well. The departures are most noticeable in Peter's treatment of the devil, in his understanding of the theme of justice, and in his increasingly critical stance toward Anselm of Canterbury in his most mature work.

It will be recalled that, as an exegete of Paul, Peter had been both a supporter of the "rights of the devil" theory and of some features of Anselm's doctrine.¹³⁴ As he explains in his Romans gloss, God could have saved man some other way, since He is omnipotent; but He ordained the incarnation and passion of Christ as the most suitable way. This is because one of the effects of the fall is that man can grasp both the hopelessness of his situation and the fact that he is fully responsible for it. He has lost the eternal life he desires and he is frustrated by his futile attempts to possess it. This, according to Peter, is why Christ must be a God-man. Since He is the Son of God, He is immortal. He can therefore free man from mortality and hence from his frustration and despair. Christ's saving work thus has a subjective dimension, in Peter's Romans gloss, as well as an objective one. This is true of the effects of Christ's actions in the hearts of men. It is also true of Christ's liberation of man from the devil, whom Peter still sees here as an external power. He agrees with those who hold that the devil's power is an unjust usurpation of God's legitimate authority. The devil himself rules man by brute force. If He had so wished, God could have overcome the devil by an act of violence of His own, since He is more powerful than the devil. But God does not want to counter violence with violence. Rather, He wants to oppose the injustice of the devil with divine justice. At this juncture, Peter incorporates Anselm's analysis into his gloss. Since Christ is wholly blameless as a man, His unmerited death on the cross is a just recompense to God for man's sin. At the same time, Christ's justice in this connection plays an exemplary role for man. He serves as a

¹³⁴ See above, chapter 4, pp. 217–20. The rights of the devil, in this case seen as the "princeps regionis illius dissimilitudinis," are also noted by Peter in *Sermo de adventu domini*, ed. Damien Van den Eynde, "Deux sermons inédits de Pierre Lombard," in *Misc. Lomb.*, p. 78.

moral example for man, offering a behavioral model that God wants man to imitate, by following the path of justice, not violence, in his own moral life. In this connection, as well, Christ must be both God and man. His divinity is the guarantee of His ability to offer an infinitely worthy gift to God, a gift certain of acceptance by the Father, Who is already bound to the Son in love. Christ must also be a man, otherwise he could not have been put to death. As with Anselm, in the Romans gloss Peter views Christ as transferring to man the immortality that He has won for man by imputation. Eternal life is His objective gift to man, and it is the meaning of His liberation of man from the devil, while His subjective gift is the substitution of hope for fallen man's despair and frustration.

In Peter's reworking of his doctrine of Christ's saving work in the *Sentences*, he continues to regard the atonement as having both an objective and a subjective dimension. At the same time, in the manner of Bernard of Clairvaux, he assimilates the externalist understanding of the rights of the devil into a thoroughly internalist account of the redemption as occurring entirely within man's soul.¹³⁵ He now grounds his doctrine of the redemption in his doctrine of Christ's human nature, and, in particular, in the principle that Christ possessed all the virtues. Christ had complete ethical merit because, in the exercise of His faculty of free will, and despite His capacity to be tempted, He brought His will into perfect conformity with the will of God at all times. This total obedience to the Father made the human Christ perfectly virtuous. Since He did not need anything for Himself, His merit allows Him to win redemption for mankind from the devil, from sin, and from punishment for sin. Christ's redemption means as well the opening of God's kingdom to man, the glorification of the body and the impassibility of the soul which He earned for Himself and made possible for man in the resurrection.¹³⁶ Here Peter emphasizes that the obedience and hence the merit of the human Christ was so exhaustive that it was fully present at all points during His earthly life. Christ was obedient to the Father not only in submitting to death on the cross but also in submitting to His conception and

¹³⁵ The appreciation of both of these dimensions is found in the balanced commentaries of Franks, *The Work of Christ*, pp. 167–76; Rivière, "Le mérite du Christ," pp. 234–35; Gottschick, "Versöhnungslehre," pp. 35–36. On the other hand, Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 2: 338 overemphasizes the objective aspect, while Fritz Büniger, "Darstellung und Würdigung der Lehre des Petrus Lombardus vom Werke Christus (Sentent. 1. III, dist. 18–20)," *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* 45 (1902): 92–126 overemphasizes the subjective side.

¹³⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 18. c. 1, 2: 111–12.

birth and throughout all the stages of His life on earth. In the behavior He manifested at all times, the virtues and charisms were perfect in Him to the full limits of the human condition; they could not, at any time, have been improved on. This view is one that Peter holds so strongly that it moves him to conclude that the passion of Christ was not, for Him, a critical event in His relationship with God the Father. The passion simply afforded Him another opportunity to display the perfect obedience that He had always possessed. Qualitatively, the passion did not enlarge Christ's merit. He may have merited more, in a quantitative sense, because of His passion and crucifixion, but not better.¹³⁷

Given this startling claim that Christ's crucifixion was not greater in merit than the virtue He possessed throughout His life, Peter has to address the question of why the passion was ordained, given the fact that God could have effected man's redemption in some other way. Here, he begins by making the point that Christ underwent the passion not for Himself but for mankind. His suffering and death were meant to be a form and a cause, a form of virtue in man, especially in the imitation of His paramount virtues of obedience and humility, and a cause of liberty, beatitude, and glory. In a very objectivist description of the redemption here, Peter states that Christ earned paradise for man, in freeing him from sin, from punishment, and from the devil, and in a more positive sense, in creating the opportunity for men to become adopted sons of glory. For this, it was necessary for Christ to be a man of the line of Judah, consubstantial both with Adam and with the rest of the human race. And, He must be the possessor of the most consummate humility, in order to counteract the consummate pride that led to Adam's fall. Perfect humility cannot be shown more fully than in the voluntary acceptance of undeserved suffering and death. Here, Peter departs from Bernard's view that personal rejection was the most grievous suffering that Christ endured, adhering to the more standard notion of the passion and crucifixion and anchoring the point with Ambrosiaster, the author who, like everyone else at the time, he takes to be Ambrose. Still, like Bernard, he sees pride as the quintessential sin and humility as its necessary antidote, although in more specifically dogmatic terms.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Ibid., c. 2, c. 4, 2: 113–114, 115–116. This point is misinterpreted by Gottschick, "Versöhnungslehre," p. 35, who overemphasizes the function of Christ's death in Peter's soteriology.

¹³⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 18. c. 5, 2: 116.

But how, then, do Christ's suffering and death, which He accepts thanks to His perfect humility, redeem mankind from sin, from punishment, and from the devil? It is instructive to note that, in addressing this question, Peter begins with man's subjective appropriation of the redemption. It is, indeed, the very conditions of man's subjective appropriation of the redemption that set the terms for Peter's description of Christ's objective nature and actions. By displaying His humility up to His death on the cross, Christ, although He does not enlarge His own merit thereby, shows forth His love for man in a manner so full of drama and pathos that He revolutionizes the human heart, inflaming in it a responding love of God, the God Who has offered this electrifying sacrifice for man's sake. As with Bernard of Clairvaux, Abelard, Roland, and Robert of Melun, Peter sees this love, both as extended to man and as responded to by man, as a force that changes man from within, energizing him and enabling him to reorder his own loves, to accept the grace of God, and to reorient himself, as justified, in charity to his fellow man: "Having shown, with regard to us, such an earnest of His own love, He both inflames us and moves us to the love of God, Who has done so much for us, and by this we are justified, that is, released from our sins; we are made just. The death of Christ thus justifies us, since through it charity is excited in our hearts" (*Exhibita autem tantae erga nos dilectionis arrha, et nos movemur accendimurque ad diligendum Deum, cui pro nobis tantum fecit; et per hoc iustificamur, id est soluti a peccati, iusti efficamur. Mors igitur Christi nos iustificat, dum per eam caritas excitatur in cordibus nostris*).¹³⁹ While the word *arrha* is evocative of Hugh of St. Victor in another context, we see Peter decisively departing from the Anselmian doctrine of imputation in favor of the more subjective understanding of Christ's effecting a change within man's soul itself, thanks to which man can now set foot on the positive path of moral growth that leads to glory.

It is with this interpretation of the redemption in mind that Peter addresses, and internalizes, the idea that Christ's passion liberates man from the devil. In agreement with Bernard of Clairvaux, he now sees the sway of the devil not as an external, political constraint but as nothing else than man's self-inflicted bondage to his own sin. The love that Christ inspires in the human heart enables man to turn away from sin, to resist temptation. Unlike Hugh of St. Victor, who holds that, once the divine alternative is tendered, the devil's power self-destructs, Peter argues that the devil will still be

¹³⁹ Ibid., d. 19, c. 1.2, 2: 118.

able to tempt redeemed and justified mankind. But, he stresses, it is the unimpeded and unopposed failure to love within the human heart that must be understood as the devil's power. The love that man now feels empowers him to shed the devil who resides within his own heart. The appropriation of Christ's saving work frees man from the pressure to consent to evil under which he suffered as fallen and unredeemed. Peter points out that this continuing ability to be tempted is a function of the *fomes peccati* which remains in man after the redemption, if in a milder form than before. He uses this analysis against authorities who support the idea that the devil is totally vanquished by the cross, such as Augustine with his pungent phrase about the cross as the devil's mousetrap, because he sees it as too external an understanding of the redemption, and also one that denies the continuing reality of temptation and backsliding in the moral lives of justified Christians.¹⁴⁰

It is as a corollary of this account of man's subjective appropriation of redemption as the liberation from his own internal bondage to sin that Peter introduces the all-important point that Christ had to be a God-man in order to accomplish His saving work. Here, he brings in some of the argumentation of his *Collectanea* while handling the subject in a different way. Unless Christ were a man, Peter observes, He would not have been able to inspire the love that enables other men to overcome voluntarily the devil within their own psychology of sin. Anselm of Canterbury had made the point that, since the fall was voluntary, on man's part, Christ's acceptance of the suffering and death that corrects for it had to be voluntary as well. Peter turns this argument around. Because the fall was voluntary, on man's part, so his turning away from the devil within must also be voluntary, on man's part. God wants man to respond to the violence of the devil with justice, and this is what Christ's empowering love enables man to do. Peter resists any interpretation of this liberation that treats man as passive in the process, acted on by forces outside himself. Just as Christ must be a man in order to inspire the change of heart that makes possible the virtuous use of man's free will, so He must be God, in order that He Himself may be rendered free from sin. For Peter, Christ's sinlessness is important in this connection not because it enables Him to offer an acceptable gift, payment, or propitiatory sacrifice to the Father, sufficient to assuage God's wounded dignity. It is not necessary, in Peter's view, for Christ to change God's mind.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., c. 1.3–4, 2: 119–20.

Rather, Christ's sinlessness is important because it is what enables Him to possess the perfect humility that is sufficient to overcome the pride causing man's fall and keeping man enslaved to the sins from which Christ's activating love redeems him.¹⁴¹ For Peter, the redemption is as little a transaction between Christ and God the Father as it is a battle between Christ and the devil, seen as external forces. It is, instead, an interaction between Christ and mankind, which takes place entirely within the ground of the individual human soul.

Having explained the sense in which he holds that Christ redeems man from sin and the devil, Peter turns to the question of how Christ redeems man from the punishment and guilt which original sin incurred. There are two kinds of punishment involved, he observes, eternal and temporal. We are released from eternal punishment and from guilt absolutely, and are granted immortality, he states. But we are released from temporal punishment only partially, for the physical and spiritual weaknesses deriving from original sin remain part of the human condition. At the same time, he argues, there is a real if not a total release here in that these weaknesses no longer have to dominate man's moral life as they do before the redemption. In explaining how Christ achieves these forms of release, Peter again offers a balance between the objective and subjective approaches to the atonement. Christ releases us by meriting, for man, the lifting of punishment and guilt, through His own acceptance of a punishment which He did not deserve. At the same time, Christ makes this release efficacious in the human soul. Our punishment abates when we feel, in an operational sense, the love of Christ that leads to our conversion, baptism, and penance. Christ is thus properly called the redeemer, Peter observes, both in His exercise of the divine power and in the subjective effects which His humility produces in man, as well as through the efficacy which He grants to His sacraments, which in turn are causes of man's redemption in the Christian life.¹⁴² For Peter, the accent is as much on Christ's operations as on His nature, and His operations are seen as both exemplary and efficacious in man. This whole section of his account of the redemption can be read as an extended critique of Anselm's view of Christ's merits being imputed to men,

¹⁴¹ Ibid., c. 2, 2: 120–21. This stress on Christ's humility is also found in the Lombard's sermons. See, for instance, *Sermo de Ascensione*, ed. Damien Van den Eynde, "Deux sermons inédits de Pierre Lombard," in *Misc. Lomb.*, p. 83. This point is also noted by Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires*, 1: 85–86.

¹⁴² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 19. c. 3–c. 5, 2: 121–22.

who are thereby given a status they have not earned but without being changed in the process. Instead, with Bernard and Abelard and the theologians whom they influenced, he holds that Christ's merits accomplish a psychic and moral change in man, a change that now enables him to earn his own merit, in collaboration with God's grace.

Peter rings yet another change on a standard description of the work of Christ as interpreted by Anselm. Christ can, he agrees, be regarded as a mediator between God and man, but not in the sense of an advocate or negotiator arguing man's case with a God whose mind Christ wants to change. Rather, Christ mediates in the sense that He acts as a catalyst or facilitator, removing the obstacles between man and God that have made man an enemy of God, so that man can now return to God in loving friendship. God has no need of this mediation, for His love is constant. It is man who stands in need of the unblocking of his power to love which the work of Christ achieves.¹⁴³

Like other contemporary theologians, Peter raises the question of whether there could have been another mode of redemption; and, like them, he holds that one must answer in the affirmative, since God is omnipotent, but also that the mode He did choose was the most suitable. His own handling of this question makes use of some of the reasoning in his Romans gloss, in responding to the point that the chosen mode was the most suitable one. The union of God and man in Christ, His combination of divine immortality and heart-wrenching humanity, cures mankind of desperation, substituting hope for sinful man's frustrated yearning for eternal life. Peter is well aware of the extensive tradition supporting the externalistic "rights of the devil" position and outlines it *in extenso* here, insisting that the authorities have to be read in the internalist and nonlegalistic manner in which he interprets the redemption. It is the justice of Christ's humility that liberates man, he stresses, and not justice in the sense invoked either by the partisans of the "rights of the devil" or by Anselm.¹⁴⁴ This being the case, and along with the sharply restricted understanding of what "the devil" means in this context, he agrees that there are three parties in the scenario, God, man, and the devil. The devil is convicted of injury against God, because he fraudulently abducted man, God's servant, and violently held him. Man is convicted of injury against God because

¹⁴³ Ibid., c. 6–c. 7, 2: 122–24.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., d. 20. c. 2.2–c. 3.2, 2: 125–27.

he repudiated God and gave himself over to another lord. This human injury can also be charged to the devil's account since it was he who deceived man with fallacious promises, and afterwards, afflicted man. With respect to himself, the devil holds man unjustly; with respect to man, his sway is just, because man, through his own fault, deserves the sufferings he receives at the devil's hands. Now, God, had He willed it, could have resolved this situation by fiat. But, for the reason given above, He wished to use the justice of humility instead.¹⁴⁵ This passage is a reminder of how important it is to read the Lombard on the devil in context. If one were not aware of His radical internalizing and psychologizing of the devil along Bernardine lines, one might think that the analysis just given places Peter in alignment with the school of Laon and with the traditional authorities whom he subjects to such forcible reinterpretation on that point. For, given the way in which he does understand the devil, not to mention the psychogenesis of sin, the three parties in the scenario he describes can actually be reduced to two, God and two dimensions or consequences of the divided self in man.

There are two other topics which Peter takes up in his consideration of Christ's saving work. One is a subject to which other theologians of the time advert, the question of who bears the responsibility for Christ's passion and crucifixion.¹⁴⁶ The position Peter takes, while aimed largely against Abelard's claim that the people who crucified Christ were not culpable because they did not regard the deed as the contravention of God's will, has a wider interest for its analysis of causation, no less than of intentionality. Who was responsible, Peter asks, God the Father? the whole Trinity? Judas? the Jews? Curiously, he omits the Romans, although the analysis he is about to offer would cover their case as well. In any event, he responds by distinguishing the senses in which we can talk about responsibility, in maintaining that all the parties he names are responsible in some way. Christ is responsible, in that He gave Himself up to suffering and death freely. The Father and, indeed, the whole Trinity, is also responsible, for ordaining this mode of redemption and for predestining the human Christ to be joined to the Word in order to carry it out. Judas brought about Christ's death by his betrayal, and so did the Jews, by instigating it. Had Peter included the Romans, he could have added that they

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., c. 4.1-2, 2: 127.

¹⁴⁶ On this subject, see the survey by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2 part 2: 329-58.

gave the order for the crucifixion and executed it. In discriminating among the roles and responsibilities of the persons he does include, Peter observes that Christ's own act was a good one, as were the acts of the other persons of the Trinity, for they were undertaken for the salvation of man. On the other hand, the acts of Judas and the Jews were evil, because they sprang from malicious intentions. Thus, although the same event is at issue, these different actions are really quite distinct with respect to it, because of the difference in intentionality which the persons in question brought to it. And, in the case of Christ and the Trinity, the persons involved functioned as a sufficient cause, while in the case of Judas and the Jews they functioned as an efficient cause, forms of causation which, as Peter notes, are not the same thing.¹⁴⁷

Peter also brings up another question which is not found in many of the scholastic theologians of his time, under the heading of the merits of Christ. Christ merited, he states, the name above all names, the honorific title "God." This topic derives not from the controversies carried on by the summists and sentence collectors, but from Peter's own exegesis of Philippians 2:9 and that of Gilbert of Poitiers.¹⁴⁸ This is another good example of the positive interaction between Peter's Pauline commentaries and his systematic theology, not only as an index of what to say and which authorities to call upon but also of what questions to put into his doctrinal schema in the first place. The question is also a good example of the way Peter reconciles conflicting authorities, at least in cases where he thinks that it is possible to do so. The two competing authorities at issue here, Augustine and Ambrose, apparently disagree. Augustine says that the appropriate title to be given to the human Christ, by grace, is "Son of God." Ambrose says that the appropriate title to be given is "God." The two positions, Peter observes, are not incompatible. Ambrose was referring not to the humanity of Christ but to the divinity of Christ, which certainly merits the term "God" quite literally. For his part, Augustine was referring to the trope by which a thing is said to exist when it becomes known, as the resurrected Christ came to be known both by men and by other spiritual beings. Thus, the terms "God" and "Son of God" are both applied appositely, and honorifically, to the resurrected human Christ.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 20. c. 5–c. 6, 2: 128–29.

¹⁴⁸ Noted by Brady *ad loc.*, 2: 114.

¹⁴⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 18. c. 3, 2: 114–15.

Interesting as these last two points may be, it is not so much from the introduction of new questions or new distinctions that the Lombard's soteriology acquires its own personal character. Rather, what gives it its distinctiveness is his ability to bring together an objective understanding of the atonement based on Christ's nature and action with a subjective understanding of the atonement based on a psychological account of the existential change that Christ's actions, and the humility inspiring them, provoke in man. Just as the human Christ has to attain His own merit by the consistent, obedient functioning of a will that remains free, so human beings are made capable of liberation from their lesser selves by an enabling act on Christ's part that unleashes their love for the good and their capacity to exercise their own free will in pursuit of it in conjunction with God's grace, despite the remaining, if partial, weakness under which the human will must labor. Peter places the redemption of mankind by Christ on a trajectory that includes their justification, their sanctification, and their glorification. No doubt the single most striking feature of this Lombardian doctrine is his emphasis on Christ's perfect humility, as the sufficient corrective to the perfect pride that brought about the fall, a humility expressive of the consummate obedience manifested at all times during the earthly life of Christ, so that His crucifixion is rendered unnecessary, except for its unique power to provoke an emotional response from man. With Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter emphasizes the suffering of Christ more than His other deeds and experiences, and he does so more restrictively. On the other hand, the systematic account he takes of the "rights of the devil" theory, which we do not find in Bernard, has the effect of enabling Peter to marginalize that theory in scholastic theology after his time, in favor of a more internalist understanding of sin and redemption, and one that squares more neatly with the intentionalism of twelfth-century theology than its alternatives. If the "rights of the devil" model continued to appeal to the popular imagination and to medieval artists, being easier to visualize than the turning around of man's heart, the Lombard succeeded in bringing the latter view, which he shares with Bernard and Abelard, fully into the mainstream of scholastic analyses of Christ's saving work.

Peter's success in attaining his objectives in the other areas of Christology which he takes up in Book 3 of the *Sentences* is not always as striking. As the debates of his contemporaries and immediate successors indicate, it took some time for the lexical clarifications he imposed on terms such as substance, nature, and person, essential in the consideration of the hypostatic union, to

sink in, and there remained thinkers who failed to take his point and who garbled what he had said, thanks to their own insensitivity to his terminology. And, no sooner had they been dismissed, when the reception of Aristotle provided theologians in the sequel with a larger and less ambiguous vocabulary of terms which they could apply to the understanding of that doctrine. Peter's account of the three opinions, and their problems, became a classic one, wherever these later theologians decided to plant their own standards. Peter's willingness to leave the question open and to admit the orthodoxy of the three opinions, despite their difficulties, stands as an object lesson of the advantages of viewing the orthodox consensus as a non-monolithic one. Peter's handling of the human Christ, reflective as it is of the growing interest which this subject was attracting in devotion and dogmatic theology alike, suffers from the twelfth century's unwillingness, and ultimately, the Lombard's own, to grant a truly human psychology to the human Christ. This problem emerges with particular acuteness in his discussions surrounding Christ's human knowledge, and it can also be seen in his consideration of His free will and His nature and functions as a moral agent. In part, the hard line that Peter takes on the transmission of original sin and Christ's exemption from it inclines him to agree with the picture of a quasi-superhuman Christ favored by his contemporaries. In part, he seems to be as inspired as they are by the devotional attractiveness of the humanity of Christ. While he does try to take a minimalist line in these debates, and to hedge his description of the honors, dignities, and exemptions of the human Christ with qualifications, in the end Peter's human Christ is no more a man like us in all but sin than theirs is. This conclusion is one that Peter does not avoid drawing despite the fact that it is at odds with the doctrine that neither of the two natures of the incarnate Christ was altered by their union, so central to his treatment of the communication of idioms in the incarnate Christ, and with the doctrine of the full consubstantiality of Christ with the rest of mankind, so central to his soteriology.

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BY

MARCIA L. COLISH

VOLUME TWO



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AUTHOR'S NOTE

I include this author's note in order to clarify some technical stylistic decisions made in this book which entail apparent inconsistencies, inconsistencies which medievalists have long since come to live with, if not to love, but which may trouble readers coming to this book from another part of the landscape.

First, there was no agreement on Latin spelling in the Middle Ages, a fact reflected in the policies of editors of medieval texts and the houses that publish them. Some editors and publishers systematically classicize the spelling of medieval Latin, however the language may be used in the manuscripts on which the texts depend. For example, they substitute "i" for "j" or "u" for "v" on this basis. On the other hand, some editors and publishers retain the spellings found in the manuscripts. I have followed the practice, when quoting from editions of medieval Latin texts, of preserving whichever decision regarding the spelling is followed by the edition in question.

Another discrepancy concerns the Anglicization, or not, of the Latin names of medieval personages, and the titles of well known works. There are names, such as John of Salisbury, Gilbert of Poitiers, and Peter Lombard, whose English form is in common use among Anglophone readers. It would be an affectation to refer to these people in Latin or in another language. On the other hand, there are figures, such as Ordericus Vitalis and Jacques de Vitry, for whom this is not the case. My practice has been to use whichever version of the name has the greatest immediate recognition value, regardless of the lack of symmetry that any result. Similarly, while the titles of works written in Latin will usually be cited in that language in the text, others, such as Abelard's *Ethics* and Augustine's *City of God* or *Eighty-Three Diverse Questions*, will be given in English as more familiar or as less cumbersome than their Latin originals.

I will have occasion to cite repeatedly in this book the works of scholastic theologians and canonists, not only by the page or column number in the texts in which their works are printed, but according to the more specific, and traditional, finding tools indicated by the subdivisions within their texts. This practice, too, is quite standard for medievalists, who will readily recognize abbreviations such as "d" for *distinctio*, "c" for *capitulum* or *causa*, "q" for

quaestio, and *dictum* for a canonist's summation of a point. This system of abbreviations should serve as a guide for any readers unfamiliar with this standard scheme of citation for medieval texts.

Let me note as well that no effort has been made here to regularize the spelling of "mediaeval" to "medieval" or vice versa. When these adjectives occur in titles or in the house style of publishers, the spelling given by the author or by the publisher is the spelling that will be followed.

I will have occasion to cite female scholars, both in the bibliography and in footnotes organized alphabetically, who began to publish under one surname but who have changed their surnames thanks to a change in their marital status. I will cite their works alphabetized according to the first surnames under which they began to publish, with their subsequent surnames indicated in square brackets following their original names. I trust that this practice will not be confusing to readers who may initially seek citations to the writings of these scholars in locations where they will not be found.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AHDLMA</i>	<i>Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge</i>
Beiträge	Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie [und Theologie] des Mittelalters
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum, continuatio medievalis
C CSL	Corpus Christianorum, series latina
<i>CIMAGEL</i>	<i>Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen âge grec et latin de l'Université de Copenhague</i>
CSEL	Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum
<i>DTC</i>	<i>Dictionnaire de théologie catholique</i>
<i>ETL</i>	<i>Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses</i>
<i>FS</i>	<i>Franciscan Studies</i>
Landgraf, <i>Dogmengeschichte</i>	Artur Michael Landgraf, <i>Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik</i> , 4 vols. (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1952–56)
MGH, Scriptores	Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores
<i>Misc. Lomb.</i>	<i>Miscellanea Lombardiana</i> (Novara: Istituto Geografico de Agostini, 1957)
<i>PL</i>	<i>Patrologia latina, cursus completus</i> , ed. J. P. Migne
<i>RHE</i>	<i>Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique</i>
Rolls Series	Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi, Scriptores
<i>RSPT</i>	<i>Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques</i>
<i>RSR</i>	<i>Revue des sciences religieuses</i>
<i>RTAM</i>	<i>Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale</i>
<i>ZkT</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie</i>

CHAPTER EIGHT

ETHICS, SACRAMENTS, AND LAST THINGS

The topics to be treated in this chapter, with the exception of ethics, are all found in the fourth and final book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. They received widely varying degrees of attention in the first half of the twelfth century. Some of them were regarded as meriting sustained and systematic investigation and were treated as subjects that warranted a clear and well-rationalized location in any *summa* or sentence collection. Others were taken up in a more random manner, without the sense that they needed discussion at some specifically chosen place in a theologian's writings, or were omitted altogether. Some aspects of these questions elicited a striking degree of consensus among contemporaries, while in other areas they were sharply divided. Controversy was particularly acute in the field of sacramental theology, both in response to the need to define and defend these rites of the church against heretics of an anti-sacramental persuasion and as an expression of the desire to work out practical and theoretical problems attached to their administration and reception. Peter Lombard plays a range of roles in his address to the subjects dealt with in this chapter. On some topics he takes a strongly partisan stand, and makes a critical contribution in helping to undermine the countervailing view. In some parallel areas, his equally partisan position does not have the same kind of effect. There are some fields in which he argues for caution and reticence over against what he regards as groundless speculation that has gotten out of hand. Finally, there are areas where his goal, a goal successfully attained, is to sum up and to expand upon the contemporary consensus, incorporating the insights of its bolder articulations while moderating their extremes.

ETHICS

This last-mentioned orientation is definitely the one that Peter takes in the field of ethics. From a schematic point of view, ethics is the major subject on which his gift for lucid organization deserts him. He does not take up all the points relevant to this topic in one place. There is some analysis of the psychology of ethical decision-making in his Pauline exegesis, and this theme recurs in his consid-

eration of the fall in Book 2 of the *Sentences*. It is there, as well, under the heading of human nature, that he considers the vices, and the relationship between man's free will and divine grace in the moral life both before and after the fall. Ethical intentionality and sin reappear, in detail, in his analysis of the sacraments, typically penance and marriage, in Book 4. While Peter discusses the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the virtues which they help mankind to develop as an extension of his treatment of grace and free will in Book 2, his principal analysis of virtue, both the theological virtues, the cardinal virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit occurs in Book 3, in connection with the moral aptitudes of the human Christ. Notwithstanding the schematic disjunctions which this plan of attack involves, Philippe Delhay, our leading guide on Peter's ethical doctrine to date, is quite right in pointing out that his ideas do manage to cohere, on the whole, even though they are not presented synthetically.¹

In general, Peter's ethics is marked by two notes, both of which are clear hallmarks of the theology of his time. On the one hand, he is deeply committed to the view that all meritorious acts require the collaboration of man's free will and God's grace. While he is resolutely opposed to the idea that grace is irresistible or that man, in his fallen state, is unable to desire the good, Peter is only marginally interested in what might be called a purely natural ethics. We recall here that, in his treatment of the nature of man as such, before the fall, he holds that grace must interact with man's free will if man is to acquire virtue. At the same time, Peter shares the view, widespread in his time, that the psychic ground on which man makes ethical decisions and on which he acts, reacts, and develops, is a subject that requires extended and sympathetic consideration. The systematic interiorizing of ethics, the analysis of what ethical behavior means in the inner life of the moral subject, and the consequent stress on intentionality in ethics that mark this period are equally compelling themes for Peter. He gives lucid articulation to these concerns. While seeking to preserve a sense that some acts are objectively wrong and while arguing that good intentions should normally be expressed in appropriate good actions, he retains the common view of the period that intentionality is the essence of the moral act and that, absent the act, it defines the moral status of the moral agent.²

¹ Philippe Delhay, *Pierre Lombard: Sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa morale* (Montreal: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1961), pp. 24–25, 28–100.

² The best overall study of this theme in our period is Robert Blomme, *La*

INTENTIONALISM IN ETHICS: THE CONSENSUS AND THE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN IT

The analysis of the psychology of moral choice on which Peter draws is ultimately Stoic in provenance and was mediated to the twelfth century by patristic authorities such as Jerome and Augustine. This position was held widely during the period. The theory is based on the principle that sin, or virtue, lies in a fixed intentionality toward evil, or good, respectively. These moral states are controlled by the mind, not by the body. Temptations to sin or inclinations to virtue may, to be sure, arise in any part of the human constitution. But it is not the inclination itself, but a rational and deliberate assent to it, the mind having judged it to be morally desirable, that constitutes the moral agent's ethical commitment and that makes him vicious or virtuous. In Hieronymian language, the process involves, with respect to sin, a *passio* or temptation, a *propassio* or hospitable contemplation of the temptation, and a *consensus*, or conscious capitulation to it. Language also found in this period which embodies precisely the same analysis substitutes *suggestio*, *delectatio*, and *consensus*, the first term including the idea that the temptation may be internal or external. The school of Laon uses both of these vocabularies, repeating the point frequently, and their lead is followed widely. Peter follows suit.³

doctrine du péché dans les écoles théologiques de la première moitié du XII^e siècle (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1958). See also Artur Michael Landgraf, "Die Bestimmung des Verdienstgrades in der Frühscholastik," *Scholastik* 8 (1933): 1-40; *Dogmengeschichte* 1 part 2: 210-61; Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, vols. 1-5 (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1948-59), 2: 421-22, 4 part 1: 310-19.

³ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 10, 85-86; *Sentences of Plausible Authenticity*, no. 218; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 277-78; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 422, 423, 447, 449, 450-54, ed. Lottin in *Psych. et morale*, 5: 22, 73-74, 138-39, 221-22, 292, 302-03, 303-05; *Sententie Anselmi* 2, ed. Franz P. Bliemetzrieder in *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, Beiträge, 18:2-3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919), p. 71; *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 4: *In Mattheum* 5:27; *In Epistolam ad Romanos* 6:12; *In Epistolam II ad Corinthios* 12:7, editio princeps (Strassburg: Adolph Rusch?, c. 1481); repr. with intro. by Karlfried Froelich and Margaret T. Gibson (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992); also *PL* 114: 94D, 488D-489A, 568C; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 1. d. 6. c. 1-c. 3; pars 2. c. 15. q. 1. pars 1 prologus, d. 2. c. 21, ed. Aemilius Friedberg, *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, 1 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879), cols. 9-11, 744-45, 1197; Roland of Bologna, *Die Sentenzen Rolands*, ed. Ambrosius M. Gietl (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1969 [repr. of Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1891 ed.]), p. 255; Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, ed. and trans. David E. Luscombe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 32; *Commentarius in I Corinthios* 10 in *Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in Epistolas Pauli e schola Petri Abaelardi*, ed. Artur Michael Landgraf, 4 vols. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1937-45), 2: 256-57; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis fidei christianae* 1.5.25, 2.13.1, *PL* 176: 257B-258D, 525C; *Sententiae divinitatis* 2.2.3, ed. Bernhard Geyer, *Die Sententiae*

Whether or not the theologians make express use of either of these vocabularies, there is a broad consensus among them on the point that intentionality is of the essence in the moral life.⁴ Yet, within that consensus, a number of related questions emerged on which there was a wider play of opinions. One, which focused on the sin of lying, involved a critique of Augustine's position in his *Contra mendacium*, where he defines lying as involving both an objective untruth and the intention to deceive. Twelfth-century theolo-

divinitatis: Ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertischen Schule, Beiträge 7:2–3 (Münster Aschendorff, 1909), pp. 24*–26*, 28*–29*; Robert Pullen, *Sententiarum libri octo* 5.33, *PL* 186: 854D–856A; Peter Lombard, *In Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 6:12–14, 7:7–8, *PL* 191: 1407C–D 1416D. Scholars who have noted this vocabulary and this analysis of the psychogenesis of ethical decisions in one or more of these figures include Ermenegildo Bertola, “La dottrina morale di Pietro Abelardo,” *RTAM* 55 (1988): 53–71; Blomme, *La doctrine du péché*, pp. 21–87; Scott Davis, “The Unity of the Virtues in Abelard's *Dialogues*,” *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, 11, ed. Phillip Pulsiano (Villanova: Augustinian Historical Institute, 1986), pp. 71–82; Lottin, *Psych. et morale*, 2: 494–96; David E. Luscombe, “The *Ethics* of Abelard: Some Further Considerations,” in *Peter Abelard*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), p. 71.

⁴ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 68, 78; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 277–78; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 422, 423, 447, 449, 5: 59, 67, 221–22, 292, 302–03, 303–05; *Biblia latina cum Glossa ordinaria*, 4: *In Matt.* 6:22–23, also *PL* 114: 104 C–D; Honorius Augustodunensis, *Elucidarium* 2.2–5, ed. Yves Lefèvre, *L'Elucidarium et les lucidaires: Contribution, par l'histoire d'un texte, à l'histoire des croyances religieuses en France au moyen âge* (Paris: É. de Boccard, 1954), pp. 405–07; Alger of Liège, *De misericordia et iustitia* 1.74, ed. Robert Kretzschmer, *Alger von Lüttichs Traktat 'De misericordia et iustitia'*; *Ein kanonistischer Konkordanzversuch aus der Zeit des Investiturstreits* (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1985), p. 244; Gratian, *Decretum* d. 6. c. 1–c. 3, pars 2. c. 32. q. 5, col. 9–11, 1132–36; Nikolaus M. Häring, ed., “Die *Sententiae magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* I” 10.15, *AHDLMA* 45 (1978): 157; Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 4–14, 16–20, 22–26; *In Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* 1:16–17, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert in *Opera theologica*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert and Constant J. Mews, *CCCM* 11–13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969–87), 11: 65; Hermanus, *Sententie magistri Petri Abaelardi (Sententie Hermannii)*, ed. Sandro Buzzetti, Pubblicazioni della facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell'Università di Milano, 101, sezione a cura di storia della filosofia, 31 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1983), pp. 141–55; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, ed. Artur Michael Landgraf in *Écrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), pp. 76, 91–93; *Sent. div.* 2.2.3, pp. 24*–26*, 28*–29*; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.4.15, *PL* 176: 240C–241A; *Summa sententiarum* 3.14–15, 4.4–5, *PL* 176: 111A–113B, 122B–124B; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.33, 6.2–11, 6.18–23, *PL* 186: 854D–856A, 865C–871A, 876C–880D; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 150, 255–61; *Summa magistri Rolandi* c. 15. q. 1, ed. Friedrich Thauer (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1962 [repr. of Innsbruck, 1874 ed.]), pp. 31–33. On this point, see Blomme, *La doctrine du péché*, passim; John F. Benton, “Consciousness of Self and Perception of Individuality,” in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 274; Lottin, *Psych. et morale*, 3: 99–104; Luscombe, “The *Ethics* of Abelard,” pp. 67, 71; intro. and annotations to his ed. of Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. xvii–xviii, xxv, xxxiii, p. 14 n. 1, pp. 46–47 n. 1.

gians who take exception to this view, and to Augustine's categorical ban on lying for any reason whatever, make use of the countervailing analysis of pious fraud found in Gregory the Great. The issue, for Gregory, arises specifically in connection with the behavior of the nurses of the enslaved Israelites in Egypt at the time of Moses's birth, who denied the existence of their charges in order to protect them from the Pharaoh's decree of death. Anselm of Laon and his followers, including the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, take the position that the nurses' intention of saving the infants' lives excuses their lie, buttressing their argument with Gregory.⁵ On the other hand, Robert Pullen agrees with Augustine that this instance of lying, as with all acts of lying, was wrong. But, he argues, a good deed can wipe away a bad one. Thus, the nurses of Exodus 1:20 were given a dispensation by God concerning their lie because of their virtuous intentions.⁶

Another debate related to ethical intentionality was the one surrounding the virtue or vice with which people in different walks of life exercise their callings. Although all involved are proponents of intentionalism, not all the masters who take up this question deploy that principle consistently in practice. Anselm of Laon withholds his favor from merchants, who, he thinks, are motivated only by greed and fraud; Honorius Augustodunensis extends his criticism to knights, craftsmen, jongleurs, and even to public penitents, who, he thinks, are guilty of self-advertisement. He can find virtuous intentionality only in the profession of farming.⁷ On the other hand, disciples of Anselm of Laon reverse his negative judgment on merchants, arguing that they perform a useful public service, and that they are just as capable of doing so for good as for selfish reasons. They find it possible as well to accept the idea that the songs of the jongleurs may inspire their audience to emulate the valiant deeds of great men and to serve the common weal, and that they do not always draw their hearers into immorality, in a striking reversal of the bad press generally given to members of this profession by twelfth-century theologians.⁸ Robert Pullen provides the

⁵ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 88; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 47–72, 5: 76–77, 310; *Summa sent.* 4.5, *PL* 176: 122D–124B.

⁶ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.35, *PL* 186: 859B–C.

⁷ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 14, 5: 24; Honorius, *Eluc.* 2.54–59, 2.61, pp. 427–28, 429.

⁸ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 441–43, 5: 300–01. For the general attitude of theologians in this period toward jongleurs, see Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 56.

most elaborate, and generous, analysis of professions as callings in the church which, while they do have their particular temptations, are all licit and capable of being conducted with virtue, thereby contributing to the salvation of their practitioners and the service of their fellow Christians. He ranges across the clergy and the laity, the *regnum* and the *sacerdotium*, the contemplative and the active lives, the celibate and the married, the rulers and the ruled, and the professions of magistrate, soldier, farmer, merchant, and miller, accenting the point that, in all cases, these callings can be seen as occasions for the practice of virtue if conducted with the proper intentionality.⁹

Still another debate concerned how the ethical intentionality defining moral states was itself to be understood and whether it conditions virtue and vice globally or not. Those contemporary theologians who give ethical intentionality a name describe it as a habit of mind (*habitus mentis*) focused on good, or evil, as the case may be. Despite the universality of the use of the term *habitus* by those who offer this definition, however, they do not always understand the term in the same way. Anselm of Laon, defining virtue as “a habit of mind well constituted” and vice as “a habit of mind badly constituted” (*virtus est habitus mentis bene constituta, et viciū habitus est mentis male constituta*), raises the question of whether a person can have virtues and vices at the same time. His understanding of the problem clearly goes back to the Stoic principle of intentionality as a fixed mental disposition which admits of no contrasting modalities at the same time. This notion, in Stoicism, had led to ethical claims regarded as paradoxes, such as the idea that he who possesses one virtue possesses them all, and the idea that all virtues and all vices are equal, since they all express equally a virtuous or a vicious intentionality. Augustine had considered these claims repeatedly. While he had agreed with the Stoics on the interconnection of the virtues, recasting all the virtues and vices as equal expressions of charity, or its absence, he had disagreed with the premise that all sins are equal or that an individual who is basically virtuous cannot experience backsliding in certain respects while retaining his paramount moral orientation. Anselm of Laon agrees with Augustine here. He sees the *habitus* of virtue as a mental disposition, but one that is not so total that its existence would be annulled by a minor peccadillo. He also agrees with Augustine that the reverse is the case, unsymmetrically, with a moral agent con-

⁹ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 7.7–9, 7.19–27, *PL* 186: 879C–922A, 931A–943B.

firmed in vice. Nothing that such a person does can be virtuous, since the absence of charity is his prevailing moral orientation. The same view of *habitus* and of the equality of the virtues as rooted in charity is found in Hermannus. The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, while he ignores the pendant to this question, likewise views the *habitus mentis* involved in ethical decisions purely from the perspective of the consent of the intellect to *suggestio* and *delectatio*.¹⁰

On the other hand, Peter Abelard understands *habitus* in a more Aristotelian sense. For him, a virtuous *habitus mentis* is to be defined not just as the willingness to obey God but also as a commitment that is confirmed in its exercise. It involves practice and improvement, and perdurance in virtue; and it is connected with the perseverance of the saints. While this attitude undergirds all modes of virtue and vice, Abelard agrees with Augustine that sins are not all equally important. He cites the standard distinction between mortal and venial sins, which he distinguishes in terms of the state of mind which the sinner displays in them. Venial sins spring from forgetfulness, carelessness, and triviality, while serious sins stem from deliberation and planning (*studio et deliberatione*). It is the degree of intentionality, and not the aspect of the human constitution from which sins derive or the amount of damage that they do, that counts.¹¹ Without the same elaboration on the difference be-

¹⁰ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 68, 5: 59; Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 141–48; *Sent. div.* 2.2.3, pp. 28*–29*.

¹¹ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 68–70, 128–30. The quotation is on p. 70. Scholars who have noted the Aristotelian sense which Abelard gives to *habitus* here and the existence of an objective standard in his ethics include Bertola, "La dottrina morale," pp. 53–71; Robert Blomme, "A propos de la définition du péché chez Pierre Abélard," *ETL* 33 (1957): 319–47; *La doctrine du péché*, pp. 103–294; Davis, "The Unity of the Virtues," pp. 71–82; Frank De Siano, "Of God and Man: Consequences of Abelard's Ethics," *Thomist* 35 (1971): 631–60; Maurice de Gandillac, "Intention et loi dans l'éthique d'Abélard," in *Pierre Abélard, Pierre le Vénéral: Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques au milieu du XII^e siècle* (Paris: CNRS, 1975), pp. 585–97; Angela Giuliano de Padova, "Alcuni rilievi sull'etica abelardiana," *Atti dell'Accademia delle scienze di Torino, classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* 102 (1967–68): 437–60; B. Landry, "Les idées morales du XII^e siècle: Les écrivains en Latin," *Revue des cours et conférences* 40 (1938–39): 387–89; Luscombe, "The *Ethics* of Abelard," pp. 71, 80–84; Roger J. Van den Berge, "La qualification morale de l'acte humain: Ébauche d'une réinterprétation de la pensée abélardienne," *Studia moralia* 13 (1975): 143–73. These statutes effectively refute the view of Abelard as a pure subjectivist in ethics put forth by G. de Giuli, "Abelardo e la morale," *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 12 (1931): 33–44 and Jean Rohmer, *La finalité morale chez les théologiens de Saint Augustin à Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1939), pp. 31–40; or the view of Abelard as an "ethical nominalist" as claimed by Richard J. Thompson, "The Role of Dialectical Reason in the Ethics of Abelard," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 12 (1936): 141–48.

tween mortal and venial sin, the author of the *Ysagoge in theologiam* agrees with Abelard's Aristotelian definition of virtue as a *habitus mentis* oriented to the highest good and developed by exercise, and adds to it another Aristotelian note, virtue as the mean between the extremes of excess and defect.¹² The author of *Sententiae Parisiensis* I agrees with the notion of *habitus* as a quality of soul that develops through exercise, as well as a mental disposition toward good or evil, and connects the point with the grading of the virtues.¹³

There are some theologians of the day who reflect on the question of the equality or gradation of vices and virtues and their mutual interdependence or lack of it without taking a stand on the nature of *habitus*. The followers of Anselm of Laon agree with him, and with Augustine, that all vices and virtues are interrelated, respectively, because of their common source in the absence or presence of charity. They agree with Abelard in distinguishing between venial and mortal sins on the basis of their accidental or deliberate character. To this they add that the severity of a sin depends on the particular vice inspiring it and on the status of the perpetrator. At the same time, they drop the Augustinian idea that a vicious person must, perforce, be vicious in all he does, unlike the virtuous person.¹⁴ Robert Pullen also supports the critique of the Stoic principle that he who has one virtue, or vice, has them all. He offers no arguments or authorities in defense of this position, presenting the mix of vices and virtues in individual human beings as a phenomenon widely encountered and as a conclusion based on experience and common sense. It is one he finds compatible with the fact that people can, and do, change in their moral habits; this situation, for him, argues against anyone's moral state as a fixed intentionality.¹⁵ Robert also grades the sins. With Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, and others, he regards the degree of deliberation involved as an index of their seriousness. Also, with Abelard, he lists ignorance and unintentional error as factors mitigating or removing guilt, citing one of Abelard's examples, that of a man who inadvertently sleeps with another woman, believing that she is his wife. He adds another example of a case which he thinks ignorance excuses, and one usually reserved for the discussion of the condi-

¹² *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 76.

¹³ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 424–25, 458, 460, 462, 5: 293, 306, 307.

¹⁴ *Sententiae Parisiensis* I, ed. Artur Michael Landgraf in *Écrits théologiques de l'école d'Abelard* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), pp. 50–52, 55–59.

¹⁵ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.31, 5.34–36, *PL* 186: 853D–854B, 856B–860B; cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.13.1, *PL* 176: 526B–C.

tions nullifying a marriage, that of a young man separated from his family as a child who returns to his native land and unknowingly contracts an incestuous marriage.¹⁶ A more independent approach to the question of whether a person who has one vice or virtue has them all is taken by Roland of Bologna. He distinguishes between interior and exterior virtue (*in affecto interiori et in effectu exteriori*). With respect to their inner affects, he agrees that all the virtues are one and the same since they derive from an identical good intention. But, he adds, they manifest their outward effects in different ways. The same analysis holds for the vices. Here, Roland seeks to emphasize equally the primacy of intentionality and the idea that different people have their paramount virtues and vices, or that they may express these moral states in a variety of ways.¹⁷

The matter of ignorance, on which Robert Pullen touches, also evoked a range of opinions. As will be recalled, Hugh of St. Victor regards ignorance as a punishment for original sin, a view in which he is followed by the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. Ignorance is thus one of the conditions, along with concupiscence, that inclines fallen man to sin, in general, and it is not viewed by these masters as a circumstance that conditions or relieves the guilt of particular actions that would otherwise be regarded as actual sins. On the other hand, amplifying on the school of Laon here, Abelard reflects a more analytical approach to the problem of ignorance, and one displaying an awareness of the ways in which the canonists treat this issue.¹⁸ Gratian, for example, gives a thorough analysis of the modes of ignorance and the ways in which they may or may not affect moral culpability. There is ignorance stemming from mental incapacity, which mitigates responsibility. There is ignorance of matters on which a person is humanly incapable of informing himself, which has a similar effect. On the other hand, there is ignorance of matters a person needs to know in order to conduct himself with propriety, matters of which he fails to inform himself through negligence. This type of ignorance, in Gratian's view, does not excuse a person from things he may say or do while acting under the resultant ignorance or misapprehension.¹⁹ Abelard poses the question of ignorance in relation to intentionality in its most

¹⁶ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.35, 5.40, 6.2–11, *PL* 186: 854D–856A, 862A, 865C–871A.

¹⁷ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 257–59.

¹⁸ Lottin, *Psych. et morale*, 3: 12–13, 18–19, 56–57; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 420, 5: 291.

¹⁹ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 22. q. 4. c. 23, dictum, col. 881–82.

extreme form, and in a manner calculated to raise the hackles of his contemporaries. He agrees with the consensus position that vice and virtue lie in inner intentionalities, whether or not they are expressed outwardly. A virtuous intention is the intention to obey God; a vicious intention is consent to an attitude or an act that stands in contempt of God. In order to make the intellectual judgment on which this consent rests, the moral agent has to know what God requires. His knowledge or belief in this respect is as critical as what the will of God actually may be, since different people in different dispensations or different states of faith may be given a differential access to that information. Abelard also includes ignorance, willy-nilly, of facts that are relevant to particular ethical decisions as excusing a person from culpability. In illustrating this point, he presents several highly charged examples. There is the example of the husband who mistakes another woman for his wife, also cited by Robert Pullen, and one that inspires a certain skepticism. Worst yet, in the eyes of contemporaries, there is the example of the people who put Christ to death. According to Abelard, they acted in good conscience since, in their view, He was a criminal and a blasphemer.²⁰ But, despite his vaunted reputation as a logician, Abelard is far from consistent in applying this principle. Another example he gives is that of a mother too poor to afford bedding for her infant, who takes him into her own bed to keep him warm, and accidentally smothers him while asleep. Despite Abelard's stand on the seriousness of sins as conditioned by deliberation, and not by the damage they may do, in this case he argues that the injury and scandal involved in the example given require that the woman be considered guilty of infanticide and punished, as an object lesson, notwithstanding the accidental nature of the event and the protective maternal intention informing her action.²¹

THE LOMBARD AS AN INTENTIONALIST

Peter Lombard subscribes to the consensus view that sees intentionality as the essence of the moral act and as a description of the moral status of the moral agent even in the absence of the act. At the same time, he places this question on a broader canvas than is the case with any of his contemporaries. He considers several definitions of the nature of sin, the initial context in which he

²⁰ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 4–14, 16–20, 26–36, 53–56.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 38–48, 68–70.

considers the psychogenesis of ethical acts, exploring their merits and demerits before presenting his own solution. He begins with two definitions drawn from Augustine, the *Contra Faustum* view that sin is any thought, word, or deed that contravenes the law of God, and the *De duabus animabus* view that sin is the will to retain and follow what justice forbids. In both of these definitions, Peter notes, Augustine accents the volitional character of sin, while conceding that sin may also be manifested externally. Next, he offers a definition drawn from Ambrose's *De paradiso*, where sin is treated as the disobedience through which a divine law is broken. Here, the malice of the perpetrator is central, but the presence of an objective external law that requires or forbids certain actions is given more prominence.²² To this range of opinions, which he sums up as sin defined as bad will as such, irrespective of external action and as sin defined as both the bad will and the bad deed, he adds another view. This third position is found in Augustine as well and had been reprised recently by Anselm of Canterbury and Honorius. It argues that sin is non-being, in the sense of the privative theory of evil. Having observed that all three positions find support from Augustine, Peter opts for the first mentioned view. Sin, he states, is evil-doing in thought, word, and deed, with the accent falling most heavily on volition: "Sin consists principally in the will, from which evil deeds proceed as bad fruit from a bad tree" (*Praecipue tamen in voluntate peccatum consistit, ex qua tanquam ex arbore mala procedunt opera mala tanquam fructus mali*).²³

Having displayed his colors early in this analysis, it now remains for Peter to disqualify the definitions of sin he rejects. His handling of the privative theory of evil is deft and knowledgeable. He begins by contextualizing it, accurately, as a cosmological, not as an ethical, doctrine, developed by Augustine in the first instance to refute the Manichees. From a metaphysical standpoint, he notes, if we equate being and goodness, then anything that exists is good, insofar as it exists, including evil thoughts and deeds. This position is clearly problematic in the field of ethics. At the same time, according to the privative theory of evil, evil is not a being but the corruption or absence of being. Sin is not a substance which, so far as it exists, is good. Rather, it is a rejection of the good, a departure

²² Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 2. d. 35. c. 1, 3rd ed. rev., ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81), 1: 529–30.

²³ Ibid., c. 2.1–3, 1: 530–31. The quotation is at c. 2.3, p. 531. See also d. 44, 1: 577–80. For Honorius on evil as non-being, see *Eluc.* 2.2, p. 405.

from being, whose existence can be grasped only by applying to it the epistemology of the *via negativa*. A far better way of understanding the condition of sin, in Peter's view, is to substitute for a content-free absence of good a willed turning from the good. His proposal is to invoke the theme of the *regio dissimilitudinis*, the region of unlikeness, in which sinful man has placed himself by his own voluntary action, thereby abandoning the image of God in himself. As Peter explores this idea, he shows how far it had developed, by the twelfth century, away from a cosmic Plotinian "fall of the soul" over which the soul has no control, and away from a purely monastic understanding of human existence apart from conversion and adherence to the contemplative life. Now it has come to mean, simply, the sinful state in which men find themselves thanks to their own moral choices.²⁴ In effect, Peter disposes of the privative theory of evil by substituting for it a notion of moral deprivation rooted in man's will. The one point of agreement with the privative theory that he feels he can maintain is the principle that sins, and other evils, are not substances or natures. This idea is essential, he concedes, in order to show that, although the punishment God metes out to sinners is earned, God does not create evil. He is not responsible for man's sins; they spring exclusively from man's bad use of his free will, a use of free will which man is not constrained to make.²⁵

As to the argument that sin can be reduced entirely to subjective intentionality, Peter turns the question around by observing that the end of the good is charity. This is the goal toward which a good will is oriented. To be sure, we can distinguish intentions from the

²⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 35. c. 2.4–c. 6, 1: 531–36. Peter adverts frequently to the theme of the *regio dissimilitudinis* in the same generic sense elsewhere in his writings. See his *Sermo* 12, 13, 21, 23, 55, 99, 111, 112, *PL* 171: 397A, 404D, 435D–436A, 445C, 610C, 798B, 850D, 857B; *Sermo de adventu Domini* ed. Damien Van den Eynde, "Deux sermons inédits de Pierre Lombard," in *Misc. Lomb.*, p. 78; *In Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas* 2:23, *PL* 192: 128C–129A. Good studies of the changes in interpretation undergone by this theme up through the twelfth century include J. C. Didier, "Pour la fiche *Regio dissimilitudinis*," *Mélanges de science religieuse* 8 (1951): 205–10; Étienne Gilson, "*Regio dissimilitudinis* de Platon à Saint Bernard de Clairvaux," *MS* 9 (1947): 108–30; and, especially, Margot Schmidt, "*Regio dissimilitudinis*: Ein Grundbegriff mittelhochdeutscher Prosa im Lichte seiner lateinischen Bedeutungsgeschichte," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 15 (1968): 63–83. On the other hand, Pierre Courcelle, "L'Âme en cage," in *Parusia: Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus, Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger*, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt: Minerva GMBH, 1965), pp. 103–16 treats the theme by way of decontextualized *topos* research that offers no sense of how the meaning of the theme changed over time.

²⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 36–d. 37, 1: 536–47.

ends they serve. But, intentions are directionalities. They always have destinations in view, by definition; for the ends in question are what the moral subject wills when he wills. Now, when the will is disordered, that is, ordered to the wrong end, we sin. The will, in making a disordered choice, may misjudge what the good is, especially if it lacks the help of grace. The misguided choice is sinful, and so is the act that connects it with its inaccurately understood end. Peter is perfectly willing to grant that acts are not good or evil *per se*, but that they are good or evil in the light of the ethical intentionalities that inform them. At the same time, and here he argues against the Abelardian position concerning the people who put Christ to death, the acts themselves are not matters of indifference. Some acts, indeed, are objectively evil. In this connection he cites Augustine's rule in the *Contra mendacium* that lies stating an objective untruth are sinful even if spoken with a good intention, thereby distancing himself from contemporaries who accepted Gregory's justification of pious fraud. Like the lie which Augustine castigates, an evil act can be intrinsically evil and also evil in that it manifests an evil intention. Also, a person may have a good, or excusable, intention and at the same time he may express it in deeds that are not good or suitable. Where Peter draws the line is at the point where an intention, of whatever quality, is expressed in an act that is objectively wrong: "All human actions are judged good or bad according to their intention and cause, except those which are intrinsically evil, that is, those which are unconditionally prohibited" (*Omnia igitur hominis opera secundum intentionem et causam iudicantur bona vel mala, exceptis his quae per se mala sunt, id est quae sine praevaricatione fieri nequeunt*).²⁶

Thus, for Peter, one can accept intentionality as the basic definition of the essence of the moral act, with two stipulations. First, one must acknowledge the normal continuity between the intention and its expression in appropriate action, in relation to the end with which it is connected. Second, one must acknowledge that an act cannot express a good intention if it stands in manifest opposition to one's own moral duties. The contemporary theologian to whom he comes the closest in articulating these conclusions is the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. Peter has sharpened the focus of his teaching. His position also takes account of Abelard's claim, and seeks to make it as palatable as possible, although he is not entirely responsive to Abelard's point that the executioners of Christ

²⁶ Ibid., d. 38–d. 40, 1: 547–61. The quotation is at d. 40. c. 12, pp. 560–61.

thought they were doing something right and appropriate. The Lombard does not expressly take up here the issue of ignorance. He does, however, include the issue of grace, in discussing the human will's judgment of the good, which Abelard omits. The Lombard's analysis here suggests that, had he included it, he would have felt comfortable with Gratian's treatment of ignorance, particularly the responsibility of an individual to inform himself of what he needs to know in order to carry out his duties virtuously, and his culpability if he fails to do so. As to the absence of grace in the will's erroneous judgments, it is on the same trajectory, for Peter, as the absence, or subtraction, of grace from those persons whom God does not predestine to salvation. As he sees it, such persons are none the less fully responsible for the consequences of the bad use which they make of their free will.

Before leaving this part of his analysis, Peter raises the related question of whether good intentions and good deeds require good faith. Here, he draws a distinction. An affirmative answer can be given if good faith means lack of hypocrisy. On the other hand, if we mean by faith the theological virtue of faith or the set of theological propositions to which faith constitutes assent, then we can answer in the negative. For, one does not have to be a Christian to possess good faith in the first sense, and hence to be capable of good intentions and good deeds. In support of this conclusion, Peter observes that the Jew or the non-believer is perfectly capable of good faith, good intentions, and good deeds, which he manifests in his own virtues and in ministering to the needs of his neighbors, "drawn by natural piety" (*naturali pietate ductus*).²⁷ While, in considering man's capacity for virtue under the heading of human nature as such, before the fall, Peter, like Hugh of St. Victor, closes off the concept of natural virtue by arguing that ethical acts, to have merit, must be assisted by grace, here he opens up the concept of natural virtue and the possible existence of the virtuous pagan or non-Christian.

Vice and Sin

Another related question which Peter next takes up is whether all sins are reducible to a single, central, sinful intentionality and whether sins can be graded. His handling of these issues is somewhat different from what we have found in other current theolo-

²⁷ Ibid., d. 41, 1: 561–66. The quotation is at d. 41. c. 2, p. 564.

gians. Peter is not always interested in the same aspects of this constellation of ideas as intrigue many of his compeers. He agrees with the principle that all sins stem from a central evil attitude or orientation, just as a bad will and a bad deed reflect the same bad intention. He uses the term *habitus* here but he does not pursue the question of whether the intention at issue is a mental disposition only, or an Aristotelian *habitus*, or both. Peter also agrees with those masters who think that sins can, none the less, be graded. The criterion for doing so, however, is not the degree of deliberation that informs particular sins, but rather the particular vice that inspires them. This rule obtains, for Peter, whether the sins are committed against God, oneself, or one's neighbor; whether they occur in thought, word, or deed, or all three; whether they are crimes as well as sins; and whether they involve the active perpetration of evil or the failure to do good. Peter also distinguishes between mortal and venial sins, and is inclined to invoke considerations of how much harm or outrage is done, and not the kind of intentionality involved, in making discriminations here.²⁸ Although he does not call upon the language used by Roland of Bologna at this juncture, he reflects Roland's idea that the same evil intention can be manifested by different people or even by the same person in different ways. In addition, and this is in line with his view that some sins are more serious than others because of the intrinsic evil they represent or because of their moral consequences, he brings to bear on this point the doctrine of the seven deadly sins given in Gregory the Great's *Moralia*. This was a standard topic in Peter's day, although theologians used it to illustrate a variety of points. Thus, Hugh of St. Victor introduces Gregory's scheme of the sins to underscore the idea that all sins spring from the mind, not the body.²⁹ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* uses it to illustrate the point that different passions give rise to different kinds of sin.³⁰ The author of the *Ysagoge in theologiam* treats the seven vices horizontally, as equal manifestations of man's bad use of free will.³¹ William of

²⁸ Ibid., d. 42. c. 1–c. 5, 1: 566–70. Artur Michael Landgraf, "Some Unknown Writings of the Early Scholastic Period," *New Scholasticism* 4 (1930): 17 has noted that a *quaestio* found in an unpublished manuscript on the British Museum, dating to the mid-twelfth century, states that the Lombard distinguished between virtue *in habitu* and virtue *in usu*, in a manner approximating Roland of Bologna, although this language does not appear in the *Sentences*. Peter's reasons for distinguishing between mortal and venial sin are not noted by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 4 part 2: 10–11, 110–16, 144–45.

²⁹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.13.1, *PL* 176: 525A–526B.

³⁰ *Summa sent.* 3.16, *PL* 176: 113D–114C.

³¹ *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 100.

Champeaux provides a detailed analysis of pride and envy, which later theologians drew upon, but stops there.³²

The contemporary theologian closest to Peter in this area is one of the Porretan sentence collectors who, like him, is interested in viewing these vices vertically, hierarchically, and developmentally.³³ Pride, in the estimation of both this author and Peter, is the deadliest of the sins, not only because it involves the most exhaustive capitulation of the self to sin but also because it leads to the other sins, each engendered in turn by the one in back of it. As both masters see it, pride has four manifestations. It attributes the good things one has to oneself and not to God; it regards the good things one has from God as His response to one's own merits; it claims to have good things which one lacks; and it lords it over others on account of the good things one has. Envy springs from pride, in the estimation of the Porretan master, following William of Champeaux. For, unless one loved one's own excellence, one would not be jealous of another's good or resentful of another's pleasure. This jealousy and resentment in turn breed wrath, out of one's inability to attain equality with one's superiors or to deprive others of the desirable things they have. The frustrations emerging from this state in turn engender *accidia* or spiritual sloth, the deprivation of internal joy in the spirit. In that state, the sinner mistakenly turns to external pleasures, in the effort to derive joy from them, leading to avarice, gluttony, and lust.

Peter follows the same analysis, with equal fidelity to Gregory. His only gloss on this text is to include cupidity in the list of vices, as a species of pride, in the effort to harmonize Gregory's account with the biblical idea that love of money is the root of all evil.³⁴ The same sense that some sins are intrinsically more destructive and disabling informs Peter's conclusion that the single worst sin that can be committed is the sin against the Holy Spirit. This is not simply because God is the supreme being and sins against Him are weightier than sins against created beings. Rather, it is because this sin—the sin of despair, which makes a person obdurate in evil, impenitent, unwilling to accept the help of fellow Christians, and, worst of all, lacking in confidence in God's mercy and love—locks him in a state in which he rates his own self-importance more highly than God's grace. Reprising here his own analysis of the

³² *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 279, 5: 222–23.

³³ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 10.19–26, pp. 158–59.

³⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 42. c. 6–c. 8, 1: 570–72.

irremissibility of the sin against the Holy Spirit in his Romans commentary, Peter draws the same conclusion. This sin, he concludes, is irremissible not in the sense that God cannot or will not forgive it but in the sense that the sinner has so convinced himself of the hopelessness of his state that he rarely responds to God's call to repent.³⁵ The purpose of this discussion of the sin against the Holy Spirit in this particular context, however, is less to compare the three Augustinian reasons for why this sin is irremissible and to show why the solution chosen makes the best sense of both Augustine and St. Paul than it is to reinforce the principle that some sins are more serious than others, both objectively and subjectively, notwithstanding the principle that all sin stems from the same evil intentionality.

There are two striking features of the Lombard's handling of the subject of sin overall. In the first place, while he certainly participates in the consensus view that sees inner intentionality as paramount in defining the ethical status of moral agents and moral acts, he is concerned with defending the idea that ethics has an objective as well as a subjective dimension. He insists that both aspects of ethical reality need to be taken into consideration. While he acknowledges the fact that Abelard had included conscious and deliberate contempt of God in his own definition of sin, Peter is aware of the fact that Abelard's intellectualizing of that state of mind could lead to the reduction of God's express commands to those commands as misperceived and misinterpreted by fallible minds who would then use their own limited knowledge and understanding as an excuse for wrongdoing. The result, in Peter's estimation, would be an erosion of the very concept that man, in his fallen state, remains capable of grasping what God requires and capable of resisting temptations, including the temptation to self-delusion, that would incline him to flout those requirements. Secondly, Peter is eager to make man fully responsible for his own sins, even to the point of ignoring in this context the problem of diminished responsibility owing to invincible ignorance or defective mental states and circumstances, which other theologians and canonists bring to bear on the point, and helpfully so. The only place where Peter raises the

³⁵ Ibid., d. 43, 1: 572–77. René Wasselynck, "La présence des *Moralia* de Saint Grégoire le Grand dans les ouvrages de morale du XII^e siècle," *RTAM* 35 (1968): 236–38 has noted Peter's dependence of Gregory here, although he ignores the Porretan parallels to Peter's handling of this topic and sees the *Summa sententiarum* as his closest neighbor. For the comparison with the *Collectanea* on the sin against the Holy Spirit, see above, chapter 4, p. 209.

issue of ignorance is in connection with the fall of Adam and Eve, and, as we saw in chapter 6 above, he raises it there only to dismiss it categorically as a mitigating factor in original sin. While Peter rejects the privative view of evil, associated in western Christian theology primarily with Augustine's polemic against the Manichees, he shares fully with the anti-Manichean Augustine the desire to place the burden of sin squarely on man's shoulders in order to reinforce the point that God is in no sense the author of evil or sin. In this connection, Peter's treatment of the moral relations between man and God is consistent with his treatment of the metaphysical and physical relations between God and the creation more generally. Just as God creates a world containing beings capable of acting as secondary causes in their own spheres of activity, so, in His ethical relations with rational beings, He creates a universe in which they have the *posse peccare et non peccare*, the capacity to damage their own natures and to reject the moral law given for their own well-being. They are likewise free, in the realm of sin, to blemish their own similitude to God and to live at a lower level of existence than their natures make possible. And, this they can do on their own initiative and volition, whether prompted by internal or external temptation.

Virtue: Free Will and Grace in Its Attainment

In moving from sin to its correlative, virtue, we move to an area in which there is also a high degree of consensus in early twelfth-century theology, in this case regarding the relations between man's free will and God's grace in the development of virtue. Within this consensus position one can also detect some lesser points of disagreement, or differences in emphasis among the theologians of Peter Lombard's time. They may offer alternative definitions of virtue in general, of particular virtues and their interrelations, and of their applications in practice. They may also manifest a greater or lesser interest in this subject altogether. Their principal point of agreement is one deriving from their understanding of human nature. Some, like Hugh of St. Victor and his followers and like the Lombard himself, regard that nature, in its prelapsarian state, no less than after the fall, as requiring the assistance of grace in the acquisition of virtue that bears merit. In the case of postlapsarian man, they agree that he needs operating grace to gain the state of justification, on which man's subsequent moral growth is based with the help of cooperating grace. There is also general agreement on the freedom of the will, however much it

may be damaged by original sin. The will, they hold, remains capable of resisting both of these types of grace. A middle-Augustinian position on this subject, in which the notion of irresistible grace is pointedly ignored, finds a wide hearing in the first half of the twelfth century, as we noted above in chapter 6.³⁶ The same understanding of grace and free will occurs in monastic writers in this period, such as Bernard of Clairvaux, as we find in the scholastic theologians, laying the foundation for the consideration of virtue on the part of Christian thinkers of the time in general. It has been claimed that the Abelardians taught an ethics of natural *eudaimonia*, in which the yearning for the good is seen as deriving from a psychic impulse arising in man himself and not from a moral capacity energized by God's grace.³⁷ This claim is not borne out by the evidence.³⁸ The Abelardians, like other theologians at this time, including the Lombard, see no difficulty in reconciling *eudaimonia* with a collaborative relationship between man and God. On this broad foundational issue, the Lombard's basic contribution is to explain clearly how divine grace can take the initiative and can do its work in man without thereby divinizing man or functioning as an immanent participation of the deity in man, and also how man's virtues and merits, although requiring the operation and cooperation of grace, can truly be his own possessions and can justly make of him the moral being on which his future reward depends.

Like his compeers, Peter grounds his analysis of virtue on the analysis of free will and grace. He first articulates his position on

³⁶ See above, pp. 289, 383–85. For the period in general, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 1 part 1: 44–48. For more on Hugh of St. Victor, in this connection, see A. Mignon, *Les origines de la scolastique et Hugues de Saint-Victor*, 2 vols. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1895), 1: 258–59; Roger Baron, "L'Idée de liberté chez S. Anselme et Hugues de Saint-Victor," *RTAM* 32 (1965): 117–21. The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* is a salient example of the crossover between monastic and scholastic writers on this theme, citing verbatim Bernard of Clairvaux's "Tolle enim gratiam, et non erit unde salvetur; tolle liberum arbitrium, et non erit, in quo fiat salus vel cui fiat." *Sent. div.* 2.2.2, p. 20*. Bernard is also reprised by the *Summa sent.* 3.7–9, *PL* 176: 98D–105A, as noted by Mignon, *Les origines*, 2: 13. Robert Pullen preserves the general contemporary balance between grace and free will, although he grants more importance to angelic help in man's development of virtue than is typical in this period. Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.7–9, 6.22–50, *PL* 186: 834D–838A, 879C–896A.

³⁷ Philippe Delhay, "L'Enseignement morale des *Sententiae Parisiensis*," in *Études de civilisation médiévale (IX–XII siècles): Mélanges offerts à Edmond-René Labonde* (Poitiers: Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisation Médiévale, 1974), pp. 197–207.

³⁸ *Sent. Parisiensis* I, pp. 58–59. See also *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 91–99.

that subject in his Romans commentary and then develops it in treating Adam's virtue before the fall in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, expanding it to include the cardinal and theological virtues in Book 3, under the heading of the human Christ and His moral aptitudes. He discusses the gifts of the Holy Spirit in both of these two latter contexts. Having defined virtue as a good quality of mind, which lives rightly and does not use anything badly, and having illustrated this point with justice and faith as works of God in man, Peter raises the question of whether the grace that activates the will is a virtue, and, if so, whether this means that virtue does not derive from free will and that virtue is not a motion of the mind. He concludes that virtue is not itself a motion or affect of the mind but a good quality informing the mind, which free will activates to develop good intentions and actions. Free will is thus an operative condition of virtue, and virtue is a disposition to be motivated to the good by means of it. In this sense, both free will and virtue are sources of the good motion and good affection in the soul of a virtuous person. Grace, for its part, is an enabling condition in this process as well. But grace, Peter insists, cannot be defined as a virtue, whether we understand virtue as a quality possessed by the human soul or as the outcome of its disposition and action. We can only regard grace as a virtue in the lexical sense of a *virtus*, a power or force that activates something else.³⁹

In explaining how this relationship works, Peter is heavily dependent on the account given in the *Summa sententiarum* of the relationship between virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, a topic to which he himself turns after his discussion of grace and virtue. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* invokes the analogy of agriculture in presenting his analysis. The gifts of the Holy Spirit, he says, are "the first motions in the heart, as it were, like seeds of virtue" (*primi motus in corde, quasi quaedam semina virtutum*). They are sown in human hearts by God, Who, as He does so, operates without man's collaboration. The virtues, for their part, are "effects of the disposition of the gifts" (*effectus donorum habitus*) in man, like the crops growing from the seeds God has sown, which draw as well on the fertility of the soil in which they are sown and on their active cultivation by the husbandman; here God and man work together.⁴⁰ As Peter expands on this analogy with respect to grace

³⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 27. c. 1.1–3, 1: 480–81.

⁴⁰ *Summa sent.* 3.17, *PL* 176: 114D–115A. The quotation is at 114D. On this passage and its influence, see Lottin, *Psych. et morale*, 3: 330–32.

and virtue, he adds another integer to the equation and reassigns the role of the seed. In agriculture, he notes, we have rain, the earth, the seed, and the fruit. The rain is analogous to divine grace; the earth is analogous to human free will; the seed is like virtue as a mental disposition or an inclination to the good; and the fruit resembles that inclination translated into virtuous intentions and actions. None of these four elements is identical with the others or can be substituted for them. The germination process that enables the seed to flower and the process enabling the flower to mature and to bear fruit are both assisted by grace, operating and cooperating, in Peter's terms. But in neither stage is the activation supplied by grace the same thing as the virtue it helps to produce.⁴¹ What is striking about Peter's handling of this topic in comparison with the author of the *Summa sententiarum* and with Augustine, whom he cites profusely in support of his position, is that he sees the interaction of grace and free will in the engendering of virtue as a simultaneous division of labor, more than as a succession of cause and effect. This understanding endows his treatment of the theme with a theandric, synergistic view of the interaction of grace and free will that is in some ways more akin to the Greek patristic tradition than it is to Augustinianism. To be sure, Peter sees grace as the principal cause of the merit man gains in developing virtue, since it excites, heals, and aids the free will so that it can become a good will. At the same time, grace begins a process that in no sense constrains or excludes free will; and, for him, "there is no merit in man except by free will" (*nullum meritum est in homine quod non sit per liberum arbitrium*).⁴²

As Peter sees it, man's reception and use of the gifts of the Holy Spirit is on the same trajectory as his reception and use of grace. These gifts are given by God and they are activated by man through his free will. Man plays an active role here in the use to which he puts the gifts. The virtues and merits he develops thereby are rewarded by God. Here, too, the gifts are not the same thing as the consequent virtues or merits and neither is man's free will. Rather, the gifts energize the will and the will is the agency through which virtue and merit arise, in the will's good exercise.⁴³ Throughout this entire analysis, Peter repeatedly cites the anti-Pelagian Augustine and reads his position as one that needs to be put into

⁴¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 27. c. 1–c. 2.3, 1: 480–82.

⁴² *Ibid.*, c. 3.2, 1: 482–83.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, c. 4–d. 28. c. 4, 1: 483–91. On this topic, see Johann Schupp, *Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1932), pp. 243–55.

perspective, and judged, by the rhetorical needs of his polemic. He also, repeatedly, cites the anti-Manichean Augustine, along with other authorities, to defend a position on grace and free will and on the gifts of the Holy Spirit and virtue that is far less extreme than that of the late Augustine. At the same time, he distinguishes clearly between the divine *virtus*, as an enabling condition, and the human virtues which can develop with its help. Human virtues, for Peter, depend as well on the human contribution of will and effort; and, when they are attained, they are attributes of the human beings who possess them and who manifest them in their own particular ways. In rewarding such virtuous persons, God rewards those persons, and not the Holy Spirit. It is clear that neither Peter nor any of his contemporaries had yet emerged with the concepts of infused or created grace. But it is equally clear that his account of grace, free will, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit provides a terrain in which later scholastics could plant that doctrine, and that Peter has provided an environment congenial to that later development.

Peter's handling of the theological virtues, the cardinal virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in specific rather than in generic terms is placed in the third book of the *Sentences*, as a pendant to the human nature of Christ, along with the theme of Christ's human knowledge. As our discussion of that subject above in chapter 7 has shown, he is scarcely a maximalist in comparison with such thinkers as Hugh of St. Victor, although he certainly concedes that the human Christ knew more than any other human being and that He did not have to undergo a learning process of the type that ordinary mortals experience. Likewise, while seeking to preserve a human *posse peccare et non peccare* for the human Christ, a man spared from original sin, Who maintained throughout His life a perfect conformity between His human will and the will of God, Peter offers a human Christ Who, similarly, possesses a moral personality with a psychology that is different from that of other men. While Peter maintains that Christ truly could be tempted, he also thinks that, in resisting temptation, Christ experienced *propassio* and *consensus*, but not *passio*.⁴⁴ This being the case, the Lombard, along with Roland of Bologna and other masters who treat virtue in the context of Christ's human nature, faces something of a problem. For Christ is, morally, *sui generis*. In what sense, then, can the virtues, as He may be held to have possessed them, function as norms or descriptions of virtues as they may be possessed by humankind?

⁴⁴ See above, pp. 442–43, 444, 447–48.

The Theological Virtues

It cannot be said that Peter resolves this problem entirely, given his chosen mode of organizing his treatment of virtue. He does make an approach to addressing it, however, by first asking what the virtues are, in themselves, and the capacity in which they are possible in ordinary mortals before considering whether and how the human Christ possessed them. This, however, is only one part of his agenda. For, in handling both the theological and the cardinal virtues, Peter also wants to take a stand on the issue of their definition and interrelation, a topic on which there was a wide range of contemporary opinions. He begins with the theological virtues, starting with faith. All theologians at this time agreed that faith is an epistemic state as well as a virtue. But attention had been distracted to the first of these considerations by Abelard and his followers, both with respect to the status of faith vis-à-vis other modes of knowledge and with respect to its content, in relation to what can be known by natural reason.⁴⁵ Abelard initially accents faith as an epistemic state and as a body of information by the schema he proposes in his *theologiae*, where he divides the material into faith, charity, and sacraments. According to this subdivision, "faith" covers the fundamental doctrines of the church which need to be held if a person is to be saved, while the other two subdivisions of theology deal with the Christian's practice of his faith. On faith itself, Abelard offers two main ideas, both of which proved to be controversial. The first is that Christ's incarnation and resurrection constitute the only Christian dogmas for which revelation and grace are required. As we have seen in our consideration of Trinitarian theology in this period in chapters 5 and 6 above, Abelard claimed that the doctrine of the Trinity was accessible to reason alone and that the pagan philosophers, especially the Platonists, had grasped its basic character, a claim that made his Trinitarian theology a cause célèbre for decades, even in the somewhat moderated form in which he eventually presents this teaching in his *Theologia "scholarium"*.⁴⁶ The claims Abelard made regarding the Trinity proved to be intellectually indigestible on the part of his contemporaries. But his second contribution to the discussion of

⁴⁵ For an overview on this issue in the period, see Georg Engelhardt, *Die Entwicklung der dogmatischen Glaubenspsychologie in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik*, Beiträge, 30:4–6 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1933), pp. 18–42.

⁴⁶ See above, pp. 51, 212–13, 239, 245, 254–59.

faith, while it evoked dismay from his monastic critics, proved to be more durable and acceptable among the scholastics.

This was his definition of faith, presented in its most influential form in his *Theologia "scholarium"*, as "the conviction of things not seen, that is, things not available to the corporeal senses" (*Fides est . . . existimatio rerum non apparentium, hoc est sensibus corporeis non subiacentium*).⁴⁷ The key word in this definition is *existimatio*. Now, *existimare* is a verb used in the Vulgate translation of the New Testament to describe epistemic states generically, regardless of their content. It can be rendered in English in most of these contexts as "to consider," "to deem," "to esteem," "to expect," "to suppose," or "to regard." *Existimare* is also used more specifically in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans to refer to beliefs and hopes held firmly by Christians about the future, on the basis of which they comport themselves in accordance with Christ's teachings in the here and now, as at Romans 6:11, 8:18, and 14:14. But, despite its Pauline credentials, the word *existimatio* in Abelard's definition evoked a storm of protest. Bernard of Clairvaux and his associates thought that it stood for "opinion," which they, in turn, understood as knowledge that is uncertain. The disciples of Abelard sought both to clarify what he meant and to show that his language was Pauline, and that it had patristic support. Several of them point out that Paul's *argumentum non apparentium* in Hebrews 11:1 is basically the same cognitive state as the one to which the apostle refers in Romans with the use of *existimare*, and that this is what Abelard means by that term as well.⁴⁸ The authors of the two *Sententiae Parisiensis* seek, further, to explain how this *existimatio* is related to other forms of knowledge. One of them points out that conviction of this sort differs from knowledge (*cognitio*) in that its objects of knowledge are invisible. As he observes, once something has been seen, it is known and is no longer believed. The key to Abelard's definition of faith, then, is not its alleged lack of certitude but rather the certitude it possesses in the absence of empirical evidence. We may believe that the king of France is not in Paris, he notes, because we have not seen him in the city, as contrasted with knowing that he is in Paris because we have seen him there.⁴⁹ While

⁴⁷ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "scholarium"* 1.2, 1.11–15, ed. Constant J. Mews, CCCM 13: 318, 322–25.

⁴⁸ Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 25–30; Friedrich Stegmüller, ed., "*Sententiae Varsaviensis*: Ein neugefundenes Sentenzenwerk unter dem Einfluss des Anselm von Laon und des Peter Abelard," *Divus Thomas* 45 (1942): 318; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 79–84.

⁴⁹ *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 3; Johannes Trimborn, ed., *Die Sententie "Quoniam missio"*

this example enables us to localize this text, it ignores the fact that, unlike the data of faith, kings are not intrinsically invisible in this life.

The backdrop against which this Abelardian scenario was played out was the tradition, maintained by the school of Laon, of confining the understanding of faith to the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not seen of Hebrews, while ignoring Paul's use of *existimare* elsewhere. Members of that school go on to note that faith can be understood as a substance in that it subsists in the heart of the believer. It is an argument in that it rests on heresy, concerning matters invisible to us, both with respect to events in the past and those in the hereafter which we in the present are unable to witness. It is also an argument in the sense of being a demonstration, in that it manifests its claims by its effects in the lives of believers.⁵⁰

This language was deemed to be too imprecise by a number of theologians later in the century. The chief figure to succeed in moderating Abelard's account, or to succeed in explaining its acceptability in Pauline terms as well as its compatibility with the teaching of the Laon masters, was Hugh of St. Victor. He has an even keener interest than Abelard in considering the status of faith as a mode of knowledge, in relation to other kinds of knowledge. He agrees with Abelard that this is an issue requiring clarification, and supports the orthodoxy of *existimatio* against Abelard's critics. As a mode of knowledge, faith, according to Hugh, is a sacrament, in the broad sense in which he uses this term, and one that needs to be placed on a wide epistemological canvas that includes all forms of the knowledge of God man may have, direct and indirect, internal and external, up to and including contemplative vision. Hugh sees no tension between what later would be called the natural and supernatural modes of knowledge.⁵¹ With this in mind, he agrees with the school of Laon's analysis of faith as the substance of things hoped for, in that it subsists in the believer's heart although he does not yet possess the things to which it refers. Likewise, he agrees, faith is the *argumentum non apparentium*, involving matters seen through a glass darkly, because it is a likeness of invisible realities although it is not corporeal itself. To this Hugh adds his own

aus der Abelardschule (Cologne: Photostelle der Universität zu Köln, 1962), pp. 152–58. The latter will be cited below as *Sententiae Parisiensis* II.

⁵⁰ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 80.

⁵¹ An excellent general orientation on Hugh's view of faith is provided by Roger Baron, "Le 'sacrement de la foi' selon Hugues de Saint-Victor," *RSPT* 42 (1958): 50–78.

refinement concerning the epistemic status of faith, which absorbs Abelard's view and makes it more precise. "Faith," he states, "is certitude concerning things that are absent; it is above opinion and below knowledge" (*Fides est certitudo rerum absentium supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta*). As with the knowledge involved in opinion, the knowledge involved in faith is indirect. At the same time, unlike opinion, which is a more free floating cognitive state, faith constitutes knowledge that is certain. But, in comparison with *scientia*, faith also constitutes knowledge that is limited. Now, we know only in part. And, agreeing here with Abelard and his disciples, Hugh adds that when that fuller *scientia* becomes available, in the next life, the knowledge that it conveys will no longer be faith. Faith will have passed into sight. Hugh also imports another dimension into his discussion of faith. Despite his concern with the epistemological analysis of faith, a topic of deep importance to him, he reflects an appreciation of the fact that the debate surrounding Abelard on this subject had pushed to the side the idea of faith as a virtue and as an affective state. Here, he draws a distinction. The matter of faith, he states, is its cognitive content. The mode of faith, as he has described it above, is the limited yet certain knowledge of things not empirically available, above opinion and below science. But the substance of faith, that is, the act of faith and the spiritual attitude represented by faith, is grounded in affection. And, Hugh concludes, one can grow in faith, both as a cognitive and as an affective state.⁵²

Hugh's treatment of faith exerted an influence on two mid-century theologians who, in turn, influenced Peter Lombard. Roland of Bologna agrees that Hugh's understanding of faith as the *substantia sperandum rerum, argumentum non apparentium, infra scientium et supra opinionum* is a large improvement over Abelard's *certa existimatio rerum absentium*. Aside from taking Hugh's analysis to heart here, another reason he advances for setting aside Abelard's definition is one derived itself from Abelard's own philosophy. *Existimatio*, in Abelard's sense, can include knowledge of many things that have nothing to do with religious faith. A conviction concerning something not present to the senses, in Abelard's logic, would also describe a concept standing for a sensible thing, which is capable of being thought about and used in propositions independent of the continued existence or present availability of its referent. Likewise,

⁵² Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.10.1–4, *PL* 176: 327D–333D. The quotation is at 1.10.2, 330C.

the certitude with which religious beliefs are held does not necessarily distinguish them from beliefs in other areas which may be held with equal certitude. In Roland's estimation, a better reason for elevating faith above opinion is that, although it is based on heresy, it derives from authoritative sources, even though, since it is indirect knowledge, it cannot be proved.⁵³

The author of the *Summa sententiarum* also expands on Hugh. Reprising the definition of faith as below science and above opinion and as partial but certain, held in the absence of full evidence and as not susceptible of proof in the sense of empirical demonstration, he adds the point that faith cannot be held without the reception of revelation, whether through internal inspiration or through external instruction by the words and deeds of other believers. In this respect, faith differs from the knowledge of God that may be had through natural theology. In particular, the key content of faith, which differentiates it from the rational knowledge of God available in philosophy, is the doctrine of God's unity and trinity as well as the incarnation.⁵⁴ While he expatiates on the content of faith, against Abelard, this author confines himself to faith as a body of knowledge and as a cognitive state, and the special epistemic conditions making it possible, and ignores Hugh's move to push faith as a virtue and as an affective state back into the picture.

Although he does not use Victorine language, Peter Lombard's definition and description of faith come down squarely in support of the Victorine position, especially as articulated by the *Summa sententiarum* and by Roland. He accepts their resolution of the controversy inspired by Abelard. He combines this position with a number of other ideas on which consensus reigned in the period, with the effect of offering a fuller and more balanced account of faith both as a virtue and as a mode of knowledge than any other theologian of his time. Peter begins by defining faith as a virtue, one which enables us to believe what we cannot see, insofar as the knowledge at issue pertains to religion.⁵⁵ He uses the *argumentum non apparenium* language of Hebrews and glosses "argument" by adding the term *convictio*, derived from Augustine, in order to emphasize the certitude of knowledge possessed by faith. He is also concerned with locating faith among the diverse modes of knowledge. Its objects of knowledge, he notes, are not sensible. Thus,

⁵³ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 10–12.

⁵⁴ *Summa sent.* 1.1–3, *PL* 176: 43A–47C.

⁵⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 23. c. 2.1, c. 7.1–c. 8.1, 2: 141, 145–47. The quotation is at c. 7.3, p. 146.

what is known by faith is known “not corporally, not by imagination, but intellectually” (*non corporaliter, non imaginarie, sed intellectualiter*). Combining these definitions with a three-fold distinction concerning faith, articulated by the school of Laon and held widely in this period by many theologians, including the Peter of the Romans gloss, he notes that faith is a content of propositions to be believed, among them the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation, and confidence in the trustworthiness of the person who proposes those propositions. The third, and definitive aspect of faith, the faith that separates the justified believer from the believing reprobate or even from the devil, is the adhesion to God with love and confidence which inspires the faith working in love that is salvific.⁵⁶ As a virtue, Peter continues, here reprising as well a doctrine that states the consensus position, faith is the foundation of hope and charity. It covers the past, present, and future, and things both good and bad. It provides hope with the confidence it has in the goods to which it looks in the future; and it is the basis and the motivation for the charity that perfects faith and enables it to work in love.⁵⁷ Returning to faith as a mode of knowledge, Peter confirms the Victorine view that it refers to knowledge that is incomplete; it can, he adds, be supplemented by *intellectus* or intellectual clarification of the content of the faith, which can be added on by subsequent study and reflection.⁵⁸ Having tipped his hat here to Augustine and to Anselm of Canterbury, he then distinguishes between the faith possessed by mankind prior to the revelation of Christ and the faith possessed by simple Christians who do not understand all the points of faith which they profess. While the people of God before the time of Christ possessed all the revelation currently available and while they may have believed it fully, that faith, since it knew nothing of Christ, was not sufficient to save

⁵⁶ Ibid., c. 3–c. 6, c. 8, d. 25. c. 3–c. 4, 2: 143–45, 146–47, 155–58. On this trifold view of faith, see also *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 313, 415–16, 5: 247, 290; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 80–82, 86–90; Peter Abelard, *In Ep. ad Romanos* 4:57, CCCM 11: 24; *Sent. Varsaviensis*, p. 318; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 79–84.

⁵⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 23. c. 9, d. 25. c. 5, 2: 147–48, 158–59. See also *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 80–82; Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 25; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 3; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 79–84; *Summa sent.* 1.2, PL 176: 43C–45C. The author of the *Sent. Parisiensis* II, pp. 148–50, disagrees with the grounding of hope and charity in faith and treats each of these virtues as equally dependent on the others. On the relation of hope to faith in this period and in Peter’s teaching, see Jacques-Guy Bougerol, *La théologie de l’espérance aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 2 vols. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1985), 1: 21–101; Servais Pinckaers, “Les origines de la définition de l’espérance dans les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard,” *RTAM* 22 (1955): 306–12.

⁵⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 24. c. 3.3–5, 2: 151–52.

them. On the other hand, the simple Christian believer, whose faith is proportioned to his intelligence and education, and which may thus be anything but profound, does believe in Christ as the mediator and does assent to the other propositions of the creed. This faith, provided that it is manifested in works of love, is sufficient, for him.⁵⁹ With this last point, Peter signals the fact that he is going to make a significant departure from the Victorine position on the efficacy of the "sacraments" of the Old Law and on the redemption of persons lacking a specifically Christian faith.

Peter maintains a thoroughly consensus position on hope, as the virtue through which Christians look with confidence toward the spiritual and eternal goods to come in their future beatitude. He agrees that this virtue is based on faith and that the rewards it envisions derive from God's grace and the merits of the individual believer. Like faith, he notes, hope deals with things unseen. But, unlike faith, these things are all good things and they are to occur only in the future. He cites his own Romans gloss as his major source, although these views are the common coin of the period.⁶⁰ One line of analysis on hope which he ignores, although it was influential in other quarters in the twelfth century, is the Augustinian distinction among hope of pardon, hope of grace, and hope of glory (*spes venie, spes gratiae, spes gloriae*), popularized in this period by the school of Laon.⁶¹ Instead, he moves on to the question of whether the human Christ possessed the virtues of faith and hope, and hits a major snag. On the negative side of the question, it would appear that, since Christ possessed a fullness of knowledge as well as a fullness of grace, like the beatified saints, He would have had no need of these virtues. However, Peter wants to argue that Christ, having decided to live the life of a man *in via* prior to His resurrection, did possess these virtues, as the saints do in this life, although to a much higher degree. For the saints, the knowledge attaching to faith and the confidence attaching to hope are partial. These limits, in Peter's estimation, were not present in the faith and hope possessed by the human Christ.⁶² What remains unclear here, and understandably so, given the definitions of these virtues put forth by Peter above, is how, indeed, faith and hope can remain faith and hope when they lack the incompleteness that is an intrin-

⁵⁹ Ibid., d. 25. c. 1-c. 2, 2: 153-55.

⁶⁰ Ibid., d. 26. c. 1-c. 3, 2: 159-60.

⁶¹ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 313, 5: 247. On this theme, see Bougerol, *La théologie de l'espérance*, 1: 21-23, 65-76.

⁶² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 26 c. 4, 2: 160-61.

sic feature of their nature, by definition. It has to be said that Peter does not resolve this problem and that he does not succeed in explaining comprehensibly how the human Christ, given the psychology with which he endows Him, can truly be said to have had faith and hope.

Peter does at least acknowledge that the human Christ, in the light of His fullness of knowledge and grace, did not have faith and hope in the same way that other human beings can possess these virtues. But he insists firmly that Christ possessed the greatest possible degree of human charity, both in heart and deed. This virtue, he reminds the reader, is an essential condition of Christ's accomplishment of His saving work, in displaying His love to man, inspiring man's conversion, and instructing man in the love of God and neighbor. The fact that there might be a problem regarding Christ's charity, parallel to the problem regarding His faith and hope, is simply not countenanced by Peter. He proceeds immediately to an analysis of charity. There were only two notable areas in which there was any debate on this virtue in Peter's day. One was the definition of charity and the other was the question of whether, and how, it could be graded and manifested. In the first case, the Abelardians and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* offer a definition of charity as the love of the good (*amor honestus*) which directs one's affections to their proper ends, and which loves other people with respect to those ends. This definition, in its expanded form, certainly views God himself and eternal life as the highest ends in question and as the criterion of intermediate ends. At the same time, Abelard's definition tends to emphasize the generic and volitional aspect of the transaction.⁶³ The Laon masters and Hugh of St. Victor, on the other hand, adhere to a more strictly conventional and Augustinian definition of charity as the love of God for His own sake and the love of self and neighbor for God's sake. Peter Lombard follows in this latter tradition,⁶⁴ drawing on some of

⁶³ Peter Abelard, *Theologia "scholarium"* 1.3–5, CCCM 13: 319–20; Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 25; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, pp. 5, 48; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 85–91; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 3, 5; *Summa sent.* 4.8, *PL* 176: 128A. On this point, see Robert Wielocks, "La discussion scolastique sur l'amour d'Anselme de Laon à Pierre Lombard d'après les imprimés et les inédits," *Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Hoger Instituut vor Wijsbegeerte Ph.D. diss.*, 1981, pp. 277–96.

⁶⁴ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 71–72, 5: 61–64; *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 80–82; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.13.6–12, *PL* 176: 528D–550C; Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 27, 2: 162–68. On this definition, see Ruggero Balducci, *Il concetto teologico di carità attraverso le maggiori interpretazioni patristiche e medievali di I ad Cor. III* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1951), pp. 148–53; Wielocks, "La discussion scolastique," pp. 175–97, 297–99, 300–02, 306, 342–45.

the refinements added to Augustine by both the Laon masters and Hugh.

With the school of Laon, Peter holds that charity has several stages, although he expands the school's three levels of sweet and inchoate charity, wise and strengthening charity, and robust and perfecting charity into four stages. He retains the Laon masters' first three, which he labels *incipiens*, *proficiens*, and *perfecta*, and adds a final most perfect (*perfectissima*) phase denoting the charity enjoyed by the perfected saints.⁶⁵ The school of Laon's definition of charity as the Holy Spirit, "that is, the love between the Father and the Son" (*id est amor patris et filii*) is also one that influenced Peter. The Laon masters are straightforward in stating that those who dwell in charity are engrafted into the inner life of the Trinity. For his part, Peter is more guarded. He seeks to avoid a participatory or immanent view of the mission of the Holy Spirit. As Peter sees it, in communicating charisms, the Holy Spirit conveys the grace of the whole Trinity. He does not convey the divine nature to man.⁶⁶ While Peter draws on the school of Laon, at least in part, in these respects, he completely disregards the Laon masters' five-fold subdivision of charity as analogous to the five senses.⁶⁷

Peter joins Hugh in drawing on Augustine's analysis of the goods to which charity should direct our attention, although each master imparts his own accent to this topic. Hugh distinguishes what is good in and of itself, namely God as the supreme and normative good; intermediate goods which are substantially good but good only in part, although they may also be good in relation to something or someone else; and purely derivative goods, which are not good in and of themselves but which may lead to good. Under this last heading he thinks some evils may be placed.⁶⁸ In his analysis, the first two goods, which are either wholly or partly good, will therefore be good for something or someone else as well. The

⁶⁵ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 313, 5: 247; Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 29. c. 3.1, 2: 177.

⁶⁶ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, pp. 80–82; the quotation is on p. 80; Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 1. d. 14. c. 1–c. 2, 1: 126–28. For Peter on the Holy Spirit as *caritas*, see above, chapter 5, pp. 260–62. The distinctions drawn by him on this subject, in relation to the school of Laon, are not given their due weight by Ignaz Siepl, "Die Lehre von der göttliche Tugend der Liebe in des Petrus Lombardus Büchern der Sentenzen und in der *Summa theologiae* des hl. Thomas von Aquin," *Der Katholik*, 3:34 (1906): 37–49, 196–201; Franz Zigon, "Der Begriff der Caritas beim Lombarden, und der hl. Thomas," *Divus Thomas* 4 (1926): 404–11. Both of these authors draw too much of a contrast between Peter and Thomas.

⁶⁷ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 431, 5: 296–97.

⁶⁸ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.4.15–20, *PL* 176: 240B–242D.

evident purpose of Hugh's distinction is to rationalize the existence of evils as having a potential to serve the good, willy-nilly, as much as it is to distinguish between the supreme good and lower goods as objects of charity. On the other hand, Peter's focus on the levels of goodness is specifically designed as an index of how men should direct their loves. We should, he states, love God, Who is above us, the most; and our souls and those of our neighbors, including the angels, with a lesser degree of love and one that keeps their eternal destiny in view. Human bodies, our own and others', are intimately linked with the soul and are also destined for salvation; and so they should also be loved, in the sense of promoting what is conducive to their health and self-preservation. Finally, we should love what is below us, insofar as it is conducive to the wellbeing of the body.⁶⁹ Aside from his concern with the gradation of man's display of love, and its rationale, Peter's treatment of this point emphasizes man's hylemorphic constitution, a theme which he gives much more prominence than Hugh does in his understanding of human nature more generally.

Aside from the definition of charity itself, the other major topic under this heading on which the theologians and their authorities disagreed was the question of what criterion should be invoked in extending charity to one's fellow man, given the finitude of the means at one's disposal. The three criteria considered by theologians who wrestle with this point are virtue, need, and relationship to the donor. Not all of them are able to make a decision here. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* considers all three positions, and their pros and cons, and draws no conclusions of his own.⁷⁰ The author of the *Sententie Anselmi* opts for virtue, being particularly concerned that we not grant charity or alms to notorious evildoers, lest we thereby appear to condone their behavior.⁷¹ Most of the masters of the school of Laon think that need should be the primary determinant, but that if need is not a factor, relationship should be the guide, with charity dispensed first to parents, then to other relatives, then to friends, members of one's household, neighbors, and compatriots.⁷² Roland of Bologna defends the principle of need above all. He also imports into the discussion the same distinction between interior *affectus* and exterior *effectus* which he draws in

⁶⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 28. c. 1–c. 4, 2: 168–71.

⁷⁰ *Summa sent.* 4.7, *PL* 176: 125A–126A.

⁷¹ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 84; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 79, 5: 67–68.

⁷² *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 71–72; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 432–33, 436, 5: 61–64, 297, 298–99.

considering virtue more generally. The needs that should determine our charitable responses will vary according to the nature and circumstances of the needy people we assist, he notes. Thus, the specifics of the *effectus* of charity will differ accordingly. But they will all be inspired equally by the same inner charitable *affectus*.⁷³

Peter Lombard borrows this *affectus-effectus* distinction but uses it to support a view of the distribution of charity according to relationships, while going beyond the standard analysis to include enemies as well as relatives and friends. He agrees with Roland that all people are to be loved with the same charity, seen as a qualitative intentionality. With this idea in mind, it is possible to invoke the sliding scale of relationship, understanding that a different *effectus* will be appropriate to the different kinds of relatives and associates we have. Peter includes enemies not only in response to the biblical injunction to love one's enemies, but also as a means of reinforcing the point that the sliding scale of relationships speaks to charity as a virtue. We should love the people in question for the sake of God and their eternal life, not out of a merely natural affection. The rule of love of neighbor, moreover, is a general one. While it is harder to love those less closely bound to us than it is to love our nearest and dearest, and while, *a fortiori*, it is harder to love our enemies than our friends, it is also true that the virtue of charity is more perfect when it is exercised in the more difficult cases. Peter leaves open the question of whether we should aid relatives even if they are morally inferior to persons not related to us.⁷⁴ The Lombard also has two points to make on the perdurance of charity, in this case following Gratian.⁷⁵ When the apostle says that charity endures, he does not mean that individual people cannot grow stronger or weaker in this virtue. Rather, he is referring to the merits of charity *per se*, as a virtue. At the same time, while faith and hope will no longer be needed in the next life, having been superseded by sight and by the possession of what we hope for, charity will not be superseded but will rather be strengthened in Heaven, with all the limits and imperfections that may mar it in this life removed.⁷⁶ Peter concludes this treatise on the theological virtues on the same ambiguous Christological note as he had begun it. Having already stated that the human Christ had the most perfect charity possible for a human being *in via*, he now observes that,

⁷³ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 318–20.

⁷⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 29. c. 2–c. 12, d. 30, 2: 172–76, 177–80.

⁷⁵ Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 1 part 2: 136–203.

⁷⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 31. c. 1–c. 2, 2: 180–84.

while He was still alive, the human Christ possessed the even more perfect charity of the *patria*.⁷⁷ He thereby reinforces the problematic character of his treatment of Christ's humanity while at the same time raising questions, which he does not answer, about the very appropriateness of the consideration of the virtues under this heading in the first place.

The Cardinal Virtues

The same holds true for Peter's treatment of the cardinal virtues, which he considers in a primarily Christological context as well. Most of the theologians of the day did not place themselves under the constraints that follow from this decision. Many of them, including Anselm of Laon, William of Champeaux, the Porretans, and the authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum*, display no interest in this topic at all. Those who do had available to them not only the classical definitions of these virtues, whether Platonic, Aristotelian, or Stoic, by means of both pagan and patristic intermediaries. They also had, as resources, the reformulations of the cardinal virtues in association with the theological virtues put forth by Ambrose and Gregory and the redefinition of them as modes of charity found in Augustine. Ambrose's treatment of the theological virtues as imparting the power to practice the cardinal virtues had no takers in this period. The Gregorian redefinition of the cardinal virtues had one supporter, the author of the *Sententie Anselmi*. Following Gregory, he presents these virtues as expressions of the Christian virtues of penance, obedience, poverty in spirit, and humility; all of them are fruits of the fear of the Lord. Also, with Gregory, he analogizes them to the figures in Ezechiel's vision, the man, ox, lion, and eagle standing for discretion, self-mortification, fortitude, and exaltation. The master adds that, along with memory, intellect, and will, contempt of the world, hope of eternal reward, and patience, these virtues will build the "house of God" within the human soul.⁷⁸

A more Aristotelian approach to the cardinal virtues found favor with some theologians. Without placing them in an Aristotelian hierarchy, other members of the school of Laon join the Peripatetics in viewing the virtues as a mean between extremes. Prudence mediates between flightiness and sluggishness, temperance be-

⁷⁷ Ibid., c. 3, 1: 184.

⁷⁸ *Sent. Anselmi* 4, pp. 110–11.

tween luxury and insensibility, fortitude between rashness and timidity, and justice between the greater and the lesser good.⁷⁹ The Abelardians also tend to put an Aristotelian construction on the cardinal virtues. Abelard himself does not provide a discussion of the cardinal virtues as such, but singles out prudence or discernment as the mother of the virtues, a point associated with the Stoics.⁸⁰ His disciples reject that idea. According to the author of *Sententiae Parisiensis* I, prudence is not a virtue at all, since it involves knowledge of evil as well as good. As for the other three virtues, he follows Aristotle in making justice, defined as rendering to each his own and serving the common weal, the paramount virtue. Temperance and fortitude he sees as ordered to justice, aiding its exercise, with temperance strengthening the soul against the infrarational temptations that might deflect it from justice and fortitude arming the soul to repel whatever is opposed to justice.⁸¹ Hermannus includes prudence as one of the cardinal virtues, but, like the author of *Sententiae Parisiensis* I, he places justice at the head of the list and gives all four of the virtues Aristotelian definitions. He adds that they can be possessed by virtuous pagans.⁸² Hugh of St. Victor comes up with a list of virtues which also places justice at the head but whose relationship to Aristotle, or to any of Hugh's potential patristic sources, is difficult to see, as is its internal coherence. He begins with justice, followed by clemency, remorse, love of justice, mercy, purity of heart, and inner peace of mind. He does not explain the difference, if any, between justice and love of justice or between clemency and mercy. He neither redefines the cardinal virtues in Christian terms nor explores whether or how these virtues are antidotes to the seven deadly sins. This collection of virtues, to which he annexes the beatitudes and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, appears to be *sui generis* with Hugh.⁸³

In relation to these contemporary and recent discussions, and to the patristic possibilities, the Lombard takes a line of his own on the cardinal virtues. In an early sermon, he echoes the language of the author of the *Sententie Anselmi*, although without his Gregorian overtones, in describing the four cardinal virtues as the four walls of the house of God, along with its four gates as the four evangelists,

⁷⁹ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 424–25, 5: 293.

⁸⁰ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, p. 128.

⁸¹ *Sent. Parisiensis* I, pp. 52–54. On the Abelardian definition of justice, see Lottin, *Psych. et morale*, 3: 284–85.

⁸² Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 145, 149.

⁸³ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.13.2, *PL* 176: 526C–527B.

its twelve towers as the apostles, and its roof as the gifts of the Holy Spirit. He does not provide definitions of the virtues here.⁸⁴

In a still earlier sermon, he describes the cardinal virtues as antidotes of the vices of lust, vainglory, gluttony, and anger. In the same sermon, however, he proposes a non-Gregorian schedule of vices, including negligence, curiosity about things that are none of one's business, fleshly concupiscence, consent to sin, habituation to sin, contempt of the good, and delight in sin, proposing the gifts of the Holy Spirit as their remedies.⁸⁵ In the *Sentences*, Peter first brings up the cardinal virtues as virtues possessed by man before the fall. Like all meritorious action open to prelapsarian man, these virtues, he states, required the active collaboration of grace with free will.⁸⁶ In his treatise on Christology, Peter essays his only definition of these virtues. Although elsewhere he agrees with the Augustinian principle that charity is the ground of the virtues just as lack of charity is the ground of the vices, even though the internal *habitus* may be manifested outwardly in different ways in either case,⁸⁷ Peter does not follow Augustine's redefinition of the cardinal virtues as modes of charity. He does appeal to Augustine's authority here, but it is the Augustine of *De trinitate* 14.9.12, an Augustine in a less adaptive mood. In line with the definitions found in *De trinitate*, Peter states that justice is relief of those in misery, prudence is the outwitting or forestalling of attacks on virtue, fortitude is the calm bearing of suffering, and temperance is the restraining of evil pleasures. He adds that the human Christ, to Whom he accords both the perfect charity of the *via* and the still more perfect charity of the *patria*, possessed these virtues, which have their uses both in the *via* and in the *patria*.⁸⁸

In examining the cardinal virtues more specifically, Peter begins with justice, but in no sense because he wants to put an Aristotelian construction on this virtue. The assuaging of need which marks this virtue *in via* will give way, in the *patria*, to the contemplation of the divine nature for which human nature was made, and than which nothing could be better, more amiable, or more appropriate, and hence, more just.⁸⁹ As for the other virtues, they too will remain in

⁸⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sermo* 32, *PL* 171: 497A.

⁸⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sermo* 4, *PL* 171: 354B–357B.

⁸⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 29. c. 1–c. 2, 1: 492–93. Delhaye, *Pierre Lombard*, pp. 75–80, ignores this consideration of the cardinal virtues in Peter, and, in general, gives this subject shorter shrift than it deserves.

⁸⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 36, 2: 202–06.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, d. 33, c. 1–c. 2, 2: 188.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 3.2, 2: 189. Charles Lefebvre, “La notion d’équité chez Pierre Lom-

the next life and their accent will likewise shift from the negative or disciplinary to the positive, since there will be, in the *patria*, no danger of error, no suffering, and no evil desires to be overcome. Instead, wisdom will propose God as the good; fortitude will adhere to Him; and temperance will enjoy Him with no impediments.⁹⁰ These remarks concerning the function of the cardinal virtues in the next life are also drawn from Augustine's *De trinitate*. This concludes Peter's extremely abbreviated treatment of the cardinal virtues. He does not redefine them as expressions of charity. He neither confirms nor denies in Book 3 the point made in Book 2 of the *Sentences* that they require the collaboration of grace and free will. He says nothing about how these virtues may be related or engendered. The virtuous pagan, who makes a brief potential appearance earlier in Peter's analysis of virtue, is neither claimed nor dismissed here. Peter offers no suggestions as to how, or whether, the cardinal virtues are related to the theological virtues or to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, although he places them in between his account of those two topics. This is clearly an area that called for further reflection, both in the mid-twelfth-century in general and in Lombardian theology more specifically.

The Gifts of the Holy Spirit

After considering the cardinal virtues, Peter next turns to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which, in Book 3 of the *Sentences*, he treats as virtues, although in Book 2 he had distinguished quite sharply the gifts from the virtues which they enable man to develop, in collaboration with free will. That same distinction, as we recall, he had repeated at the beginning of his discussion of virtue in general, and the interaction of God and man therein. In any event, the first of these gifts which he takes up is the fear of the Lord. This provides him with the occasion to rehearse a topic that had received considerable attention in this period. Although there was some slight

bard," *Ephemerides Juris Canonici* 9 (1953): 291–304 gives a good overview of the meanings of justice in Peter Lombard, from the one given in this passage, to justice as justification, to justice as linked to or contrasted with mercy in the last judgment. The latter of these points in Peter is discussed by Landgraf, "Some Unknown Writings," p. 14. On the other hand, Hermenegildus Lio, *Estne obligatio iustitiae subvenire miseris? Quaestionis positio et evolutio a Petro Lombardo ad S. Thomam ex tribus S. Augustini textibus* (Rome: Desclée & Socii, 1957), pp. 1–4, 15–29, considers justice only from the narrow perspective of poor relief, more properly treated in conjunction with charity in Peter, and poses the question anachronistically in the light of the economic ethics of Aquinas.

⁹⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 33. c. 3.3–4, 2: 189.

difference in the terminology used, there was a rather general agreement on the substance of the doctrine. Fear was divided, usually, into four categories, servile fear, mundane or worldly fear, initial fear, and chaste or filial fear. The first was seen as motivating action so as to avoid worldly punishment, the second as prompting action so as to avoid the loss of worldly good, the third as inspired by fear of eternal punishment, and the fourth as triggering virtuous action out of the love of God alone. Filial fear was generally held to be the only perfectly acceptable ethical motivation; but it was accepted that initial fear could serve as the beginning of wisdom in prompting the conversion of heart that would lead to filial fear.⁹¹ This doctrine is found in Anselm of Laon and his followers and in Hugh of St. Victor, under the heading of ethics.⁹² Robert Pullen agrees with the substance of the consensus position, but brings it up in considering the conditions making for acceptable contrition in the sacrament of penance.⁹³ William of Champeaux and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* discuss this topic in the context of the virtues possessed by the human Christ, agreeing that He had a perfect filial fear.⁹⁴ The Lombard follows these two latter theologians, but adds his own perspective to their common teaching.

The key to Peter's handling of the theme of fear as a moral motivation is his desire to apply to the gifts of the Holy Spirit as possessed by the human Christ a treatment parallel to the treatment he gives to the theological and cardinal virtues. There, he had been concerned to show that these virtues are needed in *via*, and that, with the exception of faith and hope, they will be retained in the *patria*, although in an altered and perfected form. He likewise wants to show that the human Christ possessed those virtues that will endure into the next life both according to the *via* and to the *patria* during His life on earth. In arraying his authorities on fear of the Lord, Peter's major concern is to tackle figures such as Bede and Augustine, who say that fear will cease in Heaven. Peter agrees that initial fear, in this life, can be a useful first step toward the filial fear which, again, in this life, is the sufficient and perfect motivation

⁹¹ On this doctrine in the first half of the twelfth century, see Schupp, *Die Gnadenlehre*, pp. 164–66; Damien Van den Eynde, “Autour des ‘Enarrationes in Evangelium S. Matthei’ attribués à Geoffroi Babion,” *RTAM* 26 (1959): 71–73.

⁹² *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 31, 75; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 420, 429, 5: 33, 65–66, 291, 294–95; *Sent. Anselmi* 3, pp. 105–06; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.13.5, *PL* 176: 528A–D.

⁹³ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.30–31, *PL* 186: 851D–853C.

⁹⁴ *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 276, 5: 220–21; *Summa sent.* 3.17, *PL* 176: 115A–116A.

for virtue. He resolves the problem provoked by Bede and Augustine by drawing a distinction. Initial fear, along with its even less worthy companions, servile and mundane fear, will, to be sure, cease in Heaven. On the other hand, filial fear will endure. But, like charity and the cardinal virtues, it will be perfected and manifested only in its most positive aspects. In Heaven, the filial fear that inspires the virtuous to avoid offending God and to desire never to be separated from God will be transformed into the desire to revere God always, now that they can remain with Him forever, in a reverence mixed with love.⁹⁵ As for the definitions of the modes of fear themselves, Peter is a bit more generous than are most of his contemporaries. He regards initial fear as a form of inchoate love of God, and not just as a fear of eternal punishment, and he sees the lower servile fear, while clearly outside of the state of wisdom to which initial fear can lead, as at least possessing the capacity to prepare the way to it in some sense. He affirms that the human Christ possessed a perfect filial fear, both of the *via* and of the *patria*, throughout His life and that, while as a human being He could experience the fear of death, such fear was not servile or mundane fear in His case.⁹⁶

Peter's handling of the other gifts of the Holy Spirit is quite abbreviated. Aside from fear, the only other gifts he takes up are wisdom (*sapientia*) and knowledge (*scientia*). The chief framework of patristic authority in which he positions his analysis is Augustinian. Better, it can be read as a good case of Peter's use of Augustine against Augustine, in aid of his own desired conclusions. The first definition of wisdom he cites is the philosophical one given by Augustine in his *Contra academicos*, the knowledge of things divine and human. Against this idea Peter offers what he finds a better definition, one easier to gear to the notion of these mental states not as natural aptitudes and achievements but as gifts of the Holy Spirit. This is the definition of *sapientia* and *scientia* found in Augustine's *De trinitate*, where wisdom is seen as the knowledge of things divine, and science is seen as the knowledge of things human, omitting, that is, information that is vain, frivolous, or superfluous, and focusing on knowledge that nurtures, helps, and defends the faith and that therefore promotes beatitude.⁹⁷ According to Peter, wisdom can also be distinguished from understanding (*intellectum*, *intelligentia*). To be sure, understanding, like wisdom, applies to the

⁹⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 34. c. 3.1–4, 2: 191–92.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, c. 6.3–c. 9, 2: 196–98.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, d. 35. c. 1.2–3, 2: 198–99.

knowledge of invisible, spiritual realities. But wisdom is eternal, while understanding operates temporally. In addition, wisdom has God alone as its object, and understanding is oriented both to God and to creatures. Further, through understanding we grasp what we know; through wisdom we delight in what we know. Both wisdom and understanding can thus be differentiated from *scientia*. *Scientia* applies to our right ordering and administration of temporal things and to the turning from evil to good things. *Intelligentia* applies to our speculation on the creator and the invisible creation in time. *Sapientia* applies to our contemplation and delectation of eternal truth. Following the model developed above for holy fear, Peter concludes that, at the end of time, it is *sapientia* that will endure.⁹⁸ In elaborating on this point, he once more reminds the reader that he is not talking about natural modes of knowledge here—a category to which he certainly assigns a place in Book 2 of the *Sentences*—but about gifts of the Holy Spirit that are given for the specific purpose of theological reflection, analysis, and enlightenment. The grace so imparted assists the human mind in turning its natural functions to subjects that lead to virtue and salvation.⁹⁹ Despite his dependence on Augustine here, Peter does not use the Augustinian language of divine illumination in discussing man's direct or indirect theological knowledge. At the same time, he marks a departure from the modes of knowledge outlined by Hugh of St. Victor, who places natural knowledge and knowledge for which divine assistance is required on more of a continuum than Peter does.

The Moral Law of the Old Testament

This willingness to depart from the Victorine tradition is also visible in the final area Peter addresses in connection with ethics in Book 3 of the *Sentences*, the Ten Commandments and other features of the Old Testament moral law, and the degree to which they continue to bind Christians. Following the consensus view, which goes back to Augustine, he observes that the first three of the Ten Commandments apply to the love of God and are more important than the next seven, which apply to the love of neighbor.¹⁰⁰ He also agrees with the consensus, shared by the canonists as well as the

⁹⁸ Ibid., c. 2, 2: 200.

⁹⁹ Ibid., c. 3.1–2, 2: 201.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., d. 37. c. 1.1, 2: 206. Cf., for example, *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 12, 5: 23; *Summa sent.* 4.3, *PL* 176: 120D–125A.

theologians, that the moral rules of the Old Testament continue to bind, but that the ritual and ceremonial rites, which are subject to change and which in any case apply to religious practices that have been superseded for Christians, do not.¹⁰¹ The master to whom Peter comes the closest in this area is the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. With him, the Lombard firmly rejects the placement of the Old Law on a broad "sacramental" trajectory, of the sort found in Hugh of St. Victor. The rites of the Old Law having been replaced, definitively, with those of the New, their salvific character even in their own day receives short shrift. Anticipating what he will say about the sacraments in Book 4 of the *Sentences*, Peter views these Old Testament ceremonies as significant, but not as a means for the transmission of divine grace. He also joins the author of the *Summa sententiarum* in asserting that the ethics of the New Testament likewise perfects and goes farther than the moral rules of the Old Testament, even in the case of those earlier rules that are retained. The reason for this is that Christ's teaching pays attention to intentionality and not just to action. Sexual ethics is an example cited by both authors to defend this claim. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* adds the example of homicide, which likewise can be committed "in deed, word, and intention" (*manu, lingua, consensu*). Thus, character assassination and compassing a person's death, in the Christian dispensation, count as murder.¹⁰² Similarly, both Peter and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* take up, and condemn, usury under the heading of theft, a topic far less standard among theologians in the mid-twelfth century than it was later to become.¹⁰³

On the other hand, Peter parts company with the *Summa sententiarum* and with the majority of his contemporaries in his treatment of the sin of lying, to which he gives extended attention. Two notes emerge in his discussion of this subject. First, reprising and expanding on what he had said in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, where he rejects the view of the school of Laon, the *Summa sententiarum*, and Robert Pullen on the admissibility of pious fraud in the lie of the Hebrew nurses of Exodus, he gives the most thorough analysis of the Augustinian position on lying of anyone of his time. And,

¹⁰¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 40, 2: 228–29. Cf., for example, *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 51, 53, 5: 48–49, 50; Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* prologus 2–6, *PL* 161: 50A–60A; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 1. d. 6. c. 3. dictum, col. 11.

¹⁰² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 40, 2: 228–29. Cf. *Summa sent.* 4.3–6, *PL* 176: 120D–125A. The quotation is at 4.4 122B.

¹⁰³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 37. c. 5.3, 2: 211; *Summa sent.* 4.4, *PL* 176: 122C–D.

second, he includes within his consideration of lying the discussion of perjury provided by Gratian, a topic not discussed in the work of his theological compeers. Peter brings four Augustinian texts to bear on his treatment of lying. He is aware of the fact that Augustine changed his mind on this subject, and that, in the *De mendacio*, he located the lie in the intention to deceive alone, while in the *Contra mendacium*, he included the objective untruth of the speaker's statement as well as his deceptive intention. Peter is also aware of the fact that, both in the *Contra mendacium* and in the *Enchiridion*, Augustine adds subjective certitude as a factor in the equation. According to his argument in these two works, then, a statement may be objectively false. But, if the speaker believes it to be true and speaks without a deceptive intention, he commits an error but does not tell a lie. Likewise, Peter is familiar with the three-fold distinction, found in Augustine's commentary on Psalm 5 as well as in the *De mendacio*, among a tall tale or jocose lie, told to entertain and understood as such, which therefore deceives no one, a lie told to protect someone else from harm—the case of the Hebrew nurses—and a lie told out of malice or duplicity. The Lombard, finally, is conversant with the example given by Augustine in the *Contra mendacium*, which illustrates the point that existing personal relationships and susceptibilities condition the way a hearer interprets a statement. In this example, a man gives misdirections to an acquaintance planning to take a trip, an acquaintance who, he knows, mistrusts him and will do the opposite of what he counsels, in the effort to prevent him from taking the dangerous route that he would otherwise take.

With this array of Augustinian materials on the subject before him, Peter composes a position on lying which combines insights from the *De mendacio* and *Contra mendacium* while squarely affirming the conclusions of the late Augustine against the countervailing opinion of Gregory the Great. All lies, he asserts, are sinful. They may be graded, as Augustine grades them, as more or less serious on the basis of their provocation. But, he agrees, no provocation, however acute, excuses a lie. This judgment excludes jocose lies, which deceive no one, and honest errors, or falsehoods told in good faith, or beliefs mistakenly but sincerely held, which report what the speaker really thinks is true. It does not excuse pious fraud, which is sinful, if perhaps venially so. For Peter, as for the late Augustine, a lie combines an objective untruth, except for the conditions noted above, with the speaker's knowledge that it is untrue and with the intention to deceive. The only example he will admit of a lie that is excusable is one also accepted by Augustine,

the case of Jacob masquerading as Esau in order to obtain his father's blessing. Peter follows Augustine in saying that this is not a lie but a mystery, and that Jacob, in any event, is to be given a dispensation because he was obeying his mother's instructions under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.¹⁰⁴ The main issue on which he does not agree with Augustine is on the evaluation of the pious fraud as a venial, and not as a serious, sin. This analysis, both fuller and better informed than that of any contemporary, presents the strongest case against lying made by any theologian of the day, and one that is entirely consistent with Peter's desire to give wider scope to the objective dimension of sin side by side with ethical intentionality, in his ethical teaching more generally.

To this Peter adds an analysis of perjury, drawn from Gratian, and defined as a lie sealed by an oath. In line with this position, the Lombard notes that some say one can swear falsely, but unknowingly, thereby not lying or forswearing oneself. In response, he draws a three-fold distinction. Perjury, first, is the voluntary taking of an oath while knowingly swearing what is false, for the sake of deception. A person can also swear that what he thinks is true is true, when it is false, and he can swear that what he thinks is false is false, when it is true. The two latter cases may involve honest mistakes. But, unlike the first case, or perjury proper, they do not involve a deceptive intention. In the first case, the speaker knows perfectly well that he is not telling the truth. In the second and third cases, the speaker may actually be in error, but his statement accurately reports what he thinks to be the case, in good faith. The latter two cases can be assimilated to the statements involving objective error but subjective conviction in the absence of deceptive intention in the foregoing analysis of lying. On the basis of the same reasoning, persons who swear to what is not objectively the case may not be guilty of perjury. Perjury, as such, requires both the deliberate distortion of the truth and the intention to mislead, as is the case with lying.¹⁰⁵ This account is quite faithful to Gratian, so far as it goes, although Peter is more interested in integrating the subject of perjury into the Augustinian theory of lying than Gratian is. He also omits a consideration which Gratian presents as essential in his own analysis of oaths, the question of ignorance, especially culpable ignorance, as a factor bearing not only on the accuracy of the statements to which one swears but also on the culpability of

¹⁰⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 38. c. 1–c. 6, 2: 213–18.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, d. 39. c. 1–c. 3, 2: 218–21.

the person taking the oath. Here as elsewhere in his ethical doctrine, Peter chooses not to take account of the issue of ignorance.

Peter also follows Gratian, while theologizing him, in dealing with the related question of when it is appropriate to swear oaths and when it is permissible to break them. He agrees that oaths should not be sworn falsely, unnecessarily, or frivolously. But oaths are acceptable in order to prove innocence, to confirm a peace treaty, or to convince one's hearers of facts that are useful to them. These conditions mitigate the Scriptural injunctions against swearing oaths. But, no one should be forced to swear to something he knows to be false, however good the end served by this action may be. Peter adds that it is important to swear only on God, and not on false gods or creatures. As to the breach of vows, he admits this in cases where they were made foolishly or against faith or charity. It is better, he thinks, to break one's oath in such a case than to remain in a state of dishonor or bad faith.

Conclusion

It will be noted that the theme of the Old Law and its abrogation or continuing applicability, which serves as the context for these reflections on such subjects as lying, perjury, usury, and adultery, has little or nothing to do with the subject of Christ's human nature, His human knowledge, His human moral capacities, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, to which it has been annexed. This fact underscores an observation made earlier and one which this chapter has explored more fully: ethics is the single most disorganized subject in Peter Lombard's theology. There are, to be sure, a number of powerful and consistent ideas that serve as overriding themes, tying together what Peter has to say on ethics wherever the material is presented in his *Sentences*. Of particular note is the desire to moderate Abelard's teaching and to incorporate more of an objectivist strain into the prevailing intentionalist consensus, a consensus position which he supports. Also important is Peter's desire to emphasize the need for the collaboration of grace and free will in the development of human virtue and merit. He makes that point very clearly, while preserving a crisp distinction between the deity, or the Holy Spirit as such, and God's graces and gifts as His effects, working in man, graces and gifts which man remains free to reject and which, if voluntarily accepted and acted upon, enable him to develop virtues and merits that are truly his own. This process is understood by Peter as man's return from the *regio dissimilitudinis* to which he has exiled himself by sin, and the recov-

ery of man's inborn similitude to God. Peter emphasizes that the working of grace in man does not divinize man; rather it helps him to restore his true humanity.

In other areas of his moral doctrine, Peter is less conclusive and consistent. While he teaches that the collaboration of grace and free will, in one form or another, is a necessary enabling condition in man's moral life, he also thinks that non-believers, who presumably lack knowledge of and access to that grace, are capable of the good faith, good intentions, and good deeds that express their natural *pietas*. Yet, Peter does not come to grips expressly with the problem of the virtuous pagan. It has to be said that his *Sentences* offer support for the acceptance of the virtuous pagan, as the Abelardians do, and for his exclusion, along with Hugh of St. Victor. Peter does not seem to be aware of his own ambiguity on this point. Another area in which the reader seeks clarification that he does not find is the relationship between natural reason, of the sort that makes possible proofs for God's existence and the grasp of the *invisibilia dei* by the rational inspection of the creation, on the one hand, with the *scientia* directed to created and temporal things with an eye to their ethical and theological significance, as a gift of the Holy Spirit, on the other.

Unquestionably the most problematic feature of the Lombard's ethics is his decision to deal with sin and with ethical intentionality and the psychogenesis of ethical decision-making in general as a pendant to his account of human nature and the fall, and with virtue in conjunction with Christ's human nature. Had Peter's Christ been a man like us in all but sin, this choice might not have made for any real difficulties. But, although he is not as extreme on this point as are many contemporaries, he endows the human Christ with a nature that does not have a fully human psychology. While Peter tries to circumvent the dilemmas flowing from this schematic decision, and from the Christology he professes, by analyzing the virtues as such before exploring their mode of possession by the human Christ, the fact remains that, with the human Christ as his paradigm, understood as Peter understands Him, a gap between mankind and the Son of man has been opened in which questions may legitimately be raised about Christ's role as a moral example for man. This arrangement of the material creates a pronounced asymmetry and disparity between the analysis of vice and sin, on the one hand, and of virtue, on the other, and one that transcends the differing operative factors conditioning the exercise of vice and virtue by man before and after the fall. The decision to treat virtue under the heading of Christology also leads, as we have

seen, to the inclusion of the moral law of the Old Testament at the end of Book 3 of the *Sentences*, even though it has no immediately visible relationship to the moral capacities of the human Christ. As a schematic device, the one and only merit of Peter's placement of this material where he does is that it serves as a point of transition to the sacraments, to which he devotes most of Book 4, and on which, despite the deep and critical influence of Hugh of St. Victor which he reveals at many points, he plans to distance himself decisively from the broad and generic Victorine understanding of sacrament.

THE SACRAMENTS

In the first half of the twelfth century, there was a felt need, for the first time in the history of the western Christian tradition, for an organized, systematic, general theology of the sacraments. On one level, this fact is an expression of the emergence of systematic theology and systematic canon law as professional academic disciplines. Within each of these disciplines, practitioners felt the urge to present an organized treatise on the sacraments, conceptualized in such a way that it would cohere intellectually with the other subjects that a systematic account of their field of study would need to include. At the same time, and despite the difference in their guild mentalities and their division of labor, the canonists and theologians overlap and borrow from each other on the sacraments. It was the theologians who took the lead in organizing the authorities, defining the range of issues to be discussed, asserting their independence from earlier theory and practice, and considering the role of the sacraments in the Christian life and not just the juridical circumstances that would guarantee the validity of their administration. At the same time, the theologians drew on the canonists' dossiers of sources and cited them, sometimes to agree and sometimes to disagree with their reasoning and conclusions.¹⁰⁶ But,

¹⁰⁶ On the relations between theologians and canonists in the field of sacramental theology, the influence and greater independence of the theologians is accented by Paul Fournier and Gabriel Le Bras, *Histoire des collections canoniques en occident depuis les fausses décrétales jusqu'au Décret de Gratien* (Paris: Sirey, 1932), 2: 314–52; Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Interaction between Canon Law and Sacramental Theology in the Twelfth Century," in *Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. Stephan Kuttner (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1976), pp. 483–93; Artur Michael Landgraf, "Diritto canonico e teologia nel secolo XII," *Studia Gratiana* 1 (1953): 371–413. On the other hand, the dependence of theologians on canonists in this area is accented by Alfonso M. Stickler, "Teologia e diritto canonico nella storia," *Salesianum* 47 (1985): 695.

much more was at stake than the reinvigorating, institutionalizing, and crossfertilizing of pedagogy and reflection within and between these sister disciplines. Two other circumstances also fed into the explosion of interest in speculating on the sacraments in this period. One was the Gregorian reform movement. Focusing on the improvement of clerical morality and leading to partisan clashes within the church that left some clerics in the status of schismatics or excommunicates if they found themselves supporting an anti-pope or a bishop or ruler who was under papal censure, the reform movement, in raising for the first time since the days of the early church the question of the validity of sacraments administered by immoral, simoniac, or excommunicated priests also alerted Christians in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries to the fact that they lacked a general theory of the sacraments in terms of which they could adjudicate such matters. Aside from the question of what validates a sacrament, arising from these struggles within the church, the emergence of anti-sacramental heresies on a wide scale demanded a justification and defense of the church's rites. And, as the controversy surrounding the Eucharistic heresy of Berengar of Tours revealed, a clearer definition of sacrament as such was required. For, in formulating his own grounds for rejecting the real presence doctrine, Berengar had collected a host of patristic citations that enabled him to give precise expression to his own position. In order to refute him, orthodox thinkers recognized, it was necessary to be equally precise, not only on the Eucharist but also on the nature of sacraments in general.¹⁰⁷

The Idea of Sacrament in General

There was, initially, some uncertainty in this period as to where a treatise on the sacraments belonged in a more general work, how

¹⁰⁷ On these internal and external influences, see Nikolaus M. Häring, "Berengar's Definitions of *Sacramentum* and Their Influence on Mediaeval Sacramentology," *MS* 10 (1948): 109–46; "Character, Signum, und Signaculum: Der Weg von Petrus Damiani bis zur eigentlichen Aufnahme in der Sakramentslehre im 12. Jahrhundert," *Scholastik* 31 (1956): 41–69; "Character, Signum, und Signaculum: Die Einführung in die Sakramententheologie des 12. Jahrhunderts," *Scholastik* 31 (1956): 182–212; "The Augustinian Axiom: *Nulli Sacramento Injuria Facienda Est*," *MS* 16 (1954): 87–114; Gary Macy, "Berengar's Legacy as a Heresiarch," in *Auctoritas und Ratio: Studien zu Berengar von Tours*, ed. Peter Ganz et al. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1990), pp. 49–67; *The Banquet's Wisdom: A Short History of the Theologies of the Lord's Supper* (New York, Paulist Press, 1992), pp. 76–81; John Van Engen, *Rupert of Deutz* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 118–21.

it should be introduced, and what it should cover. As will be recalled from our consideration of the schemata of the systematic theologians in chapter 2 above, only three of them, Honorius Augustodunensis, Hugh of St. Victor, and the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, here working under heavy Victorine influence, situate the sacraments in the context of an ecclesiology in which the sacramental ministry of the church is seen as an extension of Christ's saving work in time. Honorius follows this point with a discussion of the Eucharist, as the most important of the sacraments, after which he treats the priesthood, as needed to consecrate it. He interperses various ethical points in between the priesthood, baptism, and marriage, the only sacraments he considers, and never gives a general definition of sacrament. For Hugh, the church mediates the sacraments of the New Law, and he presents the clergy immediately after introducing the church, as their ministers.¹⁰⁸ But, as we have seen, and will observe again in more detail below, his extremely loose, broad-gauged, and sometimes contradictory understanding of "sacrament" blurs the focus of that idea in his work. The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* picks up on the ecclesiological siting of the sacraments, describing the church as a nest where the mother bird protects and nourishes her young and, in even more Hugonian language, as Noah's ark, navigating believers through the flood, as the sacraments serve Christians *in via*, voyaging between birth, rebirth, and final arrival. The author does not, however, subscribe to Hugh's organization of the sacraments themselves, as we will see below.¹⁰⁹

The principal definition of sacrament inherited by Christian thinkers in this period was the Augustinian visible sign of invisible grace, sometimes recast as a visible sign of a sacred thing or a visible form of an invisible grace or thing. There are some contemporary theologians and canonists who do not offer a general definition of sacrament at all. But many who do are satisfied with the Augustinian formula and repeat it.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, some

¹⁰⁸ On the connection between Hugh's ecclesiology and his sacramental theology, see Jean Châtillon, "Une ecclésiologie médiévale: L'idée de l'église dans la théologie de l'école de Saint-Victor au XII^e siècle," *Irénikon* 22 (1949): 115–38, 395–411; Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 176–77.

¹⁰⁹ *Sent. div.* 5, proemium, pp. 105*–06*.

¹¹⁰ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 2. c. 8, *PL* 161: 148C; Peter Abelard, *Theologia "scholarium"* 1.9, *CCCM* 13: 321; *Sent. Parisiensis* II, p. 150; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.2, pp. 132–33; Heinrich Weisweiler, ed. *Maître Simon et son groupe De sacramentis* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1937), pp. 1–2. On Abelard's purely

thinkers recognize the fact that this definition could be used to support the purely symbolic view of the Eucharist put forth by Berengar, that it was not responsive to his thesis, and that it was necessary to claim for at least some sacraments, such as the Eucharist,¹¹¹ baptism,¹¹² or baptism and the Eucharist,¹¹³ that the sacred sign not only signifies but also conveys what it signifies. The authors in question, however, do not expand this definition beyond those horizons. Not all masters in this period manifest a sure-footed certitude about which sacraments to treat and where to do so. Even when they possess a definition of sacrament in general, they do not necessarily conduct a systematic inquiry into rites that might be thought of under that heading, testing them and ruling them in or out on the basis of their conformity to the definition, and organizing them according to some discernible plan. Abelard, for instance, has no systematic treatise on the sacraments, probably because of the incomplete nature of his theological works. He only treats three of the sacraments, baptism, marriage, and penance, and each is discussed in a different one of his works and in a different context. Marriage comes up in his *Hexaameron*, in connection with the creation of Eve; baptism is addressed in his Romans commentary in conjunction with original sin; and penance is treated in his *Ethics* as a corollary of his analysis of the nature of ethical acts. Abelard inherits from Anselm of Laon the tendency to call Old Testament rites sacraments, although he confines this usage to circumcision, without explaining why it is apposite there but is not applied to other Judaic rites.¹¹⁴ Gratian discusses the sacraments in two separate places, his *De consecratione*, where baptism and the Eucharist come up as an example of ceremonies performed in consecrated houses of worship, and the *De penitentia*, in which, despite its title, the other sacraments except unction are considered. Put together, these separate treatises offer a relatively full account of the sacraments, but the organization of the material has raised questions as to whether their author is the same as the

sign-oriented theory, see Richard E. Weingart, "Peter Abailard's Contribution to Medieval Sacramentology," *RTAM* 34 (1967): 164–66.

¹¹¹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 154–56.

¹¹² *Sent. Parisiensis* I, pp. 4–5, 36.

¹¹³ Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 26, 132–33. On Hermannus, see Wendelin Knoch, *Die Einsetzung der Sakramente durch Christus: Eine Untersuchung zur Sakramententheologie der Frühscholastik von Anselm von Laon bis zu Wilhelm von Auxerre* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1983), p. 150.

¹¹⁴ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 51, 5: 48–49; Peter Abelard, *In Ep. Pauli ad Romanos* 2:25; *Theologia christiana* 1.9, CCCM 11: 94, 12: 321.

author of Gratian's *Decretum*.¹¹⁵

There is also notable uncertainty as to how to classify the sacraments and on the order in which to discuss them. As we have seen, Honorius treats the Eucharist first, because he thinks that it is the most important sacrament, and holy orders next because priests are needed to administer it. Baptism is a sacrament that no one omits; and marriage would be the state of life to which most of the lay people who are the ultimate audience of the *Elucidarium* are drawn. But Honorius offers no insights into why he omits penance, a subject quite controversial at this time, or confirmation and unction, on which few debates raged, although they would be an ordinary part of the Christian life as well. The Porretans come up with a four-fold scheme of organization. There are sacraments of initiation, sacraments that fortify, sacraments that restore, and sacraments that perfect. The logic of this subdivision suggests that baptism should be the first sacrament treated. But the Porretan masters begin with the Eucharist, even though they have defined it as a sacrament of perfection. They give as examples of initiation, fortification, and restoration the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and penance.¹¹⁶ They do not indicate in which category marriage and unction, the other two sacraments they include, belong. The author of the *Ysagoge in theologiam* presents the sacraments in a sequence all his own—baptism, confirmation, marriage, unction, the Eucharist, and penance—and offers no rationale for it.

One of the most prevalent ways of distinguishing one type of sacrament from another and of prioritizing them was suggested early in the century by the canonist Alger of Liège. He separates sacraments of necessity from sacraments of dignity, a distinction that has two dimensions. Sacraments of necessity are necessary for salvation; sacraments of dignity are not. Furthermore, and here Alger reflects the canonists' concern with who can properly administer a sacrament and how the minister's moral or juridical state affects the validity of his sacramental ministry, sacraments of necessity are valid and efficacious (*vera et sancta*) so long as the minister has been validly ordained and so long as he uses the

¹¹⁵ The most recent review of this debate, with a guide to the literature, is provided by John Van Engen, "Observations on the 'De consecratione'," in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. Stephan Kuttner and Kenneth Pennington (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1985), pp. 309–20. Van Engen supports the idea of Gratian's authorship.

¹¹⁶ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.61, p. 144; Nikolaus M. Häring, ed. "Die *Sententie magistri Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi* II: Die Version der florentiner Handschrift" 4. 61, *AHDLMA* 46 (1979): 67.

correct verbal formula. On the other hand, in the case of sacraments of dignity, if immoral, excommunicated, heretical, or schismatic priests administer them, even if they use the correct form, the sacraments are true but not efficacious.¹¹⁷ This distinction, in essence, is designed both to address the clerical fall-out of the Gregorian reforms and to exempt baptism, the only sacrament that Alger regards as a sacrament of necessity, from the strictures he places on the sacramental ministry of bad or unlawful priests in other respects. It is true that he holds that the moral status of the recipient affects his ability to internalize spiritually what he has received. But Alger's accent is on the minister's side of the transaction. Gratian absorbs the distinction between sacraments of necessity and other sacraments but defines these categories differently and disagrees with Alger on some of the specifics of the exercise of the sacramental ministry. For Gratian, the sacraments of necessity are those that cannot be repeated, and hence include baptism, confirmation, holy orders, and also penance. While he removes clerical immorality from the list of disqualifications, he agrees that, with sacraments of necessity, priests in poor standing juridically can administer them validly and efficaciously. With respect to the sacraments of dignity, that is, the Eucharist, unction, and marriage, validity and efficacy are present if they are administered "to the worthy, worthily, and by the worthy" (*digni, digne, a dignis*).¹¹⁸ Gratian likewise sees an objective character in the sacraments and is less concerned with the verbal formula than Alger and more concerned with the standing and attitude of the minister and the recipient. But his handling of this topic reflects the same basic canonical priorities.

Some theologians pick up the distinction between sacraments of necessity and of dignity without always classifying the sacraments which they place under these rubrics in either Alger's or Gratian's way. The author of the *Sententiae Parisiensis* I classifies baptism,

¹¹⁷ Alger of Liège, *De misericordia* 1.48, 1.55–50, 1.69, 1.72, 3.2–4, 3.16, 3.19–20, 3.55, 3.83, pp. 224, 231–34, 239, 242, 315–18, 325–27, 328–29, 333–34, 365, 379. An excellent account is Nikolaus M. Häring, "A Study of the Sacramentology of Alger of Liège," *MS* 20 (1958): 41–78. Kretzschmar, *Alger*, pp. 27–30 and Gabriel Le Bras, "Le Liber de misericordia et iusticia d'Alger de Liège," *Nouvelle Revue historique de droit française et étranger* 45 (1921): 96–98 date the work, most probably, to 1105–06 and as not later than 1121.

¹¹⁸ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 1. q. 1. c. 39. dictum, col. 374. For this rule on baptism in particular, see *ibid.*, c. 1. q. 1. c. 47. dictum, col. 377, 379, 380, and Gratian's summary and reprise at c. 54. dictum, c. 57. dictum, c. 97, dictum, col. 397.

confirmation, and the Eucharist as the sacraments of necessity.¹¹⁹ More of the theologians who invoke this distinction combine it with some other prevalent way of organizing their material. Hugh of St. Victor notes that we can subdivide the sacraments three ways. There are those necessary for salvation, and here he includes baptism and the Eucharist; those helpful for man's sanctification but not necessary for man's salvation, and here he gives as examples such things as the ashes used on Ash Wednesday and holy water; and those instituted so that the sacraments of necessity can be administered, that is, holy orders. Yet another way of framing this subdivision, he says, is to distinguish among sacraments of sanctification, exercise, and preparation.¹²⁰ This classification has its confusing elements, in that Hugh does not explain where confirmation, penance, unction, and marriage fit in, although, and presumably by default, they would be placed in the second category. But if they were so placed, they would inhabit that category side by side with rites that Hugh later rules out as sacraments in any case, relegating them to the subordinate rank of sacramentals.¹²¹ He muddies the waters still more by adding that, from the beginning, there were three sacraments necessary for salvation, faith, the sacraments of the faith, and good works. He makes this point in order to emphasize the idea that sacramental ritual and reception are meaningless unless they are undergirded by faith and manifested in good works.¹²² But it is clear how unhelpful his polyvalent use of the term "sacrament" is in this connection. Another combination is made by Master Simon, a theologian likely to have been writing in the lower Rhine area or Flanders around 1145. He holds, like Alger, that baptism is the only sacrament of necessity, and calls the other sacraments voluntary. To this he yokes an even more widespread distinction, between sacraments common to all Christians, and sacraments received only by some Christians, such as marriage and holy orders. As for the five common sacraments on Simon's list, they cleanse, as with baptism; arm the cleansed, as with confirmation; relieve the armed, as with penance; incorporate the relieved, as with the Eucharist; and make present the vision of God, as with unction.¹²³ The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, reflecting the

¹¹⁹ *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 36.

¹²⁰ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.9.7, *PL* 327A–B.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 2.9.10, *PL* 176: 471D–478B.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 1.9.8, *PL* 176: 328A–B.

¹²³ Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 2. For the dating and location of this work, see Weisweiler's intro., pp. xlvi–lxii, lxxx, xcvi, ccxii–ccxiv.

influence of both Hugh and Simon here, repeats the distinction between necessary and voluntary sacraments, placing baptism alone in the first category, and unites this idea with two other principles, the distinction between sacraments common to all Christians and orders and marriage, and, within the common sacraments, the treatment of the sacraments in the order in which they are received. Hence, his lists reads baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, and unction. This is how he states his case in principle.¹²⁴ In practice, he discusses only five sacraments. He mentions unction, but does not say anything about it. And, alone among the canonists and theologians of the time, he omits marriage. Roland of Bologna confines what he has to say about the relative necessity of individual sacraments to his commentary on each of them in course, and presents the common sacraments, in the order in which they are received, followed by marriage and an extremely abbreviated treatment of holy orders, confined to the power of the keys.

The theologian who did more to set the agenda on the nature of the sacraments in general to which the Lombard responded, both positively and negatively, was Hugh of St. Victor.¹²⁵ Hugh makes a major contribution to the development of doctrine in this field of theology by systematically expanding the Augustinian definition of sacrament well beyond the scatter-gun tactics of other thinkers in this period. For him, a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing, whose external form resembles the internal thing (*res*) or divine power (*virtus*) contained within the sacrament. By its institution, moreover, the sacrament contains the grace it signifies and conveys it, through its material medium, to the recipient, for the purpose of sanctifying him. The exterior medium is visible and material; the interior *res sacramenti* is invisible and spiritual. The physical medium is a container of invisible and spiritual grace and, when the recipient comes to it properly disposed, it is efficacious in

¹²⁴ *Sent. div.* 5, proemium 2, pp. 108*–09*.

¹²⁵ The best account of Hugh's sacramental theology is Heinrich Weisweiler, *Die Wirksamkeit der Sakramente nach Hugo von St. Viktor* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1932), pp. 5–154; see also his "Sakrament als Symbol und Teilhabe: Der Einfluss des Ps.-Dionysius auf die allgemeine Sakramentenlehre Hugos von St. Viktor," *Scholastik* 27 (1952): 321–43; "Sacramentum fidei: Augustinische und ps.-dionysische Gedanken in der Glaubensauffassung Hugos von St. Viktor," in *Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Michael Schmaus zum sechzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht von seinen Freunden und Schülern*, ed. Johann Auer and Hermann Volk (Munich: Karl Zink, 1957), p. 434; Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 85–92; Paulo M. Pession, "L'ordine sacro e i suoi gradi nel pensiero di Ugo di S. Vittore," *La Scuola Cattolica* 64 (1936): 130–31.

conferring that spiritual grace upon him. The two new generic keynotes of the sacraments that are important for Hugh are thus the fact that they do not merely signify; they effect what they signify. Also, they do so not merely because the physical medium bears a resemblance to its inner *significatum* but because of the express biblical institution of the sacraments.¹²⁶ This is, no doubt, Hugh's single most significant contribution to sacramental theology; but there is more. The matter of the sacrament, that is, its physical form as contrasted with its inner reality or *virtus*, has three notes, for Hugh, "things, deeds, and words" (*rebus, factis, dictis*). The first of these is the appropriate physical medium, such as water in baptism and bread and wine in the Eucharist. The second, deeds, speaks to the liturgical rite and the gestures used in the administration of the sacrament, such as the ablution of the baptizand and the fraction of the host during the mass. The third is the verbal formula, such as the invocation of the Trinity in baptism or the words of consecration in the Eucharist.¹²⁷ Hugh also adds a characteristic explanation of why the sacraments were instituted. As he has already observed, they are there for the sanctification of Christians. The way they carry out this function is by working in the recipient's soul, for his "humbling, enlightenment, and exercise" (*humiliatio, eruditio, exercitatio hominis*). For God, they are a dispensation, since He can save without them; for man, they are a necessity.¹²⁸ What Hugh has accomplished here in a few brief chapters is to redefine the sacraments as efficacious channels of grace and to emphasize the importance of the sanctification they impart in the inner lives of Christians. Just as the canonists stress the external aspects of the sacraments and the juridical conditions that validate them, principally from the standpoint of the minister, so Hugh turns the subject around by considering sacraments as valid because they effect what they signify and communicate an ongoing growth in grace in the soul of the recipient. This shift in emphasis and this expansion of the definition of sacrament in general by Hugh proved to be an achievement of critical importance in the sequel.

¹²⁶ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.9.2, *PL* 176: 317C–318D.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.9.6, *PL* 176: 326B–327A. On the combination of these three elements in the thought of this period, see Damien Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments in Early Scholasticism, 1125–1240," *FS* 11 (1951): 1–20.

¹²⁸ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.9.3–5, *PL* 176: 322A–326B. The quotation is at 1.9.3–4, 322A.

At the same time, this decided doctrinal advance travels in the company of Hugh's imprecise and often confusing handling of the idea of sacrament more widely, as anything manifesting God to man and anything helpful in man's restoration. From this perspective, sacraments have been available to man since the beginning of time, well before Christ's arrival, reflecting God's intention all along to save mankind and to provide an alternative to the sacraments of the devil.¹²⁹ Given his more specific definition of sacraments as rites of the church, just noted, or even his wider view of sacraments as manifesting God and restoring man, it is truly difficult to envision what these *sacramenta diaboli* may be, in Hugh's estimation. Black masses? Special rituals engaged in by fallen man? Unlike sacraments in any other of Hugh's conceivable senses of the term, these sacraments of the devil cannot be envisioned as stemming from God's institution or as playing a role in man's restitution. Without making any effort to explain this anomalous term, Hugh proceeds to extend the concept of sacrament to the moral precepts of the natural law, perceptible by reason, and to the Old Testament covenant. On the latter, he is far from consistent on whether the precepts and rites involved were salvific, in the same sense as Christian sacraments. On the one hand, he observes, the ritual prescriptions of the Old Law were morally neutral and not unchangeable. On the other hand, the rite of circumcision was salvific, although females could be saved without it, through faith and works. Yet again, these rites signified salvation only; they did not impart saving grace.¹³⁰ This inconsistency aside, there is also Hugh's conflation of sacramentals with sacraments in the Christian dispensation. Hugh retains the sacramentals within his general definition of sacrament, as we have seen above, even though he also takes pains to disqualify them because they signify only, and effect nothing.¹³¹ Coupled with his disorganized and redundant discussion of the Christian sacraments in practice, these teachings prevent Hugh from offering a fully coherent sacramental theology.

Now, there was some carryover of Hugh's broad understanding of sacrament in the theology of the mid-twelfth century, as can be seen in Roland of Bologna.¹³² But the key figures who serve as

¹²⁹ Ibid., 1.8.11, *PL* 176: 312B.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 1.12.1–2, 1.12.5–10, *PL* 176: 347D–351B, 352A–364A. On these inconsistencies, see Heinrich Weisweiler, "Hugos von St. Victor *Dialogus de sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae* als frühcholastisches Quellenwerk," in *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1946), 2: 179–219.

¹³¹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.9.10, *PL* 176: 471D–478B.

¹³² Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 194.

points of transition between Hugh and the Lombard are, rather, eager to repress this dimension of the Victorine legacy and to retain, or press further, what they perceive to be Hugh's more positive contributions. His influence extended into the Abelardian circle, as we may note in the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, whose author agrees that the sacraments are educational, bringing humility, insight, and exercise, and who repeats Hugh's point that sacraments are visible forms of invisible grace that are distinct from mere signs in that they confer grace as well as signifying it.¹³³ More detailed are the authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and the *Summa sententiarum*. The former master likewise distinguishes between a sign and a sacrament in that the sign "does not confer on us the thing it signifies" (*signum non confert nobis rem significantam*) while the sacraments "effect what they signify" (*efficiunt quod figurant*).¹³⁴ The author agrees that the sacraments were instituted *propter eruditionem, humilitatem, exercitationem*, although he accents enlightenment and behavior modification more than sanctification.¹³⁵ He also distinguishes between the *sacramentum* or physical medium and the *res sacramenti* or invisible grace it contains, and agrees that the recipient does not receive and internalize this grace fruitfully if he lacks the proper faith, intention, and attitude.¹³⁶ The main area in which he amplifies Hugh's teaching is in connection with the things, deeds, and words that constitute the matter of the sacraments. He follows Hugh's definitions of what these aspects are but adds that they reflect the remedial character of the sacraments, since Adam sinned *in rebus* in bringing damnation on the human race, *in factis* by taking the forbidden fruit, and *in dictis* by seeking to exculpate himself.¹³⁷

The author of the *Summa sententiarum* also displays his fidelity to most of Hugh's formulae, although he annexes holy orders to the power of the keys as exercised in penance and emphasizes the salvific function of the sacraments as well as their educational and disciplinary functions.¹³⁸ Like the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, he incorporates a remedial view of the sacraments into their role as media of grace and as stimuli of moral action, in his handling of

¹³³ *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 179–80.

¹³⁴ *Sent. div.* 5, proemium 1, 5.1, pp. 106*, 123*.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 5, proemium 2, p. 107*.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.1, pp. 113*–15*.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 5, proemium 2, p. 108*.

¹³⁸ On the *Summa sententiarum* in relation to Hugh of St. Victor, on the sacraments, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 114–18, 120.

their work of *eruditio*, *humiliatio*, and *exercitatio* and their correction in *rebus*, *factis*, and *dictis*.¹³⁹ He agrees that all sacraments contain a *sacramentum* or physical medium and a *res sacramenti* or interior grace, which the exterior medium conveys.¹⁴⁰ He emphasizes very strongly the efficacy of sacraments, as contrasted with mere signs. In part, this is a function of his effort—and it is a successful one—to restrict sacraments to the rites of the church, eliminating both sacramentals on the one side and all ceremonies of the Old Law on the other. It is also a function of his desire to reinforce Hugh's point that the sacraments are efficacious not because their outward form resembles their inner spiritual content, but because of the power of divine institution. This is what enables sacraments, unlike signs, to serve as efficacious channels of grace. In placing sacraments, so understood, over against pre-Christian rites and practices, however, this master does not go the full distance in his criticism of Hugh, although his ethical doctrine, discussed above, gives him the tools to do so. He retains the use of the term "sacrament" in referring to the practices of men under the natural moral law, and the written or Mosaic law, as well as the Gospel. Sacraments have developed over time, he notes, and have improved until they have reached their current state of Christian perfection. While he does soft-pedal the salvific capacities of the earlier rites, and while he cuts the amount of space he allocates to this topic, in comparison with Hugh, he does not relegate them to the status of mere pre-figurations of rites that alone can be called true sacraments according to his own definition of them.¹⁴¹ Robert of Melun, on the other hand, is willing to offer what he regards as a correction of Hugh on this point,¹⁴² and in this sense is bolder than the *Summa sententiarum*, which is somewhat inconsistent here, and than the *Sententiae divinitatis*, which does not raise the matter.

It is generally, and rightly, agreed that Peter Lombard's major contribution to the understanding of sacraments in general is both programmatic and substantive. He closes Book 3 of the *Sentences* and opens Book 4 with a crisp and unambiguous definition of sacraments in general, laying the foundation for the treatment he

¹³⁹ *Summa sent.* 4.1, *PL* 176: 118B–C.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.1, *PL* 176: 117B–C.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 4.1–2, *PL* 176: 118C–120D.

¹⁴² Ulrich Horst, *Gesetz und Evangelium: Das Alte Testament in der Theologie des Robert von Melun* (Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1971), pp. 3–5, 35–53. Horst is working from the unpublished manuscripts of that part of the incomplete section of Robert's *Sentences* where he takes up this question. We have not inspected the manuscripts ourselves.

gives to each of them in turn, a treatment which also reflects how controversial or problematic each of them happened to be at this time. Substantively, he relies on the Victorine and post-Victorine masters just discussed. While underscoring his points of agreement with them, particularly the idea that sacraments effect what they signify, he also rigorously excludes the rites of the Old Law from this designation.¹⁴³ Peter also integrates his definition of sacrament with the Augustinian theory of signs and things, use and enjoyment, which he makes the overall theme of the *Sentences*.¹⁴⁴ In addition, he takes his own position on the issue of remedy and sanctification as functions of the sacraments. He distinguishes clearly between the validity imparted by proper administration to their material elements, on the one hand, and the sanctification or remedy which they impart to the recipient, on the other, and considers the conditions affecting both processes fully. In that same connection, he devotes more attention than his theological predecessors to the role of the minister as an instrument in the transmission of grace through the sacraments.¹⁴⁵ As well, he provides a clear and coherent basis for the definition of seven sacraments, omitting none of the Christian rites ventilated by contemporaries in this connection.¹⁴⁶ In all these respects, his handling of sacraments in general seizes upon and redirects an emerging consensus and puts it on a more articulate and at the same time a personal foundation.

Peter launches his discussion of sacraments in general with a forthright statement on their relation to the rites of the Old Testa-

¹⁴³ For good accounts of Peter's relationship with his predecessors here, on which there is a good deal of consensus, see Adriano Caprioli, "Alle origini della 'definizione' di sacramento da Berengario a Pier Lombardo," *La Scuola Cattolica* 102 (1974): 718-43; Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle*, pp. 309-10; Joseph de Ghellinck, "Un chapitre dans l'histoire de la définition des sacraments au XII^e siècle," in *Mélanges Mandonnet; Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du moyen âge* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), 2: 79-96; Häring, "Berengar's Definitions," pp. 109-16, 128-32; Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 227-29; Macy, *The Banquet's Wisdom*, pp. 89-91; Mignon, *Les origines*, 2: 116-18, 121-22; Damien Van den Eynde, *Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la scolastique (1050-1240)* (Rome: Antonianum, 1950), pp. 31, 40, 42-46. These authors effectively refute the claim, made by Elizabeth Frances Rogers, *Peter Lombard and the Sacramental System* (New York, 1917), p. 76, that Peter made no contribution to this subject.

¹⁴⁴ Seamus P. Heaney, *The Development of the Sacramentality of Marriage from Anselm of Laon to Thomas Aquinas* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), pp. 26-28.

¹⁴⁵ Häring, "The Augustinian Axiom," pp. 87-117; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 1; 173-76.

¹⁴⁶ For Peter's relationship to his predecessors here, see Caprioli, "Alle origini," pp. 735-40; Édouard Dhanis, "Quelques anciennes formules septénaires des sacrements," *RHE* 26 (1930): 574-608, 916-50; 27 (1931): 5-26.

ment. In contrast with the promises of earthly good embodied in those practices, he states, sacraments promise heavenly goods: "The sacraments are different," he asserts, "since the former [the rites of the Old Law] only signified, but they [the sacraments] confer grace" (*Diversa etiam sacramenta, quia illa tantum significabant, haec conferunt gratiam*).¹⁴⁷ The promise of future heavenly good that is made in each sacrament thus begins to work and is progressively activated by the grace transmitted to the recipient through the sacraments in this life. In addition to being promises, and the means by which Christians are made capable of attaining them, the sacraments are remedies repairing the damage caused by original and actual sin. As Peter points out in these introductory remarks, he plans to consider, in each individual case, what the sacrament is, why this particular one was instituted, in what it consists, and how it differs from the Old Testament rites that may parallel or prefigure it.¹⁴⁸ Before doing so, he cites the Augustinian definition of a sacrament as a sign of a sacred thing and notes its inadequacies, bringing the sign theory of the *De doctrina christiana* to bear on the point. As Augustine observes, signs are either natural or conventional. In the first case, they indicate natural processes or involuntary reactions, as smoke indicates fire and a grimace indicates pain. Conventional signs are signs whose significance is not automatic; it is, rather, imposed on the signs by the users of the verbal or non-verbal language in question, by common agreement. In neither case, however, is a sign identical with its *significatum* or productive of it. In relation to a sign, Peter observes, a sacrament does far more than to stand for its *significatum* or to bring it to mind. He agrees with Hugh of St. Victor and the *Summa sententiarum* that the material medium resembles the sacrament's inner spiritual content, or, in his terms, its interior grace, promise, and remedy. In that sense, sacraments may be compared with natural signs. But, here agreeing with these masters again while rephrasing the point in Augustine's semantic terms, the power of the sacrament is given, not an automatic consequence of that resemblance. Its given power, in this case, is not a function of the conventional understanding imparted to it by its users but is a consequence of its divine institution. It is the divine institution that empowers a sacrament to effect what it signifies. This is the basis on which it is different from a sign, which merely signifies but does not sanctify. And so, he

¹⁴⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 3. d. 40. c. 3.1, 2: 229.

¹⁴⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 1. c. 1.1-2, 2: 231.

concludes, a sacrament properly speaking is more than the sign or form of the invisible grace of God. It is also the cause of the recovery of his image in man: "For it was not just to signify grace, therefore, that sacraments were instituted, but also to sanctify" (*Non igitur significandi tantum gratiam sacramenta instituta sunt, sed et sanctificandi*).¹⁴⁹ Aside from the clarification imported into the Victorine position thanks to the Augustinian analysis of signs with which Peter associates it, and which enables him to offer a crystalline rationale for departing from Augustine's definition of sacrament and for distinguishing the sacraments from both sacramentals and from pre-Christian rites, Peter has expanded the understanding of sacraments by proposing that they have both a remedial character and a sanctifying character, features that enable their users to grow in grace so as to be worthy of the promise of salvation which the sacraments also contain.

With this definition in place, Peter offers, as a concrete example of the difference between sacraments, properly understood, and the signs represented by Old Testament rites, a comparison between circumcision and baptism. This example is not chosen at random. For, even among contemporary theologians who may have been inclined to dismiss other rites of the Old Law as *figurae* only, there was a substantial inclination to regard circumcision as efficacious, or as salvific, in its own time and place prior to the Christian era, even if they did not go to the lengths of Hugh of St. Victor in this connection.¹⁵⁰ Peter's opening salvo is a semantic one. When we use the term "sacrament" to refer to these Old Testament rites, he states, the word should not be understood literally. It is a courtesy title only, since they only promised but did not give salvation. Peter has no scruples about attacking and rejecting authorities such as Augustine and Bede, who could be and had been used to support the claim that circumcision was efficacious against original and actual sin. In so doing, he raises the question of what happened to the men, not to mention the women, who lived upright lives prior to the institution of circumcision. Calling on Gregory the Great and his own gloss on Romans, and the doctrine of justification found there, he states that these people were saved by their faith and good works. In this respect, circumcision, while its symbolism is useful as a moral reminder of the need to cut off sin and to guard against

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., c. 2–c. 4.4, 2: 232–34. The quotation is at c. 4.2, p. 233.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., c. 6–c. 10, 2: 235–39. For current treatments of circumcision and its efficacy, see above and below, pp. 49, 52, 198, 199, 519, 525, 530–31, 533, 578 and p. 533 n. 154.

concupiscence, is superfluous and was superfluous even in the pre-Christian dispensation. Unlike baptism, which is available to persons of both sexes and which not only forgives sin but communicates the grace that assists recipients in doing good and developing virtue, circumcision did not and does not justify. In this analysis, Peter brings the notion of justification by the faith that works in love to bear on the problem of pre-Christian rites as a cogent rationale for rejecting them as sacraments. The same principle will also afford a useful basis for his understanding of the salvation of the Old Testament worthies at the end of time. He departs quite pointedly from the Victorine position here. On the other hand, he endorses, essentially verbatim, the Victorine rationale for the institution of the sacraments *propter humiliationem, eruditionem, exercitationem*, as occasions for enlightenment, moral education, and self-discipline, and agrees that, as liturgical events, their celebration involves action, physical media, and the apposite verbal formulae.¹⁵¹

As for the sacraments of the New Law, Peter spells out seven, joining Master Simon, Roland of Bologna, and others who do the same. His own scheme for organizing them comes closest to that of Roland, but he presents another perspective on this issue. Sacraments, he notes, can be divided into three types. There are those that are remedies for sin and that also bring with them assisting grace (*gratia adiutrix*), such as baptism. There are those that bring a remedy, such as marriage. He hastens to add that marriage was ordained in the original creation as a sacrament, a good thing, and an office. It remains a sacrament after the fall but now is also a remedy. The third type of sacrament strengthens recipients in grace and virtue; the Eucharist and holy orders are given as examples. Of whichever type, he concludes, all sacraments are efficacious.¹⁵² This typology of the sacraments, however, is not the order Peter uses in the discussion of the sacraments in particular which follows. In the sequel, to which we now turn, he joins Roland in reserving the remarks he wants to make about their necessity for salvation to each sacrament in turn, and presents the sacraments common to all Christians, in the order in which they are received, before turning to holy orders and marriage, as sacraments received only by some Christians. This fact, coupled with his comment on marriage in these stage-setting observations, raises a question concerning the status of that sacrament, in his mind. His actual mode

¹⁵¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 1. c. 5.1–6, 2: 234–35.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, d. 2. c. 1, 2: 239–40.

of organizing sacramental theology would suggest that marriage is a parallel of holy orders, a sacrament administered in order to convey to those receiving it a particular office in the church, which they alone are legitimately empowered to exercise and whose grace strengthens them in the conduct of that calling. On the other hand, Peter's remarks here suggest that marriage as a sacrament does not convey grace and is remedial only, in that it affords to the married a divinely sanctioned way of avoiding fornication. This apparent disjunction has provoked debate as to whether Peter truly extends his definition of sacrament in general to marriage, or whether his treatment of marriage is asymmetrical with his treatment of the other sacraments as means of grace.¹⁵³ It alerts us to the fact that we will need to be attentive to that question in considering his discussion of marriage below.

Baptism

As a theologian of baptism, the first sacrament received by all Christians, Peter registers the fact that there was considerable consensus among canonists and theologians on many aspects of this subject and that, at the same time, there were features of baptism that were debated, both because the practices of the early church were being called into question as inappropriate, because traditional authorities were coming under fire or being manipulated to support contrasting conclusions, and because some contemporaries were posing difficulties that demanded a response. Although there are a few topics aired in connection with baptism at this time that he does not address, such as conditional baptism, and the proper time of baptism, the latter of which was controverted, Peter reflects the consensus position in the areas that were not controversial in his time. In the areas attracting debate, he sometimes takes a conservative line while at other times he is far more flexible and critical of the established tradition. In these debates, it is occasionally the case that Peter is strongly influenced by one or another of the thinkers in his period, in terms of how he poses the question, or answers it, or both. At the same time, he often supplies his own rationale for the solutions he proposes, or imports his own emphasis into the subject.

¹⁵³ On this point, Heaney, *The Development*, pp. 26–28, asserts that marriage is a full sacrament for Peter, while Joseph de Ghellinck, “Pierre Lombard,” in *DTC* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1935), 12 part 2: 1999–2002, argues that Peter failed to extend his understanding of sacraments as a means of grace to marriage.

As might be expected from his remarks on circumcision as an example of a rite that was never a sacrament, properly speaking, Peter firmly distances himself from those theologians who place baptism on a sacramental trajectory that includes circumcision, and also the baptism of John, as efficacious in the remission of sin. He sides with those who draw a clear distinction between Christian baptism and its prefigurations, taking a stronger line here than his compeers.¹⁵⁴ For Peter, the baptism of John can similarly be called a sacrament only as a courtesy title. This being the case, the reason Christ accepted it although He did not need it was to signify His humility. The function of John's baptism, according to Peter, was to call mankind to repentance, as a preparation for the true baptism that would remit sin, and also to serve as the first occasion when the Holy Spirit disclosed the divinity of Christ.¹⁵⁵

There were several other controversies surrounding baptism in the first half of the twelfth century. As we have already noted, a number of canonists and theologians described it as a sacrament of necessity. In supporting this position they could and did draw on the views of the late Augustine, who stressed, along with the unrepeatability of baptism, that it was mandatory for salvation and that persons neglecting to receive it, infants included, would be irrevocably damned. There are a number of thinkers in the early twelfth century who reflect the opinion that this teaching is too harsh. They take two lines of attack against the Augustinian view, one from the perspective of the damnation of unbaptised infants and the other from the perspective of the doctrine of baptism by desire and baptism by blood.¹⁵⁶ Early in the century, Anselm of

¹⁵⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 2. c. 2–c. 6, 2: 241–43. Theologians admitting the sacramentality of circumcision include Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.6.4, *PL* 176: 449D; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 5.1–13, pp. 144–46; *Sent. div.* 5.1, pp. 110*–11*; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 194–96. Theologians who provide the background for Peter's position include Anselm of Laon, *Sententie divine pagine*, ed. Franz P. Bliemetzrieder in *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen*, Beiträge, 18:2–3, (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919), pp. 42–43; the Laon master who wrote *Augustinus: Semel immolatus est Christus*, ed. Heinrich Weisweiler in *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in deutschen Bibliotheken*, Beiträge, 33:1–2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), pp. 281–91; Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 120; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 37; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 187; *Summa sent.* 5.2, *PL* 176: 128C. The author closest to Peter is Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 12–13, 15. See also Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 1: 61–108.

¹⁵⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 2. c. 2–6, 2: 240–43. The *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 6.1–3, p. 146 supports this position on the baptism of John received by Christ as an act of humility.

¹⁵⁶ For an overview of this theme, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 1: 216–53.

Laon airs his own discomfort with the Augustinian hard line on baptism, indicating what he finds problematic with it. Noting that baptism is necessary for salvation, he observes that adult baptizands must bring faith to their reception of the sacrament if it is to be efficacious, while for infants, the sacrament is sufficient. There are exceptions, however. Catechumens and other people who desire baptism but who die before they can receive it, except in cases of negligence, are also saved. Anselm cites the case of Cornelius, to whom Christ gave the *res sacramenti*, the remission of sins, without the baptismal rite. The same is the case for infants who die unbaptized. In their case, the negligence involved will be charged to the account of their parents, who will be punished for it; but Anselm can see no reason why the infants themselves should be deemed responsible, or why they should be taxed with the sins of others.¹⁵⁷ In another connection, a different concern of his surfaces, which also informs his disquiet with the traditional teaching. The Holy Innocents, he notes, are venerated as saints, and there is a feast day in the liturgy in their honor. They are indubitably believed to have been received into Heaven and are rightly revered.¹⁵⁸ William of Champeaux does not cite the Holy Innocents or other biblical exceptions, but summarizes Augustine's opinion on the damnation of unbaptized infants and states that it is not at all clear that Augustine is correct.¹⁵⁹ Other followers of Anselm of Laon express other misgivings. Acknowledging that the correct faith is needed for the efficacious reception of baptism on the part of adults, they see infant baptism as efficacious on the basis of the sacrament alone, even if the faith of the parents is heterodox. Still, perfect charity is salvific, without baptism, and the martyrs' baptism by blood is another exception.¹⁶⁰

Another anti-Augustinian perspective is presented by Abelard. His rejection of the need for infant baptism altogether, as a function of his rejection of the principle that infants are guilty of original sin, since all sin springs from intentionality,¹⁶¹ was certainly the most extreme reason for opposing the traditional view. It did not catch

¹⁵⁷ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine*, pp. 42–46; *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 57–59, 5: 53–54.

¹⁵⁸ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 94–97, 5: 79–81.

¹⁵⁹ *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 269, 5: 216.

¹⁶⁰ *Sent. Anselmi* 2, p. 84; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 364–67, 5: 273–74. For the school of Laon on baptism, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 27–44.

¹⁶¹ Peter Abelard, *In Ep. Pauli ad Romanos* 5:9, CCCM 11: 164, 166, 170–72; Weingart, “Abailard's Contribution,” pp. 166–69.

on, even among Abelard's disciples. The author of the *Ysagoge in theologiam* is only willing to go as far as stressing the priority of faith over the objective efficacy of the rite in the case of adults who receive baptism by blood and by desire. In the case of infants, who lack faith, this condition does not obtain, in his view. It is less the faith of the elders or the efficacy of the rite itself that counts than God's decision to accept them, which can occur if they die unbaptized or are raised by non-believers.¹⁶²

Hugh of St. Victor launches another line of reflection on this subject, one based on source criticism. In treating the question of baptism by blood and by desire, he notes that authorities who support these ideas include Augustine but that Augustine hardened his position in the *Retractiones*. Faced with this conflict of Augustine against Augustine, the farthest Hugh is willing to go is to frame the problem in hypothetical terms. If a person could have perfect faith and charity without baptism, in a situation where it is impossible for him to receive it, it is not likely, in Hugh's opinion, that he would be condemned.¹⁶³ Hugh responds to the controversy on infant baptism by omitting that topic. Robert Pullen follows Hugh here, although only in part. He combines a reassertion of the Augustinian hard line on infant baptism and the need for adult baptizands to have faith with the exceptions of baptism by blood and by desire, citing not only Cornelius but the good thief on the cross received by Christ.¹⁶⁴ An equal effort to balance the unconditional necessity of infant baptism, yoking it to the objective efficacy of the sacrament in their case, with a willingness to make exceptions, in this case for baptism by desire, is found in Master Simon. But he is rather more repressive on the latter point than Robert or Hugh. Like the author of the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, he presents this exception as lying under the control of divine omnipotence but also as a privilege extended to biblical personages which is not the basis of a common rule.¹⁶⁵

Much bolder in pulling together the misgivings of theologians in this area, whether those aired by Abelard or those articulated by the school of Laon, are the Porretans and the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. The *Summa sententiarum* reprises the notion that, when baptism is correctly administered, infants receive both the sacrament and the matter of the sacrament without faith, although

¹⁶² *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 187–88.

¹⁶³ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.6.7, *PL* 176: 452A–454C.

¹⁶⁴ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 1.14, 5.17, *PL* 186: 702B–C, 843D–844B.

¹⁶⁵ Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 3–5, 9–10.

adults require faith; otherwise they receive the external sacrament only. Martyrs and those seeking baptism but prevented from receiving it receive the *res sacramenti* without the exterior rite. The author expressly rejects Augustine's exclusion of baptism by desire in his late work and thinks, regarding his own position, that it is proved by reason (*quod ratio probat*). He feels the same way concerning Augustine on infant baptism. Augustine's position, he argues, is not solidly grounded. "On this matter," he asserts, reprising William of Champeaux, "we have nothing definite" (*De quo nihil definitum habemus*). He cites the case of the Holy Innocents, who are believed to be saints, as an argument against the opposition. But he pulls back from asserting the contrary in a positive sense.¹⁶⁶

The Porretans, taking a cue from the Abelardians, go even farther. Their method is both to cite other, countervailing, authorities against the Augustinian hard line on infant baptism, and also to introduce another tactic, the citation of Augustine on predestination, against Augustine on the damnation of unbaptized infants, possibly as suggested by one of the *quaestiones* in Abelard's *Sic et non*. They agree that faith is necessary, in the case of adults, and that the faith of their elders meets this condition in the case of infants. Baptism by blood and by desire are fully acceptable, provided that no contempt of the sacrament is involved, in the case of those who love God. Cyprian and Ambrose are the chief alternative authorities here. The Porretan master who expounds this position most fully goes on to note that faith and martyrdom, which can suffice for adults, do not suffice for children, who are incapable of bearing witness. Unless, that is, pagans overrun a Christian city and infants are put to death before they can be baptized. Such infants, the master asserts, are saved "although this opinion has not been expressly given by the learned" (*licet non sit hoc a doctoribus expositum*). None the less, it is a valid opinion that these infants should be regarded as martyrs, baptized by blood, "as we believe of the Holy Innocents" (*sicut de innocentibus credimus*). The clinching argument, however, is the one derived from Augustine on predestination. God has chosen His elect, from all eternity, the master observes; and His decree of predestination does not change. God will, therefore, save His elect, whether baptized or not.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ *Summa sent.* 5.5–7, *PL* 176: 130B–C, 131B–133A. The quotations are at 5.5, 132B and 5.6, 133A, respectively.

¹⁶⁷ *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 187–88; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 7.6–7.7, 7.9–11, 7.19–20, 7.25, 7.28, pp. 148, 148–49, 150, 151, 152. The quotations are at 7.20, p. 150. Cf. Peter Abelard, *Sic et non* q. 106, ed. Blanche B. Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 343–46.

The independence of this line of thinking reflected by the theologians expressing discomfort with the Augustinian tradition on baptism can be better appreciated when we recognize the sternness of their contemporary opponents, who refused to budge one inch away from that tradition. This obduracy is found in canonists and theologians alike. The unconditional necessity of infant baptism, and the tendency to gloss over or omit exceptions, is found in Honorius Augustodunensis, Ivo of Chartres, and Gratian;¹⁶⁸ Roland of Bologna sums up this position by stating categorically that an unbaptized infant "is damned, without any doubt" (*procul dubio dampnatur*).¹⁶⁹ The toughest defense of this principle in our period, and one that also takes into account the claims made by opponents for baptism by blood and by desire and for the irrelevance of the sacrament for the elect, is indubitably the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*. No one, of whatever age, he asserts, can escape damnation without baptism. While he is willing to admit that baptism by blood and by desire may have saved some people, his tactic for undercutting this claim as an ongoing possibility is to historicize it or to treat it as a unique personal exemption. The martyrs, he points out, lived at the time of the *ecclesia primitiva*, an age when Christians were a persecuted minority group. Circumstances then differed markedly from the situation today. And so, he concludes, while baptism by blood may have been efficacious in the past, it is now irrelevant. As for the good thief on the cross, the salvation extended to him by Christ can be viewed as a unique case. The thief's situation makes him *sui generis*. Picking up on a point made by Master Simon, the author insists that the thief, like the martyrs, does not constitute a category of persons who can serve as models or as precedents for contemporary twelfth-century theory or practice. The author pointedly ignores adult catechumens as well, although his technique of historical relativization could have been used to deal with them as well. As for those who say that baptism cleanses only the elect, who, in any case, will be saved, the author argues that, even for the elect, their salvation depends on their own behavior.¹⁷⁰

Faced with this array of opinions, Peter Lombard aligns himself with the Victorine position, as articulated by the author of the

¹⁶⁸ Honorius, *Eluc.* 2.42–45, pp. 423–24; Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 1. c. 35, *PL* 161: 75D; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. c. 30. d. 4. c. 3–c. 7, c. 129, c. 132–c. 146, col. 1362–64, 1402–04, 1405–09.

¹⁶⁹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 209.

¹⁷⁰ *Sent. div.* 5.1, pp. 115*–17*, 122*–24*.

Summa sententiarum, while including some of the dimensions of the argument introduced by the *Ysagoge in theologiam* and the Porretans. He brings this constellation of ideas to bear on baptism by blood and by desire, which he defends strongly on the grounds of authority, reason, and theological appropriateness. On the other hand, he ignores the disquiet expressed by thinkers concerned with the Holy Innocents as a rationale for providing exceptions to the rule of infant baptism, while arriving at a defense of his own for the necessary and universal requirement of that practice. Peter begins with the distinction between the *sacramentum*, or external rite alone, the *res sacramenti*, or matter and effect of the sacrament alone, and the combination of the two, in the language common at this time, which had been articulated the most crisply to date in the *Summa sententiarum*. Infants, he continues, receive both the *sacramentum* and the *res*. All recipients are freed from original sin, although only those who are elect will be saved as well. Peter cites the late Augustine on this point, not for the purpose of confining salvation to the elect so much as to underscore the universality of the remission of original sin in baptism. Faith is not critical for infants, in Peter's view. For, infants who are not baptized cannot be saved even if the faith of the whole church supports them. In the case of infants, the efficacy of the sacrament is objective.¹⁷¹

In the case of adults, those who receive baptism without faith receive the *sacramentum* without the *res*. More than faith is required, he argues, if adults are to receive baptism efficaciously and fruitfully. They must come to the font with the sincere intention of abandoning a sinful way of life and any unfraternal or uncharitable attitudes they may harbor, in addition to assenting to the propositions in the creed. They must conform themselves to Christ in order to put on Christ in baptism. Those adults who receive the *res* without the *sacramentum* include the martyrs and those possessing faith and contrition whom necessity prevents from coming to the rite, although without contempt for it. On this point, Peter expressly acknowledges Augustine's change of opinion in the *Retractationes* and the objection to his later teaching raised by some contemporaries. He agrees with that objection. As for Augustine, Peter regards his retraction of the example of the good thief as an error on his part; according to the Lombard, the basic argument Augustine had made earlier concerning baptism by blood, which he had extended to baptism by desire, was a perfectly cogent one that

¹⁷¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 4. c. 1, c. 4.12, 2: 251–52, 259.

embraces both cases. So, his position in the *Retractationes* has to be read as a lapse, not as a correction. Not only does the earlier Augustine make sense on this point, so do other authorities; and “reason also supports it” (*ratio etiam id suadet*). For, as Peter sees it, if baptism alone suffices for infants, who are incapable of belief, how much the more does faith suffice for an adult who desires baptism when it is not available? We should, therefore, accept that baptism is necessary for salvation, but with this stipulation. For, to insist that baptism is required in all cases would be to constrain God’s power. Anticipating here what was later to be developed into a more elaborate distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power in the order of salvation, Peter concludes that, while God instituted baptism as the path to be followed by mankind in ordinary cases, He Himself is not bound by the order of salvation that He lays down for man; “His own power is not constrained by the sacraments” (*suam potentiam sacramentis non alligavit*).¹⁷²

Returning to infants and the importance of universal infant baptism, Peter adds a point that is an original opinion in defense of that practice. It is not only the objective efficacy of baptism in cleansing the infants of original sin that is critical, he observes, but also the grant of operating and cooperating grace which they receive at the same time. This grace will enable the infants, like adults, to gain access to a positive source of sanctification that will make it possible for them to develop virtue and merit when they reach the age of discretion. Peter harks back here to his definition of baptism as a sacrament with a double effect, that of imparting sanctifying grace as well as remitting sin. In the case of infants, to be sure, the grace remains latent in them until they are old enough to be able to accept it voluntarily and collaborate with it; until that time, it remains in them in a potential, not an active state (*in munere, non in usu*).¹⁷³

The whole question of the effects of baptism on the recipient was another debated issue, although not one as widely controverted as the matters just discussed. In this area, there were three contemporary opinions.¹⁷⁴ The school of Laon holds that baptism destroys

¹⁷² Ibid., c. 2–c. 4.10, 2: 252–58. The two quotations are at c. 4.8, p. 257 and c. 4.10, p. 258, respectively. For the positioning of Peter on these issues, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 2: 53–56, 130–34, although Landgraf accents too exclusively his Victorine sources and his desire to refute Abelard.

¹⁷³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 4. c. 7.5, 2: 262–63.

¹⁷⁴ Lottin, *Psych. et morale*, 4 part 1: 288–97, for the school of Laon, the Victorines, Abelard, and Peter Lombard. See also above, chapter 6, pp. 381–85 for contemporary views on the effects of original sin.

the guilt of original sin, although the effects of original sin, that is, mortality, concupiscence, and the inclination to sin, remain. The Porretans agree with this view, adding that baptism also removes the eternal punishment due for original sin.¹⁷⁵ Hugh of St. Victor agrees that the guilt of sin and eternal punishment are removed and that the suffering imposed by sin remains; he includes in the subsisting inclination to sin both ignorance and concupiscence. His disciples follow suit. Since he does not think infants are guilty of original sin and that they are not yet capable of actual sin, Abelard argues that there is no need for baptism to wash away a culpability that does not, in his opinion, exist. At the same time, he admits that unbaptized persons share the consequences of original sin, in the form of mortality and the inclination to sin. To be sure, his handling of original sin itself makes it difficult for him to explain why this should be the case. In any event, he holds that baptism removes the punishment for sin. Roland of Bologna agrees with Abelard.¹⁷⁶ On this subject, Peter Lombard takes a modified Victorine line. Baptism, he holds, cleanses us of original sin and, in the case of adults, actual sin as well, removing the guilt and eternal punishment they bring upon fallen man. He agrees that baptized persons retain the inclination to sin and that this inclination involves concupiscence and ignorance. At the same time, and here he departs from Hugh and his followers, the inclination to sin is weakened in people who have received baptism. The operating and cooperating grace which they receive at the same time strengthens them and makes them better able to resist temptation, so that the inclination to sin is now no longer as automatic or as compelling as it would have been otherwise. As well, the grace of baptism, in the case of recipients whose actual and original sins are removed thereby, may relax the temporal punishment due for such sins.¹⁷⁷ Compared with his contemporaries, Peter widens the scope of the healing and empowering effects of baptism.

There were several other controversies surrounding baptism in this period which were less acutely felt and which did not receive attention from every master. Two of them had to do with the

¹⁷⁵ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 7.1–4, pp. 146–47.

¹⁷⁶ Peter Abelard, *In Ep. Pauli ad Romanos* 5:9, CCCM 11: 164, 166, 170–72; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 203.

¹⁷⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 4. c. 4–c. 6, 2: 255–61. This position is also found in Peter's sermons. See Jean Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires des maîtres parisiens au XII^e siècle: Étude historique et doctrinale*, 2 vols. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1975), 1: 234.

administration of baptism and not with its basic theology; they are of interest as indices of how the participating masters used authority, or reason, or pastoral relevance, or liturgical symbolism, as a rationale for defending either their own desired departures from the tradition of the early church or their support for its practices. The subject of one of these controversies, single versus triple immersion, went back, as a debated question, to the patristic period. Augustine and Pope Leo I had required triple immersion, although the custom was not universal in the western church. In the sixth century, Leander, bishop of Seville, had signaled that fact by writing to Gregory the Great as pope and requesting a ruling on the practice. Gregory had recognized both the diversity of customs within the church and also the fact that single and triple immersion both have an edifying symbolic significance; the former signifies the unity of the deity and the latter signifies both the Trinity and the three days Christ lay in the tomb between His death and His resurrection, prefiguring the death to sin and the spiritual rebirth of the newly baptized Christian. In responding to Leander, Gregory does not require or rule out either practice, emphasizing that the unity of faith in the church is not obstructed by the diversity of baptismal custom. A fair number of the theologians who discuss this topic in the first half of the twelfth century advert to this Gregorian analysis, although they do not always put it to the same uses.

One can, to be sure, find supporters of triple immersion, such as the Laon masters, Hugh of St. Victor, the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, Master Simon, and Robert Pullen, who simply state that this is a required practice without referring to the contemporary debate, indicating support for the *triduum* symbolism where they can find it and saying nothing about, or to, the other side of the question.¹⁷⁸ Ivo of Chartres lists the pros and cons of both modes of administration while leaving the matter open, along Gregorian lines.¹⁷⁹ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* also invokes, and quotes, Gregory. He personally prefers triple immersion because he finds the *triduum* symbolism appealing. But his prime consideration is the principle that local custom ought to be followed.¹⁸⁰ On the other side of the debate, Roland of Bologna defends single immersion; he argues that, if triple immersion is used, it is on the first

¹⁷⁸ *Sent. Anselmi* 6, pp. 113–14; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.6.1–2, *PL* 176: 441D–447D; *Sent. div.* 5.1, pp. 118*–19*; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.10–12, 5.24, *PL* 186: 838B–840C, 847D–848A; Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 5.

¹⁷⁹ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 1. c. 130, *PL* 161: 914A–B.

¹⁸⁰ *Summa sent.* 5.4, *PL* 176: 130A–B.

immersion that the baptizand's sins are remitted. But he offers no reasons or authorities for that opinion.¹⁸¹ A much fuller rationale for single immersion is provided by the Porretans. Concerned with the susceptibility to chills of infants, who now constitute the majority of baptizands in the church, their overriding reason for abandoning Leo's rule is pastoral utility. But they do not let the matter rest just on that point. Their own patristic research indicates that the first ancient authority to rule on the matter was Cyprian. He imposed single immersion. How, then, did the church fathers and early popes justify a departure from that practice? The Porretan masters note that Augustine had cited Cyprian, and that, in so doing, he had garbled Cyprian's text, thus substituting triple for single immersion. And then, instead of cross-checking his sources, Leo had simply repeated Augustine's corruption of Cyprian in making his own ruling. In their own argument, the utility of citing Gregory the Great is that he provides both a history of baptismal practice in the primitive church and a way around both the triple immersion tradition and the local custom theory advanced by contemporary opponents. The Porretans' own quotation of Gregory, in their view, validates the sweeping away of the Leonine and Augustinian departures from "true" tradition so that it can be invoked as the rationale for universalizing single immersion.¹⁸² This daring exercise in source criticism finds, as a happy outcome, that the earliest authority, Cyprian, supports the conclusions which the masters want to reach, in any case. But, in the logic of their argument, it is less Cyprian's antiquity than his correctness that matters, from the Porretan standpoint, coupled with the fact that Cyprian and Gregory together can be used to show that the more widely held Augustinian and Leonine rulings are both based on faulty patristic research. As for the Lombard, he gives this debate, and the authorities used to support both sides of it, a full review. Along with many others, he cites Gregory's maxim about the diversity of custom and its lack of interference in the unity of faith. His position is closest to that of the *Summa sententiarum*. While he approves warmly of the *triduum* symbolism, and sees the more general shift in the church to the practice of triple immersion as hence desirable, he agrees that respecting local custom is the most important consideration, and the reason for maintaining both

¹⁸¹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 210.

¹⁸² *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 7.14, p. 149.

forms of baptismal initiation; other necessary conditions obtaining, the sacrament is valid either way.¹⁸³

There was another debate concerning the administration of baptism on which the Lombard does not feel inspired to take a stand, the question of when the sacrament should be administered. Ancient custom, as crystallized by Leo I and other early popes, required candidates for baptism to be received into the church on Easter or Pentecost Sunday, unless they were in danger of death. This ruling, and its congruity with the events in the life of Christ recalled by the Christian community on the great feasts of the resurrection liturgy, were duly noted and reinforced by a large number of masters in the first half of the twelfth century.¹⁸⁴ The chief opposition to this largely consensus view came from the school of Laon. Reflecting the same kind of pastoral concern which we have seen animating the Porretan defense of single immersion above, and which will also inform the Laon masters' view of the administration of the Eucharist below, their objection to the Easter-Pentecost rule is made with the needs of infants in mind. To be sure, the authorities were willing to waive this rule if the candidate were in danger of death. But, notes the Laon master who speaks to this point, the health of infants is very fragile, and they are unable to advertise the fact if they are in danger of death. Further, the church has a responsibility to minister as well to the anxieties of parents, who have a legitimate worry if their babies have to weather the hazards of their first winter without benefit of baptism. He accents the differences between the *ecclesia primitiva* and the present day here. Then, the majority of baptizands were adult converts. Their collective reception into the church on the great feasts of the Easter season was a source of group reinforcement for the struggling early Christian community and a powerful witness to the pagan society surrounding it. But now, he concludes, these conditions no longer obtain. For the sake of the current baptizands and their families, baptism should be administered whenever it is needed.¹⁸⁵ This argument is an authentic index of the pastoral considerations that often urged changes in sacramental practice in this period, as well as reflecting an authentic concern of

¹⁸³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 4. c. 7, 2: 249.

¹⁸⁴ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 1. c. 45–c. 58, *PL* 161: 79A–82B; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. c. 30. d. 4. c. 11–c. 18, col. 1364–67; *Sent. div.* 5.1, pp. 118*–19*; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 9, 13–14.

¹⁸⁵ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 371, 5: 275–76. See above, chapter 2, pp. 46–47.

current sacramental theology, the desire to remove impediments to the accessibility of sacramental grace, which twelfth-century masters often felt had been imposed too strictly in the early church. In this case, however, the Laon master finds himself swimming against the current. In the sequel, neither he nor the proponents of the majority view could look to Peter Lombard for support, for he does not take up this question.

The one remaining debate that he does enter on baptism is one that has neither a real theological nor a real pastoral significance. It was joined, by those who entered into it, more as a matter of biblical history. It was agreed that the sacrament of baptism was instituted personally by Christ. But when, in His career, did He do so?¹⁸⁶ Some masters, such as Anselm of Laon and Hermannus, ask this question only to review the options while making no personal determination.¹⁸⁷ Master Simon thinks that Christ instituted baptism when He told Nicodemus that rebirth through water and the Holy Spirit was required for salvation.¹⁸⁸ But Simon does not advert to the other positions taken on this subject, which received more support. Hugh of St. Victor and Roland of Bologna teach that the institution of baptism took place when Christ commissioned His apostles to baptize and to preach the Gospel in His name at Pentecost.¹⁸⁹ The majority view, and the one espoused by the Lombard, was the opinion that Christ instituted baptism at the time of His own baptism; here, he follows the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, the *Sententiae divinitatis*, and the *Summa sententiarum*. Peter thinks that Christ's speech to Nicodemus has something to be said for it as the moment of institution, but rules out the position taken by Hugh and Roland because he holds that baptism must have been instituted by Christ during His lifetime, and not after His resurrection. The preferability of Christ's own baptism to His response to Nicodemus as the key moment, in his view, lies in the fact that the name of the whole Trinity, a basic requirement of the verbal formula used in baptism since then, was first invoked at that time.¹⁹⁰

These constituted the issues controverted regarding baptism,

¹⁸⁶ For an introduction to the range of opinions on this point, see Weisweiler, intro. to his ed. of Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. lxxx–lxxxix.

¹⁸⁷ Anselm of Laon, *Sent. divine pagine*, p. 42; Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 120–24. On this point, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, p. 150.

¹⁸⁸ Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 3.

¹⁸⁹ Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 92–94.

¹⁹⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 4. c. 5, 2: 247.

and, as can be seen, they ranged from those directed to the essence of that sacrament, to those addressed to administration and liturgical practice, and to those that are relatively marginal. There were also a number of features of baptism on which all Christian thinkers agreed in the first half of the twelfth century and on which Peter joined his voice to the chorus without altering the consensus view. Under this heading we have the unrepeatability of baptism; baptism as a liturgical event composed of water as the sacramental medium, so chosen because of its general availability and cheapness and its symbolic resemblance to the *res sacramenti*, or the spiritual ablution it conveys, coupled with the correct invocation of the Trinity; the proper disposition and faith of the recipient with the stipulations regarding infants noted above; and the intention to baptize as the church intends, on the part of the minister. When these conditions are present, anyone can validly administer baptism, including a heretic, schismatic, non-believer, or lay person.¹⁹¹ The necessity of a proper baptismal intention in the minister rules out, for Peter as for everyone else the validity of baptisms that are fictive or done in jest. Peter acknowledges that a baptism will be valid, assuming a proper intention, if the minister garbles the verbal formula as a consequence of poor grammar or a slip of the tongue, so long as this misadventure does not bespeak a heretical intention or malice on his part. Here, he departs from the stricter rulings of some of the canonists. His model is the *Summa sententiarum*.¹⁹² In handling these standard points, Peter is fully aware of how the canonists treat them, especially Gratian. While he frequently finds himself in agreement with Gratian's conclusions, it is still to be noted that these two thinkers tend to pose the questions differently. Thus, while they agree that the virtue of the sacrament comes from Christ, and from the intentions of the minister and the recipient, Gratian accents the problem of whether a bad priest can validly confer the sacrament, while Peter approaches the instrumentality of the minister from the perspective of the idea that the gift of grace comes from God, not from man, and God's love and power cannot be obstructed by the shortcomings of the human ministers through whom He ordained its transmission. Finally,

¹⁹¹ Ibid., d. 3. c. 1–c. 4, c. 6, d. 5–d. 6. c. 2, c. 5, 2: 243–47, 248–49, 263–69, 272–74. Ludwig Ott, *Untersuchung zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik*, Beiträge, 34 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1937), p. 160, draws some comparisons between Peter and other theologians but ignores the canonists.

¹⁹² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 6. c. 4, 2: 272; cf. *Summa sent.* 5.9, *PL* 176: 135C–136A.

other consensus topics which Peter addresses are the point that the ceremonies preceding and accompanying baptism, the appointment of godparents, the exorcisms, and the requests of the parents, while decorous and appropriate, are not of the essence in baptism, as well as the point that an infant cannot be baptized in the womb, following, as everyone else does, Augustine's opinion that, in order to be reborn in baptism, one must first be born. In both cases, he follows most closely the language as well as the conclusions of the *Summa sententiarum*.¹⁹³

There are, finally, a few issues which other thinkers mention but which, like the time of baptism, Peter ignores. Some are raised by only one master. Thus, the author of one of the Porretan sentence collections forbids the alarming possibility that people might baptize a baby by throwing him in a well, lest he be hurt or killed.¹⁹⁴ The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* raises and rejects the possibility that a person can baptize himself.¹⁹⁵ He also notes that, in the *ecclesia primitiva*, thirty to forty days of penance were required of adult converts prior to their baptism, and queries this practice, given the fact that baptism washes away all sin. He concludes that, while unnecessary, the custom was useful in helping to promote the intention of the conversion needed for a fruitful reception of the sacrament by an adult. The *Summa sententiarum* reviews the same argument and comes down on the other side of it, agreeing with Augustine that this penance should not be required.¹⁹⁶ The matter of conditional baptism is also aired by a few thinkers. The Porretan master thinks that, if there is any doubt at all as to whether a person has been baptized, one should go ahead and baptize him; the necessity of baptism for salvation, in his view, is more important than the canonical non-repeatability of the sacrament. On the other hand, Master Simon points ahead to later usage, by suggesting that a conditional baptism be performed in such a case, and by offering a formula for that purpose.¹⁹⁷ An item that is taken up more widely, and by Peter as well, but more typically under the heading of conditions that nullify or impede a marriage, is the question of the continuing validity of the marriage of a couple who baptize

¹⁹³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 6. c. 3, c. 6–c. 7, 2: 270–72, 274–76; cf. *Summa sent.* 5.4, 5.12, *PL* 176: 129C–D, 136D–138A.

¹⁹⁴ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 7.24, p. 151.

¹⁹⁵ *Sent. div.* 5.1, p. 121*. Weisweiler, *ibid.*, n. 1, notes that he is the only theologian of the time to raise this question.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 113*–15*; *Summa sent.* 5.5, *PL* 176: 130D.

¹⁹⁷ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 7.21, p. 150; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 15–16.

their infant in a circumstance of necessity, thus standing as godparents as well as parents to the child and contracting a condition of spiritual affinity. Both Master Simon and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* agree that such a situation does not automatically nullify the marriage. The latter author observes that there are decretals on both sides of this matter and indicates that he finds the more lenient position to be the more acceptable one.¹⁹⁸

The Lombard is more concerned with engaging in reflection and debate on issues that he finds more central to the theology of baptism. He is not interested in the details of the ministry of the sacrament from the standpoint of canonical rules and regulations and their administrative corollaries. He is interested in what makes the sacrament valid, but largely from the perspective of the capacity of the valid sacrament to serve as an efficacious channel of God's grace to the recipient and as a condition of his fruitful reception of it. Both in his affirmation of the points on which consensus reigned and in the choices and contributions he makes in debated areas, he seeks to strike a balance between the principle of intentionality and the principle of the objective efficacy of baptism. He is incisive in distinguishing definitively between the precursors of Christian baptism and the baptism instituted by Christ, with only the latter justifying its recipient and putting him on the path to salvation. For Peter, the grace imparted by baptism is more than the spiritual ablution that washes away sin and remits the punishment that mankind would otherwise bear for it. Baptism, as well, conveys the operating and cooperating grace and the mitigation of the inclination to sin which still afflicts the human race. With this grace, and the weakening of the grip of ignorance and concupiscence on him, man can now make a new beginning. Baptism, for Peter, is hence a true rebirth, a renewal of the mind (*innovatio mentis*),¹⁹⁹ which cleanses, heals, and strengthens the recipient and arms him with the grace with which, latently in infants and immediately in adults, he can work voluntarily as he moves ahead into the Christian life. Altogether, Peter is far less interested in the social and ecclesiological dimensions of baptism than he is in its function as the hinge on which the capacity to grow in virtue and sanctification turns in the inner life of the individual Christian. The more corporative

¹⁹⁸ Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 8–9; *Summa sent.* 5.10, *PL* 176: 136B. Weisweiler, intro. to his ed. of Master Simon, pp. xci–xcii, is therefore incorrect in claiming that Simon is the only author to air this question at the time.

¹⁹⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 3. c. 9, 2: 251.

aspects of the sacramental life he reserves for his discussion of some of the other sacraments. But baptism, for him, is a rather more strictly personal event.

Confirmation

Much the same can be said for Peter's understanding of confirmation. This sacrament evoked little attention in the first half of the twelfth century and inspired few controversies. Those that did arise give the appearance of having attracted only a half-hearted interest. There are several points on which all the masters agree. The sacrament of confirmation, they concur, was instituted to strengthen the recipient in the battle against sin; it must be administered by a bishop; and it is not repeatable. There are also a few areas in which they disagree, or where they give the subject a different emphasis.²⁰⁰ The question of when and by whom the sacrament was instituted does not elicit wide interest. The masters who raise it, Simon, Roland of Bologna, and the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, assert that confirmation was instituted by Christ, Roland adding that He did so when He imparted the Holy Spirit to His apostles at Pentecost.²⁰¹ The Laon masters dissent from the view that confirmation remits sin, describing its effects, rather, as the communication of grace as a gift of the Holy Spirit; the Abelardian *Sententiae Parisiensis* I, Hugh of St. Victor, and the *Summa sententiarum* agree that the sacrament is a gift of the Holy Spirit.²⁰² Roland, the Porretans, and Master Simon see its effects as a combination of the gift of the Holy Spirit and the remission of venial sin.²⁰³ It is agreed that confirmation should be administered after baptism, but how much later was disputed. Some authors,

²⁰⁰ Heinrich Weisweiler, "Das Sakrament der Firmung in den systematischen Werken der ersten Frühscholastik," *Scholastik* 8 (1933): 481–523 provides the only existing overview. He considers only the debates over the age at which confirmation should be administered and by whom it was instituted. On the latter point, p. 483, he is in error in stating that Roland of Bologna held that confirmation was instituted by the apostles. For the patristic background on confirmation, see Franz X. J. Dölger, *Das Sakrament der Firmung, historisch-dogmatisch dargestellt* (Vienna: Mayer & Co., 1906), pp. 1–156.

²⁰¹ Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 18; *Sent. div.* 5.2, p. 126*; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 212.

²⁰² *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 372, 374, 5: 276–77; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 40; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.7.6, *PL* 176: 462C; *Summa sent.* 6.1, *PL* 176: 137C–139A. For the school of Laon on confirmation, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 44–47.

²⁰³ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 213; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 8.1–3, p. 153; Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 21.

such as Gratian and Simon, are not specific on the point.²⁰⁴ Some, like Roland and the author of the *Sententiae Parisiensis* I, reflecting the Abelardian stress on intentionality, emphasize that the recipient should be an adult, or at least that he should have reached the age of discretion.²⁰⁵ Robert Pullen contradicts himself on this point, saying that confirmation should be given "to children in their childhood" (*parvuli in parvitate*) and then supporting the view that candidates must have attained the age of discretion.²⁰⁶

Aside from the recipient's age, few masters display an interest in any of the other of the conditions or dispositions that he should bring to the reception of confirmation. The school of Laon teaches that he should approach it without sins on his conscience;²⁰⁷ but for Master Simon, Gratian, the Porretans, and the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, the only consideration mentioned is that he should come to the sacrament fasting.²⁰⁸ Most of the same masters are concerned with the condition of the ministering bishop, and agree that he, too, should be fasting, a view in which they are joined by Hugh of St. Victor and the *Ysagoge in theologiam*. Predictably, the author who devotes most of his attention to the technical aspects of administration is Gratian.²⁰⁹ There is a fair degree of vagueness as to which aspect of the sacrament constitutes its physical medium. Most authors ignore this issue. Among those who do not, the author of the *Summa sententiarum* states that the *sacramentum* is the bishop's laying on of hands; but Hugh of St. Victor thinks that it is the unction used in the rite while the Porretans locate the *sacramentum* in both the unction and the laying on of hands.²¹⁰ There is wide support for the view that confirmation is not a sacrament of necessity, although it should not be neglected on that account. But the school of Laon and the *Sententiae divinitatis* depart from that consensus, the latter qualifying the point by conceding that confirmation is not required in the case of a baptized infant.²¹¹ There is

²⁰⁴ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. d. 5. c. 1–c. 2, col. 1413; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 18–20.

²⁰⁵ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 214; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 40.

²⁰⁶ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.23, *PL* 186: 847A–B.

²⁰⁷ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 374, 5: 276–77.

²⁰⁸ Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 21; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. d. 5. c. 3–c. 12, col. 1413–15; *Sent. mag. Gislebert* I 8.4, p. 153; *Sent. div.* 5.2, p. 128*.

²⁰⁹ Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 21; *Sent. div.* 5.2, p. 128*; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.7.1–6, *PL* 176: 459C–462C; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. d. 5. c. 3–c. 12, col. 1413–15. For Hugh on this sacrament, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 94–96.

²¹⁰ *Summa sent.* 6.1, *PL* 176: 137C; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.7.1–6, *PL* 176: 459C–462C; *Sent. mag. Gislebert* I 8.1–3, p. 153.

²¹¹ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 372, 374, 5: 276–77; *Sent. div.* 5.2, p. 127*.

also some dissent from the more generally held view that confirmation is less important than baptism. Both the author of the *Sententiae Parisiensis* I, the Porretans, and Robert Pullen think that confirmation is greater in dignity because of the higher rank of the administering clergyman. Robert adds that its greater dignity lies as well in its effects, using as an analogy the point that the regime for training an athlete is better than one that merely cures an illness.²¹² Two other themes surface, of a more idiosyncratic nature. Predictably, Hugh of St. Victor devotes much attention to Old Testament parallels of confirmation, getting rather confused in comparing it with assorted forms of unction that are also used in other Christian rites, and adding that the confirmand should not wash off the oil until seven days have passed, in honor of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.²¹³ And Roland of Bologna uses the agreed-on point concerning episcopal administration to expatiate on the need to revamp ancient practices on the basis of the differing historical circumstances in the present. In the *ecclesia primitiva*, he notes, citing the pertinent decretals, it was acceptable to waive the requirement of episcopal administration and to concede it to priests, because, in a missionary church with widely scattered Christian communities, a bishop might not be easily available. But, since nowadays this problem no longer exists (*quae hodie locum non habent*), the earlier dispensation should be rejected.²¹⁴

Peter Lombard does not address all the issues aired by contemporaries in connection with confirmation. He is not interested, for instance, in the age of the recipient, the time and agency of the sacrament's institution, or the condition of the ministering clergyman.²¹⁵ Although other masters of the time serve as his source for the idea that the *sacramentum* in each case involves words, deeds, and a material medium, Peter is more consistent than his contemporaries in adhering to this rule for confirmation. For him, the external medium combines the words of the bishop, the chrism he applies to the confirmand's forehead, and the sign of the cross with which he signs him. Peter joins Roland of Bologna, Master Simon, and the Porretans in seeing the effect of the sacrament as both the remission of sins and the gift of the Holy Spirit. He is more flexible than Roland in conceding that a priest may administer

²¹² *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 40; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 8.2, p. 153; Robert Pullen, 5.23, *PL* 186: 847B.

²¹³ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.1.6, *PL* 176: 462C.

²¹⁴ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 214.

²¹⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 7, 2: 276–80 for the entire treatise on confirmation.

confirmation if a bishop is lacking, and sees the ancient dispensations as retaining a continuing utility. He agrees with the standard consensus view concerning the ordinary episcopal ministry, the non-repeatability of confirmation, and its strengthening function, and joins the majority in disallowing the claim that it is more dignified than baptism, arguing that those who make this argument have confused the rank of the minister, whose role is purely instrumental in any case, with the effects of the sacrament and its relative necessity for salvation. All told, the strongest impression Peter's handling of this sacrament makes is his desire to avoid strictures that might impede its availability, his desire to make his account of confirmation conform to the guidelines he erects for the consideration of sacraments in general, and his affirmation of the broad view of its effects, as encompassing a remedial as well as a sanctifying and strengthening component.

The Eucharist

If confirmation received comparatively little attention in this period and if the debates it inspired seem to have been less than earthshaking in the eyes of the participants, the same cannot be said of the Eucharist. The Eucharist attracted considerable attention in the first half of the twelfth century, and with excellent reason. All orthodox Christian thinkers at the time warmly endorsed the words of the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, who elevated the Eucharist above all other sacraments as worthy of reverence "because, while in the other sacraments grace alone is given, in this one not only is grace given but also the giver of graces" (*quia cum in aliis sacramentis sola gratia detur, in isto non solum gratia, sed etiam dator gratiarum*).²¹⁶ The theological principle affirmed here was matched, in this period, by a surge of Eucharistic devotion in popular piety and mystical experience, one that would continue to flourish in the following centuries.²¹⁷ This fascination with the Eucharist is a genuine case of how the convergence between religious devotion and theological speculation helped to direct the

²¹⁶ *Sent. div.* 5.3, p. 128*; the same sentiment is expressed on p. 129*. The language of the *Summa sent.* 6.2, *PL* 176: 139B comes very close to this: "In hoc enim sacramento non solum gratia, sed ille a quo est omnis gratia sumitur."

²¹⁷ The best treatment of this subject, which integrates the history of theology with that of popular Eucharistic piety, is Gary Macy, *The Theologies of the Eucharist in the Early Scholastic Period: A Study of the Salvific Function of the Sacrament according to the Theologians c. 1080–c. 1220* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

course of twelfth-century Christian thought. Aside from its appeal both to the learned and the unlearned, the Eucharist demanded attention because of the sharply felt need to defend it against anti-sacramental heretics and against those who denied the real presence doctrine. The terms of this debate had been shaped in the late eleventh century by Berengar of Tours and antagonists of Berengar such as Lanfranc of Canterbury. Whether or not they traced their genealogy back to Berengar in the full doctrinal sense, more recent heretics of a similar persuasion found his formulation of the issues and the dossier of authorities he had assembled to support his case to be of continuing utility. So, perforce, did their orthodox opponents.²¹⁸ Given their concerted interest in defending and promoting the importance of the Eucharist in the Christian life, both canonists and theologians, in the backwash of the contemporary Gregorian reform movement, also sought to clarify the conditions required for a valid administration of the sacrament, on the part of priests who might be unworthy, heretical, schismatic, or excommunicated, as well as the differential efficacy of the sacrament upon recipients who might bring heterodox and not orthodox understandings of the Eucharist to their reception of it. Likewise, the Berengarian controversy reimported into the arena topics that had tended to remain in abeyance since the Carolingian period, such as what happens if a consecrated host is accidentally dropped on the ground, vomited by a recipient who is ill, or eaten by an animal.²¹⁹ These, like virtually all the debates about the Eucharist raised by the masters of the first half of the twelfth century, derive from the conviction of the truth of the real presence doctrine. It is either the desire to expound that doctrine more persuasively to those who rejected it or the felt need to address questions that arise within the orthodox consensus given the belief in the real presence that set the contemporary agenda on the Eucharist.

The belief that the physical elements of bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ when the celebrant utters the words of consecration, echoing the personal institution of the Eucharist by Christ at the Last Supper, coupled with the principle of concomitance, or the full presence of both the body and the blood of Christ

²¹⁸ For Berengar's continuing influence, see Häring, "Berengar's Definitions," pp. 109–46; Macy, "Berengar's Legacy," pp. 49–67, "Of Mice and Manna: *Quid mus sumit* as a Pastoral Question," *RTAM* 58 (1991): 157–66; *The Banquet's Wisdom*, pp. 76–84.

²¹⁹ Macy, "Berengar's Legacy," pp. 55–67; "Of Mice and Manna," pp. 157–66. See also Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 2: 207–22.

in either of the two consecrated species, serves as the consensus position on which the theologians and canonists ground their differences of opinion and differences of emphasis in other areas of Eucharistic theology and practice.²²⁰ It is the real presence of Christ that the Eucharist transmits, they agree. But, how best to respond to Berengar's efforts to reduce this claim to absurdity by posing objections such as the notion that Christ's body, as a finite physical entity, would be affected by repeated Eucharistic celebrations, damaged by the fraction of the host during the mass, or by the chewing and swallowing and digestion of the elements by the recipient, or physically added to, if repeated consecrations repeatedly convert more bread and wine into more of Christ's body and blood? Orthodox thinkers are unanimous in rejecting all these assertions; yet, they differ on the best way to go about refuting them.

One idea, inherited from Lanfranc's side of the debate, acknowledges that these problems would be insuperable if it were, indeed, Christ's historical body that was communicated in the Eucharist.²²¹ Orthodox thinkers could and did respond that this is not the body of Christ now given in communion, but rather the resurrected body of Christ, incorruptible and not subject to physical containment, growth, or diminution. Still, which body did Christ give to His disciples at the Last Supper? Was it His mortal or His immortal body? Some masters, such as Anselm of Laon, William of Champeaux, Ivo of Chartres in his *Panormia*, Hugh of St. Victor, and Master Simon, seize on the advantages offered by the doctrine that communion conveys Christ's resurrected body and argue that He gave this same resurrected body, which Christians now receive in the Eucharist, to His disciples at the Last Supper.²²² William

²²⁰ Macy, *Theologies*, passim and esp. pp. 1–17 for a fine review of the previous literature on this subject; Walter Dürig, "Die Scholastiker und die Communio sub una specie," in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten*, ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungmann (Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), 2: 864–75; James J. Megivern, *Concomitance and Communion: A Study in Eucharistic Doctrine and Practice* (Fribourg: The University Press, 1963), pp. 36–47. Collectively, the work of these scholars corrects and supersedes all earlier accounts, such as Joseph de Ghellinck, "Eucharistie au XII^e siècle en occident," in *DTC* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1913), 5: 1233–1302; Josef Geiselmann, *Die Eucharistielehre der Vorscholastik* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1926); Josef A. Jungmann, *The Mass of the Roman Rite*, trans. Francis A. Brunner (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1955), 2: 385–86.

²²¹ Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchieri [Fumagalli] and Massimo Parodi, *Storia della filosofia medievale da Boezio a Wyclif* (Bari: Laterza, 1989), pp. 136–42.

²²² *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 26, 62; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 274, 5: 27, 55–56, 219; Ivo of Chartres, *Panormia* 1.134, PL 161: 1075B; Hugh of St.

responds to an objection that can be raised against this position, about which Hugh also worries: How can Christ's resurrected body be available before He received it, after suffering and dying on the cross? William's answer is that this was quite possible, in the same way that Christ could manifest His future glorified body in His transfiguration, while He was still alive. But Roland of Bologna uses this same point about the transfiguration as an argument for the countervailing view that Christ, by means of a miracle, gave His mortal body to His disciples, although without dismembering or destroying it, just as the transfiguration did not prevent Christ from continuing to possess the mortal body in which He completed the rest of His life and met His death. Robert Pullen agrees with this conclusion but manifests no awareness of the physical difficulties which it entails. He emphasizes the point that, whichever body Christ gave to His disciples, it was a miracle either way.²²³ Ivo of Chartres, in his *Decretum*, appears to be groping toward an answer of this sort, in the statement that the body Christ gave His disciples was the one He currently possessed, although this has to be understood in a spiritual sense.²²⁴ On the other hand, one of the Porretan sentence collectors seeks to split the difference between these two positions. Acknowledging that the theory that Christ gave to His disciples the body He possessed at the time of the Last Supper has the support of Augustine, he argues against it by making a distinction. The body of Christ had two physical modes, he asserts. It was immortal by nature and mortal by will. This natural immortality is something for which he offers no explanation. In any event, the master concludes that what Christ gave his disciples was the immortal body.²²⁵ The Abelardians tend to hold themselves aloof from this problem. Hermannus and the author of *Sententiae Parisiensis* I raise the question and refrain from answering it.²²⁶

Even more taxing and fraught with metaphysical problems which theologians before the reception of Aristotle were ill equipped to handle was the vital issue of explaining how the change of

Victor, *De sac.* 2.8.3, *PL* 176: 462D–464C; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 31, 38–40. Anselm's position is reported incorrectly by Ludwig Hödl, "Sacramentum und res-Zeichen und Bezeichnetes: Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Arbeit zum fröhscholastischen Eucharistietraktat," *Scholastik* 38 (1963): 161–70.

²²³ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 218–21; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 8.4, *PL* 186: 964C–965C.

²²⁴ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 2. c. 5, *PL* 161: 140C–142C.

²²⁵ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.59, p. 143.

²²⁶ Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 123–31; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 43. On Hermannus's treatment of the Eucharist, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 50–51.

the elements into the body and blood of Christ takes place. In some respects this topic offers a parallel with the contemporary problem of theological language. But, in Eucharistic theology the problem is more a question of the period's lack of a philosophical and scientific vocabulary precise enough and generally accepted enough with which to clarify the nature of the change and the metaphysical anomaly which it entails. While some of the thinkers who take a stand on this vexed question use terms such as *substantia*, which have a specific sense in Aristotelian philosophy, others do not. Even when the masters use Aristotelian-sounding language, they do not always give to *substantia* the technical meaning that it has in Peripatetic terms. And, while the term "transsubstantiation" does occur in this period, it does not have the denotation which it had acquired by the time of the fourth Lateran council in the usage of the master who employs it.²²⁷

Easily the most nebulous of the theologians who tackle the change in the elements is Anselm of Laon. He states, merely, that the species remain, although the substance changes into the body and blood of Christ. He neither defines the terms he uses nor displays an interest in explaining how this change occurs. The same laconic type of statement is made by William of Champeaux, and Roland of Bologna follows his lead.²²⁸ Another member of the school of Laon claims that the *res sacramenti*, that is, the body and blood of Christ, cannot be separated from the *sacramentum*, or physical medium. This rather unclear statement is as far as he tries to go; he remarks, simply, that the change is a miracle which defies explanation.²²⁹ Alger of Liège likewise says that the substance changes while the species remain, a process that transcends reason.²³⁰ Gratian is also convinced of the reality of the change but

²²⁷ A good sense of the overall terminological issues is provided by Ludwig Hödl, "Der Transsubstantiationsbegriff in der scholastischen Theologie des 12. Jahrhundert," *RTAM* 31 (1964): 230–59. Both Hödl and Hans Jorissen, *Die Entfaltung der Transsubstantiationslehre bis zum Beginn der Hochscholastik* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1965), pp. 4–7 state that the term *transsubstantio* was not used until the late twelfth century. In this claim they are, lexically, incorrect; although they are correct in noting that the use of this term in the same sense as it was given when written into orthodox theology by Lateran IV does not appear in the first half of that century.

²²⁸ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 25, 62; *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 272–73, 5: 28–29, 62, 518; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 221–29. For a useful survey of discussions of the change in the Eucharistic elements in this period, see Damien Van den Eynde, "William of Saint-Thierry and the Author of the *Summa Sententiarum*," *FS* 10 (1950): 252–56.

²²⁹ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 375, 5: 277–78.

²³⁰ Alger of Liège, *De misericordia* 1.48, 1.16–62, pp. 224, 235–36.

is vague on how to account for it. His principal concern here, and the one point which he feels he is able to determine with precision, is when the change occurs, at the time of the consecration.²³¹ The Abelardian authors of the *Sententiae Parisiensis* I and *Ysagoge in theologiam* agree that the change occurs and are more interested in considering why this is the case than how. Their answer is that the body and blood of Christ retain the physical attributes of bread and wine so that the sensibilities of recipients will not be offended.²³² Master Simon describes the change as a change in substance (*commutatio substantie*) which leaves the accidents intact, and presents this position as if it were non-problematic.²³³

On the other hand, Hugh of St. Victor, the Porretans, the *Sententiae divinitatis*, the *Summa sententiarum*, and Robert Pullen reflect a more circumspect effort to come to grips with the change in the elements, wrestling manfully with the difficulties which, they acknowledge, the orthodox teaching presents. Of these five masters, Hugh, Robert, and the Porretans are particularly bedevilled by the imprecision and inconstancy of their chosen lexicons.²³⁴ Hugh notes that the Eucharist is made up of its visible appearance (*species*), on the one hand, and, on the other, of the real body and blood of Christ and the spiritual grace which its reception imparts to communicants. This sacramental *substantia* replaces the substance of bread and wine when the elements are consecrated. Hugh agrees that the species of bread and wine remain intact. He recognizes that it is difficult to see what these species now inhere in, and describes the change of substance very loosely as a transition (*mutatio*). His chief concern is to make the point that, although the grace conveyed by the sacrament makes use of a transitory physical medium which is swiftly assimilated into the recipient's digestive tract, its spiritual effects endure beyond the moment of his physical intake of the elements.²³⁵

The Porretans are also concerned with the idea that the physical elements are assimilated according to a different timetable than their spiritual content. One master holds that the body and blood of Christ remain united to the consecrated bread and wine so long

²³¹ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. d. 2. c. 35–c. 42, col. 1324–29.

²³² *Sent. Parisiensis* 1, p. 43; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 200–07.

²³³ Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 30.

²³⁴ This point has been noted, à propos of Hugh, by Mignon, *Les origines*, 2: 171–79; Heinz Robert Schlette, "Die Eucharistielehre Hugos von St. Viktor," *ZkT* 81 (1949): 170–76.

²³⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.8.7–9, 2.8.13, *PL* 176: 466C–468C, 470B–471C.

as these elements retain the distinguishable species of bread and wine. Once they lose those traits in the recipient's digestive process, he assimilates the species like other food while he retains the union with Christ spiritually. The master's analysis of how the change in the elements comes about deploys a vocabulary that is unique to him. He distinguishes between essence and substance in the sacrament. He uses the term *substantia* in a very un-Aristotelian way. The *substantia* of the elements, he states, does not change; it is, rather, their essence that changes. Substance, for him, means the perceptible, physical aspects of the bread and wine. There is no *transsubstantio*, he argues, because these visible, tangible features of the consecrated species remain in them, unchanged. Equating substance with species in the Eucharist, he concludes that it is the essence which changes, not the substance (*mutantur secundum proprietatem essentie tantum et non secundum substantiam subiectam*). His reason for equating substance with species in the consecrated elements is that there can be no accidents unless they have a substance in which to inhere, a position which simultaneously distinguishes substance from accidents and identifies them with each other. The master's chosen formula also fails to explain how a substance subtending accidents is different from an essence, in his usage.²³⁶

Unclear and inconsistent language also haunts Robert Pullen's handling of this subject. On the one hand, he states that the *substantia* of the elements changes, although the form (*forma*) of bread and wine remains the same. Alternatively, he states that the *substantia* changes, although the properties (*proprietates*) of the bread and wine do not. Yet again, he says that the *substantia* changes, although the natural qualities (*qualitates naturae*) of the bread and wine are unaltered. Without offering definitions of any of these terms, Robert appears to think that these three statements are equivalent or synonymous; he does not acknowledge the diverse metaphysical significance which they may have.²³⁷

A much more energetic effort to pinpoint the issue is found in the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum*. The author of the first of these works indicates a clear-eyed awareness of the problem involved in the Eucharistic change, which he describes as a change in substance without a change in accidents. He understands these terms in an Aristotelian sense. He begins by distinguishing this

²³⁶ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.19–21, 4.23–24, 4.46, pp. 135–36, 136, 141. The quotations are at 4.19, p. 135.

²³⁷ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 8.9, *PL* 186: 966D–977A.

kind of change from a change in accidents only, which does not bring with it a change in substance. Examples he cites to illustrate the latter case are the change of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt and the change of water into ice crystals. He is fully conscious of the difficulty in explaining how the accidents of bread and wine can remain when the substance in which they formerly inhered has been changed into a different substance. He poses the question lucidly and admits that he can find no philosophical answer to it, falling back on the idea that the Eucharist involves a supernatural miracle parallel with the miraculous mode of Christ's birth. Beyond this, and the affirmation that the change does take place, he feels he can say no more (*non amplius potest dici*); he agrees with the Abelardians that the reason for the change is so that the reception of the Eucharist will not be offensive, while adding that it is a test of faith which brings merit to those who perceive the true body and blood of Christ in the visible species of bread and wine.²³⁸ The *Summa sententiarum* makes essentially the same points, although without the analysis of change from one accidental mode to another. The author agrees that the *substantia* of the bread and wine changes into Christ's resurrected body and blood and that this event parallels the miraculous conception of His historical body. Manifesting the same interest in why the elements retain the sensible appearance of bread and wine after the consecration, and giving the same answer as the Abelardians and the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* to that question, he poses clearly the metaphysical difficulty which this doctrine entails. The accidents of bread and wine remain, he concludes, although they no longer have the substance of bread and wine in which to inhere (*et ut praeter substantiam*). He, too, is able to pose the problem crisply, a problem which he understands in Aristotelian terms, and to admit that he lacks an explanation of the change, in those same terms.²³⁹

To the extent that progress is made on the matter of the Eucharistic change in the period just prior to Peter Lombard, the most that can be said is that the thinkers who discuss it move from the position that this article of faith should be restated but that it cannot be explained to the position that it must be posed in Aristotelian language and that the resources of philosophy currently available do not make possible an account of the change which

²³⁸ *Sent. div.* 5.3, pp. 131*–33*. The quotation is on pp. 131*–32*.

²³⁹ *Summa sent.* 6.4, *PL* 176: 141A–D. The quotation is at 141A. On this point, see Van den Eynde, "William of Saint-Thierry," pp. 241–56.

the theologians see as required, and imperatively so. On these major issues surrounding the real presence doctrine, the Lombard comes the closest to the views of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum*, particularly in his adherence to an Aristotelian vocabulary. On the other hand, in the debate over which body Christ gave to His disciples at the Last Supper, his closest immediate forerunner is Roland of Bologna. Peter's own account of the change of the Eucharistic elements uses language that reproves the terminology of Robert Pullen and the Porretans. The change in the Eucharist, he affirms, is a change in substance. The change cannot be a formal change, he notes, because the species of bread and wine are retained in those elements after the consecration. As for the claim that a change in substance is not the same thing as a change in essence, Peter expressly takes it up and rejects it. He also denies that support of this notion entails acceptance of the idea that all the Eucharists celebrated over time add new substance to Christ's historical body, since the body of Christ with which Christians have dealings in the Eucharist is His immortal, impassible, resurrected body, which can neither be enlarged, subdivided, or broken by the celebration and reception of the sacrament. As to the mode of existence of the accidents of bread and wine which remain after the change, Peter considers a range of opinions. Some say that these accidents continue to exist, even though they no longer possess a material substratum (*preiacentem materiam*) in which to inhere. They exist, anyway, inhering in nothing. Others think that the change in the elements is not total, and that enough of the bread and wine remains to provide a metaphysical foundation for the accidents of bread and wine. This latter view, he points out, is refuted by the authorities who say that the change is full and complete. Having ruled out the second opinion on these grounds, Peter is left with the first position cited.²⁴⁰ He is not entirely happy with it, but he has clearly benefited from the way in which the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum* have posed the problem. He agrees that, normally, accidents cannot exist unless they inhere in a subject. At the same time, these particular accidents cannot inhere in the body and blood of the resurrected Christ. Peter thus comes to the conclusion that "these accidents remain, subsisting by themselves" (*Remanent ergo illa accidentia per se subsistentia*), attached

²⁴⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 8. c. 4, d. 10, d. 11. c. 1-c. 2, d. 12. c. 2-c. 3, 2: 282, 290, 296-97, 304-05.

to no substance.²⁴¹ Peter acknowledges the fact that this position is a metaphysical anomaly. The most that can be said about his handling of the topic of the Eucharistic change is that he articulates the problem and presents its difficulties more sharply than does anyone else in this period. And, like the masters who serve as his immediate models, he reflects the increasing tendency of mid-twelfth-century theology to conceptualize this question in Aristotelian terms, with Aristotelian meanings attached to the vocabulary used in this context. If Peter recognizes the metaphysical problem attached to the position he takes on the Eucharistic change, however, the same cannot be said of his espousal of the relatively unpopular view that it was His mortal and passible body that Christ gave to His disciples at the Last Supper.²⁴² The main point he wants to make here is that this mode of Eucharistic communion was no more or less efficacious, for the apostles, than the Eucharistic reception of Christ's resurrected body is for later Christians. But, uncharacteristically, Peter makes no attempt to acknowledge the difficulties, difficulties already in circulation since the time of Berengar of Tours, which this doctrine bears in its train; nor does he attempt to refute the opposing view.

The two debates concerning the real presence just discussed constitute the weightiest speculative controversies raised in connection with the Eucharist in this period. They both remained unresolved in the immediate sequel, pending the arrival of the richer philosophical resources on which the orthodox formulations later to develop could be grounded. There were also other aspects of the sacrament of the Eucharist which provoked disagreement, even though they were less philosophically intractable in mid-twelfth-century terms. It was agreed by all that, for the sacrament to be fruitfully received, the communicant had to approach it with the right intention and with a belief in the real presence. Yet, not all contemporary masters agreed on the kind of efficacy the sacrament had for different kinds of human recipients, and, indeed, subhuman ones as well. Debate also centered on the mode of administration of the Eucharist and the conditions empowering the minister to consecrate it validly. Also, the masters do not always define the *res sacramenti* received by the communicant in the same way.

The responses which the masters give to these questions are

²⁴¹ Ibid., d. 11. c. 2.5–10, d. 12. c. 1, 2: 298–99, 304. The quotation is at d. 12. c. 1, p. 304.

²⁴² Ibid., d. 11. c. 6.1, 2: 303.

usually related to the way they understand the nature of the *res sacramenti* transmitted efficaciously through the *sacramentum* of the Eucharist; in most cases, the position they take on that issue lays the foundation for their treatment of the effects of communion on the recipient. The distinction between the external physical medium of a sacrament, its spiritual content, and the capacity of an individual to receive either without the other had been drawn early in the twelfth century à propos of baptism, in which connection it had evoked considerable interest and support. Alger of Liège appears to have been the earliest thinker in this century to apply this idea to the Eucharist as well. For him, the *sacramentum* is the species of bread and wine, the *res sacramenti* is the body and blood of Christ, and the *effectum sacramenti*, the grace which reception conveys to the communicant, depends on his disposition, bringing him eternal life or damnation, depending on whether he believes in the real presence or not.²⁴³ The same idea is found in masters writing closer to the middle of the century, who expand on Alger's theme. A good case in point is the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*. As he sees it, the *sacramentum tantum*, or physical medium by itself, is the physical species, which, he notes, following Hugh of St. Victor on this point, resembles what it signifies, in that the individual grains and grapes that make up the bread and wine stand for the individual Christians united with each other and with Christ in the church. Likewise, the water added to the wine in the chalice recalls the blood and water issuing from the side of Christ on the cross, and symbolizes the combination of divine and human elements in the church. Along with the elements, he continues, the *sacramentum* includes the verbal formula of consecration and the rest of the Eucharistic rite, the mixing of water with wine in the chalice, the elevation, deposition, and fraction of the host, and the distribution of communion. For this master, the *res sacramenti* has two aspects, the body and blood of Christ, which the sacrament signifies and contains, and the union of Christians in the church, which it signifies but does not contain. To receive the *sacramentum tantum* is,

²⁴³ Alger of Liège, *De misericordia* 1.48, 1.61–62, pp. 224, 235–36. On Alger, see Häring, "A Study of the Sacramentology of Alger," pp. 41–78. Alger is left out of the account in the survey of the use of this distinction in our period by Hödl, "Sacramentum und res," pp. 161–82. He is also ignored by Macy, *Theologies of the Eucharist*, pp. 85, 96–98 and Van den Eynde, "William of Saint-Thierry," pp. 241–56, who both see William of St. Thierry as the first thinker to transfer the definition from baptism to the Eucharist and the *Summa sententiarum* as its only channel of entry into scholastic discourse.

like Judas, to receive the physical species only, but not what they signify and effect. According to this master, one can also receive spiritually the *res tantum*, the sacred matter of the Eucharist alone, if one is properly disposed and prevented from receiving the physical elements by some emergency. Such a spiritual communion, while clearly possible for the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, is not standard. A worthy, and normal, communion involves a reception of both the *sacramentum* and the *res sacramenti*.²⁴⁴

The essentials of this position, which offers the fullest account of the issue prior to Peter Lombard, are found in other thinkers in this period, although in a more abbreviated form. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* omits the sacramental ritual in defining the *sacramentum tantum*, although he adds that it signifies the spiritual nourishment of Christians as well as the body and blood of Christ and the union of Christians in the church. He, too, agrees that, for the *res sacramenti* to be internalized efficaciously by the communicant he must have the proper belief and disposition; failing those conditions, communion works to his damnation, not his salvation.²⁴⁵ While he uses a different, and older, vocabulary, calling the physical medium the sign of a sacred thing (*sacre rei signum*) and the union of Christ and the church the visible sign of invisible grace (*visibile signum invisibile gratium*), and while he sees the body and blood of Christ as the hidden holy thing (*sacrum secretum*) conveyed by the sign, his pre-Victorine language describes, for Roland of Bologna, a *res sacramenti* that combines the bonding of Christians in the church with the salvific consequences of Christ's sacrifice in the remission of the recipient's sin and his sanctification through the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Roland, too, distinguishes between the mere physical reception of the consecrated elements, which, in the case of unbelieving or unworthy recipients leads to their damnation, as was the case with Judas, and the fruitful reception of both the sacrament and its sacred content by the properly disposed communicant. The former, he states, do receive the body and blood of Christ; but they are unable to assimilate and profit from its effects spiritually.²⁴⁶ In omitting the idea of spiritual communion, Roland offers a less well developed version of this doctrine than the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*; but he agrees with most of the main points presented in that master's teaching.

²⁴⁴ *Sent. div.* 5.3, pp. 130*–31*, 135*–36*.

²⁴⁵ *Summa sent.* 6.3, 6.5, *PL* 176: 140A–D, 142B.

²⁴⁶ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 157, 216, 229–30. On Roland here, see Macy, *Theologies of the Eucharist*, p. 117.

One can find a similar kind of understanding of the differential effects of Eucharistic reception even in authors who do not refer overtly to Alger's distinction and its development by more recent masters. The Porretans offer their own scheme here, distinguishing among spiritual, sacramental, and neutral reception. Infants, martyrs, and people who cannot consume the physical elements but who unite themselves to Christ in spirit, faith, and good works communicate spiritually. The conditions which the Porretan master attaches to spiritual communion make it difficult to see why he includes infants on his list here. Sacramental communion, which involves the reception of the body and blood of Christ by means of the consecrated elements, he divides into two categories, fruitful and unfruitful. The first applies to people who keep the faith and it works toward their sanctification. The second applies to people who, like Judas, betray the faith, and it works toward their damnation. Neutral reception, in the eyes of this master, occurs when a non-believer receives communion. The master is regrettably vague on whether such a person receives more than just the physical elements. What he is sure of is that this kind of recipient is not saved by this kind of reception.²⁴⁷

One corollary of this issue that receives attention, in the wake of the Berengarian controversy, and which may or may not benefit from a master's possession of a well developed distinction among *sacramentum tantum*, *res tantum*, and *et sacramentum et res sacramenti*, is the problem of what happens if the consecrated species are inadvertently dropped on the ground or, worse yet, consumed by an animal. Berengar himself had raised these questions for their shock value in the effort to embarrass proponents of the real presence doctrine, well before Alger's distinction provided a way of disposing of it.²⁴⁸ Master Simon offers the opinion that, in such occurrences, God withdraws the body and blood of Christ from the elements, keeping them invisibly suspended in the air, so that they will not suffer contact with the ground or be processed by the digestive system of a mouse, the animal typically singled out for attention since Berengar's time. The Porretans second this

²⁴⁷ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.11–15, 4.51–56, pp. 133–34, 142–43. To some extent this author here parallels Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 25, 28, 33–36, 41–42. Another parallel, although it is less marked, is Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.180–84, pp. 394–95. See Macy, *Theologies of the Eucharist*, pp. 106–11.

²⁴⁸ Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3, part 2: 207–22; Macy, "Of Mice and Manna," pp. 157–66; "Berengar's Legacy," pp. 49–67.

interpretation.²⁴⁹ A less circumstantial account is given by the author of *Sententiae Parisiensis* I. He agrees that the mouse receives the species only, and not the body and blood of Christ, but declines to speculate on what happens to the body and blood in that event.²⁵⁰ Oddly enough, Roland of Bologna, presenting pros and cons, leaves the matter undecided, even though the principle concerning the communion of Judas which he has articulated could have supplied him with a means of resolving it. The most he is willing to say is that he does not think that the mouse receives the *res sacramenti*; but he does not feel confident as to how this position can be defended.²⁵¹ It is perhaps noteworthy that the masters best qualified to deal definitively with the mouse, the authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and the *Summa sententiarum*, do not take up this question, and that Roland, who also has what he needs to do so, does not use his own armory effectively. The other contemporary masters interested in this topic are canonists such as Ivo of Chartres, who is more concerned with the culpability of persons who vomit the Eucharist, who allow it to fall on the ground, or who fail to guard it against animals, and the penance appropriate to them, than he is with the theological issues involved.²⁵²

Interest was much more widespread, and diverse, on another aspect of the distinction between the sacrament and its effects launched by Alger of Liège, the question of what these effects actually are. Although we have to wait until Hugh of St. Victor and his followers to find the full shift away from the Augustinian definition of sacrament in general as a visible sign of an invisible grace to its definition as a sign that contains and effects what it signifies, thinkers in this period, even if they write before or outside of this decisive Victorine development, none the less concur in the view that the Eucharist can be understood as efficacious as well as significant. Where they disagree is on the point of what the properly disposed recipient actually receives by means of the sacrament. Gary Macy has offered a distinction here, between what he calls the mystical and the ecclesiological understanding of the way the Eucharist was thought to be internalized in the twelfth century. Thinkers in the first group, according to Macy, accent the impact of communion on the inner life and religious experience of the recipient, whether or not it triggers mystic transports in the strict

²⁴⁹ Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 40–41; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.16–18, pp. 134–35.

²⁵⁰ *Sent. Parisiensis* I, pp. 43–44.

²⁵¹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 234–35.

²⁵² Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 2. c. 55–c. 61, *PL* 161: 172C–173D.

sense of the term. Thinkers in the second group see the primary if not exclusive effect of the Eucharist as the incorporation of the communicant into the church, seen as Christ's mystical body and as a historical institution.²⁵³ Another way of putting the same point is to contrast thinkers who emphasize the subjective side of the sacramental transaction with those who emphasize its objective side. Macy's view in general can certainly be supported. One can, to be sure, find authors in our period who can be used to document these extremes in his interpretation. But a great many masters in the first half of the twelfth century present a much more eclectic or nuanced position on this question, and this irrespective of whether they are monks, scholastics, or canonists.

Perhaps the most extreme case of an author who views the reception of communion from a largely subjective standpoint is the Laon master who lists seven states of soul as needed for a proper reception and seven spiritual benefits which reception brings. In addition to the standard prerequisite of faith, the consensus position, he thinks that a communicant receiving worthily needs frequent thoughts about Christ, understanding, memory, and love of Christ, and adhesion to Christ, each state growing out of the one anterior to it. In turn, communion brings the communication of the effects of Christ's passion to the faithful, in their own measure. This, to be sure, is an objective gift. But, as noted, it is differential in the way it is appropriated by different communicants. This gift engenders six other benefits that enrich the inner life of the recipient: the thirst for God, the drink that quenches it, the inebriation of the spirit, tranquillity, and eternal life. The objective component that is undeniably present in this analysis is regarded from the perspective of how the soul of the communicant internalizes it.²⁵⁴

At the other end of the spectrum we may place Honorius Augustodunensis and Hugh of St. Victor. Each of these theologians, it will be remembered, is unusual in that he prefaces his account of the sacraments with an abbreviated ecclesiology, it being more typical, in this period, for theologians to leave ecclesiology to the canonists and publicists in their division of labor. Both Honorius and Hugh present the church as the mystical body of Christ. Honorius makes the connection even more organic than Hugh does, in that he takes

²⁵³ Macy, *Theologies of the Eucharist*, passim.

²⁵⁴ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 381, 5: 280. For the school of Laon on communion, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 47–55, although Knoch does not touch on all aspects of their teachings.

up the Eucharist as the first sacrament he discusses, rather than marriage, as the first sacrament instituted. Honorius describes the effects of communion as the engrafting of Christians into the ecclesial body of Christ and, through it, as obtaining the spiritual nourishment that begins in this life and that is perfected, for the community of the elect, in Heaven. The bread and wine, with their many grains and grapes, signify this union of Christians with Christ and with each other.²⁵⁵ Hugh agrees that the Eucharist, since it contains the body and blood of Christ, is the sacrament of sacraments and the source of all sanctification. This sanctification, for him, is also a function of the incorporation of the recipient into the ecclesial body of Christ. The particularly Hugonian twist he imparts to this doctrine is to present it in terms of participation in the divine light, an idea which he derives from the *Celestial Hierarchy* of the Pseudo-Dionysius, a text on which he commented. This notion gives a rather Neoplatonic cast to the engrafting of Christians into the church through the Eucharist, in Hugh's account.²⁵⁶

Most masters in the first half of the twelfth century cannot be fitted so neatly into a framework bounded by personal religious experience on the one side and ecclesiology on the other. Not all the thinkers who accent the objective effects of communion conceive of this issue in ecclesiological terms. Ivo of Chartres, for instance, sees the effects of the Eucharist as a combination of the union of Christians in the church and the gift of eternal life; and he is seconded by the *Summa sententiarum*. But his fellow canonists, Alger of Liège and Gratian, who take an equally objective line, leave out the ecclesial dimension and describe the effects of communion as eternal life, salvation, and union with Christ.²⁵⁷ The disciples of Abelard do not always distinguish what is a condition of fruitful reception from what is a consequence of it. Hermannus states that the effect of the sacrament is to remind us of Christ's love, while the author of *Sententiae Parisiensis* I asserts that the Eucharist helps us to recall Christ's crucifixion and that we should bring this recollection to

²⁵⁵ Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.177–84, pp. 393–95.

²⁵⁶ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.8.1, *PL* 176: 461D. This Dionysian slant has been noted by Erich Kleineidam, "Literaturgeschichtliche Bemerkungen zur Eucharistielehre Hugos von St. Viktor," *Scholastik* 20–24 (1949): 564–66; Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 96–98; Schlette, "Die Eucharistielehre," pp. 193–99, 204–10; Weisweiler, "Sakrament als Symbol und Teilhabe," pp. 321–43. Macy, *Theologies of the Eucharist*, pp. 83–84, reads this point less Neoplatonically.

²⁵⁷ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 2. c. 4, *PL* 161: 138B; *Summa sent.* 6.3, *PL* 176: 139C–D; Alger of Liège, *De misericordia* 1.48, 1.61–62, pp. 224, 235–36; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. d. 2. c. 44–c. 53, col. 1130–33.

communion when receiving it. In addition, he thinks that the recipient is rendered immune from vice (*immunem facit ab omni vitio*) by the Eucharist.²⁵⁸ Still, the accent of the Abelardians is on the subjective side, another unacknowledged legacy of Abelard's from the school of Laon. The master who accents this point most heavily is the Cambridge Commentator. If we do not respond to Eucharistic reception with love, he states, then Christ's saving work, itself understood as the conversion of man's heart, is frustrated in us and we cannot appropriate it in the Eucharist.²⁵⁹ Other masters who may or may not have absorbed Abelardian influence on this point include Master Simon and the Porretans, who give as the effects of reception conversion, perfection, and the remission of venial sin;²⁶⁰ Robert Pullen, who proposes spiritual nourishment;²⁶¹ and the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, who says that reception of the Eucharist remakes the communicant spiritually and liberates him from evil.²⁶² The one author who goes the farthest in balancing these diverse modes of understanding the effects of Eucharistic reception is Roland of Bologna. For him, the effects are threefold: the engrafting of Christians into the church, the remission of sin, and the sanctifying gifts of the Holy Spirit.²⁶³

In dealing with the fact that there are two material elements in the Eucharist, bread and wine, although the doctrine of concomitance stresses that they equally contain the body and blood of Christ, the theologians in this period tend not to defend the point simply on the grounds that this was the way Christ instituted the sacrament, but rather view the two species from the standpoint of man's needs and how the sacramental media are responsive to them, both as signs and as signs that effect what they signify. Here, is it not surprising that authors who see the prime effect, or one of the effects, of Eucharistic reception as the engrafting of Christians into the church should advert to the symbolism of the individual grains of wheat and grapes united in the Eucharistic bread and wine. This is the case with Roland and Honorius.²⁶⁴ The instructive

²⁵⁸ Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 125; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 43.

²⁵⁹ *Comm. in Epistolam ad Hebraeos* 9 in *Commentarius Cantabrigiensis*, 4: 782. Macy, *Theologies of the Eucharist*, pp. 114–16, 118, states that the Abelardians waver between an individual and a corporate view of the effects of communion. We have not found much to support the alleged corporative ingredient in their teaching.

²⁶⁰ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.60, p. 143. The author cites Simon by name as his source.

²⁶¹ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 8.2, *PL* 186: 961C–963B.

²⁶² *Summa sent.* 6.2, *PL* 176: 139B.

²⁶³ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 157, 216.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 216; Honorius, *Eluc.* 1.180–84, pp. 394–95.

power of this symbolism is so appealing that it also attracts masters who take a less ecclesial view of the effects of Eucharistic communion, such as the Laon masters, Master Simon, Robert Pullen, and the author of the *Ysagoge in theologiam*.²⁶⁵ Some authors combine man's need for signs that enlighten him as to how the sacrament works in his soul with his need for redemption tout court. Although agreeing that both the body and blood of Christ are fully contained in each of the consecrated elements, they observe that the wine none the less stands for and nourishes man's soul while the bread stands for and nourishes man's body. Christ, they argue, took on both a human body and a human soul in order to redeem mankind both in body and soul; and, in the Eucharistic elements, He provided species that signify and effect this redemption of the whole human person. This Christological and soteriological argument is joined to the symbolism of the grains and grapes by the Porretans, Master Simon, and the authors of the *Summa sententiarum* and *Sententiae divinitatis*.²⁶⁶

There were two other issues related to concomitance that evoked a certain amount of discussion, as this doctrine affected the mode by which the Eucharist was administered to the laity. In this connection it is worth keeping in mind that the laity had been receiving the Eucharist under both species, separately, since the days of the early church. While communion in both kinds was the rule, there is evidence to suggest that some pastors were practicing intinction, or the dipping of the host into the chalice before giving it to the communicant. Pope Paschal II (1099–1118) had reproved this practice, citing the standard argument that intinction was unscriptural. The only one of the disciples to whom Christ gave communion in this way was Judas, another clear reason for prohibiting it. Paschal reinforced the traditional insistence on reception in both kinds, sequentially. He also granted a traditional dispensation, by conceding that aged, infirm, and moribund persons who are unable to consume solid food are allowed to receive

²⁶⁵ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 275, 5: 277–78; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 8.2, *PL* 186: 961C–963B; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 200–07.

²⁶⁶ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.6–10, pp. 133–34; *Sent. div.* 5.3, pp. 129*–30*, 138*; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 26–29; *Summa sent.* 6.5–6, *PL* 176: 142B–143B. Macy, *Theologies of the Eucharist*, pp. 68–69, 172 argues that the first person to develop this body-soul argument was Hervaeus of Bourg-Dieu in his Pauline commentary of ca. 1150; Philippe Delhaye, “Un dossier Eucharistique d’Anselme de Laon à l’abbaye de Fécamp,” in *L’Abbaye bénédictine de Fécamp: Ouvrage scientifique du XIII^e centenaire, 658–1958* (Fécamp: L. Durand et Fils, 1960), 2: 156, rightly sees it as arising earlier than that. The notion was more widespread than either of these scholars thinks.

the chalice alone. This dispensation was a standard one, but it omitted, in Paschal's case, another category of communicant, infants in danger of death, who had been included in the dispensation in earlier decretals. Concomitance certainly supplied a rationale for Paschal's exception, but he made it less in defense of concomitance itself, or of pastoral need, than in conjunction with his ban on intinction.²⁶⁷

Whether they cite Paschal or rely on the authorities to whom he himself refers, the vast majority of masters in the first half of the twelfth century defend *utraquism*, oppose *intinction*, and connect this teaching with the doctrine of *concomitance*. Exceptions to this consensus are few; and they are interesting in that they reflect a desire to depart from established tradition on the basis of pastoral utility. The availability of the Eucharist to the people who need it, and in the form in which they are able to receive it, is the operative norm here, a norm reflecting the more general desire to remove obstacles that might separate Christians from the grace available through the sacraments that is quite characteristic of this period. Considering, especially, the common wish to emphasize the sacred dignity of the Eucharist and its necessity for salvation, this criterion impelled several theologians to swim against the current of contemporary opinion on its behalf. Their views are thus more interesting for the concerns that animate them than for their ability to overturn the consensus position or to offer what could be regarded as another viable option within it. Roland of Bologna stands out as the one and only master to present a defense of *intinction* in the face of universal opposition to it on the part of the papacy, the canonists, and the theologians alike. He is fully aware of the objection based on Holy Scripture. In a remarkable if totally un influential turn-about of that objection, he argues that the fact that Christ gave the Eucharist to Judas in this form validates *intinction*, even though, as he has argued elsewhere, the bad faith which Judas brought to communion meant that it worked to his damnation. The reason why *intinction* should be permitted, according to Roland, is that it is an easier way to administer communion than by the host and chalice separately. The fear of dropping the host, or of accidentally spilling the contents of the chalice, he notes, may make some communicants anxious. This anxiety may undercut the proper state of devotion and receptivity which they need to bring to the

²⁶⁷ See the references cited above, n. 220.

sacrament. Their worry, indeed, may keep them away from communion altogether. And so, for practical pastoral reasons (*curis secularibus*) intinction should be allowed.²⁶⁸

As the twelfth century moved along, the clearer articulation of the doctrine of concomitance, coupled with the increasing incidence of "bleeding host" miracles, was to bring about a major change in the administration of communion to the laity. By the end of the century, the western church had abandoned the age-old practice of utraquism for the laity and had made the reception of the host alone the new standard. But, members of the school of Laon, along with the Porretans, resisted this change. To be sure, they could appreciate the rationale supporting communion in one kind in the light of the doctrine of concomitance. What they sought to retain, however, was the older custom of administering the chalice alone, not only to the aged and infirm and to those in danger of death, but also to infants, who are likewise unable to consume solid food. Pope Paschal's recent ruling, they noted, while it retained the dispensation permitting the chalice alone to the aged, infirm, and moribund, had ignored the infants. The desire of these masters to rush to the defense of the pastoral needs of infants is exactly parallel with the desire of these same theologians to relax the rule confining baptism to Easter and Pentecost, although their stance in the face of ecclesiastical tradition differed in these two areas of sacramental theology. In the case of baptism, as we have seen above, they wanted to depart from a historically conditioned rule which no longer spoke to the needs of the cohort of people now largely receiving the sacrament. In the case of the Eucharist, on the other hand, the masters defend the retention of an ancient practice which, in their eyes, has as much pastoral relevance in the here and now as it had ever had. Granting that, if no necessity arises, the first communion of infants can safely be deferred, Anselm of Laon insists that, if the infant is in any danger, he should be given communion at the next celebration of the Eucharist following his baptism, by means of the chalice alone, because he cannot take solid food. Anselm urges that this practice is essential since the child's salvation will otherwise be placed in jeopardy. He adds that the priest who fails to administer the chalice to the child has failed miserably in his pastoral duty; Anselm compares him with a shepherd who abandons his flock.²⁶⁹ William of Champeaux force-

²⁶⁸ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 230.

²⁶⁹ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon from the Liber Pancrisis*, no. 61-62, 5: 55-56.

fully seconds this opinion and connects it more specifically with the doctrines of the real presence and concomitance.²⁷⁰ Another Laon master repeats Anselm's argument almost verbatim and adds a point which we see cropping up elsewhere in twelfth century sacramental theology, the idea that, should the priest be negligent, his failure to give the chalice to the infant will be charged to his own moral account by God, Who will not condemn the infant because of someone else's irresponsible behavior.²⁷¹ This observation also parallels exactly the reason why some members of the school of Laon reject the automatic damnation of the unbaptized children of negligent parents. Both the disciples of Gilbert of Poitiers and Gilbert himself strongly support the position of the school of Laon here, although they are fully conscious of the fact that it is a minority view, not given an extensive hearing in the schools (*Hec quaestio quamvis a doctoribus non sit ventilata*).²⁷²

There were two other issues related to the recipients of the Eucharist that provoked a mild flurry of interest, one illustrating a logical application of the agreed-upon conditions making for valid and fruitful reception held by all at this time and the other illustrating the desire to loosen older strictures. Anselm of Laon insists that communion should not be given to heretics and excommunicates, not even as a *viaticum*. His reasons are perfectly straightforward. Heretics lack the correct faith needed for fruitful reception, and severance from communion is precisely what excommunication is all about as well as being the penalty it imposes on the malefactor whose behavior has warranted such drastic requital.²⁷³ The desire to make communion available to persons known or suspected of being evildoers or persons of bad character informs opinions on criminals, and on actors and magicians, at the hands of the Porretans and canonists, respectively. A priest should not deny communion to someone he knows to be a criminal, states the Porretan master, on the model of Christ's giving of the Eucharist to Judas, who, He knew, would betray Him. The only exception that the master admits is the case of a criminal who has also been publicly

²⁷⁰ *Sentences of William of Champeaux*, no. 270, 5: 216–17.

²⁷¹ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 372, 5: 276.

²⁷² *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.42, p. 140. As the editor notes, p. 140 n. 48, a gloss on this passage in a copy of the work preserved in MS. Paris BN lat. 14423, f. 97^v states that this is Gilbert's teaching as well: "Parvuli debet dari, tamen in liquida forma . . . sicut magister Gillibertus instituit." This point has also been noted by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 2: 192.

²⁷³ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 63, 5: 56.

excommunicated.²⁷⁴ And, Ivo of Chartres and Gratian, although well aware of earlier canonical hostility to actors and magicians (*histrioni, magi*) as persons likely to have evil habits, noxious beliefs, or both, argue that they should be admitted to communion. Ivo cites the supporting authority of Cyprian; Gratian is not quite so generous, stipulating that the actors and magicians must first repent of their putative bad behavior and that they should not be given communion side by side with other, presumably Godfearing, Christians, but separately.²⁷⁵

This largely concludes the list of questions raised, by a greater or smaller range of masters, concerning the recipient of communion, the conditions affecting its efficacy in him, what it actually transmits to him, and how it ought to be administered. These debates have moved us from matters of pressing general concern to those that interest only a handful of authors, and from those directly connected with the essential definition of the sacrament itself to those embracing ecclesiastical policies and administrative matters regarded as subject to change. Looking at the Eucharist from the other side of the rite, the side of the minister and not that of the recipient, we encounter another debate, extremely widespread in this period, and one on which there was a decided range of views.²⁷⁶ This aspect of the Eucharist, understandably, received detailed attention from the canonists, along with the rules and regulations for the liturgical celebration of the mass, provision of the reserved sacrament for sick calls, and other concerns of the clergy in this connection. Motivated by the reformist urge to deny priestly faculties to schismatics, excommunicates, or heretical clergymen, the canonists, by the mid-century, had arrived at a consensus among themselves that is aptly summed up by Roland of Bologna. For the Eucharist to be truly consecrated, he states, the minister must be a priest validly ordained, regardless of his moral qualities. Roland, however, withholds this capacity from priests who have been interdicted, deposed, or unfrocked, or who are heretics, schismatics, or excommunicates. The first set of disqualifications respects the fact that they are no longer in good standing canonically. Heresy obviates the correct faith and correct intention required for a valid consecration. Schismatics and excommunicates are ruled out by

²⁷⁴ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.49, p. 141.

²⁷⁵ Ivo of Chartres, *Panormia* 1.152, *PL* 161: 1080C; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. d. 2. c. 95–c. 96, col. 1352.

²⁷⁶ On this point, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 1: 119–45, 3 part 2: 223–34, 240–43.

definition; the Eucharist is the sacrament of unity, and it cannot be administered by a cleric who is not in union with the church.²⁷⁷

Many of the theologians of the day found this canonical position, for all its clarity and cogency, to be too restrictive. Another model was proposed by the Porretans, who argue that there are three conditions needed to validate the consecration of the Eucharist: *ordo*, *actio*, and *intentio*, or a validly ordained priest, the use of the proper canonical formula of consecration during the mass, and the intention to do what the church understands by the celebration of the Eucharist. With this principle in hand, the Porretan master objects to the automatic disqualification of excommunicated priests. To be sure, he agrees that non-believers cannot consecrate validly; but, presumably, this category could exclude priests who had lost the faith themselves but who might be willing to be of service to communities of believers who would otherwise lack access to the mass and the Eucharist. The inclusion or exclusion of the non-believing priest is thus not a blanket one, in the master's estimation. In the case of the priest who is excommunicated, the master argues that it is perfectly possible for him to consecrate validly, so long as the notes of *ordo*, *actio*, and *intentio* apply to him.²⁷⁸ The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* also uses the *ordo*, *actio*, *intentio* model and expands the range of acceptable ministers still farther. Both heretics and schismatics may consecrate validly, in his opinion, so long as they are validly ordained, use the appropriate rite, and intend to do what the church intends. He does not take up the excommunicates or raise the question of why a heretic would want to participate in the sacramental ministry of the church.²⁷⁹ Master Simon agrees that *ordo* and *actio* are required. He omits *intentio*, but concedes legitimacy to the consecrations of priests who display the first two traits.²⁸⁰ In praise of flexibility in this area, he cites Gregory the Great's maxim that diversity of customs does not impede unity of the faith in the church, without noticing that it was directed by Gregory to the number of immersions required or permitted in baptism and not to who is to be barred from the Eucharistic ministry. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* also uses the *ordo*, *actio*, *intentio* formula, although he takes a harder line than some of his compeers. Agreeing with the *Sententiae divinitatis* here, he admits that a properly ordained heretic may be able to consecrate

²⁷⁷ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 216–18, 235–37.

²⁷⁸ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.28, 4.32, 4.43–44, pp. 136, 137, 140.

²⁷⁹ *Sent. div.* 5.3, p. 141*.

²⁸⁰ Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 38.

validly for the people who receive communion at his hands, although, in his own view, such a hypocrite would bring moral obloquy upon his own head. He disallows schismatics and excommunicates, since their own alienation from the church would prevent them from connecting their congregations with its unity by means of the Eucharist.²⁸¹ Robert Pullen shifts his focus from the issue of heresy, schism, or severance from communion as impediments to valid consecration to the problem of morally unworthy priests. He agrees that their Eucharistic ministry is valid. But he is less concerned with what gives the formula of consecration its efficacy than he is with the blame and punishment attached to clerical misconduct in this area.²⁸²

Three other observations are needed to complete our survey of Eucharistic debates in the first half of the twelfth century before turning to the question of how Peter Lombard addresses the issues of reception, administration, and appropriation of the grace made available by the Eucharist, in comparison with his contemporaries. One area in which those canonists and theologians who take up the issue agree in softening the rigor of an earlier age is the matter of a nocturnal emission experienced by a priest scheduled to celebrate mass the following morning, and whether this accident places him in a state of ritual pollution which would bar him from celebrating. The consensus position in this period rejects the strict idea of ritual pollution and distinguishes among the reasons why the individual experiences the seminal emission in the first place. He is guilty of sin, it is agreed, if he has brought the event upon himself by overindulgence in food or drink or by deliberately entertaining lustful thoughts. For these offenses he must do penance and he may not approach the altar as a minister of the Eucharist until he has done so. On the other hand, if the seminal emission occurred willy nilly, out of the superabundance of the man's animal spirits, then no sin has been committed. Here, the principle of intentionality in ethics is clearly at work. In the latter case, the priest should cleanse his person, clothing, and bedclothes but he is not prohibited from celebrating the Eucharist. Among the theologians, not all of whom take up this topic, the canonico-theological consensus position is spelled out the most crisply by the Porretans.²⁸³ Another matter addressed by both canonists and theologians, although far less

²⁸¹ *Summa sent.* 6.4, *PL* 176: 141A–D.

²⁸² Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 8.6, *PL* 186: 968A–D.

²⁸³ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 4.47–48, p. 141.

often, is the frequency of communion for the laity. Robert Pullen is the best guide to the state of play on this subject. Even though he does not name the authorities he cites, he gives an accurate report of the tradition reprised by the canonists. This tradition states that lay people should receive communion three times yearly, at Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost. Robert offers no recommendation of his own on the timetable, but stresses, rather, that what is most important is receiving worthily, however frequently or infrequently reception occurs.²⁸⁴ Finally, and the point is worth mentioning mainly to illustrate a shift of major dimensions in the agenda of writers on the Eucharist at this time, there is the evaporation of the polemic against the Greek church, which had been given sustained attention as recently as the final years of the eleventh century. Only one scholastic in our period, Roland of Bologna, attacks the Greeks for using leavened bread in the Eucharist; and he is the exception who proves the rule.²⁸⁵

While in the field of Eucharistic theology, as in theology more generally, one can find Peter Lombard characterized as the good, gray mediator, striking a compromise or middle-of-the-road position in relation to his contemporaries,²⁸⁶ a consideration of the opinions he gives, or declines to give, on the range of Eucharistic questions just discussed shows him taking sides, more often than not, in areas where there was a range of views among the orthodox. As we have seen, in addressing the critical debates stemming from the defense of the real presence, he takes the relatively unpopular line of Roland of Bologna on the matter of Christ's giving His mortal body to His disciples at the Last Supper. And, he takes, and sharpens considerably, the most recent and most Aristotelian way of formulating the question of the Eucharistic change presented by the authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum*, rather than trying to coordinate it with other modes of framing the issue. It is likewise from the latter two masters that Peter derives his clearly stated distinction among the *sacramentum*, the *res sacramenti*, and the existence of either without the other in the Eucharist. He is closest of all to the *Summa sententiarum* here; for, as with its author, he confines the physical medium to the species of bread and wine, omitting the liturgical rite which the *Sententiae divinitatis* includes in

²⁸⁴ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 8.7, *PL* 176: 968D–969A. Cf. Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 2. c. 27–c. 30, c. 33–c. 51, *PL* 161: 167A–168A, 168B–171A.

²⁸⁵ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 231.

²⁸⁶ See, for instance, Domenico Bertello, 'La problematica eucaristica in Pier Lombardo,' in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 149–61.

his definition of the *sacramentum*. As with both of these authors and with Roland, he sees the *res sacramenti* as having two components, using the language of the *Sententiae divinitatis* here. This *res* includes the body and blood of the resurrected Christ, which it signifies and contains, and the union of Christians in the church. He adds, qualifying the latter point, that the *societas ecclesiastica* involved is both the mystical body of Christ and its institutional manifestation, and that this Christian community includes all those who are predestined, called, justified, and glorified.²⁸⁷ This double *res sacramenti*, he adds, is one of the reasons why there are two species in the physical *sacramentum*. He agrees with the Victorine idea that there is a similitude between the elements and their sacred *significata*. The new twist he imparts to this theme is that both the bread and the wine signify both aspects of the *res sacramenti*. The Eucharistic bread and wine, in Peter's handling of this point, do not stand for the ministry of the sacrament to different components of the human constitution. Both severally and together, the two species nourish the human body, and, in so doing, both species stand for and transmit Christ's nourishment and support of the human soul. At the same time, Peter agrees with the widely held idea that the many grains and grapes that make up the elements stand for the union of Christians in the society of the church. Another reason, in his estimation, for the double physical medium, and here Peter concurs as well with the *Sententiae divinitatis* in particular, is their Christological symbolism and soteriological effects. Notwithstanding the fact that Christ's body and blood are both fully present under each species, He provides this mode of sacramental ministry in the Eucharist in order to show that He assumed both a human body and a human soul so as to redeem mankind in both body and soul. In this connection, Peter accepts the idea that the bread signifies and ministers to the salvation of the body and the wine signifies and ministers to the salvation of the soul. He agrees with the Abelardians, and those influenced by them, that the body and blood of Christ are made available under the species of bread and wine both as a test of faith and in the light of human sensibilities. In his teaching here, Peter firmly links concomitance with his ecclesial, soteriological, and Christological agendas alike, as do the Porretans, Master Simon, the *Sententiae divinitatis*, and the *Summa sententiarum*, while at the same time connecting the point organically with the notion of a double *res sacramenti*. Just as this does not make

²⁸⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 8. c. 7, 2: 284–86.

the Eucharist two sacraments in its institution, so concomitance does not mean, for Peter, that the reception of both elements, sequentially, constitutes more than one act of communion.²⁸⁸

Peter omits the topic of spiritual communion through the reception of the *res tantum*, concentrating on people who receive, in the normal course of events, the *res sacramenti* by means of the *sacramentum*. But he is fully appreciative of the point that the idea of the *sacramentum tantum* provides a basis for analyzing the differential effects of communion on people who bring different beliefs and intention to the Eucharist. He also extends the notion of the double *res sacramenti* into a broader understanding of what the worthy communicant appropriates. Peter states firmly that the beliefs and intentions of communicants do not alter the objective content of the Eucharist, and criticizes thinkers who, in his estimation, have failed to grasp and to support this principle. Human failings and limitations cannot override what God has decided will happen when the elements are consecrated. What they can do, and here Peter agrees with the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum* in their formulation of the issue, is to interfere with the capacity of the recipient to make a spiritual appropriation of that objective content.²⁸⁹ The recipient must bring to communion both belief in general and belief in the real presence in particular. Also, he must be morally and intentionally in concord with Christ. Peter gives full weight to these subjective considerations as controlling what the recipient derives spiritually from the Eucharist. But he gives more weight to the objectivity of the body and blood of Christ which even the unworthy communicant receives. For Peter, the same *res sacramenti* is received by whoever communicates, but not to the same effect. He is not presenting a view of the objective efficacy of the Eucharist so sweeping that it is internalized the same way by all communicants irrespective of persons. The unworthy, he agrees, receive to their condemnation. As to what the worthy communicant receives, Peter sides with those masters who see both a subjective and an objective, an individual and a corporative, dimension to this question.²⁹⁰ The masters to whom he comes the closest are Roland of Bologna and the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, but he goes beyond both of

²⁸⁸ Ibid., d. 8. c. 7, d. 10. c. 2.8, d. 11. c. 3–c. 4, c. 6.2, 2: 285–86, 296, 299–300, 303. On the basis of Peter's recognition of the ontological as well as the redemptive and ecclesial significance of the two species, Megivern, *Concomitance and Communion*, pp. 134–38, has rightly stated that, in his hands, the doctrine of concomitance comes of age.

²⁸⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 12. c. 4.3, 2: 308.

²⁹⁰ Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 233–35. Macy, *Theologies of the Eucharist*, pp.

them. Roland had seen three effects of communion, the engrafting of the recipient into the church, the remission of sin, and the sanctifying gifts of the Holy Spirit. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* had seen the effects of communion as fourfold, the engrafting of the Christian into the church, spiritual renewal, spiritual nourishment, and eternal life. For his part, Peter combines the personal union of the communicant with Christ and with Christ's redemptive ministry with the union of the communicant with his fellow Christians in the church, as a function of the fact that these are the two aspects of the double *res sacramenti* which he receives. As he appropriates these graces in his own inner life, they provide both a spiritual remedy and a means of spiritual growth. The Eucharist, Peter observes, was ordained both to remedy our daily infirmities and to increase our virtue. As a pendant to baptism, the Eucharist remakes us spiritually; it nourishes and redeems us in body and soul; it perfects us in the good. It is not only an augmentation of virtue and grace, but "it is the source and origin of all grace" (*est fons et origo totius gratiae*).²⁹¹ Peter's language has as a strongly Victorine coloration here. But, while he certainly underscores the ecclesial dimensions of the effects of communion, he inclines more to the consequences of communion in the recipient's inner life than the *Summa sententiarum* does, and more than Roland does, although, with the latter, he sees these effects as both remedial and perfective.

Another area in which he follows the Hugonian line of argument to a conclusion reflecting Victorine influence which is, none the less, post-Victorine, is the relation of the Eucharist to its pre-Christian parallels. Hugh himself is inclined to grant salvific power more to circumcision than to the Old Testament precursors of other Christian sacraments. When it comes to the paschal lamb, the forerunner of the Eucharist, he is vague on whether it saved the Israelites in more than a political sense.²⁹² In the next generation, the authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum* are more insistent on the point that Old Testament analogies, such as the manna in the desert and the sacrifice of Melchisidech, are *figurae*, which merely foreshadow the Eucharist and do no more.²⁹³ Peter refers to all these types as only pointing ahead to Christ and

122–23; and *The Banquet's Wisdom*, p. 90 takes too preclusively ecclesial a line on this point, in our estimation.

²⁹¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 8. c. 1, c. 7, d. 12. c. 6.1, 2: 280, 284–86, 310. The quotation is at d. 8. c. 1, p. 280.

²⁹² Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.8.5, *PL* 176: 465A.

²⁹³ *Sent. div.* 5.3, p. 120*; *Summa sent.* 6.3, *PL* 176: 139C–D.

to His sacrifice on the cross, which endows the Eucharist with a unique salvific efficacy. He draws here with particular sharpness the distinction between mere sign and efficacious sign which he draws in his definition of sacraments in general. In order to accentuate the supersession of all of these Old Testament prefigurations, he calls the reader's attention to the fact that, while communion is now received fasting, at the Last Supper Christ gave it to His disciples at the end of the Passover meal. This unique circumstance, he notes, is designed to point up both the continuity and the discontinuity between past and present; the recollection of a past, physical, and collective deliverance merges with and is radically transformed into a rite that is not only corporative and commemorative but is also a transfusion of grace that sanctifies and glorifies the soul of the individual communicant in the here and now.²⁹⁴

When Peter turns to the conditions validating the consecration of the Eucharist by its minister, he displays considerable independence from the theologians, largely of Victorine provenance, on whom he draws in other areas of Eucharistic doctrine, whether to edit, streamline, refine, or embroider upon their views. In this case Peter sides wholeheartedly with the canonists, repudiating the efforts of most mid-century theologians to admit priests with certain kinds of canonical disqualifications to the Eucharistic ministry. Peter stands foursquare with masters such as Gratian and Roland of Bologna in barring heretics, schismatics, and excommunicates. Heresy of any kind, and not just the failure to believe in the real presence, is an obstacle to valid consecration on the part of the minister just as much as it is to the salvific appropriation of communion on the part of a recipient with the same liability. A heretic, Peter agrees, cannot have the same understanding of the Eucharist as an orthodox priest does, and cannot bring to it the same intention as the church brings. Peter also sees the full cogency of excluding schismatics and excommunicates. Men who are separated from the Christian community cannot act for it. Nor can they draw their congregations into a deeper unity with a church from which they themselves are detached. Here, he affirms both the canonists' conclusions and the rationale behind them. Peter also assents to the principle that the moral failings of a duly ordained

²⁹⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 8. c. 2–c. 3, c. 5, 2: 280–81, 283–84. Here, Peter also reflects the canonical consensus on the reception of the Eucharist fasting; cf. Ivo of Chartres, *Panormia* 1.152, *PL* 161: 1080C; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 3. d. 2. c. 54, col. 1133–34.

priest in good standing canonically are not an impediment, although he gives a somewhat different reason than the canonists do. It is not so much the dignity and authority of holy orders that is the key, for him, as the idea that the efficacy of the sacrament lies in God's power. The human minister plays an essentially instrumental role; and God will not allow His grace to be impeded by the unworthiness of its intermediaries. Aside from this important shift in emphasis, the other personal nuance Peter gives to this essentially canonical reading of the topic is to distinguish between moral weaknesses that do not affect the priest's capacity to consecrate the Eucharist validly and sins so heinous that they have resulted in drastic disciplinary action, such as his unfrocking or ejection from the church.²⁹⁵

Although, as we have just seen, Peter reflects a generous use of the canonists, especially Gratian, at some points in his Eucharistic theology, there are also some points which concern the canonists, and, to a lesser extent, other theologians of the day, in which he displays no interest. The nocturnal emission of a priest scheduled to celebrate mass the following day is not on his agenda. Nor is the dispensation concerning communion in one kind, by means of the chalice, for the aged, infirm, or moribund as given in the ancient canons and more recently by Paschal II in connection with his renewal of the ban on intinction. Peter certainly supports the contemporary consensus on utraquism and against intinction, but without mentioning these exceptions.²⁹⁶ Nor does he refer in any way to the argument of the Laon masters and Porretans concerning the communion of infants. Another consensus position he reflects is a disinterest in arguing with Greek Eucharistic practices. Noting that water is added to the chalice to signify the Christian people who are redeemed by Christ's blood, he adds that the Greeks do not do this, but judges that the omission, if it stems from ignorance, does not invalidate the celebration of the Eucharist.²⁹⁷

There are two points taken up concerning the Eucharist by some masters in this period on which Peter is less conclusive, or outright dismissive, even though the general orientation he takes toward this sacrament might have suggested another course of action. Along with Robert Pullen and the canonists, he considers the matter of the frequency of communion for the laity. He provides a fuller array of authorities than anyone else does here. In addition to

²⁹⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 13. c. 1–c. 7, 2: 311–14.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, d. 11. c. 6.2, 2: 303.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, c. 5, 2: 301–03.

citing the standard rule that Christians should communicate on Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost, to which he adds, on his own account, at the very least, he brings in the position, ascribed to Augustine although it is actually the view of Gennadius, recommending communion every Sunday. Like Robert Pullen, he declines to take an overt stand of his own on this issue, and emphasizes that the essential point is to receive worthily.²⁹⁸ Still, the logic of his handling of the topic is to suggest the desirability of frequent communion, a conclusion which, had he articulated it more decisively, would certainly have been in harmony with his general inclination to encourage Christians to avail themselves of the benefits of sacramental grace as much as they can, or as much as they need. Perhaps even more surprising, given Peter's keen interest in the speculative issues surrounding the defense of the real presence doctrine and his own clear statement that the body and blood of Christ do not depart from the consecrated species when they are received by a communicant whose unworthiness prevents him from appropriating the grace of the sacrament in a fruitful and salvific way, is his handling of the question *quid sumit mus*. Peter can evidently compass the idea that the objective content of the Eucharist may be appropriated, or not, depending on the status of the human recipient. But he regards the extension of this state of affairs to a mouse as an entirely frivolous question. His response to it is: "What does the mouse receive? What does it eat? God knows!" (*Quid ergo sumit mus? quid manducat? Deus novit*).²⁹⁹ This effort to dismiss the problem, even though, in principle, like Roland and the authors of the *Sententiae divinitatis* and *Summa sententiarum*, he has the means at hand to resolve it, did not prove determinative, either in the middle of the twelfth century or in the sequel, when a fresh supply of philosophical and scientific analysis would be brought to bear upon it.

The unwillingness or inability of Peter and some of the masters best equipped to do so to engage themselves with the last-mentioned question is a reminder of the fact that the more speculative aspects of Eucharistic theology were less amenable to principled resolution in the 1150s than was the case with other problem areas in which this sacrament provoked debate. Even the most philosophically minded of the theologians recognized that the conceptual resources available to them were adequate to do no more

²⁹⁸ Ibid., d. 12. c. 6.2, 2: 310–11.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., d. 13. c. 1.8, 2: 314. See Macy, "Of Mice and Manna," p. 160.

than to pose the questions connected with the real presence doctrine clearly, but that they were not adequate to provide a resolution of those questions or a comprehensible rationale for the mysteries they embody. Peter's contribution in bringing this idea to consciousness is most notable in connection with the account of the change in the elements. Neither he nor anyone else in this period was able to articulate, with a similar degree of lucidity, the physical and metaphysical difficulties embedded in the questions of which body Christ gave to His disciples at the Last Supper and *quid sumit mus*. In other areas of Eucharistic theology, Peter takes a stance that is highly selective. He agrees with the consensus, or majority, positions on the institution of the Eucharist, the real presence, concomitance, communion in both kinds sequentially, and the idea that the unbelieving or unworthy recipient receives to his damnation. When it comes to the conditions that validate the consecration of the Eucharist, he sides unhesitatingly with the canonists in rejecting the efforts of other theologians to make the rules more flexible. He finds it perfectly reasonable to rule out heretic, schismatic, and excommunicate priests, although, in admitting the validity of the Eucharistic ministry of immoral priests, he accents the instrumentality, and not the authority, of the priest in this context. Concerning the reception of the Eucharist, what makes for its efficacious appropriation, and what, indeed, is appropriated when the communicant receives worthily, Peter concurs with the idea of the double *res sacramenti* found in Roland of Bologna, the *Sententiae divinitatis*, and the *Summa sententiarum*, which he understands as the personal and the ecclesiological dimensions of the sacrament. The personal appropriations are the ones that he emphasizes the most heavily. In so doing, he combines an appreciation of the subjective dispositions which the communicant needs to bring to the sacrament if it is to do its work of healing and sanctifying in him with a heightened sense of the objectivity of the content of the sacrament, which remains present in the physical elements received by the unworthy communicant as well, although he does not appropriate them. Peter's conviction that man lacks the power to thwart God in blocking access to the sacramental grace which God institutes and administers through the Eucharist is thus coupled with his equally clear conviction that man can and must dispose himself, in belief and attitude, so that he can make spiritual use of this grace in his own inner life. Above all, Peter accentuates the positive. He is far more interested in how the effect and the affect of this sacrament of sacraments can be realized in the bonding of members of the Christian community and, even more so, in

the sanctification and perfection of individual Christians, than he is in discussing impediments or conditions that would deactivate or delegitimize it.

Penance

Penance was a sacrament that also attracted considerable attention in the early twelfth century. Both the administration and the theological understanding of this sacrament had undergone substantial change since the days of the early church.³⁰⁰ Penance had originally been viewed as a single, solemn, public event, one that was unrepeatable during the penitent's lifetime, and one that required heavy and protracted satisfaction before he could be restored to communion. In the spread of Christianity to the Germanic and Celtic peoples during the early Middle Ages, private confession was introduced and penances remained lengthy and heavy. Up until the late eleventh century, the fact that those performing satisfaction were visibly distinct within the community led to a tendency to regard the completion of satisfaction as the point at which the penitent's sins were remitted. The early twelfth century witnessed a shift in the way in which penance was understood and practiced. Pences became much lighter; public, solemn confession became the exception not the rule; and attention shifted to the intention of the penitent and the role of the sacrament in his spiritual growth and development. With this, the idea that penance was an unrepeatable sacrament came under sharp attack and was demolished. Prior to this time, writers on penance had approached it from a polemical perspective, or from the standpoint of the practical guidelines for its administration and the appropriate satisfactions to be required for particular sins. In the formulation of a theology of penance, to all intents and purposes for the first time in the history of the western church, the masters before and during Peter Lombard's generation were not only expressing the need to systematize this subject and to coordinate it with what they had to say on the sacraments in general. They also wrote in order to

³⁰⁰ Good general overviews are provided by Paul Anciaux, *La théologie du sacrement de pénitence au XII^e siècle* (Louvain: É. Nauwelaerts, 1949), pp. 164–231, 329–35; Polycarp Schmoll, *Die Busslehre der Frühscholastik: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Munich: J. J. Lentnerschen Buchhandlung, 1909), pp. 3–14, 18–74; Amédée Teejaert, *La confession aux laïques dans l'église latine depuis le VIII^e jusqu'au XIV^e siècle: Étude de théologie positive* (Wetteren: J. De Meester et Fils, 1926), pp. 1–101. This last-mentioned work covers much more than what is indicated by its title.

rationalize the changes from the ancient and more recent practice which penance was actually undergoing in their own century. While there existed a good deal of consensus on the idea that this was the contemporary agenda on penance, there were still two broad areas of disagreement. One was on the best kind of argument to be made for the repeatability of penance and for the principle that, if a sin were repeated, it could be remitted again, as needed, by this sacrament. The other debate focused on when, in the three-part process of contrition, confession, and satisfaction inherited from Augustine and Gregory the Great, the penitent's sin was remitted. In both of these areas, canonists and theologians sometimes came to the same conclusions, and relied on each other's work. Yet, even on occasions when this was the case, their ways of conceptualizing the common problems they faced were often quite different. In addition, the study of penance in this period reveals a geographical differentiation between the practices of the Roman and the Gallican churches. The latter church was swifter in setting aside ancient practices. The question of where a master taught in this period and which theory and practice of penance he was most familiar with is thus, on occasion, a factor that he may bring to bear on the finding of his own solutions to the debated questions on penance.

The fact that canonists and theologians, even when they agreed on the need to rationalize the changes that penitential practice was undergoing in their own day, tended to do so in ways reflecting their respective guild mentalities is well illustrated in the first debate, on the repeatability of penance, and the associated question of the reviviscence of sins.³⁰¹ Like the theologians, the canonists are advocates of change here, and seek to make the remedy provided in the sacrament of penance more generally available to Christians.³⁰² They are well aware of the ancient strictures banning the repetition of penance and confining it to a single, solemn penance. They are equally familiar with the ancient argument that, if a person commits the same kind of sin for which he did penance earlier, this proves that his earlier penance was hypocritical and he cannot be forgiven again. Gratian does not shrink from listing the authorities

³⁰¹ For a survey of contemporary views on the reviviscence of sins and the repeatability of penance, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 4 part 1: 195–228; Joseph de Ghellinck, “La reviviscence des péchés pardonnés à l’époque de Pierre Lombard et Gandulpe de Bologne,” *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 41 (1909): 400–08, although the latter paper is not a reliable guide to Gratian’s position.

³⁰² The best study of this motive in twelfth-century sacramental theology is

who support these ancient policies. He thinks they are wrong. In his view, penance should be available as often as it is needed, since human vices do not get eradicated all at once. If the same kind of sin recurs, he maintains, it should be confessed and forgiven. Gratian's tactic in defending this position against the authorities on the other side of the issue is a twofold one. In the first place, he uses countercitation. Penance is not a subject on which he thinks he can find a middle ground or on which he tries to harmonize irreconcilable opinions. He cites the anti-Donatist Augustine as his main weapon against the opposition. In attacking this sect, Gratian notes, Augustine had defined penance as the method of handling post-baptismal sin, in order to refute the Donatist idea that rebaptism could be used to deal with it. In this particular instance, then, Augustine had contrasted penance, as a repeatable sacrament, with baptism, as an unrepeatable one. Augustine thus comes in very useful as a means of undermining the ancient rules and their supporters, who include Augustine himself, writing in other contexts. In Gratian's hands, the rejection of the repeatability of penance becomes tantamount to a belief in Donatism, or in the idea that one cannot fall from grace once having received it. This line of argument, as we will see below, attracted theologians as well as canonists. Far more indicative of his canonical mentality is Gratian's conclusion that, although the ancient tradition is wrong, for the reasons he has given, the existing rules should still remain on the books. But they should not be enforced, on grounds of charity. This recourse to the principle of dispensation from the rules, rather than the outright abandoning of the rules and their replacement by new ones, is a hallmark of the canonists' caution with respect to past precedents.³⁰³ Roland of Bologna shows an analogous kind of caution, in connection with local custom. Agreeing entirely with Gratian on the desirability of repeated penance, he notes that there is a difference between the Gallican church and "us," that is, the Roman church, on the repeatability of penance. The Italians adhere to the hard line on the practice of only a single, solemn, public penance. While his own reasoning would support the idea that the practice followed north of the Alps should be extended to the whole church, Roland shrinks from advocating an institutional revamping of the Roman practice.³⁰⁴

Häring, "The Augustinian Axiom," pp. 87-117.

³⁰³ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. d. 2. c. 1-c. 20, d. 3. c. 1-d. 4. c. 24, col. 1189-97, 1211-38.

³⁰⁴ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 237-43, 249-51.

For their part, the theologians display no such hesitations. They feel perfectly free to reject out of hand the ancient tradition as fundamentally incompatible with the purposes for which penance was instituted. Yet, there are a number of ways in which they defend this common conviction. The members of the school of Laon, convinced, with Gregory the Great, that the cure of souls is the art of arts (*ars artium est regimen animarum*) and that pastoral need requires the repeatability of penance, invoke the principle of historical criticism as a basis for overturning the traditional rules. Back in the time of the primitive church, they note, the idea of a single, solemn, public penance may have made good pastoral sense. In those days, only the truly committed risked membership in the church. The early Christians, moreover, were largely adult converts. The single, solemn, public penance was a useful device for putting the fear of the Lord (*propter incutiendam terrorum*) into new Christians who might think they could join the church without true moral conversion. But, nowadays, the situation is a different one. The church is no longer a community of zealots. The current needs of real, and fallible, Christians have to be taken into account, lest people fall into despair. The abandoning of the old practice is thus a real and relevant desideratum. It is now better to rule that penance should be received as often as people sin (*item salubriter provisam est ut quotiens peccarent totiens ad penitentiam recipirentur*). Each of the rules, the old rule to be set aside and the new rule to be observed in its place, is suitable to the conditions of its own time (*suo tempore congruum est*). The Laon masters also see that private penance can be invoked to circumvent the old rule. If a person has already done public penance for a serious sin, his subsequent penances for subsequent sins can be done in private.³⁰⁵ This pressure to change the rules, in the estimation of the Laon masters, stems from the necessity of penance for salvation,³⁰⁶ given the present membership of the church and its pastoral requirements.

Historical criticism is not the only tack that a theologian in accord with this conclusion may take. Hugh of St. Victor offers a different rationale for rejecting the unrepeatability of penance. He combines a cogent appeal to reason with an exegetically based attack on the opposition. Once a person does penance for a sin, he

³⁰⁵ *Sentences of Plausible Authenticity*, no. 200; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 383, 385–87, 5: 134, 280, 282–83. The first quotation is at no. 383, p. 280; the others are at no. 200, p. 134. See also *Sent. Anselmi* 8, pp. 122–23.

³⁰⁶ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 363, 5: 272.

observes, it is forgiven and God does not tax him with it again. But, a person can commit the same kind of sin again. This is not the same act of sin that he committed and repented of earlier, Hugh stresses, but a different, if analogous, event. Consequently, the penitent can repent and be pardoned again. When this happens, neither the sincerity of the penitent nor the mercy of God on the first occasion needs to be called into question. This being the case, how, Hugh asks, did the ancient fathers make the error in judgment that led them to the imposition of the rule declaring that penance was unrepeatable? Hugh's technique for exposing this error is the countercitation of authorities, all deriving from the Bible, in order to show that the opposition's view is founded on an incorrect understanding of Holy Scripture. While his basic motive is certainly the desire not to limit the occasions of divine mercy in the lives of Christians, his tactic is to put the debate on an exegetical foundation, and one that can be subsumed by the principle that the Bible cannot be read correctly if it is read so as to undercut God's goodness and His wish to redeem and to sanctify mankind.³⁰⁷

The author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* provides yet another kind of argument in support of the new twelfth-century consensus position, an argument by definition. He cites as his definition of penance one derived from Augustine and Gregory and one widely held at this time. Penance, he states, is sorrow for past sin and the sincere desire not to commit it again. This sincere desire is laudable; but human beings are fallible. Since people can and do sin again, they can and do repent again. Thus, by its very nature as defined, penance is repeatable. Its repetition does not obviate the sincerity of an earlier penance. Further, the master warns sternly, the opinion of those who reject this conclusion is impious and merciless (*impia et immisericors sententia ista*). As with the members of the school of Laon, he invokes private penance as a remedy for fresh outbreaks of repentance, although he draws a different distinction than they do between public and private penance. It is not the intrinsic seriousness of the sin that mandates public penance, in his view, but the fact that sin so remedied has social implications or has given public scandal. In contrast, private penance can be used, repeatedly, for sins that affect only the sinner himself, whether the sin is major or minor. The master does not have a recommendation, however, on how to deal with renewed occasions when sins having a public impact need to be repented, since he retains the

³⁰⁷ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.14.4, 2.14.9, *PL* 176: 556C–559D, 570C–578A.

rule that public penance can be performed only once.³⁰⁸

The author of the *Summa sententiarum* takes still another line of attack, and one, perhaps, that is less persuasive than the aggressive appeals to pastoral need, history, exegetical accuracy, and the nature of penance as such made by the masters just mentioned. His approach is to try to relativize the force of the prohibition of the repeatability of penance by asserting that the authorities who advocate that position were referring only to public penance. He ignores the fact that they may have been writing before private penance had been developed as a substitute for public penance, or as a simultaneous option. In his estimation, this reading of the anti-repeatability authorities clears the field for the defense of repeated private penance, although the master offers no positive rationale for that practice.³⁰⁹ Other masters simply reiterate the conclusions that can be drawn from all the above arguments for the repeatability of penance, without developing a rationale for it, as if the position were in no need of support.³¹⁰

The second major debate concerning penance in our period, and it is one involving the substance of the doctrine and not just the tactics of argument adopted to defend a particular mode of administration, concerns the question of when, in the standard three-part event embracing contrition, confession, and satisfaction, the sins of the penitent are remitted. Here, the terrain was divided between the contritionists and the confessionists. The canonists were inclined to take the confessionist position and the theologians the contritionist one, but the battle lines were not drawn hard and fast and, as we will see, there were some masters on both sides who broke ranks.³¹¹ There are, to be sure, masters who ignore this

³⁰⁸ *Sent. div.* 5.4, pp. 142*-44*, 148*-51*. The quotation is on p. 143*. Other authors who give the same definition of penance include Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum*, 15. c. 1, *PL* 161: 857C; Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, p. 76; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 10.65, pp. 85-86; Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 22. Master Simon, *ibid.*, pp. 22-24 agrees that public penance is not repeatable but that private penance is, although without taking up the reviviscence of sins.

³⁰⁹ *Summa sent.* 6.12, *PL* 176: 149B-150C.

³¹⁰ Thus the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 207; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 10.63-64, p. 85; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.41, 6.24, *PL* 186: 847C-D, 862D-863A. Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 196-97 misinterprets Robert here.

³¹¹ An extensive and excellent survey of this debate is provided by Anciaux, *La théologie du sacrement de la pénitence*, pp. 164-223. Briefer but still useful are Francesco Carpino, "Consensi e critiche ad una teoria sull'assoluzione sacramentale nel sec. XII," *La Scuola Cattolica* 67 (1939): 308-21; "Un tentativo al secolo XII per valorizzare l'assoluzione sacramentale," *La Scuola Cattolica* 66 (1938): 281-98; Jean Gaudemet, "Le débat sur la confession dans la Distinction 1 du 'de penitentia' (Décret de Gratian, C. 33, q. 3)," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*,

debate, noting merely that the sacrament has these three parts and venturing no opinion on which of them is of the essence in the remission of sin. In this category we can find Honorius Augustodunensis, and Ivo of Chartres.³¹² As the century progressed, however, the only writer on the sacraments who manages to ignore this question is Master Simon. Gratian takes a commanding lead in the elaboration of the confessionist view. He is important here not only for the classic rendition of this position which he provides, but also for the elaborate dossier of authorities pro and con which he assembles, material on which other masters draw whether they agree with him or not. After his exhaustive review of the evidence, Gratian concludes that the authorities supporting contritionism have made a good case, but only up to a point. They are useful in rebutting a totally unqualified confessionist line that would ignore, or undervalue, the penitent's attitude, while placing the emphasis purely on the external acts of confession and the completion of satisfaction. This pure confessionism Gratian rejects as too mechanical. He asserts that true contrition is necessary if penance is going to be efficacious and fruitful. But, if it is a necessary step, contrition is only the first step. It is required but, for Gratian, it is not sufficient. In particular, it is in the confession stage of the sacrament that he locates the moment when the penitent's sins are remitted, at the point when the priest pronounces the words of absolution. As for the satisfaction, it may be public or private, depending on whether the sins confessed were confessed in public or in private. The distinction Gratian draws here combines the criteria given by the Laon masters and the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*. Public penance is reserved for serious sins that affect others; while private penance is for lesser sins that affect only the penitent. Both types of sins, Gratian stresses, need to be confessed. Confession perfects the sacrament which contrition initiates. It is mandatory, otherwise the power of the keys vested in the priesthood would be frustrated. Further, refusal to confess is a sign of pride that compounds the penitent's existing moral problems and

kanonistische Abteilung 71 (1985): 54–56; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 2: 244–45, 264–65, 273; 4 part 1: 275–99; Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires*, 1: 257–58; Jean Charles Payen, “La pénitence dans le contexte culturel des XII^e et XIII^e siècles: Des doctrines contritionnistes aux pénitentiels vernaculaires,” *RSPT* 61 (1977): 399–428; Joseph A. Spitzig, *Sacramental Penance in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1947), pp. 38–67.

³¹² Honorius, *Eluc.* 2.72, p. 432; Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 2. c. 71, *PL* 161: 857C–902A.

indicates that his contrition is insincere. Confession, Gratian concludes, is, to be sure, first offered to God in contrition. But it must also be offered, orally, to a priest. Appreciative as Gratian is of the need for a truly contrite disposition in the penitent, he holds that penance, in order to be ratified and perfected, must be carried from the internal forum of conscience to an external, judicial forum. The penitent's placement of himself under the judgment of the priest is necessary for him, if he wants his sins to be remitted. It is also necessary for the church, in its guarantee of the proper exercise of priestly authority, both in the priest's loosing of the penitent's sin with the words of absolution and in his assigning of the satisfaction.³¹³

This argument requires Gratian to make the claim that the contritionist authorities are not talking about contrition as the point when the forgiveness of sins occurs, although that is precisely what they are in fact doing, but merely about contrition as the sacrament's necessary but not sufficient first step, as he holds it to be. This is the way in which he seeks to adjust their view to the confessionist position that he, and the confessionist authorities as moderated by his analysis, maintain. Gratian's technique here involves the same sort of creative misreading of authorities as what we have found in the *Sententiae divinitatis* on the repeatability of penance. This manhandling of the sources forces them into alignment with the largely institutional view of penance which Gratian presents.³¹⁴ It is the legitimate exercise of the priestly power of the keys that is foremost in his defense of the necessity and centrality of confession, not the moral education of the penitent. This emphasis is reflected in a range of other topics which Gratian takes up à propos of penance, which likewise view it from the standpoint of the minister of the sacrament, not the recipient. He devotes a good deal of attention in this connection to how priests should administer penance, whether, if they are penitents themselves, they should hear the confessions of others—a question which, in its very formulation, suggests that Gratian has not fully emancipated himself from the idea that penance means the completion of satisfaction—and how to deal with a penitent who the priest suspects of making a hypocritical confession or who tries to buy absolution by bribing the priest. Gratian also has urgent words of support for the princi-

³¹³ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. d. 1. c. 87–c. 89, col. 1181–89. Good accounts are found in A. Debil, “La première distinction du De poenitentia de Gratien,” *RHE* 15 (1914): 251–73, 442–55; Gaudemet, “Le débat,” pp. 54–56.

³¹⁴ Gratian's handling, or mishandling, of the contritionist authorities is analyzed fully by Gaudemet, “Le débat,” pp. 52–75.

ple that the seal of confession must be respected at all costs. The defense of this principle, in his estimation, requires the deposition of a priest whose ability to maintain confidentiality is compromised. Finally, penance, for Gratian, can and should be administered up to the point of death; and priests should not fail, in their ordained responsibility as the ministers of penitential absolution, to hear the confessions of the moribund.³¹⁵ In all these areas, as well as in his stress on confession as the point in the sacrament of penance when the penitent's moral state is determined, Gratian emphasizes the institutional, sacerdotal side of the transaction.

This point of view is quite typical of the canonists, both before and after Gratian. Alger of Liège also takes a strongly confessionist line, stressing that it is the priest who has the power to forgive sin, to loose and to bind, an authority he possesses *ex officio*, regardless of his personal merits.³¹⁶ Roland of Bologna summarizes Gratian's argument and refines it slightly. He devotes attention to the charity and lack of dissimulation that must inform the contrition which begins the process of penance. While the penitent's guilt (*culpa*) is remitted in contrition, in his view, Roland agrees that confession and satisfaction are sure signs (*certa signa*) of that state and that it is they that remit the temporal punishment due for sin. Contrition alone would suffice only in cases of necessity where confession and satisfaction are impossible. Otherwise, time permitting, both are required. When we sin, Roland observes, we sin against both God and the church. Thus, when we repent, we must satisfy both, God by our contrition and the church by our auricular confession and satisfaction. While Roland grants more attention to contrition than Gratian does, his outlook, if marginally less clericalist, is equally institutional.³¹⁷

Not all of the masters in the first half of the twelfth century who concur with Gratian's confessionism are fellow canonists. Among the theologians, both Robert Pullen and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* offer strong support for this position. With Gratian, they argue that all three steps are required for penance to be real penance. Sincere contrition, in which none of the penitent's sins are held back, begins the process and is a critical factor in his capacity to make moral progress by means of this sacrament. But the decisive moment, at which his sins are forgiven, occurs when the

³¹⁵ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 1. d. 50, pars 2. d. 5–d. 7, col. 178–203, 1236–47.

³¹⁶ Alger of Liège, *De misericordia* 1.64–65, pp. 237–38.

³¹⁷ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 343–49; *Summa* c. 33. q. 3, pp. 193–94. Schmoll, *Die Busslehre*, pp. 249–51 depicts Roland as more of a contritionist than he is.

priest pronounces the words of absolution following the penitent's oral confession. Following Anselm of Laon here, Robert states that the worthy celebration of this rite demands absolution (*quoniam in ipsa digne celebrata peccatorum est absolutio*). Further, taking a firmly clericalist line, both masters insist on the right and duty of the priest to impose satisfaction. Robert acknowledges the fact that the confessor may be delinquent and fail to do so. The *Summa sententiarum* adds that the confessor may lack good judgment and may impose an unsuitable satisfaction, noting as well that the penitent may neglect to do or to complete the satisfaction that he does impose, whether it is appropriate or not. If so, additional time in Purgatory will be required of the penitent by God so that the deficiency can be remedied. The only exception to the need for confession and satisfaction, in Robert's eyes, is martyrdom, or the case of the good thief on the cross, on the analogy with baptism by desire and baptism by blood.³¹⁸

Likewise, not all of the canonists are confessionists. Paucapalea, the earliest commentator on Gratian, whose work dates to the years between 1144 and 1150, takes the point about contrition being sufficient in emergencies and contrition being the moment when God removes the penitent's *culpa* also found in Roland of Bologna and develops it into a defense of contritionism that does not square with Gratian's position.³¹⁹ Without repeating the thoroughgoing analysis of the confessionist authorities on whom Gratian bases his own solution, he summarizes the contritionists' arguments and presents his own view as a logical inference from them. While he does not seem particularly comfortable with the conclusions he draws, he presents them as a position which he can find no way of refuting or relativizing, being unwilling, evidently, to make use of Gratian's own strategy of argument here.

Indeed, discomfort with the logical corollaries of contritionism can also be found in some of the most ardent defenders of that

³¹⁸ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.30–31, 6.52–53, 6.59–61, 7.1–5, *PL* 186: 851D–853C, 902B–904D, 908C–912C, 911C–913A. The quotation is at 6.61, 912C. Schmoll, *Die Busslehre*, pp. 60–64 presents Robert as offering a more balanced view than he does. See also *Summa sent.* 6.10, 6.13–14. *PL* 176: 146D–147B, 152A–153A. Cf. *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 64, 5: 57, where it is stated that forgiveness of sins does not occur “nisi per ministros ecclesie solvitur.” On Anselm, see Francesco Carpino, “Una difficoltà contro la confessione nella scolastica primitiva: Anselmo di Laon e la sua scuola,” *Divus Thomas* ser. 3^a, 16 (1939): 94–103.

³¹⁹ Paucapalea, *Summa über das Decretum Gratiani*, ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1965 [repr. of Giessen, 1890 ed.]), p. 132. For the dating of this text, see Schulte's intro., pp. viii–x.

position. What troubles them is the fact that they are hesitant to dismiss the desirability of confession and satisfaction. But they face real difficulties in trying to explain why these steps in the sacrament should be retained, given their conviction that the contrition stage is when the penitent is forgiven by God. Proponents of contritionism deal with this problem more or less cogently. The members of the school of Laon are a good index of the unsuccessful effort to resolve this dilemma. In general, they find Anselm of Laon's position unacceptable. It is the intention of the penitent that they accent. What inspires God to remit his sin is his true sorrow for sin and for having offended God. If, after having been released from his sin on account of such true contrition, the penitent fails to proceed to confession and satisfaction, God does not withdraw the forgiveness He has already given; nor does God grant it conditionally.³²⁰ But, side by side with this assertion that contrition is sufficient in the eyes of God, the Laon masters make other statements suggesting the opposite. Noting that, when we sin, we sin in thought, word, and deed, and so we must do penance in thought, word, and, deed, they also say that, while contrition provides the cleansing (*ablutio*), God does not actually remit the sin until the penitent is absolved by the priest.³²¹ Another member of the school makes the equally confusing observation that, while the confession made to God in the contrite penitent's soul purges sin, it remains for the priest to teach how this sin is to be purged.³²² At the same time, one can find points made by the Laon masters suggesting adherence to the opinion that penance can be defined as satisfaction, that it is the works done under this heading that rise to God as an evening sacrifice, and that a penitent has not truly repented and is not to be given communion until the yoke of satisfaction has been lifted from his shoulders.³²³

Hugh of St. Victor manifests some of the same kinds of inconsistency and self-contradiction as we have just seen in the school of Laon, a fact reflected in the inability of modern scholars to decide whether he is a contritionist or a confessionist, or something in between.³²⁴ On the one hand, he presents the contritionists as

³²⁰ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 383, 5: 280–81.

³²¹ *Sent. Anselmi* 8, pp. 121–25; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 64, 363, 389, 5: 56–57, 272–73, 280.

³²² *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 199, 5: 134.

³²³ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 384, 385–88, 5: 281, 281–82. Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 58–61 does not appreciate these inconsistencies.

³²⁴ Carpino, "Un tentativo," pp. 281–95 presents Hugh as a would-be confessionist; Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 103–09 sees him as a full-fledged confessionist;

people seeking to avoid the biblical injunction to confess sins, one to another, and as thinkers who have abandoned patristic as well as apostolic authority. Yet, in his own treatment of penance, he distinguishes between interior and exterior penance. The first is the grief and sorrow for sin and the firm purpose of amendment. Interior penance, for Hugh, is penance proper. Exterior penance is its fruit, and works to correct the sin. Hugh sees exterior penance as satisfaction, omitting confession here, and states that the satisfaction is not penance proper. Having made that point, he next asks what happens to people who do not complete their penance in this life, thus equating penance with satisfaction. The scenario he has in mind is not that of a person whose completion of satisfaction is cut off by death but rather that of a person given an inadequate satisfaction by an imprudent confessor. Hugh's response is that God will not tax this penitent with the inadequacies of his priest. Anyway, leftover satisfaction can be dealt with in Purgatory.³²⁵ After pausing to discuss other aspects of the sacrament, Hugh returns to this issue later in the same section of the *De sacramentis*. There, he asserts that what is efficacious in penance is repentance, not satisfaction. To be sure, a good will seeks to express itself in good deeds. But, should the good deeds be thwarted or incomplete, the good will suffices, and it is on this basis that God judges the penitent. In addressing the question of when, in the penitential process, the remission of sin occurs, he ventilates both sides of the debate and takes what he tries to present as a compromise view, which has the effect of muddying the waters. With the contritionists, he states that it is contrition which is efficacious. Also, he points out, it is God Who forgives, not the priest. But, as in all sacraments, so here as well God has chosen to use physical means as channels of His grace. In this case, God associates Himself with the ministry of the priest, and the forgiveness He grants is given through the words of absolution spoken by the priest. Further, satisfaction must be done, in Hugh's estimation, even though he has stated that it is not the sacrament proper. The necessity of satisfaction is offered to buttress the argument for the necessity of confession, as the point at which sin is forgiven officially. The exchange between the penitent and the confessor reflects the penitent's humility, good faith, and willingness to undertake satisfaction. It also provides the occasion for the priestly exercise of the

Schmoll, *Die Busslehre*, pp. 47–57 argues that he is a contritionist. None of these authors notes Hugh's inconsistencies.

³²⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.14.1–3, *PL* 176: 549D–556C.

power of the keys. The priest not only absolves, assigns satisfaction, and counsels the penitent; Hugh presents him also as interceding with God on the penitent's behalf, persuading God to forgive the sinner in addition to persuading the sinner to repent. Here, Hugh neglects to note that, at this point in the process, by his own account, the penitent no longer needs to be so persuaded. And, having ordained this mode of remedy for post-baptismal sin, neither does God.³²⁶ This effort at finding a middle road between confessionism and contritionism thus emerges as a non-solution, rather than as a coherent and viable compromise between those two positions.

Judging from his overall stance on the role of intentionality in ethics, and in sacraments such as baptism, we are not surprised to find in Peter Abelard a staunch defender of contritionism. What is surprising in his handling of penance is his unwillingness, or inability, to press or even to follow the logic of his own position.³²⁷ As with the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis*, he states that contrition is the very definition of this sacrament; penance is nothing other than the sorrow for sin in the penitent's mind. Furthermore, and here Abelard opposes the school of Laon, Robert Pullen, and the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, who allow that *timor initialis*, or fear of eternal punishment, can be an acceptable trigger to contrition, at least if it leads to love of God as the penitent's motive, Abelard asserts that, in order for contrition to be fruitful, contrition must stem from the love of God and the hatred of sin because it offends God, and not in any sense from the fear of punishment. If that state of contrition is present, for Abelard, God grants the remission of sin: "In the sigh of inner repentance inspired by charity we are instantly reconciled to God for our past sins" (*In hoc statim gemitu Dei reconciliamur et precedentis venium assequimur*).³²⁸ Abelard follows up

³²⁶ Ibid., 2.14.6–8, *PL* 176: 560C–570C.

³²⁷ Abelard's inconsistencies on penance have been noted by Schmoll, *Die Busslehre*, pp. 28–35; Sikes, *Peter Abailard*, pp. 196–200; Weingart, "Abailard's Contribution," pp. 173–77; *The Logic of Divine Love*, pp. 197–200; Amédée de Zedelghem, "L'Attritionisme d'Abélard," *Estudis Franciscans* 35 (1925): 178–84, 333–45.

³²⁸ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, p. 76; the translation is Luscombe's, p. 77. On this point, see Amédée de Zedelghem, "Doctrine d'Abélard au sujet de la valeur morale de la crainte des peines," *Estudis Franciscans* 36 (1926): 108–25. For the countervailing position on fear in the masters he opposes, see *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 383, 5: 280–81; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 5.30–31, *PL* 186: 851D–853C; *Summa sent.* 6.10, *PL* 176: 146C–D. In agreement with Abelard on this point we find not only disciples of his such as Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 156–57 but also Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 24–25.

this forthright assertion of contritionism with the point that, since contrition involves a complete inner reorientation toward the good, one cannot be forgiven if he retains any unacknowledged sins on his conscience, a consensus position. The forgiveness applies to the remission of the eternal punishment due for sin, but not to the temporal punishment. This claim establishes why satisfaction is needed and provides Abelard with the occasion to observe, as other masters do, that a person who dies before completing his satisfaction is detained in Purgatory on that account.³²⁹

It is not, however, the relations between contrition and satisfaction but the relations between contrition and confession where the real, and perceived, problems lie in Abelard's doctrine of penance. Despite the clarity and force of his contritionist claims, Abelard wants to argue that confession is still necessary, even though the penitent's sin has already been forgiven before he speaks to the priest. It must be said that, notwithstanding his reputation as a logician, Abelard is aware of the difficulties he imposes on himself in seeking to make confession mandatory, and he makes heavy weather of his argument here, jumping from one idea to another in a kind of scatter-gun effort to distract the reader from the logical insufficiency of any of the claims he makes. There is a pastoral argument for confession, he notes: the prayers of the confessor will assist the penitent. There is an argument for the moral education of the penitent: the knowledge that we have to confess our sins may serve as a deterrent to sin, for going to confession is difficult and embarrassing. In this sense, the act of confessing is part of the satisfaction. Moving to an ecclesiastical argument, Abelard notes that priests have the right and duty to impose satisfaction, and penitents have the duty to accept correction.³³⁰

This last-mentioned observation leads Abelard to a discussion of the power of the keys, where he gets even more deeply ensnared in contradictions which he recognizes and shrinks from resolving. Having noted the penitent's duty to accept correction, Abelard asks what one should do if one cannot find a confessor who is religious, discreet, and trustworthy, and who is intelligent enough to impose a suitable satisfaction and to counsel the penitent effectively. This is by no means a frivolous question. Abelard's posing of it here reflects the fact that, the Gregorian reforms notwithstanding, the improvement in the quality of clergymen at which they aimed was

³²⁹ Peter Abelard, *Ethics*, pp. 76–98.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 98–100.

being outpaced by the rising expectations of the Christian people to whom these clerics ministered. Having aired this real and vexing question, Abelard says that, even if a good priest cannot be found, one should go to confession anyhow. Agreeing with Hugh here, he states that God will not charge the failings of His ministers to the penitent's account. Listing in some detail, and even with some relish, the assorted sacerdotal shortcomings which penitents may encounter in the practice of confession, he still insists that they are not excuses for refusing to confess to an unworthy priest, even though this conclusion is incompatible with the educational and pastoral benefits which the penitent is supposed to derive from the encounter.³³¹ With respect to the power of the keys on the priest's side of the transaction, Abelard argues that, in penance, the role of the priest is not to loose and bind, on the grounds that it is God Who does the loosing, and that He does it in the contrition stage of the sacrament. In his view, the priest exercises the power of the keys here only in connection with the imposition of satisfaction, which falls under the heading of the key of discretion, not the key of power. But, here Abelard notes that not all priests in fact possess the attribute of discretion. Some priests lack the intelligence and good judgment needed to exercise their faculties, in the administration of the sacrament of penance, in a seemly and circumspect manner. Now, Abelard continues, if individuals do not possess these attributes by nature, the reception of the sacrament of holy orders on their part does not in itself remove that regrettable defect. Abelard here tries to glide away from the dilemma in which he leaves penitents confronted by such inadequate priests by trying to turn the discussion toward the moral problems that unworthy priests create for themselves. But, as for the moral problems that they create for others, Abelard simply abandons the point. The final observation he has to make about the power of the keys creates another inconsistency, however. As we have seen, he has left the power to loose and to bind, understood as the power to excommunicate and to readmit to communion, out of the reckoning à propos of penance. There is good reason for this omission, since this dimension of the power of the keys is not really pertinent to penance. Still, Abelard brings it up at the close of his analysis of that sacrament. The power to excommunicate and readmit, he states, is canceled when it is exercised unjustly. This observation may or may not have been included as a reference to Abelard's own

³³¹ Ibid., pp. 106–10.

misadventures. In any event, he does not see that a parallel judgment might be made, for the sake of logical symmetry, in the case of the unworthy or deficient exercise of the key of discretion, despite the harm that it may do. Why the power of discretion should not be subject to the same logical analysis as the power of excommunication and readmission is a matter that Abelard declines to discuss.³³² He ends by leaving penitents in a double bind by insisting on the necessity of confession, a requirement that does not follow from his definition of penance itself, and which, in the event of a counterproductive spiritual encounter with an indiscreet confessor, he fails to justify.

Precisely the same problems are found in Abelard's disciples, mitigated only to the extent that their treatment of this topic is much more abbreviated than his own, giving them fewer opportunities to get ensnared in their own reasoning. Still, the basic contradiction remains. They are contritionists; they see contrition as valid only if it is inspired by the love of God; they seek to insist on the necessity of confession; they recognize the fact that priests may not possess the key of discretion in actuality; and they leave the penitent in the same impasse as Abelard does.³³³ The same can be said for the Porretans and for Gilbert of Poitiers himself, whom his disciples cite as teaching that sins are forgiven in the contrition stage of penance. They agree, but likewise require confession and satisfaction and are not successful in explaining why, given their recognition of the fact that discretion is no respecter of persons and that holy orders are no guarantee that an individual will possess it. One of the Porretan masters describes priests as having the official function of discerning (*officium discernandi*); but he leaves the reader in the dark as to how priests will be able to exercise this function if they lack the mental and moral wherewithal required to do so.³³⁴

We can see little real effort to break the log-jam which the mid-century defenders of contritionism create for themselves until we get to the *Sententiae divinitatis*. The author of this work is an unqualified contritionist. After reviewing with great thoroughness the arguments on both sides, he invokes the definition of penance as contrition noted above, and states firmly that sins "are remitted in contrition of the heart" (*dimissa sunt in cordis contritione*). He adds forthrightly that confession and satisfaction "have no effect on the

³³² Ibid., pp. 112–26.

³³³ Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 156–65; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 207–16.

³³⁴ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 10.57–62, 10.66–67, pp. 84–85, 86. The quotation is at 10.67, p. 86.

remission of sins" (*valet quidem non ad peccatorum remissionem*). One should go to confession, he recommends, not because it has any effect on the forgiveness of sin, but so as not to put the institutions of the church in despute.³³⁵ In dealing with the problems surrounding priests handled so inconclusively by the Abelardians and Porretans, this master imports into the discussion an authority whom they do not cite, the *De vera et falsa poenitentia*. This work, written anonymously in the mid-eleventh century, was ascribed to Augustine. It validates a principle that had been part of the orthodox consensus for centuries, and one which was to remain there during and after the middle of the twelfth century if as a minor current of opinion, confession to a lay person. Says the master, citing the Pseudo-Augustine, if a priest is not available, confess to a deacon. If a deacon is not available, confess to a neighbor (*confiteatur proximo*). Such a confession will be valid and worthy so long as the proper contrition is present and the desire to confess to a priest is present, were one at hand.³³⁶ Further, the master adds that if the penitent knows that a particular priest is excommunicated or is under a disciplinary ban, as a punishment for sin, he should avoid that priest and seek another confessor. But, he warns, one should not avoid a priest simply because one does not like him personally. Also, priests should not seek to rob their brother priests of their penitents, reaping a harvest where someone else has sown.³³⁷ Displaying more interest in the priest's side of the transaction than is typical of the theologians, the master considers what priests ought to bear in mind when they judge the severity of the sins confessed to them and assign satisfaction. The conditions, in his view, should be the quantity, quality, place, time, and occasion of the sin and the person who has committed it. With respect to the person, the priest should consider the individual's office, age, sex, wealth, and circumstances. Also, he should consider whether the sin was committed in thought only or also in act, whether it implicated or affected others, and whether it was committed in public or in private.³³⁸ These concerns give the master's treatise on penance as much the look of a penitential guidebook for confessors as the look of a

³³⁵ *Sent. div.* 5.4, pp. 145*-48*. The quotations are on p. 148*.

³³⁶ *Ibid.* 5.4, pp. 151*-52*. The quotation is on p. 152*. For the background on confession to lay people, see Teetaert, *La confession aux laïques*, pp. 1-142. For the *De vera et falsa poenitentia* and its influence, see in particular *ibid.*, pp. 50-56, 102-42; on the *Sent. div.*, see pp. 134-37.

³³⁷ *Sent. div.* 5.4, p. 152*.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.4, pp. 152*-55*.

sacramental theology. He does not raise the issue of the power of the keys or the problem of priestly indiscretion in connection with penance. Still, it has to be said that this master goes farther toward assisting contritionism to a cogent resolution of its difficulties than does any of his predecessors. His influence on Peter Lombard is considerable.

The *Sententiae divinitatis* is not, however, the only recent source on which the Lombard draws in elaborating his doctrine of penance. Another author whom he uses extensively, both in a positive sense and in order to turn his argument on its head, is Gratian.³³⁹ Abelard receives both criticism and homage and Hugh of St. Victor and the *Summa sententiarum* are treated as helpful only intermittently. While the Lombard has been characterized as doing no more, and no less, than summarizing the aspects of the doctrine of penance on which consensus reigned in his time,³⁴⁰ in actual fact he does much more. In areas where he agrees with the consensus position, he anchors his points in his own way, and with a richer array of authorities than is generally the case. In addition, he takes a forceful stand in debated areas, a stand which is typically both more extreme and more coherently defended than is usual among recent and contemporary masters.

One striking and unusual feature of Peter's handling of penance is that he offers his fullest definition of the *sacramentum* and the *res sacramenti* at the end of his treatise on the subject, rather than at the beginning. While he has a clear understanding all along of how he proposes to define these terms, and one that certainly controls his exposition of the topic throughout, Peter adopts this strategy because he seeks to present the definitions with which he concludes as following logically from the analysis and argumentation that precede them. At the start of his discussion, then, he confines himself to observing that penance was given to help people reapproach God after they had distanced themselves from Him by falling into the *regio dissimilitudinis* of post-baptismal sin. Penance is both a sacrament and a virtue of the mind. The exterior rite is the sacrament.³⁴¹ The virtue of the mind is interior; and here Peter

³³⁹ This point is noted, correctly, by Debil, "La première distinction," pp. 252–53, 255–56; Gaudemet, "Le débat," p. 66.

³⁴⁰ Thus Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 2: 244–45, 264–65, 273.

³⁴¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 14. c. 1, d. 19. c. 1.3, 2: 315–16, 365–66. Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1: 93 is thus incorrect in stating that Peter Lombard's definition of penance excludes a physical element.

joins the *Sententiae divinitatis* and Abelard in reprising the Augustinian and Gregorian definition of contrition as sorrow for sin and a sincere purpose of amendment. He thus agrees, at the outset, that contrition is of the essence in penance, by definition; but the idea of calling penance a virtue of the mind is not found in any current canonist or scholastic theologian. It bears a closer affinity to the treatment of this question by monastic authors such as Bernard of Clairvaux, who is interested in the subjective disposition involved in the state of compunction which he seeks to inflame in his audience in his writings on this subject.³⁴²

This understanding of contrition sets the stage for Peter's treatment of the reviviscence of sins and the repeatability of penance. He agrees with Hugh of St. Victor's clarification of the topic of reviviscence. When the same type of sin is committed again, this is not the identical sin which was committed on another occasion. The fact that the earlier sin may have been remitted in penance does not obviate the need, and the desirability, of returning to this remedy, if circumstances should require it subsequently. One should not, he warmly agrees, cut off access to the channels of grace which God in His mercy has made available. Peter also concurs with Hugh, and with everyone else, that for a repeated reception of penance to be fruitful, or for any reception of penance to be fruitful, for that matter, a proper attitude is required, which includes the willingness to admit and to repent of all one's sins, holding nothing back, except for sins already remitted in penance, unless they have been repeated. The only stipulation he adds to this common teaching is that a penance will not be fruitful if the penitent, knowing that he can have future recourse to the sacrament, fails to bring to his reception of penance a truly sincere purpose of amendment. Peter also seconds wholeheartedly Gratian's argument on the repeatability of penance, making use of his dossier of authorities. Noting that the pro-repeatability authorities can offer cogent pastoral and moral reasons in defense of their position, while those who would limit penance to the single, solemn, public penance can offer no rationale at all for this restriction, he likewise caps his conclusion by citing the anti-Donatist Augustine, observing that the doctrine of nonrepeatability gives lefthanded support to a Donatist, sectarian view of the church. His argument is an effective

³⁴² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 14. c. 1–c. 3.1, 2: 315–18; Jean Leclercq, "S. Bernard et la confession des péchés," *Collectanea Cistercensia* 46 (1984): 122–30; Schmoll, *Die Busslehre*, pp. 23–24.

synthesis of the pastoral considerations put forth by the school of Laon, the moral analysis of Hugh, and the broad-gauged grasp of tradition afforded by Gratian, not to mention Gratian's elegant use of the anti-Donatist argument. He is, however, more interested in invoking reason than historical criticism in rejecting ancient tradition and does not follow Gratian in urging that the old rules should remain on the books but that Christians should be systematically dispensed from observing them. Rather, he argues for the repeatability of penance tout court, and the abandonment of any restrictions on that principle. Peter rejects the efforts to hedge the idea of the single, solemn penance by introducing the possibility of using private penance repeatedly for certain kinds of sins, introduced by less independent-minded masters. He boldly sweeps away their distinctions. Since we should not spurn the grace provided in penance for our spiritual healing and spiritual growth, Peter concludes, we can retain the single, solemn penance if we wish to. But, in his hands, this rite has become fundamentally irrelevant. Repeated private penance replaces it as the norm. It is to be used as often as it is needed, and for all kinds of sins.³⁴³ This solution had the decided effect of clearing the air, paving the way to the dropping of the single, solemn, public penance altogether as a practice in the western church, one that is optional, and one that is essentially marginal to the way in which penance is normally administered and received. Here, while certainly confirming the contemporary consensus position on the repeatability of penance, Peter pushes beyond the boundaries set on this subject by his compeers. He succeeds in placing the discussion of this aspect of the sacrament in a new state of equilibrium. By anchoring his solution in the positive pastoral and moral rationale that supports it, and by urging that the authorities who defend the ancient practice be rejected out of hand because of their inability to adduce any coherent reasons for the rule they advocate, Peter effectively raises the ante to the point where his opponents are forced to leave the game.

On the matter of confessionism versus contritionism, as we have seen, there was no consensus in this period, either on the particular point in the penitential process when sins are remitted or, for the contritionists, on the way to support the idea that confession and satisfaction are desirable practices even though they are held to take place after the remission is granted and therefore to have no effect on it. In this area Peter emerges as a staunch contritionist,

³⁴³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 14. c. 3.2–d. 15. c. 7, d. 22. c. 1, 2: 318–36, 386–88.

and as the only supporter of that side of the debate in the mid-twelfth century who refuses to shrink from the logic of its claims, who goes on to develop a coherent and non-contradictory theory of the relations between contrition and the other two traditional elements in the penitential rite.³⁴⁴ In taking his stand on this controversy, Peter adheres consistently to the principles he advocates, and does not hesitate to offer arguments that are relatively extreme in their defense. Peter's opening salvo is a quotation from John Chrysostom, actually the Pseudo-Chrysostom, cited as well by the Laon masters and by Peter himself in his treatment of sin, in general, under the heading of ethics, a point making it clear that he intends to consider the remission of sins in penance in a parallel manner. When we sin, says the authority, we sin in thought, word, and deed. And so, perfect penance involves compunction of heart, oral confession, and satisfaction. Both inner and outer penance must be sincere, an idea on which he amplifies by noting that we should not confess one sin to one priest and another to another.³⁴⁵ Moving at once to the heart of the matter, he next introduces a trio of related questions. Can sins be remitted without confession and without satisfaction? Can one confess just to God, purely by one's contrition of heart, without a priest as accessory? Can one confess to a lay person?

Peter plans to answer each of these questions with a resounding "yes." He recognizes the fact that, in order to do so successfully, he needs to take account of the authorities and arguments on the other side of the debate and to de-fang them convincingly. In dealing with the first two of these questions, he borrows not only from Gratian's dossier but also takes a leaf from his book, methodologically speaking. Peter's own chosen solution is that the remission of sin is a gift of God that is given in the contrition stage of penance. The gift is given and received within the penitent's heart. If the penitent has time, he should also confess to a priest, although the sin has already been remitted. Peter presents this issue as if penitents are people with such busy schedules that, for perfectly legitimate reasons, they may be unable to go to confession. And, just as Gratian "adjusts" the contritionist authorities he cites to make

³⁴⁴ Good accounts of Peter's stance in the confessionist-contritionist debate are provided by Anciaux, *La théologie du sacrement de la pénitence*, pp. 223–31, 329–35; Schmoll, *Die Busslehre*, pp. 67–74; and Spitzig, *Sacramental Penance*, pp. 67–85. Briefer but also useful accounts are Carpino, "Consensi e critiche," pp. 321–25; Gaudemet, "Le débat," pp. 56–57; Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires*, 1: 257–58.

³⁴⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 16. c. 1–c. 3, 2: 336–40.

them read as if they were supporting the idea of contrition as a necessary first step, but not as the point when the sin is remitted, so Peter likewise “adjusts” the confessionist authorities, interpreting them to mean that confession is not required but only recommended, as a desirable event taking place after the sin has been remitted in contrition, and also as taking place if time permits.³⁴⁶ We may say, in surveying this line of attack, that if the fudging of authorities comes into play here, alongside of the exposure of their relevance or irrelevance or their possession or lack of a cogent rationale, this process occurs on both the contritionist and the confessionist side of the debate.

Moving to the question of confession to a lay person, Peter appropriates the argument of the *Sententiae divinitatis* derived from the *De vera et falsa poenitentia*, yokes it with the analysis of the power of the keys found in Abelard’s *Ethics*, and goes both authors one better. To the point that a lay person may be a substitute for a priest if a priest is not available Peter adds the idea that this substitution may also be made if priests are thick on the ground but if none can be found who possess wisdom and discretion, that is to say, who possess sound judgment, and not just authority. In such a case, he recommends, one should confess to a friend who possesses the requisite mental and moral attributes (*Quaerendus est enim sacerdos sapiens et discretus, qui cum potestate simul habeat iudicium; qui si forte defuerit, confiteri debet socio*).³⁴⁷ In any event, Peter emphasizes, while it is a good idea, confession is not necessary, “since the sin has already been forgiven in contrition” (*cum in contritione iam deletum sit peccatum*). Confession and satisfaction, that is to say, may be helpful in increasing caution and humility in the penitent’s moral life, but they are not strictly necessary.³⁴⁸ In explaining this point, Peter observes that we need to understand what role this non-requisite confession plays in penance. He begins by emphasizing here, as he does in the case of the other sacraments, that the confessor plays a purely instrumental role. It is God Who remits the sin; and He does so before the penitent goes to confession. If the confessor is a priest, then, in what sense does he exercise the power of the keys in the sacrament of penance? Since God has lifted the penitent’s eternal punishment, in what sense does the priest loose and bind? In

³⁴⁶ Ibid., d. 17. c. 1–c. 2.3, 2: 342–50.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., c. 4, 2: 351–55. The quotation is at c. 4.6, p. 352. A good analysis of Peter’s handling of this point is given by Teetaert, *La confession aux laïques*, pp. 137–42.

³⁴⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 17. c. 5, 2: 355.

Peter's estimation, and here he takes the point farther even than Abelard does, the key of loosing and binding is exercised by priests only in the acts of excommunication and readmission to communion. This authority is given to all priests *ex officio*, irrespective of their personal qualifications. The other key, the key of discretion, is given only to some priests. These individuals are men who already possess this quality. If they lack it naturally, holy orders, unfortunately, does not supply them with it. If that is the case, as Peter has already observed, they cannot display a soundness of judgment which they personally lack in the counsel they may give or in the satisfaction they may impose on a penitent. This is why a discreet and intelligent lay confessor should be substituted in that event. If a priest does possess discretion, Peter concedes, then he does indeed manifest it *ex officio* in the conduct of these pastoral functions. But, and this is the critical point, for Peter, in pronouncing the words of absolution, priests are not loosing or binding. They do not loose and bind in confession. What they do, and all that they do, is to announce the forgiveness that God has already granted, and to impose, for better or for worse, such satisfaction as they deem appropriate. Essentially, the role of the priest is declaratory only. For, not only does God alone forgive the sin; it is God alone Who purges the sinner, and it is God alone Who has the authority to waive satisfaction, partially or altogether, if, in His judgment, the situation and the penitent's state of mind warrant it.³⁴⁹

As a concrete example of a circumstance which might incline God to make this kind of judgment, Peter brings up penance when the sinner is in danger of death. That such a person could always repent, up to the end, and that penance should not be denied him, was a consensus view, as was the idea that his contrition would be acceptable to God even if he died before being able to complete his satisfaction. Hugh of St. Victor adds the qualification that this arrangement would not work with a person who hedged his bets, looking forward to a deathbed conversion, since that attitude is entirely incompatible with sincere contrition.³⁵⁰ Peter, using the

³⁴⁹ Ibid., d. 18–d. 19, 2: 355–71. For Peter on the power of the keys, see Ludwig Hödl, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Literatur und der Theologie der Schlüsselgewalt*, Beiträge, 37:4 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1960), pp. 193–96; Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 235–36; Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires*, 1: 260–61. These authors correct François Russo, "Pénitence et excommunication: Étude historique sur les rapports entre la théologie et la droit canonique dans le domaine pénitentiel du XII^e et XIII^e siècles," *Recherches de science religieuse* 33 (1946): 274–75, 441, who fails to observe the distinctions that Peter draws.

³⁵⁰ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.14.5, *PL* 176: 559D–560C.

issue of penance *in articulo mortis* to illustrate his doctrine of penance more generally, agrees with the consensus position and expands on it in a manner rather different from Hugh. To begin with, and here he narrows the rule of admissible motivations, in comparison with his own handling of the four kinds of fear in the moral life more generally, repentance is acceptable only for penitents who seek it out of the love of God. Aligning himself with the Abelardians here, he redefines the nature of the evening sacrifice that rises gratefully to God in Psalm 140. In contrast with Hugh, he sees it not as the penitent's satisfaction but as his contrition. In Peter's view, perfect contrition, the contrition arising from the love of God alone, suffices to waive not only the penitent's eternal punishment but also his temporal punishment for sin. Granted, if his contrition is less than perfect, and if he dies before completing his satisfaction, the fires of Purgatory will make up the difference. But, if his contrition is perfect, no punishment at all will follow.³⁵¹ Likewise, the penitent will not be punished if his confessor has been indiscreet or foolish and has imposed an inappropriate satisfaction. For, in that event as well, the penitent's interior sorrow for sin will right the balance. No minister of the church, Peter emphasizes, can judge the quality of another man's contrition. The state of his soul can only be known to the God Who alone scrutinizes hearts. And God will not reject perfect contrition, even if the satisfaction performed under these conditions is insufficient.³⁵² In any event, since a person about to die will not be likely to be able to perform satisfaction himself, Peter urges that priests called to minister to the moribund should require prayers and almsgiving from the penitent's kinsmen and friends instead. But, most importantly, in times of necessity, penance and reconciliation are not to be withheld. Necessity cancels many requirements, Peter insists, including episcopal permission for the reconciliation of excommunicates and of certain other classes of penitents that would otherwise obtain. Throughout this passage in his treatise on penance, Peter uses the concept of necessity to relax the strictures of the authorities he cites who are speaking to non-emergency situations. Similarly, he insists that the intention to

³⁵¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 20. c. 1–c. 2, 2: 371–74. He gives a more extended comment on Purgatory, forecasting his remarks on that subject to be made under the heading of Last Things, at d. 21. c. 1–c. 6, 2: 379–83. On fear as a motive in penance in this period, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 4 part 1: 277–99 who, however, does not note Peter's departure from his more general ethical analysis in this context.

³⁵² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 20. c. 3, 2: 375–76.

confess will be taken as confession if a person is overtaken by death enroute to his confessor.³⁵³ All of this is perfectly consistent with Peter's strong defense of contritionism and his emphasis on the importance of intention over outward acts in the moral life more generally.

In moving to the close of his discussion of penance, Peter takes up a few additional questions, which are of interest not only because of the answers he gives but also because, reflecting his use of Gratian, they are issues rarely addressed by contemporary theologians. What if someone makes a general confession and inadvertently omits a sin because he has honestly forgotten about it? Here, distinguishing between the event as described and the willful omission of a sin that one remembers perfectly well, Peter rules that the confession is valid, even if the sin forgotten is a mortal one. Another case he raises, admittedly more difficult to envision, is that of a person who accuses himself of a sin he has not committed. Without exploring whether the person holds himself guilty out of a genuine misapprehension or because he is in a delusional state, Peter agrees with his canonical source in accounting his confession a lie, and hence as a sin.³⁵⁴ Finally, he agrees with Gratian that priests have a solemn obligation to respect the confidentiality of confession, and that they should be deposed if they fail in this responsibility.³⁵⁵

Having presented this thoroughly, and consistently, contritionist analysis of penance, which lays the foundation for the doctrine of repeatability, the stress on private penance as normal in all cases, the suspension of the necessity of confession and satisfaction, not only in times of emergency but also in the standard observance of the sacrament, reducing them to desirable and recommended practices whose importance is a function of how they help the penitent grow in virtue and not how they reinforce the authority of the clergy, Peter now turns, at the end of his treatise on penance, to the definition of the *sacramentum* and *res sacramenti*, definitions which have certainly functioned as governing principles in the foregoing analysis. Some say, he notes, that the exterior penance is the sacrament, signifying the interior penance, or the contrition in the penitent's heart. This Hugonian position he rejects, and on Victorine grounds. A sacrament of the New Law, he reminds the reader, "effects what it signifies" (*efficit quod figurat*). This is not the case,

³⁵³ Ibid., c. 4–c. 7, 2: 376–79.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., d. 21. c. 7–c. 8, 2: 384–86.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., c. 9, 2: 385–86.

however, with exterior penance, since it is the contrition that is efficacious, not the external manifestation or declaration of the fact, which follows it. Others say, he continues, that both the interior and the exterior penance are the sacrament, the exterior acts being the *sacramentum tantum* while the interior contrition is both *sacramentum* and *res*. Peter agrees with this view, with a qualification of his own, and one in which he reminds the reader that penance is a virtue. The *res sacramenti* in penance, strictly speaking, is the grace of God that forgives sins. This forgiveness occurs in the contrition stage and it is a divine response to the virtue of contrition which the penitent offers to God. Like all virtues, the virtue of contrition can also be seen as the human response to the grace of God that enables the penitent to acknowledge his sins as sins, and to turn away from them and seek reconciliation. In this sense, Peter concludes, the contrition stage of penance is both the *res* and the *sacramentum*. Contrition is both the remission of sins and a sign of the remission of sins. For its part, thus, exterior penance is not an efficacious sign but a visible manifestation of the fact that the efficacious sign has been received and internalized by the penitent.³⁵⁶

Of all the masters on the contritionist side of the debate, the Lombard is the only one who is truly and wholly faithful to the logic of that position, to the point of being willing to regard confession and satisfaction as optional, to abridge dramatically the power of the keys in penance, and to exempt penitents, whose spiritual welfare comes first, for this is the reason why the sacrament was instituted, from having to subject themselves to the ministrations of indiscreet priests, encouraging them instead to seek the counsel they need wherever they may find it. While his views on the reviviscence of sins and the repeatability of penance help substantially in strengthening the argument for the consensus position that emerged in his century, Peter's systematic and consistent defense of contritionism, along with the corollaries of that stance, which he does not hesitate to draw, put Peter in a rather more exposed position. It was one that lay well within the orthodox consensus of his own day, to be sure, but it came close to locating itself on the radical fringe just inside the limits of that orthodox consensus. Peter Lombard is the only contemporary contritionist able to offer as strong, as well-reasoned, and as well-documented a case on behalf of its cause as Gratian was able to offer on behalf of confessionism. Neither side achieved a salient victory over the other in the

³⁵⁶ Ibid., d. 22. c. 2.2–c. 5, 2: 389–90.

twelfth century. When a new balance was struck and a new consensus was formed in the thirteenth century, it was one that accepted many of the exceptions and exemptions promoted by Peter, under the heading of removing obstacles between the penitent Christian and the grace available in the sacrament of penance. But it was also a consensus that could appreciate the values for which Gratian's position had stood, in locating the moment when forgiveness is given in the moment when God acts through the words of priestly absolution. The motive for making that choice, in the sequel, combined a more Aristotelian way of framing the notion of sacramental causality with an ongoing and increasingly felt need to guard the dignity of the priestly office from the attacks of anti-clerical and anti-sacramental heretics. Peter Lombard's position on penance thus stands not so much as the occasion for the emergence of a new consensus on all features of penance as it stands as an index of his combative, principled, and systematic spirit.

Unction

In the case of penance, as we have seen, the debates and arguments of the canonists and theologians were, to a large extent, sparked by the desire to defend changes in the practice of penance which they were eager to promote and support. The existence of changing attitudes between the early church and the twelfth-century present, visible in liturgical rites, saints' lives, and canonical and theological texts alike, can also be documented in the case of unction. This fact, however, is not always registered faithfully in the sacramental theology of our period. While differences of opinion on unction certainly do occur, the masters do not pursue them with dedication and zeal. Nor do they give the impression that a great deal hangs on their resolution. Comparatively little effort is made to integrate unction coherently into whatever general theory of the sacraments a master may propose, and themes normally treated in the case of the other sacraments, such as the ordinary minister and the proper disposition of the recipient, are frequently omitted.

Unction had been a popular practice in the early church.³⁵⁷ At that time, it was seen as a sacrament instituted for the healing of the sick and was widely administered, by lay people as well as by

³⁵⁷ Excellent background is supplied by Antoine Chavasse, *Étude sur l'onction des infirmes dans l'église latine du III^e au XI^e siècle*, vol. 1 (Lyon, 1942); Placid Murray, "The Liturgical History of Extreme Unction," in *Studies in Pastoral Liturgy*, ed. Vincent Ryan (Dublin: Gill & Son, 1963), 2: 18–38.

the clergy. By the sixth century, the idea that unction also remits sin had emerged, although the corporal effects it was believed to convey received more attention. It was only in the Carolingian period that unction started to be seen as a *viaticum*, or extreme unction, the last opportunity of a moribund person to receive sacramental grace, which often occurred in conjunction with death-bed penance. This development enhanced the tendency to view a cleric as the only suitable minister. Despite this shift in practice, which had become quite general in the western church by the end of the eighth century, the theologians of the first half of the twelfth century do not always take note of the change. While a number of them, including Honorius Augustodunensis, the Abelardians, and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* define unction as extreme unction,³⁵⁸ Anselm of Laon and the Porretans retain the older definition of unction as the anointing of the sick.³⁵⁹ Another tack is taken, most influentially by Hugh of St. Victor, who is followed by Master Simon and Roland of Bologna, in defining unction as serving both as the anointing of the sick and as *viaticum*.³⁶⁰

While the masters therefore do not agree on what unction is, in terms of the class of persons for whose needs it has been instituted, there are a number of points on which a consensus, or a virtual consensus on unction, does exist. All who raise the point agree that unction is not a sacrament of necessity but that it should not be neglected out of contempt for the institutions of the church. Gilbert of Poitiers appears to be alone in rejecting the sacramentality of unction, giving the opinion that it is no more a sacrament than the washing of feet on Maundy Thursday; he gives no grounds for this exclusion. Gilbert's own disciples criticize him for departing from orthodoxy on this point;³⁶¹ and every other master at the time sees unction as a sacrament, including Hermannus, even though he states that it does not effect what it signifies.³⁶² There is also

³⁵⁸ Honorius, *Eluc.* 2.94, p. 439; Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 132–33; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 47; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 199; *Summa sent.* 6.15, *PL* 176: 153A. This definition of unction at the time is ignored by Henry S. Kryger, *The Doctrine of the Effects of Extreme Unction in Its Historical Development* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1949), pp. 1–11. On Hermannus, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 151–52.

³⁵⁹ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 57, 5: 53; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 9.1, p. 154. On Anselm, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, p. 62.

³⁶⁰ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.15.2, *PL* 176: 577D–578B; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 42–43; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 261–62. On Hugh, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 107–09.

³⁶¹ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 9.6, p. 155; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 9.5, p. 75.

³⁶² Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 132–33.

widespread agreement on the point that unction was instituted by the apostles, on the authority of the Epistle of James.³⁶³ Hardly anyone discusses the question of the ordinary minister, but of those who do, the Porretans say it should be a priest while Roland of Bologna states that it may be a priest or a bishop.³⁶⁴

The two areas where the masters rise from their extremely lethargic and laconic treatment of unction and seek to coordinate it with the other sacraments they treat are the repeatability of unction and its effects on the recipient. In handling penance, as we have seen, there was a concerted effort on the part of theologians in this period to repudiate the early church rule that the sacrament could not be repeated. In the case of unction, on the other hand, the early church view of unction as a sacrament designed to heal the sick led to the principle, supported in theory as well as practice, that it is a repeatable sacrament. Even with the development of the shift in perception that led unction to be seen as a *viaticum*, there was no reason, in theory, to refuse to administer it more than once, if a person happened to find himself in danger of death more than once. The general interest in keeping open the channels of sacramental grace to Christians and in removing obstacles to their reception of it, so richly documentable elsewhere in the sacramental theology of this period, suggested to a number of mid-century masters that unction should be repeatable as well, on the analogy of the other repeatable sacraments. Hugh of St. Victor compares unction with penance here, while the Porretans draw a parallel with the Eucharist.³⁶⁵ Hugh's warrant for his position is common sense and the lack of any countervailing authorities, or, at least, any that he chooses to acknowledge. For the Porretans and for the other masters who agree on repeatability, no arguments at all are given.³⁶⁶ Yet, the alternative view is maintained by Hermannus and Master Simon. The former offers no reasons; but Simon's basis for his opinion is a garbled citation from Augustine, coupled with the idea

³⁶³ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 9.1, p. 154; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.15.2, *PL* 176: 577D; *Summa sent.* 6.15, *PL* 176: 153A; Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 42; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 161–62.

³⁶⁴ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 9.2, p. 154; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 163.

³⁶⁵ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.15.3, *PL* 176: 578B–580B; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 9.4–5, pp. 154–55.

³⁶⁶ *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 48; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 200; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 164; *Summa sent.* 6.15, *PL* 176: 154C. On this debate, see Heinrich Weisweiler, "Das Sakrament der Letzten Ölung in den systematischen Werken der ersten Frühscholastik," *Scholastik* 7 (1932): 321–53, 524–60, although he is not entirely reliable on all the members of the Abelardian school, the *Summa sententiarum*, or Roland of Bologna.

that a married person should abstain from sexual relations after receiving unction, which would suggest a once-and-for-all approach to this sacrament, confining it to the extremely elderly or to persons whose recovery from serious illness is given a highly negative prognosis.³⁶⁷

To a large extent, the decision as to whether to regard unction as repeatable or not is tied to the master's understanding of what it accomplishes, at least in the case of authors capable of following the logic of their own arguments. Hermannus, for instance, thinks that unction remits sin, although, as noted, he does not regard it as efficacious, a manifest self-contradiction. If unction does remit sin despite the latter claim, it is also difficult to see why he thinks it should not be repeated; it has to be said that his exposition does nothing to clarify why he thinks this is the case. Simon also thinks that unction remits sin, as an exit sacrament parallel with baptism,³⁶⁸ but it is the marital conditions he imposes on recipients that account for its non-repeatability in his eyes, not the baptismal analogy. On the other hand, those masters who accept the repeatability of unction connect this point with the remission of sin, whether or not, like Hugh of St. Victor, they compare unction with penance. Typically, they expand the effects of unction beyond the remission of sin to include the restoration of health, if God wills it, and to the strengthening of the recipient's soul if God wills that he should now pass into the next life. They may also add the purgation of vice as an effect of unction.³⁶⁹ Anselm of Laon, who has no position on the repeatability of unction, stands alone in confining its effects to the stimulation of devotion.³⁷⁰

In his own extremely terse discussion of unction, Peter Lombard is clearly influenced by Hugh of St. Victor, and, to a lesser extent, by the author of the *Summa sententiarum*.³⁷¹ From the latter master he takes the idea that the *sacramentum* is the oil used in unction and that the *res sacramenti* is the remission of sins.³⁷² But he yokes this point to

³⁶⁷ Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 134; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 43–44.

³⁶⁸ Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 132–33; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 42–43.

³⁶⁹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.15.2, *PL* 176: 577D–578B; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 262–63; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, pp. 47–48 join the remission of sin to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in all their plenitude. *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 9.2, p. 154 adds the purgation of vice. On the other hand, *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 200 and the *Summa sent.* 6.15, *PL* 176: 153A–B confine themselves to the remission of sin.

³⁷⁰ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 57, 5: 53.

³⁷¹ This point is developed well by Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, p. 237; Weisweiler, "Das Sakrament der Letzten Ölung," pp. 324, 329, 341–42, 525–31, 555.

³⁷² *Summa sent.* 6.15, *PL* 176: 153A–B; Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 22. c. 3.3, 2: 391.

the wider, Hugonian understanding of the effects of the sacrament as curing the sick, if God wills it, and as increasing virtue in the recipient. For him, the spiritual benefit extends both to the unction of the sick and to the moribund in need of *viaticum*, while the corporal benefit extends only to the sick person who does, indeed, recover. It was for all these purposes that the apostles instituted the sacrament.³⁷³ Peter also agreed with Hugh about the repeatability of unction and sees Simon as the main thinker he needs to refute. He does so by going back to the Augustinian text that Simon had garbled, the *Contra epistolam Parmeniani*, and by showing that what Augustine was really placing under the heading of unrepeatable sacraments were baptism and holy orders, not unction. Further, he notes, we should not confuse the reconsecration of the oil used in unction, which is to be avoided, with the repetition of unction itself, which he supports, in order to make the grace of the sacrament available whenever it is needed.³⁷⁴ Peter takes a harder line than most of his compeers in saying that it is damnable to omit unction out of neglect or contempt; and he certainly stands alone in insisting that this sacrament must be administered by a bishop.³⁷⁵ But, in most respects, his teaching on unction is a reprise at Hugh's, with the amplifications noted. He retains the balance between unction as the sacrament of the sick and unction as *viaticum* despite the historical shift in practice to the latter understanding, in his time. He retains a combination of physical and spiritual benefits in the sacrament, although he views the latter as constant and the former as contingent. He insists on the repeatability of unction, as part of his consistently applied general rule on the availability of sacramental grace. There is, however, one respect in which Peter fails to integrate his theology of unction into his sacramental theology as such. Despite his firm insistence on intentionality and the proper disposition as conditioning the recipient's appropriation of sacramental grace in his account of other sacraments, Peter remains as silent on the question of the disposition of the recipient of unction as does every other contemporary master. The one, and the only, idiosyncratic note in his treatment of unction is his requirement of episcopal administration.

³⁷³ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 22. c. 1–c. 3.1–3, 2: 390–91.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 4, 2: 391–93.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, c. 1, c. 3.3, 2: 390, 391.

Holy Orders

The one sacrament that is taken for granted, to such an extent that it is frequently passed over in silence or given a very scanty treatment even by masters seeking to promote its dignity and its necessity elsewhere in their sacramental theology, is holy orders. This tendency can be found in canonists and theologians alike. Alger of Liège displays only one preoccupation in treating this topic, the problem of unworthy priests and the validity of the sacraments they may administer. The intentions of such unworthy ministers are of interest to him in relation to the efficacy of the sacrament of holy orders in itself as guaranteed by the proper formula and ritual in the administration of holy orders. He never goes into the matter of what makes holy orders a sacrament in the first place and how it operates in the ministry and in the inner life of priests whose status and behavior are not problematic.³⁷⁶ Honorius Augustodunensis is also preoccupied with the problem of bad priests; but, consistent with the interests of the ultimate audience for which he writes the *Elucidarium*, he is more concerned with how lay people should respond to them and whether the laity should accept their directives. Other than that, he confines his analysis of their ministry to the consecration of the Eucharist. He joins those who argue that excommunication, but not moral weakness, invalidates this priestly function.³⁷⁷ Roland of Bologna confines himself to the priestly power of the keys in his treatise on holy orders, even though he clearly thinks that priests play a wider role than merely excommunicating and readmitting to communion, hearing confessions, and imposing satisfaction. On the one point he raises, he follows the standard canonical line in viewing the power to loose and bind as embracing the forgiveness of sins in penance as well as the excluding and readmitting of persons to communion with the church. As for the key of discretion, he admits that people who are not priests sometimes have this quality and that not all priests display it. Still, he maintains, discretion is granted to priests *ex officio* thanks to their ordination; they have the capacity to use it whether they do so or not.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁶ Kretzschmar, intro. to his ed. of *De misericordia*, pp. 31–57; Le Bras, “Le Liber de misericordia et iusticia,” pp. 92–94, 115; Friedrich Merzbacher, “Alger von Lüttich und das kanonische Recht,” *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, kanonistische Abteilung 66 (1980): 233–34, 246–50.

³⁷⁷ Honorius, *Eluc.* 2.185–92, 2.198–202, pp. 395–403.

³⁷⁸ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 265–68.

Roland does not manifest any interest in the technical or administrative side of holy orders that is the typical preserve of the canonists and that is, indeed, often the only aspect of the subject that concerns them. In this respect, Gratian is prototypical. He is concerned, and concerned only, with the rights and duties of priests, the correctness of their ordination, the age limits, qualifications, and other norms to be enforced in admitting men to this or that grade of orders, and the impediments and disqualifications that should prevent ordination or give rise to disciplinary action, suspension, or deposition. Insofar as he distinguishes the functions of one grade of ordination from another, he presents them as a job description, not as a mode of sacramental grace, which will enable the individual's superior to ascertain whether or not he is performing appropriately. The only mild debate into which Gratian enters, and it is an echo of a controversy to which Honorius had alluded earlier in the century, is whether there is any difference between a secular priest and one living under a monastic rule. Given his emphasis on the juridical aspects of the question, Gratian's solution, predictably, is that all priests, whether they are monks or not, have the same rights and duties.³⁷⁹

Some theologians adopt this canonical perspective as well. Robert Pullen shows a similar concern for the qualifications, rights, and duties of clerics, accenting in particular their right to receive tithes and their duty to avoid simony or the acceptance of payment for their services. While he ignores the question of what makes holy orders a sacrament, he deals primarily with the priesthood as a calling in the church, and one that has certain ethical requirements attached to it. His chief effort is to outline the moral responsibilities of priests, such as celibacy, detachment from military, political, and commercial affairs, hospitality, generosity to the poor, studiousness, honesty, purity of faith, mercy, soundness of judgment, and freedom from the abuse of the authority entrusted to them by their office.³⁸⁰ Aside from listing the ways in which clerics are expected to give good moral example, he has one and only one point to make about holy orders as a sacrament. Ordination, he notes, imparts a permanent character to a priest. And so, if a priest is suspended for disciplinary reasons and then restored to his

³⁷⁹ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 16. q. 1. c. 40. dictum, c. 69. dictum, col. 773, 781.

³⁸⁰ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 7.6, 7.10–11, 7.13, 7.16–17, *PL* 186: 913A–914B, 922B–924A, 927A–B, 928B–930C.

sacerdotal duties, he is not to be reordained.³⁸¹

The two quarters from which we first see the effort truly to develop a sacramental theology of holy orders, and a theology in which the way sacramental grace is seen to operate is differentiated according to the clerical rank involved, are Ivo of Chartres and the school of Laon.³⁸² Ivo spells out seven grades of holy orders. More than merely being a division of labor, these grades, as he sees them, are designed to signify the church and the various forms of grace that its ministers are given in order to empower them to perform the different ecclesiastical functions of their offices. The ranks of the ministry signify, as well, the moral qualities that these ministers should possess. In treating minor orders, Ivo accents the ecclesiological dimension or significance of each rank, while in discussing subdeacons, deacons, and priests, he focuses on the personal moral qualities required in ministers at these ranks. For Ivo, the porter signifies the church's role in distinguishing good from evil. The lector performs the church's function of announcing the prophecies of the Old Testament and the good news of the New. In the office of exorcist the church casts out evil spirits, both in catechumens and in its people more generally, for which the exorcist needs to have purity of spirit. In the office of acolyte, the church sheds light into the darkness and conveys Christ as the light of the world. The subdeacon's role is to carry the liturgical vessels in which the Eucharist is contained, and the aquafer used in the priest's ablution in that rite. This function both signifies and requires the virtue of continence and imparts the grace that helps the subdeacon to preserve it. Noting that seven deacons were ordained by each of the apostles, Ivo explores the symbolism of that number, signifying the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the seven-branched candelabrum of which the Bible speaks, and other septiform allegories. In ordination to this rank, the deacon receives the charge, and the grace, to evangelize and to dispense the sacraments, to elevate the host and carry the chalice in the celebration of the Eucharist. For this, he must be chaste in mind and body and free from greed and lust. Priests, finally, are the successors of the original apostles. Ivo points out that the word *presbyter*, in Greek, refers to the elders, which suggests the ethical and behavioral maturity that must be brought to this grade of holy orders. The role of the priest is fourfold, for Ivo. He

³⁸¹ Ibid., 7.15, *PL* 186: 927C–D.

³⁸² Cf. Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, p. 237, who claims that the Lombard was the first to give a sacramental definition of holy orders.

mediates between man and God; he forgives sins; he prays for his people; and he offers the Eucharist. Ivo observes in passing that some of the other functions exercised by priests in the early church were later transferred to bishops. But the chief point he wants to make about the priesthood is that, in all four respects, priests provide an extension in time of Christ's saving work. The grace they are given enables them to serve as channels of God's power, to that end. The moral corollary of this fact is that the entire life of priests should be an imitation of Christ.³⁸³

This theme of the imitation of Christ is given a much more sustained development in the school of Laon.³⁸⁴ As the Laon masters see it, the life of Christ is a model for each and every grade in holy orders. This, in turn, is the inner spiritual meaning of the sacrament for the men who receive it. As with the porter, Christ served as a gatekeeper when He ejected the money-changers from the temple. Christ functioned as a lector when He interpreted the prophesy of Isaiah. He was an exorcist when He cast out demons. He was an acolyte when He described Himself as the light of the world and when He illuminated the minds of those who accepted Him in faith. Christ acted as a subdeacon when He turned water into wine at the marriage of Cana. He was a deacon when He washed the feet of His disciples at the Last Supper and when He preached the coming of the kingdom of God. Christ, also, was a priest when He celebrated the Eucharist at the Last Supper. The Laon masters add to this list of seven grades of orders the rank of bishop. This office Christ exercised as well, when He ordained and commissioned His disciples to preach the gospel and to baptize in His name, and to loose and to bind, and when He raised people from the dead.³⁸⁵ It is true that the members of this school go on to discuss, in some detail, the canonical regulations validating or invalidating ordination or the exercise of priestly functions, taking a rather more generous line here than most masters do on the capacities of excommunicate and heretic priests, unless they have been unfrocked by their bishops, but also urging that, if a priest has been unfrocked for a grave crime, such as murder or adultery, he

³⁸³ Ivo of Chartres, *Sermo* 2, *PL* 162: 514B–519D.

³⁸⁴ This point is ignored by Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 54–57, in his account of the Laon masters on holy orders.

³⁸⁵ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 359, 5: 271. This interest in discussing the sacramental functions of bishops is comparatively unusual in the first half of the twelfth century. See Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 3 part 2: 277–96.

should not be readmitted to the ministry.³⁸⁶ Still, they clearly understand holy orders as a sacrament, in which the *res sacramenti*, the grace that imparts discretion, power, and knowledge (*discretio et potentia et scientia*) is transmitted by the rite of ordination, if the ordinand is moved by the appropriate intention in receiving it. If he is not suitably motivated, he receives the *sacramentum tantum* and not the *res*.³⁸⁷ And, as we have seen above, the grace which the clergyman receives not only imparts authority, enabling him to perform his public sacerdotal functions. It also is a grace that strengthens him inwardly and assists him in developing the virtues needed for the *imitatio Christi* which is the meaning of ordination in his own spiritual life.

The school of Laon plays a critical role in the development of the sacramental understanding of the priesthood in the twelfth century. Subsequent masters who contributed to that development, within our period, are heavily influenced by the position of the Laon masters although they expand on it, introducing additional considerations. Hugh of St. Victor strengthens the point that the grace imparted to the clergy in holy orders has the double role of empowering them to serve as the sacramental channels of grace to other members of the Christian community in the ecclesiastical dispensation and of enriching their own spiritual lives. To the imitation of Christ in the grades of holy orders from porter to priest as given by the Laon masters he adds both Old Testament parallels and insights drawn from the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* of the Pseudo-Dionysius, thus imparting a somewhat more participatory and Neoplatonic cast to the notion that clerics are associated with Christ's own ministry in performing their own and in achieving personal sanctification thereby.³⁸⁸ Hugh goes on to explore the parallels, in the lay and clerical estates, between groups arranged in hierarchical order with a single ruler at the top, the king and pope respectively, adding that the clerical order precedes the secular power in honor and dignity and that it has the right to judge its

³⁸⁶ For the rules and regulations in general, *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 393–97, 400, 5: 283–84, 285–86; for the points about unfrocked priests and their ineligibility for reinstitution, no. 376, 380, 390–92, 399, 479, 5: 279, 280, 283, 285, 313.

³⁸⁷ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 391, 5: 283.

³⁸⁸ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.2.1–2, 2.3.6–19, *PL* 176: 415B–417D, 423A–431D. This point is brought out well by Paolo M. Pession, “L’ordine sacro e i suoi gradi nel pensiero di Ugo di S. Vittore,” *La Scuola Cattolica* 64 (1936): 133–49, although he sees the influence of Ivo of Chartres here and not that of the school of Laon. See also Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 98–103; Mignon, *Les origines*, 2: 221–33.

exercise, a mild pass at church-state relations atypical in theological *summae* of this period.³⁸⁹ Also, in considering the seven clerical grades, Hugh observes that some of them, such as deacon and priest, are distinguished from each other in that they have different faculties, while others, such as deacon and archdeacon, are distinguished from each other as having the same faculties but a different range of powers. Still other grades, such as priest and bishop, have both different faculties and a different range of powers.³⁹⁰ Like the Laon masters, Hugh includes the rules and regulations governing ordinands, material which he derives from the canonists and which he explores in rather more detail than is typical of theologians at this time.³⁹¹ Unlike the school of Laon, he appends a discussion of liturgical vessels and vestments as used by the clergy, how to deploy them, and their symbolism.³⁹² He also picks up a point made by Gratian while responding to it differently. Monks, he agrees, can validly exercise the priestly ministry; and, of course, it is appropriate for them to do so within their own monastic communities. Beyond that, however, this faculty should be seen as an indulgence, not as an intrinsic part of their calling, which, for Hugh, is prayer, penitence, and contemplation.³⁹³ But, while adding to the Laon masters in these respects, he preserves faithfully their sense of the double effect of the grace of holy orders on clergymen, both authorizing them to serve the church and sanctifying them in their inner lives, and he retains their understanding of how clergymen participate in and manifest the life of Christ at all levels of the ministry.

Master Simon is another theologian strongly influenced by the school of Laon on holy orders, whether directly or by way of Hugh, although he amplifies the Laon analysis in a different way. Simon is less interested than either Hugh or the Laon masters in the juridical dimensions of this subject. He does discuss the power of the keys, which he takes up here rather than in his treatise on penance. He agrees with the view that this power includes loosing and binding in confession as well as in excommunication and readmission to communion. He acknowledges the fact that not all priests have discretion and fails to deal with the problem. Aside from making the standard observation that bishops are responsible for performing

³⁸⁹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.2.4, *PL* 176: 417D–418D.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.2.5, *PL* 176: 418D–419B.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 2.3.20–24, *PL* 176: 431D–434A.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 2.4.1–7, 2.5.1–3, *PL* 176: 433C–438D, 439A–442C.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, 2.3.4, *PL* 176: 422D–423A.

ordinations,³⁹⁴ he leaves rules, regulations, and jurisdictional matters to the side and concentrates his attention on the sacramental quality of holy orders, giving much more attention than his sources to the effects of sacramental grace on the recipient. Simon agrees with Robert Pullen that ordination imparts an indelible character. For him, this means that even an excommunicated priest can validly consecrate the Eucharist as well as validly baptize, a permission which, as we have seen, was not so freely granted by all contemporary masters.³⁹⁵ Even more important than the permanent faculty to minister in the sacramental lives of others which a priest acquires through the grace of holy orders, for Simon, is the effect which this grace has in the cleric's spiritual life. Simon gives more sustained attention to this aspect of the sacrament than do the Laon masters and Hugh of St. Victor. He agrees firmly that each grade of holy orders manifests the life and ministry of Christ: "Each of these, in itself, shows forth our Lord and savior" (*Hos ipse Dominus et Salvator noster in se ostendit*).³⁹⁶ But, what Simon does in developing this theme is to use some of Ivo of Chartres' definitions of the grades of orders, and some of his own, as descriptions of aspects of Christ's ministry, side by side with other definitions inherited from the Laon masters and Hugh. He also expands this topic by exploring how the grace of ordination is manifested in the gifts of the Holy Spirit as associated with the grades of ministry.

Thus, for Simon, the porter suggests Christ's ejection of the money-changers from the temple; the lector represents Christ's teaching under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; the exorcist reflects Christ's casting out of demons. The acolyte, as Simon presents him, shows forth Christ's healing miracles that opened the eyes of the blind, a note not found either in Ivo or in the Laon tradition. The subdeacon, Simon agrees, imitates Christ in washing the feet of the disciples, the deacon in administering the Eucharist, and the priest in consecrating the bread and wine. As with the Laon masters, he sees the ministry of these last two orders in a rather more narrowly Eucharistic light than is the case with Ivo. With the former, he also adds the episcopate as a grade of holy orders. Bishops imitate Christ by instructing and consecrating others. And, whether bishops, archbishops, or popes, they are successors of the apostles as well as participants in and conveyors of the ministry of Christ.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁴ Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 66–67, 70–81.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 65–66.

To this account Simon attaches an analysis of how the grades of holy orders are informed by the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The porter manifests fear of the Lord, the beginning of wisdom. Here, Simon reprises the four modes of fear and concludes that it is filial fear which is involved in the porter's case, not initial fear. The lector manifests piety. His desire to read expresses his desire to teach others. The exorcist is informed by knowledge, the discretion or discernment of spirits that enables him to help others come to grips with and to purge themselves of the moral problems that may be troubling them—a notable interiorization of the idea of exorcism, we may observe. The acolyte, for Simon, manifests fortitude, in that he holds up the candelabra that light liturgical ceremonies. The subdeacon reflects counsel. He reads the Epistle during the mass; he mixes water and wine in the chalice; and he thereby enlightens his hearers and inspires the love of God in them. The deacon is granted the gift of intelligence, to be used in his preaching and in his distribution of the Eucharist. The priest, finally, shows forth the gift of wisdom. His truest office, according to Simon, is the consecration of the Eucharist. Other sacerdotal functions which priests may exercise he lumps together under the vague phrase *et cetera*. The gifts of the Holy Spirit, he concludes, enrich the inner lives of clerics and assist them in developing the virtues needed for these different grades of ministry. Having himself occupied each step along this clerical *cursus honorum*, the priest will have acquired all of these virtues as he completes what, for Simon, is better understood as a *cursus gratiarum et virtutum*.³⁹⁸

In placing Peter Lombard's theology of holy orders in the context of the treatments of this topic current in his day, it can be said that he stands in the tradition of the school of Laon both in emphasizing, and in defining clearly, the sacramentality of holy orders. In outlining the grades of holy orders he draws on Hugh and Simon, as well as Ivo of Chartres, while adding some ideas of his own. In one important respect he departs from the Laon masters, Hugh, and Simon alike. He removes bishops and other prelates from the grades of holy orders and considers them, instead, as occupying different ranks within the priesthood but not as different orders. Another notable difference between Peter and the other masters, whether canonists or theologians, is that he eliminates a number of topics which they discuss under this heading. He does not concern himself with what qualifies a man to enter the

³⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 67–69.

priesthood or what disqualifies him. Nor is he interested in the circumstances under which a priest may be deposed, disciplined, or restored to service. The regulations governing the supervision of clerics, once ordained, by their superiors are not, in his view, to the point here. The only juridical considerations that he imports into his theology from the canonists have to do with the conditions validating or invalidating the administration and reception of the sacrament of holy orders itself.³⁹⁹

Peter begins by seconding Hugh, in placing the doctrine of holy orders within the context of a brief ecclesiology, in which Christ is the head and church members are the parts of His mystical body. He agrees that the seven grades of holy orders all exemplify aspects of Christ's own ministry, participating in it when the incumbents accede to ecclesiastical office with a worthy intention. Leaving aside Hugh's mini-treatise on hierarchy and on the two-swords theory, he agrees with Simon that the seven grades of holy orders manifest the gifts of the Holy Spirit as well and that ordination imparts not only an office in the church, with the power and authority needed for its exercise, but also provides a means through which clerics can unite themselves with Christ in both their inner and their public lives. Peter places more emphasis than either of these masters on the importance of quality control, citing Pope Clement to the effect that it is better to have fewer priests who are truly worthy of the dignity to which they are called than to have many useless ones not capable of rising to the demands of their office or of internalizing its graces.⁴⁰⁰ While Peter refers to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in these opening remarks, he does not schematize them, as Simon does, in conjunction with the different grades of orders. In handling that topic, Hugh is his model, especially for the Old Testament parallels and for his frank interest in the symbolism of the roles of Christian clerics. At the same time, he often borrows Ivo's definitions and substitutes them for those of Hugh and the Laon masters, sometimes but not always in the way that Simon

³⁹⁹ Cf. Joseph de Ghellinck, "Le traité de Pierre Lombard sur les sept ordres ecclésiastiques: Ses sources, ses copistes," *RHE* 10 (1909): 290–302, 720–28; 11 (1910): 29–46, who presents the doctrine as one of mere sterile and servile imitation. Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 237–39, while he credits Peter with more originality than he in fact displays, gives an accurate description of many if not all features of his teaching on holy orders.

⁴⁰⁰ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 24. c. 1–c. 3.1, 2: 393–94. The particular Clement is not indicated. As Brady notes, *ad loc.*, p. 394, Peter's citation of Clement is derived from Gratian.

does; and he appends to the definitions he chooses some further reflections of his own.

All clerics receive the tonsure. With Hugh, Peter takes up its symbolism. Like a king's crown, he observes, the tonsure is a mark of office. It bares the head because the head is where the mind, man's highest faculty, is located. Baring the head signifies the opening of the mind to revelation. The tonsure is cut in a small round shape because this, according to Peter and Hugh, signifies the removal of obstructions from the senses, which have to do their part in informing the cleric. Completing this introduction to the grades of orders with tonsorial types and parallels of clerical commitment from the Old Testament, Peter commences his itinerary through the seven grades of orders, noting both the Old Testament analogies, the ways in which the grades of orders participate in Christ's ministry, and the ways in which they manifest a moral imitation of Christ. Christ accepted the office of porter, he agrees, when He drove the money-changers out of the temple. He Himself is the gate, the way, as well as controlling access to it. The janitors guarding the entrance to the temple of Jerusalem are the forerunners. And, porters must possess the judgment that Christ displayed, in carrying out their functions. The lector reads and preaches. For these duties, Peter adds, he must be literate and have a clear and carrying voice, and eloquence. Christ manifested these qualities when He debated the book of Isaiah among the elders in the temple. The Old Testament prophets are the forerunners of the lectors. Exorcists, for Peter, have the traditional rôle of casting evil spirits out of catechumens, as Old Testament exorcists did more generally and as Christ did in the New Testament. Peter does not pick up on Master Simon's more psychological reading of this function. Exorcists must have purity of spirit. The acolyte holds up the candelabra that shed light when the Gospel is read and the Eucharist is offered and he helps prepare the Eucharistic elements on the altar. Candelabra were also used in the Old Testament temple services and their keepers are the earlier analogies of Christian acolytes. The acolyte needs a specific acquaintance with his duties, as Christ did, in being the light of the world.⁴⁰¹

Moving to the three higher grades of orders, Peter offers an expanded description of their roles, in comparison with his sources. The subdeacon receives the offerings of the people, arranges the materials used in liturgical rites on the altar, such as the paten,

⁴⁰¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 24. c. 5–c. 8, 2: 396–99.

chalice, and other vessels used in celebrating the Eucharist. The sacrifices that took place in the temple service in Old Testament times, and the ministers who coordinated them, are the types here. Christ manifested this mode of ministry when He washed the feet of the disciples at the Last Supper. Peter assigns this role to the subdeacon, not to the deacon, as the Laon masters do. Continence is the virtue required of subdeacons. The deacon is analogous to the Old Testament Levites. These functionaries carried the ark and tabernacle, and, like the Christian deacons whom they prefigure, they must have reached a mature age. Peter here shifts the note of maturity from the office of priest, where Ivo had located it, to the office of deacon. Deacons minister by distributing communion and by assisting in baptism and in other sacramental rites. Deacons also preach and carry the cross in processions. In comparison with his sources, Peter widens the scope of the deacon's activities. He also observes that they wear a stole as a sign of office. To fulfill that office they must have the capacity to announce and to warn. Christ performed the ministry of the deacon both when He distributed the Eucharist at the Last Supper and when He enjoined His disciples to watch and to pray on the night before His passion. While Peter enlarges the office of the deacon well beyond the Eucharistic ministry, or that ministry combined with preaching, he narrows the office of priest to an essentially Eucharistic one, unlike Simon and Ivo. The priest, for Peter and for the Loan masters, consecrates the Eucharist. His role is paralleled by that of Aaron and other Old Testament priests who offered sacrifices. Priests, like deacons, need maturity. They also require the virtue of prudence. Here, Peter combines the gift of wisdom prescribed by Simon with the lexical understanding of *presbyter* offered by Ivo. Christ fills this particular clerical office, and to perfection, by offering Himself as a sacrifice on the cross, according to Peter; he replaces Christ's institution and first celebration of the Eucharist with the act that gives it its ongoing sacramental efficacy.⁴⁰² Throughout this discussion of the seven grades of holy orders, then, Peter preserves the overall schema of the Laon masters and Hugh, while at the same time he feels perfectly free to incorporate ideas from Simon and from Ivo, to rearrange the material when he feels moved to do so, and to add his own insights and perspectives.

Peter asserts much more independence in dealing with bishops and prelates of a still higher level of authority. As we have seen,

⁴⁰² Ibid., c. 9–c. 11, 2: 400–05.

both the Laon masters, Hugh, and Simon treat the episcopacy as a grade of holy orders. Peter does not. He draws a sharp distinction between ranks within the clergy that are dignities, and ranks that are orders. Bishops and those above them fall clearly into the first category. The bishop, be he a bishop alone or a metropolitan, archbishop, or patriarch as well, has a specific office, along with a specific dignity. The dignity refers to the scope of his jurisdiction and whether it embraces a diocese or a province, or some larger unit of church governance. The office refers to those sacramental functions which are reserved to bishops. These include confirmation and ordination, and, in Peter's eyes at least, unction as well. The Lombard also accords two brief lines to the papacy. He remarks, rather laconically, that the pope is the supreme priest in the church and that he disposes all other ecclesiastical orders. Peter shows no interest in explaining how the pope exercises these functions or in his juridical relationship with other church leaders or with the secular power.⁴⁰³ His lack of interest in these subjects is quite typical of systematic theologians in the middle of the twelfth century; Hugh of St. Victor and Robert Pullen, who do take up jurisdictional matters and the relation between *regnum* and *sacerdotium*, are the exceptions who prove the rule. Still, by making mention of the papacy at this juncture, however vague and abbreviated his remarks may be, Peter offers a location in the *Sentences* where later theologians, if inclined to discuss these matters at greater length in this kind of setting, could find a natural home for the subject. To round out his consideration of dignities in the church that convey rank, but not a new degree of orders, and in some cases do not involve, necessarily, any degree of orders at all, Peter mentions seers (*vates*), who may be priests, prophets, or poets.⁴⁰⁴ His inclusion of poets under this heading, as holding rank within the church, is a remarkable expression of belief in the inspirational power of art when it is turned to the service of edification and the glorification of God. Literary art is not the only kind of art of which Peter takes cognizance, for he includes, as a final example of a rank within the church that is not necessarily associated with ordination, the office of cantor. The cantor may be the *praecentor*, the singer who leads the choir, or the *succentor*, his deputy.⁴⁰⁵ Either way, the art of the musician gives him an office in the church since he embellishes

⁴⁰³ Ibid., c. 14–c. 16, 2: 405–07.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., c. 18, 2: 407.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., c. 19.1, 2: 407.

divine worship and uplifts the spirit of the Christian people. Peter appears to have been unique among scholastic theologians in this period for the official rank in the church which he accords to literary and musical artists, in recognition of the services they perform for the faithful.

These addenda or exceptions to the seven grades of holy orders having been duly noted, Peter concentrates his attention in the rest of his treatise on holy orders on defining what it is, as a sacrament, and on outlining the conditions required for its valid administration and reception. Here, he applies his standard distinction between the *sacramentum* and the *res sacramenti*. The ceremony of ordination, and, specifically, the laying on of hands by the ministering bishop, constitute the sacrament. By means of it, the ordinand receives a permanent spiritual character. With it he also receives the grace empowering him to perform those actions which only the clergy can perform with efficacy and the grace enabling him to develop the virtues he needs in order to show forth the ministry and the sanctity of Christ in his own ministry. As with the school of Laon, Hugh, and Simon, and especially the latter two masters, Peter sees a double effect of sacramental grace in holy orders. On the one hand, this grace assists in the recipient's personal and internal sanctification, and, on the other, it also enables him to function as a channel of grace for others in his public sacramental ministry.⁴⁰⁶ Peter agrees with Simon and with Robert Pullen on the imparting of an indelible and permanent sacramental character to the priest in his reception of ordination, a fact which entrenches this doctrine firmly in the understanding of the priesthood after his time.

Yet, more is required to convey this *res sacramenti* to the ordinand than the correct celebration of the ceremony of ordination. The intentions of both the minister and the recipient also play a critical role. This is the heading under which Peter takes up the question of whether bishops in a state of heresy or schism can validly ordain. He gives a thorough review of the opinions offered on this subject by the canonists and by his fellow theologians and he takes a hard line, and one that is perfectly consistent with the position that he takes on the valid consecration of the Eucharist in his treatise on that sacrament. Heresy and schism alike, in Peter's eyes, deprive a bishop of the capacity to ordain validly. A heretic will not have the requisite faith and intention, and a minister not himself in com-

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., c. 13, c. 19.2, 2: 405, 407.

munion with the church cannot induct other men into its sacerdotal ministry.⁴⁰⁷ The situation is a bit more complicated, in his estimation, in the case of ordination by simoniacs. This is the only aspect of clerical morality which Peter raises in connection with ordination. Simony may be brought to the rite by would-be ordinands as well as by bishops who have themselves obtained preferment in this vicious manner. Here, Peter argues that the state of knowledge of the parties involved is a relevant factor in the equation. If the ordinand is not himself trying to purchase ordination, and if he is honestly unaware of the fact that his bishop is a simoniac, his ordination should be accepted as valid. On the other hand, if the ordinand knowingly seeks ordination from a simoniac bishop, his ordination should be rejected. In general, if ignorance is not a factor, Peter thinks that three circumstances should be taken into account in making a ruling. If both bishop and ordinand are simoniacs, both should be deprived of office. If a simoniac is ordained by a non-simoniac, the simoniac should be deprived of office. Finally, if a non-simoniac is ordained by a simoniac, he should be allowed to remain in office on the condition that the loss of his services would be a serious deprivation to the faithful, a proviso Peter derives from Pope Nicholas II along with the above-mentioned condition that the ordinand is unaware of his bishop's simoniac state. Another dispensation which Peter accepts is the validity of an ordination in which the candidate has been forced by violence to receive ordination at the hands of a schismatic or heretic.⁴⁰⁸ In all these cases, it is clear that proper intentionality, and free will, on both sides of the transaction, are vital determinants of sacramental efficacy. And, while in the case of other sacraments, where the moral unworthiness of the minister is not seen as capable of impeding the workings of grace through the sacramental medium, the deep horror of simony, and the recognition that it remains a serious and ongoing problem in the middle of the twelfth century, inform the massive exception to that rule that Peter makes in the case of holy orders. Also, while he does pay brief and passing attention to the rules and regulations attached to ordination, as with the age requirements for advancing to different grades of orders,⁴⁰⁹ it is also clear that this matter of the status, and morality, of both minister and recipient is the only major aspect of

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., d. 25. c. 1, 2: 408–13.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., c. 2–c. 6, 2: 413–15.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., c. 7, 2: 415–16.

the canonical approach to ordination that Peter is truly concerned with, and it is a concern which he reformulates so as to align it with intentionality as it applies both to the objective efficacy of the sacramental ministry and to the efficacy of the recipient's appropriation of sacramental grace subjectively.

Marriage

The sacrament that received the fullest discussion on the part of canonists and theologians alike in the first half of the twelfth century, and the one that has inspired the most research on the part of modern scholars is, indubitably, marriage.⁴¹⁰ In contrast with the situation that affected sacraments such as the Eucharist, this chorus of concern does not mirror a change in the practice of marriage on the part of twelfth-century Christians at large, a change which the masters of the day might seek to oppose or to rationalize. On the other hand, in line with other branches of sacramental theology at this time, marriage was strongly affected by the felt need of orthodox thinkers to defend it against the attacks of heretics, such as the Cathars, who rejected it. The central fact that most differentiates marriage as a sacrament from other sacraments in the writings of canonists and theologians in the first half of the twelfth century is that marriage existed as a social and legal institution, and always had, regardless of what Christian thinkers might say about it. It had a life of its own, apart from Christianity, a circumstance which was not the case with the other Christian rites treated under the heading of sacramental theology. The mas-

⁴¹⁰ For helpful overall surveys, see James A. Brundage, *Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 182–245; Jean Dauvillier, *Le mariage dans le droit classique de l'église depuis de Décret de Gratien (1140) jusqu'au la mort de Clément V (1314)* (Paris: Sirey, 1933), pp. 5–32, 183–94, 279–92, 310–18, 473–79; Gérard Fransen, "La formation du lien matrimonial au moyen âge," *Revue de droit canonique* 21 (1971): 106–26; Heaney, *The Development of the Sacramentality of Marriage*, pp. 7–14, 75–79, 82–83; T. P. McLaughlin, "The Formation of the Marriage Bond according to the *Summa Parisiensis*," *MS* 15 (1953): 208–12; Hans Zeimentz, *Ehe nach der Lehre der Frühscholastik: Eine moralgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Anthropologie und Theologie der Ehe in der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux, bei Hugo von St. Viktor, Walter von Mortagne und Petrus Lombardus* (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1973). Briefer overviews are provided by Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires*, 1: 251; Michael M. Sheehan, "Choice of Marriage Partner in the Middle Ages," *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, n.s. 1 (1978): 1–33; Rudolf Weigand, "Kanonistische Ehe traktate aus dem 12. Jahrhundert," in *Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. Stephan Kuttner (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1971), pp. 59–67.

ters writing on this subject in our period are not always very successful in coming to grips with this basic fact. Their debates on marriage, for this reason, often have a curiously airless quality about them; they read as if the masters were talking only to each other in some empyrean realm, without acknowledging the practical realities attached either to marriage itself, as it operated in real life, or even to the workability of the rules, principles, and procedures which they themselves advocate. There are, to be sure, major aspects of marriage on which a solid contemporary theological consensus existed. All masters at this time, for instance, agree with the Augustinian view that marriage was instituted in Eden before the fall, as an index of the creator's ordinance that sexual intercourse was to be the means for the propagation of the human race; after the fall, they agree, as well, marriage was designed to serve as a remedy for sin.⁴¹¹ This consensus position was expounded both to refute Origen's views on human nature and the Catharist position on human sexuality. On another level, under the heading of the status of a marriage once made, all the masters hold that, once a valid marriage has come into being, it is indissoluble. Indissolubility, indeed, is part of what the agreement to marry involves, in their view, and it is seen as one of its goods, remaining in effect even if the couple are physically separated or if one puts aside the other on account of infidelity.⁴¹² Another consensus position relates to impediments to marriage, or grounds for the nullification of a marriage. All agree that prior vows, especially those involved in entry into the monastic life or the priesthood, spiritual affinity, such as that created between a godparent and a godchild, or ignorance as to the identity or status of the other contracting party, constitute such impediments. There are many other areas where a principle at stake, such as consanguinity as an impediment, may receive general approval, but where the masters disagree as to the precise understanding of the principle in practice. There are also aspects of marriage on which the debates reveal sharp differences of opinion on questions of fundamental substance, as well as divergences of opinion on procedure as well as substance that reflect regional rules and not merely personal preferences. But the single debate on marriage that generated the most discussion was the question of

⁴¹¹ Michael Müller, *Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus von der Paradiesesehe und ihre Auswirkung in der Sexualethik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts bis Thomas von Aquin* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1954), pp. 19–103.

⁴¹² Heaney, *The Development of the Sacramentality of Marriage*, pp. 154–56.

what makes the association of two people a marriage that can be regarded as a sacrament of the New Law.

In the field of marriage formation, the battle lines were drawn between those who argued that consummation makes the union a marriage and those who argued that it was consent that makes the marriage. This dispute was a bitter one, not only because of the serried ranks of authorities who could be, and were, marshalled in support of both of these positions but also because of the need to counter objections, both practical and theoretical, that could be leveled against each of them. On the consummationist side, for instance, it was hard to explain the difference between marriage and concubinage, recognizing that the latter institution, legitimate in Roman law and most forms of medieval secular law in the twelfth century, remained in existence, however much Christian moralists might deplore the fact. There was also the difficulty of proving non-consummation of a marriage, for the purpose of adjudicating it as a cause of nullification, without violating personal and conjugal privacy and without admitting the evidence of witnesses who were likely to be partisan. Most serious of all, in the light of twelfth-century religious sensibilities, if a valid marriage required consummation to bring it into existence, then the consummationist position made it difficult to see how the marriage of the Virgin Mary and St. Joseph could have been a valid, sacramental marriage, given the fact that it was recognized to have been a celibate union.

For its part, the consent theory presented difficulties of its own. If consent to a common life, without the necessity of sexual community, were sufficient to make a marriage, how is marriage different from arrangements in which two relatives share a common household? If consent alone is sufficient, can the exchange of vows on the part of two persons legally capable of marriage and lacking in impediments constitute a valid marriage in the absence of witnesses, a priestly blessing, the permission of the parents, and the standard provision of a dowry? If clandestine marriage is admitted, is this permission not a disservice to the legitimate interests of the state, the family, the church, and even the principals themselves? If consent makes a marriage, can consent unmake it, as was the case in Roman law, a logical and symmetrical conclusion even though it flies in the face of the Christian principle of indissolubility? All these questions and difficulties, and more, proved to be extremely intractable. Defenders of both the consummationist and the consent positions found their ingenuity taxed to the utmost in finding responses to the opposition while supporting their own positive solutions in the authorities and dealing with the authorities who

supported the other side of the debate. We find both canonists and theologians in the consummationist camp, or Italian school, with Gratian emerging as its leading champion. The consensus, or French, school is also populated with both canonists and theologians, Hugh of St. Victor providing it with its most powerful insights and arguments and Peter Lombard articulating this position in its fullest and most sharply honed form. He also goes farther than anyone else in the debate in taking seriously the argument on the other side of it, borrowing from its perspectives, while at the same time staunchly refusing to compromise the principles he defends.

Although the members of the school of Laon are, generally, supporters of consent, one Laon master, the author of *Decretum dei fuit*, gives an early inkling of the position to be articulated much more powerfully by Gratian later in the century. The master sees the centrality of consummation, in marriage formation, as a corollary of the institution of marriage in Eden for the purpose of procreation and its later reinstitution as a remedy for fornication after the fall. Therefore, what marriage is all about, in his view, is sexual relations. Marriage is, simply, the carnal union of the spouses. This is the sacrament, the external physical sign. What it signifies is the union of Christ and the church. This author writes before, or outside of, Hugh of St. Victor's important expansion of the definition of a sacrament as a sign that effects what it signifies, as well as bearing a physical resemblance to it, and so he does not take up the question of whether, or how, the *sacramentum* conveys or effects this *res sacramenti*. He regards the intentions which the spouses bring to their marriage as important, and defines them, purely, as the hope of offspring. He does not raise the question of whether the validity and sacramentality of their marriage would be jeopardized were they to bring other intentions to it, or if they omit this one. The one item he adds to the point that consummation makes the marriage is that marriage also requires public celebration before witnesses. He does not specify whether one of those witnesses must be a priest. The master makes no direct mention of consent, whether of the spouses themselves or their parents, as in any way required. To the extent that consent, in an implicit sense, can be read into their intention, or wish, to have children, it would be a consent to carnal relations only. The master makes no reference to the problem of Mary and Joseph or to the difference between marriage and concubinage.⁴¹³

⁴¹³ *Decretum dei fuit*, ed. Heinrich Weisweiler in *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms*

In turning from this Laon master to Gratian, we can clearly see that, while the latter has profited from the reflections of the theologians, he is determined to place the topic of marriage formation on a far wider canvas and to handle it in a much more circumspect way. Gratian's treatment of marriage has typically been studied in isolation, as a subject in its own right, by historians of canon law.⁴¹⁴ Much can be gained, however, by comparing his analysis of this subject with his discussion of penance. Marriage and penance are given parallel treatment by Gratian in two respects. In both cases, he agrees that an initial stage is necessary in which the correct intention is manifested by the recipient of the sacrament, but that the sacrament itself cannot be held to have been received in fact unless and until a second stage occurs that is public and institutional and presided over by a priest. It is in this second stage that the alteration in the recipient's status imparted by the sacrament takes place. The second clear parallel is that, in the case of both sacraments, Gratian collects and discusses thoroughly a large dossier of authorities who say that the first, or consensual, stage is the point at which that change of status occurs. Several of these authorities are as weighty as they are unequivocal. They include Pope Nicholas II, who locates marriage formation in consent not coitus, John Chrysostom, who says that consent, and not the marriage ceremony, the formal handing over of the bride to the groom, or their sexual union makes the marriage, and Ambrose, who states crisply that it is not the defloration of the virgin but the conjugal pact that makes the marriage. To be sure, Gratian is concerned with showing that consent is necessary and that it cannot be omitted. He is also willing to recognize that, while the public celebration of weddings is required and appropriate, it is not the ceremony itself but the consummation of the marriage following it that is the critical determinant of the status of the spouses. As with his handling of the

von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in deutschen Bibliotheken, Beiträge, 33:1-2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), pp. 371-73. Heinrich J. F. Reinhardt, *Die Ehelehre der Schule des Anselms von Laon: Ein theologie- und kirchenrechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu den Ehetexte der frühen Pariser Schule des 12. Jahrhundert*, Beiträge, n.F. 14 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1974) is unaware of this text and its departure from the support of consent by other Laon masters. His study is otherwise the best guide to their position. Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 62-73, omits marriage formation in his account of the school of Laon on marriage.

⁴¹⁴ See, in particular, Brundage, *Law, Sex, and Christian Society*, pp. 235-45; Raymond G. Decker, "Institutional Authority versus Personal Responsibility in the Marriage Section of Gratian's *A Concordance of Discordant Canons*," *The Jurist* 32 (1972): 51-65; Fransen, "La formation," pp. 119-26; Fournier and Le Bras, *Histoire*, 2: 314-52; John T. Noonan, "Power to Choose," *Viator* 4 (1973): 419-34.

authorities supporting confessionism, whom he reads as deeming the critical act of confession and absolution as having been inspired by a rightly motivated spirit of contrition, whether or not this is what they actually argue, so he reads the consummationist authorities as saying that the consent of the spouses is also required, whether the authorities in fact make this point or not. As for the pro-consent authorities, whatever the literal sense of their opinions may be, he reads them as speaking only to a consent that is necessary but not sufficient, in a manner directly parallel with his handling of the contritionist authorities in his treatment of penance. In Gratian's own solution, he presents marriage, like penance, as a two-part process. In the case of marriage, a truly sacramental, and hence indissoluble, bond is not forged until the second part has been completed. Marriage begins, as he sees it, at the time of the betrothal of the couple, when consent to the marriage is given. But it does not become truly binding until it is consummated. As he puts the point: "It must be known that marriage is begun by betrothal and completed by [sexual] mixing. Hence between the betrothed there is a marriage, but only a beginning; between the couple there is a ratified marriage" (*Sed sciendum est, quod coniugum desponsatione initiatur, con mixtione perficitur: Unde inter sponsum et sponsam coniugum est, sed initiatum; inter copulatos est coniugum ratum*).⁴¹⁵

Consistent with this clear distinction between *matrimonium initiatum* and *matrimonium ratum* which he draws, Gratian states, at one point, that, since the marriage does not become indissoluble until it is consummated, engaged persons may break their engagements if they prefer different marital partners or in order to undertake religious vows, although elsewhere he gives the opposite view.⁴¹⁶ Where does this leave the marriage of Mary and Joseph? Gratian's first sally is to argue that their union includes the three Augustinian goods of marriage, faith, offspring, and sacrament. It manifests faith in their fidelity to each other. It manifests sacramentality in the permanence of their union. And, it manifests offspring in their rearing and education of Jesus. Still, when push come to shove, Gratian is an honest man. He recognizes the fact that the goods of marriage are not the same thing as marriage itself. Marriages can

⁴¹⁵ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 27. q. 34, col. 1073. The translation is that of John T. Noonan, *Marriage Canons from the Decretum* (Berkeley: School of Law, 1967), p. 12. For the argument in this paragraph more generally, see *Decretum* pars 2. c. 27. q. 34–c. 30. q. 5, col. 1073–1108.

⁴¹⁶ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 27. q. 50–q. 51, col. 1077–78.

and do exist which lack these goods. And, given the fact that there was no *matrimonium ratum* in the case of Mary and Joseph, their marriage was not truly sacramental, and could have been dissolved.⁴¹⁷ A marriage that is *ratum*, for Gratian, requires consummation, even if this is the one and only time that the spouses come together in the flesh.⁴¹⁸ If the condition is met, the marriage is indissoluble.

As noted, notwithstanding his firm consummationism, Gratian thinks that consent, involving an appropriate intention, is also a required if not a *per se* constitutive part of marriage. In comparison with the author of the *Decretum dei fuit*, he widens appreciably his understanding of what marital consent includes. More is at issue here, for Gratian, than merely the consent to sexual relations. For, that would not make it possible to distinguish between marriage and concubinage. In his terms, consent that is specifically marital consent requires marital affection.⁴¹⁹ This idea, which goes back to Roman law, means, neither for the civilians nor for Gratian himself, romantic or erotic love. Indeed, the civilians contrast the two attitudinal states. Rather, marital affection involves according to one's spouse the respect, the honor, the moral standing and regard, and the acknowledgement consistent with one's recognition of the spouse as one's partner in an upright, lawful union. This is not the kind of attitude one would display toward a partner whom one would not or could not marry, toward whom one felt no enduring commitment, and whose offspring would not be part of one's legitimate lineage. Gratian's incorporation of the idea of marital affection guarantees the continuing availability of this principle in both canonical and theological treatments of marriage in the sequel. Important as it is, he none the less makes it plain that, while the couple's inner intention, in the form of marital affection, is necessary, the consent reflecting it is *matrimonium initiatum* only, not *matrimonium ratum*.

Gratian's earliest commentators tend to confirm his position, although they do not always use his exact language and while they may subtract from, add to, or amplify on his teaching. Paucapalea

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., pars 2. c. 27, col. 1062–78.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., pars 2. c. 27. q. 29, col. 1071.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., pars 2. c. 28. q. 1. c. 17, col. 1089. On marital affection, see John T. Noonan, "Marital Affection in the Canonists," *Studia Gratiana* 12 (1967): 479–509; "Power to Choose," pp. 419–34; Rudolf Weigand, "Liebe und Ehe bei Dekretisten des 12. Jahrhunderts," in *Love and Marriage in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Willy Van Hoeke and Andries Welkenhuysen (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1981), pp. 41–58.

agrees that, while consent is necessary, it is consummation that makes the marriage. He thinks that the consent involved must include that of the parents as well as the principals, and makes a point of insisting on the spouses' taking of their vows in person, ruling out the acceptability of proxies. He disallows clandestine marriage although, inconsistently, he says that it is licit and indissoluble.⁴²⁰ Roland of Bologna who, like his canonical associates, is far more interested in impediments, grounds for nullification or separation, and other actionable matters than he is in the sacramental character of marriage, takes a somewhat different line in his *Summa* and in his *Sentences*. In the former work, which is more a commentary on Gratian, he reprises that master's view that consent, expressed at the time of the betrothal, supplies only *matrimonium initiatum*, while it is consummation that makes the union an indissoluble *matrimonium ratum*. He presents marriage as having three aspects, or parts: consent, the conjugal pact or engagement, and the absence of obstacles to a legal union. This analysis associates the consent with the engagement. But Roland contradicts himself by introducing a distinction which he finds in contemporary theologians on the opposing side of the debate, the distinction between present and future consent. The engagement embodies future consent. It is the present consent voiced at the wedding itself that conveys the consent needed for the *matrimonium initiatum* phase of the event. While the husband and wife may be called spouses from the time of their engagement, they are not actually married until the union is consummated sexually. Roland follows Gratian's first line of the defense of the marriage of Mary and Joseph as a true marriage by stating that the raising of Jesus enabled them to fulfill the marital good of children. But he does not acknowledge the logic of Gratian's conclusion that their marriage was, technically, no marriage at all according to the consummationist theory.⁴²¹ In his *Sentences*, Roland omits the distinction between future and present consent and does not consider whether the consent required is given at the betrothal or at the wedding. He cites the pro-consent authorities in discussing this point, without using Gratian's creative reinterpretation of their views so as to make them compatible with a consummationist position which they plainly reject. This gives a rather inconclusive tone to Roland's defense of that position. One thing he does that is not found in Gratian is to discuss the

⁴²⁰ Paucapalea, *Summa* c. 27, c. 28. q. 5, pp. 110–11, 112, 115, 123.

⁴²¹ Roland of Bologna, *Summa* c. 20. q. 3, c. 27 prologus, c. 27. q. 2. pp. 72–73, 113–14, 126–30.

sacramental character of marriage, in line with his treatment of the other sacraments. The *sacramentum* in any such rite must be the physical, perceptible sign. In the case of marriage, this is the sexual union of the spouses. Roland adds this theological rationale to Gratian's argument in favor of consummationism. The sexual union of the spouses signifies the union of Christ and the church, which is the *res sacramenti*. Roland does not discuss whether this *sacramentum* serves as a channel of grace as well.⁴²² But his emphasis on the sexual union as the *sacramentum* is associated with a view of marriage that limits it to its sexual purposes only and that omits Gratian's idea of marital affection.

Canonists no less than theologians are to be found supporting the consent position as well. Indeed, one of the earliest of twelfth-century canonists to devote attention to this topic, Ivo of Chartres, gives a strong statement of the position that marriage is made by consent. Unlike other canonists writing on this subject in the period, and unlike the theologians, Ivo was a bishop. As an ecclesiastical statesman, he needed not only to rule on delicts occurring within his own sphere of jurisdiction; he was also called upon by other bishops to give advice concerning cases on which they had to render judgment. Many of these marriage cases, starting with the flagrant and protracted affair between King Philip I and Bertrada de Montfort, countess of Anjou, both of whose spouses were still alive when they decided to live together openly, involved mighty personages who regarded themselves as the makers of manners and whose behavior demanded correction, not only on general principles but also because of their high social profile and rich capacity to give scandal. While Ivo, in his letters no less than in his more systematic decretals, was a man of principle, fully capable of maintaining strict and rigorous opinions, the political necessities surrounding particular cases sometimes lead him to accept a compromise position for the sake of resolving practical problems. For the same reasons, he is willing to take seriously the practices which the civil law condemns or permits, whether he approves of them or not, and his emphasis often has more to say about the frequency and urgency of the problems that he confronts as a sitting bishop than it does about their importance to him in the abstract. In this

⁴²² Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 116, 157, 270–72. On Roland here, see Gietl, intro. to his ed., pp. lxii–lxvii; Brundage, *Law, Sex, and Christian Society* p. 263; Jean Gaudemet, “Sur Trois ‘Dicta Gratiani’ relatifs au ‘matrimonium ratum,’” in *Études de droit et d’histoire: Mélanges Mgr. H. Wagnon* (Louvain: Faculté Internationale de Droit Canonique, 1976), pp. 550–54.

respect, Ivo's position on marriage formation can be read as much as a reflection of the ways in which northern French aristocrats understood marriage in actuality as it is an effort on his part, however successful or unsuccessful, to impose Christian values on this group and to persuade them to regard marriage as a sacrament and not merely as a matter of political and dynastic policy or of personal convenience.⁴²³

Ivo launches his discussion of marriage formation with a forthright assertion that consent, not consummation, makes the marriage, citing Ambrose, Chrysostom, and Nicholas, the standard authorities who support this view. He does not seek to disarm the authorities on the other side of the debate, but simply anchors his own position with the pro-consent authorities and goes on to elaborate on its implications.⁴²⁴ This position undergirds his own ruling that physical separation, of the sort that might occur thanks to pilgrimage, crusading, or long-distance trading, does not terminate a marriage, since the physical union of the spouses is not what created the marriage in the first place.⁴²⁵ In addition to being a logical application of the consent principle, these examples are also a sign of the times; it is difficult to envision any writer on the subject before Ivo who would refer so casually to these indices of early twelfth-century behavior. Ivo's stress on the consent principle also informs his insistence on the point that underage children, too young to give informed consent, cannot be married off by their parents; nor should they be betrothed by their parents before the age of seven. The attention that Ivo gives to this issue reflects three things: the fact that the consent of the principals was frequently ignored in actuality, the need for the principals themselves to consent knowingly and of their own free will, and the idea that the principle of consent extends in some sense to the parents as well as to the spouses.⁴²⁶ The same point of view can be seen in Ivo's judgment concerning rape as the basis for establishing a marital

⁴²³ Good assessments of Ivo which take his circumstances into account include Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, "Le mariage d'après la correspondance d'Yves de Chartres," *Revue historique de droit française et étranger* 61 (1983): 195–215; A. Foucault, *Essai sur Yves de Chartres d'après sa correspondance* (Chartres: Petrot-Garnier, 1883), pp. 140–77; Paul Fournier, *Yves de Chartres et le droit canonique* (Paris: Bureau de la Revue, 1898), pp. 1–10, 36, 39–47, 57–62.

⁴²⁴ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 8. c. 2–c. 3, c. 16–c. 17, c. 20, c. 35, *PL* 161: 583D–584D, 587B–588A, 588B, 591C; *Epistolae* 99, 134, 168, 243, 246, *PL* 162: 118D–119A, 143C–144C, 153B–154D, 251A, 253B–C.

⁴²⁵ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 8. c. 9, c. 12–c. 14, c. 189–c. 193, c. 244–c. 245, *PL* 161: 586A–D, 623D–624D, 637D–638C.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8. c. 21–c. 22, c. 169, *PL* 161: 588C–D, 620A.

claim on an unmarried woman. As we will see below, this topic tends to surface frequently in the list of impediments to marriage at this time, and the masters reflect a general inclination to reject this claim, in contrast to their Carolingian predecessors. In handling this point, Ivo states that the rapist can be refused but sees this decision as requiring the consent of both the victim and her parents.⁴²⁷

These efforts to accommodate the principle of consent to the social realities of the day can be seen in other areas of Ivo's treatment of marriage formation. He draws no distinction between the consent given at the time of the betrothal and the consent given at the time of the wedding, and does not consider the question of which of these moments is the time when the union becomes indissoluble. Given his admission of the age of seven as an acceptable age at which a child may be betrothed, he does not, in practice, offer much protection to the consensual rights of young spouses, although he seeks to defend them. Similarly, he adds other conditions which propose that more than consent is required to initiate a marriage. A marriage is valid, Ivo says, if the vows are sworn in church (*in oratorio*) in a public ceremony, even if there is no written document attesting the event and no dowry; although he contradicts himself concerning the dowry and elsewhere says that there can be no wedding without one.⁴²⁸ Ivo clearly opposes clandestine marriage, but declines to rule on its validity.⁴²⁹ As for the intentions that spouses ought to bring to marital consent, he takes the same broad-gauged line later followed by Gratian. He does not confine himself to the consent to sexual relations alone, but invokes the principle of marital affection, and defines it in the same way as Gratian does later in the century, as the dignity, courtesy, and standing as an honorably wedded spouse which it accords. In making this point, however, Ivo is not interested in reflecting on what makes Christian marriage a sacrament, a question which, indeed, he never raises. Rather it comes up in the context of his effort to distinguish marriage from concubinage, not in defense of consummationism but as a critique of the relationship between Philip and Bertrada. Despite the fact that Philip had browbeaten several French prelates into witnessing a fictitious wedding cere-

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 8. c. 23, c. 40–c. 41, c. 170–c. 177, *PL* 161: 588D–589A, 593A–B, 620A–621C.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., 8. c. 44, *PL* 161: 594A. For his retraction of this position on the dowry, see 8. c. 144, *PL* 161: 616C.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., 8. c. 141, *PL* 161: 616B.

mony between himself and Bertrada, an event loudly deplored and denounced by Ivo, the lovers were not, he insists, married. Rather, they were living in a state of adulterous concubinage, which Ivo certainly disapproves of although he is constrained to recognize that it is a licit relationship, according to the secular law. So, he does what he can to explain why concubinage is not marriage.⁴³⁰

The theologians on the pro-consent side of the debate feel, on the whole, less constrained than Ivo to take the realities of life as it was lived in their time into account, however much they may have agreed with him. The influence of Ivo can be marked in the treatment of marriage typical in the school of Laon, whose members also amplify considerably on his position.⁴³¹ As one Laon master forthrightly states, "where there is no mutual consent, there is no marriage" (*ubi non est consensus utriusque non est coniugum*).⁴³² And, two other Laon masters, evidently the earliest source for this critical distinction, specify that the consent required to make a marriage is the present consent given at the wedding, not the future consent given at the betrothal.⁴³³ The author of the *Sententie Anselmi* goes on to indicate three aspects of this present consent. It must involve the manifest, not tacit, consent of persons who are present—no proxies are allowed—who have the legal capacity to marry, and who lack impediments to marriage. The spouses must also bring to their marriage vows two intentions, the desire for children and the commitment to welcome their arrival whether it is convenient or not, and the commitment of mutual fidelity until death.⁴³⁴ Another author in this group treats the production of offspring, and the sexual relations required for it, and the consummationist authorities who stress this aspect of marriage, as speaking merely of what happens in a typical marriage after it has come into being, although this sequel is not of the essence in making the union a marriage. Others agree that the three Augustinian goods of marriage do not constitute the marriage, since marriages continue to remain in force in their absence.⁴³⁵ Masters in this school are

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 8. c. 32, c. 36, c. 60, c. 153, *PL* 161: 591A–B, 591C–D, 597A, 617C–D.

⁴³¹ For Ivo's influence on the Laon masters, see Reinhardt, *Die Ehelehre*, pp. 86–98, 132, 184. This book as a whole gives a good account of the pro-consent arguments of the school.

⁴³² *Sentences of Plausible Authenticity*, no. 206, 5: 135. See also no. 405, 5: 287.

⁴³³ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 527, 5: 365–66; *Sent. Anselmi* 5, pp. 146–47. Cf. Brundage, *Law, Sex, and Christian Society*, p. 237, who attributes this distinction, in the first instance, to Abelard.

⁴³⁴ *Sent. Anselmi* 5, pp. 112–13, 139–40, 141, 149.

⁴³⁵ *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, ed. Heinrich Weisweiler in "Le recueil des

sensitive to the problem of Mary and Joseph, and harness it to their cause. The author of *De coniugo* uses this point to hammer home his conclusion that sexual relations, although usually present, are not required to make a marriage. The content of consent which accomplishes the end of marriage formation is, rather, the spouses' commitment to a common life, their common will to live together under the laws of the church. He is willing to push the principle of consent, so defined, with nothing added, to its ultimate logical conclusions, by admitting that a clandestine marriage is valid, so long as consent is present and the parties are legally marriageable.⁴³⁶

Also on the pro-consent side of the controversy stands Robert Pullen, although he is less interested in the question of marriage formation than he is in marriage as a calling within the church, and one that has special ethical notes attached to it. While his basic concern in his treatise on marriage is sexual ethics within marriage, and not marriage as a sacrament, and while he omits many standard topics relating to this subject, he agrees that consent is of the essence. He does so without profiting from the Laon masters' distinction between present and future consent. Marital consent, in his eyes, should embody an appropriately religious intention. Only God's reasons for marrying, the procreation of offspring as given by His first institution of marriage in Eden and the avoidance of fornication attached to its reinstitution after the fall, are acceptable. Robert objects to worldly reasons, such as the enjoyment of the beauty, desirability, wealth, or social position of one's spouse, although he does not go so far as to say that such defective intentions invalidate a marriage. In any event, he holds that a marriage that is validated by consent remains in force irrespective of whether it leads to mutual fidelity, offspring, or permanence.⁴³⁷

It is striking that neither the Laon masters, nor Robert Pullen, nor Ivo of Chartres has much to say about the sacramentality of marriage. This is by no means invariably the case among the defenders of consent. Much more of an effort to see how, or if, marriage can be brought into accord with their general definitions of sacrament is found in other masters in this group. Peter Abelard

sentences 'Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur' et son remaniement," *RTAM* 5 (1933): 270–72; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 527, 5: 365; *Sent. Anselmi* 5, p. 112; *De coniugo*, ed. Franz Bliemetzrieder in "Theologie et théologiens de l'école épiscopale de Paris avant Pierre Lombard," *RTAM* 3 (1931): 274–75.

⁴³⁶ *De coniugo*, pp. 274, 283.

⁴³⁷ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 6.4, 7.35, 7.39, *PL* 186: 867B, 952A, 956D–960B.

and his followers wrestle with this problem rather inconclusively, and also inconsistently in some respects. To be sure, Abelard himself bring up marriage only indirectly, in discussing the creation of Eve in his *Hexaemeron* and as a gloss on Paul's remarks on the subject in his Romans commentary. Elsewhere, he treats marriage in a hortatory vein in addressing a monastic audience, Heloise especially, who must put aside thoughts about marriage. The circumstances and contexts in which marriage comes up in Abelard's writings help to account, in part, for the line he takes on it. In his view, marriage is purely a concession to the regrettable fact of human carnality. It exists as a remedy for sin, only, and it is burdened with worldly cares, sorrow, and luxury. The wise man, he argues, here invoking Jerome and the anti-matrimonial argument of his *Adversus Jovinianum*, will avoid marriage and spare himself its aggravations. At the same time, Abelard asserts that marriage is a sacrament and, presumably, as such, it ought to be viewed as something holy. Yet, he can find nothing in the relations between spouses that signifies a divine grace, his general definition of sacrament.⁴³⁸

The fullest exposition of marriage within the Abelardian school is provided by Hermannus, who faithfully perpetuates Abelard's negative appraisal of it and his logical inconsistency regarding its sacramentality. Hermannus is a firm proponent of consent as what makes the marriage and accepts the distinction between present and future consent. Indeed, this distinction is of use to him because he sees the content of marital consent as extending specifically and only to the agreement of spouses to exclusive sexual rights to each other, which rights come into being only at the wedding. "It is this pact that initiates the marriage" (*Et hoc federatio ad primum facit coniugum*), he asserts.⁴³⁹ Marital vows make licit and blameless the sexual relations which are the sole point of marriage, and which exist purely as a concession to human weakness. The wise man, Hermannus agrees, citing Theophrastus as well as Jerome, does not marry. In other areas one can try before one buys. Not so with marriage. A wife is either chaste or unchaste. If chaste, she is

⁴³⁸ Peter Abelard, *Hex.*, pp. 133–35; *In Ep. Pauli ad Romanos* 4:18–19, CCCM 11: 148. Good treatments of Abelard on marriage are provided by Weingart, "Abailard's Contribution," pp. 172–73; *The Logic of Divine Love*, pp. 195–96; Philippe Delhay, "Le Dossier anti-matrimoniale de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* et son influence sur quelques écrits latins du XII^e siècle," *MS* 13 (1951): 65–86.

⁴³⁹ Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 135. For Hermannus on marriage, see Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 152–53.

proud; if unchaste, she embroils her husband in a life of never-ending suspicion and embarrassment. Marriage, in short, is a yoke, an obstacle to a man's freedom.⁴⁴⁰ At the same time, Hermannus states that marriage is a sacrament. He gives the standard Augustinian definition of a sacrament as a visible sign of invisible grace or as the sign of a holy thing. As for marriage, however, it conveys no merit in the sanctification or salvation of those who enter it; it stands for nothing sacred; and it confers no *donum*, no gift of grace.⁴⁴¹

Precisely the same position is taken by the author of *Sententiae Parisiensis* I. Although sex is what marriage is all about, in his eyes, he agrees that consent to it, and not its actual exercise, is what makes the marriage. The concession of exclusive sexual rights to each other is all that the spouses promise. Marriage itself is a purely negative, remedial, concession. It is, he states, a sacrament, although, illogically, "it conveys no gift of grace" (*non confert donum*).⁴⁴² On the other hand, this master does think that marriage signifies something sacred, the union of Christ and the church.⁴⁴³ But, given his treatment of marriage in general, it is understandably difficult for him to explain why and how this is the case. He makes no effort to do so. The same can be said for the authors of *Sententiae Parisiensis* II and the *Ysagoge in theologiam*.⁴⁴⁴ The latter master also makes the mistake of mentioning the marriage of Mary and Joseph, although it does not help his argument. Since he has a purely sexual understanding of the content of marital consent, he has as much difficulty accounting for that marriage as the consummationists do.⁴⁴⁵

Most of the masters on the pro-consent side of the debate show far more sensitivity to the usefulness of the Mary and Joseph case to the defense of their position. This fact has already emerged in our consideration of the school of Laon. But the contemporary master who, more than any other, capitalizes on this theme, and uses it to promote a generous and expanded understanding of marriage, both in itself and as a sacrament, is Hugh of St. Victor.⁴⁴⁶ Hugh first

⁴⁴⁰ Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 137–38.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 135, 136.

⁴⁴² *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 44.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁴⁴⁴ *Sent. Parisiensis* II, p. 150; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 196, 199.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 196–99.

⁴⁴⁶ The best treatment of Hugh's contribution to the understanding of marriage is provided by Henri A. J. Allard, *Die eheliche Lebens- und Liebesgemeinschaft nach Hugo*

develops his position in his *Epistola de beatae Mariae virginitate*, not initially in the context of sacramental theology. He then reprises what he says in that work in his *De sacramentis*. This fact accounts for the way he approaches the nature of marriage in the first instance. The question he poses at the beginning of the *Epistola* is whether, as a woman already betrothed at the time of the annunciation, Mary changed the nature of her marital consent when she married Joseph so as to retain her virginity, and, if so, whether she was marrying him under false pretenses. This issue leads Hugh to a consideration of the essential content of marital consent, and whether it must include consent to sexual relations. Repeating the position of the ancient pro-consent authorities without expressly citing them by name, he insists that "marriage is not made by sexual union, but by consent" (*matrimonium non facit coitus, sed consensus*).⁴⁴⁷ This consent, he continues, must be mutual. In it the spouses promise fidelity and permanence. The agreement to sexual relations is not required to make a marriage. But, when sexual relations are included in a vow that also contains the other and the essential ingredients, their exercise is a duty flowing from the vow, and not the bond itself (*officium et non vinculum*).⁴⁴⁸ In Hugh's eyes, the bond itself is a bond of charity, not one forged by sexual intercourse. A true marriage is marked by its spiritual and affective character. In it, the spouses are one in heart (*duo in corde uno*). This union of hearts signifies the union of God and the individual human soul. The relationship of spouses that Hugh envisions is marked by constancy, sincerity, solicitude in all things, affection, piety, consolation, devotion, care, and compassion. They mutually support each others as companions and partners, bearing tribulation and suffering in undivided unity (*semper in omni sinceritate dilectionis, in omni cum sollicitudinis, in omni affectu pietatis, in omni studio compassionis*,

von St. Viktor (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). See also Fransen, "La formation," pp. 114–17; Corrado Gneo, "La dottrina del matrimonio nel 'De B. Mariae virginitate' di Ugo di S. Vittore," *Divinitas* 17 (1973): 374–95; Penny S. Gold, "The Marriage of Mary and Joseph in the Twelfth-Century Ideology of Marriage," in *Sexual Practices and the Medieval Church*, ed. Vern L. Bullogh and James Brundage (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982), pp. 102–17; W. E. Gössman, "Die Bedeutung der Liebe in der Eheauffassung Hugos von St. Viktor und Wolfram von Eschenbach," *Münchener theologische Zeitschrift* 5 (1954): 205–08, 213; Heaney, *The Development of the Sacramentology of Marriage*, pp. 14–16; Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 110–13; Ott, *Untersuchung*, pp. 404–15; Christian Schütz, *Deus absconditus, Deus manifestus: Die Lehre Hugos von St. Viktor über die Offenbarung Gottes* (Rome: Herder, 1967), pp. 121–24; Zeimentz, *Ehe*, pp. 136–40.

⁴⁴⁷ Hugh of St. Victor, *Epistola de beatae Mariae virginitate*, PL 176: 858A.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, PL 176: 859D.

in omni virtute consolationis, et fide devotionis . . . in bonis et in malis omnibus, sicut consolationis socium ac participem, ita et tribulationis et sufferentiae indivisum exhibeat).⁴⁴⁹ Hugh certainly agrees that God intended spouses to reproduce sexually from the very beginning. This activity, however, does not constitute the bond of love that makes the marriage. Also, it is a duty that not all couples are required to perform. When it is included in their marriage, it signifies the union of Christ and the church. This physical union is sacramental, for Hugh, just as the spiritual and affective union of spouses is sacramental. But, in his view, the union of hearts is the greater sacrament of the two, and it is *per se* constitutive of marriage and sufficient.⁴⁵⁰ The marital union of hearts, he adds, here addressing an objection raised by the consummationists, is not the same thing as a common household shared by relatives who may also be bound by affection. For, the former union signifies the union of the soul and God, which the latter does not. Pointing out that the consummationists, if they are honest, are forced to admit that the marriage of Mary and Joseph was not a real marriage, he returns to the question he had posed at the beginning of the *Epistola* and concludes that Mary and Joseph had already agreed on a celibate union before the annunciation, so that neither of them changed what they intended in their actual marriage vows.⁴⁵¹

Hugh repeats the essentials of this doctrine in the *De sacramentis* and adds to it, drawing not only on ideas found in other contemporary thinkers but also on his own general theory of the sacraments. He reiterates the point about the double sacramentality of marriage, with the spouses' pure love of the mind (*pura mentis dilectione*) standing for the union of God and the soul and their sexual association, if any, standing for the union of Christ and the church. He agrees that it is the spiritual society that is of the essence, although he does not give the effusive description of it that he provides in the *Epistola*. To the double institution of marriage, before and after the fall, he adds that, in addition to being a remedy for sin in the latter case, marriage, like the other sacraments, is given for our instruction and for our growth in virtue; he thus adds a positive moral dimension to this state of life.⁴⁵² Reaching out to include points made by other masters, whether pro-consent or not, and whether

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., PL 176: 860A–D.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid., PL 176: 864A–B.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., PL 176: 858C, 865C–867D, 873B–876C.

⁴⁵² Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 1.8.13, PL 176: 314C–318A. The quotation is at 316B.

canonists or theologians, he observes that, along with mutual consent, the spouses must both possess the legal right to marry. The content of their consent, moreover, must include consent to marital affection and honor, in the sense that Ivo and Gratian give to this term, as well as being a compact of love and a spiritual society. It is a commitment, as well, to mutual fidelity in spirit, and not just to mutual fidelity and reciprocity in their sexual relations, when the latter are included.⁴⁵³ Hugh also concerns himself with the question of when the marriage comes into being.⁴⁵⁴ He agrees with the distinction between present and future consent and sides with the Laon masters and those influenced by them in asserting that it is the present consent given at the wedding, not the future consent given at the betrothal, and not the consummation, if any, that follows the wedding that initiates the bond. He would like to see this consent confirmed before witnesses; but, like the author of the *De coniugo*, he recognizes that the logic of his position forces him to recognize the validity of clandestine marriages, the other necessary conditions being present. Hugh accepts the distinction drawn between the goods of marriage and marriage itself, and maintains that the latter remains in force in the absence of the former.⁴⁵⁵

There is no question of the fact that Hugh offers the most solidly grounded defense of the principle of consent in marriage formation of any master up through his time. He also widens considerably the range of issues pertinent to the understanding of marriage as a sacrament. Consistent with the emphasis on consent, he provides a detailed and broad analysis of the kind of intentionality that spouses need to bring to the reception of this sacrament, including the marital affection of the canonists and going beyond it to embrace a spiritual, moral, and affective bonding, seen as symbolizing the intimate union of God and the soul. His description of this state, especially in the *Epistola de beatae Mariae virginitate*, offers a richer and more positive assessment and account of what marriage means, or should mean, to those persons who commit themselves to this state of life. Hugh also moves well beyond the remedial in his consideration of the help which marriage can give to Christians in becoming better, wiser, and more virtuous people. Yet, there are two salient areas where he does not integrate marriage fully into the general theory of sacrament that undergirds his innovations in

⁴⁵³ Ibid., 2.11.4, *PL* 176: 483A–485D.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., 2.11.5–6, *PL* 176: 485D–494A.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid., 2.11.7–9, *PL* 494A–496D.

these other respects. While in the case of other sacraments, he is deeply concerned with the intention which the recipient brings to the sacrament as conditioning his ability to profit from its reception, Hugh does not deal with the question of whether people who marry for purely worldly reasons, and not for the exalted and idealistic reasons which he imputes to spouses, are therefore not validly married in the eyes of God and Christian society, whatever the civil law and civil society may think. And, mindful of the fact that Hugh's definition of sacrament in general is a sign that is a medium of grace, a sign that effects what it signifies, it is odd to note that he never raises the question of how the spiritual union of spouses can be thought of either as a physical sign or as a sign that effects as well as symbolizes the union of God and the soul, or how the sexual union of the spouses, when present, although it certainly is a physical transaction, can be thought of as effecting as well as symbolizing the union of Christ and the church. Nor does he explain in what sense either of these *sacramenta* functions as a container or medium of grace. None the less, the contribution of Hugh of St. Victor proved to be quite important in the sequel. His definition of marriage and his defense of present consent as the point when it comes into being, informed as they are by his ardent Mariology, provide the framework within which supporters of consent in marriage formation came to view the subject during and after his time.

A good index of Hugh's wide influence, coming as it does from a perhaps unexpected quarter, is the treatment of marriage formation by the early Porretans. The goal of these masters is to try to mediate between the consent and the consummation schools by arguing that both consent and carnal union are required, without specifying when in the course of events the spouses' change in status occurs and when the union becomes an indissoluble one. There is, to be sure, an inclination on their part to favor the consent position, reflected in their acknowledgement of the point that future consent is not binding. None the less, they bypass the issue of whether it is the exchange of wedding vows or the subsequent consummation of the marriage that is determinative. This unwillingness to take a stand on a matter that was quite clear cut for all other masters at the time, including Hugh, does not prevent the Porretans from viewing marriage as a double sacrament, just as he does. Agreeing that marriage is both a union of a man and woman for the purpose of leading a common life and a union, by consent, of two persons legally capable of marrying, they view the consent as the consent to establish a conjugal society in a spiritual sense, which symbolizes the union of God and the soul, as well as a carnal

union, which symbolizes the union of Christ and the church. Consistent with this position, they do not condemn clandestine marriages outright, although they note their disadvantages.⁴⁵⁶ On their own account, they add a point not found in Hugh, the idea that sexual relations were ordained both before and after the fall, apart from the other reasons God had in mind, in order to engender a human genealogy for Christ.⁴⁵⁷ At the same time, they agree that lack of offspring, like lack of fidelity and permanence, does not invalidate a marriage.⁴⁵⁸

Another master who shows the ability to combine Hugonian insights with ideas on marriage that Hugh does not countenance is Master Simon. Although he introduces his remarks on marriage in a manner similar to that of Robert Pullen, by describing marriage as a calling, indeed, as the only calling for the laity in this sphere of personal life, Simon rapidly moves to the sacramentality of marriage and its formation. Given the reasons why marriage was instituted both before and after the fall, that is, the propagation of offspring and the remedy for incontinence, marriage must require sexual union, in his estimation. Although he agrees with all the other pro-consent masters that it is consent that makes the marriage, he agrees with the Abelardians that the consent itself is consent to sexual relations (*Nam et per consensum efficitur et propter carnalem copulam celebratur*).⁴⁵⁹ Yet, at the same time, what is required and reflected in this consent is not just a commitment to the exclusivity of sexual rights between the spouses but a union of wills and mutual love (*voluntatis unionem, mutuam dilectionem*),⁴⁶⁰ which, according to Simon, is manifested by the husband in his protection of his wife and by the wife in her submission to her husband. This combination of love, protection, and subjection signifies the spiritual union of Christ and the church, for Simon, just as the carnal union of the spouses signifies the union of Christ and the church viewed institutionally. With Hugh, Simon holds that it is in the spiritual rather than in the physical bond that the *sacramentum* is truly and essentially located. He brings in Mary and Joseph and the pro-consent authorities to buttress this conclusion, which is where he rests his case.⁴⁶¹ It has to be said that Simon emerges with

⁴⁵⁶ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 11.30–33, pp. 160–61; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 11.5–6, 11.8–9, pp. 86–87, 89.

⁴⁵⁷ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 11.1–4, p. 86.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.8–9, p. 89.

⁴⁵⁹ Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 47.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45–49.

a rather inconsistent position, because his insistence on the priority and efficacy of the spiritual union undercuts his point about sexual relations being required to fulfill the purposes for which marriage was instituted. Further, the model of protection and subjection as descriptions of the mutual love of the spouses is rather a travesty of Hugh's extended vision of true mutuality in their relations. Still, the appeal of Hugh's conception of marriage is so strong, for Simon, that he incorporates the Victorine understanding into his account despite the inconsistencies that result.

A much more faithful follower of Hugh on the consent side of the debate is the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, although he does not hesitate to disagree with Hugh at times or to amplify on points that Hugh ignores or to which Hugh, in the master's opinion, gives short shrift. With respect to the intentions informing the decision to marry, he asserts that the procreation of offspring and the avoidance of fornication are the only theologically acceptable reasons. Other possibilities advanced by some authorities, such as the reconciliation of enemies, he rejects as not found in Holy Scripture. The less upright, or worldly reasons, such as sexual pleasure, riches, and connections, he deplores; but he affirms that they do not invalidate a marriage so long as the spouses are bound by mutual consent. Consent is of the essence; and it provides the master with a way of addressing the all-too evident gap between marriage, as it exists in the real world, and marriage, as theologians would like it to be.⁴⁶² When it comes to marriage formation and the relation of marriage to the goods of marriage, he follows Hugh in observing that, when a valid marriage exists, the absence of the goods does not alter that fact. With Hugh, he holds that the requirements for a valid marriage are the absence of legal impediments and consent. While citing the standard pro-consent authorities, he is particularly concerned with enlarging the dossier used by Hugh to include those who condemn parents who interfere with or undermine their children's liberty of choice, especially in the case of their daughters. He emphasizes as well that spouses must be of age, so that they can render informed consent. For the same reason, he rejects future consent as determinative, given the fact that children can be betrothed at an early age. With Hugh, he brings the marriage of Mary and Joseph to bear on the defense of consent, and acknowledges that his position admits the validity of clandestine marriage. Although he does not stop to consider, and to refute, the authorities

⁴⁶² *Summa sent.* 7.1, *PL* 176: 153D–155B.

on the other side of the debate, he comes down firmly on the conclusion that consent is sufficient, even in the absence of a dowry, a solemn, public wedding ceremony, and a priestly blessing, and that this is the case whether or not the marriage is consummated.⁴⁶³ The master adds to this analysis of marriage formation a paean of praise to marriage itself, not so much as a way by which man assists in the continuing work of creation, as Hugh would have it, but as a means of refuting heretics who impugn its goodness. For, as he says, marriage “is a good thing and in no way evil” (*rem esse bonam et nullo modo malam*), and this is so both because of its double divine institution and because of the honor with which Christ endowed it by performing His first miracle at the marriage of Cana, a point also made by the author of the *Sententie Anselmi*.⁴⁶⁴ This is a sentiment which Hugh would certainly have endorsed although he himself does not put such an expressly antiheretical construction on the point. But there is also an area in which the author moves away from Hugh. He does not speak about the inner quality of mutual love that describes a sacramental marriage, and he does not see the friendship of the spouses that proceeds from their spiritual conjugal society as essential. He puts this condition in the same category as the goods of marriage, which may flow from marital consent, but which do not obviate it if they are absent. Likewise, the union of minds and hearts may be absent, both as an intentionality flowing into consent or out of the spouses’ common life. Consistent with his initial point, it is the consent to a permanent common life that counts, with or without these desiderata.⁴⁶⁵ In this respect, the author shows himself to be less interested in the quality of the commitment made by the spouses and the ways in which marriage may help them to grow as persons than he is in the unimpeded, conscious, and deliberate character of the consent which initiates the marriage.

In positioning Peter Lombard’s view of marriage as a sacrament and marriage formation in the contemporary context, three main features of his account stand out: his solid support for the principle of consent, coupled with an appreciation of the values and realities to which his consummationist opponents speak, rare for a defender of consent; a generous use of the work of his predecessors, with the guiding spirits being Gratian, Hugh of St. Victor, and the *Summa sententiarum*; and his ability, notwithstanding his appeal to these

⁴⁶³ Ibid., 7.4, 7.6–7, *PL* 176: 157B–C, 158C–160C.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., 7.2, *PL* 176: 155C; *Sent. Anselmi* 5, pp. 129–30.

⁴⁶⁵ *Summa sent.* 7.4, *PL* 176: 176B–C.

masters and to many well-worn themes and opinions, to impart to these topics a quality that is Lombardian in its own right, and that moves reflection on marriage forward.⁴⁶⁶ Peter begins with the double institution of marriage before and after the fall, for the purpose of procreation and the avoidance of fornication. He immediately tips his hand on how he plans to present sex in marriage by remarking that the postlapsarian institution was for the protection of nature, and not merely for the repression of vice. In explaining this point, he adds that, while marriage was a precept in Eden, and again after the flood when the repopulation of the world was required, it is now an indulgence. An indulgence can be regarded as a concession, or for remission, or as a permission. Marriage, he states, is conceded. What this means is that it is granted for a good purpose, and not just merely allowed as a dispensation from a rule that would otherwise be binding or as a mere permission. The goodness of marriage after the fall is a notion which Peter, like the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, wants to stress specifically against the heretics who condemn marriage. No names are named but the Cathars are clearly in the dock. The fact that marriage is a good thing (*res bona*), he agrees, is shown not only by its divine institution in Eden, but also by the fact that Christ chose to perform His first miracle at the marriage of Cana. For, he concludes, were marriage not good, it would not be a sacrament. As the sign of a sacred thing, a sacrament must resemble what it signifies, he reminds the reader; and Christ, in turning water into wine at the marriage of Cana, indicates how, through the blessing He thus imparts to marriage, it can be transformed from a purely human institution into one drawing spouses to the holy thing it signifies.⁴⁶⁷

This holy thing, the *res sacramenti* of which marriage is a sign is, for Peter, who here departs from Hugh and follows Master Simon, the union of Christ and the church. There is a single *res sacramenti*,

⁴⁶⁶ Helpful treatments include Gold, "The Marriage of Mary and Joseph," pp. 102–17; Orio Giacchi, "Voluntà e unione coniugale nella dottrina matrimoniale di Pier Lombardo," in *Misc. Lomb.*, pp. 341–43; Heaney, *The Development of the Sacramentality of Marriage*, pp. 28–31; Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 239–41; Zeimentz, *Ehe*, pp. 118–23, 136–40. Mignon, *Les origines*, 2: 241–42, 248–49 makes the unsupported claim that Peter rejects Hugh in favor of Abelard, while Ludwig Ott, "Walter von Mortagne und Petrus Lombardus in ihrem Verhältnis zueinander," in *Mélanges Joseph de Ghellinck S.J.*, 2 vols. (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1951), 2: 656, 666 n. 35, 669 claims that Walter of Mortagne was his source for ideas found in all the defenders of the principle of consent.

⁴⁶⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 26. c. 1–c. 5, 2: 417–19. The quotation is at c. 5.2, p. 419. Peter makes the same point about the marriage of Cana in *Sermo* 13, *PL* 171: 402B.

he holds, but marriage signifies it in two ways, since Christ is united to the church in two ways. Christ associates Himself to the church both in will and in nature (*voluntate et natura*). His intention and desire to make His love and His salvation available to the believers who make up His mystical body is made efficacious through the church as a visible institution. Its existence as an institution is a manifestation and expression of the loving intentionality of Christ which is its inspiration and source. So, as Peter sees it, marriage is a bond "according to the consent of souls and according to the union of bodies" (*secundum consensum animorum et secundum permixtione corporum*). Consent signifies the bond of charity joining Christ and the church by will, while the sexual union of the spouses signifies Christ's union with the church by nature, in that He Himself took on the nature of man and continues to make Himself available to man in modes that can be appropriated physically in the ecclesiastical dispensation. And, just as the visible church expresses the invisible bond of love which created it and which informs it, so the physical union of the spouses expresses and reinforces the union of souls which animates it.⁴⁶⁸

It is clear from his posing of the definition of marriage in this way that Peter is planning to adhere forcefully to the principle that a marriage comes into being when the spouses give their consent, while at the same time acknowledging that their life together in the flesh is not an irrelevancy or a mere option in the vast majority of cases. Rather, he wants to present the sexual relations of spouses as something that can, and should, be joined meaningfully to their union of souls, in such a way as to express and to strengthen that spiritual bonding. This being the case, he has a clear idea of how to handle the authorities on both the consent and the consummation side of the controversy. He borrows Gratian's dossier here and also his tactic of relativizing the judgments of those authors whose statements are made without the qualifications that he himself wants to impose on them. Peter also has a way of dealing effectively with the marriage of Mary and Joseph, without having to urge or even to imply that a *mariage blanc* is normative or desirable for most couples. He begins by citing the authorities who say that the consummation is the point at which a true and indissoluble marriage comes into being. This position is flatly in error, he asserts. A marriage can be perfect, valid, sacramental, and indissoluble without sexual union. Such was the case with Mary and Joseph. Since

⁴⁶⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 26. c. 6, 2: 419–21.

the union of souls signifies a sacred thing, the bond of charity between Christ and the church, it is a sacrament, although it is not a visible one. A standard marriage, on the other hand, is sacramental in a twofold sense, since both the union of souls and the union of bodies stand for a *res sacramenti*. Further, and this is the way the consummationist authorities should be understood, he argues, while in a standard marriage the sexual union is just as sacramental as the union of souls, the former is a manifestation of the latter. The spiritual communion of love comes first and is the ground; “for marriage is the sign of spiritual bonding and of the love uniting souls, and, on this account spouses ought to come together in the flesh” (*Est etiam coniugum signum spiritualis coniunctionis et dilectionis animorum, qua inter se coniuges uniri debent*).⁴⁶⁹

In one stroke, by means of this argument, Peter has managed to accomplish three things at once, which move forward the understanding of marriage in his time. He has retained the notion of deliberate and loving consent as the essential basis of marriage and of marriage formation as put forth by Hugh of St. Victor, but without Hugh’s asceticism. He has acknowledged, with the consummationists, that life in the body is natural and commensurate with the purposes for which marriage was instituted. But, rather than seeing the sexual union as what perfects a consensual union that serves only as the incomplete beginning of a marriage, he regards the sexual union as sacramental in that it expresses the union of minds and hearts that is constitutive of the marriage. This perspective dignifies the sexual relations of spouses, in seeing them as more than merely remedial, and provides the foundation for Peter’s treatment of sexual ethics in marriage later in his treatise on this subject.

But before he gets to that point, and to the other topics pertinent to marriage that he intends to treat, he offers a more specific and more institutionally framed definition of marriage which includes a consideration of when it begins, which he discusses under the heading of the efficient cause of marriage; of the intentions which the spouses bring to it in rendering their consent, which he does not label a cause but which might well be called the formal cause; and of the ends of marriage, understood as its final cause. His handling of these themes reflects his familiarity with Gratian’s terminology and concerns, even if his own conclusions are not always substantively the same as Gratian’s. Peter agrees with the canonical notion

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid. The quotation is at c. 6.5, p. 421.

that marriage is a union of a man and woman who are legitimate persons (*legitimas personas*), that is, legally able to contract a marriage, who come together to live a common life under a common custom (*individuum vitae consuetudinem retinens*). This means that the spouses recognize that they have a common, and, Peter stresses, a mutual, set of rights and obligations. Aside from the standard point about the rendering of the marriage debt and the requirement that spouses may not withdraw into continence without their spouses' consent, he adds their common agreement to a permanent union and a union in which there is no double standard; each spouse commits himself or herself to the same conjugal chastity and fidelity that he or she requires of his or her partner.⁴⁷⁰

As to the efficient cause of this union, it is clearly, in Peter's eyes, the consent of the spouses verbally and freely given, a present not a future consent (*Efficiens autem causa matrimonii est consensus, non quilibet, sed per verba expressus; nec de futuro, sed de praesenti*). If the principals are unable to speak, they may substitute some other perceptible sign indicating that they are aware of the commitment that they are undertaking and that they bring to it the requisite intentions. This stress on the articulate word or sensible sign in the taking of marriage vows reflects Peter's desire to make the marriage ceremony symmetrical with the rites in which the other sacraments are administered, which involve a visible or sensible sacramental medium, with the possible exception of penance, in his case. For the same reason, he rules here as well that vows taken fraudulently or under coercion are invalid.⁴⁷¹ Having disposed of the consummationist authorities as he does above, he does not debate with them here, but concentrates on presenting the main pro-consent citations, with which he plainly agrees. Also, having already laid to rest, to his own satisfaction, the claim that the marriage is not valid until it is consummated, he focuses his attention rather on the claim that the marriage begins at the time of the betrothal. The way to read those authorities who support the latter position, he argues, is with a lexicographical clarification. A couple can be called spouses (*sponsus, sponsa*), as a courtesy title, from the time of their engagement (*desponsatio*), just as they can properly address their in-laws-to-be with the titles of relatives. But they are not actually husband and wife (*coniuges*) until they render their present consent at their wedding. This distinction, Peter shows, can be reinforced by the

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., d. 27. c. 2, 2: 422.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., c. 3.1, 2: 422–23. The quotation is on p. 422.

fact that an engaged person may choose a monastic vocation unilaterally, while *coniuges* cannot withdraw into monastic life except with the express consent of their husbands or wives. It is only at the point of the exchange of marriage vows that the union becomes indissoluble. There is no hesitation in Peter's mind as to whether an engagement can be broken. Engagements manifestly can be broken, since they are merely promises to do something in the future and not the doing of the thing itself. He points not only to the rule regarding entrance into monastic life, and other canonical rules pertaining to engaged persons to buttress this position, but also to the civil law. If a woman's fiancé should die prior to the marriage, he points out, she does not gain the legal status of a widow vis-à-vis his estate. Likewise, if it is the fiancée who dies, the man in question is not held to have been married, insofar as that might be a bar to his ordination.⁴⁷² Through arguments of this type, Peter seeks to show that those authorities who collapse present consent into future consent or who ignore present consent altogether are both erroneous and self-contradictory, just as he has sought to show that those who argue for consummationism, or who require a dowry, confuse the marriage itself with events that come later and which are consequences of the marriage and not its point of inception.

In turn, this argument leads Peter to assert that we must distinguish what is necessary to initiate a marriage from what is decorous in conjunction with it. As in the case of other sacraments, he notes, there are ceremonies surrounding marriage which are and should be observed. But the marriage remains a valid marriage if they are omitted. It is under this heading that he places parental consent, along with the formal handing over of the bride to the groom, and priestly blessing. Peter is as frank as Hugh of St. Victor, the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, and the school of Laon in recognizing that the logic of this position means the acceptance of clandestine marriage. Peter does not shrink from drawing this conclusion. He admits the validity of such marriages, the other necessary conditions obtaining, although he does not seek to encourage them. Like the Porretans, his tactic for handling this admittedly uncomfortable corollary of the pro-consent view is to discourage people contemplating a clandestine marriage by pointing out that it is not to their enlightened self-interest to enter into such a union. If problems should arise later on and the principals should need to have to

⁴⁷² Ibid., c. 3-d. 28. c. 1, 2: 422-32.

prove that they are really married, the ability to produce witnesses will be to their advantage. Still, when push comes to shove, Peter's desire to defend the principle of consent is unyielding, and he rules that such couples must be received as truly married on their own testimony.⁴⁷³

Peter also discusses the intentions brought to a marriage under the heading of the content of the present consent of the spouses. Here, he addresses a number of debated points by the way he defines his terms. This consent, he notes, is more than the commitment to share a common life. For, if this were all that were required, brothers and sisters and other relatives sharing a common household would be considered married, and they are not. Nor is the sole content of marital consent the consent to sexual relations, he states, herewith rejecting the position of the Abelardians. If this were the case, the marriage of Mary and Joseph would be no marriage, a weapon that can be used against this group of pro-consent theologians as handily as it can be deployed against the consummationists. While marriage, for Peter, typically does include both consent to a common life and consent to sexual relations, it is exhausted by neither of these ingredients nor by both of them together. What is of the essence, for Peter, is the agreement to form an association that is, specifically, a conjugal one (*consensus coniugalitatis societatis*), an association constituted and guided by marital affection (*coniugali affectu*).⁴⁷⁴ In his discussion of these conditions, which inform both the intentions of spouses as they render present consent and which serve as the final causes of their union, Peter reveals his familiarity with the canonists' understanding of the term *maritalis affectio*, although he does not use their precise language. He also reveals his familiarity with the substitution of this canonical notion by the author of the *Summa sententiarum* for the more effusive and idealistic view of marital intentionality proposed by Hugh of St. Victor. Peter accepts the canonists' idea that marital affection means the honor, dignity, and respect which people recognize that they owe to their spouses as such, and that the concept does not refer to erotic or romantic love, although he does not manifest their interest in endorsing this principle as a means of distinguishing marriage from concubinage. He joins the *Summa sententiarum* in advancing marital affection as a more workable and reasonable norm than the counsels of perfection advocated by Hugh; few

⁴⁷³ Ibid., d. 28, c. 2, 2: 433–34.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., c. 3.2, d. 31, c. 2.5, 2: 435, 444.

validly married couples can be expected to approximate the exalted example of Mary and Joseph, who, in any case, were granted special charisms because of their unique role in the Christian story. The aspect of marital affection and conjugal society that Peter emphasizes is found neither in the canonists, Hugh, nor the *Summa sententiarum*. Here, he reintroduces the observation he had made about the creation of Eve in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, an idea which he shares with Hugh and with many other masters of the time, as a means of reinforcing his point. Eve was taken from Adam's side, he reminds the reader, and not from his head or his feet, to indicate that the wife is neither the ruler nor the servant of her husband but rather his equal associate in a common life. This equality and mutuality extend to the moral relationship of spouses and not only to their sexual relationship. In making this point, what Peter omits is as striking as what he says. While he is certainly willing to put forth the idea in his Pauline glosses, he does not refer here to the subjection of wives to husbands as a punishment for sin or to the principle of hierarchy within the family as a foregone conclusion both socially and theologically. Unlike Master Simon, the union of souls he has in mind is not based on the model of protection and subjection but on the model of spiritual and sexual equality.⁴⁷⁵

While putting this egalitarian construction on the principle of marital affection, Peter joins the author of the *Summa sententiarum* in applying it to what he calls the final causes of marriage, from a sexual point of view. Recognizing that there are spiritual values that marriage confirms and promotes, he agrees fully with the idea that there are two proper and honest sexual causes at work in marriage, the propagation of offspring and the avoidance of fornication. He acknowledges that people in fact often marry for less unselfish reasons. Unlike the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, he reimports the sealing of peace and the reconciliation of enemies into the question, under the heading of lesser but still worthy reasons for marrying. These motives may not have Scriptural foundations but he finds them eminently reasonable none the less. Motives still less worthy, and, in this case, not honest either, include marriage for the sake of wealth, social position, or the gratification of erotic desire. Confronted with the problem of whether marriages undertaken for essentially worldly and selfish reasons are truly sacramental unions, Peter recognizes fully that the intentions which

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., d. 28. c. 4, 2: 435. This point has been emphasized correctly by Zeimentz, *Ehe*, pp. 220–21.

spouses bring to such unions are defective. In the case of other sacraments, as we have seen, defective intentionality on the part of either the recipient or the administrator is enough to rule out the validity of the sacrament and its fruitful appropriation by the recipient, for Peter. On this point, apparently recognizing the limited force which sacramental theology can have with respect to legal and social institutions such as marriage, fully capable of existing independent of the sacramental understanding which theologians may seek to impose on them, he bows to the perceived need to depart from his otherwise symmetrical treatment of sacramental intentionality in the case of marriage. He agrees, with the *Summa sententiarum*, that if a couple give their mutual and unforced present consent, they are validly married, even if the marriage serves ends which he holds to be dishonest and inappropriate, from a Christian perspective. The goodness of the sacrament, he reluctantly concludes, is not contaminated by the less than good ends that it serves in such marriages.⁴⁷⁶ Agreeing as well with the host of contemporaries who distinguish the Augustinian goods of marriage from marriage itself, the only category of spousal intentionality which he thinks pollutes the sacrament to such an extent that it warrants the withdrawal of the title of married from those who engage in the practices it informs has to do with contraception and abortion. Those spouses who procure poisons seeking to prevent conception or induce abortion are in a class with simoniac clergymen, in his estimation. But, in stating that they should no longer be considered married, Peter acknowledges tacitly that he is making a hortatory and rhetorical point only, for there is no way of stripping such people of their marital status on this account analogous to the canonical procedures for unfrocking a simoniac priest or invalidating his ordination.⁴⁷⁷

In practice, then, as well as in theory, Peter adheres to the principle of consent in marriage formation, whether the intentions spouses bring to present consent are truly in keeping with the sacramental character of marriage or not. Without falling into inconsistency, what he manages to do, better than any of the other defenders of consent, and, indeed, better than any of the defenders of consummation, is to find a way of integrating, positively, the importance of sexual relations between spouses into the position that marital consent, not consummation, is of the essence in mar-

⁴⁷⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 30. c. 3, 2: 440–41.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, d. 31. c. 1–c. 4, 2: 442–46.

riage formation. In the immediate sequel, his doctrine of marriage formation proved to be decisive for both theologians and canonists. It was adopted officially in the decretals of Pope Alexander III in the next generation.⁴⁷⁸ This is not to say that the victory of the consent position, with the particular emphasis Peter gives to it, was able to come to grips with the many ways in which it fails to square with marriage as practiced in medieval societies and as regulated by medieval codes of secular law in and after Peter's time. Parents continued to force children into unwanted marriages; dowries remained essential requirements for marriage; breach of promise remained a cause of action; the notary, rather than the priest, continued to be the official personage of choice in nuptial agreements; the high and the mighty continued to ignore or to manipulate the principle of marital indissolubility when it suited their convenience; and the dependent, the poor, and the semi-free found that their status and circumstances stood in the way of making their own free choice of marriage partners. In all these respects, while Peter's definition of marriage and of marriage formation proved determinative for the masters in the schools of theology and canon law, and for the leaders of the church, it neither responded to the perceived needs of married Christians nor informed their understanding of marriage in practice.

The definition of marriage and of marriage formation was the single biggest debated question raised with respect to this sacrament in the first half of the twelfth century. There were, however, other controversies into which some if not all of the contemporary masters entered. The two remaining topics, sexual relations in marriage and impediments to marriage, are subjects which a considerable numbers of masters felt a need to address and on which they expressed a range of opinions. In the case of the first of these topics, the terms of the debate were set by the position articulated

⁴⁷⁸ For Peter's influence, see Brundage, *Law, Sex, and Christian Society*, pp. 268–70. Brundage writes as if there were an automatic trickle-down process and as if the views of the theologians and canonists actually informed the attitudes of high medieval Christians concerning marriage. The same kind of over-simplification, but one which treats ecclesiastical authorities and theologians as having a monolithic position, is found in Georges Duby, *Medieval Marriage: Two Models from Twelfth-Century France*, trans. Elborg Forster (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and *The Knight, the Lady, and the Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France*, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983). A more realistic appraisal is given by Jean Gaudemet, *Le mariage en occident: Les mœurs et le droit* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1987) and Michael M. Sheehan, "Theory and Practice: Marriage of the Unfree and the Poor in Medieval Society," *MS* 50 (1988): 457–87.

by Augustine. As a pendant to his view that the sexual relations of Adam and Eve in Eden, had they not fallen, could have taken place entirely under the direction of reason and will, exclusively for the procreation of offspring, and devoid of sexual desire or sexual pleasure, he argued that, in man's fallen state, they could not be engaged in, even in pursuit of the legitimate goods of marriage, without lust, and hence without at least venial sin. This position continued to receive support from some twelfth-century masters, such as the author of the *Sententie Anselmi*.⁴⁷⁹ But, wherever they stood regarding consummation versus consent in marriage formation, and regardless of whether they saw the content of marital consent as sexual only or as broader than that, a number of masters expressly reject the Augustinian position. Indeed, within the same school of Laon in which the *Sententie Anselmi* was produced, the majority opinion is that sex in marriage is a good thing, or at least that it is excused when applied to the ends of marriage.⁴⁸⁰ Hugh of St. Victor agrees that the sexual relations of spouses can take place without sin,⁴⁸¹ and so does Master Simon, who, however, adds a distinction taken from Gregory the Great: if the spouses are acting with a procreative intention, they act "for a conjugal good, . . . so that sin in no way attaches to them" (*per bonum coniugale, . . . ut nullo modo peccatum reputetur*). But, if the couple are acting in order to avoid fornication, venial sin does attach to their behavior, while serious sin is imputed to them if they unite merely for the sake of pleasure.⁴⁸² Both the author of the *Summa sententiarum* and Robert Pullen take a much more generous line, distancing themselves still more sharply from Augustine. For the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, sex in marriage is exempted from all vice when it is intended to minister to the physical needs of the couple as well as to their wish to produce offspring (*absque omni vitio et sola intentione guerandi*). It only becomes venially sinful if neither of these intentions is present and if the couple come together for erotic pleasure alone. But, even in that event, he holds the fault to be quite mild. His accent is on the fact that sexual relations are required for the bearing of offspring and for the rendering of the marriage debt, and that this situation is approved by God. The pleasure necessarily attending the use of sex for the ends of marriage, he adds, is no

⁴⁷⁹ *Sent. Anselmi* 5, pp. 131–34.

⁴⁸⁰ *De coniugo*, p. 386; *Decretum dei fuit*, p. 364; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 401, 403, 527, 5: 286, 365; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 270.

⁴⁸¹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.11.4, *PL* 176: 481B–482D.

⁴⁸² Master Simon, *De sac.* pp. 53–54. The quotation is on p. 53.

more evil *per se* than the pleasure attending eating, so long as moderation is observed.⁴⁸³ Robert Pullen is equally interested in accentuating the positive. At the very worst, he holds, any sins found in marital sex will be slight (*levia peccata*). But, in those who are baptized and married sacramentally, this sin, if any, is excused in virtue of the sacrament. Since spouses commit no sin in the married use of sex, sin should not be imputed to them. Robert agrees with the *Summa sententiarum* in observing that sexual relations, like eating and sleeping, are natural acts that have nothing intrinsically evil in them, although, like these other functions, our use of them may be virtuous or depraved. He adds that there are also some virtuous acts that are inspired by, or are concomitant with, certain emotions, to which they are appropriate. Righteous indignation is a case in point. The same is true of sexual pleasure in marital relations. No blame attaches to it when sex in marriage is used for the sake of offspring, to render the marriage debt, and to avoid fornication.⁴⁸⁴

While the effort to moderate, or to reject, the rigors of Augustinianism on sex in marriage attracts support from a large number of masters in the mid-twelfth century, we can also find evidence of a more ascetic approach to this issue. Consistent with their narrow, negative, and purely concessive treatment of marriage itself, the Abelardians elevate celibacy above marriage and see nothing positive in married sex.⁴⁸⁵ The only thing that marriage does in this connection, in their view, is to make legitimate a form of activity which the wise man should rise above, and which is not licit except for married persons. Given the fact that all the masters just discussed, whether Abelardians or not, are proponents of consent in marriage formation, it is hard to agree with the claim of James A. Brundage that defenders of consent took that position in order to elevate the spirit above the flesh, out of ascetic inclinations.⁴⁸⁶ That view would seem to describe the Abelardians primarily, and not most of their scholastic compeers.

In the context of contemporary opinions on sexual ethics in marriage, the Lombard comes closest to the *Summa sententiarum* and Robert Pullen, similarly repudiating Augustine, and dignifying sex

⁴⁸³ *Summa sent.* 7.3, *PL* 176: 156A–157A. The quotation is at 156A.

⁴⁸⁴ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 6.4, 7.28, 7.30, *PL* 186: 867B, 945C–D, 948C–949C. The quotation is at 6.4, 867B.

⁴⁸⁵ Hermannus, *Sent.*, pp. 120, 137–38; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, pp. 44, 46; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 196.

⁴⁸⁶ Brundage, *Law, Sex, and Christian Society*, pp. 237, 268.

in marriage still farther. Because it is required in order to attain the goods of marriage, Peter agrees, the sexual union of spouses is freed from blame (*excusetur coitus carnalis*). Having noted that some people marry for purely worldly reasons and that they are considered to have a valid sacramental marriage none the less, he extends that same reasoning to the good of offspring as one of the three Augustinian goods of marriage. To be sure, Augustine was referring to the bearing and rearing of children in the faith, as good citizens of the church. Peter observes that many couples pursue this good not for religious reasons and not because they see the family as a cellular unit within the church, but for the sake of maintaining and expanding the importance of their own lineage, for the sake of self-perpetuation through children, or for other selfish reasons. Nevertheless, a procreative intention that is defective, from a theological or moral standpoint, does not remove the freedom from sin attaching to the sexual relations of such couples. The only point at which Peter draws the line is the case of sexual relations engaged in by spouses purely out of the desire for pleasure. This activity he sees as no better than fornication. But, in developing a sliding scale that places the rightly motivated desire for children at the top and the pleasure principle at the bottom of the hierarchy of ethical motivations and ethical evaluations of sex in marriage, what is striking is the way he describes the term in between. While all his contemporaries see the avoidance of fornication as one of the reasons for the institution of marriage, and while most of them see sexual relations undertaken for this purpose either as totally blameless, as with the *Summa sententiarum* and Robert Pullen, or as blameworthy but only to a slight degree, as with Master Simon, they still put the matter negatively. Peter sides here with Simon on the venial character of sin attached to this type of sexual activity, but he puts the point positively. The reason for the acceptability of this motive for sexual relations is that it serves the fidelity of the spouses. It is a positive motive, not a negative one springing from the view that it obviates the need for the spouses to seek satisfaction with other partners, in illicit relations. Peter presents this type of sex in marriage not as a means of preventing sin but as a means of strengthening the couple's mutual commitment. In concluding that sexual behavior that exceeds the norms he outlines, behavior that ends in incontinence that is selfish and immoderate is hence blameworthy, the point that Peter wants to stress is not that marital sex is restricted in its virtuous use but that sexual pleasure in marriage is no more evil than the satisfactions accompanying other natural functions and activities, such as rest and recreation

after work and eating when one is hungry. As for the more ascetic and concessive authorities, Peter holds that they should be read in the light of the principle that human sexuality is a good when exercised in the service of the ends of marriage. Also, while in certain legal contexts the husband is the head of the wife, in their sexual relations they have equal rights and obligations. Peter acknowledges the idea that there are certain time in the church year when the canonists think spouses should abstain from sexual relations. But he is far more permissive than they are. He asserts that the payment of the marriage debt for the sake of preserving marital fidelity must always be seen as a higher priority. This willingness to recognize that sexual relations play a positive role in the lives of married couples, joined, as it is in Peter's eyes, to the mutuality of the spouses' rights and duties, is a teaching that Peter presents in the light of his understanding of sexual relations in marriage as expressing and as reinforcing the union of minds and hearts in mutual consent, on which the sacrament is based and which is its fundamental definition.⁴⁸⁷ And, while agreeing with Hugh of St. Victor and with other proponents of consent that Mary and Joseph were joined in a holy and sacramental marriage, entered into without false pretenses concerning its celibate nature, and reflective of the good of offspring in their rearing of Jesus as well as in the goods of fidelity and permanence, he reminds his reader that this marriage is not the norm of Christian marriage in that it lacks the full sacramental significance of the union of Christ and the church that the standard marriage possesses in its combination of the union of souls with the union of bodies.⁴⁸⁸

A final set of issues confronting theologians and canonists who wrote on marriage in the first half of the twelfth century has to do with impediments to marriage, the conditions that nullify a marriage, and grounds for separation, coupled with the question of when and if either or both parties have the right to take another spouse in the event that their marriage has been dissolved. There are certain points on which there is general agreement here. All concede that the only grounds for separation is infidelity and that, if a spouse is dismissed on that account, the marriage remains in effect and neither party can remarry. Those masters who take up the question also agree that physical separation, as might be

⁴⁸⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 27. c. 1, d. 31. c. 1–c. 2.4, c. 5–d. 32. c. 4, 2: 421–22, 442–45, 446–56. Zeimentz, *Ehe*, pp. 226–28, 237–45 gives a sensitive appreciation of these points.

⁴⁸⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 30. c. 2, 2: 439–41.

brought about by pilgrimage, crusade, long-distance trade, or capture by an enemy, does not dissolve a marriage either; and, if a new union has been made by either or both parties, it is not valid, and the original partners must return to each other if the absent spouse reappears. It is also a consensus position that consanguinity to the sixth or seventh degree, depending on whether one counts the parent-child relationship or not, and spiritual affinity, of the type created by godparenting or serving as a sponsor at a person's confirmation, are a bar to marriage. Likewise, holy orders at the rank of subdeacon or above, vows of celibacy whether public or private, in association with a monastic profession or not, are generally accepted as impediments to marriage or as grounds for nullification if they were not known at the time of the marriage and are subsequently discovered. These views are shared by canonists and theologians alike, although, faithful to their own guild mentality, the canonists revel in the discussion of consanguinity, giving it protracted and enthusiastic attention; and in considering impediments and decrees of nullity they are deeply interested in the identification and prosecution of delicts and the procedures to be followed in these kinds of cases, themes that do not appeal very much to the theologians.

There are also a number of topics in this same general category where a range of opinions can be detected, both in areas where masters take opposing views on the same questions and areas where they agree on the substance of the issue but disagree on the rationale supporting their common conclusions. A good example of the latter is the observation that the rules and regulations affecting marriage have changed over time, to a greater extent than those affecting other sacraments. In Old Testament times, polygamy and concubinage were acceptable; the rules on consanguinity were drastically different from those obtaining later on; and divorce and remarriage were permitted. Some masters merely register these changes without much comment, or content themselves with the observation that these are disciplinary regulations, which are changeable by nature, as opposed to the sacramental character and purposes of marriage, which are not.⁴⁸⁹ One Laon master, however, dissents, arguing that polygamy was and always is wrong, but that God tolerated it among the Old Testament patriarchs on a lesser of

⁴⁸⁹ Honorius, *Eluc.* 2.51, p. 426; *Sent. Anselmi* 5, p. 112; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 402, 404, 5: 286–87; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, pp. 272–73; Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 32. q. 3, col. 1127–30; *Sent. Parisiensis* 1, pp. 44–55; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 196; Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 54.

the two evils basis.⁴⁹⁰ Robert Pullen sees the change in marriage customs as an index of the moral weakness of mankind in earlier times and the hardness of heart and selfishness of pre-Christian family life.⁴⁹¹ On the other hand, Hugh of St. Victor, Hermannus, and the author of the *Summa sententiarum* explain the change in customs on historical grounds. In the earliest chapters of Old Testament history, they observe, as well as after the flood, polygamy and concubinage were permitted in order to populate or repopulate the world; and the small number of people available for that purpose made it necessary to marry relatives who would now be ruled out as too closely connected. Hugh is anxious to make the point, following Augustine, that the patriarchs took multiple wives out of piety and public spirit, not lust. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* adds that these necessities and constraints have now been superseded, and Christian marriage can operate according to rules that are better (*honestior*).⁴⁹²

Concerning impediments to marriage and grounds for nullification, the topics on which we see substantive disagreement do not agitate all masters to the same extent. Sometimes their positions are related to their theory of marriage formation and sometimes not. Thus, while all agree that being underage is an impediment, Gratian sets the age limit at seven, reflecting his position that the *matrimonium initiatum* begins with the betrothal. Although Roland of Bologna supports Gratian on the point that the union is not a *matrimonium ratum* until it is consummated, he insists on the age requirement of twelve, for a girl, and thirteen, for a boy, or adequate physical maturity, both because this is necessary for consummation and because he thinks that persons below these ages are not likely to know their own minds or to be capable of rendering the informed consent required before the consummation. For his part, the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, as a defender of consent, sees the latter ages, which he gives as twelve and fourteen, as needed from the sole perspective of the capacity of spouses to consent intelligently.⁴⁹³ Although members of the school of Laon are generally on the side of consent, one Laon master discusses the status of a marriage in which one partner is above the age of consent and the other is below it. He rules, unhelpfully, that the marriage is valid

⁴⁹⁰ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 527, 5: 366.

⁴⁹¹ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 7.28–29, *PL* 186: 946A–947D.

⁴⁹² Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.11.10, *PL* 176: 496D–497C; Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 136; *Summa sent.* 7.5, *PL* 176: 157C–158C.

⁴⁹³ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 30. q. 2, col. 1099–1100; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 279–80; *Summa sent.* 7.15, *PL* 176: 166C.

for the first party but not for the second.⁴⁹⁴ Another impediment which is usually, although not always, related to the master's theory of marriage formation is insanity. While it is generally agreed that insanity, as with any other malady that may strike a married person after he is married, has to be seen, like sterility, as a misfortune that does not alter the valid status of his marriage and that gives his spouse no grounds for dismissing him, insanity is seen as an impediment to the creation of a marriage by Gratian, the Porretans, and the *Summa sententiarum*.⁴⁹⁵ Gratian's argument is linked to the requirement of informed consent in the first phase of marriage formation, the betrothal that initiates but does not perfect the marriage, while the other masters connect it to their view that consent alone suffices to make the marriage. Despite their strong support for the principle of consent, however, Hugh of St. Victor and Master Simon omit this question altogether, notwithstanding its pertinence, and Ivo of Chartres, although a defender of consent as well, oddly enough treats insanity as not being an impediment to marriage.⁴⁹⁶ All involved, wherever they come down on insanity as a bar to informed consent, and not always consistently with the position they take on that matter, agree that insanity does not prevent people from carrying out the duties of marriage, even if they see marriage as involving a union of souls, and one that requires a self-discipline in the use of sex that is difficult to envision in a relationship in which one or both partners are deranged or not fully responsible for their actions. The principal argument the masters make in support of their position is that spouses who are insane should not be required to separate lest the benefits of marriage be lost to them.

Another debated topic under the heading of impediments to marriage and grounds for nullification, which also may or may not be related to a master's views on marriage formation, has to do with the religious beliefs of the spouses. On this topic, as well, conflicting legal and Scriptural injunctions and concessions collide. Noticing the fact that, unlike the other sacraments, marriage was not invented in the dispensation of Christ, Hermannus and the author of the *Sententiae Parisiensis* I see no reason to object to the

⁴⁹⁴ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 528, 5: 368.

⁴⁹⁵ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 32. q. 26, col. 1147; *Sent. mag. Gisleberti*. II 11.20, p. 90; *Summa sent.* 7.15, *PL* 176: 166C.

⁴⁹⁶ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 8. c. 168, *PL* 161: 619D. Ivo's *Panormia* 6–7, *PL* 161: 1244D–1304A gives a summary of his position on impediments both on this and on other points.

validity of marriages between infidels. Master Simon agrees, pointing out that these marriages conform to the Roman law definition of marriage, which he cites by way of Isidore of Seville, the union of a man and woman possessing the right to marry, for the purpose of living a common life.⁴⁹⁷ On the other hand, the members of the school of Laon raise a plausible objection, to which none of the abovementioned masters responds. The marriages of infidels cannot be valid, the Laon masters assert, because the union of spouses signifies the union of Christ and the church, which simply cannot apply in the case of infidels. Also, marital consent includes the consent to live together under the laws of the church, which similarly is not the case with infidels.⁴⁹⁸ Gratian attempts to mediate in this dispute by ruling that marriages between infidels are valid in civil law, but not in canon law, while Hugh of St. Victor seeks to bring the topic into line with his sacramental theology in general by observing that such marriages are legally valid but that they are not sacramental. He agrees with Gratian that they could be dissolved, according to the civil law, and that, were this to occur, the former partners could remarry. But, unlike Gratian, he mentions this point only to dispose of it as irrelevant to the positive exposition of the doctrine of sacramental marriage that is his subject.⁴⁹⁹

In a related area, the question of disparity of faith as an impediment and as a basis for dissolving a marriage receives lively attention in this period. The treatment which the masters give to this topic reflects, on the one hand, an emerging consensus that seeks to restrict the biblical and patristic permission of mixed marriages while, on the other, it manifests disagreement as to the best arguments to offer in support of that departure from the practice of the early church. There are, to be sure, some sturdy defenders of the Pauline principle that such marriages should be allowed, in that the believing spouse sanctifies the unbelieving one, and can assist him or her in moving from unbelief to faith. Hermannus and the author of *Sententiae Parisiensis* I give an affirmative ruling, citing this biblical reason.⁵⁰⁰ Both Hugh of St. Victor and Master Simon expand on the point, urging that the Christian spouse take an active role in working for the conversion of his or her spouse, seeing

⁴⁹⁷ Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 139; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 44; Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 59.

⁴⁹⁸ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 406, 5: 287; *Sent. Anselmi* 5, p. 137; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, pp. 272–73.

⁴⁹⁹ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 28. q. 1, col. 1078–89; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.11.7–9, *PL* 176: 494A–496D.

in such marriages a missionary opportunity. Since it is apposite to his case, Simon adds that this practice is supported by the earliest authorities, starting with St. Paul, and that it follows the guidelines laid down by the *ecclesia primitiva*. He also adds that Christian spouses should not invoke the Pauline privilege on the other side of this issue, by dismissing unbelieving partners merely on that account; he suggests that some spouses who do so invoke it for frivolous or self-serving reasons.⁵⁰¹ Ivo of Chartres looks at both sides of the question. He agrees that mixed marriages are licit, and also that the unbelieving spouse may be dismissed if he or she is interfering in the Christian spouse's practice of the faith. His main goal is to try to iron out marital dissension in such cases and to help spouses make their marriages work.⁵⁰² One member of the school of Laon agrees with this view, although he omits Ivo's concern with marriage counseling and is more forthright in extending permission to the Christian spouse to dismiss the unbelieving partner.⁵⁰³ Another member of the school offers the unworkable ruling that the marriage is valid for the believing spouse but not for the unbelieving one.⁵⁰⁴ The most exhaustive defender of the legitimacy, and even of the desirability, of mixed marriages, the master who rules out disparity of cult as an impediment to marriage most vigorously, is Paucapalea. This is, perhaps, surprisingly so. As a commentator on Gratian, he refers to the very full dossier of citations, pro and con, that Gratian brings forward, from St. Paul on up, and he overturns the conclusions of his master.⁵⁰⁵

It is the same Gratian who occupies a pivotal role in turning the twelfth-century consensus away from the idea that mixed marriages are acceptable. Gratian offers the most solidly based arguments in favor of disparity of cult as an impediment to marriage and as a basis for nullifying a marriage of anyone in this period. In so doing, he also manifests a distinctly canonical approach to the question. Gratian is well aware of the fact that Paul both permits mixed marriages and that he permits the dismissal of the non-believing spouse. He is also aware of the fact that the church fathers and early decretals emphasize the first of these permissions. His

⁵⁰⁰ Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 139; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 47.

⁵⁰¹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.11.9, *PL* 176: 504D–510C, Master Simon, *De sac.*, p. 59.

⁵⁰² Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 8. c. 147, c. 195–c. 197, c. 246–c. 253, *PL* 161: 617A, 625B–C, 638C–639C.

⁵⁰³ *Decretum dei fuit*, pp. 368–70.

⁵⁰⁴ *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 272.

⁵⁰⁵ Paucapalea, *Summa* c. 28, p. 117.

reason for rejecting that tradition is not, ultimately, based either on a “creative” reading of the authorities he rejects or on the historical criticism that might have been used to relativize early church practice in the light of the missionary posture of the church at that time. Rather, Gratian’s argument comes down upon a lawyer’s point. The notion of two spouses living within the same household being governed by two different legal systems with respect to marriage is intellectually indigestible. It is also an administrative nightmare, in the event that it should prove necessary to adjudicate a marital dispute. And so, he rules that disparity of cult is an impediment.⁵⁰⁶

Support for Gratian’s position was not slow in coming. Roland of Bologna follows his analysis, although he confines himself to citing the authorities who favor this conclusion, departing from his master by ignoring those who permit mixed marriages.⁵⁰⁷ There are also other masters who agree with Gratian’s solution, but who offer quite different, and less legalistic, reasons for defending it. Some members of the school of Laon see disparity of cult as an impediment because they think it is very likely that the Christian spouse will be obstructed in the practice of his or her religion.⁵⁰⁸ The Porretans and Robert Pullen agree with that idea but put the question more under the heading of the grounds for the dissolution of a marriage. The situation they envisage is not one in which a Christian and a non-Christian seek to marry but one in which both spouses start out as pagans and one converts to Christianity or one in which two Christians marry and one of the spouses subsequently falls into heresy or embraces another religion. They thus yoke this issue to the principle that a spouse may be dismissed for fornication. Since they see the union of spouses as a spiritual as well as a physical one, they view the commission of spiritual fornication that is involved in renouncing the Christian faith as an extension of this same principle. But, because these masters have linked disparity of cult with fornication, they see the separation to which it should lead as just that, a separation and not a nullification of the marriage that would allow either or both partners to remarry.⁵⁰⁹ For his part, the author of the *Summa sententiarum* agrees with this notion of spiritual fornication and links it to a defense of disparity of cult as an

⁵⁰⁶ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 28. q. 1–q. 2, col. 1078–90.

⁵⁰⁷ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 275.

⁵⁰⁸ *Sent. Anselmi* 5, pp. 137–38; *De coniugo*, p. 282.

⁵⁰⁹ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 11.15, 11.22, 11.34–35, pp. 89, 158, 161; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 7.33, 7.35, *PL* 186: 950B–952A.

impediment that is as religiously motivated as it is ungallant. Dismissing cavalierly the Pauline concession, he argues that disparity of cult is an impediment to marriage because Christian marriages must be chaste. In his opinion, the marital attitudes and practices of non-Christians are, *ipso facto*, unchaste. A Christian would thus be put into an impossible situation morally if he or she were united to a partner whose sexual rights over him or her would force the Christian to traduce Christian values.⁵¹⁰

Certain kinds of sexual relations, or the lack of them, give rise to another set of disputed questions concerning impediments to marriage. One topic that is of interest, on which the masters invoke earlier principles derived from Roman law over more recent Carolingian rulings that reflect Germanic attitudes and practices now seen as unacceptable, has to do with rape as an impediment. For the Roman lawyers and the church fathers whom they influenced, the heinous crime of rape, far from giving the perpetrator any status as a claimant for the hand of his victim, made him liable to prosecution for a crime seen as a capital offense. In Germanic custom, on the other hand, cultural norms made it acceptable for men to raid other tribes of their women and to marry them by forcibly reducing them to their own power. Canonists such as Ivo of Chartres, Gratian, and Roland of Bologna seek to resurrect the older Roman principle in the case of the rape of an unmarried girl. In so doing, they also take note of the fact that a Roman girl was married by the consent of her *paterfamilias*, not by her own consent. They are not always clear on whose consent is required in this particular connection. Gratian views rape as an impediment, although he allows that it is one that can be waived if the principals consent to marriage. But, who are the principals? On the question of whether it is the woman's consent, or her father's, that binds her, he contradicts himself, although he asserts that compulsion itself is an impediment to marriage.⁵¹¹ Ivo of Chartres agrees that rape establishes no claim on an unmarried girl and sees it necessary for both the girl and her parents to assert her right to view rape as an impediment.⁵¹² Like Gratian, Roland is more forthright in treating rape as an impediment tout court and not as a possible way of initiating a marriage unless it is specifically rejected as such. He

⁵¹⁰ *Summa sent.* 7.8 PL 176: 160C–161B.

⁵¹¹ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 31. q. 2. c. 2.13–c. 16, c. 36. q. 2. c. 7–c. 11, col. 1112–14, 1124–25, 1291–92.

⁵¹² Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 8. c. 23, c. 40–c. 41, c. 170–c. 177, PL 161: 588D–589A, 593A–B, 620A–621B.

concedes that, as an impediment to marriage, rape may not be automatic or intrinsic. He also observes that the girl and her parents may not agree on this point. If that is the case, he rules that it is the consent of the victim that is determinative, although he is not entirely clear on whether he means the consent to the illicit sexual activity represented by the rape itself or to the subsequent marriage, if any.⁵¹³ On the other hand, the author of the *Decretum dei fuit* shows both an inclination to adhere to the Carolingian authorities and a disinclination to consider the opinion of the victim that ill accords with the school of Laon's general support for the principle of consent. He flatly asserts that rape is not an impediment to marriage.⁵¹⁴

Another form of sexual misbehavior discussed as a bar to marriage is a prior adulterous affair between the principals, their having lived together in concubinage, the wife-to-be having been a prostitute with her intended husband as one of her former clients, or the more general issue of prior unchastity. The handling of this range of topics is conditioned by the context in which a given master places it and also by the fact that there was a standard pair of opposing authorities on this issue, Pope Leo I and Augustine, whose reasoning the master might or might not bring to bear on his solution. Leo had ruled that a prior adulterous affair was an impediment to marriage. The situation he envisages is one in which a married woman commits adultery and she and her lover conspire to murder her husband, in order to clear the way for their own marriage. This type of behavior, of course, he seeks to discourage; and so he bans their subsequent union. Augustine has in mind a different kind of situation, in which adulterers or two people living together illicitly come to see the error of their ways and seek to regularize their relationship when events make this possible. He applauds such a conversion of heart and the intention of reparation, and permits the marriage for the spiritual healing of the couple.

This question is the only one on marriage raised by Anselm of Laon. Reviewing the arguments on both sides and the rationales of Augustine as well as Leo, he comes down squarely in support of Leo. In his estimation, Leo's point of view is entirely cogent. Murder should not be encouraged or countenanced. Criminals should not be allowed to profit from their crimes, and thereby to imply that the church sanctions, or turns a blind eye to, their

⁵¹³ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 308–10.

⁵¹⁴ *Decretum dei fuit*, p. 377.

scandalous behavior. On his own account, he adds that inheritance rights may become confused in the event that the lovers are allowed to marry. The disciples of Anselm follow his lead.⁵¹⁵ Roland of Bologna seeks to split the difference. If the lovers have committed murder, he agrees that Leo's ruling should be applied. But, if their only crime is adultery, they should be permitted to marry, following Augustine, assuming that they have first done penance for that sin.⁵¹⁶ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* is also supportive of Leo's position and seeks to vaporize the authority of Augustine in the alembic of historical criticism. As he argues the case, Augustine was referring to an earlier time, the age of David and Bathsheba, when such unions were allowed, not excluding the *de facto* elimination of Bathsheba's husband by David's ordering him to the front lines of the army, where he was dispatched by the enemy. On the other hand, according to this master, Leo was addressing a later age, in which such unions were forbidden. In his view, we are still living in the age to which Leo spoke and for which he was legislating. Leo's ruling thus still holds, and, pending any more recent dispensations, it should be followed.⁵¹⁷ In this reading of the question, the reasons why Leo and Augustine take the positions they take are set aside and the matter is treated simply in the light of one set of customs succeeding another, with the idea that it is fitting to observe the conventions in place. The master sees Leo not so much as legislating new rulings for his own age as he is making a declaratory statement about current norms. It is quite possible that the master takes this tack because he cannot produce a satisfying refutation of Augustine's position. For his part, one of the Porretan masters carefully reviews the position of both Leo and Augustine and the concerns that animate them. We are, unfortunately left in suspense concerning his solution, because there is a lacuna in his sentence collection and the text breaks off just at the point where he would have rendered his verdict.⁵¹⁸

Ivo of Chartres' whole focus on sexual misconduct as a bar to marriage is informed by his desire to come to grips with the affair between Philip I and Bertrada de Montfort. There actually was a point during this affair when the adulterers could have married, the spouses of both parties having died. In his effort to terminate the

⁵¹⁵ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 66–67; *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 409; 5: 57–58, 288; *De coniugo*, p. 283; *Sent. Anselmi* 5, pp. 146, 148–49. See above, chapter 2, pp. 47, 87.

⁵¹⁶ Roland of Bologna, *Summa* c. 31. q. 1, pp. 154–56.

⁵¹⁷ *Summa sent.* 7.13, *PL* 176: 165A–B.

⁵¹⁸ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 11.39, pp. 161–62.

scandal, which had also brought a decree of excommunication upon the head of the king, a situation impeding the resolution of the investiture controversy in France, Ivo sees much to be said in favor of Augustine's position. He rules that it is acceptable for a man to marry a woman who has been his concubine, providing that no impediments of any other kind exist.⁵¹⁹ Ivo writes, clearly, before Bertrada herself had resolved the problem by acquiring a monastic calling and retiring to a nunnery. Since the Philip-Bertrada affair is the only context in which Ivo takes up this matter, it is difficult to know how much the felt need to lay the scandal to rest influenced his thinking. For his part, Gratian associates prior adultery with a range of other illicit or problematic forms of sexual behavior. He recognizes the general difficulty that Leo wants to address, but thinks that his prohibition is far too sweeping. The couple, in his estimation, ought to be allowed to marry provided that they do penance first, so long as they have not committed murder. On the other hand, he rules out as acceptable a marriage between a rapist of a matron and his victim if she is later widowed, a position consistent with his view of rape as an impediment. In Gratian's opinion, Augustine is not entirely to the point here, because he was talking about marriage to one's concubine or to a mistress who had been repudiated by her husband because of her infidelity. Marriage to the latter sort of woman might have been permitted under the divorce laws of the Old Testament, he notes, but in the New Testament such a woman would not be considered marriageable. Gratian thus criticizes both Augustine and Leo, although he turns Leo's prohibition into a legitimate if qualified opportunity. A propos of marriage to one's concubine, he yokes this problem to the larger question of marriage to a woman who has been unchaste or who was a prostitute whom her intended husband had patronized. Gratian feels distinctly uncomfortable at the thought of permitting such marriages. In his view, the moral horizon of such women, and of the men who resort to them, is so low that they will be inclined to import the sexual ethics governing their past lives into their nuptial relations as Christian spouses, thereby debasing Christian marriage. They will engage in sexual relations immoderately, and for pleasure only, and not in accordance with the ends of marriage. They will be much more likely to succumb to the temptation of aborting unwanted offspring than will other people. Gratian views

⁵¹⁹ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 8. c. 32, c. 34, c. 38, *PL* 161: 591A–B. 591B, 592A; *Epistola* 16, ed., and trans. Jean Leclercq in Ivo of Chartres, *Correspondence* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1949), I: 64–71.

with the deepest misgivings the capacity of sexual sinners genuinely to abandon their past lives and to enter into Christian marriage with a firm purpose of amendment. Yet, much as he dislikes the idea, he agrees that such unions are licit.⁵²⁰ Paucapalea puts the subject in the same context as Gratian and rules as well that the wife's status as a former concubine or prostitute is not an impediment to marriage. But he is far less grudging than Gratian and far less worried about the sexual temptations likely to be present in such marriages.⁵²¹

Leo I also looms as a standard authority in an even stickier debate concerning another impediment and basis for dissolving a marriage, sexual dysfunction. During the first half of the twelfth century, this problem went by the name of *frigiditas*; and it was, almost universally, held to be an affliction of the male sex only. Another contemporary assumption, also almost universal, was that *frigiditas* comes in two forms. There is natural impotence, as a congenital disability, whether structural or functional in character, or as a disability brought about by accident, illness, or injury. And, there is impotence that is a consequence of witchcraft (*maleficium*).⁵²² This distinction in turn reflects a more basic assumption, the idea that any two members of the opposite sex will, automatically, desire and be able to have sexual relations with each other under any circumstances. This belief that the sex drive is no respecter of persons, times, and conditions and that it is always translatable into coitus unless malevolent supernatural forces intervene is what informs the view that temporary sexual dysfunction or impotence with a particular partner whom one finds sexually unattractive or with whom one is a bad physical match must be caused by *maleficium*. These beliefs are brought to the discussion of *frigiditas* as an impediment and as grounds for nullification of a

⁵²⁰ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 31. q. 1, c. 32. q. 1–q. 2, col. 1106–12, 1115–22.

⁵²¹ Paucapalea, *Summa* c. 32. q. 1, p. 125.

⁵²² Good overviews are provided by James A. Brundage, "Impotence, Frigidity, and Marital Nullity in the Decretists and Early Decretalists," in *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. Peter Linehan (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1988), pp. 407–23 and Josef Löffler, *Die Störungen des geschlechtlichen Vermögens in der Literatur der autoritativen Theologie des Mittelalters: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Impotenz und des medizinischen Sachverständigensbeweises im kanonischen Impotenzprozess*, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 6 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1958), pp. 9–10, 14–15, 17, 63–91. As Löffler, himself a historian of medicine, shows, the progressive refinements on these concepts in later medieval theology and canon law can be read as an index of the reception of Greco-Arabic medical science and its accessibility to thinkers outside of medical circles.

marriage by all contemporary masters and cause them to labor under the same liabilities in the effort to resolve this question. And, despite what one might be inclined to think, the pressure to address *frigiditas*, the inclination to regard it as an impediment or as a cause for nullification, and the recognition that this view requires a means of verifying the claims of the aggrieved spouse were not confined to those masters who judged that consummation makes the marriage or even to those who deemed that sexual relations are all that marriage involves.

A good index of that lack of symmetry, and even of logical inconsistency, can be found in the treatment of *frigiditas* among the Abelardians. Since they agree that marriage was conceded only as a remedy for human concupiscence and they argue that the consent to exclusive sexual relations is the sole content of marital consent, one would expect them to rule that marriages are null in which sexual relations are impossible. But, instead of following this, the Leonine ruling, such is their ascetic distaste for the sexual relations whose legitimization is the only rationale for marriage that they agree with the authority who undergirds the other side of the debate, Gregory the Great. They join him in ruling that, in cases where a marriage cannot be consummated, the spouses cannot file for an annulment but should live together as brother and sister. The fact that such an arrangement would defeat the primary, and indeed, the only, purpose of marriage as they see it give them no qualms at all.⁵²³ Roland of Bologna, in his *Summa*, also agrees that *frigiditas* affords no grounds for dissolving a marriage.⁵²⁴

The Laon master who wrote the *De coniugo* suggests that the preference for the Gregorian over the Leonine position may be regionally, if not rationally, induced, and that it is also a function of whether one distinguishes between natural *frigiditas* and *frigiditas* caused by witchcraft. Like other members of the school and like the majority of theologians and canonists in this period, he sides with Leo. In the case of natural *frigiditas*, which he thinks must be proved by the testimony of seven witnesses (*septima manu*), the marriage can be nullified and the wife may remarry. If the husband loses his disability later, the wife must set her new husband aside and return to her original husband. If witchcraft is involved, the master prescribes a regime of fasting, prayer, and almsgiving for a period of five years. After that time, the Gallican church permits

⁵²³ Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 136; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, pp. 45–46; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 197–99.

⁵²⁴ Roland of Bologna, *Summa* c. 33. q. 1, pp. 188–89.

the dissolution of the marriage and the marriage of the wife to another partner, but not the remarriage of the husband. The Roman church, he notes, withholds that permission and requires the dysfunctional marriage to remain in force. This master does not discuss how the witnesses in the first case come by their evidence and whether the testimony of interested parties, such as relatives of the wife, will be admitted. He offers no advice on how natural *frigidity* which later disappears can be distinguished from temporary dysfunction brought about by *maleficium*.⁵²⁵ Another member of the school tries to address the intractable problem of proving the non-consummation of a marriage, in an area where, admittedly, empirical verification of the facts is impossible to obtain without violating personal modesty and connubial privacy. In order to avoid selfish or frivolous claims against husbands, he says, the evidence must be given under oath. This still leaves to the side the question of how the evidence is to be obtained in the first place. Leaving that problem unresolved, he rules that, if a man whose marriage has been annulled on account of his *frigidity* finds himself capable of having sexual relations with another woman, he must return to his wife. The possibility that the wife may have been the problem in the first place is never considered. Regarding *maleficium*, he prescribes the same five-year regime as the author of the *De coniugo* and, siding with the Gallicans, admits not only the remarriage of the aggrieved spouse but also, if the spell passes, of the formerly dysfunctional one as well. He does not require the original partners to reunite, a view not widely shared in this period. Other members of the school are in basic agreement, except for that last point, although they display even less interest in how allegations in this area can be proved.⁵²⁶

The distinction between natural impotence and impotence caused by witchcraft is not always so clearly marked in the teaching of other masters, even though many of them who join the members of the school of Laon in viewing *frigidity* as grounds for nullification and for the prohibition of a marriage also join them in regarding consent, not consummation, as the essence of the marriage. In strict logic, their doctrine of marriage formation would seem to make it a moot point whether or not a marriage had been consummated. The attention they give to this point and their support of

⁵²⁵ *De coniugo*, pp. 279–80.

⁵²⁶ *Decretum dei fuit*, pp. 371–73. See also *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 528, 5: 367, where the regime for *maleficium* is reduced to two years; *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, p. 273.

Leo suggest that their awareness of what most people expect in a marriage takes pride of place over their view of what makes a marriage valid and sacramental, even in the case of masters who have a broader understanding of marriage than do the Abelardians. The Porretans treat *frigidity* as grounds for annulment, but only if it is a permanent, congenital disability. They are unique, up to their time, in observing that this disability may afflict women as well as men. That consideration aside, the author of the *Summa sententiarum* agrees with the Porretans' narrow definition of the problem and thinks that the permanence of the dysfunction can be assumed after a trial period of two years. He notes that the couple are not required to separate but that, if they do, the dowry is to be returned by the husband. He offers no recommendation of his own.⁵²⁷ Master Simon and Robert Pullen also see *frigidity* as grounds for annulment and make no distinction as to its type. Simon offers some vague remarks about oaths and witnesses but provides no real understanding as to how a claim of non-consummation can be proved.⁵²⁸

This murkiness on how to test allegations of impotence in the authors just noted is not just a function of the fact that they are theologians a bit out of their depth in handling forensic matters. For it is found, to an equally bemusing degree, among the canonists as well. Ivo of Chartres demands that proof must be obtained, whether one is dealing with *maleficium* or with natural *frigidity*. He is not at all clear on how one gathers it. If one has the proof, he states that a wife can repudiate an impotent husband after two years, and, her marriage having been nullified, she may remarry. But, if the wife lays a charge and the husband denies it, the husband's word is to be taken, even if they both give their word under oath, for the husband is the head of the wife in legal matters. This ruling gives the wife no legal remedy for the non-payment of the conjugal debt which Ivo elsewhere agrees is just as much the wife's right as the husband's. Ivo does not appear to recognize that his opinion here is inconsistent and unfair. However, consistent with his emphasis on consent, he states that if a man who, knowing that he is impotent, marries, he has committed perjury, which invalidates his marital consent. Ivo grants that, when witchcraft is at work, and if the prayers, tears, and almsgiving prove ineffective,

⁵²⁷ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 11.15, p. 89; *Summa sent.* 7.15–17, 7.20, *PL* 176: 165B–166B, 170C–D.

⁵²⁸ Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 50–51, 54–58; Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 7.36, *PL* 186: 956A–D.

the marriage may be dissolved and the aggrieved partner may remarry. If the remedy is effective, the spouses should remain with each other. One finds in Ivo's imprecision about evidence and in his dismissive treatment of the testimony of wives almost a wish, unspoken, that spouses in unconsummated marriages should not air their problems in public but rather should suffer in silence.⁵²⁹

Gratian does no better in providing a real remedy for the wife when her husband contradicts her, a fact which also stands at odds with his guarantee of the equality of spouses in rendering the marriage debt and his firmly evenhanded treatment of the right to dismiss a spouse on grounds of fornication.⁵³⁰ He agrees that *frigidity* is a cause for nullification. He also agrees that the husband is to be believed if the spouses are not in agreement on the facts. He offers no suggestions on how the authorities who sit in judgment can or should substantiate the allegations or disclaimers of the spouses. As for the impotence caused by *maleficium*. Gratian joins other masters of the day in offering no insight on how to prove that witchcraft is, indeed, afoot, and no remedy for the new husband of a woman freed from a marriage on this account, if her first husband recovers.⁵³¹ Nor do Gratian's earliest commentators offer much further help. Paucapalea ignores natural impotence altogether, as well as how one would go about proving it. He confines himself to *maleficium* and agrees with Gratian on that subject.⁵³² Roland of Bologna, taking a totally different position in his *Sentences* from the one he offers in his *Summa*, states that natural *frigidity* both impedes and dissolves a marriage, so long as it is not pretended or falsely and maliciously charged. In treating *maleficium* as a cause of impotence, he is the one and only master in this period to recognize the fact that a man may be sexually functional with one partner and not with another. Without pausing to notice that this conceptual breakthrough places the whole idea of *maleficium* on a very shaky foundation indeed, and without indicating what the regime for exorcism should be, he takes the unpopular line, along with the author of *Decretum dei fuit* that, if a man dysfunctional because of

⁵²⁹ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 8. c. 79–c. 80, c. 178–c. 180, c. 182, c. 194, *PL* 161: 600C–D, 621C–622A, 622B–C, 624D–625A.

⁵³⁰ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 32. q. 6–q. 7, q. 25, col. 1136–44, 1146–47. See James A. Brundage, "Sexual Equality in Medieval Canon Law," in *Medieval Women and the Sources of Medieval History*, ed. Joel T. Rosenthal (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990), pp. 68–78. I am indebted to Professor Brundage for the latter reference.

⁵³¹ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 33. q. 1, col. 1148–50.

⁵³² Paucapalea, *Summa* c. 33, pp. 130–31.

witchcraft should recover, he should be allowed to take a new wife, in contrast with the naturally impotent man, who is not permitted to do so after his first marriage is annulled. On the vexed question of proving non-consummation, or proving which kind of impotence is at issue, Roland waffles. He dislikes the idea of witnesses, thinking that anyone close enough to a married couple to be able to claim certitude about their intimate relations is likely to be prejudiced. He prefers adverting to the oaths of the plaintiff and defendant, but offers no advice on what to do if they disagree.⁵³³

There is one other major debate over an impediment to marriage, this one focusing on status and not on sexual conduct or its absence. The problem in part derives from the ambiguous meaning of the term *servus* in medieval Latin. It can have the same sense of the word as classical Latin gives it and refer to a slave, who, by definition, in Roman law, is a thing and not a person and who lacks *connubium*, or the legal right to marry. But *servus* can also mean serf, a person of semi-free legal status and one who did have assorted private and public rights in law and custom, rights that could be quite diverse depending on the part of Europe in which he lived and on his relative degree of semi-freedom and semi-servitude. Slavery, to be sure, was far less in evidence in the twelfth century than it had been in the Roman world, but it was still to be found, although to a different extent in different parts of Europe. Now, the ancient authorities who had ruled on the question of whether servile status was an impediment to marriage had done so in the late Roman period, when the institution of slavery was normal, for Christians and non-Christians alike. It is true that, in the later centuries of Roman history, the crystal-clear distinction between slavery and free status found in Roman jurisprudence grew blurred, as a sizable group of upgraded slaves and downgraded freemen replaced, as the labor force, the slaves who had now become an insupportable drain on the capital resources of their masters. But the *servi*, or partially free former slaves in this category, while they bore the same name as the Roman slave and as the later medieval serf, had fewer legal rights than the serf did, rights which, in the latter case, were difficult to generalize about in the twelfth century given the profusion of local variations of law and custom.

Faced with these institutional and regional discrepancies and

⁵³³ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, pp. 280–82.

⁵³⁴ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 8. c. 51–c. 55, c. 139, c. 156–c. 157, c. 164–c. 165, c. 167, *PL* 161: 594–D–595D, 615C, 618B–C, 619B–C, 619C–D.

terminological imprecisions, it is perhaps no surprise that theologians and canonists in the first half of the twelfth century reached no consensus on the question of whether servile status, however defined, was an impediment to marriage. The confusion is registered by Ivo of Chartres, who flounders about inconclusively on the question of whether marriage partners need to be of equal legal status and whether persons of servile status can marry.⁵³⁴ Most other masters take a more definite stand. The Porretans and the Abelardian authors of the *Ysagoge in theologiam* and the *Sententiae Parisiensis* I assert that servile status is an impediment.⁵³⁵ Gratian and Roland of Bologna take the opposing position and draw some distinctions. Disparity of status, or unfree status, they agree, are not impediments or grounds for nullifying a marriage. Error as to the identity of the person one is marrying or as to his legal status would, they think, impede or nullify a marriage, in contrast with inaccurate information as to his wealth and condition, the latter term embracing his moral character as well as his health.⁵³⁶ The theme of error, or misinformation, or even disinformation, is picked up by Hugh of St. Victor, Hermannus, and Master Simon, who concur that servile status is not an impediment or a cause of nullification, so long as the *servus* has not tried to pass himself off as a *liber*, or free man, in order to marry a free woman; Simon adds the stipulation that a *servus* must obtain his master's consent.⁵³⁷ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* agrees with that proviso and offers a historical and geographical gloss on this point. He notes that in some local churches, in places where Roman law is followed, persons of servile status are denied the right to marry. This is not the case in the Gallican church, where people of unequal status do have the right to marry, each person retaining his or her original status thereby. He supports this latter rule because he is a member of the Gallican church and because he advocates the following of local custom, and not necessarily because he thinks that it is the correct and fair position. The observance of the rules in force where one lives is a sufficient justification, in his eyes, for this conclusion. Thus, he makes no effort to plead for an extension to other parts of the church of the Gallican practice; within the Gallican jurisdiction, at any rate, it is fitting for a *servus* to marry another *servus* or

⁵³⁵ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* II 11.10, p. 88; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 196; *Sent. Parisiensis* I, p. 45.

⁵³⁶ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 19, col. 1091–95; Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 275.

⁵³⁷ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.11–19, *PL* 176: 497D–520C; Hermannus, *Sent.*, p. 136; Master Simon, *De sac.*, pp. 60–61.

for a *servus* to marry a *liber*, so long as the consent of the master of any *servus* involved is obtained.⁵³⁸

The debates just discussed, whether they involve substantive disagreements among the masters or areas where they draw the same, or similar, conclusions but for different reasons, constitute the principle controversies concerning impediments to marriage or grounds for dissolution on which contemporaries of Peter Lombard took a stand. Before positioning his own handling of this aspect of marriage doctrine in relation to the ideas of other masters, we might mention three other issues, topics much more restricted in the interest they elicited. Under this heading, several masters place monstrous crime as an impediment to marriage. Roland of Bologna gives this opinion without indicating what sort of crimes he has in mind.⁵³⁹ Gratian specifies uxoricide. He displays no concern with women who may murder their husbands, but appears to think that a man who has murdered one wife is likely to be a serial killer whose right to remarry should be withdrawn.⁵⁴⁰ The author of the *Summa sententiarum* also thinks that punitive action should be taken against serious criminals in the matrimonial forum but is more interested in the status of the marriage of such a person once his crime is discovered. In this master's view, the criminal should be separated from his spouse. This would mean that neither of them would have the right to remarry, and it would thereby punish the innocent wife as well as the guilty husband—for this master, along with Gratian, envisions the criminal as being the husband—but it would at least mean that she was not forced to live with a horrible felon.⁵⁴¹

The other two mini-debates are triggered by the departure of the Porretans from views standard at this time. Under the heading of the point that misfortunes or vicissitudes in the areas of health, wealth, or the discovery of sterility in a spouse do not provide grounds for an annulment or separation, the defenders of the consensus position, citing Augustine as their authority, urge that not even leprosy, should it supervene, offers an exception from this rule. Leprosy is singled out, among misfortunes, both for its loathsome manifestations and for its alleged contagiousness, in the eyes of Augustine and his followers. One of the Porretan masters objects specifically to this Augustinian notion. In his view, leprosy does

⁵³⁸ *Summa sent.* 7.14, *PL* 176: 165B–166B.

⁵³⁹ Roland of Bologna, *Sent.*, p. 280.

⁵⁴⁰ Gratian, *Decretum* pars 2. c. 33. q. 2. c. 9. dictum, col. 1154.

⁵⁴¹ *Summa sent.* 7.20, *PL* 176: 170B.

offer grounds for dismissing a spouse.⁵⁴² Another area in which the same master finds himself swimming against the current has to do with the horror of incest that informs the elaborate consanguinity rules of this period. In order to dramatize how seriously this principle has to be taken, the Laon master who wrote the *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, reflecting the contemporary consensus in so doing, poses a hypothetical case whose plot has all the trappings of a Hellenistic romance. Imagine that a brother and sister are separated in childhood, he suggests. The brother is stolen and taken to a faraway land, there to be raised in ignorance of his true homeland and identity. After he grows up, he finds his way back to his native land, and chances to meet his sister. The two young people fall in love and marry. But then, evidence of their close blood relationship comes to light. What to do? The master is quite unequivocal in his ruling. He states the standard opinion that the marriage must be annulled forthwith.⁵⁴³ Now, the Porretan master tells the same gripping tale by way of example. He pointedly fails to agree with the consensus position. If, and only if, legitimate witnesses can be found, in sufficient number, to testify to the sibling status of the spouses, should the couple be parted. But if not, they should be allowed to stay together, for they married in perfectly good faith. And, in any event, he reminds the reader, in this unsuccessful sally against the serried ranks of ancient and contemporary opinion, the purpose of theologizing about impediments to marriage and grounds for nullification is not to obstruct people from seeking the solace of marriage, whenever possible, but to try to find as many ways as possible of keeping marriages together and of enabling spouses to work out their difficulties within its embrace.⁵⁴⁴

This last sentiment, if not the Porretan master's position on incest, is one warmly shared by Peter Lombard. It certainly colors the way he addresses the whole subject of marital impediments. Irrespective of the alignment of his position, or not, with this or that contemporary master on particular impediments, he does something that no other scholastic theologian of the time does, in his generous incorporation into his account of material drawn from the canonists and in his effort to rationalize the treatment of the entire subject. When one reads the discussion of matrimonial impediments provided by other theologians and canonists in this period, one is struck by the randomness of their attack on the

⁵⁴² *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 11.29, p. 160.

⁵⁴³ *Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur*, pp. 273–74.

⁵⁴⁴ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 11.37, p. 161.

subject. There seems to be no individually or generally understood reason for the sequence in which impediments are presented; and the ordering of this material differs considerably from one author to another. From the very outset, the Lombard gives his own treatment of impediments a look that sets it apart from the marriage treatises of his compeers. He offers a clear and cogent principle of organization. He first presents conditions that may interfere with the consent that is constitutive of the marriage. Next, he considers who has a legitimate right to marry. His way of posing this question is of interest. Instead of presenting impediments in negative terms, as obviating legitimate marriages, he accents the positive qualities possessed by marriageable persons as rights that they have, insofar as they have not ceded them by their own free will or as a result of forces beyond their control. In handling other impediments, Peter organizes them in two categories, those that are intrinsic, natural, and unchangeable and those that are accidental, existing because of human choices or contingencies that are not graven in stone, or because of disciplinary rulings that can and do change. This mode of organization gives the whole subject of impediments a much more coherent and comprehensible shape in Peter's *Sentences* than it finds anywhere else in this period.⁵⁴⁵

Under the heading of circumstances that impede the consent which is of the essence in marriage formation, Peter lists coercion, fraud, and error. He is in full agreement with the consensus position, which invalidates marriages in which defective consent of these kinds is present. His own concern, notwithstanding his vigorous defense of the need for free and informed consent, is to ask whether there is any basis for accepting as valid marriages in which these defects are present. With respect to coercion, he cites an oft-mentioned case of a crusader baron who forced his daughter into a political marriage that was initially repugnant to her. But, as time went on, she grew to appreciate her husband or at least to make her peace with her situation. Peter concedes that such a marriage is, initially, invalid. But he thinks it can become valid if, in the sequel, the dissenting spouse changes her opinion to one of assent. Peter's position on this case can be understood two ways. It can be seen as a rare concession on his part to the realities of

⁵⁴⁵ Peter outlines this organizational scheme at *Sent.* 4. d. 27. c. 1, 2: 421–22. None of these points are noted by the only general study of Peter Lombard on marital impediments to date, Leon M. Smišniewicz, *Die Lehre von den Ehehindernissen bei Petrus Lombardus und bei seinen Kommentaren* (Posen: Druckarnia Katolicka, 1917), which is very sketchy and not to be recommended. The author treats the subject as a mere curtain-raiser for Peter's thirteenth-century commentators.

marriage as it was actually practiced in the twelfth-century world. It can also be read in another light. Peter is as interested in the possibility that the experience of conjugal life can engender, over time, the true consent needed to make the marriage sacramental as he is interested in objecting to coercion. In this instance, his view of marriage as a means of moral education emerges strongly. On the other hand, on the question of fraud, error, or *bona fide* ignorance as impediments, he follows Gratian very closely. Not all error, he agrees, vitiates consent. If there is error, deliberate or otherwise, as to a person's identity or legal status, this error is an impediment. But error, and even disinformation, as to a person's fortune, condition, and moral qualities, or as to his past history, is not an impediment. Along with Gratian, Peter argues this case on both rational and legal grounds. Error as to person and status is deception, and is hence wrong. It may also infringe on the legal rights of the spouse who marries such an individual and thereby suffers disparagement. Deception may also be present in the case of error as to fortune and condition. This, he concedes, is also immoral. But, no infringement on the spouse's legal rights results. And so, error as to fortune and condition is not an impediment or grounds for the dissolution of a marriage.⁵⁴⁶ To this common doctrine which he shares with Gratian Peter adds a theological problem not of such concern to the canonists, the question of whether the father of Leah, who passed her off as Rachel in marrying her to Jacob, committed a sin or refuted the principle that error as to person is an impediment to a valid marriage. His opinion is that this event was designed to state a mystery and not to lay down a legal or theological precedent.⁵⁴⁷

Peter opens his discussion of who is legally entitled to marry by remarking on the point that some of the rules relative to this question, and to other regulations governing marriage, have changed over time. Agreeing that the deity has altered these rules in accordance with His estimate of human needs and capacities in various times and places, he adds to the stand taken on this matter by Hugh of St. Victor, the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, and Hermannus by noting that, aside from population statistics as a controlling consideration, the deity, in His successive dispensations

⁵⁴⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. c. 29, 2: 436–37. Teodoro Ruiz Josué, “Los efectos jurídicos de la ignorancia en la doctrina matrimonial de Hugo de San Victor y Roberto Pulleyn,” *Revista española de derecho canónico* 8 (1948): 63, 65, 68–105 sees Hugh, whether directly or indirectly by way of Robert Pullen, as Peter's chief source for the doctrine of error, ignoring Gratian.

⁵⁴⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 30. c. 1, 2: 437–38.

on this subject, moved from a covenant in which religion was held to be passed on by hereditary succession to a covenant potentially embracing all mankind, by faith. God also moved from a sexual ethic in which marriage alone was valued to one in which celibacy as well was esteemed. Peter places the differences between the Old Testament and New Testament rules on marriage on a trajectory that includes the rules changed by men in the ecclesiastical dispensation, including the enforcement of clerical celibacy, suggesting the understanding that some of the impediments to marriage to be discussed later on are of man-made invention and that others are not.⁵⁴⁸ Thus, with respect to who a legitimate person is, one has to take account not only of the changes in marriage before the law, under the law, and in the time of grace but also the changes between the rules obtaining in the *ecclesia primitiva* and those obtaining in the present day, an observation designed to suggest that historical criticism may need to be invoked in disallowing earlier rules which Peter means to reject. In addition, even regarding those regulations that are currently in force, some are fully legitimate, others are fully illegitimate, and still others, in an intermediate group, are neither fully legitimate nor fully illegitimate. In the first category Peter places unions that do not violate vows of continence, holy orders, cognation, legal status, disparity of cult, or natural *frigiditas*. In the second category he places unions that include persons with prior vows, ordination, cognation, and disparity of cult. In the intermediate category are unions made problematic by impotence or by the legal status of one or both spouses. The principle underlying this distinction is whether the marriage is indissoluble, as it is in fully legitimate unions, whether marriage must be prevented or annulled, as in the case of the fully illegitimate unions, or whether the marriage presents a range of options in this connection, as in the case of the intermediate type of union, especially if the marriage has been contracted in ignorance.⁵⁴⁹

These distinctions having been clearly laid down, Peter now proceeds to group impediments under the headings of natural and permanent impediments and impediments conditioned by will, circumstance, or changeable disciplinary rulings. The first of the natural impediments are *frigiditas* and insanity, because these defects speak to the natural capacities needed to express the two aspects of marital sacramentality that Peter sees in a valid union. Peter sides firmly with the majority of contemporary masters who

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., d. 33. c. 1–c. 4, 2: 456–62.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., d. 34. c. 1, 2: 462–63.

follow Leo in supporting the dissolution of marriages that cannot be consummated on the basis of natural *frigiditas*. In line with his egalitarian treatment of the sexual rights of spouses, he departs from the contemporary consensus and agrees with the Porretans that this rule applies to husbands and wives alike. He considers the problem of obtaining proof and mentions both the swearing of oaths, on relics, by the contending parties, and the use of witnesses. Peter is not particularly interested in these procedural issues, but appears to think that the inclusion of relics will deter litigants from bringing frivolous or malicious charges or from lying about the facts under oath. Peter rejects the idea, found in Ivo of Chartres and Gratian, that the wife's testimony is to be disallowed if it conflicts with her husband's. Peter recognizes the contemporary distinction between natural *frigiditas* and *frigiditas* caused by witchcraft. He includes the latter in his discussion here because, although it is not congenital, it is a result of forces beyond the control of the couple in question. He agrees with the generally held notion that a regime of prayer, fasting, and almsgiving should be undertaken and that, if exorcism fails, the marriage should be dissolved. Just as in the case of natural *frigiditas* the functional partner may remarry. In the case of a person whose marriage has been annulled because of his own dysfunction and whose former spouse has remarried, who subsequently finds himself able to have sexual relations with another partner, Peter attacks the consensus position as being too harsh and too lacking in equity. He joins Roland of Bologna and the author of the *De coniugo* in ruling that the new marriage or marriages should not be broken up and the original spouses should not be forced to reunite. As he points out, it was by the judgment of the church that the original marriage was annulled, because it could not be consummated. But now, both of the original partners find themselves in new, and functional, marriages. They both originally entered the state of marriage in recognition that they were called to this state and that they need its consolations. Thus, the forced reconciliation of the original spouses, in despite of the rights of their new spouses, should not be automatic and rigidly enforced. Rather, the range of personal circumstances involved and the demands of fairness should be taken into account, a perspective which, in Peter's eyes, is likely to favor the new, and functional union or unions over the original, and dysfunctional, one.⁵⁵⁰

Just as sexual relations in a marriage are a sacrament, in that

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., c. 3, 2: 465.

they signify the physical and institutional union of Christ and the church, and their impossibility renders the sacrament null, so, *a fortiori*, insanity must be viewed as a natural impediment to marriage in that it makes impossible the consent and the union of minds and hearts that signify the bond of love between Christ and the church. It is this aspect of the sacrament, as we have seen, that, for Peter, initiates a marriage and that animates, or should animate, its external expression in sexual relations. The reason why Peter considers insanity under the heading of natural impediments and not under the heading of error, ignorance, fraud, or compulsion is that these latter obstacles are products of the exercise of human free will. On the other hand, insanity is a congenital defect. People who are mentally ill (*furiosi*) or who are mentally incapacitated (*in amentia*), should not be allowed to marry, in Peter's view, because they are persons of diminished responsibility who are not capable of giving informed consent. If it is not entirely self-consistent, Peter's position on this point, along with his view that insane persons already married should be allowed to stay together and that, when insanity, like physical illness or deformity, supervenes, it is not grounds for dismissing a spouse, is consistent with the consensus on that subject.⁵⁵¹ As with his contemporaries, his treatment of insanity is not symmetrical, either with itself or with his treatment of *frigiditas*, even though in both cases he draws a distinction between a disability that is inborn and a disability that is acquired later. For, although he sees the union of minds and hearts involved in marital consent as essential, he does not permit the annulment of marriages in which the mental condition of one or both spouses makes that union of minds and hearts problematic, or even impossible, after the marriage has come into being, even though he sees the impossibilities involved as an obstacle to the creation of a marriage in the first place. It is not entirely clear why he admits this discrepancy. He offers no grounds for his ruling, except the idea that marriage requires a commitment, for better or for worse.

All the other conditions to be considered as impediments to marriage, and grounds for dissolution, or not, fall under Peter's second heading, since they are subject to human will, circumstance, or changeable convention. The first item on his agenda here is sexual misconduct. He agrees with the consensus position that fornication is a basis for separation but that it does not dissolve a marriage and permit the remarriage of either the guilty or the

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., c. 4–c. 6, 2: 465–67.

innocent party. The particular accent which the Lombard gives to this standard opinion is derived, in part, from Gratian, and, in part, from his own pastoral outlook on marriage. With Gratian, he argues that a spouse who himself or herself has been unfaithful has no business seeking to dismiss his or her spouse for the same offense; a single standard of marital chastity must apply to both husbands and wives. And, since, even if a spouse is legitimately dismissed for this reason, neither party can remarry, it is a better idea to aim at forgiveness and reconciliation than to activate the permission to separate.⁵⁵² The second kind of sexual misconduct to which Peter adverts is the prior adulterous affair as a bar to marriage in the first place, on which there was no contemporary agreement. Here, Peter comes the closest to the position taken by Gratian and Roland of Bologna, although, again, with an emphasis on how the church can best minister to the spiritual needs of the parties involved. In comparing the analyses of Leo and Augustine, Peter prefers Augustine's concern with penance, reparation, and the regularization of the couple's relationship when events make this possible over Leo's more legalistic and punitive approach. He also agrees with Gratian and Roland that, if the couple have indeed succumbed to the temptation to murder the obstructive spouse, they should not be allowed to profit from their crime. In that event, he thinks that Augustine would join Leo in forbidding the marriage, as he would himself. But, if this condition does not obtain, the spiritual healing of the couple takes priority, and is the reason why Augustine should be supported.⁵⁵³ This is as far as Peter takes the subject of sexual misconduct, before or outside of marriage, as an impediment to marriage. By his omission of the range of worries on this score ventilated by Gratian and Paucapalea, he suggests, at least by implication, that marriage creates a new status, morally and sacramentally. Sincere commitment to its values is what counts, rather than the past history of the partners before they accepted its rights and duties.

Like the decision to commit fornication or adultery, the decision to take vows of celibacy, to enter into holy orders, and to commit a serious crime are matters deriving from the exercise of free will, which Peter logically includes under the heading of impediments to marriage that are not part of the natural givens of a person's life. He agrees entirely with the consensus position on ordination at the rank of subdeacon or above as an impediment to marriage. With

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, d. 35. c. 1–c. 3, 2: 467–71.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, c. 4, 2: 471–72.

Gratian, he withdraws from uxoricides the right to remarry. Peter also adds his own insights to these topics. In handling holy orders, he is less concerned than are the canonists in showing that authorities in the early church support clerical celibacy. With respect to the murder of a spouse, he shares the assumption that this form of felony is to be conceived of as a crime on the husband's side, not the wife's. The evenhanded treatment of wives and husbands more typical of Peter's theology of marriage deserts him on this subject. The chief point that he wants to make in this connection is that, even if the provocation of a husband's uxoricide was his wife's adultery, a motive that might be excused in the civil courts, he should be punished by the spiritual penalties of the church.⁵⁵⁴ On the subject of vows, Peter is somewhat more lenient than is typical in this period. He is also deft in turning a legalistic point against a ruling of the canonists. While he agrees with the canonists, and with everyone else, that vows of celibacy are an impediment to marriage and a cause of nullification if they are discovered later on, whether the vows involve a monastic commitment or a calling to virginity, celibacy, or widowhood in a non-monastic context, he draws a distinction between vows taken in public and vows taken in private, one not found in contemporary masters. According to Peter, if a person takes a private vow of celibacy and later marries, the marriage should not be dissolved. While Peter acknowledges that such conduct is morally wrong, especially if the individual passes himself off as someone who has not taken such a vow, he notes that, in the absence of witnesses, there is no way of proving that the vow was ever taken.⁵⁵⁵

There are other impediments that Peter addresses under this same heading. While they may not be volitional, they reflect conditions that are conventional, accidental, and subject to change. One such circumstance is servile status. Peter places it here because he regards it as accidental and not as built into the nature of things. On this subject, while his dossier of sources is derived from Gratian, his solution has more in common with that of Hugh of St. Victor, Hermannus, and Master Simon. With them, he agrees that servile status is not an impediment to marriage and it is not a cause of nullification unless a person of servile status has defrauded his spouse by pretending to be free. If there is disparity of legal status in a marriage, and if both partners have entered into the marriage

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid., d. 37. c. 1–c. 2, 2: 475–77.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., d. 38. c. 1–c. 2.7, 2: 478–80.

with their eyes wide open, the union is not to be dissolved. Peter further agrees that the permission of the lord is required in the marriage of a person of servile status, whether to another *servus* or to a person of higher status. Peter does add a legalistic touch, found in the canonists and not in the theologians on whom he draws. As he observes, a free man who is already married to a wife of free status cannot accept a servile status for himself that would also disparage his wife, without the wife's consent. He should neither dismiss her on this account nor force her to accept servile status. Peter's recommendation, in situations of this kind, is that the husband should gain his wife's consent, or else he should not accept servile status for himself.⁵⁵⁶ One thing curiously absent from this analysis, deriving as it does from patristic authorities familiar with the downgrading of the Roman free farmer into a semi-free *colonus* during their own time, is the fact that neither Peter nor the canonical sources from whom he derives this question ask whether it has any real pertinence to mid-twelfth-century society.

Unfree status may be an accident of birth, or a condition accepted voluntarily, but it is a condition that can be changed. A circumstance that is totally accidental is captivity, the extreme form of a range of conditions that impose a physical separation between spouses. Without considering the other cases that can be grouped together with captivity, such as pilgrimage, crusading, and long-distance trade, Peter agrees wholeheartedly with Ivo of Chartres and Gratian that this circumstance does not terminate a marriage and that it does not allow either of the spouses to take a new partner. He is, however, somewhat more lenient than the canonists in addressing this topic. If the captive or absent spouse is honestly believed to be dead and his partner remarries, in all ignorance of his continued existence, the partner commits no sin, Peter allows. And, if the absent spouse should return, he thinks, the spouse left behind should return to him and renounce a new marriage that may have been made, but only if this can be accomplished without bad will. These conditions soften the rigor of the canonical position notably.⁵⁵⁷

There are four other impediments which Peter considers as serious obstacles to marriage but which he sees as impediments deriving from convention and from the disciplinary and legal rules which, although currently in force, have not always been in force,

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., d. 36. c. 1–c. 3, 2: 473–75.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid., d. 38. c. 3, 2: 482–83.

and which, in principle, are subject to change. Under this heading he places disparity of cult, age, cognation, and affinity, impediments which other contemporary masters are more inclined to view as natural or voluntary. To be sure, a person's age and his blood relationships can be viewed as natural and his religion is a matter of choice. But Peter treats these four impediments as conventional because he wants to focus on the point that the rules governing them, or the rules that he thinks should govern them, are man-made and have not always been the same. Peter joins Gratian's sturdy defense of the growing contemporary sense that mixed marriages should not be allowed. He holds as well that disparity of cult is a basis for dismissing a spouse. Rather than presenting religious commitment as a matter of choice, Peter treats this whole topic of the two Pauline concessions, and which should be followed, from a historical standpoint. He takes this tack so as to undermine the permission to marry a non-Christian given by Paul and supported by the early church. But, rather than seeking to relativize the practice of the *ecclesia primitiva* directly, as irrelevant to the historical conditions of the twelfth-century church, he makes use of a more roundabout historical argument, which appeals at the same time to the perceived contradictions of the authorities who permit mixed marriages, starting with Paul himself. Here, the Lombard cites the Pauline permission to dismiss the unbelieving spouse in 2 Corinthians 5:14 as proof that Paul was in error in allowing mixed marriages in 1 Corinthians 7:12–13. He admits that the Christian partner is not required to dismiss the unbelieving spouse and that Paul was correct in stating that the Christian spouse may win over the unbelieving spouse. But, still, on what grounds can it be argued that the Paul of 2 Corinthians is more to be believed than the Paul of 1 Corinthians? Peter's main argument rests on the claim that Paul's permission of mixed marriages, which was seconded by the early church, was a mistaken departure from a still earlier rule which continued then, and continues now, to remain in effect. This is the Old Testament prohibition of mixed marriages. This earlier historical precedent, according to Peter, remained in effect in the new Christian dispensation. It was not one of the Mosaic laws that was abrogated or superseded by the New Law. To be sure, this argument from historical priority is offered not because Peter thinks that antiquity, in and of itself, is normative, but rather because, in this instance, the Old Testament rule conforms to the rule he wants to advocate. At the same time, his handling of this topic is a good index of the fact that Peter does not hesitate to criticize St. Paul, in this case for having made what he holds to have been an erroneous

and unwarranted departure from a law still binding, an error then compounded by the church fathers which Peter intends to reject. While his conclusion is certainly in line with that of many masters of his day, who join him in viewing disparity of cult as a marital impediment, his argument here is all his own. Peter shares with Hugh of St. Victor and thinkers influenced by him the idea that disparity of cult, in the case when a Christian spouse falls into heresy, non-belief, or another religion, is an index of spiritual fornication that permits dismissal of the apostate. In line with that theological appraisal of the problem, his most telling reason for banning mixed marriages is one that stands at antipodes from Gratian's, notwithstanding their strong and substantive agreement on that policy. For Gratian, as we have seen, it is both intellectually unthinkable and administratively prohibitive for two spouses in a single household to live under two different legal systems pertaining to marriage. For Peter, disparity of cult is to be disallowed because the union of minds and hearts essential to marital consent cannot, in his estimation, exist if the two spouses have different religious beliefs and values concerning marriage.⁵⁵⁸

Peter also confronts the question of whether, having dismissed an unbelieving spouse, the Christian partner can marry again. Here, he contrasts the position of Ambrose, who allows remarriage, with that of Augustine, who does not. Peter basically sides with Augustine, not in the interests of harshness, but in the hope that, since such a remarriage is forbidden, the Christian spouse will be motivated to work for the conversion of the unbelieving spouse whom he has dismissed, with an eye to achieving a marital reconciliation and reunion. His strategy here is to try to show that Ambrose contradicts himself, just as St. Paul does. But the argument is in line with Peter's more general interest in keeping couples together, or reuniting them if they have been separated, and encouraging them to be reconciled and to work out their differences.⁵⁵⁹ This kind of proposal he sees as reflecting the educational value of marriage as a sacrament. With respect to the marriages between infidels, he joins Hugh of St. Victor in ruling that they are legitimate, but not sacramental, and that they are important to mention only to show that they are irrelevant to sacramental theology.⁵⁶⁰

Peter's handling of the other three impediments, age, consanguinity,

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid., d. 39. c. 1–c. 4, 2: 483–88.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., c. 5, 2: 488–90.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid., c. 6–c. 7, 2: 490–91.

and affinity, is of a piece in that he does not treat these conditions as natural but as conventional. In accepting the ages of twelve, for girls, and fourteen, for boys, for present consent, norms derived from Roman law, and the age of seven, for engagement, he observes that these regulations are in force and that they make sense although he is able to see that different age limits have applied and do apply in other legal systems.⁵⁶¹ His source is the *Digest* of Justinian which, he knows, is not the law of the land everywhere. The affinities set up by spiritual relationships are, to be sure, created by regulations imposed by the church for the administration of the sacraments, regulations that can, and do, change. While Peter agrees entirely with the consensus view on affinity, here, following Gratian in all details, including the point that parents who baptize their own child in a case of necessity, and who therefore become the child's godparents as well as his parents, are exempt from the rule that affinity annuls a marriage, he presents this impediment as based on disciplinary regulations that are essentially mutable.⁵⁶² What is perhaps more surprising is that Peter treats consanguinity in exactly the same way, although blood relationships would appear to be natural givens. Consanguinity is a matter which he dispatches with signal brevity and with a good deal of impatience. He agrees that consanguinity to the sixth or seventh degree is an impediment, and a cause for nullification, and that one arrives at the seventh or the sixth degree depending on whether one begins with the parent-child or the brother-sister relationship. On the problem of a consanguineous relationship, if subsequently discovered in spouses innocent of the knowledge when they married, he sides with the mainstream view by briskly stating that the couple cannot be allowed to stay together since no legitimate marriage between them ever existed. The only point he finds debatable is whether the witnesses in such a case should be relatives or informed neighbors, which he leaves open. But, Peter's whole attitude to the issue of blood relationships, and, *a fortiori*, to relationships with in-laws, as an impediment to marriage is that the rules are conventional. They have changed over time, just as the rules governing polygamy and monogamy. They are not rules for the ages. And, in practice, and in the last analysis, people are so frequently dispensed from them that it is a waste of time to belabor the point.⁵⁶³

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., d. 36. c. 4, 2: 475.

⁵⁶² Ibid., d. 42. c. 1-c. 6, 2: 501-08.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., d. 40-d. 41. c. 4, d. 42. c. 3, 2: 491-99, 505.

There is one sexual delict, rape, that is treated by many other masters as an impediment to marriage, or not, which Peter handles in a different way. Instead, he discusses it under the heading of crimes or sins against marriage, so defined because they involve the illicit use of sex when sex is legitimate only for the married. Here, he distinguishes five types of illicit sexual behavior. There is fornication, which can refer to illegal sexual activity in general, but which also refers specifically to this activity in persons who are not married, such as widows, concubines, and prostitutes. There is dishonor (*stuprum*), which is the illicit defloration of a virgin. There is adultery, or sexual relation with someone's else's spouse. There is incest, or the sexual relations between relatives. And there is rape. Peter offers a definition of rape that blends Roman law with later Germanic practice. He sees it as the stealing of a girl by violence from her father's house in order to take her as a wife corruptly. His response to this behavior is exactly the same as Gratian's and that of the other canonists. Rape establishes no marital claim whatever, in his eyes, but rather makes the rapist liable to criminal indictment, which bears the penalty of death if he is convicted. Peter offers one qualification on this judgment. It is not one relating to the victim's consent to marriage with her rapist, a possibility which he finds hard to countenance, since she has been taken violently and against her will. Nor does this act, *ipso facto*, reflect or augur well for the union of minds and hearts needed for the consent that makes a marriage. The one exception to the dire and richly deserved punishment that awaits the rapist if he is apprehended and convicted is, rather, the immunity that he can gain if he seeks and finds sanctuary in a church or consecrated place.⁵⁶⁴

This disquisition on crimes against marriage aside, the point of these remarks is to emphasize that no one should be forced into marriage, or into sexual relations, and that freely rendered consent is of the essence. Marriage should not be denied to people, except in the cases where real obstacles exist, whether natural, circumstantial, freely willed, or conventional. Even in these cases, Peter is rather more generous in allowing exceptions, with regard to remarriage, than are most of his contemporaries, in the interest of not condemning people, especially innocent, people, to a celibate life to which they are not called and for which they have not received the necessary charisms, whether as single people or as spouses in a

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., d. 41. c. 5—c. 9, 2: 500.

dysfunctional marriage. By the same token, drawing on his own commentary on 2 Corinthians, he dismisses the authorities who restrict second and third marriages, or even more. Since marriage itself is good, and since it is a school for virtue in a positive and not merely a remedial sense, the remarriage of widowed persons called to this state of life and needing its consolations is desirable, "for the virtue of the sacrament" (*pro sacramenti virtute*).⁵⁶⁵

If the sacrament helps spouses to grow in virtue and contributes to their salvation thereby, there are still major respects in which the Lombard's theology of marriage falls short of being fully symmetrical with the rest of his sacramental theology. Two aspects of his treatment of marriage stand out here, which can be highlighted by a comparison of the Lombard on holy orders and penance with the Lombard on marriage. The insistence on an upright intention and on a blameless motive for receiving the sacrament, which informs his analysis of the valid and fruitful reception of the sacrament in the case of these other rites, is not found in Peter's theology of marriage. In this case, and in agreement with the *Summa sententiarum*, he holds that free, unfeigned, and unforced consent is all that is required, even if the couple bring essentially worldly or selfish reasons into play in their decision to marry and to seek the goods of marriage, rather than the union of souls, the wish to help each other to grow in virtue, a commitment to fidelity, and the wish to bear and to rear children for the love of God and the Christian community and not out of dynastic self-interest and the egotistical desire for self-perpetuation. The criticism he extends to priests who abuse their office can be paralleled by his objection to the immoderate or selfish use of sex in marriage and to worldly philoprogenitiveness; but a defective intention of this sort brought to marriage does not in itself disqualify the recipients as it does in the case of holy orders, or as inadequate and less than sincere and exhaustive sorrow for sin does in the case of penance.

The lack of symmetry noted above may derive from an inclination, on Peter's part, to accommodate marriage as he would like it to be to marriage as it exists in the real world, in an unequal contest in which realism achieves one of its rare victories over theological principle in his handling of marriage. The second major discrepancy between Peter's sacramental theology in general and his theology of marriage is one he shares with Hugh of St. Victor, who is far less willing to make concessions to real life on the matter of marital

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid., d. 42. c. 7, 2: 508–09. The quotation is at c. 7.4, p. 509.

intentionality. Although Peter joins Hugh in advancing the understanding of sacrament in general as involving more than the visible sign of invisible grace, moving, with Hugh, beyond the Augustinian definition of sacrament to the notion that the sacramental sign is a medium of grace which effects what it signifies, he also joins Hugh in failing to extend this understanding of sacramentality to marriage.⁵⁶⁶ It would not have been difficult for Peter to have done so, treating marriage on the analogy of holy orders or on the analogy of penance. On the analogy with holy orders, the vows articulated at the wedding could have been viewed as the sensible sign of the consent that constitutes the spiritual union of the couple, the point at which they are given the grace to model their union on the bond of love joining Christ and the church. As with penance, their physical union could likewise have been envisioned as the external expression of the grace already received through their union of minds and hearts as mediated through their articulation of their vows. As with holy orders, their physical union could have been seen as an occasion of grace that enables the couple to model their common life on the physical and institutional union of Christ and the church, an occasion of grace that empowers them fitly to exercise their unique office in the church, in the proper use of human sexuality, and that gives them the strength to do so without selfishness and for the sake of the Christian community. All these pieces are in place. The Lombard could have extended his theology of marriage in these directions, advancing the concept of its sacramentality farther than he does and bringing marriage into full accord with his treatment of the other sacraments. But this he does not do. As a sacrament, marriage, for him, remains a mere Augustinian sign, not a sign that effects what it signifies, or a spiritual or physical medium of grace. The inconsistency between Peter's theology of marriage and his sacramental theology as a whole can also be charged to Hugh of St. Victor's account. Still, for the Lombard, it is a missed opportunity. Dependent as he is on Hugh, he does not hesitate to move the Victorine project forward in other respects. It has to be said, therefore, that, significant as his contribution to the theology of marriage may have been in his day, Peter's conception of marriage as a sacrament remains, in the end, sub-sacramental in comparison with his understanding of the other sacraments and of sacraments as such.

⁵⁶⁶ Both Heaney, *The Development of the Sacramentality of Marriage*, pp. 26–28 and Knoch, *Die Einsetzung*, pp. 239–41 overinterpret Peter on this score. Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," col. 1999–2002 is correct in noting his inconsistency here.

At the same time, Peter does make some notable contributions to the development of the doctrine of marriage. While maintaining an unwavering commitment to the principle of consent in marriage formation, his understanding of marriage as having a double sacramentality gives strong support to the goodness and naturalness of the sexual relations of spouses. His approach to this aspect of marriage has none of the praise of asceticism and none of the grudging and concessive distaste for human sexuality, and the pleasure it bears with it, found in much of the previous Christian tradition and in some of the masters of his own day. To be sure, he thinks, as they do, that sexual relations in marriage have been authorized, and blessed, so that they can be used for the ends of marriage. He does not regard them as ends in themselves. But he makes a generous and positive appraisal of what those ends are, viewing them as more than merely procreative and as more than merely making a preemptive strike against the illicit satisfaction of sexual needs outside of the bonds of marriage. He sees the rendering of the marriage debt not in negative, remedial terms, but as a way in which spouses can strengthen their bond of fidelity while at the same time growing in virtue by replacing egotism with unselfishness, mutuality, and egalitarianism. Peter's stress on the equality of spouses in their sexual relations is enriched by his use of Gratian on that point, but he goes farther than the canonists, both by extending the single standard to the equality of the wife in marriage litigation, where her sworn testimony is to be taken just as seriously as her husband's, and also by recasting this theme, not as a statement about legal rights alone but as an index of how Christian marriage can be not merely a school for virtue but a sign of contradiction in a society where patriarchy is the rule. In contrast with his handling of intentionality, and how it informs marital consent, while he feels constrained to admit that one cannot withhold the sacrament from spouses who bring sub-Christian intentions to it, in this area Peter does not hesitate to preach counsels of perfection and to rule that they are normative.

In treating the impediments to marriage and the grounds for nullification or separation, Peter states the consensus position of his day to a large extent, enlarging the theological outlook on it thanks to his borrowings from Gratian. There are points on which he modifies and softens rulings that he thinks are too harsh or inequitable, as with the remarriage of a person whose spouse has been absent for a long time and who is honestly presumed to be dead. Another notable area in which he takes a minority view in relaxing the rigor of a rule is the case of a man whose first marriage he was

unable to consummate, leading to its dissolution, but who finds himself able to function with a new partner. Peter does not require him and his first wife to return to a dysfunctional union but allows them to remain with their new spouses. Thus, while Peter generally supports the consensus position, he is certainly willing to nuance it and also to challenge it, in the interests of fairness and charity as opposed to the rigid and mechanical enforcement of norms. In this area he also takes a stand on disputed matters where there was no contemporary consensus, such as the prior adulterous affair as an impediment to marriage. In such cases, his solutions consistently reflect the appreciation of the principle that spiritual growth, repentance, reconciliation, forgiveness, and associated values are what the church should be promoting, in making marriage as accessible as possible and by concentrating more on the quality of life it affords for spouses and less on the occasions, especially the man-made ones, that prevent a union, that require its nullification, or that afford opportunities for separation or litigation.

Another major achievement of the Lombard's theology of marriage lies in his handling of impediments to marriage, which imposes a clear and logical order on this topic for the first time. According to his scheme, impediments to free, honest, and unforced consent come first, since such consent is of the essence in making a marriage in the first place. This category is swiftly followed by impediments built into the nature of things, regardless of human will or convention, such as mental and physical incapacity. The two parts of the theme of incapacity which he takes up here reflect not only the fact that both of these kinds of incapacity exist, but also his own notion of the double sacramentality of marriage. There is both the union of minds and hearts, for which sufficient mental health is needed, and the union of bodies, in the vast majority of marriages, which expresses that union of souls and which requires the capacity to consummate the marriage. While his treatment of mental and physical incapacity as impediments to marriage is perfectly symmetrical, Peter shares an inconsistency found as well in the contemporary consensus by failing to treat them in a parallel way as a cause for nullification. In any event, all other impediments he relegates to the category of those affected by choice, circumstance, and human legislation, and, hence, as subject to change. While, as noted above, Peter does not see insanity as a basis for ending a marriage, however incapable its victims may be of carrying out their marital responsibilities, he supports the emerging consensus view on disparity of cult as an impediment to marriage and as authorizing the dismissal of the non-Christian

spouse, seeing as critical the inability of the unbelieving partner to play his or her necessary role in the union of minds and hearts that is of the essence in the sacrament of marriage. Peter places this solution to the problem of disparity of cult on a thoroughly theological and psychological foundation, not on a legal or administrative one. He does not seize upon the opportunity to promote the Pauline permission to dismiss an unbelieving spouse over the Pauline permission to take a non-Christian spouse as an example to be supported on the historical grounds that it speaks more realistically to the situation of the present church, one no longer in the missionary position of the early church. Had he done so, Peter could have integrated the topic of disparity of cult more smoothly into his exposition of the other impediments to marriage which he addresses in his third and final subdivision of this subject, since he treats age limits and the definitions of cognation and affinity as man-made conventions that have changed over time, along with other rules attached to marriage which can change and which have changed over time.

In adopting the doctrine of consent in marriage formation, as taught by Peter, in his marriage decretals later in the century, Pope Alexander III gave recognition to one of the principal areas in which the Lombard's theology of marriage could be seen as superior to that of his contemporaries. Advances there indubitably were, however much this theory managed to impress itself on the consciousness and practice of medieval Christians. Yet, as this conclusion to Peter's doctrine of marriage and to his sacramental theology more generally suggests, he left soft spots and inconsistencies for his followers to puzzle over in the sequel. And, irrespective of his concessions to the world in which he lived at some points, there remains an air of unreality about his theology of marriage, an air of trying to turn the hortatory into the normative, that is just as apparent in Peter's work as it is in the treatments of marriage offered by his compeers.

LAST THINGS

The subject of Last Things is a field in which we can detect a real difference between authors who write in the light of popular belief and the exegesis of the Book of Revelation, on the one hand, and the systematic theologians, on the other. The period during which the Lombard lived and worked was marked, on the part of the former group, by a rash of apocalyptic thinking, mostly in the ranks of the monastic authors. Their works are marked by a highly speculative

reading of Revelation, which anxiously seeks to answer questions arising from the worries of people concerned with what is going to happen to their own souls, and the souls of others, at every step of the way during the coming last days. It also reflects a tendency to politicize the idea of Antichrist, in the context of the current papal-imperial feud, sometimes connecting this theme with the tradition of Nero as Antichrist. At times, Last Things is a subject linked by these monastic authors with liturgical reflection, or is treated as an agency for, or an expression of, visionary experience. At the very least, it affords an opportunity for meditation, and exhortation, in helping individuals in the writer's audience to contemplate their own moral state in preparation for their own impending deaths.⁵⁶⁷ On the other hand, the scholastics take a different tack on Last Things altogether. They have no hortatory or visionary concerns and they take a dim view of apocalyptic speculation. They distance themselves from the effort to attach the doctrine of Antichrist to any particular political events or personalities, or to an allegorical view of human history. As a group, they seek to base what they have to say on the authorities who, they hold, are the most reliable. They draw heavily on Gregory the Great's *Moralia* and, even more so, on the final chapters of Augustine's *City of God*. Above all, since they are systematic theologians, they seek to show the connection between their doctrine of Last Things and the main themes that animate their *summae* and sentence collections, at least in the case of those scholastic theologians who address the subject at all. Since the mainstream effort draws essentially on the same sources, from the school of Laon through Hugh of St. Victor, Robert Pullen, and Robert of Melun, there is a high degree of consensus on the main outlines of the end-of-time scenario among scholastics in the first half of the twelfth century. Disagreements tend to be on matters of detail. Peter Lombard reflects the attitude of his fellow scholastics. He helps to crystallize the consensus treatment of Last Things on the part of scholastic theology, while at the same time imparting his own highly individual coloration to a number of the standard topics which his contemporaries treat. As well, both in his manner of handling those themes relevant to Last Things which he takes up,

⁵⁶⁷ Good general background is supplied by Richard Kenneth Emmerson, *Antichrist in the Middle Ages: A Study of Medieval Apocalypticism in Art and Literature* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), pp. 78, 11–33, 37–57, 63–67, 74–107, 158, 166–72; Bernard McGinn, *Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 94–121; Horst Dieter Rauh, *Das Bild des Antichrist im Mittelalter: Von Tyconius zum deutschen Symbolismus*, Beiträge, n.F. 9 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1973), pp. 1–18, 165–365, 416–540.

in addition to those he pointedly ignores, he conveys his own opinion as to what is knowable, suitable and proper to discuss, and important in this area of theology, suggesting the desire to take a stand on the broader range of treatments of this topic found outside the schools as well as within them.

The Non-Scholastic Challenge

That the non-scholastic theology of Last Things presented a decided challenge to the more sober leanings of Peter and his colleagues can be appreciated by a consideration of the way Honorius Augustodunensis handles this assignment. Honorius straddles the divide that can be seen between the monastic and scholastic authors here. He is a systematic theologian, who makes a clear connection between the doctrine of Last Things and the rest of his exposition, presenting it as the conclusion of the ecclesiastical dispensation in which Christians will be rewarded or punished eternally according to their practice of the ethical and sacramental life as members of the church. This highly coherent integration of the subject into the fabric of his theological system is combined, however, with a wild-eyed fascination with the last days and the state of souls in the life to come that reflects both Honorius's own interests and those of the lay people for whose ultimate consumption his *Elucidarium* was written. His exposition of Last Things is extremely lengthy. Freighted with much detail, it reflects his eagerness to describe the events he relates in vivid and concrete terms, an eagerness so great that it inspires him to go beyond the standard patristic authorities and to appeal to other sources less reputable and more inventive. The most important of these is the *Prognosticon futuri saeculi* of Julian of Toledo (d. 690). Indeed, much of the flamboyant and circumstantial material in Honorius's account, material for which there is no Scriptural warrant whatever, is drawn from Julian.

From its very outset, Honorius's treatment of Last Things speaks to the questions that worry ordinary people, starting with death. Death, he somberly notes, comes in many forms, including the premature death of children, the cruel death of people in the prime of life, and the natural death of the aged. Yet, even God's elect need to die. He offers the consoling thought that however they die, their death is precious in the sight of God, whether or not they can be interred in consecrated ground.⁵⁶⁸ Honorius is keenly interested in

⁵⁶⁸ Honorius, *Eluc.* 2. 96–97, 2.101–04, pp. 440, 441–42.

how the souls of the departed occupy themselves between their death and the end of time. Before the last judgment, he avers, the souls of the damned know both the souls of other people who are damned, as well as those of the saved, and suffer on that account. The souls of the saved know other just souls, as well as what is happening on earth. They take an interest in earthly affairs, praying for their friends and relatives as well as for each other and for the souls undergoing purgation. The latter, who, he thinks, sometimes begin their purgation while they are still alive, suffer, but they are assisted by the prayers of the saints even as they are helped by the prayers, masses, and good works of their fellow Christians on earth. Those souls who will be damned in the last judgment are housed in an upper part of Hell, envisioned by Honorius, following Gregory, as a kind of holding tank where they are not yet punished except by their separation from God.⁵⁶⁹

Next comes the reign of Antichrist, which Honorius describes in extremely elaborate detail. According to him, Antichrist is the offspring of the devil and a prostitute from the tribe of Dan. He will govern the world with terror and cruelty, deluding even clerics and monks by his eloquence and false miracles. Readers, he implies, should take this as a warning, although he allows that those who succumb to the deceptions and threats of Antichrist will be granted forty years in which to repent. On the authority of Julian, who, apparently, invented the idea, Honorius claims that the human body during the time of Antichrist will be smaller than it is now. The only mitigating feature of his reign will be that it will witness the conversion of the Jews to Christianity, a point which, however, Honorius ignores later in the scenario.⁵⁷⁰

The general resurrection, Honorius affirms, will occur instantaneously. It will be a double resurrection of the body and the soul, paralleling the double death of the body and the soul. The instant in which the resurrection occurs will be the same time of day as Christ's resurrection. Following Augustine, Honorius explains that everyone will be resurrected with a perfect body, at the perfect age of thirty, the age when Christ died, whatever his physical condition at the time of his own death. Those with deformities or disabilities will lack them, in the next life. Infants who died in the womb, if ensouled at the time, will be resurrected as adults; if not, they will be raised as part of their mothers' bodies. In the case of fetuses

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid., 3.1–11, 3.19–32, pp. 443–46, 449–52.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid., 3.33–37, pp. 452–54.

miscarried or aborted, the cells belonging to their father and their mother will be restored to each parent, to be raised as part of him or her. As to the troubling issue of people who were eaten by wild animals, Honorius counsels his readers not to worry. The God Who created the universe *ex nihilo* will see to it that they are resurrected, none the less.⁵⁷¹

The last judgment, too, will occur in the twinkling of an eye, according to Honorius, following Augustine. In the second coming, Christ will appear in the glorified body which He manifested to His disciples in His transfiguration. Ushered in by an elaborate angelic procession, as the book of Revelation foretells, He will judge mankind seated in the midst of His twelve apostles. Following Gregory, Honorius states that the angels will go among the people and sort them out into four groups, those who are perfect and who do not need to be judged, but who judge along with Christ; the just who are both judged and saved; the impious who are judged and condemned; and the damned who have already been judged and condemned. Unlike Gregory, his source for this distinction, he extends the system of classification to people in certain callings or states of life, irrespective of how they conducted themselves therein. In the first category he places the apostles, martyrs, monks, and virgins. In the second he places married people, those who have done good works, and who have done penance for their sins. In the third group are non-Christians who, whether they were there at the time or not, are held to have consented to the death of Christ because of their non-belief in Him. In the category of the damned, Honorius places not only those Christians who have sinned, unrepentant, under the new dispensation but also the Jews who sinned, before Christ's coming, according to their own law. The books that are opened during the last judgment, according to Honorius, are to be understood allegorically as the books of the Bible and the examples of the saints, held up as a model to which the judged are compared, for the purpose of assigning them to one or another of these four groups.⁵⁷²

After the judgment, the damned will be dragged to Hell by the

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., 3.38–49, pp. 454–57. This Augustinian account of the resurrection shapes the contemporary consensus position, as is noted by Richard Heinzmann, *Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele und die Auferstehung des Leibes: Eine problemgeschichtliche Untersuchung der früh-scholastischen Sentenzen- und Summenliteratur von Anselm von Laon bis Wilhelm von Auxerre*, Beiträge, 40:3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1956), pp. 148–67; Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang, *Heaven: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 54–66.

⁵⁷² Honorius, *Eluc.* 3.50–78, pp. 457–63.

devil and his minions, the saved ushered to Heaven by their guardian angels, and those undergoing purgation returned to the place of purgation, which Honorius envisions as a less obnoxious zone of Hell, in which suffering is temporal and marked by both heat and cold. The damned will be consigned to a Hell with two general subdivisions, one involving physical torments and the other, more loathesome, involving torment specifically by fire, a distinction he derives from Gregory. From Julian he reprises a more specific distinction of the grades of punishment in Hell, designed to parallel the nine orders of angels.

In vivid, and lurid, sensory detail, he describes these punishments as fire, cold, serpents and dragons, disgusting stench, the blows of demons, palpable darkness, hatred, the fearsome sight of demons and dragons, and the cacophonous cries of the victims and their torturers alike. This infernal arrangement is also an antithesis of the varieties of bliss enjoyed by the saints in Heaven, which will include beauty, joy, health, swiftness, freedom, concord, comfort, power, and honor. Honorius is deeply interested in what the resurrected bodies of the damned and the saved will look like. He allays his own curiosity, and that of his intended audience, with an appeal to Julian. On this rather dubious foundation, he affirms that the new body will be not only incorruptible but also translucent as glass. Moreover, it will be color-coded. The resurrected bodies of the damned will be of somber hue. But the glorified bodies of the saints will come in an assortment of bright colors—blue, green, red, and the like, each assigned to a particular type of saint. Thus, their fellow-citizens in Heaven will be able to see, at a glance, whether they are united in happy concord with a virgin, a martyr, or whatever.⁵⁷³ Once the souls, truly visible saints or visible reprobates, have taken their places, the world will be destroyed. Honorius offers an elaborate description of the celestial fireworks accompanying that event. Time will cease, and the heavenly bodies will stop moving, as the alternation of night and day is replaced by eternal light. Then, he concludes, the world will be recreated, as a *locus amoenus* just like the original paradise, without suffering and pain.⁵⁷⁴ Having brought his story to an end, symmetrical with the creation of the universe at the beginning of time, Honorius thankfully lays down his pen.

⁵⁷³ Ibid., 3.1–18, 3.79–121, pp. 443–49, 463–77.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., 3.78, p. 463. This elaborate description of Heaven, Hell, and the new earth follows the monastic approach to Last Things, as noted by McDannell and Lang, *Heaven*, pp. 72–73, 78–79, 107–10.

The Scholastic Response

Faced by the competition represented by this extremely circumstantial, not to say fanciful, account of Last Things, the systematic theologians of a scholastic persuasion responded in a number of ways. Some, like the Abelardians and the authors of the *Summa sententiarum* and *Sententiae divinitatis*, simply react to Honorius and his ilk by omitting the topic of Last Things altogether. Other masters view the tactic of strategic omission as irresponsible. The Porretans grasp the nettle, and indicate by their extremely abbreviated and repressive treatment of the subject that it needs to be reduced, radically, to what can be established by reference to Scripture and the more reliable authorities, especially Gregory. In the leanest discussion of Last Things found among the scholastics in the first half of the twelfth century, an account which they place not at the end of their sentence collections but as a pendant to the devil's temptation of Adam and Eve, they raise the question of where Hell is located, and what it is like. This question is introduced, in the first instance, to permit the masters to disclaim our ability to know very much about Hell. They note that Gregory says that Hell has two sections. In the superior part are the souls of those awaiting judgment; in the inferior part are the souls of the damned. On the other hand, others say that Hell does not have two compartments, but that it is a single zone in which the damned and the just undergoing purgation by fire are mingled, led there, respectively, by demons and angels. Offering no comment on Heaven, they observe that it is the destination of souls who have completed their penance. But, as to where the purgatorial fire is located, they remark, in such a way as to dismiss the whole question of Last Things, "we say that we do not know" (*dicimus quod nescimus*).⁵⁷⁵

In the eyes of most other scholastic theologians, and Ivo of Chartres as well, a better plan was to state what could be known more fully and to acknowledge that the Bible and the reliable authorities permitted a rather larger number of positive statements to be made than the Porretans allow. Ivo, for example, relies heavily on Gregory here. In effect, he gives a swift reprise of the *Moralia* on Last Things, adverting to the *City of God* only for

⁵⁷⁵ *Sent. mag. Gisleberti* I 13.75–76, p. 174. The quotation is at 13.76. Even in this most repressive account of Purgatory in the period, it is clear that the doctrine of Purgatory exists; the claim of Jacques Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 135: "Purgatory did not exist before 1170 at the earliest," cannot be sustained.

Augustine's descriptions of Heaven and Hell. Ivo clearly sees the next life as divided into Heaven and Hell, representing permanent states of being, and Purgatory, as a transitional state in which souls are purged by the refining fire and aided by the prayers and masses offered by the living on their behalf. He declines to speculate on where Purgatory may be located, just as he indicates that we have no clear information on where the souls of the departed are to be found before the general resurrection. He thinks that the damned and the saved will be aware of each other's condition in the next life and will suffer and rejoice the more, accordingly. Souls in both Heaven and Hell will dwell in different mansions. It is unavailing for the saints to pray for the souls of the damned, and the saints recognize that this is the case, because their status is unalterable. This last observation is one that Ivo adds in acknowledgment of the contemporary felt need to refute Origen's doctrine of the permanent capacity of souls to reform, or to fall, in the next life, up to and including the salvation of Satan. The saved must endure death, Ivo agrees, because it is a consequence of original sin affecting everyone, even God's elect. The joy of the blessed will be an intellectual joy, the vision of God and a knowledge greater than any that can be had on earth. For their part, the damned will suffer physical as well as mental pain, the former in the torments afflicting their bodies and the latter in the sorrow of mind which includes the knowledge that they will never experience consolation, light, or joy.⁵⁷⁶ Having outlined this Gregorian description of the next life, Ivo concludes with an account of what will happen before souls arrive there. After a trimmed-down description of the reign of Antichrist taken from Gregory, he ends with Augustine's views on the general resurrection, the last judgment, and a reprise of his earlier remarks on Heaven and Hell.⁵⁷⁷

Ivo, to be sure, does not present this doctrine as the finale of a systematic theology. He includes it merely because of its general interest, a choice in which he is not seconded by the other canonists in this period. The members of the school of Laon, likewise, do not propose their views on Last Things in the context of a systematic sentence collection. While they advert to Gregory at some points, they mainly follow the *City of God*, while bringing in some other issues and authorities. These masters appear to be more interested in the state of the blessed in Heaven than in any other aspect of

⁵⁷⁶ Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum* 17. c. 67–c. 103, *PL* 161: 993A–1009A.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 17. c. 104–c. 120, *PL* 161: 1009A–1015B.

Last Things. Anselm of Laon agrees with Gregory that the souls and bodies of the saved are not beatified in the same way. Only the souls receive complete brightness, incorruptibility, and glory (*claritas, incorruptio, glorificatio*).⁵⁷⁸ But other members of the school dwell on the resurrected body and its qualities. It will have no physical needs—although there is some inconclusiveness here about eating—and it will be subtler and lighter than the earthly body, and not dependent on the senses for knowledge.⁵⁷⁹ One Laon master, citing Gregory Nazianzus by way of Eriugena, argues that, in the next life, the senses will be converted into reason, reason into intellect, and intellect into God. The resurrected saints, he holds, will enjoy the direct apperception of non-sensible objects of knowledge. This perfect, intuitive knowledge will constitute the joy of the saints; the exclusion from it of the damned constitutes their punishment.⁵⁸⁰ Anselm worries about how the souls of the departed will recognize the bodies to which they were attached in this life, given the changed nature of these bodies in the resurrection. He proposes that a nexus of some sort will remain between the soul and the body after death enabling the soul to claim the correct body in the resurrection.⁵⁸¹ Mostly, the members of the school are interested in following up on Augustine's account of the resurrection. They agree that all will be raised at the age of thirty in a perfect physical state, lacking in any defects which they may have had in life. Miscarried fetuses are included in this rule. The only exception to it is the scars of the martyrs, which they will retain in Heaven and wear as badges of honor. With respect to the foodstuffs men have eaten in this life, the masters agree, they are not a problem in the resurrection because they were assimilated and have become part of the human bodies of the people who ate them. As for fingernail clippings and hair that has been cut off in this life, they suggest, with Augustine, that we should not worry about what becomes of them. They support his view that people will be resurrected in the male and female sexes, although there is no marriage in Heaven, and affirm that hermaphrodites will receive the physical attributes of whichever of the two sexes was preponderant in their earthly constitution.⁵⁸² The saints, the Laon masters agree, will all enjoy beatitude but in different degrees, just as the damned will suffer

⁵⁷⁸ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 93, 5: 79.

⁵⁷⁹ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 500, 530, 5: 322, 395.

⁵⁸⁰ *Sent. Anselmi* 11, pp. 152–53.

⁵⁸¹ *Sentences of Anselm of Laon*, no. 91, 5: 78.

⁵⁸² *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 498–500, 530, 5: 320–22, 396–97.

different degrees and modes of punishment. They will hear the prayers of the living, and of those in purgatory who need their assistance, and, if God has decided to save them, these suppliants will be aided by the prayers of the saints.⁵⁸³ The Laon masters also refer to the identification of Antichrist with Nero in 2 Thessalonians, seeking but failing to explain it.⁵⁸⁴ They think that Purgatory is a fiery place located in the air.⁵⁸⁵ But their treatment of the end of time is less a treatise on Last Things in general than a discussion of the resurrection and the beatitude of the saints.

The first scholastic theologian to attempt a more systematic treatment of Last Things, and one that he seeks to correlate with the overarching themes of his theology in general, is Hugh of St. Victor. He follows in the Laon tradition, in that his account is largely a reprise and abridgement of the last three chapters of the *City of God*. But he presents a more connected story as well as raising a wider variety of questions than do the Laon masters. The fact that he raises questions, however, is not always an index of his ability or desire to answer them. In some instances, like the Porretans, his queries are introduced as a means of pinpointing issues on which he thinks speculation should be discouraged. The latter is the case with the question with which he opens his treatise on Last Things, the whereabouts of the souls of the departed in between their separation from their bodies in death and the general resurrection. Hugh thinks, with some pertinence, that this is a question *mal posée*. Pointing out that the soul is spiritual, he concludes that souls do not need, and indeed, they cannot have, a local habitation once detached from their bodies. In any event, he warns, this is a subject on which there is little secure information. Of greater interest to him, and an area in which he is not disinclined to speculate, is the question of whether such souls can return to earth as ghosts in visible form, a possibility which he by no means rules out.⁵⁸⁶

Since Hugh follows a generally historical model in his *De sacramentis*, this is the way he approaches Last Things as well. Reprising Augustine throughout, he states that we cannot know the day or the hour when the Antichrist will arrive and trigger the rest of the end-of-time scenario, an observation perhaps also aimed at the too-enthusiastic monastic exegetes of Revelation in this period.

⁵⁸³ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 501–02, 504–05, 5: 322–23.

⁵⁸⁴ *Sentences of the School of Laon*, no. 530, 5: 397.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 394.

⁵⁸⁶ Hugh of St. Victor, *De sac.* 2.16.2, *PL* 176: 580C–584C.

After the Antichrist has completed his reign of three years and six months, the general resurrection and last judgment will occur, each in the twinkling of an eye.⁵⁸⁷ Hugh reports Augustine's views on the perfection of the resurrected body faithfully, except for the fact that he disclaims knowledge of when, in the gestation process, the fetus becomes a person and will be resurrected as himself and not as part of his mother's body. He admits that the resurrected body will have physical needs and desires, but not those that can aggravate the soul.⁵⁸⁸ In treating the punishments of the damned, Hugh agrees that they will be afflicted by corporeal fire and finds this doctrine problematic, since it is a punishment they start to receive as soon as they die and before their resurrected bodies have been joined to their souls. Hugh can find no explanation either in authority or in reason for the claim that a soul not attached to a body can suffer physical punishment. He states that this teaching should be held by faith alone. The punishment by fire, which he takes from Gregory as well as Augustine, can also be understood, metaphorically, as spiritual torment. Hugh does not think that the damned can see the blessings of the saved. He does think that the punishments of the damned in Hell are graduated. He holds that Hell is located in the nether regions, somewhere in the bowels of the earth; but, in his view, its exact location cannot be ascertained.⁵⁸⁹

Hugh also takes exception to those authors who think they can give a precise location for Purgatory. He reviews the principal opinions on this issue. Some say that people begin their purgatorial punishment on earth while they are still alive, in the same places where their sins were committed. Others say that Purgatory is in or near Hell. The most likely opinion, in Hugh's estimation, is that of Gregory, who locates it underground in an upper, and less loathesome, part of Hell. Still, the best course of action, Hugh advises, is to acknowledge that we do not know for certain where Purgatory is. What is more important, in Hugh's eyes, is what happens in Purgatory. It is a zone, he agrees, where people predestined to salvation, who died still possessing faults on their consciences which they need to eliminate, undergo purgation temporarily. He adds that these souls are aided by the prayers, masses, and almsgiving offered on their behalf by the living.⁵⁹⁰

As for the saved in Heaven, Hugh confirms Augustine's view

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., 2.17.5–8, *PL* 176: 598B–600C.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., 2.17.13–20, *PL* 176: 601C–606A.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., 2.16.3–5, 2.18.1–2, 2.18.5–6, *PL* 176: 584C–593C, 609B–C, 610B–C.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid., 2.16.4–10, *PL* 176: 586C–596A.

that part of their edification consists of their ability to witness the torments of the damned. They do not pity the damned or pray for them, since they know that the fate of the damned is sealed and that it is just.⁵⁹¹ For Hugh, the bliss of Heaven can be defined primarily and essentially as the vision of God. As with the Laon masters, he treats beatitude as a cognitive state, in which perfect knowledge and perfect sight replace the partial knowledge available to man by faith in this life. At the same time as he seconds this Augustinian theme, he puts his own Victorine construction on it. At the opening of the *De sacramentis*, he had outlined the modes of human knowledge and had placed systematic theological investigation on a trajectory starting from the knowledge of God one gains through reason, the knowledge of God one gains through revelation, and the knowledge of God one gains through contemplation. This quest for knowledge, in Hugh's understanding of Heaven, is consummated in the vision of God enjoyed by the saints. While they possess other kinds of beatitude as well, including immortality, love without offense, the forgetting of all past sufferings and the memory and reexperiencing of all past joys, it is ultimately the perfection of knowledge, and not only the knowledge of lesser things without error, but first and foremost, the knowledge of the creator and redeemer Himself, that brings Hugh of St. Victor's envisioned work of institution and restitution to its close.⁵⁹²

This Victorine focus on knowledge aside, Hugh sets the agenda for succeeding accounts of Last Things on the part of the systematic theologians in this period. This fact is visible in the slender gleanings that have been found of Robert of Melun's teaching on this subject.⁵⁹³ It is also the case with Robert Pullen. Like Hugh, Robert Pullen draws heavily on Augustine and Gregory and emphasizes the events that will take place between the official end of this world and the final assignment of souls to their ultimate places of punishment and reward. The coming of Antichrist, his reign, the general resurrection of all into perfect bodily form, and the last judgment claim Robert's primary attention. He discusses all these processes in considerable detail.⁵⁹⁴ He acknowledges that some of the saints will be brighter than others, as there are many mansions in Heaven. But he is far less interested than Hugh or, for that matter, Augustine, in what the existence of the blessed and the damned will

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., 2.18.5–6, 2.18.13, 2.18.15, *PL* 176: 610B–C, 612A, 612C.

⁵⁹² Ibid., 2.18.16–19, 2.18.21–22, *PL* 176: 613A–616D, 617B–618B.

⁵⁹³ Raymond-M. Martin, ed., "Un texte intéressant de Robert de Melun (*Sententiae*, libr. II, part 2, cap. cxvii–ccxiii)," *RHE* 28 (1932): 322–26, 328–39.

⁵⁹⁴ Robert Pullen, *Sent.* 8.15–17, 8.26–32, *PL* 186: 982D–988B, 1003A–1010B.

be like in Heaven and Hell. All he has to offer on that subject is the observation that the mental and moral attitudes (*habitus mentis*) which they had at the time of their death will be intensified, and that Hell involves extremes of cold as well as heat.⁵⁹⁵ Robert largely omits Purgatory from Last Things. He takes it up primarily as a pendant to his discussion of penance. He follows Gregory's teaching on that subject, locating Purgatory somewhere underground, and in the upper portion of Hell, where repentant souls complete any satisfaction still owing, the length of their stay depending on the needs of the individual. He omits the idea that the prayers and masses of the living may speed up their purgation, but concentrates on the sufferings they undergo, which, he says, will be worse than the sufferings they endured in this life but far lighter than the punishments of the damned. Robert also thinks that this purgatorial upper zone of Hell was where the Old Testament worthies awaited Christ's harrowing of Hell,⁵⁹⁶ another context in which he brings up the subject. But, aside from the elaboration of the stages through which souls will pass before attaining these habitations, Robert's chief concern is to combat Origen's teaching on the possibility that souls in the next life may undergo repeated backsliding, or conversion, *ad infinitum* and even that the devil may be saved.⁵⁹⁷ The finality of God's judgment is the principal reality he wants to stress.

Peter Lombard on Last Things

In placing Peter Lombard's doctrine of Last Things in the context of contemporary accounts, modern scholars, while noticing the range of his sources, including the same Julian of Toledo used by Honorius to such cinematic effect, see his contribution largely as the amplification of Hugh of St. Victor.⁵⁹⁸ There is certainly strong evidence indicating that Peter has drawn on Hugh, and on Augustine, Hugh's own major source. Yet, in comparison with both of

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid., 4.14–24, 8.32, *PL* 186: 823B–828A, 1008B–1010B.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid., 1.14, 4.17–18, 8.21, *PL* 186: 705A, 823B–824D, 994A–D.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid., 8.25, *PL* 186: 999C–D.

⁵⁹⁸ Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," col. 2002; Coloman Viola, "Jugements de Dieu et jugement dernier: Saint Augustine et la scolastique naissante (fin XI^e-milieu XIII^e siècles)," in *The Use and Abuse of Eschatology in the Middle Ages*, ed. Werner Verbeke, Daniel Verhelst, and Andries Welkenhuysen (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1988), pp. 242–98; Nikolaus Wicki, "Das 'Prognosticon futuri saeculi' Julians von Toledo als Quellenwerk der Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus," *Divus Thomas* 31 (1953): 349–60; *Die Lehre von der himmlischen Seligkeit in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik von Petrus Lombardus bis Thomas von Aquin* (Freiburg in der Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1954), pp. 4–17, 62–63, 175–76, 186, 239–40, 280, 319.

these authors, and, indeed, with most other early twelfth-century treatments of Last Things, what is striking in the Lombard's account is his sobriety and his accent on positions that can be documented in Holy Scripture. At the same time, and by the same token, he ruthlessly suppresses anything smacking of fanciful or wild-eyed speculation. His principal tactic for enforcing his views concerning what can be known about Last Things with certitude and what cannot is his appeal to St. Paul and to the strategy of selective omission, which he uses not only against Hugh and Augustine but against Paul himself. Another major feature of Peter's treatment of Last Things is that he, like Hugh, is interested in harnessing this subject to the overall themes animating his systematic theology as a whole; but the themes, in his case, are different ones.

Peter largely follows the scenario laid out by Paul in 1 Thessalonians in describing the events leading to the permanent assignment of souls to the two cities of Augustine, although he reverses the emphasis in such authors as Robert Pullen by giving this part of his assignment a rather streamlined treatment, reserving more space for the actual state of being of the damned and the saved. He draws as well on his own biblical exegesis here. The story begins with the descent of Christ from Heaven in the voice of the archangel and in the trumpet's blast, the sound of the trumpet being the cause that triggers the general resurrection (*causa . . . resurrectionis*) in the sense of being the efficient cause of what happens next. The second coming of Christ will occur at an unexpected moment, he stresses. Peter is just as unsympathetic as Hugh toward efforts to spell out the day and the hour; the middle of the night to which the apostle refers points to no specific time, he observes. The books that will be opened are the consciences of the individuals now to be judged.⁵⁹⁹ Peter declines to speculate on some of the matters of interest to other theologians, including his patristic and post-patristic sources, in connection with the resurrection. He thinks it likely that the elect will remember the troubles they endured, and overcame, in this life, but not in such a way as to interfere with their present happiness. There is no forgetting of all past suffering, as in Hugh's account. But he points out that there is no evidence in Scripture as to whether people who are not members of the elect will remember their past sins. The most he is willing to concede is that facts that occurred openly will be known openly in the next life. Peter dismisses the question of whether people still alive when the trumpet

⁵⁹⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 43. c. 2–c. 4, 2: 511–12. The quotation is at c. 2.1, p. 511.

blows will be taken immediately into immortality, their bodies swiftly changed from living, earthly ones to resurrected ones, or whether they will have to die before they can be resurrected, like everyone else. We have no basis for answering this question, he observes. Likewise, the idea that Christ judges the living and the dead may be taken literally, in the sense that those people still alive at the time of the second coming will be judged, along with the departed. It may also be understood figuratively, in the sense that the living stand for the saved and the dead stand for the damned. No precise or preclusive determination can be given here, in Peter's view. Furthermore, none is required. Likewise, while Peter follows the standard Augustinian account of the perfection of the bodies of the resurrected saints, pointedly declining to appeal to the technicolor version of this theme provided by Julian of Toledo and Honorius, he argues that we have less evidence about the nature of the resurrected bodies of the damned. The most we can say is that their bodies will be able to burn without being consumed and that their souls will be able to suffer along with their bodies.⁶⁰⁰

Peter moves immediately to the last judgment, and, in so doing, he draws on the doctrine of Gregory the Great, which he had also developed in his Psalms commentary, and to which Honorius refers as well. The saints, he affirms, will participate in the last judgment along with Christ, starting with the twelve apostles in whose midst He conducts the proceedings. Four categories of souls will emerge in this judgment. There are those who are not judged and who are condemned to perdition. It is not necessary to judge them in the hereafter, because they have openly condemned themselves to damnation as unrepentant sinners in this life. Then, there are those who will be judged and condemned. These are people who professed the faith but did not manifest it in good deeds. There are, thirdly, those who are judged and who will rule. These are the souls who died with unexpiated but repented sins on their consciences. They will be admitted to glory, but only after their purgation. Finally, there are those who are not judged and who rule. These souls, like those in the first category, do not need to be judged. For them, this is the case because they have already shown their true character in this life, having manifested their perfect virtue through works of supererogation. They are the saints who will assist Christ and His apostles in the last judgment.⁶⁰¹ This description of the

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., c. 5–d. 44, 2: 513–22.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., d. 47. c. 2–c. 3, 2: 537–40. See above, chapter 4, pp. 176–77.

four categories of souls departs from Honorius's account of them, as referring to different callings, belief systems, or states of life, and restores to them the authentic Gregorian note of moral choice and moral action.

In the judgment itself, Christ, with His angelic and saintly assistants, will gather the saved from the four corners of the earth, leaving the damned behind to be dragged to their punishment by demons. Peter gives passing attention to the issue of where the last judgment will take place, and agrees with the authorities who say that it will occur in the firmament somewhere, and not on earth. He dismisses as irrelevant and as unknowable the matter of why the heavenly bodies will remain in existence after time stops and is replaced by perpetual day. The points he really wants to accent about the last judgment are two other ones. First, the form in which Christ will preside over the last judgment is the form of His resurrected body. This, says Peter, is eminently fitting, since Christ's resurrection is the earnest of our own. Further, since this is the form in which He communicates Himself to believers sacramentally in the Eucharist, Christ's resurrection is also the cause of our own salvation.⁶⁰² The other major teaching Peter wants to emphasize concerning the last judgment, before going on to the condition of souls in their posthumous states, is, in effect, the *Leitmotiv* of his entire account of Last Things. The judgment of Christ is just. And, the judgment of Christ is merciful. True, for those who are condemned, this judgment means eternal and unchanging punishment. This point, developed by Robert Pullen as an argument against Origen, is focused on a different objective by Peter. The punishment of the damned is not in conflict with God's mercy, he observes, because God punishes them less than they actually deserve. In any event, he reminds the reader, the justice and mercy of God are one and the same. Therefore, nothing in the judgment of God is lacking in mercy, since these attributes are identical in, and with, the divine essence itself. Here, Peter refers his readers to the extended account of the radical unity of the divine essence and of how divine attributes are to be understood in connection with it that he had provided in the first book of the *Sentences*.⁶⁰³

In surveying the steps that lead to the manifestation of this justice and mercy of God in the states of souls in the next life, on

⁶⁰² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 47. c. 4–d. 48. c. 5, 2: 540–47.

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, d. 46. c. 1–c. 5, 2: 529–37. On this point, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, 4 part 2: 268–70.

which he plans to lavish much attention, we may say that Peter has been pointedly concerned with pruning the florid display of fantasy found in many of his sources and with dismissing as inappropriate or as unanswerable many of the questions that they are willing to consider. His tactic of strategic omission can be seen most strikingly in the fact that he begins his own end-of-time scenario with the second coming of Christ and the general resurrection, not with the reign of Antichrist. Indeed, the single most original feature of Peter's treatment of Last Things is that, unlike all of his predecessors, ancient and modern, he ignores the Antichrist altogether. This decision is fully conscious. As we have seen above, in his exegesis of 2 Thessalonians, he develops a thoroughgoing and a quite innovative interpretation of the meaning of Antichrist, one that unshackles it completely not only from the Emperor Nero, the initial problem in that epistle, which he sets out to correct, but also from any kind of institutional manifestation or historical phenomenon.⁶⁰⁴ Peter relies on St. Paul for much of his account of Last Things, but it is noteworthy that the Paul he relies on is only the Paul of 1 Thessalonians, and his own gloss on that epistle, and not the Paul of 2 Thessalonians, and his gloss on the latter text. A more sharply pointed rejection of the tendency of some contemporaries to speculate on the apocalypse and to cater to the fears, worries, and yearnings for certitude to which the chiliastic imagination gave free rein would be difficult to envision. While Peter is ready and willing to offer his own interpretation of Antichrist, as an exegete, in order to bring the Paul of 2 Thessalonians into line with the Paul of 1 Thessalonians and with Pauline theology more generally, when it comes to the systematic theology of Last Things, his goal is to excise this topic from the syllabus altogether. It is not a subject on which responsible theological research can be done, in his estimation. It is not a field in which certitude is available. Thus, it should not be allowed to obstruct the logical and theological passage of the student from the ethical and sacramental lives of Christians on earth to their posthumous outcomes.

This point having been made by the radical surgery he performs on the theme of Antichrist, in the *Sentences*, Peter turns to those posthumous conditions, presented as expressions of divine justice and mercy. With respect to Purgatory, he declines to raise the question of whether it can be localized and, if so, where it is. But he has a perfectly clear understanding of its nature. For Peter, this

⁶⁰⁴ See above, chapters 4 and 6, pp. 196, 204, 205–07, 350.

state is one that souls requiring purgation enter immediately after their deaths, although their condition therein is altered following the general resurrection. The third category of person who is judged in the last judgment, and who will attain to glory, is the population found in Purgatory. The inhabitants of this state of being are assisted, according to Peter, by the prayers of the saints. They are also helped by the prayers, masses, and almsgiving which the living offer on their behalf, before the end of time. What is striking about Peter's handling of Purgatory under the heading of Last Things, a point also visible when he discusses it as a corollary of the sacrament of penance, is that he is not interested in expatiating on the nature of purgatorial punishments. Rather, what he wants to emphasize, along with Gregory, is the doctrine of the communion of the saints and the connections uniting all Christians, living and dead, in the bond of love that is the church. He has an ecclesiological point to make here, as well as a piece of earnest advice to his contemporaries. The aids that living Christians can offer to the souls in Purgatory are efficacious, he observes, and it is much more important to spend one's time and money on them than on elaborate and expensive funerals or funerary monuments.⁶⁰⁵ Equally basic, he agrees with Gregory, is the justice and mercy God expresses in providing this transitory realm for people who died in a contrite state of mind, so that the continuing grace of forgiveness of sins acknowledged and repented can be made available to them in the hereafter.

Turning to the souls permanently damned and saved, Peter appeals largely to Augustine, and to his own personal appropriation of Augustine in his orchestration of the idea of use and enjoyment as the main theme of his *Sentences*. There are two conditions which the saints and sinners will share, he agrees, outside of the eternalization of the prevailing state of their love in the city of God or the city of man, respectively. They will be disposed in differing degrees of punishment and bliss in Hell and Heaven, all equal in the sense that the damned will all have what they deserve and the blessed will all have what they want. Just as the blessed will enjoy the incapacity to sin (*non posse peccare*), so the damned will be confirmed in their possession of a bad will. Even though they will not be able to engage in all their earlier earthly modes of sin, they will still be incapable of not sinning by intention. Hence, Peter observes, they will continue to merit their punishments, to all

⁶⁰⁵ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 4. d. 45. c. 1–c. 6, 2: 523–29.

eternity, since they will continue to add to their own viciousness and demerit. Therefore, their eternal punishment is just. The outer darkness into which the damned are cast is their separation from God, which they earn thanks to the inner darkness of soul that led them into sin. Their inability to see, and to see God, is a terminal case, for Peter, of the dissimilitude to God and to their true selves which they have created for themselves; Hell, as he sees it, is the ultimate, and permanent, *regio dissimilitudinis*. So greatly does citizenship in this anti-city blind its inhabitants that they cannot recognize God or even remember Him. The only tiny glimmer of humanity that Peter, following Augustine, is willing to grant to the damned is the capacity to feel sorrow or empathy with other people's punishments. On the model of the *dives et Lazarus* story, it would seem that they do care about the fates of their living relatives. Other than that, bad will and total moral blindness characterize their condition.⁶⁰⁶ Unlike Augustine, Peter focuses on the spiritual horrors of Hell, and ignores the idea of physical punishment.

The blindness of the damned, according to Peter, will make it impossible for them to see the bliss of the saints. This condition, too, is an act of divine mercy and justice; for the damned are spared a vision of joy that is totally closed to them. For the blessed, on the other hand, faith will be replaced by sight. They not only see God face to face, and all things in Him, but, confirmed in their rectitude, they understand His justice. They grasp the fact that the punishment of the damned is just, and unalterable, and their capacity to observe it does not diminish their own beatitude. The question of their praying for the damned does not arise. For Peter, the beatitude of the saints will consist largely of knowledge and joy. Peter acknowledges his debt to Hugh of St. Victor here and goes beyond him. Despite the different mansions they inhabit, the saints will all see God, although in different ways. Each will possess all the knowledge and joy of which he is capable; each will attain everything for which he has hoped and yearned. This gift, for each of the saints, is the consummation of God's power, mercy, and justice as it is displayed to man. In the grand finale Peter orchestrates, before laying down his pen, the bliss of heaven consists in the confirmation of the saints' recovery of the image of God in themselves. Indeed, it consists in their acquisition of a condition better than the one in which man was created. For they have now moved beyond signs to the possession of the things signified. They have moved beyond use

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., d. 49–d. 50. c. 1–c. 4, 2: 547–57.

to the enjoyment of God, the supreme good Who can now be loved, fully, and without impediment, for Himself alone.⁶⁰⁷ And, even more than that, they have now transcended the mutabilities of their condition as creatures, the limits of their earthly modes of interaction with the God Who manifests Himself to man within the temporal and physical boundaries of the order of creation and redemption. They now share in an eternal communion with the deity Who transcends time. Peter, thus, unites his treatment of Last Things, with which he concludes his *Sentences*, with his own reworking of the Augustinian motifs which he recasts as the framework, and the agenda, of his own systematic theology, as an enterprise uniting intellect and will in the final attainment, through God's mercy, of that God Himself, the deity Who transcends His own manifestation of Himself to man in time, as the highest object of knowledge and love, and the highest good.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., d. 49, d. 50. c. 4–c. 7, 2: 547–53, 557–61.

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing pages, care has been taken to present the contemporary state of play in western theology, among Peter Lombard's scholastic compeers, when he entered the field, in order to locate his own teachings in the environment in which he worked. As we have seen, his relationship to his coevals is not a simple one. Sometimes, the Lombard's role is essentially that of strengthening, restating, or confirming the current consensus position. Sometimes he draws together, in his own eclectic mix, ideas derived from other masters, canonists and theologians alike. Sometimes his concern is to criticize and to demolish the teachings of some one master, or group of masters. Sometimes his contribution is to find a fresh way of conceptualizing issues that other thinkers had raised and had failed to resolve. Sometimes he takes a decidedly polemical approach in areas keenly debated at the time, areas in which there was no consensus. In so doing, he often contributes a clear articulation of one side of a controversy that was not settled in the mid-twelfth century. In other areas, his reasoning, as a partisan, plays a decisive role in defeating the opposition and in contributing to the emergence of a new consensus. In addition to positioning the Lombard's theology in these several ways, we have also, in the body of this book, sought to explore Peter's sources, and his use of them. His address to the inheritance of the Christian tradition, whether ancient or more recent, is, as we have seen, both thoroughgoing and independent. The same can be said for his attitude toward the *artes* and to the philosophy available in the schools of his day. In the conclusion which now follows, we plan to set aside these questions of context and comparison in order to draw together the strands of the Lombard's teaching in their own right, in order to set forth the main outlines of Lombardian theology as such.

We begin, as Peter himself does, with the single most important subject with which he thought theologians should be concerned, and the subdivision of theology in which he thought western Christian thought in his own day most needed a massive overhaul, the doctrine of God. The supremacy, and centrality, of the deity as a subject of attention is one that Peter signals not only by the notable amount of space he devotes to this topic, but also by the place he assigns it in the reformulation of the Augustinian idea of signs and things, use and enjoyment, which is the guiding theme he

announces at the beginning of his *Sentences*, and which is to govern his doctrinal priorities throughout. God alone is to be enjoyed in and for Himself. He is the supreme being and the supreme good, to which everything else points and in relation to which everything else, and not least, systematic theology itself, is to be used. Peter states a positive doctrine of man's knowledge of God that displays no interest whatever in the claims of negative theology. He is quite confident in man's ability to prove God's existence by the use of natural reason, and launches his doctrine of God by doing so.

This foundation laid, he proceeds to tackle the two most important aspects of the doctrine of God which he regards as needing clarification and rigorous enforcement. The first is the doctrine of the Trinity. In Peter's eyes, it is mandatory to make a clear and intelligible distinction between the divine nature and the divine persons in the Trinity, one that neither collapses the personal determinations of the Trinity into the common essence which the Trinitarian persons share, nor confuses each person with a particular divine attribute or a particular divine mission *ad extra*, in such a way as to produce tritheism or subordinationism in the Trinity. This first task was, initially, complicated for Peter by the absence in his day of a common, a speculatively adequate, and a generally understood vocabulary of the terms needed to discuss the distinction between nature and person in the Trinity. Not the least of the Lombard's contributions here, and a prior condition on which it depends, is his circumspect treatment of the problem of theological language as it applies to the Trinity. Peter's theological agenda, with respect to the Trinity, is of a piece with his agenda for the second major concern he addresses in treating the doctrine of God, the stress on God's transcendence. With respect to the Trinity, he emphasizes this principle by insisting that the determinations distinguishing the Trinitarian persons from each other are, and only can be, the relationships They bear to each other *in se*, in the eternal and unmanifested Trinity, and not in anything They do *ad extra*. When he turns to the divine nature as such, shared by the persons of the Trinity quite apart from any outward manifestation of it that They may make, Peter strongly emphasizes the idea that God is absolute being, utterly one and simple, infinite and unbounded in all His attributes, immutable and incommutable despite the differing ways in which He can be understood or be seen to act in relation to His creation. For Peter this principle has two critical and irrefragible corollaries. God acts not by emanation or by immanence in the world. His workings in man and nature are His effects and are not participations in the divine being. Above all,

they are not responses to any internal necessities of His own nature. Secondly, and consequently, the divine being is always greater than any expression of it that God may make in the creation. God is never limited, exhausted, or circumscribed by anything He does *ad extra*. He acts, to be sure, to create, to sustain, to govern, and to empower man and nature; but His role as a God of agency in these respects does not override or subsume His transcendent reality as a God of essence.

With the reinforcement of this doctrine of God in mind, over against a purely or primarily economic understanding of the deity, Peter launches forthwith into his proofs of God's existence, on the basis of natural reason. His lead-in is the *invisibilia dei* passage from St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. But, although he certainly starts with evidence that can be found in the visible creation, whose causes inductive reason can infer, Peter also imparts a metaphysical look to this topic as well. In this area he is confident and unhesitating about the powers of reason and about the corroboration of the proofs he bases on it in pagan philosophy. He offers four proofs. The first is an *a posteriori* proof from effects to causes and from causes to a first cause, and from design and order in the creation to the notion that this first cause is also an intelligent supreme orderer. The second is an *a posteriori* proof from motion to a ground of being that is itself immutable. Here we see the beginning of Peter's shift from physical to metaphysical analysis. It is not how the deity acts, as a cause, that is the crux of this proof, but what He is. Peter seeks to show how a structure of being in creatures that involves change is metaphysically grounded in a being that has a different kind of nature. The analysis of being offered in the second proof undergirds the third and fourth proofs. In the third proof, Peter notes that the universe yields evidence of hierarchy, a favorite theme of his. There are degrees of being and degrees of excellence. A supreme being is required as a cause of this phenomenon. And, it cannot be one that is merely the highest term in the hierarchy. It must be a being that transcends the hierarchy. In the fourth proof, Peter observes that the universe contains beings marked by compositeness as well as by changeability. Thus, the supreme ground of the being of such creatures must be simple as well as unchanging.

Four general observations may be made about these proofs. First, in each case, the cause of the phenomena induced by the proofs is not merely a cause that is like those phenomena, but one that is merely greater than they are. Rather, for Peter, it is a cause that utterly transcends them. Secondly, and therefore, what the *ea*

quae facta sunt show forth is not how the creation resembles the creator, but, rather, how the creator differs from the creation. The ontological dependence of the world upon God as its ground of being reflects both the world's connection with God and His radical independence from the world. Thirdly, the prime attribute of God accented in the demonstration of God's otherness is God's immutability, which attribute plays a key role in two out of the four proofs. It is adverted to more frequently than the divine notes of primacy, intelligence, unity, and simplicity. Finally, while these are *a posteriori* proofs, Peter is concerned not merely with what causes the phenomena and events that occur in time. He understands priority and posteriority primarily in the order of being, not in the order of time. The proofs, in short, offer grist for the mills of the metaphysicians as well as for those of the natural theologians.

For Peter, natural reason is an epistemic reality that can certainly prove the existence of God and elicit some extremely basic aspects of His nature; but it cannot prove that God is three and one. With respect to the Trinity, the most reason can do is to offer similitudes and analogies, with the clear-eyed recognition of the fact that, as analogies, they always fall short of what they resemble. This is a form of the knowledge of God that requires revelation and faith, in Peter's eyes. Any apparent parallels to the doctrine of the Trinity found in pagan philosophers are the shadow, not the reality. They stop short well before they can attain to the doctrine of the Trinity held by Christians. Peter's consideration of man's natural knowledge of the Trinity is also a concerted effort to banish the idea that this knowledge is found in economic descriptions or similitudes of the Trinitarian persons, especially when they refer to attributes shared equally by those persons. The Trinity of which man can have knowledge by analogy is, for Peter, first, last, and always the unmanifested Trinity. The analogies must speak to the interactions of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit among Themselves.

This being the case, Peter focuses on two such analogies, bequeathed by Augustine, that are found in human psychology. The fact of threeness in oneness in the human soul can be seen in its simultaneous possession of memory, intellect, and will and in the simultaneous presence of the mind, its knowledge of itself and its love of itself. Critical to either of these analogies, and to Peter's stress on the intratrinitarian interaction of the divine persons as the only basis for the denomination of those persons, is his handling of the concept of relation, an idea he also borrows from Augustine and nuances. Relation, he stresses, must, in this context, be purged of

its Aristotelian acceptation as an accident, one of the predicables that may, or may not, be attributed to a substance susceptible of modification by accidents. Rather, relation here should be understood in the light of relative nouns, such as right and left or light and dark. So understood, a relative, comprehensible in connection with its correlative, provides a means of describing the association and the distinction among the Trinitarian persons, whose determinations as unique individuals vis-à-vis each other, the determinations of unbegottenness, filiation, and procession, have always been structured into the eternal Trinitarian family. In comparing the two Augustinian analogies that he cites, Peter sees the analogy of *memoria-intellectus-voluntas* as having more limitations than that of *mens-notitia-amor*, although Augustine places them in the reverse order of priority. Also, Peter is less interested in the light these analogies may shed on human psychology than in the structure of being that they display. In any case, and this is another advantage of these analogies in Peter's eyes, they make relatedness in the deity, and not splendid isolation, the supreme reality.

With this discussion of what can be known and proved about the deity as such and about the Trinity in place, Peter proceeds logically to explore the distinction between person and nature in the Trinity. In his own vocabulary, substance can be used in this connection, as indeed it must be used, for it is in the creed. Deliberately refraining from associating this term with any particular philosophical definition of it in this context, he treats substance as the intrinsic qualities that make a being itself, whatever kind of being it happens to be. With this understanding of substance in mind, Peter consistently yokes substance to nature, as denoting the divine essence shared equally and in the same way by the Trinitarian persons. One can, properly, attribute the terms substance and nature to the Trinitarian persons only when one is referring to the divine essence which They share. In sharing it, They do not do so numerically, as parts that make up a whole, or as species within the same genus. The Godhead is not a level of being metaphysically prior to the Trinitarian persons. Rather, the divine nature is wholly possessed by each of Them; there is not "more God" present when two or three of the persons are considered together than when one person is considered by Himself. These are the respects in which the persons of the unmanifested Trinity are one in nature and being. The respects in which they are three, and distinct, are the respects in which they are both bonded to and distinguishable from each other, also in that unmanifested state, as unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding. In these particular relations, and only there, is

each Trinitarian person a specific individual whose personal properties are unique to Him. The same simply cannot be said of any of the other denominations that the Trinitarian persons may be given. For, in their role *ad extra*, what They manifest and exercise is the divine nature, not Their divine personhood. The divine persons are fully coactive in anything They do *ad extra*, including missions which may be delegated to one or another Trinitarian person in particular.

Thus, for Peter, it is the Godhead Who interacts with the world and man, and not some one of the Trinitarian persons, in an array of cosmological and charismatic activities limited to any one of those persons. And, while God is engaged in His various modes of activity *ad extra*, He remains utterly immutable, incommutable, incomparable, simple and transcendent over His creation, never identical with or consumed by His effects in the orders of nature and grace. Given the infinite store of being that God possesses, or, better put, is, Peter stresses very heavily the point that God always has, or is, more than He does or chooses in actuality. In general terms, in handling the issues that arise under the heading of the divine nature in this connection, Peter resolutely emphasizes the metaphysics of that subject. He dislikes, and criticizes, the tendency found in some quarters, ancient and modern, to collapse metaphysical questions concerning the deity into logical questions, especially if the logic used is a propositional logic which, on its own accounting, disclaims the ability of logic to verify conclusions that lie outside its own formal bailiwick. This basic outlook informs Peter's handling of the three most important issues he raises in discussing the divine nature in relation to the universe, God's ubiquity; the compatibility of God's providence, predestination, and foreknowledge with contingency and free will; and the vexed question of whether God can do different, and better, than He does.

In treating God's ubiquity, Peter rejects a substantialist or immanentist understanding of God's presence in the universe, for such a mode of presence would blur the difference between divine and created being. The only created being in which God is present substantially is the man Jesus. But, He is the exception Who proves the rule. In every other case, God is present in creatures ontologically, as their ground of being, not as their essence or as their form, but as the source that creates and sustains them and that gives them the capacity to carry out their natural functions. Likewise, in the order of grace, a theme Peter plans to develop more fully in his ethics and sacramental theology, what God communicates, except in the case of the Eucharist, is not Himself but a *virtus* or power that

leaves intact the creaturely status of the human beings to whom He grants it. They must, and can, cooperate with it, in developing their own virtues and merits, and they can reject it. In this sense, God is less ubiquitous in the charismatic order than He is in the order of nature, in that not all people receive and act on His grace, and not all of those who do receive and act on it do so to the same degree or in the same way. Nevertheless, in both cases, God's presence in the world and man is a presence by way of ontological grounding and by way of enabling power, not by way of participation.

In comparison with thinkers who viewed God's relation to the world in terms of the logical or physical relations between necessity, possibility, and contingency, Peter recasts the question into a metaphysical investigation into God's foreknowledge, providence, and predestination in relation to contingency and free will. In so doing he seeks to make two basic points. In the first place, the function of this inquiry is to shed light on the divine nature, not on the creation or on human logic. Secondly, and in particular, the aspect of the divine nature which is at issue here is God's omniscience. God's exercise of this attribute is the focus. And, like God's exercise of any of His attributes *ad extra*, it is not exhausted by the ways in which He actually chooses to exercise it. Although we can think of God's knowledge in relation to the world in terms of foreknowledge, disposition, predestination, and wisdom, God's knowledge is, intrinsically, as one and as simple as it is eternal and complete. As Peter defines these terms, foreknowledge is God's knowledge of everything that will happen from all eternity, irrespective of who or what the causes of those events will be. Disposition is God's governance of the universe, including His foreknowledge of the natural laws He will create, before He puts them in place. Predestination is the grace of preparation, which God grants to His elect, His salvation of them in the next life, and His knowledge from all eternity of who they will be, before they have a chance to acquire merit. Wisdom is God's knowledge of all things, past, present, and future. The dimension of time included by Peter in this definition of wisdom refers not to God's knowledge as such, but to that knowledge as applied, in a relative sense, to a universe that exists in time. This application in no sense diminishes or conditions the intrinsic eternity and infinity of divine omniscience, for God's knowledge is of His essence.

On the other hand, the things that are in God's knowledge are not God Himself. This is true of His predestination, which is causative, but which does not mean that the elect share the divine nature or that they do not have to cooperate with the grace of

predestination in order to profit from it. For its part, divine foreknowledge is not *per se* causative. Some of the things God foreknows He also causes. But He also foreknows things that will occur contingently. The fact that God does not cause events that stem from contingency or from free will in the case of rational creatures is not an imperfection or a limitation on God's knowledge or on God's role as a cause, for He freely chose to create beings capable of acting as secondary causes and as agents possessing free will. The fact that God knows contingent events, and events that have not yet occurred, does not mean, moreover, that He knows them better when they do eventuate. For, His knowledge has always been exhaustive. The events in question are conditioned by time; God is not. Also, God's knowledge cannot increase because it is, and always has been, total. This same principle also means that God does not alter His immutable decree as to the people He predestines. His omniscience in this regard is immutable although the grace of predestination is not irresistible. Peter, therefore, creates a clear zone for the existence of contingency and free will, one just as well garrisoned as those provided by his confrères from the side of natural philosophy or formal logic. He shows the compatibility of these possibilities both with divine foreknowledge and disposition, and with the existence of direct divine causation in some areas. Yet, the whole topic, in his hands, is firmly guided back to his own metaphysical point of departure, the principle that the omniscience of the immutable and transcendent God is not limited by or definable as the way His cosmological and charismatic order works its way out in time.

In addressing the question of whether God can do different, and better, than He does, Peter develops an argument parallel to the one just noted, this time placing the issue under the heading of God's omnipotence. His analysis here is likewise designed to replace a purely logical argument or an argument from theodicy with one whose first concern is to illustrate this particular divine attribute. Similarly, he seeks to show that God's actual arrangements in the temporal world do not exhaust His power and that God acts freely and not in response to any internal necessity of His own being. Peter grounds his argument on the distinction between God's power and God's will. God's omnipotence, he notes, is not God's power to do everything. For "everything" includes the doing of evil, and the doing of things that require a body, things which, in God's case, would be imperfections and antithetical to His nature. Rather, God's omnipotence is God's power to do whatever He wills. Peter agrees that what God does do is just and good. But,

God is not constrained by His justice and goodness in the exercise of His power; and, the choices that He in fact does make in this connection do not limit what He might have done otherwise. God's omniscience, further, includes His knowledge of the range of options out of which He selects the ones He chooses to perform. Not only can God do whatever He wills; He always remains, in principle, capable of doing more than He actually decides to do.

What Peter is really stating here, and it is a principle that animates his discussion of the divine nature more generally, is the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power, although he does not use this express terminology. Beyond that, Peter rejects the idea that the world we have is the best possible world that God could have created because the world is not perfect. Only God is perfect. Created beings are capable of improvement. The life they lead, under the natural law He created, could have been an easier one, had God chosen to dispose things differently, just as He could have ordained a different mode of human redemption than He did ordain. Peter presses this argument to the point of saying that, just because Christ was born, crucified, and resurrected once for all, this does not mean that God lacks the power to do all these things again, should He choose to do so. This example is Peter's most extreme and rigorous application of the principle that God's power always transcends His actual use of it. To man, God, manifests His will in His precept, prohibition, permission, operation, and counsel. These manifestations, Peter points out, are all signs of the divine will, signs of the way an unchanging will is shown forth *ad extra*. Signs are not to be confused or equated with their *significata*, Peter notes, adverting to the Augustinian analysis of signs and things with which he begins the *Sentences*. Likewise, the unchanging and simple will of God cannot be collapsed into the ways He chooses to signify it to man. By the same token, man's exercise of his God-given free will in contravention of God's precepts or prohibitions does not circumscribe God's power. Here, in a manner analogous to his handling of divine foreknowledge and related matters in connection with contingency and free will, Peter guarantees a zone of independence for creatures, even as he underscores the inexhaustibility of God's transcendent omnipotence.

This analysis of the divine nature and its manifestations *ad extra*, in addition to accomplishing Peter's objectives for the doctrine of God, thus sets the stage for his intended treatment of the creation, angels, man, and the fall. While these topics are all related to the doctrine of God, Peter conveys much less of a sense, in the second book of the *Sentences*, that these individual subjects are themselves

tied together as organically as are those in Book 1. Also, in treating the questions he takes up in Book 2, especially on the creation, Peter departs from his usual practice of citing authorities by name and title, quoting or paraphrasing them *in extenso*, and evaluating their reasoning as well as the conclusions to which it leads before rendering his own opinion. He thus appears, uncharacteristically, to have relied on *catenae* or other intermediary sources, which report merely the conclusions of the authorities, for this part of his work. This fact may either be a cause or an effect of Peter's comparative lack of interest in cosmological speculation in its own right as a suitable focus for theologians.

With respect to creation, this perspective is notable in Peter's deep lack of sympathy with the project of considering how or whether the account of cosmogenesis in Plato's *Timaeus* squares with the Book of Genesis. Peter marshals both philosophical and theological weapons against both the plausibility of that enterprise and the particular conclusions reached by some of its partisans. His own solutions on creation are grounded in the exegetical and patristic traditions. He is, typically, less interested in the speculative side of the subject than are many thinkers in that heritage. Peter's own contribution to the doctrine of creation is a threefold one. He discovers a cogent way of including the creation of the angels within a primarily hexaemeral account of creation. He also finds a way of combining the six-day account in Genesis with a modified doctrine of creation *simul*. And, he also finds a way of acknowledging the pertinence of presenting creatures in an order reflecting their relative metaphysical status, even while retaining the standard six-day model which does not order creation in that manner.

According to Peter, God and God alone is the cause of creation *ex nihilo*. He rejects the idea of exemplary causes, however understood, along with preexistent matter. Further, he sees God as such as doing the whole work of creation, and not as delegating different aspects of it to this or that Trinitarian person, a notion consistent with his conception of the unity of God's actions *ad extra*. Likewise compatible with his doctrine of God are the principle that God cannot be equated with the forces of nature He creates and the principle that He does not create in response to any necessity of His own nature, but freely. In all these respects, God transcends the world He creates. Since, as Peter sees it, God clearly did not need to create the universe, why did He do so? In response to that question, Peter asserts that He creates rational creatures, such as angels and men, out of His benevolence, so that they can come to a knowledge

and love of God and hence possess beatitude. Following the principle of use and enjoyment, everything else in the creation was brought into being for the utility of rational creatures in attaining that end. With respect to human beings, this also means that Peter has a positive reason for their creation that allows him to dismiss the claim that they were created to make up the numbers of the fallen angels. It also means that man's possession of a body can be given a solid and generous foundation. God gave human bodies to human souls, according to Peter, so that man could serve as a microcosm of creation. Thus, in loving and serving God in body and soul and in attaining beatitude both in body and soul, man brings the whole of creation back to God; and it is metaphorically redeemed and glorified in him. Peter does not expressly use the term "microcosm;" but it is clearly what he intends here. This notion also lays the foundation for the doctrine of human nature which he develops later in Book 2 of the *Sentences*. He firmly rejects a Platonizing anthropology in which man is equated with his soul, a soul merely using or even trapped in a body seen as the source of his problems. He favors a more Aristotelian view of man as a hylemorphic unit, both aspects of which are integrally human. From this perspective, God created man with a body and a soul in order to redeem and glorify man in both body and soul, a process in which body and soul are interdependent.

Having explained why God created what He created in metaphysical order, Peter turns to the timetable of the creation. In the scenario he presents, angels and primordial matter are created *simul* and before anything else. Then, the other creatures are produced according to the biblical six-day plan. Peter rounds out the Genesis account by including God's creation of seminal reasons during the hexaemeron to account for developments that occur later. Peter thinks that it is possible to grasp the idea of unformed matter conceptually by analogy with our use of negative or privative language that refers not to species but to the absence of species. In his view, God creates directly and immediately the specific forms which He unites with unformed matter in making actual creatures. Both unformed matter and the forms are created *ex nihilo*. When He creates individual creatures, God inserts seminal reasons into them, which will enable them to carry out their natural functions as well as accounting for any new beings that may arise. Peter presents a literal, straightforward, and streamlined treatment of creation. He shows no interest in extrapolating moral and allegorical meanings from the Genesis account of creation, and no concern for the scientific anomalies it contains. Here, as in his handling of

cosmogenesis itself, he shows no desire to wear the hat of the natural philosopher.

While Peter disagrees with some theologians as to when the angels were created, he states the consensus view on their nature, disposition, and attributes and on why they constitute a subject important for theologians to consider in the first place. For Peter, angels are spiritual beings who possess intelligence and free will. They are sempiternal once created; and they are arranged in nine hierarchical ranks, headed by the seraphim, as Gregory the Great and the Pseudo-Dionysius propose. They function as divine messengers and guardians of men in this life, as well as having certain ceremonial roles to play in the last judgment. All of this is standard. So is Peter's chief concern in the field of angelology, the fall of the angels. This interest in how the fall occurred, the moral states and capacities of the good angels confirmed in their goodness and of the fallen angels confirmed in their fall, is an agenda framed largely by the felt need to refute Origen's teaching on the eternal capacity of souls, including those of angels, to backslide or to be converted, not excluding the possibility of the salvation of Satan. Peter keeps this agenda firmly before his own and the reader's eyes. He omits question that have nothing to do with it, or which he thinks are frivolous or unanswerable, such as the metaphysical status of the bodies that angels may take on in performing their missions to men, or the status of *incubi* and the offspring they allegedly may engender in union with human partners. Peter's discussion of the angelic attribute of free will, defined as the capacity to choose good or evil without violence or constraint, affords him the first opportunity to consider free will. The definition of it he gives here is one he extends to free will in prelapsarian man as well. He is less interested in how angels know what they know. With respect to the angelic hierarchy, Peter expands on it to embrace not only gradations of function but also gradations in the angelic nature itself. While he holds that all angels are equal in possessing personhood, immortality, and a simple and immaterial nature, he thinks that they also possess different grades of tenuousness and different degrees of wisdom and will.

In exercising the latter faculties in their decision to fall or not to fall, the angels, for Peter, are dependent on divine grace. The good angels remain loyal to God thanks to their cooperation with the grace God gives them. The fallen angels fall, not only because they choose to be malicious and disobedient, but also because God subtracts or withdraws His grace from them. This subtraction of grace from the fallen angels then becomes a permanent and

unalterable consequence of their fall. Lacking grace, their only option is to continue to make vicious choices, and thus to continue to merit their expulsion from Heaven. They are incapable of repenting or improving. On the other hand, the good angels are confirmed in goodness, and continue to receive grace. They do not have the *non posse peccare* as possessed by God. But they continue to choose to cooperate with grace and to grow in virtue. The fact that these two sets of angels now consistently will only evil and good, respectively, does not mean, for Peter, that their free will has been abrogated. Rather, it has been intensified. The angels of either sort now experience no conflicting desires. Thus, they will entirely what they want, without violence or constraint. Other than that, there is a basic lack of symmetry between them. The fallen angels cannot improve. The good angels do grow in virtue. Also, since they live in time, they continue to grow in knowledge as well, knowledge of the events that unfold in time. Peter draws a distinction here, with respect to the good angels. Their orientation toward the good, being confirmed in them, does not change. Likewise, in their contemplation of God, their knowledge does not change. The quality of their merit does not change. But the quantity of their cognition of temporal affairs, and the number of opportunities they have to express their virtue, do increase over the course of time. By means of this distinction Peter accomplishes two objectives at the same time. His distinction between the quality and quantity of virtue in the good angels sets up the terms in which he is going to discuss the human Christ as a moral agent in Book 3 of the *Sentences*. And, his argument that the angels continue to grow in virtue and knowledge, despite their confirmation in the good and their possession of a pure and simple spiritual nature, enables him to distinguish between these exponents of the highest and best of the spiritual creation and the creator, a God Who is eternally omniscient, good, and immutable. Despite their nature and their excellence, angels, as creatures, lack these divine attributes. Thus, in addition to his fidelity to the concerns agitating contemporaries on this subject, Peter's angelology is connected organically to his doctrine of God, just as it has links to his Christology and to his understanding of free will and grace and their ultimate outcomes in Last Things, in the case of men.

The theological agenda concerning man before the fall was a less clear one, in Peter's day. His own handling of this subject offers a striking reorientation of it, dominated by his desire to de-Platonize anthropology and to consider human nature as such, as an important topic in its own right. This interest leads Peter to reflect at

length on human nature before the fall, in a manner that is often quite speculative, given the leanness of the biblical data and the fact that fallen man is now the only kind of man available for empirical study.

Most of the theologians of Peter's time give pride of place to the soul of prelapsarian man, its faculties and attributes. They have far less to say about the human body before the fall. In this connection, they focus primarily on human sexuality. In treating human nature they typically distinguish between male and female nature, regarding Eve as inferior to Adam in mind, in body, or in both. Peter's own handling of this subject reflects a distaste for these extremes of subordinationism, both of woman to man and of the body to the soul. He holds that creation in God's image and likeness applies to all human beings regardless of their sex. All human souls resemble God in their possession of reason, will, immortality, and indivisibility; in their natural capacity for virtue; and in their possession of the Trinitarian analogy of memory, intellect, and will. He sees the similarities between the human soul and God as operational as well as structural. The differing modes by which Adam and Eve were created do not imply or entail an intrinsic hierarchy between man and woman. Rather, these differences speak to their consubstantiality and equality in the bond of marital love that unites them. It is primarily the physical and metaphysical implications of Eve's creation, rather than the moral or matrimonial, that interest Peter.

Dismissing the claim that the investigation of human nature before the fall is a matter of vain curiosity, he concurs with the idea that human sexuality is the chief topic to be considered under the heading of man's physical nature. Agreeing that prelapsarian man had the capacity to die or not to die, and the ordinary functions of life in the body, such as the need to eat and drink, he places human sexuality in the same naturalistic perspective. He agrees with the consensus position framed against Origen by Augustine which states that the sexual procreation of offspring was part of God's original plan and that, before the fall, its exercise would have been free from lust and fully under the rational and volitional control of Adam and Eve. Peter annexes the procreation, gestation, birth, and growth of offspring to man's other natural processes, as goods that are part of the creation, not punishments for sin. Likewise, growth in knowledge and virtue are natural human aptitudes which would have continued in Eden. In Peter's view, while man before the fall had the rational capacity to distinguish good from evil, the capacity to choose freely between them, a knowledge of the other creatures and why they had been created, self-knowledge, and an awareness

of God's presence, these prelapsarian aptitudes were just that, aptitudes. They were not perfections, but capacities through which Adam and Eve could have been translated to a higher state of wisdom and virtue. Peter describes two faculties in the human soul. There is the sensual soul, an inferior power of the soul which man shares with the animals, and which he uses to regulate the body and to dispose of temporal matters. The rational soul is the superior power of the soul, the intelligence which enables man to grasp higher things, whether scientific or contemplative. Although Peter divides reason, in its exercise, into the functions of knowledge and wisdom, his bipartite faculty psychology is an unusual one, for his time. As for man's will, Peter gives it the same treatment as he accords to the angelic will. Prelapsarian man had the natural capacity to choose good or evil without violence or constraint. A twofold process is involved here, which basically parallels Peter's analysis of grace and free will in the life of postlapsarian man. In each case, an initial grace is given by God, although, in the case of Adam, it is the grace of creation while in the case of fallen man it is the operating grace needed to help him turn away from sin. This distinction aside, acceptance of the initial grace, in each case, enables man, whether before or after the fall, to go on to collaborate with God's cooperating grace in the development of virtue and merit. To be sure, Adam also lacked a burden borne by fallen man, the inclination to sin. None the less, the choice of evil, for Adam as well, was the only moral choice he could make with complete autonomy, purely on the basis of his natural endowment of free will.

This evil choice, Peter agrees, is the one that in fact was made by the primal parents. The Lombard has a very definite view of the motivations leading to that choice, the faculties through which it was activated in Adam and Eve, the consequences they suffered as a result, and the mode by which original sin is passed on to the rest of mankind. His account of the fall leads Peter to propound two inconsistencies concerning the two primal sinners. Although, as noted above, he insists on the metaphysical, moral, and intellectual equality of Adam and Eve, he argues that the devil tempted Eve first because she was less rational than Adam. This external tempter makes an appeal, in Eve's case, to the internal temptations of vainglory, gluttony, and avarice and, in particular, to her immoderate and presumptuous desire for knowledge. Peter situates this analysis of Eve's fall in the more general context of his psychogenesis of moral choice. It is not the temptation to sin itself, be it external or internal, or the contemplation of the temptation, but the rational consent to sin that counts. Notwithstanding his claim of

Eve's rational inferiority, Peter does not think that her responsibility for capitulating to sin is any less than Adam's. Indeed, he finds her the more culpable of the two, even though he thinks that original sin can be imputed to Adam more seriously. Eve may not have been as intelligent as Adam, but she cannot be excused on grounds of ignorance. She was intelligent enough to understand what God required. Her state, like that of Adam, displayed neither invincible nor vincible ignorance, a topic that Peter includes here only for the purpose of disqualifying ignorance of any kind as a mitigating factor in the fall. Both Adam and Eve sinned consciously. But each exercised a different aspect of the rational faculty in so doing. Eve's sin was a function of consent made through knowledge. She sought to enjoy knowledge as an end in itself. This sin is serious; but it is not so serious as the sin of Adam, which was a function of consent to sin made through wisdom. Now, wisdom, the highest exercise of the rational faculty, involves more than knowledge. It involves the capacity to place knowledge in the context of man's ultimate destiny. It must hence rule over knowledge. Adam's sin was thus more serious, even if Eve's motivation was more reprehensible, and even though she was just as responsible for her sin as Adam was for his. For, he failed to take the wider perspective into account and he failed to govern Eve, thus bringing mortality on both of them and on the entire human race. While Eve can be reckoned the greater sinner because of her greater presumption, Adam bears the greater guilt because he sinned more profoundly, with a more comprehensive faculty of the mind, and with disastrous results that are universal.

In considering the consequences of original sin, while Peter notes that it brought with it physical suffering and death, the removal of man's capacity to exercise his sexual functions without lust, concupiscence understood more generally, and ignorance, the particular effect that he emphasizes above all others is the depression of the will. Man's free will, for Peter, is partially lost in the fall; and, what remains is weakened. While the Lombard staunchly holds that man still possesses a conscience that inclines him to seek the good and avoid evil and while man still remains free to reject grace, he argues that fallen man no longer is free from necessity. The freedom to choose good or evil without violence or constraint has gone by the boards. Man now has an inclination to sin which undercuts his freedom. Man continues to need grace in order to will the good. In postlapsarian man, grace is not a substitute for free will. What it does, in conjunction with free will, is enable the free will to be a good will. But the choice of the good that it enables man to make is

not just a choice of the good; it is a choice of the good in the face of a tidal pull drawing him toward evil, with which prelapsarian man did not have to contend. Aside from freedom from necessity and freedom from an existing state of sin, man before the fall had freedom from misery. This latter freedom has been lost to all men by the fall, since no one now can avoid suffering and death. In sum, for Peter, the will after the fall, like the will before the fall, is completely free and completely autonomous only in willing evil. But, it has now lost the freedom not to incline toward evil which man possessed before the fall. Peter stops well short of taking the late Augustinian line that man must, necessarily, will evil unless prevented by God, and that God's prevenient grace is irresistible. Inclination, for Peter, is not the same thing as necessity; and man can resist grace. Fallen man is less free in willing the good than in willing evil, and is less free in willing the good with God's assistance than he was before the fall. Man now needs operating or prevenient grace, which helps him to turn away from sin and prepares him for virtue, and cooperating grace, which works with his free will thereafter. Free will is as essential a condition as grace in both stages of this process. Peter holds that there can be no merit where there is no liberty of will. But the human will now operates under different, and more difficult, conditions of labor. The major continuity between Peter's understanding of the relations between grace and free will before and after the fall is that, in both situations, both grace and free will are required. And, in both situations, man cannot acquire virtue and merit without both grace and free will, virtue and merit that then become characteristics inhering in the moral personality of the human agent. In both situations, as well, Peter views the interaction of grace and free will synergistically. Each provides the operative conditions for its collaborator. Grace comes first, to be sure, empowering the will to do the good. But what it excites and heals is a natural human faculty which then becomes the agency through which the moral subject acquires human virtue and merit.

Peter firmly believes that when that happy outcome occurs, those elected to respond to grace will enjoy a glory far greater than the happiness of Adam and Eve before the fall. But the fall, and its consequences, as they are conveyed to the rest of the human race by the primal sinners, constitute the rocky road that the Christian must traverse while he is still *in via*. How that regrettable condition is passed on from parent to child, especially given the fact that Peter sees the depression of the will as its main consequence, is a highly problematic question. Peter is staunchly anti-traducianist.

The parents, he holds, transmit only the body to their offspring. It is God Who directly creates each person's soul. The soul is good as a result of its divine creation. It contains the rational faculties, free will included. How, then, can the parents transmit the guilt, the punishment for sin, and the inclination to sin that spring from or are consequences of the consent of the will to a soul that they do not create themselves in their children?

Like everyone else in his period, Peter finds himself forced to address this intractable problem with the weapons forged by Augustine's theory of the transmission of original sin through the sexual mode of generation ordained by God for the procreation of offspring. After the fall, it was agreed by Augustine and his followers, however reluctantly, spouses would no longer be able to engender offspring without the desire and pleasure accompanying sexual relations. This condition might be seen as a moral problem for the spouses themselves. But the fetus so engendered is not capable of experiencing these sexual feelings at the point when it is engendered. Peter deals with this objection by answering that what the parents necessarily convey to their offspring is not the sexual feelings that they personally may experience in the act of conception. Rather, what they pass on is a flesh that has been corrupted as a consequence of the fall, along the lines of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. This must occur, perforce, because their own bodies have been weakened as a result of the fall; and, genetically, their own vitiated physical endowment is the only one they have to pass on to their children. This vitiated body bears with it the inclination to sin. In due course, it will make the sexuality of their children incapable of functioning without lust. Moreover, thanks to the intimate union between the human body and the human soul, the vitiated body inherited from the parents will fuse with the innocent God-given soul in the womb and corrupt that soul as well.

For Peter, the fact that the parents are baptized Christians themselves who have been cleansed of original sin, and spouses united in holy matrimony who come together for the goods of marriage and whose sexual feelings are therefore free from any imputation of sin, does mitigate the concupiscence of the parents. This exemption, in his estimation, is a real one. Yet, enough concupiscence remains to inspire them to the sexual union that, unavoidably, transmits a corrupted body to their child which, in turn, corrupts his soul. Whether Peter has completely resolved the problems stemming from the Augustinian account of the transmission of original sin or not, and the question remains moot, he is

forthright in his acceptance of that account and circumspect in recognizing the kinds of objections that can be, and had been, raised against it. He can see no other way to explain the transmission of original sin, and, with it, the universal necessity of baptism for salvation. Nor can he see much reason for essaying an alternative analysis. The account that he himself offers, in his own eyes, has, at least, the signal merit of reinforcing the major point he makes about the nature of man. Man is an integral unit of body and soul. It was as a unit of body and soul that man was created. It was as a unit of body and soul that he fell. It was, also, as a unit of body and soul that he was afflicted with the consequences of original sin. While the fall depresses the will more than any other faculty, it also vitiates the body. The negative side of the intimate union of body and soul in man is that this vitiated body then afflicts the soul to which it is joined and corrupts it as well. At the same time, it is as an integral unit of body and soul that man will be redeemed and glorified. This fundamental reality controls, for Peter, God's chosen mode of redemption for man in the incarnation of Christ. It also controls God's ordinance for the extension of Christ's saving work in the ethical and sacramental life of the church.

There are three main areas in the field of Christology on which the Lombard takes a clear stand, areas that are logically and theologically interrelated in his thought, although the nature of his contribution to western theology differs in each of the cases. The first of these is the hypostatic union. In this area there were three prevailing opinions at the time, the *assumptus homo* theory, the subsistence theory, and the *habitus* theory, all inherited from the patristic period and all finding contemporary adherents. Peter acknowledges that they all have support in the Christian tradition. He also finds something to criticize in all of them. His contribution in this field of Christology is to lay out clearly how these opinions are to be understood and, from his own perspective, why they are all problematic. He refuses to choose among them, concluding that the most prudent course of action is to leave the matter open, pending further investigation. In the second subdivision of Christology, Christ's human nature, and, in particular, His psychology, His human knowledge, and His moral aptitudes, Peter maintains a definite positive position. Against the tendency of some theologians to divinize the human Christ, in effect, he seeks to stress the full consubstantiality of the human Christ with the rest of the human race. At the same time, and this constitutes the single most massive inconsistency in Peter's theology as a whole, he endows the human Christ with a psychology that is quasi-superhuman. In the third

area of Christology, the doctrine of Christ's saving work, Peter reflects a powerful contemporary tendency, visible in his ethics as well, to accent the internalizing of the Christian message in the lives of believers. This orientation leads him to join thinkers of the time who reject both the "rights of the devil" understanding of the redemption as well as any effort to view it from a political, military, or forensic perspective. He emerges with a personal theology of the redemption which, while it retains an objective dimension in its view of what Christ accomplishes and what man receives, accents the subjective side of the transaction, both in Christ's inner disposition and in the appropriation of His saving work in man that it makes possible.

Peter's handling of the first of these problems, the hypostatic union, is thoroughly informed by the clarification, with respect to theological language, that he had brought to bear on the doctrine of God and on human nature. His distinction, in the Trinity, of personhood as the relations of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit vis-à-vis each other, in contrast to the divine essence, substance, and nature which They all commonly share, enables him to specify what the divine contribution to the hypostatic union is, while his view of human nature as involving the integral substantial union of body and soul helps him to explain the human contribution to it as well. These same lexical clarifications assist him not only in describing the hypostatic union looked at from a constitutional point of view, but also serve him in dealing with the incarnate Christ's behavior during His earthly life.

Reminding his readers that the work of any one person of the Trinity *ad extra* is the work of the divine nature that inheres equally in all of its members, even though the assignment may be delegated to a particular Trinitarian person, he observes that the Word joins the divine nature to human nature in the person of the Son, just as the divine task of accomplishing the incarnation in the Virgin Mary is delegated to the Holy Spirit. In explaining what the Word took on, Peter stresses three points. In the first place, and seeking to avoid Adoptionism, he emphasizes the point that the human Christ was not a man already in existence prior to His union with the Word, a man possessing a human person. For, this would make the incarnate Christ an individual with two persons, an idea which, for Peter, is a contradiction in terms. Equally unacceptable would be the formation of a composite, semi-divine and semi-human person out of the union of the two natures. This, too, would be impossible because the person of the Word, being divine, is, by definition, simple and immutable. Thus, rather than taking on a preexisting

human nature or human person, the Word took on a human body and a human soul, infrasubstantial ingredients that go to make up a human nature, which were not yet in existence and which had not yet been joined together until they were simultaneously created and united with each other and with the person of the Son. In this union, the Word took on the human body through the mediation of the human soul. Peter takes sharp exception to the idea that the substance of the human Christ, that is, the union of a human body and a human soul in Him, can be conflated with the idea that He had a human person. It is the proponents of that conflation, he points out, who make themselves vulnerable to the charge of Christological nihilianism in rejecting the notion that Christ had a human person.

Secondly, Peter stresses the point that the man Jesus was a specific, historic, human being. In taking on a human nature, the Word did not unite Himself with an abstraction. This principle is firmly linked to Peter's soteriology. Only a God-man Who was a specific individual could perform Christ's saving work. Thirdly, and of equal importance to Peter for equally strong soteriological reasons, the human nature of the individual man Jesus is the same as that of the rest of mankind. Otherwise, the ability of this God-man to extend the benefits of His redemption to the whole human race would be severely compromised. Thus, Peter holds that the Word was joined to human nature both in the sense of being joined to a concrete human being and in the sense of being joined to humanity in general. Both aspects of this union are critical. The exception to Christ's identity with the rest of the human race as it currently exists lies in His exemption from original sin. Given Peter's understanding of the transmission of original sin, which, as he sees it, involves the passing on of corrupted genetic materials as well as the presence of lust in the engendering of offspring, this exemption must also be extended to the Virgin Mary as well, and at some unspecified time prior to the moment when she conceived Christ. This dogmatic imperative provides an opening for pushing back the moment when the Virgin's exemption took place. The Lombard's theology of the hypostatic union thus has implications for the development of western Mariology.

Peter's positive doctrine of the incarnation informs the way that he understands the three prevailing opinions on the hypostatic union, and explains why he finds all of them defective. As he sees it, the *assumptus homo* theory, in emphasizing the intimate union between the divinity and humanity of Christ, in effect absorbs the human nature into the divine nature in such a way as to blur the

distinction between the two natures which proponents of this theory claim to be defending. The chief problem with the subsistence theory is similar, although it arises out of a different estimate of what occurs in the hypostatic union. Proponents of that theory maintain that this union produces a composite person, and, in some quarters as well, a composite of three substances, divinity, a human body, and a human soul. Given his own understanding of human nature, Peter objects to the idea that the body and soul, the infrasubstantial components that combine to make up a human nature, can each be described as a substance. More problematic still is the idea of a mixed or duplex person. This would entail the alteration, and dilution, of the simple and immutable divine personhood of Christ. Also, were He a composite person, the incarnate Word would introduce a fourth member into the Trinity, side by side with, but not equal in divinity with, the Word as unmanifested. In any case, no person, by definition, can be understood as made up of parts. *A fortiori*, this is true of the Word, Who has been and Who remains a "whole" person from all eternity and Who does not require the incarnation for His completion. As Peter presents the *habitus* theory, according to which the Word took on human nature like a habit, or garment, which conforms to the shape of the person wearing it, he sees it as overemphasizing the divinity of Christ at the expense of His humanity. As with the *assumptus homo* theory, the humanity is conformed to the divinity and the human Christ is thereby divinized. But, where the *assumptus homo* theory views that process as a substantial one, the *habitus* theory regards it as a purely spatial and adventitious one. From Peter's standpoint, this conclusion is equally alarming, for it suggests that Christ's humanity is not integrally united with His divinity once it is taken on, and that it remains accidental and partible. Indeed, proponents of the *habitus* theory did teach that the incarnate Christ laid aside His human nature, in between His death and His resurrection, a claim that Peter vigorously opposes.

Difficulties therefore exist, for him, in all three opinions, although it can be said that he finds the subsistence theory the thorniest of the three. While some readers in the twelfth century, and even today, have failed to take seriously Peter's advice that the matter not be foreclosed prematurely, this counsel was, to a large extent, accepted in his own century. Further research and reflection did, in the event, take place, permitting a consensus on the hypostatic union to emerge in the thirteenth century in a field where no consensus existed in the Lombard's day. This topic is the crispest index imaginable of Peter's espousal of the generally held

twelfth-century view that Christian orthodoxy does not have to be monolithic, even on very basic issues. As Peter's handling of the hypostatic union indicates, *diversi, sed non adversi* is a real and operational guideline for him, delineating the working conditions under which he thinks theologians of good will should labor.

While, as a theologian of the hypostatic union, Peter is consistent, and insistent, on the point that the divinity and humanity of Christ were integrally united, that the union was not partible, and not accidental, and that neither the divinity nor the humanity was altered thereby, it has to be said that he does not push the latter conviction to its ultimate logical conclusion in treating the nature of the human Christ. On the one hand, Peter stresses that Christ's body and soul were fully human, consubstantial with those of His mother and those of all other human beings. While His conception was miraculous, He underwent gestation, birth, physical growth and development from infancy to adulthood, just as all other human beings do. He lived at a particular time and place in history; He was capable, as a man, of being predestined; and He was endowed with a sexual nature, in this case a masculine one, although Peter sees this choice on God's part not as necessary but as useful in the light of the *morés* of the community into which He was born. In all these ways, Peter asserts the full humanity of Christ, over against theologians who argued that His humanity was divinized accidentally or substantially by its union with the Word.

At the same time, Peter's treatment of Christ's human knowledge and His moral aptitudes endows Him with a psychology that is more than human. To be sure, these endowments are gifts of grace, not Christ's natural human inheritance, as he sees it; but they exempt Christ from the intellectual and volitional processes which other human beings undergo in acquiring knowledge and in making ethical decisions. While he is scarcely as extreme here as are other masters of the day, Peter assents to the proposition that Christ, as a man, enjoyed a fullness of grace and wisdom from the moment of His conception. His wisdom is created wisdom, and not the uncreated wisdom possessed by the Word. But, not only did the human Christ know everything that God knows, He never had to undergo a learning process. The most that Peter will concede here is that, although the quantity of knowledge possessed by the human Christ was the same as God's, He knew what He knew less exhaustively than God knows what He knows. Also, unlike God, the human Christ could not translate everything He knew into fact. This is certainly a knowledge far transcending the knowledge possessed, at least potentially, by Adam before the fall.

The same must be said of Peter's estimate of the moral condition and aptitudes of the human Christ. Christ was exempted from original sin, although He voluntarily took on some of its consequences, such as mortality, and the ability to feel hunger, thirst, exhaustion, pain, affection, and fear. These consequences of sin Christ took on because they were expedient for Him. They were essential to His mission and did not derogate from His dignity. On the other hand, He did not take on the major consequences of original sin, ignorance, concupiscence, and the depression of free will. In these respects, the human Christ as Peter presents Him was not like the rest of mankind in all but sin. To be sure, it could be argued that prelapsarian man was capable of making moral decisions unhampered by the ignorance, concupiscence, and the constraints on free will under which fallen man must labor. But Peter gives the human Christ a psychology of ethical decision-making different from Adam's. Adam, like all men, underwent a three-step process, involving temptation, the contemplation of temptation, and the conscious consent that is the essence of the moral act. According to Peter, however, Christ experienced only the contemplation of the temptation and the consent stages. At the same time, and inconsistently so, Peter maintains that Christ really experienced the temptations set before Him by the devil, as well as the temptation to despair during His passion, experiences which the Lombard regards as critical in enabling Christ to know and to empathize with the human weaknesses that He came to heal. Peter's human Christ lacks the defective knowledge that leads to sin. He does not experience temptation in the psychogenesis of His moral decisions. His flesh does not lust against His spirit. Hence, in the exercise of His fully free will, Christ at all times chose to bring His human will into perfect conformity with the will of God. Hence, He always possessed perfect virtue, marked especially by the notes of obedience and humility. The impulse to grant that the human Christ be given worship, and not just veneration, while it reflects Peter's awareness that, even here, a distinction must be observed between the creature and the creator, also reflects the fact that the human Christ he envisions is actually more than human.

If Peter's treatment of the human Christ accents His functional differences from other men more than His constitutional similarities with them, his doctrine of the atonement, one very much his own, draws on both of these ideas. Peter takes a firm stand in opposition to the externalist and politically or militarily envisioned doctrine that Christ's saving work was to free mankind from the power of the devil, whether that power is seen as just or unjust. He

also opposes, just as vigorously, the critique of the "rights of the devil" position offered by Anselm of Canterbury, holding it to be just as externalist as the "rights of the devil" account in that Anselm sees Christ's saving work as the changing of God's mind about man thanks to the imputation of His own merits to man, enabling man to rectify his account with God and to repay a debt justly owed, but without man's inner life being changed thereby. Instead, Peter warmly embraces the countervailing tendency to ignore the category of justice and to see Christ's redemption as effecting a change in man himself, and adds his own personal coloration to this teaching.

As he sees it, the atonement has both an objective and a subjective dimension. On the objective side of the account, the key point he makes is that Christ possessed all the virtues perfectly, especially obedience and humility. Christ's ethical merit is total. At all times in His earthly life, His will was in accord with that of the Father, so that nothing He did, up to and including His crucifixion, could have improved His virtue in the Father's sight. Here the distinction between the quality of virtue and the quantity of virtue that Peter draws in discussing the good angels also comes into play. From this perspective, the crucifixion of Christ merely gave Him an opportunity to display the perfect obedience and humility that He had always had. Startling as is this claim, Peter makes it in order to explain why God chose this particular mode of redemption, although, as he had noted under the heading of his doctrine of God, He was in no sense constrained to do so. While the passion and crucifixion did not enhance the quality of Christ's merit in the eyes of God, the drama and pathos of His heart-rending sacrifice is critical from the standpoint of man. Christ, in offering this electrifying expression of His love for man, provides an affective catalyst that is essential for man's appropriation of the redemption subjectively. Christ's saving work revolutionizes man's heart and changes man's mind, enabling him to respond in love to God and to his fellow man. Christ's role is to change man's inner being, his inner moral orientation. This change empowers man to think, feel, and act with charity, to accept God's grace and to work with it voluntarily. This appropriation of Christ's death justifies man, for Peter, not by transferring unearned merits to man that clear his debt with God and not by changing God's mind about man, but by changing man's mind and by exciting charity in his soul.

Peter does not fail to address the "rights of the devil" debate, and drastically subjectivizes this whole idea. As he sees it, the devil is not an external power whom Christ defeats on the passive battleground of the human soul. The devil, rather, is nothing other than

man's own internal slavery to sin, from which the new power to love inflamed in man's heart by Christ enables him to liberate himself. The devil, Peter observes, remains a psychological reality even after that liberation has taken place, in the form of the temptations that continue to afflict redeemed and justified mankind. Once again, it is the power to love unleashed in man's soul by Christ, in their continuing relationship, that enables the redeemed to resist temptation. For Peter, just as the fall leads to the depression of the will, so the redemption, when subjectively appropriated, restores a measure of the radical freedom to choose good or evil without constraint possessed by man before the fall. While some inclination to sin will still be present in the redeemed, the appropriation of Christ's saving work in man relaxes the pressure to choose evil under which man had labored as fallen and unredeemed. We may note that this relaxation of the *fomes peccati* is an objective consequence of Christ's saving work, and that it is efficacious only when that saving work is appropriated subjectively, a relationship that will reappear in Peter's sacramental theology. Although the inclination to sin is weakened in the redeemed, it is still present in their lives. In this sense, the devil is not completely vanquished by the cross, but his power is significantly reduced. What is equally important, the devil's power is dramatically reinterpreted by Peter as a function of man's own internal psychology of sin.

The merits which Christ possesses, and which He offers to man in lifting man's guilt and punishment for sin, are real and objective. At the same time, Christ makes this release efficacious within the human soul by empowering an equally real inner conversion, in which man's soul is active, and not a passive terrain on which contending armies clash or advocates offer briefs. Christ's virtue is exemplary for man; but it is also efficacious in inspiring the change of heart that will enable the redeemed to develop their own virtues and to acquire their own merits, in collaboration with divine grace. It is through His human mortality, which Christ's virtue led Him to offer up on the cross, that He accomplishes this aspect of man's redemption. It is through His divine immortality that He is able to grant eternal life and posthumous glory to man. In Peter's view, this is why the Father ordained man's redemption by means of a God-man, given the fact that He could have ordained it some other way. Yet, what gives the Lombard's soteriology its own distinctive cast is his ability to unite an objective understanding of the atonement, based on Christ's nature and action both as God and as man, with a subjective understanding of the atonement, based on a psychological and existential reading of the moral change that

Christ's human love and human virtue inspire in man. Peter's accent on Christ's humility, as His most paramount and efficacious virtue, is consistent with his view that humility is needed to supply the sufficient corrective to the pride that brought about the fall. So important is this point, for Peter, that he takes the unusual step of regarding the crucifixion as unnecessary, except for its unique capacity to provoke an emotional response from man. The enabling act which Christ performs within man's heart is also what allows Peter to marginalize and to internalize the "rights of the devil" theory and, in effect, to remove it from the agenda of scholastic theology. This accomplishment, and the rest of his account of Christ's saving work, are related organically to his stress on intentionality in his moral teaching and to his effort to balance the objective with the subjective in his sacramentology, as the continuing relationship between man and God specified by Christ's atonement works its way through the Christian life.

This point brings us next to ethics, although it has to be said that Peter's handling of that subject is not necessarily presented as a logical corollary of Christ's atonement. His ethical teaching is marked by a serious organizational disjunction, and one that requires a certain amount of repetition on his part, in that he treats the vices and the psychogenesis of sin under the heading of man's nature as created and man's fall, while he discusses the virtues primarily under the heading of the moral capacities and achievements of the human Christ. In that latter location he considers the theological virtues, the cardinal virtues, and the virtues understood as the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The question of ethical intentionality in its relation to sins and virtues appears as well in connection with his treatment of a number of the sacraments, while the relations between grace and free will in man's ethical life crop up in several contexts. Peter's decision to place virtue largely under the rubric of the moral aptitudes of the human Christ is not without its difficulties, given the fact that he endows the human Christ with a greater than human psychology. The Lombard is sensitive to this problem and seeks to correct for it by discussing the virtues as such before considering Christ's possession of them. This tactic, however, is not in the end fully responsive to the question of how Christ can be seen as a moral exemplar for man. That problem aside, and notwithstanding the repetition which his chosen mode of organizing his ethical doctrine entails, there is a good deal of consistency in what Peter has to say on this subject. If that consistency is notable, however, it is not total. There is one major point on which he gives with one hand and takes with the other, the question of whether

natural virtue is possible. And, he leaves unexplained what connection there is between human reason as an endowment of nature and the knowledge and wisdom that are gifts of the Holy Spirit.

On the face of it, the bulk of the evidence would suggest a clear negative answer to the question concerning the virtuous pagan, for one of the earmarks of Lombardian ethics is the principle that all meritorious acts require the interaction between free will and grace. This principle extends backwards from man as redeemed, justified, and sanctified in the ecclesiastical dispensation to man before the fall and even to the angels. At the same time, the second central attribute of Peter's ethics is his stress on voluntary consent as the essence of the ethical act and on intentionality as the critical determinant of the moral agent's moral status. While he seeks to provide an objective ethical norm as well, holding that some acts are intrinsically immoral, and while he thinks that good intentions ordinarily need to be translated into good, and appropriate, actions, he also holds that inner intentionality remains of the essence, present or absent its external expression. He also holds that the capacity to possess a good will is a generic human possibility.

This latter point is reinforced by Peter's agreement with the three-part analysis of the psychogenesis of ethical decision-making standard in his time. Whether using the language of *passio*, *propassio*, and *consensus* or that of *suggestio*, *delectatio*, and *consensus*, he agrees that there is temptation, internal or external, the entertaining of the temptation, and the conscious and voluntary decision to reject it or to succumb to it. Inner intellectual consent is where sin and virtue lie, not in the outward manifestation of that consent. The active exercise of volition is critical, for Peter. When it comes to sin, this conviction leads him to dismiss the privative theory of evil and to invoke the theme of the willed fall into the *regio dissimilitudinis*, in which man deliberately rejects the image of God in himself. To be sinful, an act must manifest an evil intention. At the same time, intentions cannot be severed from the ends they serve. One cannot, therefore, serve an objectively good end by wrongdoing. Peter's strong intentionalism is thus qualified by the principle that a good intention cannot inform a bad end or an action that is unconditionally prohibited, or one that conflicts with the moral subject's acknowledged moral duties. As noted, Peter considers the question of ignorance, its modes, and the degree to which it mitigates or removes moral culpability under the heading of the fall, essentially as a means of ruling it out as an extenuating circumstance in the case of Adam and Eve. He does not reimport this theme into his analysis of ethical intentionality, of the way in which a person

identifies ends as morally good or bad, or of the quality of his grasp of what is categorically prohibited or required in his own case. Peter's handling of these topics might have been enriched had he done so. But, before he leaves this point, he acknowledges that good deeds require good faith. Leaving aside faith here as a theological virtue, which would require consent to specifically Christian teachings, he agrees that good faith means the absence of hypocrisy as well as good intentions in a positive sense, and concedes that non-Christians are capable of expressing it, in their own virtues and in their service to their neighbors inspired by natural piety. The virtuous pagan rears his head here, however briefly.

While Peter agrees with other intentionalists, ancient and modern, that vice, and virtue, spring respectively from a vicious or a virtuous intention, he does not think that all sins or virtues are equal or that intentions or actions in either category can be collapsed into each other. He grades the sins as more or less serious. Seriousness is determined by the nature of the vice that inspires them; by whether they are sins committed against self, neighbor, or God; by whether they occur in thought, word, or deed, or all three; by whether they are crimes as well as sins; and by whether they involve the active perpetration of evil or the passive failure to do good. The intrinsic nature of the sin, and the extent of the harm it does, are the criteria, for Peter, rather than the degree of deliberation involved. This analysis yokes the standard seven deadly sins with the understanding of how they engender each other in the psyche of the sinner, which was a common inheritance of the time from Gregory the Great. In agreement with that tradition, Peter sees pride as the most serious sin and the sins of the flesh as less important than the sins of the intellect. Sins, of whatever type, are entirely accountable to the people who commit them. Both Peter's dismissal of the privative theory of evil and his disinterest in considering how ignorance may limit moral responsibility point to his desire to place the burden of sin squarely man's shoulders, and to emphasize the point that the creator, Who endowed man with the freedom to sin, is in no sense to be charged with man's evil use of that freedom.

As we have already seen, despite the common thread of intentionalism that binds vice to virtue in Peter's ethics, his treatment of virtue, as a pendant or alternative to vice, is not and cannot be symmetrical with his analysis of vice, in that men can and do sin purely on their own initiative, while virtuous choices and actions require collaboration between free will and grace, both operating and cooperating grace since the fall. Both forms of grace can be

rejected by man. When he accepts grace and works with it, man can acquire virtue. Peter defines virtue as a good quality of the mind, inclining it to live rightly and not to use anything badly. In this stage of his analysis, virtue is seen not primarily as what the moral subject acquires by means of upright moral activity but rather as a disposition of the mind to such activity. Both grace and free will are needed to activate this disposition. In exploring their relations, Peter develops an agricultural analogy. Grace is like the rain; free will is like the earth; virtue as a disposition of the mind is like a seed. The fruit borne by the seed, the other necessary conditions obtaining, is virtue in the sense of the good intentions and actions that ornament the soul of the moral subject and that are accounted meritorious in him.

Peter treats grace and free will as enabling conditions that work simultaneously, and synergistically, upon man's natural moral inclinations, rather than from the standpoint of cause and effect. An important consequence of his doctrine of grace and free will, which provides the conceptual model that he also uses for the gifts of the Holy Spirit as virtues, is that it allows him to preserve and to develop, in his ethics, an *idée maîtresse* found throughout his theology, most notably in his doctrine of God: God's interaction with His creation, whether in the order of nature or in the order of grace, preserves the distinction between God as the transcendent supreme being and His effects in His mission *ad extra*. Neither God's grace, nor even the gifts of the Holy Spirit, afford man a participation in the divine nature. The virtues and merits which that grace or those gifts assist man in acquiring are, and remain, purely human attributes, spiritual characteristics of the moral subject in whom they inhere. In rewarding such a meritorious person, God rewards that person; He does not reward Himself. The human being so transformed by the acquisition of virtue is not divinized thereby. Rather, he reacquires his full humanity, the image of God in himself lost in his earlier state of sinful fall into the *regio dissimilitudinis*.

In handling the three categories of virtue that he treats specifically, Peter displays more interest in the theological virtues than in the cardinal virtues or in the gifts of the Holy Spirit as virtues. His handling of the cardinal virtues is quite abbreviated. It reflects no interest in considering them from the perspective of any of the available philosophical definitions of them, whether Platonic, Aristotelian, or Stoic. Nor does Peter show any interest in redefining them in Christian terms, on either an Ambrosian, an Augustinian, or a Gregorian basis. He does not treat them as natural virtues. For, he states that they were possessed by Adam before the fall,

when all virtue required the collaboration of grace. The chief point that Peter wants to make about these virtues concerns their perdurance beyond the Christian's life *in via* into the *patria* in the next life. In all cases, their posthumous manifestations will shift from the negative or disciplinary to the positive. Wisdom will propose God as the good; fortitude will cling to Him; temperance will enjoy Him unopposed; and justice will engage in the contemplation of the divine nature. Peter has no insight to offer about the relationship of the cardinal virtues to the theological virtues, on the one side, or to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, on the other, even though he places them, in his table of organization, between those two topics. This fact, as well as the extreme leanness of his account of the cardinal virtues, in the light of what the philosophical and patristic traditions had to offer on this subject, suggests that this was an area of Lombardian ethics ripe for subsequent development.

The one point of connection that Peter draws between the cardinal virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit is the idea of perdurance into the next life, along with the carryover of the positive features of the virtues in that transition. This notion informs Peter's treatment of holy fear, knowledge, and wisdom, the only three of these charisms which he considers in any detail. The theme of holy fear in this context is where he orchestrates the oft-cited distinction among servile fear, worldly fear, initial fear, and chaste or filial fear, as ethical attitudes and motivations. Peter takes a generous line on this subject. He treats initial fear not as fear of eternal punishment but as an inchoate love of God, which he thus sees as being on more of a continuum with filial fear, or reverence for God for His own sake, than is typically the case. This initial fear, he agrees, will no longer be needed in Heaven, where it will have been superseded by the filial fear which, he also agrees, Christ possessed perfectly in the *via* as well as the *patria*. Peter offers a parallel account of knowledge and wisdom. Reprising, to some extent, the distinction he had drawn between the different functions of the intellectual faculty in assigning guilt to Adam and Eve in the fall, he defines knowledge as the right ordering and administering of temporal things, with beatitude as their end, and the turning from evil to good things. Wisdom can be distinguished from knowledge, and also from understanding. Like wisdom, understanding addresses itself to invisible, spiritual realities. But it is concerned with the grasp of these realities in this life; so it, too, along with knowledge, will be superseded in the next life. Wisdom alone endures. To be sure, in this life, wisdom is concerned with the knowledge of God, and of creatures in Him, through the temporal thought processes

available to man *in via*. But, in the *patria*, wisdom will be able to contemplate these objects of knowledge without temporal constraints. Peter makes no effort to explain how, or if, these mental operations seen as gifts of the Holy Spirit are related to knowledge, understanding, and wisdom as natural functions of human reason tout court. The question of whether charismatic intervention is needed to activate man's mental faculties in some connections, but not in others, is a question that he does not take up, although this *locus* in Book 3 of the *Sentences* could provide a natural habitat for scholastics who might want to orchestrate that theme, in one way or another.

The major topic under the heading of the virtues that Peter is interested in addressing is the theological virtues. To be sure, one point of carryover we can see here between this sub-set of virtues and the other two is the notion that some virtues perdure, in more exalted form, while others are ordered to man's life *in via* and terminate once it is over. In this case, charity endures, while faith is replaced by sight and hope by the possession of the blessings hoped for in this life. It is not the urge to gloss the St. Paul of 1 Corinthians on this subject that animates Peter's extended discussion of the theological virtues, so much as the felt need to come to grips with the definition of faith, and, to a lesser extent, the desire to offer a policy statement on charity in action in this life. The definition of faith is certainly complicated by Peter's wish to ascribe this virtue to the human Christ, although, since He is deemed to have known everything that the Word knows, it is difficult to make a case for this claim. Also pressing is the need to locate faith as an epistemic state, inspired by the contemporary misunderstanding of Abelard's use of the term *existimatio* in this connection. Peter puts his stamp of approval on the Victorine resolution of this problem by agreeing that faith, the substance of things hoped for and the argument of things not seen, lies below knowledge that can be empirically proved and above opinion, owing to its certitude. He clarifies the point that the objects of knowledge addressed by faith as a theological virtue are religious ones, not available to the senses or the imagination. Another major issue that Peter wants to consider is the salvific character of faith. Here, he articulates the consensus view by distinguishing among faith, as intellectual assent to a body of theological propositions held to be true, faith as assent to what a person says because one has confidence in his trustworthiness, and the faith that saves. The latter involves adhesion to God in love and confidence and a faith that works in love. Peter acknowledges that the faith that saves may also be proportioned to the intellect and

education of the believer. But, in its content, it needs to embrace the propositions in the creed, however imperfectly they may be understood. Overall, the chief quality that Peter imparts to faith is to give equal attention to its nature as an epistemic state and its nature as a virtue, both in itself and in its informing of hope and charity.

Peter's remarks on hope are brief, and largely uncontroversial. He agrees that, unlike faith, the things hope addresses are all good things, not good as well as bad, and that, like faith, hope points to the future, to things unseen and not yet in our grasp. Thus, by definition, like faith, hope is incomplete in this life. As well, and as with faith, Peter grapples with the difficulties involved in arguing that the human Christ possessed the virtue of hope, despite His omniscience and His fullness of grace. As with faith, his proposal for resolving this problem is to withdraw, in Christ's case, the condition of incompleteness from hope, although that is part of its very definition. This effort is not a particularly successful one. Peter has far less trouble arguing that the human Christ possessed the greatest possible charity, and one that was as perfect, for Him, in the *via* as it was in the *patria*. This claim is, of course, central to his account of Christ's saving work and its ability to evoke the loving response of man in man's appropriation of it.

The same definition of charity, love of God for His own sake and love of self and neighbor for God's sake, applies to the charity that human beings are enjoined to develop, despite their constitutional inability to possess this virtue to the degree to which the human Christ did. Manifesting his general propensity for hierarchy, Peter posits four grades of charity, incipient, proficient, perfect, and most perfect, the latter descriptive of the saints in Heaven. As a gift of grace, charity, for Peter, remains, like all other charisms, an effect of God in His mission *ad extra* and not a participation of the divine nature in man. He resists the tendency to view those dwelling in charity as becoming so bonded to the Holy Spirit, understood as the love uniting the Father and the Son, that they become engrafted into the inner life of the Trinity. The principle of hierarchy also informs Peter's gradation of goods under the heading of charity, as a guide to how men should order their loves. We should love God the most, as the supreme good. We should love the souls of rational creatures next, for they have an eternal destiny. We should love the human body next, for it is intimately linked to the soul and it is destined, as well, for future glory. Therefore, its health and self-preservation in this life are legitimate goods. Finally, we should love those things that are below us in the creation, insofar as they

are conducive to the well-being of the body. This ladder of love recapitulates, from the standpoint of man's return to God, the metaphysical and moral hierarchy of the creation set forth by Peter at the beginning of Book 2 of the *Sentences*. Finally, there is the problem of charity understood as the practical assistance of other men, given the finitude of means at anyone's disposal. Departing from those who make the principle of need the only or the primary determinant, Peter adopts the criterion of relationship, starting with parents and moving to other relatives, members of one's household, neighbors, and compatriots, and ending with enemies. His inclusion of enemies is to be noted, stemming from his wish to support the biblical injunction to love one's enemies, and from his desire to emphasize that the sliding scale he proposes is grounded not merely in natural ties and natural responsibilities but in charity as a virtue expressing a commitment that transcends nature. It is charity in this wider sense that perdures, after our natural obligations in time are no more. While Peter is clearly willing to grade the outward expressions of charity, both by the closeness of blood ties and social relations and by the difficulty of its exercise in the case of enemies, and while he agrees that its *effectus* should be proportioned to the recipient, he holds that its inner, intentional *affectus* is the same in all cases, as controlled by the general definition of charity which he provides.

Peter concludes his consideration of ethics by exploring the moral precepts of the Old Law in relation to the New, treated as a general approach to the question of which Old Testament rules and practices merely prefigure Christian ones and which carry over into the new dispensation. This is also the context in which he develops an extended analysis of lying and of perjury, under the rubric of not bearing false witness. Peter's lengthy and extremely well documented treatment of lying emphasizes the point that a lie involves both objective untruth and a deceptive intention, and that lies are never justifiable, whatever the provocation or the good end one may be trying to serve in such a devious way. This single topic, in short, is designed to reinforce his more general position on the relations between ethical intentions and the ends they serve, and the relations between the objective dimension of ethics and subjective intentionality. Peter treats perjury as a pendant to his analysis of lying, in a parallel way, adding only the points that perjury is a lie sealed by an oath and that there are occasions when the lesser of the two evils is to break an oath. This topic, like that of the abrogation of the Old Law or its continuity in force, which ends his consideration of ethics, is placed at the end of Book 3 of the

Sentences, where his main subject is Christology. As has been noted, Peter's decision to treat virtues under the heading of the moral aptitudes of the human Christ leads to certain difficulties, in his effort to argue that Christ possessed virtues that seem inapposite in an individual who possessed a fullness of grace and wisdom at all times. Even more problematic is the inclusion of the material just referred to under the same Christological umbrella. The abrogation of the Old Law, or not, and the analysis of lying and perjury, have no manifest connection with the nature of Christ or the atonement as such. They point to the fact that Peter's schematic decisions, in the field of ethics, do not always make sense. The one, and the only, advantage of Peter's arrangement of his material at the end of Book 3 is that it permits him to introduce the rituals of the Old Testament as a transition to the sacraments, his subject in most of Book 4, and one on which he plans to take a distinct and vigorous stand in differentiating between these Old Testament rites and those of the New.

Peter's most important contribution to sacramental theology is his absorption and refinement of Hugh of St. Victor's redefinition of sacraments in general, not merely as visible signs of invisible grace, but as signs that resemble what they signify and, more important, as signs that contain and serve as physical media of divine grace and make it effective in the inner life of the recipient. It is on the basis of this Victorine definition of sacrament that Peter decisively rejects the Victorine claim that Old Testament rites, which the Lombard holds to be signs and signs only, are truly comparable with the efficacious, sanctifying, and salvific sacraments of the Christian church. In general, he holds that the sacraments were ordained as mediating an objective content of sanctifying grace, and as sanctifying the recipient by strengthening his soul, enhancing his moral education, and helping him to grow in virtue. According to Peter, sacraments contain and convey divine grace objectively thanks to their divinely ordained capacity to do so, assuming that the sacrament is administered in the appropriate way, by the appropriate minister, with the appropriate intention. The capacity of the recipient to receive and to make fruitful use of the grace mediated by the sacrament, in turn, is conditioned by the faith and intention that he brings to his reception of it. In addition to the particular form of remedy, or sanctification, or both, that particular sacraments impart, the sacraments promise a future heavenly good, and one that begins to be activated in the inner life of recipients in the here and now, by helping them to recover the image of God in themselves. Peter associates this understanding of

sacraments in general with Augustine's sign theory, a comparison designed to show how sacraments partake of both natural and conventional signification, and go beyond both, thanks to their status as efficacious signs. For Peter, the Christian's journey back from the *regio dissimilitudinis* of sin is concretely moved along, and not just signposted, by the sacraments. As extensions of Christ's saving work in time, the sacraments partake of the combination of objectivity and subjectivity that the Lombard sees in the atonement. The divine healing, cleansing, and strengthening that they contain is objective; and it is made operational by the recipient's subjective disposition. Another way in which he makes this point is in noting that sacraments have two aspects. There is the *res sacramenti*, the divine grace contained in the sacrament. There is also the *sacramentum*, the physical medium. By divine ordination, the *sacramentum* is endowed with its *res sacramenti*, in the proper administration of the rite. A worthy recipient who brings the proper disposition to the *sacramentum* receives the *res sacramenti* by means of it. On the other hand, if a person approaches a sacrament without the proper intention, he receives the *sacramentum tantum*, the physical medium alone. Even in cases where Peter is unwilling to grant that the objective content of the sacrament goes by the boards, he insists that the unworthy recipient cannot profit from it in his own inner life.

Sacraments in general can be differentiated, for Peter, in terms of whether they supply sanctification, a remedy, or both. But his preferred scheme for presenting sacramental theology is to group the seven rites so considered in two subdivisions. The first contains the sacraments received by all Christians, in the order in which they are received—baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, and unction. The second contains the sacraments—holy orders and marriage—received only by some Christians. The relative necessity and importance of each sacrament is a question which he treats in considering each sacrament in turn. There are two salient features of the Lombard's handling of the sacraments as a whole that stand out clearly. In each case, while he is interested in the conditions that validate the administration of the sacraments, leaning more heavily here on the canonists, especially Gratian, than is typical of contemporary theologians, his chief concern, and it is one that differentiates him and other theologians from the canonists, is how the sacraments work to heal and sanctify in the inner lives of Christians. Secondly, and given that the purpose of the sacraments is precisely that, he is interested, as are most of his contemporaries, in removing obstacles to the reception of sacramental grace.

Whether this emphasis speaks to the rationalization of changes in the liturgical and devotional practice of the church that had already taken place, or to changes that he wants to promote, its effect is to widen the access he grants to the sacraments, to insist on the repeatability of all but baptism, confirmation, and holy orders, and to view the departures from the sacramental theory and practice of the early church which this policy entails as a rational, pastoral, and theological desideratum.

In the case of baptism, for instance, Peter agrees with the consensus on the universal necessity of baptism, arguing for its objective efficacy in the case of infants who are incapable of bringing to it the faith required of adult baptizands. He prefers this solution to the idea that the adults presenting the infant for baptism supply the requisite faith. He offers a strong defense of baptism by desire and baptism by blood; in cases where physical baptism is impossible, the sincere intentions of the persons at issue enable them to receive the *res tantum*, the grace of baptism, without the external *sacramentum*. This exception recognizes the point that, while God has ordained the rite of baptism as the normal way in which that grace is to be received, His mercy cannot be limited by emergency conditions. Nor can it be limited by the availability of a priest, the ordinary minister of the sacrament. Given the necessity of baptism for salvation, and given the mere instrumentality of any minister of the sacraments, Peter agrees that, in an emergency, anyone using the correct rite with the intention of the church to baptize can validly administer baptism. Peter offers a still wider exception, and one that underscores the organic connection between his sacramental theology and his doctrine of God, a doctrine that consistently stresses the point that God's power always transcends the particular ordinances He imposes by means of it. Even though baptism is normally mandatory, Peter asserts, to insist that it is mandatory in all cases would be to constrain God's power. For God Himself is not bound by the order of salvation that He lays down for man, by means of the sacraments. The specific effect of baptism, when received by a properly disposed baptizand, and when received by any infant, is a double one, for Peter, and in two senses. Baptism washes away all sin, and it imparts sanctifying grace. The eternal punishment owing for original sin is remitted. Also, the temporal punishment owing for actual sin may be relaxed as well. And, while inclination to sin remains in baptized Christians, along with ignorance and concupiscence, it is weakened. The grace that baptizands receive in the sacrament makes them better able to resist temptation, so that the inclination to sin is not as compelling,

for them, as it otherwise would be. These effects are immediate, in the case of adult recipients. In the case of infants, the effects of baptism remain latent and potential until these baptizands are old enough to accept and to cooperate with baptismal grace.

These are the features of baptism that are of central interest to Peter. He relaxes rules that might prevent a baptism from being performed, such as the inadvertent garbling of the baptismal formula by the minister. He notes that the ceremonies surrounding baptism are decorous but not of the essence. He ignores issues such as the time of baptism, whether penance should be required before baptism in the case of adults, and whether a person can baptize himself, questions he dismisses as marginal or frivolous. The moral and liturgical symbolism of triple, as versus single, immersion in baptism appeals to him, although he does not devote major attention to it and does not seek to enforce his personal preference. His concern lies, rather, with what makes the sacrament valid, and largely from the perspective of the capacity of the valid sacrament, worthily received, to serve its ordained role in liberating mankind from original sin and in enabling recipients to make fruitful use of that gift of grace as they grow in sanctification. He sees the change effected in the baptizand on a personal and individual basis. The role of baptism in incorporating a new Christian into the Christian community is not his focus. The renewal of mind, the healing, strengthening, and cleansing function of the sacrament, and its role in empowering the individual Christian's first steps on the *via* that leads back to the *patria*, is his focus.

Peter likewise streamlines his treatment of confirmation, setting to the side such matters as the recipient's age, the time and agent of the sacrament's institution, and whether the ministering clergyman should be fasting or not. As with other sacraments, confirmation involves an external rite, which is composed of the verbal formula, the chrism placed on the confirmand's forehead, and the sign of the cross made by the bishop in so doing. The *res sacramenti* so imparted is the grace that strengthens the Christian against temptation and that arms him in the struggle against sin. It also remits sin and imparts the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Like baptism, confirmation cannot be repeated. But it is less critical for the Christian's salvation, although it should not be ignored out of disrespect for the rites of the church. This stripped down account of confirmation reflects both the general lack of controversy which this sacrament inspired in Peter's day and his systematic and successful effort to bring his discussion of it into conformity with his general theory of the sacraments.

The theology of the Eucharist was fraught with many problems in the middle of the twelfth century, some embedded in the need to defend it against heretics who rejected the real presence doctrine or the sacrament altogether, and others embedded in the difficulties faced by orthodox theologians in explaining coherently the Eucharistic doctrines on which they disagreed among themselves and even those position on which they stood in agreement. That the Eucharist is the greatest of sacraments, in that it conveys not only grace but the giver of all graces, they all heartily and devoutly supported. The real presence, concomitance, and the necessity of Eucharistic reception for salvation are also consensus positions. The chief line of subdivision that is visible in the Lombard's treatment of this sacrament can be traced between the questions flowing from the belief in the real presence, and the conceptual and terminological problems deriving from the difficulty in explaining this belief, given the speculative vocabulary available at the time, and the questions addressed to the administration and reception of the Eucharist. Peter is drawn above all to the first set of questions. The conditions of labor under which he works in tackling them share the same limits that affected other theologians writing before the reception of Aristotle. His solutions, to the extent that he reaches them, are thus, of necessity, provisional ones, from the standpoint of the history of scholastic theology. There are two main topics he addresses here. One is the question of which body Christ gave His disciples at the Last Supper, the resurrected body which Christians now receive in communion or the historical body which He then possessed. Peter supports the relatively unpopular view that it was the historical body Christ gave to His disciples. He neither lays out nor accounts for the physical and metaphysical understanding which this claim requires. The second is the problem of accounting for the change undergone by the elements of bread and wine when they are turned into the body and blood of Christ at the time of the consecration, and the retention by the elements of the physical attributes of bread and wine notwithstanding that change. Here, Peter's achievement is notable if partial. It consists of his rigorous effort to pose the problem in Aristotelian terms. The change undergone by the elements is thus a change of substance. The physical attributes of the elements are seen as accidents. The difficulty, as Peter spells it out, is that these accidents, after the consecration, no longer have a substance subtending them and serving as a material substratum in which they can inhere. Yet, they subsist anyway, inhering in no substance. Peter is no more successful than anyone else at the time in accounting for this anomaly. He does not solve

the problem. But he does pose it very clearly indeed, in a philosophical vocabulary that provides a congenial setting for further essays on this subject, to be drafted in that same vocabulary in the sequel.

As with other orthodox theologians of the day, Peter agrees that the Eucharist is subject to differential effects in its reception, despite its objective divine content, depending on the belief and disposition that the recipient brings to it. The *res sacramenti* itself, as he sees it, is a double one. It includes the body and blood of Christ, which nourish and sanctify the communicant's soul by means of his body, and which signify and help to accomplish his redemption in both body and soul. It also includes the union of Christians in the church, and with Christ, the head of that body, as signified in the many grapes and grains of wheat that unite to make up the Eucharistic elements. This twofold significance of the sacrament is symmetrical with the rule that it should be received under both species, sequentially, although the body and blood are equally and concomitantly present in each of the species individually. Peter ignores the question of the communion of infants by means of the chalice alone sometimes attached to this last point, and the theme of spiritual communion, or the reception of the *res tantum* without the *sacramentum* in emergency cases, although the latter has a clear parallel with his handling of baptism by desire or by blood. He is concerned, rather, with how people appropriate the *res sacramenti* by means of the sacramental medium in the normal course of events. Nothing that recipients believe or intend, he argues, can change the objective content of the Eucharist, for this would allow mere mortals to frustrate God's merciful and gracious ordinance with respect to the sacrament. What the immoral or unbelieving recipient can do is to frustrate his own capacity to profit from communion. Indeed, such a person receives to his condemnation. Conversely, the upright and believing recipient appropriates a personal union with Christ that remakes him spiritually, remits his sin, and perfects him, as well as bonding him with other Christians in the church. As between the ecclesial and the subjective dimensions of this event in the inner life of the communicant, Peter emphasizes the personal. As between the remedial and the perfective consequences of communion, he emphasizes the perfective. The same principle which he uses to distinguish the effects of unworthy from worthy communion could have provided Peter with an answer to a vexed question of the day, concerning what happens if a mouse consumes the consecrated species. But, perhaps surprisingly, and in a response that was scarcely determinative, he dismisses this question as pointless and irrelevant.

While the recipient's side of the Eucharistic transaction is of greater interest to him, Peter also pays sustained attention to the Eucharistic ministry and the conditions that validate it. Here, parting company with most of his theological confrères and with his own general disinclination to circumscribe the availability of grace through the sacraments, he finds the strictures imposed on the sacramental ministry by the canonists eminently convincing, and supports them wholeheartedly. Thus, he agrees with Gratian, priests who are heretics, excommunicates, or schismatics, however validly ordained they may have been, are *ipso facto* barred from celebrating the Eucharist. These impediments are intrinsic, because they bespeak a defective faith and a state of dissociation from the community of faith which prevent such priests from intending what the church intends and from officiating in and for a congregation from which they are severed. Peter also agrees with the canonists' ruling that a priest's moral failings are not an impediment in his Eucharistic ministry, but he offers a different rationale for this conclusion. It is not the authority of the priesthood that he accents, but its instrumentality. Once again, he stresses the point that God will not allow His grace to be impeded by the personal failings of His human instruments. These themes constitute Peter's main concerns à propos of the Eucharist. Other questions, such as the problem of a celebrant's nocturnal emission as a possible bar to his officiating and the frequency of communion for the laity, he either ignores or gives only passing attention. This is not because they are philosophically intractable or incapable of principled solution. It is, rather, because the other aspects of the Eucharist are more central to him. Although he is less flexible in the rules he imposes on the minister's side of the sacrament than he is in other areas of his sacramental theology, Peter is consistent in placing more emphasis on the sanctification that individual Christians can attain by means of the Eucharist than on the conditions or impediments that would deactivate or delegitimize it.

The centrality of the recipient, and of the role of the sacrament in his inner life, come through even more forcefully in Peter's doctrine of penance. Here, he stands foursquare with his contemporaries in insisting on the repeatability of penance, in dismissing the single, solemn, public penance of the early church as now marginal and irrelevant, and in acknowledging that, if the same type of sin recurs in a penitent's life, penance itself can and should recur, so that the channels of divine forgiveness and reconciliation remain open. He takes a firm and consistent stand on the controversial issue of when, in the three-part process of contrition, confession, and satisfaction,

the remission of the penitent's sin occurs, siding vigorously with the contritionist position. He does not shrink from pressing the logic of this position to its ultimate conclusions, even when this forces him to espouse views that place him close to the radical fringe within the orthodox consensus. Thus, he states that confession is optional. If confession is made to a priest, all that the priest does is to declare the fact that the penitent has already received divine forgiveness in the confession of the heart that he had already made to God in his contrition. Since Peter agrees with the definition of penance as sincere sorrow for sin and a firm purpose of amendment, as well as the willingness to acknowledge all of one's sins, penance is contrition, by definition. While confession may be desirable, it is desirable only to the extent that the counseling the penitent receives from the confessor is useful in his moral education. While priests are authorized to loose and to bind, in excommunication and in readmission to communion, they do not exercise this aspect of the power of the keys in confession, as Peter sees it. The other aspect of the power of the keys is discretion. This function can be served by priests, according to Peter, if they happen to be discerning and intelligent men, in advising those penitents who confess to them and in assigning appropriate satisfactions. But, Peter resolutely acknowledges the fact that not all priests indeed possess discretion. A penitent who chooses to seek guidance from a confessor is thus entitled to choose a lay person with discretion as his confessor, if a discreet priest is not available. In any event, Peter notes that the matter of performing satisfaction comes under the discretion of God. He may waive it entirely, if He judges the penitent's contrition to have been perfect, or if some emergency prevents him from fulfilling it, or if his confessor has assigned an inappropriate satisfaction. Peter does concern himself, if marginally, with the confessor's duties, when he is a priest, and takes a hard line in punishing any priest who fails to respect the confidentiality of confession. But his account places the question of the ordinary minister to the side, given his view that confession to a priest, indeed, confession at all, is optional and not required, and that, in any case, it is not the point in the sacrament when the moral status of the penitent is altered. Penance, as he sees it, is a transaction between the penitent and God. Insofar as there is a human minister of penance, it is the penitent's own conscience. In this respect, in assigning to the different aspects of penance the terms *sacramentum* and *res sacramenti*, Peter holds that both the *res sacramenti* and the *sacramentum* are to be found in contrition. The matter of the sacrament is God's forgiving grace. It is a divine response to the sorrow for sin presented by the

penitent. This sorrow for sin, like all virtues, can be seen as a product of the collaboration of the penitent's free will with cooperating grace. It is by means of this virtue that God grants His forgiveness to the penitent and it is by means of contrition that he appropriates this grace. Confession, if any, is merely the outward indication that the matter of the sacrament has already been given and received through contrition.

As the foregoing analysis suggests, there is a lack of symmetry between penance and the other sacraments, in the Lombard's teaching, and in two respects. First, there is no human minister of the sacrament other than the penitent himself. Second, there is no physical medium that signifies and conveys grace. The penitent's confession of the heart may be made in silence and solitude. None the less, contrition, for Peter, is both the remission of sin and the efficacious sign of the fact that this remission of sin has been granted and internalized. As for exterior penance, it is neither a sign of the remission of sin, nor does it effect it. It merely indicates or gives formal recognition of the fact that the penitent has been reconciled to God. The just-noted absence of a physical medium aside, the logic and elegance of the Lombard's reasoning on penance has much to recommend it, both in itself and as a specific application of the principles that hold pride of place in his sacramental theology as a whole. The healing and sanctification of Christians through the sacrament are absolutely primary; and anything that interferes with this objective is to be dismissed or drastically marginalized. In the event, this logic did not prove powerful enough in Peter's day to eliminate the confessionists from the game. The matter remained unsettled. And, when a new consensus emerged in the next century, it was one that required sincere contrition but that made confession, and, specifically, the statement of the words of absolution by the priest, the moment when the penitent was reconciled. This step was taken in the name of an Aristotelian analysis of sacramental causality not available in the Lombard's day and in the effort to heighten the importance of the institutional side of penance. This latter consideration is one that Peter is perfectly prepared to undercut, in giving pride of place to the penitent's intentions and the penitent's growth in virtue. This is not to say that he ignores, or underrates, the objectivity of God's forgiveness. What it does say is that, in this sacrament at any rate, the communication of divine grace can be objective and efficacious without being physically manifested.

While, Peter can be regarded as being within the pale on penance, even if somewhat extreme in his admission of confession to a

layman and in the radical surgery he is willing to perform on the priestly power of the keys, he strikes an idiosyncratic note in his treatment of unction as well. Unique among his compeers, he insists that a bishop should be the ordinary minister of this sacrament. Another unusual feature of his handling of unction, in relation to his own sacramental theology in general, is that he says nothing about the disposition which the recipient needs to bring to the sacrament in order to profit from it. In other respects, his theology of unction, laconic though it may be, brings together the range of opinions that existed in his day on what the sacrament had been instituted to accomplish; and in this sense, it is as synthetic as it is non-problematic. Peter holds the *sacramentum* to be the oil used in unction and the *res sacramenti* to be the remission of sins. In addition, it imparts physical healing, if God wills it, when it is the unction administered to the sick, and the spiritual strengthening of *viaticum*, when it is administered to the dying. Since a person may be seriously ill or in danger of death more than once, unction is repeatable. Like confirmation, it is not a sacrament of necessity. But Peter condemns more harshly people who neglect unction out of disrespect for the rites of the church. The very perfunctory discussion which he allots to unction reflects the fact that, like confirmation, it ranked very low on the list of sacraments that inspired controversy at this time. Oddly, that same characteristic fails to take note of the substantial changes in the understanding and practice of unction which this sacrament had undergone since the days of the early church, changes which neither Peter nor his contemporaries felt strongly motivated to justify, or even to mention.

In considering holy orders, Peter makes a decisive move away from the canonists' tendency to view clerics merely as functionaries with particular job descriptions, qualifications, and impediments, and presents, instead, a broad-gauged theological understanding of holy orders as a sacrament. Each of the seven grades of holy orders, for Peter, signifies and makes efficacious in the ministry of its recipient the various modes of service performed by Christ in His own personal ministry. As this *res sacramenti* is internalized by the properly disposed recipient, it empowers him to perform his own duties vis-à-vis his fellow Christians and it also grants him the grace that enables him to carry out this *imitatio Christi* in his own inner life. In this respect, the ordinand receives the gifts of the Holy Spirit, although Peter does not coordinate the particular gifts or virtues in question with the different grades of orders. Peter sees the culminating clerical office as the Eucharistic ministry of the priest.

He treats the ranks of bishop, archbishop, and pope not as grades of holy orders beyond the priesthood but as dignities or ranks within the priesthood, referring to the scope of their jurisdiction in church governance and to the forms of sacramental ministry which bishops alone can perform, such as confirmation, ordination, and, for Peter, unction. He is not interested in the juridical interrelationships of clerics in these various ranks, or with the relations of *regnum* and *sacerdotium*, which he leaves to the canonists and the publicists in his division of labor. Peter also considers other official functions within the church that, in his view, convey rank, although they are not new grades of holy orders and although they may be exercised, in some cases, by people who are not ordained at all. These include prophets, poets, and priests who have foresight. Musicians as well as poets hold a rank within the church, for the contribution which they make to the inspiration and edification of the Christian people and to the embellishment of the liturgy through the power of their art.

Peter devotes more attention here than elsewhere in his sacramental theology to the conveying of the *res sacramenti* in ordination. In his treatment of holy orders, there is more of a balance between this side of the sacrament and the recipient's appropriation of it than is typical, for Peter. His handling of this subject is symmetrical with the way he deals with the qualifications of the minister of the Eucharist. In this case, as well, he is equally supportive of the reasoning of the canonists. While he is unconcerned with such matters as age qualifications, he is supremely interested in the intentions, faith, and canonical status of the minister no less than that of the recipient of ordination. Heretics, schismatics, and excommunicates cannot validly ordain, in his view, for precisely the same reasons why they cannot validly consecrate the Eucharist. In the case of this one sacrament, Peter departs from one of his general rules by granting that there is also a form of immorality, namely simony, that is an impediment to valid ordination for both the minister and the recipient. In his eyes, simony is also grounds for depriving a cleric of office after the fact. Peter admits that ignorance as to the true state of the minister or the ordinand, on either side, may be a mitigating factor, even as pastoral need may be in the case of a non-simoniatic ordained by a simoniatic whose deposition would be a serious deprivation to the lay people he serves. So strong is Peter's horror of the sin of simony that, in this single case, he allows the immorality to stand as a barrier, obstructing God's grace from reaching the ordinand and from enabling him to perform the clerical functions that it would

otherwise authorize him to undertake in his ministry. *A fortiori*, for Peter, such a state would prevent a cleric from making use of the grace of holy orders in his personal sanctification. But, lacking such impediments, this *res sacramenti* is conveyed by the bishop's laying on of hands as the physical *sacramentum*, and it imparts an indelible clerical character to the recipient.

The single sacrament that evoked the most controversy in the twelfth century and that warranted, for Peter, the lengthiest exposition, is marriage. In some ways his approach to marriage can best be appreciated by comparing it with penance and holy orders. As with penance, and symmetrical to a significant extent with his treatment of it, marriage, for Peter, involves more than one stage in the joining of the couple. In his view, it is the stage expressing their intentionality, and not a later, optional, and physical expression of that intentionality, that is determinative in creating a change of status. Thus, with respect to marriage formation, it is not the betrothal, which promises future consent, and not the sexual consummation that normally follows a marriage, but the present consent of marriageable parties, freely and consciously given at the time of the wedding, that makes the marriage. Just as Peter rejects the confessionists on penance, in arguing that confession, if any, is strictly *ex post facto*, so he defends the principle of consent in marriage formation against the argument of the consummationists who urge that, while consent is required, it is not sufficient, and that the marriage is ratified, perfect, and indissoluble only after it has been consummated. In both cases, Peter develops a parallel line of reasoning in support of consent, and contritionism; and, in both cases, it is the consummationism and confessionism of Gratian that is the chief challenge he wants to overcome and a major source of the material that he uses against this opponent.

Peter's insistence on the sufficiency of the intentional stage in marriage formation is so thoroughgoing that he acknowledges the validity of clandestine marriages lacking in any witnesses, parental consent, or priestly blessing, much as he would like couples pondering such a course of action not to follow it on grounds of enlightened self-interest. In contrast with his defense of contritionism in penance, however, Peter does require a sensible sign as the vehicle of the spouses' present consent. Typically, this is an exchange of vows expressed verbally. But, it may be a non-verbal means of signifying their consent, so long as it is a physically perceptible sign. Once such a marriage has been formed, it is sacramental, even if it is never consummated. Like the marriage of the Virgin Mary and St. Joseph, it is a union of minds and hearts, a spiritual

union in which the spouses pledge their fidelity and their commitment to a permanent common life. This sacrament signifies the spiritual union of Christ and the church. If this already valid and sacramental marriage should be consummated in the sequel, as is usually the case, the physical union of the spouses is also a sacrament. It manifests and reinforces the spouses' spiritual union and it signifies the institutional union of Christ and the church. Unlike penance, in this case the external manifestation of the intentional state that is of the essence is regarded by Peter as a sacrament as well.

As with penance, there is no consideration in Peter's discussion of marriage formation of who the ordinary minister of the sacrament is. In both cases, however, the implicit answer to this question is that the recipient, or recipients, perform this function for themselves or for each other. As with penance, Peter seeks to remove obstructions that would limit its availability to Christians, so far as possible. He is generous on the matter of remarriage, both for widowed persons and for a number of categories of persons whose marriages have been dissolved or placed, in effect, in limbo, by the extended absence and presumed death of a spouse or by the spouse's sexual dysfunction. At the same time, there is a striking and major discrepancy between Peter's treatment of marriage and penance, more important than the need for a physical means of indicating consent and the sacramentality of its sexual expression, which must be noted side by side with the many ways in which his treatment of these two sacraments is parallel. In penance, the *res sacramenti* is the grace of God's forgiveness, communicated in the penitent's contrition. He receives sanctifying grace, as well as the opportunity to undergo moral education and improvement. On the other hand, while Peter certainly thinks that marriage affords an alternative to sin and while he regards it as a school for virtue, the union of Christ and the church, the *res sacramenti* signified by marriage, is a theological and ecclesial reality already in existence whether or not any two people marry. Moreover, the marital consent which constitutes and initiates their union is not seen by Peter as a medium through which divine grace is transmitted to them. Their marital consent, and their sexual expression of it in the standard marriage, are seen as sacraments, but as sacramental signs only. They each signify a divine reality but neither is an efficacious channel of that reality in the common life of the spouses. For the Lombard, therefore, marriage, alone among the sacraments, remains a still-Augustinian and pre-Victorine sacrament. In the light of Peter's own doctrine of sacraments in general, marriage is sub-sacramental.

A comparison between Peter's handling of marriage and his treatment of holy orders is also instructive in clarifying what he does, and does not do, with his doctrine of marriage. In both cases, these are sacraments received only by some but not by all Christians. The persons receiving these sacraments do so out of a calling to lead a particular kind of life, with the intention of receiving its authorizations, and embracing its responsibilities and commitments, as the church intends, for the service of the Christian community. Selfish, immoral, or manipulative abuses of the powers that these sacraments convey are equally to be deplored in the case of each of them. With respect to the clergy, what is granted is the capacity to function as an instrument of Christ's own ministry and to exercise it in their own communities. With respect to marriage, what is granted to the spouses is the right to engage in sexual relations, legitimately and without the imputation of sin, for the sake of the goods of marriage. In Peter's eyes, these goods include the propagation of offspring for the building up of the Christian community and the rendering of the marriage debt, which he views less as a purely remedial activity that prevents spouses from seeking illicit sexual satisfaction than as an opportunity for spouses to strengthen their bond of mutual fidelity and to grow in unselfishness and equality in their life together. Just as the right to exercise clerical faculties is unique to holders of clerical office, so the right to sexual relations pertains, legally and morally, only to married people.

So much for the parallels. The lack of symmetry between these two sacraments is also noteworthy. If a would-be ordinand fails to present a proper intention, Peter holds that he receives the *sacramentum tantum* in his ordination, and not the *res sacramenti* as well, just as an unworthy or unbelieving adult baptizand receives only physical ablution, and not the spiritual ablution of baptism. On the other hand, Peter is well aware of the fact that many people marry for mercenary, political, erotic, or other self-serving reasons, and that their marital relations, even when philoprogenitive, are often motivated by the same kinds of sub-theological considerations. Yet, he does not deny to such spouses a valid, sacramental marriage, despite the faulty intentionality which they may bring to marital consent. The spouses may be united in mind and heart, but for thoroughly worldly and unchristian reasons. Still, the marriage stands. The marital rights of the spouses are not withdrawn from them. Aside from a defective intention, Peter recognizes simony as an impediment to holy orders and as a basis for deposing a cleric who obtained his post in this way. Serious crime, notably uxoricide, is one of the impediments to marriage that he accepts, as prevent-

ing a widower made such by his own crime from marrying again. In other respects, a person's previous moral history, even if he supplies disinformation about it to a potential spouse, is not seen by Peter as an impediment to marriage or as grounds for nullification. Yet, while there are a range of disciplinary actions that can be taken to suspend or to disqualify a simoniac priest, or one abusing the confidentiality of confession, no analogous range of disciplinary actions exists for punishing irresponsible spouses or for terminating their marriage on grounds of immorality. Marriages continue to remain in force even if they lack the notes of fidelity and permanence understood to be present in the marriage vows. These imbalances reflect two discrepancies between holy orders and marriage, which the Lombard's treatment of marriage does not eliminate. One is the fact that simony, in his view, does interfere with the efficacy of ordination, as a means of authorization and as a channel of grace to the recipient. But, since he envisions no transmission of grace in marriage, the immorality of spouses or their abuse of their authority cannot be seen as obstructions, from a sacramental standpoint, however much such behavior may place them in jeopardy ethically speaking. Secondly, Peter is forced to recognize the fact that, alone among the sacraments, and apart from the church's sacramental view of it, marriage already exists as a legal and social institution. As such, it is thought of, governed, and practiced in ways that are not necessarily commensurate with the theological values that he wants to impart to it. This is a fact that he sometimes tries to accommodate, and sometimes not.

Consistent with his desire to focus on what marriage is all about, in a positive sense, Peter devotes more of his attention to the problem of marriage formation than to the impediments to marriage, grounds for nullification, and grounds for separation. He agrees that marriage was instituted in Eden before the fall and that sexual reproduction was part of God's original plan; after the fall, marriage was reinstituted for the purpose of avoiding fornication as well. Peter takes a fairly generous line on sexual relations in marriage by observing that the avoidance of fornication means the protection of nature and the service of marital fidelity; it is not just the repression of vice. His stress on the idea that the union of bodies typical of most marriages, although not required, is no less sacramental than the union of souls that it expresses, dignifies the sexual relations of spouses. A procreative intention, whether Christian or sub-Christian, removes all blame from the lust that unavoidably accompanies these relations. Rendering the marriage debt, a requirement that takes precedence over the counsels sug-

gesting abstention during certain seasons, is, at worst, minimally sinful. Peter draws the line only at marital relations pursued for the sake of selfish erotic pleasure alone. His handling of the sexual rights of the spouses is uniformly egalitarian, whether it comes to rendering the marriage debt, conjugal chastity and fidelity, voluntary temporary withdrawal from marital relations, or the seriousness with which the sworn testimony of both spouses is to be taken in marriage litigation. Included in the present consent that makes the marriage is marital affection. This concept, as a marital intention, is one that Peter borrows from the canonists. He agrees with them in defining it as the commitment to accord to one's spouse the honor, dignity, and respect owed to a lawfully wedded spouse as such. With this notion he sets to one side both an excessively idealistic assessment of what most people can be expected to bring to their intention to marry, and a purely erotic understanding of married love, as well as the common lives that may be lived by like-minded relatives who are not thereby married. The same idea underlies his admission that unforced present consent creates a sacramental marriage even when the spouses use their marriage in the service of ends that he regards as inappropriate or even dishonest. The same holds true for marriages that may lack the goods of fidelity, permanence, and offspring.

In turning from marriage formation and the morality of sex in marriage to impediments, the single most notable feature of Peter's treatment of this range of questions is the coherent order he imposes on the material, coherent not only in and of itself but also in relation to the principle of consent as making the marriage. He begins by considering circumstances that would impede consent or lead to defective consent, such as coercion, fraud, and error. He next discusses the positive attributes possessed by marriageable persons, insofar as they have not ceded these rights freely or to forces beyond their control. Under the heading of involuntary or congenital impediments he takes up sexual dysfunction and insanity. The former may be temporary or permanent; the latter he sees as an unchangeable and incurable condition. All other impediments, such as servile status, vows, disparity of cult, age, cognation, and affinity, he places under the heading of impediments that exist not in the nature of things but as a consequence of choice, accident, or conventional regulations subject to change.

Peter is firm on the need for free consent, although he thinks there are cases in which a union based initially on coercion, which was therefore not sacramental when it came into being, may ripen into true sacramentality if the dissenting spouse undergoes a

change of heart within the course of married life. Fraud always obviates a valid marriage. Error does so when it is error as to an individual's personal identity and legal status, but not if it is error as to his fortune and condition. Noting that the rules have changed over time as to who is marriageable, Peter observes that there are also basic natural incapacities that impede marriage. His handling of *frigiditas*, or impotence, reflects the idea that, notwithstanding the fact that it is consent, not consummation, that makes the marriage, marriages normally are consummated; and, the inability to do so constitutes grounds for annulment, in that impotence makes impossible both the procreative and the remedial reasons for the institution of marriage. Peter also adheres to the contemporary distinction between natural impotence and impotence caused by witchcraft. He is quite as unhelpful as anyone else at the time in explaining how reliable proof of non-consummation can be obtained, although he also expresses a minority viewpoint both in acknowledging that sexual dysfunction can afflict females as well as males and by granting wives as much credibility in court as husbands in litigation on this point. He is also more generous than most in allowing the dysfunctional partner, no less than the other spouse, to remarry if the dysfunction vanishes after the original marriage has been dissolved. For its part, insanity or mental incapacity renders persons incapable of giving informed consent and of participating in the union of minds and hearts that constitutes marriage. Yet, and unsymmetrically with his treatment of *frigiditas*, Peter holds that this condition prevents a marriage from being formed; but, if it should supervene after a marriage has come into being, it provides no grounds for nullification, any more than any other illness or misfortune that may supervene, or the discovery that a spouse is sterile.

Peter next turns to the second class of impediments, those conditioned by convention, circumstance, or free will. He takes up illicit sexual behavior before or outside of marriage, and rules that, while fornication provides grounds for a separation in which neither partner may remarry, sexual misconduct before marriage is not an impediment to marriage in the first place. He does not view rape either as an impediment to marriage or as grounds for making a marital claim, but rather as a sexual sin which, like other kinds of illicit sexual relations, is a sin against marriage and which, in this case, is a crime as well. As with sexual sins, the taking of vows of celibacy, the entry into holy orders, and the commission of the serious crime of uxoricide are matters of choice. But unlike sexual sins, they all impede marriage; and the first two are grounds for

nullification if subsequently discovered. For its part, servile status is an accident which may occur voluntarily or not. Peter does not regard it as an impediment to marriage, so long as a *servus* does not seek to dissimulate his real status in making a marriage with a free person whose status would be disparaged thereby, and so long as the masters of any *servi* involved give their consent. In Peter's view, a married person should obtain his spouse's consent if he seeks to accept servile status. But he cannot force that status upon his spouse willy nilly, nor dismiss the spouse on that account. Also circumstantial is captivity, which does not terminate a marriage *per se*. But Peter is more generous than most in leaving open to negotiation the status of the relict spouse who remarries, if and when the absent spouse returns.

The other obstacles to marriage, which include disparity of cult, age, cognation, and affinity, are all treated under the heading of impediments defined by convention and as subject to change, even though one might think of age and cognation as naturally determined and of religious commitment as a matter of choice. Still, Peter points out that the rules governing all these matters are not the same in all times and places, and have been altered in the course of church history. They are not graven in stone. With respect to disparity of cult, he thinks that St. Paul's dispensation from the rule barring mixed marriages in 2 Corinthians was unauthorized, and that Paul, and the patristic authorities who compounded this error, should be rejected in favor of the Old Testament rule, also stated by Paul in 1 Corinthians, in his permission to dismiss an unbelieving spouse. Peter presents this latter rule as one that was not abrogated in the Christian dispensation and as still in force. The policy he prefers also makes sense, in his estimation, since he thinks that spouses who have differing religious beliefs will lack the union of minds and hearts that defines marriage. If such a situation should arise in an otherwise valid marriage, Peter regards it as spiritual fornication. As with physical fornication, it would entitle the aggrieved spouse to dismiss the unbelieving one, but it is not grounds for an annulment. He hopes that, if such a circumstance should arise, this fact will encourage the believing spouse to work for the conversion of the unbelieving spouse, and for reconciliation with him or her. Peter follows the standard Roman law principles on age requirements, of twelve for girls and fourteen for boys, recognizing at the same time their conventional character and the fact that Justinian's code is not in force everywhere. His handling of consanguinity and spiritual affinity does not depart from consensus views on the substance of these impediments. But

Peter is notably impatient with these subjects, spending little time elaborating them. He observes, in so doing, that it is pointless to waste energy on these man-made rules, rules from which, in any case, people are dispensed so frequently.

Altogether, impediments and grounds for nullification and separation are less to the point, for Peter, than the positive qualities a sacramental marriage has or should have. He sees marriage as the state of life to which most people are called and whose consolations they need. These same consolations were ordained by God in His institution of marriage. As well as serving as a remedy for sin, they afford couples the opportunity to grow in virtue and in an unselfish mutual affection. This being the case, Peter generally seeks to relax the conditions enabling people to marry, rather than taking a harsh, legalistic, ascetic, or punitive approach. He is consistent in centering marriage on the free and unfeigned present consent of the spouses. The content of that consent always includes marital affection and the union of minds and hearts that is constitutive of the marriage. In the vast majority of cases, marital consent also includes consent to the expression and reinforcement of that spiritual union in the sexual union of the spouses. Peter sees both kinds of union as sacramental. The use of sex for the ends of marriage he frees, virtually completely, from any imputation of sin. By the same token, although the spiritual bond is of the essence for him, impotence can be accepted as a real and reasonable impediment to marriage. The major advance Peter makes in the theology of marriage is his persuasive defense of the principle of consent in marriage formation. He offers this teaching in the light of his stress on intentionality more generally and in the effort to defend the sacramentality of the marriage of Mary and Joseph. Yet, he presents the principle of consent in such a way as to address the values and concerns articulated by his opponents on the consummationist side of the debate. In his treatment of sex in marriage, he is typically more generous and more egalitarian than they are. Peter's second major contribution is to impose a coherent order on the subject of impediments. While it has to be said that, in relation to his sacramental theology as a whole, his doctrine of marriage falls short, in that he does not see either the spiritual or the physical union of spouses as a means of grace, he does see marriage as assisting spouses in the acquisition of virtue and merit.

Looking at Peter's sacramental theology over all, this point is one among several areas in which his handling of a particular sacrament fails to square with his theology of sacraments in general. He does not discuss the topic of the ordinary minister in the case of

either marriage or penance. His understanding of penance as contrition means that a physical medium of grace is not required in this sacrament; any subsequent external manifestation of the penitent's reconciliation is a sign of the sacrament and is not a sacrament itself. In the case of unction, Peter omits the issue of the disposition or intention that the recipient needs to bring to the sacrament in order to receive it worthily and to appropriate its grace fruitfully. In the case of holy orders, and uniquely so, he allows a moral failing, simony, to obstruct the efficacy of grace in the valid administration and reception of the sacrament. This is the one and only instance in which Peter accepts the idea that the personal weaknesses of fallible men can block the workings of the sacraments despite their God-given power. It is a departure from his more general tendency to see the ministers of the sacraments merely as instruments in their transmission of divine grace. These anomalies aside, Peter's treatise on sacramental theology imparts a higher level of coherence and consistency to the topic, as a field of systematic theological inquiry, than it had yet received in western Christian theology. Peter's sacramentology makes frequent use of canonical insights and material, especially from Gratian, even though Peter finds himself on the opposing side of controversies, such as consent versus consummation and contritionism versus confessionism, as much if not more than he agrees with Gratian. Even when the two masters are in accord, Peter often offers a different rationale for his conclusions. The single most important feature of Peter's teaching on the sacraments is his acceptance and elaboration of the Victorine view of a sacrament as a sign that effects what it signifies. His adoption of this principle puts it at the center of scholastic sacramental theology in the high Middle Ages. The Lombard's treatment of the sacraments also puts sacramental theology on a continuum with his doctrine of God and God's relations with His creation, with his soteriology, and with his understanding of the relations between intention and action, and grace and free will, in the moral life. The healing, the sanctification, and the growth in personal virtue and merit for which the sacraments were instituted are likewise means by which God's power and mercy and man's effort combine to bring the Christian through the life *in via* to the *patria* at the end of time.

It is as the culmination of that journey that Peter views Last Things, the subdivision of systematic theology embracing the final set of questions included in his *Sentences*. In relation to that of his scholastic confrères, Peter's eschatology is notable for its resolute refusal to raise questions that he thinks are unanswerable and for

his equally firm dismissal of anything that smacks of wild-eyed speculation. He makes no concessions whatever to the chiliastic imagination or to creative apocalypticism. This norm is one he applies to his appropriation of the work of his own contemporaries and also to his patristic authorities and to the New Testament itself. The single most striking index of Peter's outlook here is his total omission of the Antichrist from his end-of-time scenario, even though he had developed a cogent and independent position on that subject in his Pauline exegesis. He leads off, instead, with, the general resurrection and the second coming of Christ. On balance, he is far less interested in catering to curiosity about the sequence of events leading to the last judgment than he is in discussing its consequences in the assignment of souls to their posthumous habitations. He imports into the last judgment the Gregorian subdivision of four categories of souls, evaluated in terms of how they have lived their lives on earth and the moral state in which they died. Both the saints who have demonstrated their merit by their charity and their works of supererogation and the unregenerate and unrepentant sinners who have confirmed their damnation by their evil choices up to the end are already judged, and saved or damned accordingly. There are other sinners, less comprehensively evil, who will be judged and condemned, as well as repentant sinners who died penitent but without having fully expiated the sins on their consciences, who will be judged and saved, after a purificatory interim in Purgatory.

In dealing with the fates of the inhabitants of Heaven and Hell, Peter seeks to integrate this subject into the larger themes informing his systematic theology. One of these themes, orchestrated throughout the *Sentences*, is his reformulation of Augustine. Here, he sees the damned and the saved as expressing, eternally, the city of man and the city of God. He also coordinates Last Things with the idea of signs and things, use and enjoyment, applied to his view of the Christian life and his doctrine of God. Peter offers a strong defense of the principle that the judgment of God is just, and that it is merciful. Since they are attributes of a divine essence that is radically simple, God's justice and mercy are identical. Further, Peter maintains, the damned have fully earned their punishment. As with the wills of the fallen angels, moreover, their wills remain free in the next life. Deprived, for all time, of access to the grace that they have spurned in this life, they will continue to consent to evil, and to evil alone. Thus, they will continue to merit their punishment, eternally. None the less, God punishes them less than they deserve, and He mercifully spares them from the sight of the

joys of the blessed, which would only increase their suffering. The blessed will experience God's justice and mercy with even greater intensity. Like the angels confirmed in the good, they too will be freed totally from any obstacle to their willing of the good. They will have everything they have hoped for, and more. Most of all, having completed their journey home from the *regio dissimilitudinis*, they will have recovered a full humanity, indeed, a greater humanity than that possessed by man before the fall. Having collaborated with grace in working out their salvation, through the good use of earthly things, including the sacramental signs that are efficacious means of grace as well as things, they will have moved, through and past the mutabilities of the world in time and the time-bound modes of human cognition and volition to the direct, unconditioned love and knowledge of the immutable God Himself, the supreme being and the supreme good Whom they can now enjoy eternally and without impediment.

This conclusion to Peter's *Sentences* thus connects the entire enterprise of systematic theology with the basic doctrine of God stated at the outset of that work and the basic principles and emphases that govern his exposition throughout it. Peter never forgets that the subject of subjects is the deity. Nor does he forget that this deity's ordinances, in the order of nature and the order of grace, have been laid down for the sake of man. They become meaningful, and functional, in man's instruction and redemption by providing the means, starting with Christ's saving work, by which man's latent desire for the good can be activated and energized. Notwithstanding the depression of the will in fallen man, man's will can and must collaborate with God's grace. This collaboration grows easier with the partial relaxation of the depression of the will when man is redeemed and justified. Together, God's grace and man's freedom continue to cooperate in the growth of virtue and merit in the ethical life and in the sacramental life. With the exception of the body and blood of Christ given in the Eucharist, the gifts of grace given by God are His effects, not God Himself. The moral progress made by man is his sanctification, not his divinization, the recovery of the image of God in himself, not a participation in the divine nature. God's transcendence over His creation, His concession of freedom and contingency to that creation, and His simultaneous refusal to let its limitations circumscribe His power or frustrate His mercy and love, are notes which Peter carries clearly and systematically throughout his presentation of Christian theology, from his discussion of the knowledge of God to his eschatology. The endpoint, for the blessed, in which their mutability as creatures has

been overcome in their eternal enjoyment of God, still preserves Peter's vivid sense that there are two distinct kinds of beings here who are now joined in loving communion.

The force and cohesion of this vision of systematic theology yet bears with it occasional inconsistencies, soft spots, and areas that could be seen as requiring further reflection or refinement, not merely in the light of some theology or other to come but in the context of Peter's own century. This point can be made with respect to Peter's address to philosophy, no less than to theology itself. Peter goes a long way toward the clarification of theological language and toward a constructive use of philosophy, and the other *artes*, as ways of posing and of settling questions. In some quarters he reflects a propensity toward Aristotelianism. His view of human nature as a substantial and integral unity of body and soul is central to his anthropology, his understanding of the incarnation of Christ, his ethics, and his sacramentology alike. This propensity makes these topics hospitable locations for the expansion of these themes by thinkers of a still more Aristotelian bent. It causes Peter to dismiss a Platonizing view of human nature that would likewise influence the treatment of those related subjects. It also inspires him to reject Boethius's definition of a person as the individual substance of a rational nature, a definition he finds as inapposite to human beings and to the human nature of Christ as it is to the Trinitarian persons. None the less, in using the term "substance" to refer to the divine nature, Peter resolutely and deliberately avoids any particular philosophical acceptance of that term. His use of it is specifically devoid of the Aristotelian sense of substance as denoting a composite being made up of matter and form that is susceptible to modification by accidents. In describing the change in the Eucharistic elements, Peter formulates the problem in clearly Aristotelian language. At the same time, he is unable to find an explanation, in that same vocabulary, for the anomaly involved when accidents have no substance in which to inhere, much as he thinks that this is the vocabulary that needs to be used in that connection.

In handling issues such as God's foreknowledge, providence, predestination and free will or contingency, Peter parries the Aristotelian tendency to conceive of the problem in terms of a logic framed in the first instance to describe events *in rerum natura*. He is also unsympathetic to the Boethian, and, more recently, the Abelardian, effort to impart a post-Aristotelian gloss to this question by reframing it in terms of formal logic. Here, as with the parallel issue of whether God could do different and better than He does, Peter

insists on treating the question philosophically but as a problem in metaphysics, looked at from the standpoint of the supreme being and His attributes, not from the perspective of natural philosophy or the inferences that can be made from certain kinds of propositions. He dismisses the debate over universals as inapposite to theology, and, at the same time, makes constructive use of the nominalist analysis of the unitary signification of nouns and verbs in defending this metaphysical address to the themes of divine omniscience and omnipotence. In these contexts, he never forgets that what he is talking about is God, and not the created world or the workings of the human mind. His selective criticism of Aristotelianism can also be seen in his substitution of relation, understood in the sense of relative nouns, for relation, understood in the sense of an Aristotelian accident modifying created substances, in his delineation of the distinction between person and nature in the Trinity and in the service of his vigorous effort to restore to the understanding of the Trinitarian persons their individual determinations, as structured eternally into the connections among the members of the unmanifested Trinitarian family, while insisting on the notion that God's action *ad extra* is not an adequate index of the differences among those persons. If he offers a criticism of Aristotelianism in this treatment of Trinitarian relations, Peter's doctrine of God more generally can be seen as a thoroughgoing effort to de-Platonize that subject, whether from the standpoint of emanationism, participationism, exemplary causation, or the *via negativa*. In still another quarter, his analysis of marriage, Peter is largely comfortable with the Aristotelian view of causation, in labeling the consent that makes the marriage the efficient cause and the ends of marriage the final cause. He does not expressly describe the intentions of the spouses as the formal cause, although his handling of the topic would make it amenable to that denomination.

In these several ways, the Lombard shows that he is anything but uninterested in or hostile to philosophy. He draws on it freely; and, when he substitutes one version of it for another, he does so as a matter of circumspect and principled choice. As indicated, he seeks radically to de-Platonize western theology, with respect to the Trinity, with respect to a preclusively economic view of the deity, with respect to human nature, and with respect to the interaction of man and God in the charismatic order. Thinkers with a more Platonic or Neoplatonic perspective would feel the challenge of reclaiming the terrain from him on these points. As we have noted, there are areas in his *Sentences* that provide a natural habitat for Aristotelianism, areas where more of this philosophy could be

added without stretching the fabric of Lombardian theology out of shape. There are also points at which his theology presents a challenge to the Aristotelians as well, and also to proponents of a post-Aristotelian logic. Indeed, it may be argued that the very fact of Peter's philosophical eclecticism, no less than his clear preferences in this field, was what made his *Sentences* a useful vehicle for budding philosophers in the later medieval centuries.

There are also inconsistencies and soft spots in Peter's theology that are less conditioned by his philosophical inclinations and tolerances. In our view, Christology must be put at the head of the list here. This is not because of his refusal to take what he thought would have been a premature stand on the three opinions concerning the hypostatic union. Much as the outsiders and obscurantists in the Lombard's time and in the following generation may have misunderstood him, charging him erroneously with Christological nihilianism or with the proposing of a quaternity in the Trinity, his own unwillingness to rush to judgment here, and his clear analysis of the three opinions, should be counted as an advantage of Lombardian theology, and not as a disadvantage. More important, and more problematic, is his treatment of Christ's human nature. While arguing that the exemptions and privileges received by the human Christ were gifts of grace, not endowments of nature, and while asserting that the human Christ was entirely consubstantial with other men, Peter gives to the human Christ a psychology that is more than human, an epistemology in which Christ is virtually omniscient and in which He never had to undergo a learning process, and a psychogenesis of ethical decision-making in which the temptations suffered and resisted by Christ are alleged to have been real temptations, although He is also held never to have experienced *passio*, but only *propassio* and *consensus*. In addition, Peter's decision to treat the virtues in connection with Christology, although he treats vice and sin in connection with human nature and the fall, is an impediment to his resolution of this discrepancy. Since Peter's human Christ is functionally superhuman, His role as a moral exemplar for man and His capacity to possess virtues such as faith and hope, which involve incompleteness by definition, are put into question. Peter does not resolve the contradiction between the human Christ, full of grace and wisdom, as he understands Him, and the human Christ Who is like us in all but sin.

There are a few other theological inconsistencies in Peter's work, notable and annoying if perhaps less fundamental in doctrinal terms, which we have flagged above and here reprise. Peter's Eve is consubstantial with Adam and equally a bearer of God's image and

likeness in her soul. Yet, according to Peter, she was less rational than Adam and her fall can be credited to her misuse of knowledge, the lower of the two functions of the higher intellectual faculty, as contrasted with Adam's misuse of wisdom. Along with the angelic nature, human nature at all times is regarded by Peter as requiring the assistance of grace in the development of virtue. Yet, he thinks that non-Christians, who can be presumed to lack that grace, are capable of possessing good faith and of developing virtue out of their natural *pietas*. Through his natural endowment of reason, man possesses, for Peter, the capacity to come to a positive natural knowledge of God and to prove God's existence. What relationship this faculty and aptitude bears to the knowledge, understanding, and wisdom that he sees as gifts of the Holy Spirit Peter leaves unexplained. Finally, notwithstanding the fact that he places on a firm foundation the new Victorine conception of sacraments as efficacious signs, severed from the Victorine idea that they are really on a continuum with pre-Christian rites, Peter does not extend his theory of the sacraments in general to all the sacraments, fully and completely. There are asymmetries with respect to intentionality in unction and with respect to the capacity of human immorality to impede the efficacy of the administration and reception of the sacrament in the case of holy orders. The question of the ordinary minister does not arise in the case of penance and marriage. Penance lack a physical medium, in his understanding of that sacrament. And marriage, while it signifies a *res sacramenti* and, indeed, does so in a double sense, is not viewed by Peter as an efficacious channel of grace to spouses, whether in their spiritual or their physical union.

Both the strengths of the Lombard's achievement, the questions that he deliberately leaves open, the areas in his theology in which he presents different philosophical options and challenges, and the topics on which he contradicts himself or fails to press the logic of his position to its ultimate conclusions, all provided a wealth of problems and opportunities for later theologians. So did the many *loci* in the *Sentences* that offered natural homes for the new materials and the new debates that lay on the immediate intellectual horizon of western Christendom. The tradition launched by the Lombard's *Sentences* was well served by the fact that it possessed a schema and a methodology that could accommodate these new materials, in whatever camp a commentator might choose to plant his standard. It must also be said that Peter was fortunate in his critics. They were, and they were perceived to be, men who were misinformed, poorly educated, and hostile to scholarly progress, men, in short,

who could be dismissed as people who had nothing to contribute to the development of mainstream western theology. It must also be said that Peter was fortunate in his supporters, the scholastics who took on his mantle and who made Lombardian theology tantamount to mainstream Paris theology in the generation after his death. How they rose to the challenges and opportunities presented by his work is the subject of another investigation. The talents and insights and the new instruments which they brought to this task constitute their own endowment and their own contribution. The terrain which that they were able to cultivate thereby was the legacy of the Lombard.

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